Thumos and Doxa As Intermediates in The
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Thumos and doxa as intermediates in the Republic Autor(es): Renaut, Olivier Publicado por: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra URL persistente: URI:http://hdl.handle.net/10316.2/47020 DOI: DOI:https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_18_6 Accessed : 30-Sep-2021 10:19:48 A navegação consulta e descarregamento dos títulos inseridos nas Bibliotecas Digitais UC Digitalis, UC Pombalina e UC Impactum, pressupõem a aceitação plena e sem reservas dos Termos e Condições de Uso destas Bibliotecas Digitais, disponíveis em https://digitalis.uc.pt/pt-pt/termos. Conforme exposto nos referidos Termos e Condições de Uso, o descarregamento de títulos de acesso restrito requer uma licença válida de autorização devendo o utilizador aceder ao(s) documento(s) a partir de um endereço de IP da instituição detentora da supramencionada licença. Ao utilizador é apenas permitido o descarregamento para uso pessoal, pelo que o emprego do(s) título(s) descarregado(s) para outro fim, designadamente comercial, carece de autorização do respetivo autor ou editor da obra. Na medida em que todas as obras da UC Digitalis se encontram protegidas pelo Código do Direito de Autor e Direitos Conexos e demais legislação aplicável, toda a cópia, parcial ou total, deste documento, nos casos em que é legalmente admitida, deverá conter ou fazer-se acompanhar por este aviso. impactum.uc.pt digitalis.uc.pt L A N R U O J Y DEZ 2018 O T T ISSN 2079-7567 A eISSN 2183-4105 E L I P I8 C Established 1989 O http://platosociety.org/ S Papers Christopher Buckels, O Aikaterini Lefka, T Dossier A Nicholas Baima, Lloyd P. Gerson, L Sophia Stone, Olivier Renaut, P Emily Katz, Nicholas D. Smith, Andy German, L Book Reviews A Anthony Preus, André Lanoue, N O I T A N R E T N I PLATO Société Platonicienne JOURNAInternatioLnale Associazione Internazionale dei Platonisti Sociedad Internacional de Platonistas Internationale Platon-Gesellschaft Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra Coimbra Universiy Press OLIVIER RENAUT | 71 Thumos and doxa as intermediates in the Republic Olivier Renaut Université Paris Nanterre [email protected] ABSTRACT Broadly speaking, something can be called intermediate for Plato insofar as it occupies a place between two objects, poles, places, time, or principles. But this broad meaning of the intermediate has been eclipsed by the Aristo- telian critique of the intermediate objects of the dianoia, so that it has become more difficult to think of the intermediates as functions of the soul. The aim of this paper is to show how, in the Republic, thumos is analogously treated as an intermediate with other kinds of intermediate ob- jects, and tentatively to relate this psychological intermediate in a broader theory with doxa, as its epistemological ground in the course of action. Keywords: intermediate, thumos, doxa, opinion, spirit, metaxu https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_18_6 72 | Thumos and doxa as intermediates in the Republic INTRODUCTION soul (with reason and desire) to a tripartition, thumos introduces a new way of thinking of When it comes to “intermediates” in Plato, the relation between reason and desire: thumos one is tempted to think solely of mathematical is immediately thought to be a metaxu. As for intermediates, the objects of dianoia in book 6 doxa, which we take to mean opinion, but also of the Republic. Whether or not it comes from belief, this is certainly an ubiquitous concept Aristotle’s critique on such intermediates, one in Plato’s dialogues which is not tied with any must admit that he himself forgets to describe systematic presentation; nevertheless, as it will as intermediates some of the most important be shown, doxa is presented in the Republic as a aspects of Plato’s psychology and ethical the metaxu too, between knowledge and ignorance, ory1. But the word “metaxu” has undoubtedly having its object somewhere between what is a broader meaning in Plato’s dialogues. As and what is not. Joseph Souilhé already noted in his thesis in The aim of this paper is certainly not to look 19192, Plato can be called a “philosopher of the for a system of intermediates. It will thus not intermediates” insofar as the aim of the whole be argued that thumos is the “seat” of doxa. As of his philosophy is to bridge the gaps between Sylvain Delcominette already showed convinc what is taken to be two poles or two kinds of ingly, one should not conflate what appears to reality. Souilhé’s first aim was to classify the be a theory of the “parts” or “functions” of the wide range of intermediates into categories: soul, and what we could call a theory of “facul “psychological” (thumos, erōs, doxa, dianoia), ties” or “capacities”4. Indeed, insofar as doxa is “ethical” (sophrōsynē, dikaoisunē, bios meson), concerned, it is quite clear from the Republic “political”, “cosmological”, and “metaphysical”; that doxa can be at least ascribed to different a second consideration was to question whether “structures” or characters or, broadly speaking, there was a more systematic link between those to the “agent”; it seems conversely impossible to intermediates. ascribe the faculty of doxa to a specific “part” This paper addresses the following ques of the soul, and even less so to ascribe different tion, which is crucial for the meaning we are to “kinds” of doxa to different parts5. Neverthe give to Plato’s moral psychology in the Republic: less, the issue persists: if we are to accept the is there a link between thumos as intermediate idea that there is an ethical function of thumos and its epistemological counterpart, doxa? Let in the tripartite soul, which is manifest for the us recall briefly what thumos and doxa stand auxiliaries, for example in the form of what has for. In book 4 of the Republic (436b‑441c), So been called an “imperfect virtue”6, one has to crates argues that the soul is composed of three look for the epistemological grounds of such so‑called “parts” or rather “functions”: the rea virtues or dispositions. soning part (to logistikon), the desiring part (to The question I want to raise is slightly dif epithumetikon), and an intermediary part (to ferent from the ones which try to ascribe sys thumoeides or thumos), which is often trans tematically doxa (or whatever function) as an lated as “spirit”3. This intermediary function intermediate faculty to thumos as an intermedi is presented as having a key role — in the best ate part; my question would rather be: is there case — to mediate reason’s commands, against a reason why we would ascribe doxa to thumos the power of the desiring part. For whatever because these two are both intermediates? In reason Plato shifts from a bipartition of the what follows, I will try to show that there is OLIVIER RENAUT | 73 a homogenous theory of the functionings of not seem to be a “wise man” though), the intermediates, that leads us to ascribe in a children, animals and Ulysses, are not privileged way doxa to thumos in certain ethi paragons of virtue, but they may nev cal situations. ertheless embody an honest behavior without being completely virtuous. 3) Meaning 3: According to Socrates, 1. THUMOS AS INTERMEDIATE thumos helps reason to fight desires whenever it is possible and provided The argument for positing thumos as in that it is well educated; thumos is termediate is found in book 4 of the Republic an auxiliary (epikouros) for reason (439e‑441c), it is not the place here to recall the (441a2‑3). A third meaning of “in precise argument that leads to the discovery of termediate” emerges here, insofar as the tripartite soul7, but it is interesting to note thumos is not only an interval and that the “intermediate” dimension of thumos a median position, but also tran can be understood in a polysemic way. scribes reason’s recommendation in the whole agent. In other words, 1) Meaning 1: Thumos is found out by thumos “mediates” reason’s rule in a contrasting its function first with positive way8. desire (439e6‑440e6), then with rea son (441a5‑c2); it is neither desire nor The polysemy of “intermediate” in our reason even if some of its features passage may explain how difficult it is to as seem identical. Thumos is then first cribe a clear‑cut theory of the cognitive power described as a kind of “interval” cov of thumos. Examples of conflicting situations ering a variety of ambivalent actions (thirst, and then the example of Leontius) and passions: being angry or ashamed, show that a complex epistemic process is go resisting desires or fighting for some ing on in the agent, which relies on different values, etc., all of them being best understandings, depending on the function described as in‑between reason and of the soul that leads the course of the ac desire. tion9. The action is morally distinct whether 2) Meaning 2: Thumos is nevertheless a we rely on a) what is pleasant and painful, “median position” between the two b) or on what is worthy or valued by others, extremes regarding virtue; if thumos c) or on what is reasonable and/or rational. is first thought as an interval, it rep There is a supplementary difference, which resents at the end of the argument an has been notoriously described through the autonomous function (eidos, genē) of distinction between good‑independent and the soul in‑between the two other good dependent principles10, whether we act poles, the range of actions and pas out of mere compulsion, or out of knowledge, sions being unified by a single class or out of a doxa which is potentially right term (439e4; 440e8; 441c6).