DOCSLIB.ORG

An Industrial 5G Spectrum Policy for Europe

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
An Industrial 5G Spectrum Policy for Europe An Industrial 5G Spectrum Policy for Europe Vodafone Public Policy Paper November 2019 Written with expert input from Vodafone Foreword Executive Summary Chapter 1: Chapter 2: Chapter 3: Chapter 4: Market and Regulatory Analysis of Industrial Policy Analysis of Spectrum Policy Proposed Policy Approach Context Contents Vodafone Foreword 2 Executive Summary 3 Chapter 1: Market and Regulatory Context 5 Market Context 5 Regulatory policy context relevant to spectrum set-aside 7 Chapter 2: Analysis of Industrial Policy considerations relevant to spectrum set-aside 10 Licensed Spectrum Case Studies: e.GO (Germany) ABB (Italy) Shell (Netherlands) Vienna International Airport (Austria) Deutsche Fußball Liga (Germany) Boliden (Sweden) Finavia (Finland) The National BVLOS Experimental Centre (UK) Ericsson (Estonia) Steveco (Finland) Emilio Moro (Spain) Unlicensed Spectrum Case Study: Ocado (UK) Spectrum Leasing Case Studies: StrattoOpencell (UK) Workspace (UK) Chapter 3: Analysis of Spectrum Policy considerations relevant to spectrum set-aside 17 Analysis of the German 5G spectrum auction 17 Chapter 4: Proposed Policy Approach for Spectrum Authorities considering spectrum set-aside 19 References 23 Appendices 24 Annex A: Case studies developed by Arthur D. Little 25 Annex B: Economic study by Compass Lexecon 57 1 Vodafone Public Policy Paper An industrial 5G spectrum policy for Europe Vodafone Foreword Executive Summary Chapter 1: Chapter 2: Chapter 3: Chapter 4: Market and Regulatory Analysis of Industrial Policy Analysis of Spectrum Policy Proposed Policy Approach Context A Note from Joakim Reiter, Vinod Kumar and Johan Wibergh In the race for economic prosperity and sustainable Our report demonstrates that set-aside policies will lead to a development across the globe, digital is quickly becoming significant consumer welfare loss, reducing the incentive for a new engine of economic growth. Policymakers investment by distorting competition, inflating the costs of recognise that Gigabit connectivity propels the digital spectrum licences and limiting the ability of operators to build transformation of both industry and society. A successful the best 5G networks possible for everyone. rollout of 5G across Europe is a necessary condition for Regulators considering setting spectrum aside for local use this European digital transformation. should be required to justify policies that move away from Vodafone is playing its part in this transformation. We have established market-based solutions, particularly as national already invested around €5 billion in 5G spectrum across the operators are already delivering innovative 5G and 5G-ready EU, rolling out 5G services in 100 European cities across seven connectivity to a range of industrial partners across the Member States. We are actively developing the innovative continent. This innovation cuts across a variety of sectors, services and applications that will realise the benefits of 5G including manufacturing, transport, energy, agriculture, logistics for all. Given the profound impact of 5G on the industrial and and mining, as exemplified by the case studies in this report. business sectors in particular, we are working closely with our With a series of important European 5G spectrum auctions set business customers across a range of sectors as they embark to take place in the near future, this approach is vital if Europe on this digital journey. is to achieve its Gigabit Society vision. Our ability to deliver on our commitment is determined by the conditions for investment set by governments and regulators. Investors, such as Vodafone, need to operate at efficient scale to earn the return that enables their investment Joakim Reiter in the first place. Consistent and predictable regulation is Group External Affairs Director, critical, supported by policies that promote development and Vodafone Group Plc tackle fragmentation. Despite this, there is an ongoing regulatory discussion on the issue of whether internationally harmonised cellular spectrum should be ‘set aside’ for private localised use instead Vinod Kumar of auctioned to whoever is able to create the largest value to CEO, society, including nationwide public networks. Vodafone Business Set-aside results in less spectrum remaining available for deployment in national networks, giving marginal potential benefits to a narrow set of stakeholders at the expense of all other 5G users, society and the wider economy. Johan Wibergh Group Chief Technology Officer, Vodafone Group Plc 2 Vodafone Public Policy Paper An industrial 5G spectrum policy for Europe Vodafone Foreword Executive Summary Chapter 1: Chapter 2: Chapter 3: Chapter 4: Market and Regulatory Analysis of Industrial Policy Analysis of Spectrum Policy Proposed Policy Approach Context Executive Summary 5G is an important new technological innovation that has the This study sets out Vodafone’s views on whether such potential to transform the European economy by enabling the spectrum ‘set-aside’ is justified, through analysis of both digitisation of a wide range of sectors. the industrial policy and spectrum policy considerations. By ‘industrial policy’, we primarily mean issues relating to In practice, there will be a number of considerations relevant to innovation, economic growth, scale, security and coverage. businesses seeking to harness 5G connectivity. These include By ‘spectrum policy’, we mean considerations relevant to their understanding of the availability of the different solutions, ensuring efficient spectrum allocation while enhancing the capabilities and cost of each solution and how these will competition in the market. In developing and/or applying meet the needs of their core business. licensing policies, the relevant authorities (Spectrum Access to 5G connectivity and solutions will also to a large Authority) will need to take into account both industrial extent depend on the policy approach to 5G, in particular policy and spectrum policy considerations. how spectrum is licensed. Governments, national regulatory To evidence the industrial policy considerations, we have authorities, public network operators, operational technology asked the consultancy Arthur D. Little (ADL) to investigate and (OT) companies1 and business end-users all have a voice in this document a range of business case studies across the EU to important policy debate. When setting policy in this area, it is examine whether there is a business requirement that national important to take into account the wider impact that 5G will licensing or alternative technical approaches cannot address. have on the economy. So, in practice, the impact of ‘industrial’ ADL’s research concluded that: 5G policy (for example, developed with industrial automation in mind) will also be felt across many sectors, impacting the y the mobile industry is well placed to deliver the economy as a whole. innovation, scale, enhanced security and coverage required by many businesses; and Some stakeholders are arguing that internationally harmonised cellular spectrum needs to be set aside for y business requirements can be addressed under the localised licensing so that they are able to manage their own current national licensing regime, combined with 5G network. This approach means moving away from market- alternative technical approaches where required based allocation of spectrum. (e.g. use of unlicensed spectrum) and policy alternatives such as spectrum leasing. While some Spectrum Authorities2 appear sympathetic to this argument (in Germany a quarter of the 3.5 GHz 5G spectrum The qualitative evidence that has been gathered by ADL is set band was reserved for localised services), other Spectrum out in full at Annex A. Authorities have considered the wider implications of setting To evidence the spectrum policy considerations, we have aside 5G cellular spectrum for local licences. For example, the asked the consultancy Compass Lexecon to develop a policy UK Spectrum Authority promoted spectrum leasing and made framework to assess a set-aside policy and examine the other non-mobile bands available for sharing instead of setting economic impact of the recent German 5G spectrum policy aside spectrum. This was done in order to deliver very similar and auction. Compass Lexecon estimates that the costs to policy objectives to those identified by the German Spectrum German society of set-aside are significant, while any benefits Authority as the basis for setting aside spectrum. are likely to be marginal, especially taking into account the We can now learn from experience in Member States where benefits that can be delivered through both the technical and 5G spectrum has already been awarded. With auctions for the policy alternatives. Specifically, it finds that: remaining 3.4-3.8 GHz spectrum expected in 17 Member States y there is no evidence that a policy of spectrum set-aside over the next two to three years, there is much still at stake. is justifiable from a spectrum policy perspective. There is insufficient evidence of market failures that would justify a departure from a market-based award mechanism and there are less costly policy alternatives that a Spectrum Authority could adopt that would deliver most if not all of any identified benefits; 1 An operational technology company deals with the hardware and software that detects or causes a change through the direct monitoring and/or control of physical devices, processes and events in the business. 2 In practice, the government (e.g. Ministry) and national regulatory
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Evolution of U.S. Spectrum Values Over Time
    The Evolution of U.S. Spectrum Values Over Time Michelle Connolly, Department of Economics, Duke University Nelson Sa, Department of Economics, Brandeis University Azeem Zaman, Department of Statistics, Harvard University Chris Roark, Department of Economics, University of Chicago Akshaya Trivedi, Trinity College, Duke University, Class of 2018 Working Paper Series 2018 | 121 Evolution of spectrum values 1 The Evolution of U.S. Spectrum Values Over Time Michelle Connolly1, Nelson Sá2, Azeem Zaman3, Chris Roark4, and Akshaya Trivedi5 February 13, 2018 Abstract We consider 1997 to 2015 data from FCC spectrum auctions related to cellular services to attempt to identify intrinsic spectrum values. Relative to previous literature, we control for license specific auction rules, and introduce measures to separate out technological progress that effectively reduces spectrum scarcity from progress that increases demand. Results confirm that technological changes have led to increases in the relative value of higher frequencies. Surprisingly, 47 percent of these licenses have been won by “small” bidders, representing 27 percent of the real value of these licenses. The use of bidding credits further appears to consistently reduce auction competition. Keywords: Spectrum, Spectrum Scarcity, Auctions, FCC, Auction Rules, Mobile Applications, Spectral Efficiency, Broadband Speeds, Closed Auctions, Small Bidders, “The Google Effect” JEL Codes: L5, O3, K2 1 Corresponding author: Michelle Connolly, [email protected], 213 Social Sciences, Box 90097, Department of Economics, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708. 2 Department of Economics, Brandeis University. 3 Department of Statistics, Harvard University. 4 Department of Economics, University of Chicago. 5 Trinity College, Duke University Class of 2018. We gratefully acknowledge the support of NSF grant 1314468.
    [Show full text]
  • Putting Auction Theory to Work
    Putting Auction Theory to Work Paul Milgrom With a Foreword by Evan Kwerel © 2003 “In Paul Milgrom's hands, auction theory has become the great culmination of game theory and economics of information. Here elegant mathematics meets practical applications and yields deep insights into the general theory of markets. Milgrom's book will be the definitive reference in auction theory for decades to come.” —Roger Myerson, W.C.Norby Professor of Economics, University of Chicago “Market design is one of the most exciting developments in contemporary economics and game theory, and who can resist a master class from one of the giants of the field?” —Alvin Roth, George Gund Professor of Economics and Business, Harvard University “Paul Milgrom has had an enormous influence on the most important recent application of auction theory for the same reason you will want to read this book – clarity of thought and expression.” —Evan Kwerel, Federal Communications Commission, from the Foreword For Robert Wilson Foreword to Putting Auction Theory to Work Paul Milgrom has had an enormous influence on the most important recent application of auction theory for the same reason you will want to read this book – clarity of thought and expression. In August 1993, President Clinton signed legislation granting the Federal Communications Commission the authority to auction spectrum licenses and requiring it to begin the first auction within a year. With no prior auction experience and a tight deadline, the normal bureaucratic behavior would have been to adopt a “tried and true” auction design. But in 1993 there was no tried and true method appropriate for the circumstances – multiple licenses with potentially highly interdependent values.
    [Show full text]
  • Collusion and Equilibrium Selection in Auctions∗
    Collusion and equilibrium selection in auctions∗ By Anthony M. Kwasnica† and Katerina Sherstyuk‡ Abstract We study bidder collusion and test the power of payoff dominance as an equi- librium selection principle in experimental multi-object ascending auctions. In these institutions low-price collusive equilibria exist along with competitive payoff-inferior equilibria. Achieving payoff-superior collusive outcomes requires complex strategies that, depending on the environment, may involve signaling, market splitting, and bid rotation. We provide the first systematic evidence of successful bidder collusion in such complex environments without communication. The results demonstrate that in repeated settings bidders are often able to coordinate on payoff superior outcomes, with the choice of collusive strategies varying systematically with the environment. Key words: multi-object auctions; experiments; multiple equilibria; coordination; tacit collusion 1 Introduction Auctions for timber, automobiles, oil drilling rights, and spectrum bandwidth are just a few examples of markets where multiple heterogeneous lots are offered for sale simultane- ously. In multi-object ascending auctions, the applied issue of collusion and the theoretical issue of equilibrium selection are closely linked. In these auctions, bidders can profit by splitting the markets. By acting as local monopsonists for a disjoint subset of the objects, the bidders lower the price they must pay. As opposed to the sealed bid auction, the ascending auction format provides bidders with the
    [Show full text]
  • Auction Design and Tacit Collusion in FCC Spectrum Auctions
    Auction Design and Tacit Collusion in FCC Spectrum Auctions Patrick Bajari and Jungwon Yeo October 19, 2008 Abstract The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has used auctions to award spectrum since 1994. During this time period, the FCC has experimented with a variety of auctions rules including click box bidding and anonymous bidding. These rule changes make the actions of bidders less visible during the auction and also limit the set of bids which can be submitted by a bidder during a particular round. Economic theory suggests that tacit collusion may be more di¢ cult as a result. We examine this proposition using data from 4 auctions: the PCS C Block, Auction 35, the Advanced Wireless Service auction and the 700 Mhz auction. We examine the frequency of jump bids, retaliatory bids and straightforward bids across these auctions. While this simple descriptive exercise has a number of limitations, the data suggests that these rule changes did limit …rms ability to tacitly collude. Bajari: Univeristy of Minnesota and NBER, Yeo: Univeristy of Minnesota. Bajari would like to thank the National Science Foundation for generous research support. 1 1 Introduction Starting in 1994, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has used auctions to award spectrum. Prior to this time, the FCC used administrative hearings or lotteries to award licenses. Economic theory suggests that auctions should have a number of advantages over these earlier mechanisms. First, in many auction models, game theory predicts that the bidder which values the item most highly will win the auction. Therefore, the auction results in an e¢ cient allocation.
    [Show full text]
  • Comments on the Above-Noted Consultation
    Rogers Communications Inc. 333 Bloor Street East Toronto, Ontario M4W 1G9 Tel. (416) 935-7211 Fax (416) 935-7719 [email protected] Dawn Hunt Vice-President Regulatory July 15, 2009 Director, Spectrum Management Operations Radiocommunications and Broadcasting Regulatory Branch Industry Canada 300 Slater Street Ottawa ON K1A 0C8 Sent via email: [email protected] Re: Canada Gazette, Part I, April 11, 2009, Gazette Notice No. DGRB-001-09, Consultation on the Revisions to the Framework for Spectrum Auctions in Canada Rogers Communications Inc. (Rogers) appreciates the opportunity to provide reply comments on the above-noted consultation. The documents are being sent in Adobe Acrobat Professional Version 8.0. Operating System: Microsoft Windows XP. Yours very truly, Dawn Hunt Attach. WIRELESS DIGITAL CABLE INTERNET HOME PHONE VIDEO PUBLISHING BROADCASTING Reply Comments of Rogers Communications Inc. (Rogers) Canada Gazette Notice No. DGRB-001-09 Consultation on Revisions to the Framework for Spectrum Auctions in Canada Published in the Canada Gazette, Part I April 11, 2009 July 15, 2009 Rogers Communications Inc DGRB-001-09 July 15, 2009 Executive Summary Rogers Communications Inc. (“Rogers) provides the following reply to the submissions filed by other parties in response to Industry Canada’s Consultation on Revisions to the Framework for Spectrum Auctions in Canada (the “Consultation Paper”). In the Consultation Paper, the Department invited comments about spectrum management in Canada, including the use of auction types other than simultaneous multiple-round ascending (SMRA), the renewal of long-term licences, the research and development (R&D) condition of licence, and Tier areas for spectrum licensing.
    [Show full text]
  • TOWARD a DIGITAL FUTURES FOUNDATION a Concept Note
    April 2021 HOW TO CLOSE AMERICA'S DIGITAL EQUITY GAPS: TOWARD A DIGITAL FUTURES FOUNDATION A Concept Note Michael A. Calabrese & Lester M. Salamon A joint product of the Open Technology Institute at New America and the PtP Project PHILANTHROPICATION thru PRIVATIZATION PROJECT Calabrese and Salamon • How to Close America’s Digital Equity Gaps: Toward a Digital Futures Foundation • Page i Suggested Citation: Michael Calabrese and Lester M. Salamon, “How to Close America’s Digital Equity Gaps: Toward a Digital Futures Foundation,” A Concept Note. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies and Washington, DC: New America, April 2021). Opinions expressed herein are solely the responsibility of the authors and may not necessarily be shared by New America, Johns Hopkins University, East-West Management Institute, or any other institutions with which the authors are associated, or that have supported their work. © Lester M. Salamon and Michael A. Calabrese, 2021 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. Cover image adapted from rawpixel.com/Freepik Calabrese and Salamon • How to Close America’s Digital Equity Gaps: Toward a Digital Futures Foundation • Page ii TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1 PART I 4 What is spectrum…and who owns it? PART II What is driving massive escalations 6 in the value of spectrum globally? PART III U.S. precedents for using proceeds from 8 the privatization of government assets PART IV The case for a private Digital Futures Foundation 11 financed by spectrum auction proceeds CONCLUSION 22 References 23 About the authors 25 bit.ly/PtP-Spectrum-Concept-Note Calabrese and Salamon • How to Close America’s Digital Equity Gaps: Toward a Digital Futures Foundation • Page 1 INTRODUCTION America’s digital ecosystem suffers from a serious set of imbalances.
    [Show full text]
  • Spectrum Auctions from the Perspective of Matching
    Spectrum Auctions from the Perspective of Matching Paul Milgrom and Andrew Vogt May 5, 2021 1 Introduction In July 1994, the United States Federal Communications Commission (FCC) conducted the first economist-designed auction for radio spectrum licenses. In the years since, governments worldwide have come to rely on auction mecha- nisms to allocate { and reallocate { rights to use electromagnetic frequencies. Over the same period, novel uses for spectrum have dramatically increased both the demand for licenses and auction prices, drawing continued attention to the nuances of spectrum markets and driving the development of spectrum auction design. In August 2017, the FCC completed the Broadcast Incentive Auction, a two-sided repurposing of an endogenously-determined quantity of spectrum that ranks among the most complex feats of economic engineering ever under- taken. The next generations of mobile telecommunications are poised to extend this growth, and to demand further innovation in the markets and algorithms that are used to assign spectrum licenses. What does all of this have to do with matching theory? Spectrum auctions differ from canonical matching problems in meaningful ways. Market designers often emphasize that a key element of matching markets is the presence of preferences on both sides of the market. In a marriage, for example, it is not enough that you choose your spouse; your spouse must also choose you. This two-sided choice structure applies also to matches between students and schools and between firms and workers, but not to matches between telecommunications companies and radio spectrum licenses. It is a different matching element that is often critically important in ra- dio spectrum auctions.
    [Show full text]
  • Award of Available Spectrum: 2500-2690 Mhz, 2010-2025 Mhz and 2290-2300 Mhz
    Award of available spectrum: 2500-2690 MHz, 2010-2025 MHz and 2290-2300 MHz Summary We briefly summarise the main points in our response to this consultation: Vodafone supports Ofcom’s decision to authorise use of the spectrum bands 2500- 2690 MHz, 2010-2025 MHz and 2290-2300 MHz. However, we believe that before this occurs Ofcom should resolve the uncertainty about 2G liberalisation and see no reason why this should frustrate Ofcom’s timetable. Failure to address this issue risks distorting the outcome of the auction. Vodafone has been a long-standing supporter of Ofcom’s generic licence conditions (technology neutrality, tradability, conditions of tenure and absence of roll-out conditions). Vodafone urges Ofcom to consider putting the licence terms for existing mobile licences (at 900 MHz, 1800 MHz and 2.1 GHz) on an equal footing with the successful bidders in the expansion band auction. Vodafone appreciates Ofcom’s desire to design an efficient (and as simple as possible) auction. However, we believe that the proposed auction contains some restrictions on the flexibility of bidding behaviour and pricing which seem to be unnecessary: • The auction design pre-supposes that that the relative preference of bidders between different frequencies within the 2.6GHz band is small relative to the overall price. However, if some bidders have very different valuations for alternative parts of the spectrum (and we believe that this may be the case because interference conditions will differ across the band and may be severe in particular parts of the band) then the auction scheme proposed may mean that spectrum is not allocated to the bidders that value it the most.
    [Show full text]
  • CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #8: Combinatorial and Wireless Spectrum Auctions∗
    CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #8: Combinatorial and Wireless Spectrum Auctions∗ Tim Roughgardeny October 16, 2013 1 Selling Items Separately Recall that a combinatorial auction has n bidders and m non-identical items, with bidder i having a private valuation vi(S) for every bundle S ⊆ M of items. Asking each bidder to report 2m bids is absurd unless m is very small. Thus, for the first time in the course, we have no choice but to design and analyze indirect mechanisms, and especially iterative mechanisms that query bidders for relevant valuation information on a \need-to-know" basis. This entails relaxing both the DSIC guarantee and full welfare maximization | we will miss these properties, but have no alternative. What other mechanisms can we try? Given that we need to sell multiple items, and don't want to elicit valuations for every bundle, the simplest mechanisms to try are those that sell the items separately, using some type of single-item auction for each. We could certainly implement such an auction if desired | all we need is one bid per bidder per item, which is arguably the minimum imaginable. We'll pin down the precise auction format shortly, but first we should ask a more basic question: could selling items separately conceivably work, even in principle? There is lots of beautiful and clarifying theory on this question, some of which we'll cover later. For now we summarize the main take-aways from this theory. There is a fundamental dichotomy between combinatorial auctions in which items are substitutes, and those in which items are complements | with the former being far easier, in theory and in practice, than the latter.
    [Show full text]
  • Spectrum Policy in Emerging Markets
    Moving the debate forward The Policy Paper Series • Number 15 Spectrum policy in emerging markets 1 This paper can be seen online at www.vodafone.com/publicpolicyseries Published by Vodafone Group Plc, August 2014 Copyright ©2014 Vodafone Group Plc 2 The Policy Paper Series Number 15 Welcome From Vittorio Colao Chief Executive, Vodafone Group Plc Welcome to the latest publication in Vodafone’s long-running series of Policy Papers. Our aim is to provide a platform for leading experts to express their views on issues that are important to us at Vodafone. One such issue is the significant positive impact of mobile communications around the world in terms of economic development and social benefit. Spectrum policy is central to determining the magnitude of these effects and the aim of this report is to further a debate that is critical to realising the potential of mobile in emerging markets. The opinions expressed are not ours, but those of independent experts whose views we respect even if we do not always agree with them. I believe these studies will be of interest to anyone concerned with the development of good public policy and I hope you enjoy reading them. Contents Introduction 1 Executive summary 3 Contributors’ biographies Expert Views 5 New issues in spectrum policy 23 A tale of two countries: spectrum policy outcomes Diane Coyle and Howard Williams in China and India compared Dan Lloyd with research by Meiqin Fang 13 Consequences of new spectrum assignment of K-Island Consulting approaches for growth and jobs Phillipa Marks, Yi
    [Show full text]
  • Pantelis Koutroumpis and Martin Cave Auction Design and Auction Outcomes
    Pantelis Koutroumpis and Martin Cave Auction design and auction outcomes Article (Published version) (Refereed) Original citation: Koutroumpis, Pantelis and Cave, Martin (2018) Auction design and auction outcomes. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 53 (3). pp. 275-297. ISSN 0922-680X DOI: 10.1007/s11149-018-9358-x © 2018 The Author(s) CC BY 4.0 This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/88371/ Available in LSE Research Online: June 2018 LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website. J Regul Econ (2018) 53:275–297 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-018-9358-x ORIGINAL ARTICLE Auction design and auction outcomes Pantelis Koutroumpis1 · Martin Cave2 Published online: 30 May 2018 © The Author(s) 2018 Abstract We study the impact of spectrum auction design on the prices paid by telecommunications operators for two decades across 85 countries. Our empirical strategy combines information about competition in the local market, the level of adoption and a wide range of socio-economic indicators and process specific vari- ables. Using a micro dataset of almost every mobile spectrum auction performed so far—both regional and national—we show that auction design affects final prices paid.
    [Show full text]
  • On Framework and Hybrid Auction Approach to the Spectrum
    On Framework and Hybrid Auction Approach to the Spectrum Licensing Procedure Devansh Dikshit Y. Narahari Electronic Commerce Laboratory, Dept. of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute Science, Bangalore, India. Email: {devansh},{hari}@csa.iisc.ernet.in November 13, 2018 Abstract few years, many private parties have entered in the field of telecommunications. And as expected they require a slice Inspired by the recent developments in the field of Spec- of spectrum for that purpose. This also provides a wonder- trum Auctions, we have tried to provide a comprehensive ful opportunityfor the governmentas there is useable spec- framework for the complete procedure of Spectrum trum which is left unused with the government, with only Licensing. We have identified the various issues the a fraction of it being used for military and civil purposes Governments need to decide upon while designing the by the governments. The amount of this spectrum is usu- licensing procedure and what are the various options ally scarce hence the greater demand-supply gap. Along available in each issue. We also provide an in depth study with generating revenues, privatization of spectrum will of how each of this options impact the overall procedure also lead to a faster pace of developmentby the private par- along with theoretical and practical results from the past. ties which may not be always possible to do by the govern- Lastly we argue as to how we can combine the positives ment. This has lead to the sale/licensing of the spectrums two most widely used Spectrum Auctions mechanisms by various countries across the globe, using methods like into the Hybrid Multiple Round Auction mechanism being lotteries, auctions, tenders etc.
    [Show full text]