WHEN THE PRESS FAILS Studies in Communication, Media, and Public Opinion a series edited by susan herbst and benjamin i. page WHEN THE PRESS FAILS Political Power and the News Media from Iraq to Katrina w. lance bennett, regina g. lawrence, and steven livingston the university of chicago press ∏ chicago and london W. Lance Bennett is the Ruddick C. Lawrence Professor of Communication and professor of political science at the University of Washington. His previous books include News: The Politics of Illusion and, coedited with David Paletz, Taken by Storm, the latter published by the University of Chicago Press. Regina G. Lawrence is associate professor and chair of the Division of Political Science in the Hatfi eld School of Government at Portland State University. She is the author of The Politics of Force and numerous journal articles. Steven Livingston is associate professor in the School of Media and Public Affairs as well as associate professor of international affairs in the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University. In addition to journal articles and book chapters, his previous publications include The Terrorism Spectacle. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637 The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London © 2007 by The University of Chicago All rights reserved. Published 2007 Printed in the United States of America 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 1 2 3 4 5 isbn-13: 978-0-226-04284-8 (cloth) isbn-10: 0-226-04284-7 (cloth) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bennett, W. Lance. When the press fails : political power and the news media from Iraq to Katrina / W. Lance Bennett, Regina G. Lawrence, and Steven Livingston. p. cm. — (Studies in communication, media, and public opinion) Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn-13: 978-0-226-04284-8 (hardcover : alk. paper) isbn-10: 0-226-04284-7 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Government and the press—United States—History—21st century. 2. Press and politics—United States—History—21st century. 3. Journalism—Objectivity—United States—History—21st century. i. Lawrence, Regina G., 1961– ii. Livingston, Steven. iii. Title. pn4738.b37 2007 071Ј.30905—dc22 2006034501 ᭺ϱ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ansi z39.48-1992. For Tim Cook inspiring colleague and dear friend CONTENTS Preface ix Acknowledgments xiii introduction The Press and Power 1 1 press politics in america The Case of the Iraq War 13 2 the semi-independent press A Theory of News and Democracy 46 3 none dare call it torture Abu Ghraib and the Inner Workings of Press Dependence 72 4 the news reality filter Why It Matters When the Press Fails 108 vii viii contents 5 managing the news Spin, Status, and Intimidation in the Washington Political Culture 131 6 toward an independent press A Standard for Public Accountability 165 appendix a Evidence Suggesting a Connection between Abu Ghraib and U.S. Torture Policy 199 appendix b Methods for Analyzing the News Framing of Abu Ghraib 205 appendix c Further Findings from the Content Analysis 210 appendix d Interview Protocol 212 Notes 215 References 235 Index 251 PREFACE There are no hereditary kings in America and no powers not created by the Constitution. a federal judge, in ruling against a domestic eavesdropping program begun by the bush administration after the 9/11 attacks Historians are likely to have a fi eld day with the Bush administration and its War on Terror. Few will be arguing that fi ghting terror was a bad or unsupportable idea. But many will be wondering how that fi ght was con- ducted so clumsily, with so little insight or learning, and with such hu- bris. They will ponder how the outpouring of goodwill and support from so many nations following 9/11 could be squandered so quickly, as polls registered growing numbers who regarded the United States as a greater threat to world security than the Islamic extremists it was battling. From the view of social science, it seems clear that much of the plan- ning inside the Bush administration occurred under the infl uence of groupthink—from the rationale for invading Iraq to the hapless conviction that democracy would fl ower there spontaneously. In his classic study of the Kennedy administration’s Bay of Pigs fi asco, psychologist Irving Janis described groupthink as a condition in which dominant personalities (of which there were many in the Bush camp) are so sure of themselves that they wall off the decision-making process from outside scrutiny and criti- cal information, and punish those who would question their convictions. The signs of groupthink persisted throughout the Bush years, defl ect- ing many opportunities for learning. For example, long after many schol- ars and experts had observed it, the president’s own National Intelligence Estimate (based on the consensus of sixteen intelligence agencies) con- cluded that the conduct of the Iraq war had become a global recruiting boon for extremists, and thus contributed to the terrorism threat that ix x preface it was supposed to help resolve. The response from the White House was not to rethink its policies, but to send the president on the offensive against opponents concerned about the fi ndings from his own intelligence agencies. Mr. Bush delivered a blistering speech attacking the patriotism of his critics and asking how anyone could believe that fi ghting terrorism could contribute to the problem. In the end, as at the beginning, the administration persisted in try- ing to defi ne reality by the sheer force of its ideas. What is perhaps most interesting about this process is how long the press remained a silent if often uncomfortable partner to this reality-bending exercise. A free and independent press is generally considered essential for democracy, both to raise timely questions about debatable government policies and to report challenges to those policies when they fail. The ideal of press indepen- dence does not mean that the resulting open public debate will necessar- ily shape or improve the course of policy. However, balancing the spin of prominent offi cials with reasonable challenges can hold government up to the bright light of public accountability—which sometimes does help make policies more intelligent and effective. At the very least, publicizing credible challenges to dubious policies may give large numbers of citi- zens more timely information. And when those citizens hear their private and sometimes ill-defi ned concerns aired and clarifi ed in the legitimating space of the mainstream press, they may begin to act as a public, instead of suffering in isolation with their own shock and awe as events unravel before their very eyes. Perhaps most important, an independent press may spare people from learning too late that they have been deceived or misled, not just by their leaders, but by the press itself, caught up in the web of political power and spin. It seems to be no accident that public confi dence in the press in recent decades has followed closely the spiral of declining trust in the executive and legislative branches of government that generate most of the daily news. This book examines why leading news organizations continued to em- phasize the Bush administration’s scripting when covering situations that had other, often more plausible sides to them. Despite the availability of credible sources to challenge administration spin, the press often reported those challenges in small fragments buried in the back pages simply for the record. Such diminutive examples of press independence may serve as preface xi face-saving gestures for news organizations whose reporters often knew far more about situations than their organizations’ heated pursuit of pow- erful sources enabled them to say. This imbalance of truth and power is small comfort to democracy, however. Of course, all of this might have been different if the Democrats had behaved as an opposition party and challenged the administration. Through the Bush years they displayed little capacity to generate ideas or leadership, and they were further handicapped by the low power index implicitly assigned to them by the press. The vicious circle of the news game meant that the Democrats were less newsworthy as a party out of power, with consequently fewer institutional levers to pull to advance news stories. But the question, where were the Democrats? begs a more important one: where was the press? This book explores the reasons why the press reported reality during the Iraq years largely as the Bush administration had scripted it, even when that script seemed bizarrely out of line with observable events. We trace the operating practices of American journalism as they have grown entwined with power and offi cials. The core concern here is with why the press fails when democracy needs it the most—that is, when the govern- ment fails to consider important alternatives and challenges to crucial courses of action. The refreshingly independent coverage of Hurricane Katrina (whose aftermath was not unlike Iraq in revealing administrative ineptitude) is the exception that proves the rule. Reporters entered a no-spin zone because the administration was caught off guard during the vacations of several key offi cials. Offi cials were suddenly challenged and held publicly accountable. And for a moment, journalistic back channels buzzed with talk about a resurgence of press independence. Soon thereafter, however, the news returned to its daily routines of reporting the scripts of the of- fi cials in power. In addition to explaining why the press fails when democracy most needs the independent public viewpoints it could provide, we also ex- plore how news organizations might think about restoring the tradition of “watchdog” journalism.