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Download=True) CONSTRUCTING A POLITICAL NATION CONSTRUCTING A POLITICAL NATION Changes in the Attitudes of Ukrainians during the War in the Donbas Olexiy Haran and Maksym Yakovlyev, editors Kyiv Stylos Publishing 2017 УДК 323:327.5(477.62)-042.3 К64 Publication is based on research enabled by grant support from the State Fund for Fundamental Research (Project No. Ф72/25-2017), and by: Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars International Renaissance Foundation Fulbright Program in Ukraine, Institute of International Education Ukrainian Fulbright Circle Constructing a Political Nation: Changes in the Attitudes of Ukrainians К64 during the War in the Donbas / Edited by Olexiy Haran and Maksym Yakovlyev. Kyiv: Stylos Publishing, 2017. – xvi, 223 p. ISBN 978-966-2399-49-3 What effect did Russia’s attack have on Ukrainian society and on public opinion? And how, in turn, did changes in public opinion and in society influence Ukrainian identity and politics? This book, prepared by the School for Policy Analysis, National University of Kyiv–Mohyla Academy with the participation of the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, shows that contrary to the Kremlin’s expectations, Russian aggression has in fact led to a strengthening of the Ukrainian political nation. The book covers national and regional dimensions of changes in the attitudes of Ukrainians during the war in the Donbas: identity issues, political and party preferences, approaches to decentralization and the conflict in the Donbas, economic sentiments, changes in foreign policy attitudes toward the EU, NATO, and Russia. First edition March 2017 (in Ukrainian) Second edition (first English-language edition) December 2017 © Editors: Olexiy Haran and Maksym Yakovlyev ©Translation: Jarema Hawrylyshyn, Olha Nikolska © English-language editor: Marjorie Pannell © Stylos Publishing, 2017 © Layout: Halyna Shalashenko ISBN 978-966-2399-49-3 © Book cover: Alyona Kaminska CONTENTS Preface and Acknowledgments xiii 1. Decisive 2014: Did It Divide or Unite Ukraine? 1 Iryna Bekeshkina 2. The Party System after the Maidan: Regional Dimensions of an Unfinished Transformation 35 Iryna Bekeshkina and Oleksii Sydorchuk 3. Russian Aggression in the Donbas as a Factor in the Formation of Economic Sentiments in Ukraine 63 Ihor Burakovskiy 4. Changes in the Foreign Policy Orientations of Ukrainians after the Euromaidan: National and Regional Levels 111 Maria Zolkina and Olexiy Haran 5. Decentralization of Power in Ukraine: Achievements and Challenges 133 Oleksii Sydorchuk and Marharyta Chabanna 6. The Donbas: New Trends in Public Opinion 159 Maria Zolkina 7. Attitudes of Ukrainians toward Russia and Russians: Dynamics and Main Trends 183 Ruslan Kermach Afterword: Scenarios for the Donbas and Ukraine’s Path Forward 201 Contributors 221 v LIST OF TABLES Table 1.1. What is your attitude toward the Euromaidan—acts of protest in Kyiv on Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) and similar acts in other cities of Ukraine? (%) 7 Table 1.2. If a referendum on Ukraine’s independence were held today, how would you vote? (%) 11 Table 1.3. Whom do you consider yourself first and foremost? (2013–2014, %) 14 Table 1.4. To what extent are you proud or not proud of being a citizen of Ukraine? (2013–2014, %) 17 Table 1.5. Attitudes of the population in different regions of Ukraine toward probable geopolitical unions (2013–2014, %) 19 Table 1.6. Do you feel it necessary to grant the Russian language official status in Ukraine? (%) 23 Тable 1.7. What should be the status of the region you live in? (%) 26 Тable 1.8. What should a politician whom you plan to vote for in the elections for the president of Ukraine do first and foremost? (%) 28–29 Table 2.1. If you feel that the activity of political parties in Ukraine does not correspond to democratic standards, then why? (%) 55 Table 2.2. Which of the features listed below should a political party have to win your vote? (%) 57 Table 2.3. Who, in your opinion, should finance the activities of political parties? (%) 58 Table 3.1. Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in the economy of Ukraine on the eve of the Revolution of Dignity and Russian aggression (2012–2013) 66 vi List of Tables Table 3.2. Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts’ share in the foreign trade of Ukraine on the eve of the Revolution of Dignity and Russian aggression (2012–2013, %) 67 Table 3.3. Index of Regional Human Development (IRHD) of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and Crimea (2012 ranking) 68 Table 3.4. Budget losses in the ATO zone (July 1, 2014– April 1, 2016)72 Table 3.5. Top three problems caused by the war in the East (% of answers) 76 Table 3.6. Effect of the war in the East on industrial enterprises of Ukraine (% of answers) 77–78 Table 3.7. Factors that limited the growth of business in 2015 and 2016 (%) 80–83 Table 3.8. Factors that constrained the growth of business in 2015 (selected oblasts) (%) 85–86 Table 3.9. Factors that constrained the growth of SMEs in 2015: Factor analysis and regional dimension (%) 87 Table 3.10. Policy regarding the temporarily occupied territories: Opinion of Ukrainians (%) (November 2016) 94 Table 3.11. Policy regarding the occupied territories (%) (September 2016) 95 Table 3.12. Cessation of economic ties between Ukraine and the territories of the DPR and LPR: Regional dimension (%) 96 Table 3.13. Priority directions for the economic integration of Ukraine (%) 102 Table 4.1. Which integration direction should Ukraine take? (%) 113 Table 4.2. Which foreign policy direction should be a priority for Ukraine? (%) 114 Table 4.3. In your opinion, does Ukraine need to join the European Union? (%) 115 vii Constructing a Political Nation Table 4.4. In your opinion, does Ukraine need to join such international organizations? (%) (Customs Union, EU)116 Table 4.5. Which integration path should Ukraine take? (%) (By age cohort)118 Table 4.6. Which integration path should Ukraine take? (%) (South, East, Donbas) 119–120 Table 4.7. If you had participated in a referendum on accession to NATO, how would you have voted? (%) 122 Table 4.8. In your opinion, which option to guarantee national security would be best for Ukraine (%) 123–124 Table 4.9. In your opinion, which variant of national security would be best for Ukraine? (%) (East, Donbas, South) 125–127 Table 5.1. The territorial structure of Ukraine must be … (%) (April 2014) 140 Table 5.2. Over 2015–2016 the revenues of local budgets significantly increased. Did you feel any effects from the use of these funds (higher quality of services, public works, social welfare) compared to previous years? (%) 153 Table 5.3. This year as a result of reform the revenues of local budgets significantly increased. Do you see any effects from the use of these funds (landscaping, street lighting, road work) compared to previous years? (%) (November 2016) 154 Table 6.1. Whom do you consider yourself first and foremost? (%) (Annual polls, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) 160 Table 6.2. Whom do you consider yourself first and foremost? (%) (October 2015 and July 2017) 162 Table 6.3. Whom do you consider yourself first and foremost? (%) (November 2014, Donetsk oblast: Slovyansk and Kramatorsk) 164 viii List of Tables Table 6.4. Whom do you consider yourself first and foremost? (%) (March–April 2015, Luhansk oblast: Severodonetsk and Starobilsk) 165 Table 6.5. Which option of a territorial system do you support? (%) (June–July 2015, national) 167 Table 6.6. Currently, talks are being held on ways to resolve the armed conflict in the Donbas. In your opinion, is a compromise with Russia and leaders of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk republics necessary to achieve peace? (%) (May 2016, national) 169 Table 6.7. Currently, talks are being held on ways to resolve the armed conflict in the Donbas. In your opinion, what compromises can be agreed on so that peace is established in the Donbas? (%) (July 2017, Luhansk and Donets oblasts) 170 Table 6.8. What decisions, in your opinion, should be made so that peace can be established in the Donbas region? (%) (June 2017, national) 171 Table 6.9. In your opinion, what decision should be made so that peace can be established in the Donbas? (%) (Regional breakdown, June-July 2017) 173–174 Table 6.10. What is your attitude toward the idea of stationing international peacekeeping forces in the Donbas? (%) (Regional breakdown, June 2017) 175 Table 6.11. At the moment, the possibility of holding local elections in the territories controlled by the DPR and LPR is actively being discussed. In your opinion, under what conditions would this be possible? (%) (May 2016, national) 176 Table 6.12. Regarding the political future of the territories of the DPR and LPR, which option would you prefer? (%) (2015–2017, national) 178 ix Constructing a Political Nation Table 7.1. Attitudes toward Russia in Ukraine: Distribution by macroregion of Ukraine (%) (May 2013) 188 Table 7.2. Attitudes toward Russia in Ukraine: Distribution by macroregion of Ukraine (%) (May 2016) 194 Table 7.3. Attitudes toward Russia in Ukraine: Distribution by macroregion of Ukraine (%) (September 2017) 196 Table 7.4. Do you think that Crimea should be a part of Russia or Ukraine, or do you think it would be better for Crimea to be an independent quasi-state (such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, or Transnistria)? (%) (May 2016) 197 List of Figures Figure 1.1. Whom do you consider yourself first and foremost? (%) 12 Figure 1.2. To what extent are you proud or not proud of being a citizen of Ukraine? (%) 16 Figure 1.3. Do you feel it necessary to grant the Russian language official status in Ukraine? (%) 22 Figure 2.1. To what degree do you trust political parties? (%) 54 Figure 2.2.
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