february 2013 . Vol 6 . Issue 2

Contents Islamist Militant Groups in

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 Islamist Militant Groups in Post-Qadhafi Libya Post-Qadhafi Libya By Alison Pargeter By Alison Pargeter

Reports 5 Yemen’s Use of Militias to Maintain Stability in Abyan Province By Casey L. Coombs 7 Deciphering the Jihadist Presence in Syria: An Analysis of Martyrdom Notices By Aaron Y. Zelin 11 British Fighters Joining the War in Syria By Raffaello Pantucci 15 Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan’s New Cease-Fire Offer By Imtiaz Ali 18 The Significance of Maulvi Nazir’s Death in Pakistan By Zia Ur Rehman

20 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts

Libyans celebrate the second anniversary of the Libyan uprising at Martyrs Square on February 17, 2013, in Tripoli. - AFP/Getty Images n july 2012, Libya held its first and currents have emerged in the post- national elections since the fall of Qadhafi era, including those at the Mu`ammar Qadhafi. The Libyan extreme end of the spectrum that have people, however, appeared to taken advantage of central authority Ibuck the trend of the Arab Spring by weakness by asserting power in their not electing an Islamist1 parliament. own local areas. This is particularly the Although Islamists are present in case in the east of the country, which the newly-elected General National has traditionally been associated with About the CTC Sentinel Congress, they are just one force among Islamist activism. The Combating Terrorism Center is an many competing in the political arena.2 independent educational and research While Islamists have not succeeded in Given the murky and chaotic nature of institution based in the Department of Social dominating Libya’s nascent political Libya’s transition, which has prompted Sciences at the United States Military Academy, scene, they have come to represent an the mushrooming of local power West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses ever growing and influential force on brokers, it is difficult to distinguish the Center’s global network of scholars and the ground. A number of Islamist groups between many of the Islamist militant practitioners to understand and confront groups and brigades. While some contemporary threats posed by terrorism and groups, such as the Rafallah al-Sahati other forms of political violence. 1 The term “Islamist” refers to those who engage in politi- Brigade or the February 17 Brigade, are cal activism articulated through an Islamic discourse. This operating, nominally at least, within does not necessarily mean those who espouse violence. the official structures of the state, The views expressed in this report are those of 2 The Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice and Construction 3 the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, others, such as Ansar al-Shari`a, are Party, for example, secured a significant presence in the the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. congress and is now part of the recently appointed gov- ernment. 3 Ansar al-Shari`a (Partisans of Shari`a) has emerged as

1 february 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 2 functioning independently. Despite the time of the revolution.5 This There is a strong feeling in the east that the fact that the state attempted to includes figures such as the former the central authorities, as well as the dissolve these independent militant director of Benghazi security, Colonel Islamist-dominated local authorities, brigades following the public protests Faraj Mohammed al-Drissi, who was are engaged in a cover-up and are that erupted in response to the attack killed on November 21, 2012.6 Given pandering to militant elements.12 Such on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi the nature of the targets, it is widely suggestions may be exaggerated. The in September 2012, these groups assumed that the attacks are the work of central authorities remain weak and continue to operate and impose their Islamist militant forces seeking revenge unable to properly project authority. authority in their communities. This for the suppression they experienced at Despite the repeated efforts to bolster poses particular challenges for Libya the hands of the former regime. as it moves through the transition “Given the power vacuum process. Despite the ongoing violence, the official bodies of the state have been slow to react that accompanied the fall This article examines the nature of or to bring the guilty parties to justice. of the former regime, the some of the Islamist militant groups They did, however, arrest Majdi Zwai active in the east of Libya, including (also known as Majdi Dhub), a member central authorities have Ansar al-Shari`a, as well as their of the Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade, on had little choice but to relationship with the state. It argues charges of having assassinated al- that while these militant groups are Drissi.7 In December 2012, the Shabab rely on Islamist brigades largely working within the confines of Libya channel reported that Zwai had and units to help keep the the state, this cooperation could quickly confessed not only to al-Drissi’s killing, turn to confrontation if the formation of but to the killings of other officials.8 He peace in certain regions, the constitution does not develop the also reportedly implicated a number particularly in the east way that they expect. of key Islamist militants operating in the region in the assassinations.9 On where the national army “By Night We Are Benghazistan” December 16, 2012, however, a group of has a limited presence.” The growing influence of Islamist armed gunmen, believed to be from the militant elements has prompted Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade, attacked the particular concern among local police station that held Majdi Zwai.10 residents in the east. On December Zwai was freed after a three hour gun the national army, the government and 28, 2012, Benghazi residents staged battle that left four policemen dead.11 the General National Congress remain another demonstration calling for the largely at the mercy of the militias. dissolution of the Islamist militias in This fact was highlighted following the the city, holding banners that declared, attack on the Ain Amenas gas plant in “By day we are Benghazi, by night we 5 In the week of January 10-17, 2013, for example, two Algeria in January 2013, when in its are Benghazistan.”4 policemen were killed in two separate bomb attacks in rush to secure its borders and energy Benghazi and there was also an attempted assassination facilities, the government had to enlist Authorities suspect that Islamist against the Italian consul-general in the city, Guido de the help of the secular-oriented Zintan militant groups are behind the Sanctis. See “Curfew Mulled for Benghazi,” Libya Herald, militia in the west of the country.13 deadly string of night attacks and January 17, 2013. assassinations that have rocked the 6 Kareem Fahim, “Security Chief in Benghazi Assassi- Yet although the ruling authorities may east in recent months. The near weekly nated, Libyan Says,” New York Times, November 21, 2012. be unable to stem the violence in the east, bombings and assassinations have been 7 The Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade is one of the largest there is also a reticence on their part aimed almost exclusively at members Islamist brigades in the east and is believed to number to challenge Islamist elements in any of the security forces, many of whom around 1,000 members. It is named after a young engi- substantive or sustained way. Unlike in defected from Qadhafi’s regime at neer, Rafallah al-Sahati, who was killed by the regime neighboring countries, such as Tunisia on March 19, 2011, during what is known as the battle of and Egypt, where the Arab Spring Quwarsha in the west of Benghazi. The brigade is based revolutions were largely peaceful, a significant force in eastern Libya since the toppling of in the Hawari neighborhood of Benghazi and is led by Islamist militant elements in Libya have the former regime. It is more of a group or current than a prominent Islamist Ismail al-Salabi. The brigade comes a legitimacy born out of the position that specific militia or brigade, and it has “branches” in both under the authority of the Libyan Defense Ministry. Its they played in the struggle. Islamist Benghazi and Derna. Like its counterparts in Tunisia headquarters was stormed by protestors after the attack militants comprising former members and Yemen, its adherents follow an extremist ideology. on the U.S. Consulate in September 2012. See Ibrahim of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Although the Libyan group insists it is not linked to al- Majbari and Dominique Soguel, “Islamists Flee as Angry (LIFG) and other radical movements, Qa`ida, its leader in Benghazi, Mohammed Ali al-Za- Libyans Storm Benghazi Compound,” Agence France- as well as jihadists who spent time in hawi, has expressed his approval of al-Qa`ida’s strategy Presse, September 22, 2012; “Rafallah Sahati, the Martyr Iraq and Afghanistan, played key roles as well as statements issued by Ayman al-Zawahiri. See Swore that Qadhafi’s Army Would Never Enter Beng- “Meeting Mohammad Ali al-Zahawi of Libyan Ansar al- hazi,” New Quryna, March 19, 2012. Sharia,” BBC, September 18, 2012. 8 “An Armed Attack on a Police Station to Free ‘Al- 12 On December 28, 2012, for example, protesters ac- 4 Libya Focus, January 2013. This demonstration was a Dhub,’” Libya al-Jadidah, December 17, 2012. cused the authorities and the local council of being en- follow-up to the “Save Benghazi Friday” protests held 9 Ibid. gaged in a cover-up. See Libya Focus, January 2013. after the killing of the U.S. ambassador to Libya in Sep- 10 Ibid. 13 “Libya Reinforces Border, Oilfields After Algeria At- tember 2012. 11 Ibid. tack,” Reuters, January 23, 2013. 2 february 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 2 in the effort to bring down the Qadhafi to rebuild the police and military, the Part of the reason for this shift away regime. It was these elements, rather people prefer to be protected by their from jihad and toward public works is than the country’s new political elite, own people.”17 related to the upcoming battle for the who made sacrifices to effect change. As constitution. While there is a broad a result, these militant elements (like Furthermore, while some of these consensus in Libya that Shari`a will all Libya’s revolutionaries) are imbued groups have indulged in the destruction be the primary source of legislation, with an aura that gives them a special of a number of Sufi shrines as well as there are strong differences of opinion status and autonomy. cemeteries in the name of eliminating over the extent to which Islamic law any sign of polytheism, they have so far should be implemented. There are Moreover, these militant elements have largely refrained from takfir, the practice proved crucial in providing security of excommunicating fellow Muslims. in the post-Qadhafi era. Given the Rather, these groups have responded to “If developments do not power vacuum that accompanied the the changing political environment by proceed the way that the fall of the former regime, the central trying to demonstrate their usefulness authorities have had little choice to society and to spread their rigid Islamist militant groups but to rely on Islamist brigades and ideas through charitable works.18 expect, and if Shari`a is not units to help keep the peace in certain There are elements still engaged in regions, particularly in the east jihad, and these groups clearly reject implemented in full, then where the national army has a limited democracy as an ungodly and Western these elements may take presence. This includes not only those concept, yet for the most part they are brigades that come under the rubric demonstrating a willingness to work violent action to alter the of the official security structure, with the state rather than against it, at course of events.” but also those that are operating least at this time. independently. It was notable, for example, that following the attempted This is particularly the case with Ansar dissolution of all Islamist militant al-Shari`a,19 which in line with the some Libyans, including supporters brigades in September 2012, staff at the recent teachings of Abu Mundhir al- of the country’s more liberal political Jala’a Hospital in Benghazi demanded Shanqiti, the Mauritanian preacher currents, who want Shari`a to be one that Ansar al-Shari`a be permitted to who serves as a spiritual reference for source of legislation, but who are continue operating as their security many extremists, has been focusing its against it being implemented in its force.14 One doctor at the hospital told efforts on charitable works. Much in fullest sense.22 The Islamist militant journalists that security provided by the style of the Muslim Brotherhood, groups, on the other hand, are pushing Ansar al-Shari`a was better than what Ansar al-Shari`a members now provide for Shari`a to be instituted in the was currently available.15 social services such as welfare support, constitution in its entirety. At a meeting cleaning and repairing roads, and in October 2012, for example, hundreds of Charitable Works handing out alms during Ramadan.20 supporters of Ansar al-Shari`a and other In addition to the role they played in Ansar al-Shari`a has come out into the radical currents came together at the the revolution, Islamist militant groups open and is taking advantage of the lack Ansar Mosque in Benghazi to establish have become part of the fabric of Libyan of security to assert its authority in the Islamic Assembly for Shari`a, an society in other ways as well. the Hay Shabia (popular neighborhoods) organization aimed at “activating the rule in the country’s eastern cities. It was of Allah so it becomes a visible presence Unlike groups such as al-Qa`ida, many even reported in January 2013 that in the country.”23 of these radicals are not necessarily Ansar al-Shari`a had established its regarded as completely alien or own “security gate” at Quwarsha at As Libyan Islamist scholar Salim al- antithetical to the local culture. As the western entrance to Benghazi, Sheikhi described, the Islamist militant the Washington Post recently observed, which, according to the group’s leader, groups are not waging war against the “Ansar al-Shari`a is edging back Mohammed Ali al-Zahawi, was erected state but instead are waiting to see how into society, and many of Benghazi’s not only to assist with security, but also the constitution develops.24 For al- residents now say they want it here.”16 to carry out health checks on citizens Sheikhi, the call by these militants for the Indeed, Libyan government spokesman to ensure that disease was not being full implementation of Shari`a is “a just Essam al-Zubeir explained, “The brought into the city.21 demand because they are the ones who people attacked Ansar al-Sharia a few led a large part of the fighting. We don’t months ago because they were angry. need to treat them with less loyalty.”25 But now they’re asking them to come 17 Ibid. back because there is no police and no 18 For example, providing welfare support and main- 22 This assessment is based on the author’s personal ob- real military...Until the country is able taining public infrastructure. servations. 19 For a profile of Ansar al-Shari`a, see footnote 3. 23 “Ansar al-Shari`a in Libya: Putting Weapons Aside 14 “Benghazi Hospital Staff Want Ansar al-Sharia Back,” 20 “Ansar Shari`a: The Forms of al-Qa`ida’s Response in Favor of Political Involvement,” Libya al-Mostakbal, Libya Herald, October 4, 2012. to Democratic Transformation in the Arab World,” al- October 14, 2012. 15 Ibid. Hayat, January 3, 2013. 24 “Religious Affairs in Libya,” al-Jazira, December 18, 16 “Islamist Militia Edging Back into Benghazi,” Wash- 21 “Ansar al-Shari`a is Setting Up a Laboratory at the 2012. ington Post, February 17, 2013. Quwarsha Gate,” Press Solidarity, January 20, 2013. 25 Ibid.

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Yet if developments do not proceed the November 2012, al-Ghariani urged Conclusion way that the Islamist militant groups Libya’s new rulers to bring Islamist Libya’s Islamist militant groups are expect, and if Shari`a is not implemented militants into the fold by acceding to not operating in a vacuum. They have in full, then these elements may take their demands. The mufti declared that become an integral part of the new Libya violent action to alter the course of Libya did not possess “any groups that and have a key stake in the country’s events. They may decide to declare we should be scared of,” adding that “if future. Although Libya did not elect jihad against the state to replace what we can give them what they want, such an Islamist-dominated government, they deem to be a Westernized political as the application of Shari`a law, but if these militant forces comprise a crucial system with an Islamic one. Given the we can do it by degrees, [then] we can component of the complex array of forces power that these groups have been able bring them to our side…We should bring and powerbrokers that are dominating to amass since the toppling of the former them to our side with good words and on the ground in post-Qadhafi Libya. regime, such an outcome could prove promises that we will do what they want, Such elements have always been part disastrous for the new Libya and its but in stages.”29 Similarly, al-Ghariani and parcel of Libya, however repressed transition to a functioning democratic issued a fatwa against participating in they may have been, and it is little state. the Benghazi protests in December 2012 surprise that they are exercising their that called for the dissolution of the strength now that the Qadhafi regime is Sympathy Within the State country’s Islamist militant groups.30 gone. The development of Libya’s legal framework could become even more In fact, January 2013 saw a major While these elements appear to be complicated given that the official union of parts of the establishment largely working with rather than against religious establishment, as well and militant groups in the east. On the state, their power and legitimacy is as certain elements within the January 4-5, the local Benghazi council, such that if they feel their demands are state, shares with the militants the the Libyan Association for Mosque not being met—especially in regard to same uncompromising view of the Speakers and Preachers, and the the formation of the new constitution— constitution. The influential Dar Warriors’ Affairs Committee organized they will become a serious force for al-Ifta (Fatwa House), the highest a special security conference for the instability in the longer term. religious authority in Libya, issued a east.31 Local security bodies such as the statement at the end of November 2012 Benghazi Security Directorate and the Alison Pargeter is a Middle East and North stipulating that not only should Shari`a Benghazi intelligence services attended Africa analyst who specializes in political be the source of legislation, but that any the meeting, as well as the various Islamist movements. Her books include: ruling that goes against Shari`a should brigades that come under the interior Libya: The Rise and Fall of Qadhafi be considered “null and void.”26 The and defense ministries, including (2012), The Muslim Brotherhood: The statement also declared that the article those with an Islamist orientation. Burden of Tradition (2010), and The in the constitution dealing with Shari`a A number of militant brigades also New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam is not something that can be put to the attended, including Ansar al-Shari`a in Europe (2008). She is also a Senior people in a referendum because the ruling and the Abu Slim Martyrs Brigade. The Research Associate at Menas Associates, a of Allah stands above that of the people.27 participants issued a statement at the global consultancy firm. Likewise, in December, Ghaith al-Fakhry, end of the conference, which declared the deputy to Libya’s grand mufti, Shaykh that the implementation of Shari`a was Sadeq al-Ghariani, declared, “The Libyan not up for debate and that the grand state should stand on two pillars: the mufti was above criticism.32 Even more constitution that establishes Allah’s controversially and in an indication of rule and the just ruler who will apply the extent to which the establishment in the constitution.”28 the east is sympathetic to the militant brigades, the statement also called Therefore, the views of the official for an official investigation into those religious establishment on the who had organized the “Save Benghazi constitution are close to those of the Friday” protests against the Islamist Islamist militant groups. The religious militant brigades.33 establishment has displayed a strong degree of sympathy for these militant elements, even lobbying the government on their behalf. At the government’s 29 “Government Signals New Era of Transparency as first formal cabinet meeting held in First Formal Cabinet Meeting Opened to the Press,” Libya Herald, November 21, 2012. 26 “Libya Dar al-Ifta Council Issues Statement at the End 30 “Ghariani Says Libya Faces ‘Many Challenges,’” Lib- of its Second Meeting,” Libya al-Mostakbal, November ya Herald, December 30, 2012. 25, 2012. 31 “The Final Statement of the Revolutionary Brigades 27 Ibid. and Security Bodies Conference in Benghazi,” al-Manara, 28 “Libya’s Mufti: The New Libyan Constitution Must January 6, 2013. Apply Shari`a Rulings,” al-Watan al-Libyeea, December 32 Ibid. 22, 2012. 33 Ibid.

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Yemen’s Use of Militias to southern province. If they are pulled into The diverse composition of Abyan’s local conflicts or are co-opted by political Popular Committees reflects political Maintain Stability in Abyan rivals, however, Abyan’s Popular and tribal relations that have evolved Province Committees could present a new set of since the 1994 civil war in which challenges for the embattled president. longtime strongman Ali Abdullah By Casey L. Coombs Salih’s Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) This article examines the double-edged in Sana`a defeated the Aden-based in 2011, militants from al-Qa`ida in the role of Abyan’s Popular Committees People’s Democratic Republic of Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Ansar in Hadi’s efforts to prepare Yemen’s Yemen (PDRY) to form the Republic al-Shari`a secured control of Abyan divided populace for democratic of Yemen.7 According to a Popular Province in southern Yemen.1 In 2012, elections in 2014, while fighting al- Committee commander in Lawdar, Yemen’s military reclaimed much of Qa`ida insurgents around the country. “the committees do not belong to any Abyan after launching Operation Golden After profiling Abyan’s disparate particular party. They are composed of Swords in May and June, clearing AQAP network of Popular Committees and all political factions, including Hiraak, and Ansar al-Shari`a fighters out of the outlining the events that led to their Islahis, Salafis and Sunnis.”8 A local territory’s main population centers.2 proliferation, this article highlights journalist from Abyan described the Since then, a patchwork of state-backed the economic insecurity that fosters militias in similar terms: “Some of the local militias, or Popular Committees, shifting loyalties in Abyan. That Popular Committees are affiliated with in Abyan has emerged as the frontline reality, combined with the potential the Islah Party, others are pure GPC or security force against the insurgent al- for Popular Committees to spark new Socialist (YSP) and others are members Qa`ida affiliates that governed the area conflicts in Abyan unrelated to al- of Hiraak.”9 Mohammed Ali Ahmed, for more than a year. Qa`ida, underlines the need to secure a leading Hiraak figure who returned the loyalty of the militias to guard to Yemen last year after 18 years in The Popular Committees’ ability to hold against their co-optation by rival exile, has backed Popular Committee Abyan has proven crucial to interim political factions and to ensure that forces in his native Lawdar as part of Yemeni President Abd Rabu Mansur the militias limit the use of force to a political arrangement with Hadi. Hadi, who is leading the country through Ansar al-Shari`a and AQAP. a volatile political transition following border—they are most prevalent in Abyan. Furthermore, Yemen’s 2011 Arab Spring uprisings Abyan’s Patchwork Militias as a local analyst pointed out: “Abyan is a strategic area that unseated President Ali Abdullah In April 2012, about two months after for AQAP and Ansar al-Shari`a since it was mentioned 3 Salih. If Hadi can preserve this alliance Hadi won office in a single-candidate in the hadith of the Prophet Muhammad, which said, until early 2014, when parliamentary election and a month before he launched ‘Out of Aden-Abyan will come 12,000, giving victory to and presidential elections are scheduled Operation Golden Swords, local tribal the [religion of] Allah and His Messenger. They are the to mark the conclusion of the transition militias and government troops in best between me and them.’ Geographically, the area is period, Abyan’s militias could translate Abyan’s north-central town of Lawdar also very strategic as it is located in the middle of south- into valuable political influence in the defeated Ansar al-Shari`a insurgents ern and northern Yemeni governorates. It is also open on in a bloody, week-long battle for the Arabian Sea.” See personal interview, Yemeni politi- 4 1 The U.S. State Department considers Ansar al-Shari`a control of the city. Hadi and Defense cal analyst, Sana`a, Yemen, August 7, 2012. an alias of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula. For more Minister Mohammed Nasser Ahmed 7 Abyan was part of the PDRY. For a detailed discussion information on the origins of Ansar al-Shari`a and its Ali—both Abyan natives—immediately of escalating tensions between north and south Yemen relation to AQAP, see Fernando Carvajal, “Deepening stepped up the provision of arms and since the 1994 civil war, and their impact on today’s po- Crises Breed Local Support for Ansar al-Sharia: Part 1,” other resources to Lawdar’s Popular litical transition, see “Breaking Point? Yemen’s Southern Fair Observer, July 3, 2012. Committees and intensified the lobbying Question,” International Crisis Group, October 20, 2011. 2 Personal interview, Yemeni intelligence official, Aby- of tribal and religious leaders around According to that report, “the war laid to rest the notion 5 an, Yemen, July 2, 2012. Abyan to organize similar militias. of unity and ushered in a period of Northern occupation 3 The Gulf Cooperation Council-negotiated political tran- By early July, Popular Committees of the South...According to this account, Southerners be- sition initiative is backed by the United States and the patrolled checkpoints in and around came second-class citizens at best and, at worst—and in United Nations Security Council (UNSC). See Security most of Abyan’s main cities, from its proponents’ words—slaves of the Northern elites.” Council Report, Yemen, available at www.securitycoun- Mudiya east of Lawdar southward to 8 Personal interview, Popular Committee commander cilreport.org/yemen/. For an unofficial English transla- the coastal town of Shuqra and west from Lawdar in Abyan Province, Sana`a, Yemen, No- tion of the GCC agreement, see “Next Steps in Yemen’s to the provincial capital Zinjibar and vember 5, 2012. Hiraak, or the Southern Movement, is a 6 Transition,” International Foundation for Electoral Sys- neighboring Jaar. broad coalition of disaffected southerners from the for- tems Briefing Paper, March 2012. Hadi’s two greatest mer PDRY. Hiraak’s interests range from the promotion challenges at present are enforcing military reforms and 4 “Ansar al Sharia Shells Lawder with Artillery and of equal rights among northern and southern popula- commencing the National Dialogue Conference (NDC). Tanks,” Mareb Press, April 11, 2012. tions, to the redress of past grievances to full secession Despite three rounds of military restructuring decrees, 5 Personal interview, Popular Committee commander from Yemen’s Sana`a-based government. Islah is Ye- the most powerful branches of Yemen’s fractured armed from Lawdar in Abyan Province, Sana`a, Yemen, No- men’s main opposition party, composed of tribesmen, forces remain under the command of feuding elites. vember 5, 2012. businessmen, Yemen’s version of the Muslim Brother- Meanwhile, ongoing delays to the start of the NDC, a cru- 6 The scope of this article is limited to Abyan’s Popular hood and Salafists. cial stage in the transition at which the country’s numer- Committees. Although anti-al-Qa`ida militias patrol 9 Personal interview, Yemeni journalist from Abyan, ous rival factions are expected to agree on the structure of surrounding provinces—particularly Lahj to the west, Sana`a, Yemen, February 7, 2013. The GPC is Yemen’s a new government, have fueled political insecurity. northern Bayda and Shabwa along Abyan’s northeastern ruling political party.

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The motivations for joining Abyan’s the salaries and only when it was clear Abyan, highlighted the potential for the Popular Committees vary widely. Ansar al-Shari`a would be driven from autonomous militias to commit violence Enlisted Yemeni military and security the province,” he said.14 Perhaps the against enemies using the justification of forces struck a deal with the Ministry of most high-profile defector from Ansar fighting Islamist militants. In November Defense to return to their hometowns in al-Shari`a is Abdul Latif al-Sayed, a 2012, militiamen from Zinjibar encircled Abyan with their salaries to fight for the leading Popular Committee commander al-Fadhli’s home days after he returned Popular Committees.10 Other militiamen based in Batis village north of Jaar. He from a long absence. Militiamen accused in Abyan claimed they were duty-bound has survived at least five assassination the shaykh of spreading rumors that to take up arms in the security void left attempts since his defection from Ansar Popular Committees were “mercenaries” in the wake of Operation Golden Swords, al-Shari`a in 2011.15 and said that al-Fadhli maintained ties as most state forces deployed elsewhere to al-Qa`ida.19 The subsequent two- and some lingering units revolted A journalist who regularly reports day siege, in which two of the shaykh’s against Hadi’s military reforms. “We from Abyan argued that this survivalist guards were killed and several injured, have never demanded anything from the mentality will lead to problems for the ended only after Hadi, who belongs to government; we are fighting for the sake government. “It is true that the Popular a sub-tribe of al-Fadhli’s, intervened of Allah,” a Popular Committee member Committees had a big role in shrinking on his behalf and arranged safe haven from Lawdar said. “Our support comes Ansar al-Shari`a and AQAP, but they from the people of Lawdar and our aim do not want al-Qa`ida to disappear “In Yemen’s experience, is to maintain security and stability in from the scene,” he said. “The Popular Lawdar.”11 Committees do not want to end the the long-term consequence existence of al-Qa`ida because they of arming and funding local Many attribute the rapid propagation know that will end the investment in of Popular Committees in Abyan to the fighting them. There are huge amounts militias to do the bidding of monthly stipends, government jobs and of money being paid for the Popular the state is that they amass other perks offered by Yemen’s Ministry Committees and other parties in the of Defense in the poverty-stricken name of fighting al-Qa`ida.”16 enough power to challenge province.12 A government official in the state.” Abyan argued that dismal economic From the leadership down through conditions in the province enabled the rank-and-file, Abyan’s Popular Ansar al-Shari`a’s populist promises to Committees are keenly aware of their take root, despite the group’s affiliation value to Hadi and international powers for him and his family in Aden “on the with al-Qa`ida. “They need to eat, so backing Yemen’s political transition. government’s dime.”20 Al-Fadhli said where can they go?” he said. “Ansar had According to one Yemeni scholar, the he enjoyed the support of the popular them in a corner.”13 Popular Committees “want to extract forces in Jaar, but the Zinjibar militias as much as possible from this situation, were against him.21 That desperation, according to and the threat from Ansar al-Shari`a an Abyani tribal shaykh, fuels and AQAP will ensure that Hadi relies In the same month, Popular Committee unpredictability in the province. He on them for a longer period of time.”17 forces from Jaar shot dead a suspected distrusts the Popular Committees al-Qa`ida member who belonged because many of them were allied with Tribal Disputes to the Yafa` tribe.22 According to Ansar al-Shari`a less than a year ago. Complex tribal tensions in Abyan a Yemeni journalist who reported “They joined [Popular Committees] for complicate the role of Popular Committees. from Jaar during this period, Popular One political analyst in Sana`a warned Committee commander Abdul Latif 10 Personal interview, Yemeni journalist from Abyan, that the armed militias may commit al-Sayed attempted to deescalate the Sana`a, Yemen, February 7, 2013. violent acts against their enemies under situation by offerisng blood money, 18 11 Personal interview, Popular Committee soldier, the pretense of fighting al-Qa`ida. or diyya, for the murder. The Yafa` Sana`a, Yemen, November 5, 2012. leadership instead opted for revenge, 23 12 Personal interview, National Security Bureau official, A recent conflict between Popular or tha`r, he said. Sana`a, Yemen, December 17, 2012; personal interview, Committee forces and Shaykh Tariq al- Popular Committee commander from Lawdar, Sana`a, Fadhli, the leader of a powerful tribe in Yemen, July 2, 2012; personal interview, humanitarian 19 Personal interview, tribal shaykh from Abyan, Aden, worker from Lahj Province, Sana`a, Yemen, January 15, 14 Personal interview, tribal shaykh from Abyan Prov- Yemen, December 17, 2012; “Commander of Popular 2013; personal interview, Yemeni journalist from Abyan, ince, Aden, Yemen, December 17, 2012. Committees in Lawder: The Return of Fadhli to Zinjibar Sana`a, Yemen, February 7, 2013; personal interview, 15 Sudarsan Raghavan, “In Yemen, Tribal Militias in a Will Cause Civil War Unless the Government Intervenes Yemeni scholar, Sana`a, Yemen, January 20, 2013. Lo- Fierce Battle with al-Qaeda Wing,” Washington Post, Sep- to Stop It,” al-Masdar Online, November 5, 2012. cals in Abyan claimed that “youth” (low-level Popular tember 10, 2012. 20 Personal interview, tribal shaykh from Abyan, Aden, Committee fighters) receive about 15,000 to 20,000 Ye- 16 Personal interview, journalist from Abyan, Sana`a, Yemen, December 17, 2012. meni rials (approximately $70 to $100) per month, plus Yemen, February 7, 2013. 21 “Commander of Popular Committees in Lawder.” food, water and khat, the leafy stimulant chewed by a ma- 17 Personal interview, Yemeni scholar, Sana`a, Yemen, 22 “Boy Killed in Siraar Yafa’a by Popular Committees jority of Yemeni men. January 15, 2013. Gunfire,” Barakish.net, November 2, 2012. 13 Personal interview, Abyani government official, Aby- 18 Personal interview, Yemeni political analyst, Sana`a, 23 Personal interview, Yemeni journalist, Sana`a, Ye- an Province, Yemen, July 2, 2012. Yemen, August 7, 2012. men, February 11, 2013.

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Conclusion experience, the long-term consequence Deciphering the Jihadist In the absence of a monopoly on the of arming and funding local militias to Presence in Syria: An legitimate use of violence in the country, do the bidding of the state is that they the Yemeni state has raised local militias amass enough power to challenge the Analysis of Martyrdom on numerous occasions to defend against state, as evidenced by frequent tribal Notices external threats or to extend political road blockades and the persistent influence into peripheral regions.24 sabotage of electricity, oil and gas By Aaron Y. Zelin Saudi Arabia, which shares a 900- infrastructure since 2010.29 mile border with Yemen as well as when the syrian uprising began in the fallout from instability there, also Despite the potential risks, President March 2011, the presence of jihadists has a long history of co-opting Yemeni Hadi’s best option is likely to continue in the protests was minimal at best. tribes as a tool of statecraft.25 funding and arming Abyan’s militias As the rebellion escalated, jihadists until the volatile transition period began to take advantage of the new Yemen’s “militiatary”26 strategy is concludes. Indeed, if he can manage to landscape. Fighters associated not without risks. The Salih regime’s secure the loyalty of Abyan’s Popular with al-Qa`ida’s worldview quietly co-optation of tribal militias during Committees through the transition, entered the fight in the fall of 2011. a string of wars from 2004 to 2010 while ensuring that their anti-al-Qa`ida These Salafi-jihadi fighters officially against the Zaydi Shi`a Huthi mission does not spill over into broader announced themselves in late January movement in northern Sa`da Province tribal conflicts and create new problems, 2012 under the banner of Jabhat al- led to the eclipsing of tribal revenge Hadi could benefit greatly from political Nusra (the Support Front) and became over mediation and arbitration as a influence in the highly contested one of the key fighting forces against means of conflict resolution.27 In the southern province. Yet incessant delays the Bashar al-Assad regime by the fall absence of government oversight of the to the start of the National Dialogue of 2012.1 ad hoc forces, corruption has become Conference, along with steady calls endemic to the practice. Militia fighters for southern independence among Since the Syrian protest movement in the Sa`da wars reportedly accepted Hiraak factions and fresh U.S.-Yemeni turned into an armed insurrection in stipends from both sides of the conflict, accusations of subversive Iranian- the summer of 2011, the jihad in Syria while leaders embezzled large sums of Huthi plots, have stalled the transition has become the du jour locale for fighters government cash through the creation and cast further doubt on when who want to topple the “apostate” al- of “ghost soldiers.”28 In Yemen’s conditions might improve.30 According Assad regime for a variety of strategic, to a prominent political analyst in Aden, geographic, and religious reasons. 24 Sarah Phillips, “Developmental Dysfunction and Di- “These armed militias will engage in Similar to the Iraqi jihad at its zenith, vision in a Crisis State,” Developmental Leadership Pro- armed confrontations, and they might users on al-Qa`ida’s official and gram, 2011, p. 17. ”Popular” militias fought in the 1960s turn into a hard stick in the hands of unofficial web forums began to post battles against a northern Zaydi Imamate and southern any armed faction capable of funding unofficial yet authentic martyrdom British colonial rule, which gave rise to the first Yemeni them. The Popular Committees will notices for individuals—both Syrian states. See Paul Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen (New turn into an internal problem for the and foreign—who they perceived to have 31 2 York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 114-117. government.” fought on behalf of the jihadist cause. 25 Ellen Knickmeyer, “Trouble Down South: For Saudi Arabia, Yemen’s Implosion is a Nightmare,” Foreign Casey L. Coombs is a freelance journalist This article looks quantitatively and 3 Policy, July 5, 2011. based in Sana`a, Yemen. In March 2012, qualitatively at these notices. The 26 As explained in Martin van Vliet, “The Challenges of he reported from Ansar al-Shari`a’s then data and biographical information Retaking Northern Mali,” CTC Sentinel 5:11-12 (2012), a de facto capital Jaar, which the group had collected is based on threads from 4 “militiatary” strategy is when a “state partly outsources renamed Waqar. He has covered Yemen jihadist web forums dating from the its primary mandate of security provision to local mili- for the BBC, Foreign Policy, The Jamestown tias. While often temporarily integrated into the military Foundation, TIME World and Wired’s blog 1 For more background, see Brian Fishman, “The Evi- chain of command, these armed non-state actors mostly Danger Room. dence of Jihadist Activity in Syria,” CTC Sentinel 5:5 operate outside formal state structures.” (2012); Aaron Y. Zelin, “Jihadists in Syria Can be Found 27 See Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine on the Internet,” al-Monitor, October 18, 2012. Wells, “Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen - The Corruption Assessment (Burlington, VT: USAID, 2006), 2 Although it is impossible to prove the authenticity of Huthi Phenomenon,” RAND Corporation, 2010, p. 259; p. 4. all of the martyrdom notices, the forums provide images “Defusing the Saada Time Bomb,” International Crisis 29 Hasan al-Zaidi, “Interior Ministry Orders Lifting and details on the deceased fighters, and it is unlikely Group, May 27, 2009, pp. 14-16. A minister of parliament Tribal Road Blockade; Diesel Still Unavailable in Some that this information would be fabricated for so many from Yafa` further claimed: “More than 20 soldiers from Gas Stations,” Yemen Post, July 21, 2008; Gabriel Koe- individuals. Furthermore, the notices can be cross-refer- my own district have died since the beginning of the war. hler-Derrick ed., A False Foundation? AQAP, Tribes, and enced with videos posted on YouTube or on other Syrian Neither army soldiers nor volunteers fighting alongside Ungoverned Spaces in Yemen (West Point, NY: Combating opposition sites. In some cases, relatives of foreign fight- the army have received proper treatment. The families of Terrorism Center, 2011), pp. 107-108. ers conducted honorary funerals even if they were buried those who were injured or killed did not receive any com- 30 “Yemen Requests Int’l Investigation in Iranian Arms in Syria. pensation and often were informed very late of what had Shipment,” Yemen News Agency (SABA), February 8, 3 There were limitations in collecting this dataset since happened. This inevitably created new tensions.” 2013. some notices provided far richer information than oth- 28 “Defusing the Saada Time Bomb.” For more informa- 31 Personal interview, Aden-based political analyst, ers. tion on “ghost soldiers” in Yemen’s military, see Yemen Sana`a, Yemen, January 14, 2013. 4 The data was drawn from al-Fida’ al-Islamiya,

7 february 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 2 start of the uprising through January also demonstrates the growing role some 31, 2013. It is likely that some notices jihadists have played in recent battles have been missed, but it is still useful with the regime, such as the takeover of to piece together each individual’s the Taftanaz airbase.10 identity, from where they are from, with whom they fought, and where they died.

It does not, however, include fighters mentioned in Jabhat al-Nusra’s official statements or videos. Therefore, while the data is useful in providing clarity on the role of foreign fighters in Syria, it still suffers from many limitations and should be considered anecdotal.

Quantitative Data: Basic Metrics There were discrepancies in the amount of data provided in each unofficial martyrdom notice. The quantitative Table 1. Martyrdom notices by country of origin. data mainly focuses on city of origin, country of origin, city martyred in, and Table 1 highlights jihadist forum group joined. There are two levels of martyrdom notices from individuals’ data compiled for these four metrics: country of origin. Predictably, it shows overall, and in the past four months. Syrians as having the most records.7 It Organizing the data by time period also tentatively illustrates that similar helps situate the current trajectories to the Sinjar records captured by U.S. in the conflict. forces in Iraq, Libyans and Saudis have played important roles in the fight In total, there are currently 130 against the al-Assad regime.8 Due to individuals in the author’s dataset, the proximity and known links between and 85 of the 130 have been identified al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI) and Jabhat al- in the past four months. The first Nusra, it is somewhat surprising that Table 2. Martyrdom notices by city of death. recorded unofficial martyrdom notice the number of Iraqis is so low. It is was posted in February 2012, but this possible that Iraqis might be in more Table 3 confirms what is likely individual, the Kuwaiti Hussam al- senior positions or facilitating activities uncontroversial: the majority of Mutayri, actually died on August 29, along the border and therefore not on the unofficial martyrdom notices belong to 2011, fighting with the Free Syrian front lines, but that is only speculation. individuals affiliated with Jabhat al- Army in Damascus.5 Every individual Nusra. Furthermore, it highlights the in the dataset has a record of which The data in Table 2, which shows the rapid increase in fighters who have country they were from. More than jihadist martyrdom notices for the city joined its cause in recent months.11 Table half (70 out of 130) mentioned the where the individual died fighting, 3 also shows that jihadists in individual group with which the individual confirms broader assumptions about in capacities have not recently joined fought, while 76 of 130 locations of what cities jihadists are engaged. Large and died while fighting with brigades death were provided. Additionally, portions of cities in Table 2 are located attached to the Free Syrian Army. the city of origin of the martyrs was in the northern and eastern regions of This could suggest that the recruiting detailed 45 out of 130 times. The steep Syria where many of the Salafi-jihadi networks for Jabhat al-Nusra within increase in individuals being reported groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra or and outside of Syria have built greater as martyrs on the forums in the past Kata’ib Ahrar al-Sham are based.9 It capabilities. It could also be evidence that four months, as seen in Table 1, Jabhat al-Nusra has established itself to such an extent that foreign fighters refuse provides circumstantial evidence that the growth in the strength of groups such as Jabhat al- to fight with any other group. more foreign jihadists have joined the Nusra on the ground as well as backing by global jihadist 6 battlefield recently. ideologues, it is likely that there are more jihadists fight- ing today. France-Presse, January 18, 2013; Martin Chulov, “Syria Shumukh al-Islam, Ansar al-Mujahidin, and the al-Jihad 7 If one were to take into account official Jabhat al-Nusra Crisis: Al-Qaida Fighters Revealing Their True Colours, al-`Alami forums, among other online global jihadist releases, the number would be even higher. Rebels Say,” Guardian, January 17, 2013; “Eastern Syrian sources. 8 Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, Al-Qa`ida’s Foreign Town Lives Under al Qaeda Rules,” Reuters, January 30, 5 “Awal Shuhada’ Jazirat al-`Arab fi Suriyya (Hussam Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records (West 2013. al-Mutayri),” Shumukh al-Islam, February 17, 2012. Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2007). 10 Andrew J. Tabler, Jeffrey White, and Aaron Y. Zelin, 6 An alternative conclusion is that the rise in martyrdom 9 Noman Benotman and Roisin Blake, “Jabhat al-Nusra: “Fallout from the Fall of Taftanaz,” The Washington In- notices is simply because more individuals are posting A Strategic Briefing,” Quilliam Foundation, January 8, stitute for Near East Policy, January 14, 2013. these statements than in the past. That said, because of 2013; “Kurd-Jihadist Clashes in North Syria,” Agence 11 For more details, see footnote 6.

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The records yielded a number of other Similarly, Muhammad al-Shajrawi, details. Of the 130 individuals in the a Syrian who died in mid-July 2012, dataset, 10 noted that they previously and Muhib Ru’yat al-Rahman (whose spent time in prison. A different real name is Jamal al-Yafi), a Lebanese grouping of 14 showed that they had foreign fighter from Tripoli who died experience fighting in other conflicts, in December 2012, were both members three of which stated they had fought and contributors to al-Qa`ida’s forums in two prior jihads. Seven of the 14 al-Fida’ al-Islamiya and Shumukh al- individuals fought during the Libyan Islam. Al-Yafi was prolific, posting uprising against the Mu`ammar Qadhafi 26,761 times on Shumukh alone.16 regime, three during the Iraq war, two in Yemen, two against Israel, and one each Commanders and Religious Officials in Afghanistan, the Sinai, Chechnya, In addition to individuals joining the and Kosovo. This suggests that the fight fight who previously had online careers, in Libya provided a starting point for some individuals had risen to levels of Libyans, Egyptians, and Palestinians power either militarily or religiously to fight in Syria. This is not surprising within rebel groups. For example, Abu when taking into account that there are `Abad (also known as Abu Mujahid), a known training camps in Libya that Syrian from Aleppo who was affiliated provide skills to fighters before they with Kata’ib Ahrar al-Sham, a Salafi- depart for jihad in Syria.14 jihadi fighting force, was a supervisor Table 3. Martyrdom notices by group affiliation. for the Shari`a court established in Qualitative Data: Martyrs’ Stories Aleppo.17 He died in mid-September There is also data for martyrdom There were two themes among the 2012.18 Labib Sulayman (also known notices by city of origin, but it is of a martyrs’ biographies where details on as Abu Hamza), another Syrian limited scope.12 That said, similar to the individual’s life were provided: the Sinjar records, some cities such as involvement with jihadist activism “The trend of affiliation Zarqa in Jordan and Derna in Libya online, and those who became were responsible for the most recruits. commanders or religious officials in points to Syrians and This could anecdotally suggest that different rebel groups. Additionally, foreigners who have a some of the older facilitation networks there were other distinctive stories during the time of the Iraq war are still from the martyrs. worldview closely aligned operational or were reactivated in the with al-Qa`ida and who past year. More information is needed Online Jihadists to reach a definitive conclusion.13 Over the years, self-described join the Salafi-jihadi rebel “jihadists” have moved from non- group Jabhat al-Nusra.” violent online activism to play a

12 The full list of individuals martyred by city of origin direct role in fighting on behalf of is as follows: Aleppo, Syria: 5; Zarqa, Jordan: 3; Derna, al-Qa`ida-affiliated Salafi-jihadi groups. Libya: 3; Tripoli, Lebanon: 3; al-Ahsa, Saudi Arabia: 2; The Syrian war is no different. Seven of member of Kata’ib Ahrar al-Sham, Deir al-Zour, Syria: 2; Benghazi, Libya: 2; Tunis, Tunisia: the biographies in the dataset included who died in mid-October 2012, was 2; Damascus, Syria: 2; Gaza, Palestine: 2; Alexandria, details on the individual’s online according to a Kata’ib Ahrar al-Sham Egypt: 1; Ariana, Tunisia: 1; Ayn Shams, Egypt: 1; Binsh, activism. official one of the first defectors from 19 Syria: 1; Dhiban, Syria: 1; Ha’il, Saudi Arabia: 1; Irbid, the Syrian military from Hama. Jordan: 1; Ma’an, Jordan: 1; Melbourne, Australia: 1; Pris- For example, Muhammad Abu Yasin, a He previously had been in the al- 20 tina, Kosovo: 1; Mahdia, Tunisia: 1; Arar, Saudi Arabia: Syrian from Idlib who died in late June Assad regime’s military academy. 1; Ceuta, Spain: 1; Fayyum, Egypt: 1; Homs, Syria: 1; Jed- 2012, helped with the production and He became a commander for a Kata’ib dah, Saudi Arabia: 1; Damietta, Egypt: 1; Kufr al-Shaykh, dissemination of online magazines. He Egypt: 1; Upper Egypt, Egypt: 1. The number of individu- went by the names of `Awasif al-Qa`ida 16 “Sur `Ars al-Shahid bi-Idhin Allah Ikhwaum -- 15 als martyred in the past four months by city of origin is as and Jundi Dawlat al-Islam. Muhib bin Ladin ... al-Nasir Tawala -- mata Sanlahiq follows: Aleppo, Syria: 1; Zarqa, Jordan: 3; Derna, Libya: bi-l-Qafilah,” Shumukh al-Islam, July 20, 2012; “Li-l- 2; Tripoli, Lebanon: 2; al-Ahsa, Saudi Arabia: 2; Deir al- Tawdhih -- Istishhad al-Shaykh -- Muhib Ru’yat al-Rah- Zour, Syria: 2; Benghazi, Libya: 1; Tunis, Tunisia: 1; Da- man,” Ansar al-Mujahidin Forum, December 18, 2012. mascus, Syria: 1; Gaza, Palestine: 1; Alexandria, Egypt: 1; 17 “Istishhadal-Shaykh al-Zahid al-Mujahid wa al- Ariana, Tunisia: 1; Ayn Shams, Egypt: 1; Binsh, Syria: 1; Mulaqab bi-Abu `Abid al-Mushrif `ala al-Mahkamah Dhiban, Syria: 1; Ha’il, Saudi Arabia: 1; Irbid, Jordan: 1; 14 “Libya’s Terrorist Training Camps,” CNN, January al-Shar`iyah fi Halab,” Ansar al-Mujahidin Forum, Sep- Ma’an, Jordan: 1; Melbourne, Australia: 1; Pristina, Ko- 19, 2013; Aaron Y. Zelin, “Jihadism’s Foothold in Libya,” tember 18, 2012. sovo: 1; Mahdia, Tunisia: 1; Arar, Saudi Arabia: 0; Ceuta, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Septem- 18 Ibid. Spain: 0; Fayyum, Egypt: 0; Homs, Syria: 0; Jeddah, ber 12, 2012. 19 “Istishhadal-Qa’id al-`Askari li-Katibat Salah ad-Din Saudi Arabia: 0; Damietta, Egypt: 0; Kufr al-Shaykh, 15 “Al-Shahid bi-Idhin Allah Muhammad Abu Yasin -- Abu Hamzah -- Kata’ib Ahrar ash-Sham,” Shumukh Egypt: 0; Upper Egypt, Egypt: 0. Jundi al-Dawla Ahad A`dha’ al-Muntada,” Shumukh al- al-Islam, October 11, 2012. 13 Ibid. Islam, July 20, 2012. 20 Ibid.

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Ahrar al-Sham’s sub-unit, Katibat Salah al-Halabi), originally from Aleppo, had was cousins with Abu Mus`ab al- al-Din.21 been studying medicine in Germany Zarqawi, the former leader of AQI.34 at the outbreak of the uprising.27 Al- Even closer-linked, Jarad’s father There are also individuals who had prior Armanazi made it back to Saadallah al- Yasin was purportedly behind the Najaf religious training, such as the Syrian Jabri Square in Aleppo for the protests operation that killed Muhammad Baqir from Deir al-Zour, Shaykh Isma`il on March 15, 2011, and was arrested al-Hakim, one of Iraq’s most prominent Muhammad al-`Alush (also known the next day.28 He spent two months Shi`a Muslim leaders, in 2003.35 This as Abu Ayman), who was affiliated in prison, and after his release he highlights the familial connections with Liwa’ al-Furqan and died in late returned to Germany and helped with that have inspired others to take up the December 2012, as well as the Jordanian online activities for local committees in cause as well. Riyad Hadayb (also known as Abu Aleppo.29 He later returned to Syria to `Umar al-Faruq), who was a member of fight in Idlib and Aleppo, and he died in Conclusion Jabhat al-Nusra. Al-`Alush purportedly late July 2012.30 With the Syrian war continuing into the had a master’s degree in Shari`a, while spring with no end in sight, it is likely Hadayb was an imam before he went Similarly, the 15-year-old `Umar that more unofficial martyrdom stories to Syria.22 Hadayb became a mufti for Bakirati (also known as Abu Hamza from the jihadist forums will continue Jabhat al-Nusra before his death on al-Faruq), from Qudsaya, fled Syria to to trickle out about fighters who died January 23, 2013.23 Turkey with his family.31 He returned waging war against the al-Assad regime. and became a sniper for Jabhat al-Nusra, The trend of affiliation points to Syrians These examples show that jihadists, allegedly killing 13 pro-government and foreigners who have a worldview both Syrian and foreign, are becoming shabiha before he died in Hama in late closely aligned with al-Qa`ida and who part of the budding civilian societal October 2012.32 Both stories illustrate join the Salafi-jihadi rebel group Jabhat structure related to the establishment the duty felt by Syrians in the face of the al-Nusra. of Shari`a courts in Syria. These courts al-Assad regime’s crackdown. have helped provide a small semblance Moreover, foreigners joining the fight of relative law and order in some pockets There are also those who had decades will likely continue to come from Libya, of the country that have been liberated of experience in the overall jihadist Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Tunisia or partially controlled by rebel forces. movement. For instance, `Abd al-`Aziz based on current trends, proximity, and al-Jughayman, a Saudi from al-Ahsa capable facilitation networks. As more Unique Backgrounds and former professor at King Faisal data becomes available, an even clearer Others in the dataset have stories University, had been involved with some picture will emerge to better understand that are not threaded together by any of the major fields of jihad dating back who is fighting in the conflict as part of particular theme. One individual, to the 1980s. According to the forums, the jihadist faction within the broader Ahmad Raf`at (also known as Abu al-Jughayman fought in Afghanistan on rebel movement. Bara’), an Egyptian from Kufr al- two different tours, as well as in Bosnia- Shaykh who died fighting with Herzegovina, Kashmir, and Iraq. The Aaron Y. Zelin is the Richard Borow fellow Jabhat al-Nusra, had previously been al-Assad regime, however, apprehended at The Washington Institute for Near imprisoned in Egypt.24 He was released and then imprisoned him for three years East Policy. He also maintains the website after the fall of Hosni Mubarak, and in the middle of the last decade. He died Jihadology.net, which is a primary source he swiftly went across the border to fighting against that same regime in late archive for global jihadist materials. join the fight in Libya against the November 2012.33 regime until Qadhafi’s death.25 Raf`at then traveled to Syria where he died Finally, there were individuals who in early July 2012.26 followed in the footsteps of family members who had previous experiences There were also cases when Syrians who fighting jihad. For instance, Muhammad were outside of the country returned to Yasin Jarad, a Jordanian from Zarqa fight. Hussam al-Din al-Armanazi (also who died fighting with Jabhat al-Nusra known as Abu `Umar Hussam al-Din in al-Suwayda in mid-January 2013,

21 Ibid. 27 “Al-Shahid bi-Idhin Allah Hussam al-Din min Halab 22 “Istishhadal-Shaykh Isma`il Muhammad al-`Alush,” Taraka al-Tib fi Almaniyya wa-nal al-Shahada fi al- Ansar al-Mujahidin Forum, December 28, 2012; “Abu Sham-Sura,” al-Sanam Islamic Network, July 31, 2012. `Umar al-Faruq al-Mufti al-Shar`i li-Jabhat al-Nusra 28 Ibid. Tabat Hayan wa maytan,” Ansar al-Mujahidin Forum, 29 Ibid. January 23, 2013. 30 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 31 “Al-Shahid Abu Hamzah al-Faruq ma` Inshudah la 24 “Bushra Istishhadal-Akh Ahmad Rif`at ‘ala Ardh tas’aluni `an Hayyati,” Shabakat Ansar al-Sham, Octo- 34 “IstishhadSuhur Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi fi Midinah Suriyya fi Muwajahat al-Taghut al-Nusayri,” al-Jihad al- ber 31, 2012. al-Suwayda’ Janub Suriyya wa-l-Urdun Tarfadh Isdar `Alami, July 11, 2012. 32 Ibid. Shahdah Himam al-Bilawi,” Ansar al-Mujahidin Forum, 25 Ibid. 33 “Sur # Istishhad al-Batal `Abd al-`Aziz,” Ansar al- January 18, 2013. 26 Ibid. Mujahidin Forum, November 24, 2012. 35 Ibid.

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who perceive that the West is turning a biochemistry.10 According to captive British Fighters Joining the blind eye to the plight of Muslims. John Cantlie, he carried an NHS medical War in Syria kit with him and planned to return to In highlighting the complexity of work as a trauma consultant after a two By Raffaello Pantucci this threat, this article identifies the year sabbatical.11 Less is known about current known links between the Syrian his co-conspirator Jubayer Chowdhury, since the start of the Syrian war, and British jihadist communities, as except that he is of Bangladeshi descent. British police have arrested and charged well as the broader context from which Both are currently awaiting trial for their three men for their roles in a terrorist it is emerging. It also shows how fallout role in kidnapping the two journalists. conspiracy linked to the conflict. British from Syria has the potential to have security officials fear that these arrests negative repercussions in the United In what was reported as an expansion may only be the tip of an iceberg as Kingdom for years to come. of the case, authorities arrested an they watch Syria become the brightest additional six men in mid-January flame drawing in young British The Case of the Kidnapped Journalists 2013 as part of a wide-ranging police radicals. As British Foreign Secretary Attention was first drawn publicly to investigation into links with Syria.12 William Hague recently said, “Syria the issue of British jihadists operating Authorities arrested one group of is now the number one destination for in Syria when a British and Dutch three men at addresses in east London, jihadists anywhere in the world today. journalist escaped from their captors in while a fourth man identified as being This includes a number of individuals Syria and made it to safety in Turkey. Portuguese was picked up at Gatwick connected with the United Kingdom The men, Jerome Oerlemans and John airport.13 All were detained “on and other European countries. They Cantlie, had entered Syria on July suspicion of commission, preparation may not pose a threat to us when they 19, 2012, on assignment, but had the or instigation of acts of terrorism.”14 first go to Syria, but if they survive misfortune to fall into the hands of a Authorities arrested a second pair some may return ideologically hardened group of mostly foreign extremists.4 “outside a business” in west London, and with experience of weapons and Held captive for a week, the men were although no link was immediately explosives.”1 repeatedly threatened with death and drawn between the two cases.15 In the beaten after an escape attempt.5 They end, all but Mohamed Elyasse Taleouine The most striking aspect about the were eventually released by a group from Lisson Grove, north London, were Syria-UK connection is its similarity to of Syrians who had initially helped cleared, while Taleouine was charged past events. Not only are there shades of them enter the country.6 Yet the with possession of a blank-firing MAC- Bosnia in the ease with which Britons can most surprising news to emerge from 10 that had been converted into a live join the war in Syria,2 but there are also the event was that among the men’s weapon.16 A week later, police went similarities in the structures that have captors had been almost a dozen British back and re-arrested a man from the nurtured the conflict.3 Longstanding jihadists—nine of whom “had London first set of arrests, revealing him to be London-based preachers have returned accents” and at least one who claimed Najul Islam, brother of Shajul Islam.17 to join fighters on the frontlines, to be a National Health Service (NHS) convoys run by Muslim charities take doctor.7 Najul Islam was charged with a variety food and supplies while hosting events of offenses, including funding his at which they criticize the lack of action The trainee doctor in question, Shajul brother’s travel to Syria, funding Jubayer by the international community, and Islam, was intercepted on October 9, Chowdhury’s return from Syria, and young men are taking time off from their 2012, when he returned on a flight from sending them money to support their ordinary lives to join the fight. Atop all Egypt with his wife and child.8 A Briton activities.18 Additionally, police believe of this, a political debate in the United of Bangladeshi origin, little is known he traveled by vehicle from the United Kingdom—reflective of the broader about Shajul Islam aside from his age, Kingdom through Turkey to Syria to global debate—about what action to take 26-years-old, that he is from Stratford 9 in Syria has failed to deliver meaningful in East London, and that he is a doctor. 10 Ibid. results, providing more fodder for those A graduate of St. Bartholomew’s and 11 Ibid. a University of London hospital, he 12 Paul Peachey, “Four Men Arrested Over Syria Terror 1 William Hague, “Foreign Secretary on Countering Ter- reportedly had a first class degree in Fears,” Independent, January 10, 2012. rorism,” speech at the Royal United Services Institute 13 Tom Whitehead, “Four Men Arrested Under Terror (RUSI), February 14, 2013. 4 John Cantlie, “Are You Ready to Die?” Sunday Times, Laws After Kidnap of Journalist,” Telegraph, January 10, 2 Bosnia was a bus or car ride away for British citizens, August 5, 2012. 2012. similar to Syria. 5 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 3 Covered in greater detail later in the article, there are 6 Ibid. 15 Margaret Davis, “London Man Charged Over Sub Ma- charitable organizations, as well as jihadist support net- 7 John-Paul Ford Rojas, “NHS Doctor ‘Led Extremist chine Gun Possession,” Independent, January 17, 2013. works, that help British Muslims become involved in Cell in Syria,’” Telegraph, August 27, 2012. 16 “Man, 20, is Held on Sub-Machine Gun Charge by Syria: either in providing aid as part of charity convoys, 8 “British Police Arrest 2 at Heathrow Airport in Probe Officers Investigating Alleged Support for Terrorism,” or more active roles as fighters. This is similar to Bosnia into Terrorist Activity in Syria,” Associated Press, Octo- West End Extra, January 18, 2013. where similar structures existed. Evan Kohlmann’s Al- ber 9, 2012. 17 “Man Charged in UK Over Journalists’ Syria Kidnap,” Qaeda’s Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network pro- 9 Tom Whitehead, “NHS Doctor Accused of Being Part Agence France-Presse, January 25, 2013. vides a snapshot of British jihadist support structures in of a British Jihadi Group in Syria,” Telegraph, October 17, 18 “Man at Court Charged with Terrorism Act 2006 Of- Bosnia. 2012. fence,” Crime & Justice, January 25, 2013.

11 february 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 2 provide equipment including night Initially, reports from Syria indicated ideas to British shores and ended up vision goggles, air rifle optic mounts, that Blidi and Terreri were journalists.30 radicalizing a portion of British youth. and medical supplies.19 Likely to come Little evidence, however, emerged of This led to young Britons becoming to trial next year, more information will them having done any reporting, and the involved in international radical then be released about the men and how al-Assad regime included their names networks, including al-Qa`ida, leading they reached Syria. in a list to UN Secretary General Ban ultimately to the July 7, 2005, bombings Ki-moon as evidence foreign terrorists when a group of young Britons under A great deal more information, however, were involved in the insurgency.31 The orders from al-Qa`ida killed 52 people has emerged about an unconnected, real story emerged when reporters on London’s transport system.38 separate case involving Nassim interviewed fighters who claimed to Terreri and Walid Blidi, two men of have been with the men on the night Since the advent of the Arab Spring, Algerian descent who were raised in they died.32 The two British fighters however, the larger connection between London and died March 26, 2012, at apparently opened fire at a passing Arab dissidents based in London and Darkoush, a few miles from the Turkish Syrian government convoy, attracting their home nations has become more border.20 Respectively from west and retaliatory fire and getting the group prominent. Libyan exiles from London south London, the men led relatively caught in a firefight between government and Manchester went back in unknown uneventful lives prior to their deaths.21 and rebel forces.33 During the clash, numbers to fight alongside the rebels Reported as a kind young man who other Syrian fighters were killed, and against the Mu`ammar Qadhafi regime,39 worked hard at school, Nassim Terreri another Briton known only as Hamza a number of key Tunisian Ennahda party dropped out of a university course and was injured.34 His fate is unknown.35 The members (including leader Rashid al- had drifted into waiting tables.22 In his brigade in which the men were fighting, Ghannouchi40) relocated from Britain to early 20s, he found religion and traveled the Hisham Haboub brigade of the Free help run the country in the wake of Zine to Mecca, after which he began wearing Syrian Army, was not Salafi-jihadi, but El Abidine Ben Ali’s departure, and traditional Arab dress.23 He reportedly the men’s actions and deaths highlight prominent former Muslim Brotherhood participated in an aid convoy to Gaza how easy it is for British nationals spokesman Kamal Helbawy was among led by Minister of Parliament George to participate in frontline fighting in a number of exiles who returned to Galloway.24 By the end of 2011, however, Syria. Biographies published in the Egypt as Hosni Mubarak was deposed.41 his family noted he had shaved off his British media highlighted that Nassim The United Kingdom has a personal beard and met a girl—suggesting that Terreri in particular “favorited” videos connection with the anti-government his religious fervor may have passed.25 of “extremist Australian preacher” forces in many Arab Spring countries— In early 2012, he went on a vacation Shaykh Feiz Mohammed.36 whether they are secular, nationalist, with Walid Blidi to France.26 Two weeks or Islamist. This connection is also later, he called his mother from the “Londonistan’s” Syrian Flavor present with Syria, where dissidents Syrian border and, according to a family Young Britons fighting in Syria is not a and exiles from the Syrian community friend, “told her he was going to find out surprising development. British fighters living in the United Kingdom (estimated what was really happening in Syria.”27 have been found on almost every jihadist at 13,000 strong42) have become a key After another two weeks, she received battlefield since Afghanistan in the support network for their brethren a call that he and Blidi were dead.28 1970s. This pipeline was nurtured by the Much less is known about Blidi, except unique combination of restive second- 38 Raffaello Pantucci, “A Biography of Rashid Rauf: Al- that in August 2007 he was arrested in generation immigrant communities, Qa`ida’s British Operative,” CTC Sentinel 5:7 (2012); Nic Exeter alongside a pair of others during dissident Arab populations—both Robertson, Paul Cruickshank and Tim Lister, “Docu- 29 a police drug sting. secular and non-secular—who used ments Give New Details on al Qaeda’s London Bomb- bases in London to promote causes, ings,” CNN, April 30, 2012. including anti-government agendas, at 39 Exact numbers are unknown, but anecdotal stories home, with a seemingly passive British suggest that dozens went back to fight from Manchester’s 37 government response. Captured Libyan community. See Jane Deith, “The Teenage Libyan in the public imagination with the Rebel from Manchester,” Channel 4 News, June 11, 2011; shorthand term “Londonistan,” this Edna Fernandes, “Why Do So Many Libyan Rebels Seen 19 Ibid. community also provided a home for on TV Speak with British Accents?” Daily Mail, July 31, 20 Tom Coghlan and Laura Pitel, “The British Pals Who radical preachers who brought jihadist 2011. Died Waging Holy War in Syria,” Times, October 13, 40 “Tunisian Islamist Leader Rashid Ghannouchi Re- 2012. 30 “Two Independent Journalists Killed in Syria,” Com- turns Home,” BBC, January 30, 2011. Another key figure 21 Ibid. mittee to Protect Journalists, March 27, 2012. to have returned was Said Ferjani. 22 Ibid. 31 Laura Pitel and James Hider, “British ‘Terrorists’ 41 Mohamed Elmeshad, “Profile: Kamal al-Helbawy, a 23 Ibid. Among Dead, Says Syria,” Times, May 18, 2012. Defector of Conscience,” Egypt Independent, September 4, 24 Ibid. 32 Coghlan and Pitel. 2012. For a longer overview of Britain’s “Londonistani” 25 Ibid. 33 Ibid. community and the impact of the Arab Spring, see James 26 Ibid. 34 Ibid. Brandon and Raffaello Pantucci, “UK Islamists and the 27 Ibid. 35 “Two Independent Journalists Killed in Syria.” Arab Uprisings,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 13 28 Ibid. 36 Coghlan and Pitel. (2012). 29 “Drug Squad Criticizes Jail Terms Handed out to Crack 37 Omar Nasiri, Inside the Jihad: My Life with al Qaeda 42 Zubeda Malik, “Britain’s ‘Fragmented’ Syrian Com- Cocaine Trio,” Express and Echo, February 10, 2008. (London: Hurst, 2006), p. 16. munity,” BBC, August 24, 2012.

12 february 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 2 in the Middle East. Support includes of those reportedly arrested around the al-Tartusi’s exact activities since providing funding and aid convoys, case linked to the kidnapping of the two traveling to the front are unclear, he dissident groups providing a way for journalists have been identified as being has maintained a steady production information to get out from the war of Syrian descent. of materials and fatawa and has been raging in Syria, as well as fighters and spotted at least twice brandishing an spiritual leaders for the rebellion. Yet while the foot soldiers may come AK-47.55 Al-Tartusi responded angrily from different ethnicities, the older when the news emerged that he was at In addition to Syrians, British Muslims “Londonistani” warriors who have gone the front, with the implication being of other ethnicities have traveled to back to join the frontlines seem to be that he was consorting with terrorists, Syria as well. As highlighted by the Syrian. Most prominent is Abu Basir and he published a remonstration on previous examples, British fighters al-Tartusi, a preacher formerly based his site in which he declared that he was known to have fought in Syria are in Poplar, east London. One of the there as “a servant and an adviser to all young men who have graduated from few preachers with a following among the heroic rebels and to all the Syrian university, worked as waiters, trainee radical communities to still operate in people who are in defiance against the doctors, or even as former drug dealers. the United Kingdom, al-Tartusi was oppression and tyranny of Bashar al- The exact numbers in terms of ethnic once quoted in the press as being “a Assad.”56 provenance are hard to determine, but leading jihadi theologian on a level with a substantial amount seem to be drawn Abu Qatada.”49 Another former “Londonistani” who from communities other than Syrian. appeared briefly toward the beginning According to Birmingham Minister His importance internationally had not of the Syrian conflict and then of Parliament Khalid Mahmood, as of translated into great acclaim among disappeared was Mustafa Setmariam August 2012 at least 30 young Britons Britain’s young jihadist community. Nasar, otherwise known as Abu Mus`ab not of Syrian descent had traveled to His lack of English and the fact that he al-Suri. A prominent jihadist theologian, Syria.43 A Sudanese community leader condemned suicide bombing (including U.S. and Pakistani forces captured from west London reported that he the July 7, 2005, London bombings), him in Quetta in 2005 and eventually had spoken to a younger member of taking a more moderate line than transferred him to Syrian authorities.57 his community who claimed to have at most of the “Londonistani” preachers, In the late 1990s, al-Suri was one of least 21 friends who were training to go meant he had less of a following among the prominent former Arab Afghan to Syria, and spoke of joining formerly the radical community in the United warriors to have landed in London UK-based Moroccans and Somalis who Kingdom. The radical community as Afghanistan descended into civil had already gone to fight.44 In August tended to follow preachers such as Abu war and the jihad against the Soviets 2012, a British journalist in Aleppo met Hamza al-Masri50 and Abdullah Faisal51 concluded.58 Alongside Abu Qatada, a British convert from Walthamstow (both of whom were incarcerated on al-Suri managed the jihadist screed who used the name “Abu Yacoub.”45 He charges of inciting racial hatred and Ansar that openly supported extremist claimed to have converted five years murder), Abu Qatada (who openly groups in Algeria. Following his time earlier, having originally been born in boasted to British authorities about in London, he moved to Afghanistan Tanzania and brought to the United his power over the United Kingdom’s from where he helped train fighters Kingdom as a child.46 He came to Syria extremist Algerian community),52 and and authored literature until he was four months earlier and was found in Omar Bakri Mohammed (the Syrian captured in late 2005.59 the company of an Iraqi friend who preacher who founded al-Muhajiroun).53 had been injured. Both men claimed to Al-Tartusi’s decision to travel to the Al-Suri languished in Syrian custody be members of Kata’ib Ahrar al-Sham Syrian frontlines surprised some, and until early February 2012, when news (Free Men of Syria), an Islamist group likely elevated him in the eyes of the emerged on the Shumukh jihadist involved in the war.47 broader radical community.54 While website that he had been freed.60 While it is hard to independently verify this Another report from later in the year “British Jihadi Recruits 50 Muslims for War in Syria,” instead highlighted a “pious” young Times, October 18, 2012. the following on the Islamic Awakening Forum: www. Bangladeshi Briton who had risen in 49 Duncan Gardham, “The Poplar Preacher Leading an forums.islamicawakening.com/f18/sheikh-abu-basir-al- the ranks of foreign fighters and was Armed Gang of Jihadis in Syria,” Telegraph, October 19, tartousi-hafidhahullah-liberates-61936. responsible for about 50 Britons who 2012. 55 Ibid. Also see the video at www.youtube.com/ 48 went to fight in Syria. Thus far, none 50 “Abu Hamza Jailed for Seven Years,” BBC, February watch?feature=player_embedded&v=uJfBkUgkSU8. 7, 2006. 56 For details, see his statement at www.abubaseer.biz- 43 Andrew Gilligan, “Security Services ‘Failing’ to Stop 51 “Hate Preaching Cleric Jailed,” BBC, March 7, 2003. land.com/hadath/Read/hadath%2093.pdf. By February British Jihadis Heading to Syria,” Sunday Telegraph, Au- 52 Omar Mahmoud Mohammed Othman, or Abu Qatada v. 2013, al-Tartusi had returned to the United Kingdom. gust 25, 2012. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Special Immi- 57 This abbreviated biography is drawn primarily from 44 Ibid. gration Appeals Commission, March 8, 2004. Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al Qaeda 45 Richard Spencer, “British Convert to Islam Vows 53 Mahan Abedin, “Al-Muhajiroun in the UK: An Inter- Strategist Abu Mus`ab al-Suri (London: Hurst, 2009). to Fight to the Death on Syrian Rebel Front Line,” Tele- view with Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed,” Spotlight on 58 Ibid. graph, August 16, 2012. Terror 2:5 (2005); Shiv Malik, “The Missing Links,” New 59 Ibid. 46 Ibid. Statesman, May 7, 2007. 60 Murad Batal al-Shishani, “Syria’s Surprising Release 47 Ibid. 54 This statement is drawn from conversations with of Jihadi Strategist Abu Musab al Suri,” Terrorism Moni- 48 David Brown, Sean O’Neill and Dominic Kennedy, London’s Muslim community, and discussions such as tor 10:3 (2012).

13 february 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 2 claim, the news has been widely accepted the www.alsunnah.org website.64 In groups such as Hizb al-Tahrir have as true among the expert community and 2004, Surur left the United Kingdom, also regularly held demonstrations or seemingly confirmed both by reliable moving to Jordan and later to Qatar, protest events at which they call for extremists on forums and London-based and it is from here that, according to al-Assad’s downfall.70 At these events, extremists who knew him.61 The logic one prominent Syrian journalist based emotive language is used to encourage behind the al-Assad regime’s decision in London, he has become an important people to help support the refugees, with to release him is unclear. figure in the flow of Qatari money to preachers often providing a religious Syria.65 As journalist Malik al-Abdeh explanation for why more should be Humanitarian Support alleged, “Surur has established himself done. These are all legitimate activities, Support for the war in Syria has as one of the key conduits for Qatari yet it highlights the backdrop around not only come through fighters and money to the anti-Assad rebels.”66 which the issue is discussed in Britain’s warrior preachers. One of the more Muslim community. under-reported but highly important Other Syrians have remained in the figures to have emerged from the United Kingdom and have taken roles Demonstrating the ease with which United Kingdom is Muhammad Surur publicly supporting the rebels in other British citizens are able to get close bin Nayif Zain al-Abidin. A British ways, either through formal new Syrian to the fighting—either for military passport holder, Surur was based in the National Council structures or Syrian- or humanitarian purposes—former United Kingdom for almost two decades managed NGOs.67 Beyond politics, a Guantanamo Bay prisoner and after moving there in the 1980s.62 He basic sense of feeling the need to support spokesman for the activist group Cage has reportedly been characterized as the Syrian refugees seen regularly on Prisoners, Moazzam Begg, made a trip a “Godfather-like” figure who had television screens has driven unknown to Syria as part of an aid convoy at some previously vetted individuals who had numbers of Britons to give money and point in the first half of 2012. According traveled to the United Kingdom to meet other forms of aid to support those living to his own report, he traveled to “the with Saad al-Faqih or Muhammad al- in refugee camps in Turkey or elsewhere. outskirts of the city of Aleppo [where] Massari. Al-Faqih and al-Massari are Support for Syrian refugees has come I stayed with a group of pious, well- two prominent Saudi dissidents in from traditional charitable entities from educated, relatively young and very London who have played senior roles across Britain’s Muslim community. hospitable fighters.”71 in the “Londonistan” community. As Using a blend of videos, magazines, well as individually running dissident flyers, stalls in city centers, charity Conclusion groups aimed against the Saudi regime, boxes inside and outside mosques, and The trouble in Syria remains beyond al-Massari in particular was an active sponsored events, these charities turn British borders. Security officials are supporter of Britain’s nascent online the money they raise into goods which somewhat constrained about how to jihadist community.63 they then drive—in convoys usually respond, and understandably only with donated ambulances—to refugee take action when specific cases linked A former Muslim Brotherhood camps in Turkey.68 There is no evidence to kidnapping or terrorism can be activist, Surur was an innovator in that these are anything but charitable constructed. The question becomes Salafist thinking and established with enterprises, but some of the individuals what will happen to the young men who his followers the Center for Islamic involved are notable for more radical are bloodied in the conflict after the Studies in Birmingham, from where views.69 More openly controversial Syrian war winds down, as well as the he published magazines and later ran networks that will have been established between radical groups in Syria and in 64 Jarret Brachman, Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice the United Kingdom. (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 38; Lia. 61 Specifically, Egyptian Yasser al-Siri has claimed that 65 Ibid.; personal interview, Malik al-Abdeh, London, It took a few years before former Bosnian he has information pertaining to Abu Mus`ab’s release. November 2012. fighters were implicated in terrorist See “Abu Musab Al-Suri Speaks on His Pakistan Deten- 66 Ibid. plots in the United Kingdom. In 1995, tion,” The Arab Digest, February 24, 2012. 67 Two prominent examples are Walid Saffour and Andrew Rowe, an aimless former drug 62 Details on Surur can be found in Lia. Rami Abdulrahman. dealer, converted to Islam and went to 63 In 1999, a British man working for Railtrack, Moham- 68 The author encountered one such convoy on its way Bosnia where he took up arms and was med Sohail, was revealed to be using his work account to to Ancona, Italy, in the Marche region of Italy heading to fundraise for jihad abroad, in locations such as Kashmir, a boat to Turkey. With a bus branded from “Dudley [a Algeria and Chechnya, among others. When confronted British city in the west midlands] to Damascus,” the driv- by reporters, he told them, “I work for two people really, ers reported being part of a six vehicle convoy including the Qur’anic recitation provided by Sufyan Mustafa Ka- Mr. Massari and Osama bin Laden.” See Chris Hastings an ambulance and a heavy goods truck with clothes and mal, the son of recently deported preacher Abu Hamza and Jessica Berry, “Muslim Militia Training in Britain: children’s milk. They were linked to the charity United al-Masri. While none of these men have been convicted Bin Laden Groups to Join Mujahedeen for Various Wars, Muslims (www.unitedmuslims.co.uk). Other convoys on any terrorism charges or fallen under suspicion of any Including Chechnya,” Ottowa Citizen, November 7, 1999. have been sent from the Aid Convoy charity (www.aid- crime, they have all attracted some controversy due to In later years, al-Massari would openly talk on the BBC convoy.org.uk). the tone in their preaching. about running jihad supporting websites and radio sta- 69 For example, on February 25, 2012, outside the Syr- 70 For pictures of this demonstration, see www.demotix. tions from the United Kingdom. See “The New al-Qaeda: ian Embassy, the group Aid Convoy 2 Syria (that later com/news/1060472/hizb-ut-tahrir-march-through-lon- jihad.com,” BBC, July 20, 2005; Philip Johnston, “Calls became the Aid Convoy) held an event called “Answer don-support-syrian-uprising#media-1060346. to Deport ‘the Voice of al-Qa’eda,’” Telegraph, July 27, the Call: Charity Rally for Syria,” at which Shaykh 71 Moazzam Begg, “Syria: My Journey to the Land of 2005. Haithem al-Haddad and Imam Shakeel Begg spoke with Blessing, and Torture,” Cage Prisoners, August 16, 2012.

14 february 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 2 injured during fighting.72 In 2003, he A Formidable Force was arrested with unspecified terrorist Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan’s Today, the TTP is not only operational plans after being connected with a New Cease-Fire Offer in the FATA region, but has active number of French former Bosnian cells across the country, particularly fighters who carried out a series of By Imtiaz Ali in Punjab Province as well as in the violent robberies across France.73 Saajid port city of Karachi. While the TTP Badat went to Sarajevo in 1998 and the in january 2013, Tehrik-i-Taliban established a strong network in the next year to Afghanistan.74 Two years Pakistan (TTP) released multiple sprawling city of Karachi years ago,5 it later he was on his way back to the statements offering a cease-fire to recently also warned bus drivers in the United Kingdom with Richard Reid and Pakistan’s government. Islamabad eastern city of Lahore against showing a set of “shoe bombs” with the intent to has not yet decided how to respond vulgar movies or playing explicit songs blow up transatlantic airlines.75 Also in to the peace offer, which comes as during road trips.6 1998, Omar Sharif answered the call to the country enters a critical political go and join Kosovar militants fighting phase of general elections in the According to Pakistani officials, the Serbs, although he cut his trip short. He coming months. The cease-fire offer TTP has also relied upon new bases for went to Damascus approximately a year led to intense discussion in Pakistani its fighters in neighboring Afghanistan, later, then Afghanistan after 9/11, before media outlets as well as in the corridors where they are able to hide during his fatal trip in 2003 back to Damascus of power regarding how to respond where he hoped to join the insurgency to the TTP.1 Indeed, in the past year, “While the TTP’s offer of in Iraq and instead ended up as part Pakistan’s military claims to have of a two-man suicide cell operating on cleared many of the TTP’s strongholds peace talks has dominated Hamas’ behalf in Tel Aviv.76 in the Federally Administered Tribal the country’s headlines, Areas (FATA).2 The number of TTP This is not a new narrative. Conflicts suicide attacks decreased in 2012, its strategy of targeting with a jihadist flavor attract idealistic leading some to suggest that it is a security forces and young fighters who are sometimes result of Pakistan’s military operations redirected to other conflicts. At some combined with persistent U.S. drone progressive political point, if these fighters encounter certain strikes in the FATA region.3 parties suggests that it has groups or individuals, this energy can develop into plotting at home. Certainly On the other hand, the TTP reportedly no intention of entering this is not always the case, and most of increased targeted attacks on security into meaningful political those who go—either to fight or simply forces, government installations and to do charity work—will return home high-profile figures in 2012, suggesting engagement with the and resume their lives. Yet the growing this decline was instead due to a change government of Pakistan.” depth and complexity of the UK-Syria in tactics.4 connection will perplex security services for years to come as they try to identify This article first explores the strength who is connected with Salafi-jihadi and changing tactics of the TTP. It then Pakistani military operations in FATA. groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and who reviews the TTP’s cease-fire offer, as These officials allege that many of the went for less nefarious reasons. well as how Pakistan’s government TTP’s top commanders, as well as might respond. It finds that while hundreds of fighters, are exploiting Raffaello Pantucci is a Senior Research the TTP’s offer of peace talks has positions in Afghanistan’s Nuristan Fellow at the Royal United Services dominated the country’s headlines, its and Kunar provinces for cross-border Institute (RUSI) and the author of the strategy of targeting security forces and attacks in Pakistan.7 The TTP has forthcoming We Love Death As You Love progressive political parties suggests acknowledged this claim,8 and the Life: Britain’s Suburban Mujahedeen that it has no intention of entering into significant arrest of TTP commander (Hurst/Columbia University Press). meaningful political engagement with Maulvi Faqir in Nangarhar Province the government of Pakistan. in Afghanistan on February 18, 2013, reinforced these reports.9

72 Jeremy Britton, “Rowe ‘Bore al-Qaeda Hallmarks,’” BBC, September 23, 2005. 1 Pervez Hoodbhoy, “Negotiate With the TTP?” Express 5 Salis bin Perwaiz, “Taliban in City Gaining Strength in 73 “Al Qaeda Exploits ‘Blue-Eyed’ Muslim Converts,” Tribune, January 11, 2013. Numbers,” The News International, November 3, 2012. Reuters, October 11, 2005. 2 “Pakistan Says Militant Bases Broken Up Near Afghan 6 Asad Kharal, “TTP Warns Drivers Not to Play Obscene 74 Martin Beckford, “Terrorist Supergrass Saajid Badat: Border,” Reuters, January 30, 2013. Music, Films,” Express Tribune, February 6, 2013. The Shoe Bomber Who Got Cold Feet,” Telegraph, April 3 Yasir Rahman, “Pakistani Terrorist Attacks in 2012 7 Syed Irfan Ashraf, “TTP’s Pakistan Strategy,” Dawn, 17, 2012. Dropped, Report Says,” Central Asia Online, January 29, October 24, 2011. 75 Paul Cruickshank, “Transatlantic Shoe Bomber Knew 2013. 8 Tahir Khan, “TTP Admits Having Safe Havens in Af- Bin Laden,” CNN, April 20, 2012. 4 Mahvish Ahmad, “Taliban Attack on Pakistani Air- ghanistan,” Express Tribune, June 26, 2012. 76 “World: Road to Martyrdom,” Journeyman Pictures, port Highlights Changed Tactics,” Christian Science Moni- 9 “Top TTP Commander Maulvi Faqir Captured in Af- first broadcast on May 30, 2007. tor, December 12, 2012. ghanistan: Officials,”Dawn , February 19, 2013.

15 february 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 2

Although the frequency of TTP suicide At the end of December, in a sheer show and Hakimullah’s TTP were rivals, attacks has decreased, the militant of force, TTP militants kidnapped 23 and they occasionally attacked each group continues to execute a number of soldiers from two checkpoints near other in South Waziristan Agency. high-profile operations. In June 2012, Peshawar. Two days later, authorities Nazir shared a non-aggression more than 200 armed TTP militants in found the bullet-ridden bodies of pact with the Pakistani state, and a convoy of 40 to 50 vehicles stormed 21 of the kidnapped soldiers in a Pakistan supported him in his fight a jail in Bannu city, setting free more nearby town.15 In January 2013, the against the TTP.22 His death could than 350 inmates including the high- TTP took responsibility for killing weaken Pakistan’s influence in South profile operative Adnan Rashid, who Manzar Imam—a member of the Sindh Waziristan Agency and allow the TTP was convicted for trying to assassinate Provincial Assembly who belonged to regroup and strengthen its position to the Muttahida Qaumi Movement in this strategic FATA territory. “The TTP might also now (MQM)—in Karachi.16 The anti-Shi`a sectarian group Lashkar-i-Jhangvi The TTP’s Cease-Fire Offer benefit from the killing of (LJ) reportedly assisted the TTP in the Despite the TTP’s continued strength, Maulvi Nazir, the leader attack, once again underscoring the in December 2012 Hakimullah Mehsud links between the TTP and the LJ.17 released a detailed video message of an anti-TTP Taliban offering a cease-fire and peace talks. faction who died in a U.S. Moreover, contrary to reports of Although refusing to disarm, the TTP internal differences, the TTP has leadership presented two conditions drone strike on January 2, remained organizationally strong. For to the Pakistani government before 2013.” years, there have been frequent reports peace talks could begin: 1) Pakistan of infighting, especially between should change its foreign policy top commander Hakimullah Mehsud by disassociating with the United and his deputy, Waliur Rahman.18 Yet former President Pervez Musharraf.10 these reports have proved consistently Just two months later, TTP militants false. Hakimullah Mehsud still enjoys “The TTP has not worried attacked one of the country’s most support of his top commanders and about public outrage in the critical air force bases in the city of the TTP’s shura, a committee of top Kamra, the PAF Minhas Airbase. That TTP commanders who oversee and past, which leads many to gun battle, which lasted for five hours, coordinate the group’s activities.19 His speculate that the TTP’s left 10 people dead, including nine source of strength derives not only militants, and destroyed one aircraft from his battlefield experience, but cease-fire offer could be in the base.11 The militants managed to also his strong relations with Kashmiri a tactical move given its breach the highly secure facility.12 and sectarian militant groups, as well as from Afghan Taliban factions such timing and impossible In mid-December 2012, the TTP brazenly as the Quetta shura and the Haqqani peace conditions.” carried out an attack on Peshawar network.20 International Airport that was made possible by its close coordination with The TTP might also now benefit from foreign militants, most likely from the the killing of Maulvi Nazir, the leader States, and design its foreign policy Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.13 of an anti-TTP Taliban faction who in conformity with Islamic laws; A week later, the TTP killed Bashir died in a U.S. drone strike on January 2) Pakistan’s constitution should Bilour, a senior minister in the Khyber 2, 2013.21 Nazir’s Taliban faction be based on Shari`a.23 The TTP Pakhtunkhwa government. Bilour was nominated three politicians as a leader of the ruling Awami National 15 “Taliban Execute 21 Abducted Soldiers,” The Nation, guarantors for peace talks with the Party (ANP), the progressive Pashtun December 30, 2012. military. They include former Prime 14 nationalist party. 16 Shabbir H. Kazmi, “Pakistan: TTP Claims Responsi- Minister Nawaz Sharif, Maulana Fazul bility for Killing MQM Legislator,” Euro Asia News and Rahman of Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam, and Analysis, January 18, 2013. Munawar Hasan of Jamaat-i-Islami—all 17 “TTP, LeJ Claim Killing of Manzar Imam,” Central of these figures favor negotiations with 24 Asia Online, January 18, 2013. the TTP. 18 “Exclusive: Pakistan Taliban Commanders at Each 10 “Prison Break: Taliban Attack Bannu Jail, Nearly Other’s Throats,” Reuters, January 3, 2012; “FATA An- 400 Inmates Escape,” Express Tribune, April 15, 2012. nual Security Report 2012,” FATA Research Center, Is- Waziristan Agency to conduct attacks in neighboring 11 “Taliban Claim Attack on Minhas Base; Nine Militants lamabad, Pakistan, January 21, 2013. Afghanistan. Killed,” Dawn, August 16, 2012. 19 “FATA Annual Security Report 2012”; Zahir Shah, 22 Rustam Shah Mohmand, “Mullah Nazir Death Will 12 Ibid. “Hakimullah Mehsud Not to be Replaced: TTP,” Dawn, Change Nothing,” The News International, January 10, 13 “Peshawar in Shock After Airport Attack,” Dawn, December 10, 2012. 2013. December 17, 2012; “Uzbek Militants Behind Peshawar 20 Syed Zahir Shah, “TTP: Hakeemullah a Fiercely Am- 23 Salim Safi, “Taliban Set Terms to Ceasefire,”The News Airport Attack,” The Nation, December 17, 2012. bitious Militant,” World Analysis Net, August 27, 2009. International, December 27, 2012. 14 Amir Mir, “TTP Killed Bilour to Avenge JUI-S Lead- 21 Nazir’s death is a significant success for the United 24 “Talking to the Taliban,” Express Tribune, February er’s Death,” The News International, December 24, 2012. States since his fighters used their sanctuaries in South 5, 2013.

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It is not clear what led the TTP Pakistan’s Divided Response religious parties agreed to talk to the leadership to offer a cease-fire, and Overall, Pakistan’s response to the TTP TTP, but none of them have a clear there are different theories about the threat, as well as the cease-fire offer, strategy of how to proceed. The TTP has TTP’s intentions. Some analysts link has been divided. On the military front, refused to lay down arms and has called the TTP’s fresh offer of peace talks last month Pakistan announced for the the Pakistani system of governance with developments on the other side of first time that its “military doctrine” “un-Islamic.”36 the border in Afghanistan. According now considers internal threats the to this reasoning, just as the Afghan biggest national security priority.31 This As Pakistan enters election season after Taliban is offering to negotiate with the statement served as a major break from the dissolution of the present legislature government of Afghanistan, the TTP also its decades-old India-centric security in the middle of March, it seems wants to negotiate with the government of policy. Although it is not clear whether unlikely that the military will launch Pakistan.25 This effort may be the TTP’s the latest paradigm shift in Pakistan’s a major operation against the TTP in attempt to grab headlines and concessions military doctrine is because of a warming the near future. The military may well in a rapidly changing situation in the of relations with India or if it is the choose to leave the decision to the next Pakistan-Afghanistan region. realization that there is an existential civilian government. For Pakistan threat to the state posed by militant to move forward on confronting the Others argue that the TTP has lost groups, the announcement nonetheless Pakistani Taliban, its military and much support due to its recent actions, has been received with a mixed response. political leadership need to develop a such as the attack on schoolgirl Malala There are some who have welcomed the consensus on how to face the threat.37 Yousafzai, the teenager who stood up new military doctrine, saying it is not The TTP has so far cleverly exploited to the Taliban in her hometown of the too late to properly confront the internal divisions within the country’s political Swat Valley.26 In October 2012, TTP threat.32 Others, however, argue that and military leadership. To achieve any gunmen shot the 15-year-old Yousafzai this change in doctrine is not genuine, progress, Pakistan will have to develop a in the head while she was on a school and that Pakistan will continue to coordinated policy toward the Pakistani bus in Mingora.27 The TTP was also pursue a weak strategy of countering Taliban before the group consolidates criticized for the assassination of ANP homegrown militancy, precisely because more power and increasingly challenges leader Bashir Bilour. Although the TTP the country’s military and intelligence the state. has killed more than 600 workers of services allegedly collaborate with the ANP, mostly in targeted attacks,28 friendly Taliban factions as well as Imtiaz Ali is a writer and consultant Bilour was one of the boldest figures sectarian extremist groups.33 focusing on political, development, media among Pakistani politicians who have and security issues in Pakistan. He is from taken a clear stand against militancy, On the political front, the Pakistan Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. Earlier and he was the highest ranking ANP Peoples Party government and almost in his career as a journalist, he worked leader to die at the hands of the TTP. His all mainstream political and religious as a field reporter for prestigious local assassination was widely condemned parties have now shown a willingness and foreign media organizations and has across the country.29 to talk to the TTP.34 Although in the extensively reported on Pakistani politics, wake of ANP leader Bashir Bilour’s society, security and militancy in the border Nevertheless, the TTP has not worried assassination the ANP called the region between Afghanistan and Pakistan. about public outrage in the past, which All Parties Conference to devise a Currently, he is a fellow at the Institute for leads many to speculate that the TTP’s joint strategy against the Taliban Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU) cease-fire offer could be a tactical and terrorism, today the ANP favors in Washington D.C. move given its timing and impossible negotiations with the TTP.35 Pakistan’s peace conditions. If past peace deals religious parties have always preferred between the government and the TTP an approach of appeasement when are any indication, then the TTP may be dealing with the Taliban, while the other pursuing its previous strategy of buying mainstream parties have only gone so time to regroup, before retaliating with far as to condemn acts of violence, but more violence than before. Indeed, some not the perpetrators. After the cease- argue that the TTP became stronger and fire offer, many of the political and more violent after similar agreements in 30 the past. With the Taliban,” CTC Sentinel 5:9 (2012). 31 “Pakistan Army Sees ‘Internal Threats’ as Greatest 25 “Pakistan Taliban ‘Holding Peace Talks with Govern- Security Risk,” Dawn, January 3, 2013. ment,’” Daily Telegraph, November 21, 2011. 32 “Changing Paradigm,” Express Tribune, January 4, 26 Amir Rana, “Signs of Frustration,” Dawn, October 21, 2013. 2012. 33 Mohammad Taqi, “Anti-Terrorism Doctrine: Too 27 Ibid. Little, Too Late?” Daily Times, January 24, 2013. 36 Ivan Watson, “Taliban: Pakistani Legal System Un- 28 “ANP Lost 750 Activists in War Against Terror: 34 “Malik Welcomes TTP Talks Offer,” The Nation, Feb- Islamic,” CNN, April 22, 2009; “Pakistan Taliban Chief Spokesman,” The News International, April 9, 2012. ruary 4, 2013. Hakimullah Mehsud Says Democracy is ‘Un-Islamic,’” 29 “Bashir Bilour’s Assassination Widely Condemned,” 35 “ANP Sponsor Moot: Two Dozen Parties Endorse Australian, December 19, 2012. The News International, December 24, 2012. Peace Talks with Taliban,” Express Tribune, February 15, 37 Khadim Hussain, “Consensus on Terrorism,” Dawn, 30 Daud Khattak, “Reviewing Pakistan’s Peace Deals 2013. January 28, 2013.

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This article examines Nazir’s Zabul, Helmand and up to Kandahar.16 The Significance of Maulvi significance in Pakistan and His fighters primarily consisted of Nazir’s Death in Pakistan Afghanistan, assesses the overall members of the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe, implications of his death for the United who inhabit the western and southern By Zia Ur Rehman States and Pakistan, as well as provides areas of South Waziristan.17 The a short profile of his successor, Bahawal modern guerrilla techniques employed on january 2, 2013, a U.S. drone strike Khan. by al-Qa`ida fighters inspired Nazir, killed Maulvi Nazir in South Waziristan who also worked on improving the Agency in Pakistan’s Federally Maulvi Nazir’s Significance skills of his own fighters.18 In an Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).1 Maulvi Nazir was born in 1975 in interview, Nazir said that “al-Qa`ida Nazir, a senior Taliban commander, was Birmel, a town in Afghanistan’s Paktika and the Taliban are one and the same. closely aligned with the Afghan Taliban, Province, located only five-and-a-half At an operational level, we might have the Haqqani network, and the Hafiz Gul miles from the Pakistan border.7 He different strategies, but at the policy Bahadur Taliban faction, yet he had an belonged to the Kakakhel tribe, a sub- antagonistic relationship with Tehrik- clan of the Ahmedzai Wazir.8 As is i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).2 Nazir was typical in the region, his family lived on “For Pakistan, however, the leader of one of four major militant both sides of the Durand Line separating Nazir’s death is more factions in FATA, and he was accused Afghanistan and Pakistan.9 While in of sending fighters to neighboring Birmel, Nazir reportedly studied at a complicated. Pakistan’s Afghanistan to attack NATO and religious seminary.10 He later expanded military and Nazir’s faction Afghan troops.3 Yet unlike the TTP, on his studies as a student of Maulana Nazir was opposed to attacking targets Noor Muhammad at Darul Uloom were operating under a inside Pakistan.4 His refusal to attack Waziristan, located in Wana, South non-aggression pact, and Pakistan allowed the country’s military Waziristan Agency.11 to forge a non-aggression pact with violent incidents between his faction, which served Pakistan’s He joined the Taliban movement in the two were rare.” strategy of isolating the TTP.5 1996 and fought against the Northern Alliance.12 After the fall of the Taliban Although Nazir’s death will likely hurt regime in 2001, Nazir returned to the Afghan Taliban, it marks a positive Wana and became actively involved level, we are one and the same.”19 A development for the TTP. Nazir led one in supporting al-Qa`ida and Taliban number of key al-Qa`ida leaders—such of the few militias willing to challenge activities in South Waziristan.13 He was as Ilyas Kashmiri, Abu Khabab al- the TTP, and his fighters engaged in arrested by Pakistan’s security forces Masri, Osama al-Kini, Shaykh Ahmad occasional skirmishes with the group. in 2004, but was later released under Salim Swedan, and Abu Zaid al-Iraqi— The TTP even reportedly tried to the Shakai peace deal that was signed were killed in U.S. drone strikes while assassinate Nazir in November 2012.6 between Taliban commander Nek reportedly under Nazir’s protection.20 Unless Nazir’s successor is able to Muhammad and the Pakistan Army.14 project strength quickly, the TTP may Nazir became the top militant leader be emboldened by the loss of this rival After his release, Nazir moved back to in the Wana area after he successfully leader. This might place more pressure Wana, where he became the top militant challenged local militant leaders on Pakistan’s security forces if Nazir’s leader in the area by 2006-2007.15 His Haji Sharif, Maulana Abbas and death enables the TTP to focus more network stretched into southwestern Haji Omar—all considered key resources against the Pakistani state. Afghanistan, to include Paktika, supporters of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).21 After establishing 7 Chris Harnish, “Question Mark of South Waziristan: control in these areas in 2007, Biography and Analysis of Maulvi Nazir Ahmad,” Criti- Nazir confronted the foreign Uzbek 1 “Two Attacks Leave 12 Dead: ‘Good Taliban’ Maulvi cal Threats Project, July 17, 2009; “Profile: The ‘Good’ militant presence, accusing them of Nazir Killed by Drone,” Dawn, January 3, 2013. Taliban Leader,” Express Tribune, January 4, 2012. robbing and killing Ahmadzai Wazir 2 “Pakistan Militant Mullah Nazir Killed ‘in Drone At- 8 Zulfiqar Ali, “Mullah Nazir’s Death: New Taliban Chief tribesmen and imposing their self- 22 tack,’” BBC, January 3, 2013. Named in South Waziristan,” Express Tribune, January 5, styled Shari`a on local inhabitants. 3 These factions are the Haqqani network, the Hafiz Gul 2012. Bahadar faction, the TTP, and Maulvi Nazir’s faction. 9 Ibid. 16 Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Taliban and al-Qaeda: Friends 4 He was closely allied with Hafiz Gul Bahadar, whose 10 “Profile: The ‘Good’ Taliban Leader.” in Arms,” Asia Times Online, May 5, 2011. territory is in North Waziristan Agency. Bahadar’s fac- 11 Ibid. 17 Ibid. tion shares Maulvi Nazir’s targeting selection, as they 12 Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Eviction or Safe Passage?” 18 Ibid. both choose to concentrate attacks in Afghanistan and Newsline, May 10, 2007. 19 Ibid. not in Pakistan. 13 Personal interview, Wana-based journalist, January 20 Amir Mir, “Maulvi Nazir’s Death Irks Security Estab- 5 Personal interview, Ahmed Wali Mujeeb, a Pashtun 5, 2013. lishment,” The News International, January 4, 2013. journalist who has covered militancy in the region, Janu- 14 “Profile: The ‘Good’ Taliban Leader.” 21 Mansoor Khan Mahsud, “The Battle for Pakistan: Mil- ary 5, 2013. 15 Personal interview, Ahmed Wali Mujeeb, a Pashtun itancy and Conflict in South Waziristan,” New America 6 Amir Mir, “Key Taliban Coalition Falling Apart After journalist who has covered militancy in the region, Janu- Foundation, April 2010. Nazir Attack,” The News International, December 5, 2012. ary 5, 2013. 22 Adil Shahzeb, “The Mullah and the Military,” The Fri-

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With the support of his Ahmedzai Wazir him.29 Yet his life was ultimately ended militants from the territory, as well tribe and the assistance of Pakistan’s by a U.S. drone on January 2, 2013. as increase disunity among all the military, Nazir successfully flushed the Taliban groups.36 The government has Uzbek militants from Wana in 2007, an Implications for the United States and encouraged local tribesmen to form action that angered the TTP. Baitullah Pakistan lashkars (tribal militias) to eliminate Mehsud had a long relationship with the U.S. officials and security analysts “hard-core al-Qa`ida elements and IMU, even before he created the TTP. argue that Nazir’s death will benefit the their affiliates especially the TTP,” who IMU leader Tahir Yuldashev offered United States because he headed one of his fighters to Baitullah when the latter the three major militant groups in the “Others argue that Nazir’s decided to attack the Pakistani state.23 Waziristan region that focus attacks on The TTP provided sanctuary for the U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan, killing will weaken his IMU in exchange for its assistance in as well as provide protection for al- faction dramatically, and Qa`ida fighters.30 In 2009 and 2010, “Forging good relations Nazir reportedly helped deploy allow the TTP to take hundreds of well-trained “Punjabi” advantage in Wana.” with Nazir’s successor Taliban militants of Pakistani origin is likely Pakistan’s top inside Afghan territory to pressure U.S. and coalition forces ahead of their priority so that peace withdrawal.31 One U.S. official told the have increasingly challenged the writ of can continue with the New York Times that “while it is too soon the state by mounting deadly terrorist to tell, the death of Nazir, along with attacks inside Pakistan.37 Forging good Ahmedzai Wazir of South some of his deputies, could push his relations with Nazir’s successor is likely Waziristan.” network into disarray, degrading Al Pakistan’s top priority so that peace can Qaeda’s access to South Waziristan as continue with the Ahmedzai Wazir of a result.”32 South Waziristan. fighting Pakistani security forces.24 As For Pakistan, however, Nazir’s death is Nazir’s Successor: Bahawal Khan these local commanders and their allied more complicated. Pakistan’s military After Nazir’s killing, Bahawal Khan Uzbek militants left the area, Nazir and Nazir’s faction were operating (also known as Salahuddin Ayubi) became the sole Taliban leader around under a non-aggression pact, and violent was announced as the new chief of Wana.25 incidents between the two were rare. Wana’s Taliban militants. Khan is Nazir was also at war with the TTP, the reportedly a 34-year-old illiterate Nazir’s attack on the Uzbeks, as well latter of which is Pakistan’s primary former bus driver.38 He has long been as his disagreement with the TTP domestic security threat.33 Pakistan a close associate of Nazir, as the two over attacking the Pakistani state, even offered support to Nazir’s faction men fought together with the Taliban eventually caused conflict between against the TTP.34 Nazir’s death could in Afghanistan before the U.S.-led Nazir’s Taliban faction and the TTP.26 mean that the TTP can free up resources invasion in 2001.39 He was the Taliban In January 2008, fighting broke out to attack Pakistani targets.35 commander for the Speen area of South between the two groups in South Waziristan.40 Although Qari Ziaur Waziristan.27 Periodic skirmishes Through the pro-government Nazir Rahman was Maulvi Nazir’s deputy, the continue through the present day.28 In faction, Pakistan’s military was council of Wana-based militants agreed November 2012, Nazir barely avoided trying to instigate a tribal uprising to nominate Khan because he is a veteran death after a suicide bomber—thought against the TTP in South Waziristan jihadist commander who remained close to be from the TTP—tried to assassinate and flush out the TTP’s Mehsud to Nazir. Khan initially refused to accept the leadership position, but agreed after 29 Zia Ur Rehman, “Waziristan After Maulvi Nazir,” The elders and militant commanders in the day Times, January 11, 2013. Friday Times, January 11, 2013; Mir, “Key Taliban Coali- area insisted he should become the new 41 23 Amir Mir, “TTP Using Uzbeks to Conduct Terrorist tion Falling Apart After Nazir Attack.” chief. Attacks,” The News International, December 18, 2012. 30 The Pentagon said that Nazir’s death would represent 24 Ibid. a “major development.” See Salman Masood and Ismail 25 Personal interview, Ahmed Wali Mujeeb, a Pashtun Khan, “Drone Kills a Pakistani Militant Behind Attacks 36 Ibid. journalist who has covered militancy in the region, Janu- on U.S. Forces,” New York Times, January 3, 2013; “Mul- 37 Zia Ur Rehman, “Tribal Militias are Double-edged ary 5, 2013. lah Nazir’s Death a ‘Major Development’: US,” Express Weapon,” The Friday Times, September 30, 2011. 26 Iqbal Khattak, “Wazir Tribes Ratify New Militant Tribune, January 4, 2013. 38 “Bahawal Khan to Succeed Pakistan Militant Leader Bloc,” Daily Times, July 9, 2008; personal interview, Pir 31 M. Ilyas Khan, “Taliban’s Mullah Nazir Death Spells Mullah Nazir,” BBC, January 4, 2013. Zubair Shah, a former New York Times reporter who is Trouble for Pakistan,” BBC, January 3, 2013. 39 Ibid. from South Waziristan, November 28, 2012. 32 Masood and Khan. 40 Mushtaq Yusufzai, “Shops, Markets in Wana Remain 27 Harnish. 33 Mir, “Maulvi Nazir’s Death Irks Security Establish- Closed Amid Tense Calm,” The News International, 28 See, for example, “Hakimullah’s Men Clash with Na- ment.” January 5, 2013. zir Group; Three Killed,” Dawn, August 19, 2010; “Clash 34 Ibid. 41 Irfan Burki and Mushtaq Yousafzai, “Maulvi Nazir Between Militants Groups Claimed Five People,” FATA 35 Personal interview, a Wana-based journalist, January Among 10 Killed in Drone Strikes,” The News Interna- Research Center, August 6, 2012. 5, 2013. tional, January 4, 2013.

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Analysts describe Khan as more hot Conclusion tempered than Nazir.42 Nevertheless, Nazir’s death is a loss to the insurgency Recent Highlights in some believe that Khan will be able to in neighboring Afghanistan, and it Terrorist Activity maintain cohesion within the ranks.43 could also hurt the Afghan Taliban’s Others argue that Khan may prove less sanctuaries in the Pakistani tribal January 1, 2013 (PAKISTAN): A operationally or strategically important region. For the United States, Nazir’s bomb exploded near a rally for the as Nazir, as he will have to live under death might weaken the insurgency in Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) constant threat of drone strikes.44 Afghanistan and also possibly damage in Karachi. The bomb killed four Pakistan’s strategy of negotiating people. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan In the wake of Nazir’s killing, some with militant groups friendly to its claimed responsibility, adding that analysts say his successor and followers interests.50 this was the first of a series of coming may now turn their guns on civilian and attacks on the MQM. – Daily News & military targets in Pakistan because Nazir’s death could be a contentious Analysis, January 1 they suspect that Pakistan’s security issue between Washington and establishment is consenting to drone Islamabad since the Pakistani military January 1, 2013 (PAKISTAN): attacks.45 According to this theory, one views commanders such as Nazir as Gunmen opened fire on charity negative outcome from Nazir’s death useful in keeping the peace domestically. workers involved in vaccinations and is that the peace agreement between His death may now create a power education in Swabi District of Khyber the Pakistani government and Nazir’s vacuum, and possibly spark a tribal war Pakhtunkhwa Province. Seven of the faction will collapse, and followers of that will leave Pakistan to deal with the workers, including six women, were Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur in North consequent instability. killed. – Daily News & Analysis, January 1; Waziristan will join together with the BBC, January 29 TTP.46 Such a development would be Zia Ur Rehman is a journalist and dangerous for Pakistan, although there researcher who covers militancy in January 1, 2013 (ETHIOPIA): An is no evidence that this has occurred.47 Pakistan. He has written for The Friday Ethiopian court convicted 10 people Times, The Jamestown Foundation, The of having links to al-Qa`ida, in what Others argue that Nazir’s killing will News International, The National and has marked the first trial in the country weaken his faction dramatically, contributed to the New York Times. for al-Qa`ida suspects. One of those and allow the TTP to take advantage convicted is a Kenyan national. – AFP, in Wana.48 Pakistan’s military has January 1 struggled to maintain a strategic balance in the Waziristan region by entering January 1, 2013 (NIGERIA): Nigerian into peace deals with some of the troops killed 13 suspected Boko Haram area’s militant factions—with the goal militants in Maiduguri, Borno State. of isolating the TTP. The loss of Nazir – CNN, January 2 means that there will be less pressure from this group on the TTP, providing January 2, 2013 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. it with opportunities to strengthen and drone killed Maulvi Nazir, a top expand its presence and influence back Taliban leader, in South Waziristan into the Wana area of South Waziristan, Agency of the Federally Administered which was previously dominated by Tribal Areas. Nazir was responsible Nazir.49 for sending Taliban fighters across the border into Afghanistan to fight Afghan and coalition forces. He did not, however, attack targets inside Pakistan, and he had signed a peace

42 Personal interview, Ijaz Khan, a Peshawar-based se- treaty or non-aggression pact with the curity analyst, January 12, 2013. Pakistani government. Nazir’s Taliban 43 “Bahawal Khan to Succeed Pakistan Militant Leader faction frequently skirmished with Mullah Nazir.” Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, which is 44 Shahzeb. anti-Pakistan and also operates out 45 Taha Siddiqui, “Good Taliban, Bad Taliban? Paki- of South Waziristan Agency. Nazir’s stani Commander’s Killing Exposes Blurry Lines,” Chris- death is considered a blow to Taliban tian Science Monitor, January 5, 2013. militants who use South Waziristan 46 Shamim Shahid, “Luck Runs Out for Mullah Nazir,” Agency as a sanctuary from which Pakistan Today, January 4, 2013. to execute attacks on soldiers in 47 Ibid. Afghanistan. – Reuters, January 3 48 Personal interview, Ijaz Khan, a Peshawar-based se- curity analyst, January 12, 2013. January 3, 2013 (UNITED STATES): 49 Personal interview, Ahmed Wali Mujeeb, a Pashtun British authorities extradited Abid journalist who has covered militancy in the region, Janu- 50 Personal interview, a retired Pakistani military offi- Naseer to the United States to face ary 5, 2013. cer, January 5, 2013. charges for his alleged role in a

20 february 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 2 planned al-Qa`ida suicide bomb plot January 6, 2013 (PAKISTAN): U.S. members of al-Qa`ida in the Islamic targeting New York City subways in drones killed at least 12 militants in Maghreb. – Telegraph, January 11 2009. According to the Associated South Waziristan Agency near the Press, U.S. federal prosecutors said Afghan border. According to reports, January 11, 2013 (MALI): French that they aim to “prove that Naseer some of the dead were members of military forces intervened in northern collected bomb ingredients, conducted Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, while Mali, attacking Islamist militants who reconnaissance and was in frequent others were described as being control the north. French and Malian contact with other Al Qaeda operatives members of Punjabi militant groups. forces managed to retake the town of as part of a foiled New York plot and a – Australian, January 7 Konna, which the militants overran second suspected plot to bomb a busy on January 10. Among the ranks of the shopping area in the northern English January 7, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): A militants are members of al-Qa`ida city of Manchester.” – Reuters, January 3; member of the Afghan Army shot and in the Islamic Maghreb. French Associated Press, January 3 killed a British soldier at a military President Francois Hollande said, “I base in Helmand Province. – BBC, have decided that France will respond January 3, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide January 8 without delay and alongside our bomber in a vehicle killed at least partners, to the request of the Malian 27 Shi`a Muslims at a bus station January 8, 2013 (FRANCE): A French authorities. We will do it strictly in in Mussayab, 40 miles south of court sentenced Irfan Demirtas to the framework of UN Security Council Baghdad. According to the New York eight years in prison for heading an resolutions and we are ready to stop Times, “The apparent targets were effort to fund the Islamic Movement the terrorist offensive if it continues.” pilgrims returning from the holy city of Uzbekistan, an al-Qa`ida-linked – Telegraph, January 11 of Karbala, where Shiites observe the terrorist group. – Wall Street Journal, end of the 40-day annual mourning January 8 January 11, 2013 (IRAQ): At least 12 period for the death of Imam Hussein prisoners, including members of al- ibn Ali, a grandson of the Prophet January 8, 2013 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. Qa`ida in Iraq, escaped from Taji Muhammad.” – Reuters, January 3; New York drone killed eight suspected militants prison, 15 miles from Baghdad. Some Times, January 3 near Mir Ali, North Waziristan of the escapees were on death row. Agency. – Voice of America, January 8 – RFE/RL, January 11 January 3, 2013 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. drone killed three suspected militants January 9, 2013 (PAKISTAN): January 11, 2013 (SOMALIA): French in North Waziristan Agency of the Pakistani police arrested five alleged forces launched a rescue attempt to Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan members save Denis Allex, a member of France’s Among those killed was Shah Faisal, suspected of killing female polio General Directorate for External identified as a commander for Tehrik- vaccinators and planning to attack Security (DGSE), who had been held i-Taliban Pakistan. – Los Angeles Times, Karachi airport. – Dawn, January 9 by al-Shabab since July 14, 2009, in January 3 Somalia. A fierce gunfight erupted January 10, 2013 (PAKISTAN): An during the rescue attempt, in which January 3, 2013 (YEMEN): A suspected explosion tore through the Tablighi two French soldiers and 17 militants U.S. drone killed three al-Qa`ida in Markaz in the Swat Valley, killing 22 were killed. French authorities said the Arabian Peninsula fighters in members of Tablighi Jama`at. It was that Denis Allex was killed during Bayda Province, including a “senior unclear whether the explosion was the failed raid. Al-Shabab, however, figure.” – al-Jazira, January 4 an accident, or if a suicide bomber claimed that Allex survived the raid, was responsible. – The News International, and on January 17 they announced his January 3, 2013 (SYRIA): A car bomb January 11 execution in retaliation for the French exploded at a fuel station in Damascus, military operation. – CNN, January 12 killing at least 11 people. – The Times, January 10, 2013 (YEMEN): Yemeni January 4 tribal leader Ali Abdul Salam, who January 12, 2013 (PAKISTAN): mediated between the government and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) January 4, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula chief Hakimullah Mehsud circulated a Polish and Afghan forces captured (AQAP), was killed by armed men leaflet calling for an end to the TTP’s Mullah Abdul Kabir, identified as a in an ambush in Abyan Province. attacks on Pakistani soldiers in North senior leader in the Afghan Taliban. Authorities blamed AQAP. – Reuters, Waziristan Agency. The cease-fire, – UPI, January 7 January 10 however, does not apply to the rest of Pakistan.– Reuters, January 13 January 6, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): January 10, 2013 (MALI): Islamist Two suicide bombers attacked a militants in control of northern Mali January 13, 2013 (PAKISTAN): An meeting of tribal elders at a government pushed further south, successfully improvised explosive device detonated compound in Spin Boldak, Kandahar seizing the town of Konna, just 40 near a Pakistani military convoy in Province, killing five people. The miles from Mopti. Mopti is the last North Waziristan Agency, killing Afghan Taliban claimed responsibility. garrison town that protects the road 16 soldiers. According to Reuters, – Voice of America, January 6 to the country’s capital, Bamako. “A spokesman for the Mujahideen Among the ranks of the militants are Ansar, a group dominated by Uzbek

21 february 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 2 fighters, claimed responsibility and January 15, 2013 (YEMEN): A senior January 17, 2013 (UNITED STATES): A told Reuters the attack was retaliation Yemeni official said that a Finnish federal judge, citing lack of evidence, for the Pakistani army’s complicity in couple and an Austrian man who were acquitted one of two south Florida drone strikes. The group is allied to abducted in Yemen by tribesmen last imams accused of sending more than Pakistan Taliban fighters.” – NBC News, month have been sold to al-Qa`ida $50,000 to the Pakistani Taliban. January 13; Reuters, January 13 in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Izhar Khan was freed from jail after AQAP reportedly moved the hostages the decision. – Reuters, January 17 January 13, 2013 (NIGERIA): Nigeria’s to Bayda Province. – Reuters, January 15 military captured Mohammed Zangina, January 17, 2013 (SOMALIA): identified as a top Boko Haram member, January 16, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): The United States granted official in Maiduguri, Borno State. Zangina is An estimated six militants attacked a recognition to the Somali government reportedly a member of Boko Haram’s building belonging to Afghanistan’s in Mogadishu for the first time in two shura committee, the group’s governing National Directorate of Security (NDS) decades. – CNN, January 17 body. – CNN, January 13 in Kabul, killing an Afghan security guard. According to the BBC, “The January 17, 2013 (PAKISTAN): January 14, 2013 (YEMEN): Yemeni NDS said that one suicide attacker Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan gunmen security forces arrested two members drove a minibus which exploded assassinated Manzar Imam, a of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula outside the NDS building. Five others, provincial lawmaker belonging to the near Sana`a, recovering suicide armed with semi-automatic weapons Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), bomb vests, assassination manuals, and hand grenades, then fought the in the Orangi neighborhood of Karachi. explosives, and lists of targets for security forces for 15 minutes before According to police, “A member of the attack. – Reuters, January 14 being killed by guards.” – BBC, January Sindh provincial assembly was killed 16 with three of his guards when gunmen January 15, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): on two motorcycles intercepted his The Afghan Taliban released a January 16, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide car in Orangi neighborhood and statement condemning France’s bomber in a truck filled with explosives shot them with automatic weapons.” recent military intervention in Mali. targeted the Kurdistan Democratic – Dawn, January 17 According to the statement, “When Party headquarters in Kirkuk, killing France began its withdrawal process at least 25 people. – Reuters, January 16 January 18, 2013 (PAKISTAN): from Afghanistan in recent times it Pakistan reportedly plans to release seemed as the French government January 16, 2013 (ALGERIA): all Afghan Taliban prisoners currently would likely expand its anti-war Militants attacked a BP natural gas in detention, including the group’s stance to other regions in the world. facility in Algeria, taking dozens of former second-in-command, Mullah However it broke off its commitment foreigners and Algerians hostage. The Baradar. The prisoner release is part to peace by transgressing militarily militants, who referred to themselves of reconciliation efforts in neighboring on the soil of northern African nation as al-Mua’qi’oon Biddam (Those Afghanistan. Pakistani officials did of Mali.” The Afghan Taliban warned Who Sign with Blood), identified not specify when the detainees would that the intervention will be “not their leader as Mokhtar Belmokhtar. be freed. – Reuters, January 18 only disastrous for Mali but also for Belmokhtar released a video dated France.” – AAP, January 15 January 17 in which he claimed January 19, 2013 (YEMEN): An responsibility for the attack, saying explosion tore through a house in January 15, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide that “we at al-Qa`ida are responsible Bayda Province, killing more than bomber killed Iraqi lawmaker Efam al- for this operation, which we bless.” 10 suspected members of al-Qa`ida Esawi, a member of the Sunni-backed He further said, “We are ready to in the Arabian Peninsula. Militants Iraqiya bloc, in Anbar Province. The negotiate with the West and the reportedly used the home for lawmaker’s bodyguard was killed as Algerian regime provided that [they assembling bombs, and authorities well. The Islamic State of Iraq took stop] the attack and bombardment suspect that the explosion was responsibility, describing al-Esawi against the Muslim people of Mali… accidental. – Reuters, January 20; Voice of as an “arrogant criminal.” – Reuters, and respect their desire to implement America, January 20 January 15; AFP, January 21 Shari`a in their territory.” On January 17, Algerian security forces opened January 19, 2013 (YEMEN): Suspected January 15, 2013 (SYRIA): Two fire on militants attempting to escape U.S. drones killed three alleged explosions tore through the Syrian with hostages. Security forces finally militants in Marib Province. – Reuters, city of Aleppo, killing more than 80 took control of the facility on January January 20 people. The blasts occurred between 19. Although nearly 700 Algerian the University of Aleppo’s halls of workers and more than 100 foreigners January 20, 2013 (YEMEN): Suspected residence and the architecture faculty escaped, initial reports suggested that U.S. drones killed three alleged on the first day of exams. According at least 48 hostages were killed during militants in Marib Province, marking the to the BBC, “State TV said ‘terrorists’ the four-day siege. – Voice of America, second set of drone strikes in the province had launched rockets at the campus, January 17; Reuters, January 20 in two days. – Reuters, January 20 but activists blamed missiles fired by warplanes.” – BBC, January 15

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January 21, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): January 22, 2013 (YEMEN): A U.S. before being released to Saudi Arabia Taliban militants stormed the drone killed four suspected members to participate in a rehabilitation headquarters of Kabul’s traffic of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula program for militants. He then ended police. According to CNN, “A suicide in al-Jawf Province. – Reuters, January 22 up in Yemen fighting for al-Qa`ida. bomber detonated his explosives at – Voice of America, January 24; AP, January 24; the entrance gate of the traffic police January 22, 2013 (PHILIPPINES): Abu ABC News, January 22 compound. Two or three attackers Sayyaf Group militants ambushed the then managed to charge inside the Philippines elite Army Scout Rangers January 25, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): main building, armed with machine in Basilan Province, wounding seven A suicide bomber in a vehicle killed guns and more explosives.” Other of them. – Philippine Inquirer, January 22 five people in Kapisa Province. The reports suggested that there were Taliban said they attempted to attack a multiple suicide bombings. At least January 23, 2013 (GLOBAL): NATO convoy, but the bomber missed three people were killed. – CNN, January Muhammad al-Zawahiri, the brother the convoy and crashed into a house. 21; NBC News, January 21; CBS News, January 21 al-Qa`ida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri, – CNN, January 25; RFE/RL, January 25 sanctioned violence against the West January 21, 2013 (SYRIA): A in reaction to the French-led military January 25, 2013 (SOMALIA): Al- suicide bomber in a vehicle killed a offensive in northern Mali. “All Shabab’s Twitter account was number of pro-Assad militiamen in Muslims have the right to stop this suspended after it was used to threaten Hama Province. Jabhat al-Nusra, a aggression by any means,” he said to kill Kenyan hostages. According to Salafi-jihadi rebel group, claimed in an interview with the Associated the BBC, “Twitter refused to comment responsibility. – AP, January 28 Press in Cairo. “They [the West] on the suspension but its rules say are making jihadists.” According to that threats of violence are banned.” January 21, 2013 (YEMEN): A U.S. the Associated Press, “Al-Zawahiri, – BBC, January 25 drone killed three suspected members who is the younger brother of the of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula al-Qaeda leader, was imprisoned for January 26, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): in Marib Province. According to the nearly 12 years under Egypt’s former A suicide bomber killed 10 policemen Associated Press, “security officials president, Hosni Mubarak, including in a square in Kunduz city in said the five targeted Monday were four years in solitary confinement. northern Afghanistan. Abdullah traveling in a pickup truck when it was He was tortured during his time in Zemarai, the head of the local police hit in Marib, about 25 miles outside prison, before eventually being freed counterterrorism department, was its main city with the same name. after Mubarak’s ouster. Since his among the dead, as well as Sayyed Two were killed on site, while another release, he has been appearing in Aslam Sadat, the head of the traffic died hours later of his wounds…Two street protests in defense of Shariah… police. – New York Times, January 26 of those killed were identified as Ali and on Friday he was among some Saleh Toaiman and Qassim Nasser 200 ultraconservative Islamists and January 26, 2013 (PAKISTAN): An Toaiman…the third was identified as former jihadis who staged a protest in estimated 300 Pakistani Taliban Ahmed al-Ziadi.” – New York Daily News, front of the French Embassy in Cairo.” militants attacked the Ansaarul January 21; AP, January 21 – AP, January 23 Islam pro-government militia in the Maidan area of Tirah in the Federally January 21, 2013 (NIGERIA): January 23, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide Administered Tribal Areas. During the Suspected Boko Haram militants bomber disguised as a mourner killed clashes, which lasted for days, at least attacked hunters selling bush meat an estimated 42 people during funeral 71 fighters on both sides were killed. in Damboa, Borno State, killing 18 services inside a Shi`a mosque in Tuz – Reuters, January 26; Dawn, January 27 people. According to the BBC, “strict Khurmatu, Salah al-Din Province. Muslims are forbidden to eat this type – Reuters, January 23; AFP, January 23 January 26, 2013 (MALI): French of bush meat,” which consists of meat forces were in control of parts of Gao, from monkeys and pigs. – BBC, January January 23, 2013 (YEMEN): A U.S. northern Mali’s most populous city, 22 drone killed six suspected members after retaking the city from Islamist of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula militants. – McClatchy Newspapers, January January 22, 2013 (IRAQ): A car bomb near Sana`a. – Reuters, January 23 26 exploded near an army camp in the town of Taji, Baghdad Province, January 24, 2013 (YEMEN): A Yemeni January 27, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): killing seven people. – al-Jazira, January government statement said that Said A roadside bomb killed 10 people on 22 al-Shihri, second-in-command of al- a police truck in Kandahar. Eight of Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula, has the dead were police, and two were January 22, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide died of wounds sustained during a U.S. detainees. – New York Times, January 26 bomber killed five people at an army drone attack in November 2012. It was checkpoint in Mahmudiyah, Babil not clear when he actually died. Al- January 28, 2013 (YEMEN): A suicide Province. – al-Jazira, January 22 Shihri, a Saudi national, was detained bomber in a vehicle killed 11 soldiers in 2001 by Pakistan and turned over at a military checkpoint in Ra`da, to U.S. custody. He was imprisoned Bayda Province. – Bloomberg, January 28 at Guantanamo Bay for six years,

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January 29, 2013 (SOMALIA): A suicide CTC Sentinel Staff bomber detonated explosives inside the presidential palace compound in Editor-in-Chief Mogadishu, killing two people. Al- Erich Marquardt Shabab claimed responsibility. – AP, Senior Editor, CTC January 29; al-Arabiya, January 29

Editorial Board January 31, 2013 (IRAQ): The Islamic COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. State of Iraq (ISI) called on Sunni Department Head protesters to take up arms against Department of Social Sciences (West Point) Shi`a Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. According to Reuters, “Thousands of COL Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D. Sunni Muslims have rallied mostly in Deputy Department Head the western province of Anbar since Department of Social Sciences (West Point) December over frustrations they have been sidelined since the fall of Saddam MAJ Bryan Price, Ph.D. Hussein in 2003.” The ISI said, “You Director, CTC have two options, not three: either kneel before the apostates, though that will be impossible, or to take up arms.” – Reuters, January 31

Contact Combating Terrorism Center U.S. Military Academy 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall West Point, NY 10996 Phone: (845) 667-6383 Email: [email protected] Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/

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support The Combating Terrorism Center would like to express its gratitude to its financial supporters, for without their support and shared vision of the Center products like the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you are interested in learning more about how to support the Combating Terrorism Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call Kristin Sorenson at West Point’s Association of Graduates at 845-446-1561.

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

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