L'insediamento Di Assab

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L'insediamento Di Assab Dot. Luca Castglioni Ciclo XXVIII Università degli Studi di Pavia L'insediamento di Assab: una nuova prospettiva tra politica coloniale e realtà locale Oggeto e fnalità della ricerca: L’oggeto della mia ricerca è l’insediamento di Assab, nel periodo che va dal primo stanziarsi di personale italiano nel 1879 alla sua defnitva decadenza negli anni ’90 del XIX secolo. Ho deciso di concentrarmi su questo argomento perché Assab è collocato in un contesto geografco ricco di intrecci storici e demografci di portata ‘globale’, fno ad ora poco rappresentat nella storiografa italiana di interesse coloniale e desumibili dalla ricostruzione della realtà locale atraverso l’analisi della prospetva degli amministratori italiani ed inglesi operant nella regione e dei loro rapport con l’élite locale. Sto quindi utlizzando un approccio comparatvo a livello documentario e storiografco, secondo un modello che deve tanto alla microstoria1 ed alla ricerca del ‘globale nel locale’, quanto alla storia delle relazioni e delle ret dell’area dell’Oceano Indiano ed agli studi di area incentrat sul Mar Rosso. Assab fu un insediamento ‘artfciale’, nato per volontà di una minoranza di fautori entusiast, mal informat sulle reali potenzialità e sulla situazione geopolitca della regione e mantenuto giocoforza da un governo italiano in una fase politcamente debole. Assab fu un parto della mente del Professor Giuseppe Sapeto, che intercetò una serie di ‘sentment’ comuni fra alcune diverse personalità legate sin dagli anni ’50 dell’800 al mondo dell’esplorazione geografca ed alle missioni religiose in Etopia. A fanco di quest si posero le fantasie di un’altra minoranza legata al mondo commerciale, che sognava le potenzialità dell’apertura del mercato dell’altopiano etopico ai prodot italiani, cui si afancarono negli anni ‘80 alcuni politci, sostenitori della necessità di creare una colonia penale oppure una colonia di popolamento dove far ripiegare la massiccia emigrazione nazionale. Il coronamento del progeto però si deve al modesto investmento fnanziario di Rafaele Rubatno, che vide nell’apertura del Canale di Suez la possibilità di creare una linea di vapori che collegasse l’Italia all’India e che quindi avrebbe necessitato di una stazione di carbonamento e di una fabbrica commerciale allo sbocco del Mar Rosso.2 L’idea in sé poteva sembrare tuto sommato logica, ma sarebbe bastato un resoconto meno entusiasta di quello di Sapeto per far comprendere a Rubatno che le potenzialità di Assab erano state oggetvamente esagerate. Il periodo di ‘proprietà privata’ della baia ebbe inizio all’ato dell’acquisto nel 1869 e dovrebbe ritenersi formalmente concluso all’arrivo del primo commissario civile dell’insediamento nel 1881. È sufciente una letura della documentazione inglese ed egiziana per constatare che questa 1 TRIVELLATO Francesca, Is There a Future for Italian Microhistory in the Age of Global History?, Californian Italian Studies 2/1, 2011 2 DORIA Giorgio, Debit e navi: la compagnia Rubatno 1839-1881, Genova, Mariet, 1990 1 Dot. Luca Castglioni Ciclo XXVIII Università degli Studi di Pavia proprietà durò giusto il tempo necessario perché alcuni soldat egiziani abbatessero il cartello ‘Proprietà della Società Rubatno’, dopo aver ricordato a suon di randello la sovranità otomano-khedievale ai ‘sultani’. Nel corso degli anni 1865-79 giunsero al governo italiano alcune proposte di espansione in Africa Orientale. È d’altronde il periodo che Del Boca, mutuando una espressione di padre Giovanni Stella, defnisce delle ‘colonie immaginarie’3. Al neto di alcune proposte molto fantasiose, il Corno d’Africa fu seriamente considerato. Ovviamente, non bisogna intendere vi fossero dei piani organici, le forze della diplomazia italiana erano divise prima nell’acquietare la questone romana e poi nel progeto dell’annessione della Tunisia. Verso la fne degli anni ’70 le potenzialità del commercio con l’Oriente divennero abbastanza evident. Da qui nacque allora l’iniziatva di cercare una stazione di appoggio presso lo sbocco meridionale del Mar Rosso, così da evitare di incorrere nei cost di rifornire i vapori di carbone ai prezzi di Suez o di pagare lautamente la compagnia del canale per il carico extra di carburante fossile.4 Al governo italiano giunse la proposta di acquisire la baia di Ras Filuk, nell’atuale Somalia Setentrionale, poco più ad est di Zeila. 5 Ma ad essa fu preferita la baia di Assab, giudicata un miglior approdo naturale e già di proprietà di una società italiana. È da queste premesse che ha origine la spedizione del comandante De Amezaga e del professor Sapeto per il ‘ritorno ad Assab’ nel dicembre 1879. Si erano fat molt proget per Assab. Si voleva che fosse il porto nuovo e ‘civilizzato’ che avrebbe appoggiato i vapori diret ai mercat dell’Oriente, ora a portata di mano, magari ‘rubando’ clientela ad Aden. Si voleva che intercetasse il fusso commerciale dell’altopiano abissino e diventasse il porto dell’Impero Etopico, bloccato dal mancato controllo di una fascia costera e costreto a servirsi del porto di Zeila e, più marginalmente, di Massawa, entrambi da secoli nelle mani degli otomani ed egiziani e che ricaricavano sulle merci provenient dall’interno una tassazione molto elevata. Assab avrebbe potuto essere un investmento economico per lo sfrutamento delle saline e la creazione di una rete di monopolio commerciale nella regione, una base di appoggio ed espansione per la ‘classe commerciale’ italiana. 3 DEL BOCA Angelo, Gli italiani in africa orientale: Vol. 1 Dall’Unità alla Marcia su Roma, Milano, Mondadori, 2009 p.19 4 HUBER Valeska, Channeling Mobilites, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013 5 RAINERO Romain, Carlo Guarmani e la Questone di Assab, Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1976 2 Dot. Luca Castglioni Ciclo XXVIII Università degli Studi di Pavia Il governo italiano esplicitò molte volte il conceto che Assab non sarebbe mai stato un porto militare, cosa che aveva preoccupato non poco le autorità inglesi di Aden e l’autorità khedievale. Ma Assab fu sostanzialmente una colonia ‘militare’ perché il commissario civile non poteva materialmente operare senza il supporto della marina militare. Questa diede ovviamente la priorità a materie di sicurezza e navigazione rispeto a questoni commerciali. Partendo da quest proget per Assab e ricostruendone la storia, dimostrerò come l’insediamento fu un fallimento secondo i proget italiani ed un innesto infrutuoso nel contesto del Mar Rosso, proprio per la ignoranza da parte del governo della realtà locale e per l’assunto che Assab fosse stato calato dall’alto in un luogo vuoto. L’insediamento fallì come scalo per il commercio internazionale e come polo di atrazione per il commercio interregionale di prodot locali o per lo smercio di prodot europei. Questo progeto fallito può evidenziare spunt di ricerca interessant, con ramifcazioni su tuta l’esperienza coloniale italiana in Eritrea e sulla posizione dell’Italia nell’ambito macroregionale del Mar Rosso e dell’Oceano Indiano. È mia intenzione ricostruire come gli agent coloniali occidentali, italiani ed inglesi, percepissero la medesima realtà in cui lavoravano, le sue dinamiche, le sue ret e come vi interagirono, se riuscirono ad usarle ai loro scopi o se vi si trovarono invischiat e sostanzialmente dovetero adatarvisi. Sfrutando così Assab come case study, porterò anche alla luce uno spaccato, a mio avviso inedito per l’area in questone, sia per quanto riguarda i rapport tra occidentali nel contesto coloniale sia per quanto riguarda le relazioni tra gli occidentali e gli stessi ‘locali’, che tanto locali non erano in fondo, dato che una buona parte di essi erano commerciant Bayani e Hadrami. L’approccio comparatvo con la documentazione britannica delinea come gli inglesi interpretarono l’arrivo degli italiani in Africa, non solo da una prospetva legata alla diplomazia del governo centrale, ma anche da quella ‘direta’ degli agent ‘on the spot’ di Aden, Jeddah, Suakin, Massawa. Le osservazioni di quest agent vennero generalmente poco valutate a livello centrale, in quanto spesso giungevano con un notevole ritardo rispeto ai dibatt che si svolgevano a riguardo fra Italia e Gran Bretagna. Da quest rapport ho potuto delineare come, in una fase di politca centrale tuto sommato in feri, sia per la Gran Bretagna che passava da Disraeli a Gladstone, che a maggior ragione per l’Italia di Cairoli e Deprets, la ‘direzione’ del policy making venisse dal basso, come vuole la teoria di Schölch dei ‘men on the spot’. 6 Anzi, furono spesso le condizioni in loco a costringere i governi centrali a prendere ato dell’esistenza di problemi nella regione ed ad agire spesso in modo male informato o senza diretve chiare, come nel caso dell’eccidio Giuliet o della crisi di Rahaita. 6 SCHÖLCH Alexander, The 'Men on the Spot' and the English Occupaton of Egypt in 1882, “The Historical Journal”, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Sep., 1976), pp. 773-785 3 Dot. Luca Castglioni Ciclo XXVIII Università degli Studi di Pavia Per quanto concerne la ‘percezione’ degli agent coloniali in loco della realtà che li circondava e di come eseguire i propri ordini all’interno del contesto geopolitco in cui si trovavano, posso delineare le difcoltà che sia gli italiani che gli inglesi riscontravano nel gestre e plasmare l’area ai loro bisogni. Gli italiani, in quanto nuovi arrivat, ebbero delle serie difcoltà a farsi identfcare come un interlocutore ‘credibile’ da parte delle autorità locali. D’altra parte ebbero anche molte difcoltà a capire quali fossero realmente le autorità locali, onde non ripetere l’errore di Sapeto con i ‘sultani di Assab’. Gli inglesi d’altra parte godevano di una ‘credibilità’ nell’area radicata dal lungo periodo passato in Aden e dal fato che il network dell’Oceano Indiano coincideva o toccava località di proprietà o forte infuenza britannica, bast pensare a Zanzibar, Mumbai, Karachi o Cape Town, senza contare l’enorme importanza che la navigazione del Mar Rosso aveva per la Gran Bretagna da un punto di vista politco e commerciale.
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