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Towards Jewish-Arab Normalization in Israel. Israeli Arabs Want a More

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Towards Jewish-Arab Normalization in Israel. Israeli Arabs Want a More NO. 18 MARCH 2021 Introduction Towards Jewish-Arab Normalization in Israel Israeli Arabs Want a More Pragmatic Politics while Jewish Parties Court the Arab Vote Lidia Averbukh In the run-up to the 2021 elections to the Knesset, Jewish parties are actively courting the votes of Israeli Arabs, who constitute 17 per cent of all Israelis eligible to vote. At the same time, Israeli Arabs are increasingly emphasizing the need for a politics that will help improve their living circumstances and allow them greater political participation. While the Joint List alliance of Arab parties continues to follow its traditional opposi- tionist course and has come to terms with the decision of one of its members, the Islamic Movement (Ra’am), to split away, the election campaign has seen the emergence of new Arab politics, whose actors advocate a more pragmatic approach and are looking to cooperate with Jewish parties. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the identity of the Jewish state of Israel are playing a secondary role. The situation is similar in Israeli local politics, where Jews and Arabs are already engaged in interest-based cooperation. “For many, many years, the Arab public sought to intimidate them. For example, was outside the mainstream of leadership,” it arranged for cameras to be installed at Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu said the polling stations in Arab districts because during the 2021 election campaign. But of what it alleged was fraudulent voting. there was no reason for this, he commented, In 2015 Netanyahu warned about “Arabs adding that the elections should demon- going in droves to the polling stations”. Nor strate that the Arabs are part of Israel’s suc- were the parties from the Left or the Centre cess story. With these words, he signalled able to duck the impact of the anti-Arab a remarkable turnaround, since a coalition slogans. They distanced themselves from with Arab parties had been taboo in the Arab voters and parties for fear of being election campaigns of recent years. Right- discredited as anti-Zionist. Both camps – wing Jewish parties regarded their Arab the Right and the Centre-Left – adopted counterparts as the “fifth column”, as sub- strategies that counted mainly on the versive actors with whom cooperation Jewish vote. The bulk of the Arab voter would pose an existential threat to the was left, virtually uncontested, to the Arab state. In order to keep down the number Hadash, Balad, Ta’al and Ra’am parties. of Israeli Arabs turning out to vote, Likud The Rise and Fall of the Joint List finally delivering political stability and excluded not only Arab deputies but also In 2015 four Arab parties merged to form extreme right-wing Jewish parties. There- the Joint List in order to circumvent the after, the Centre-Left camp, which had 3.25 per cent barrier, which, introduced campaigned as the “anti-Bibi camp”, dis- the previous year, was targeted, above all, integrated; only some of its deputies had against them. After having dissolved itself wanted to belong to a coalition under temporarily for tactical reasons, the alliance Netanyahu. As a result, the new govern- re-emerged for the election to the 22nd ment remained unstable. Knesset in September 2019 so that its com- For his part, the head of the Joint List, bined strength could be used to exercise Ayman Odeh of the Hadash party, lost more influence over Arab issues. It re- credibility, having failed with his strategy mained intact for the election to the 23rd of putting the entire political weight of the Knesset in 2020. Arab parties at the disposal of the “anti-Bibi The Arab parties’ harsh rejection by camp” in the hope of achieving political the Jewish parties and their concentrated concessions in the future. It is true that the presence in the Joint List had the effect of strong performance of the Arab List was gradually mobilizing the Arab Israelis, who one of the reasons why, in the last three traditionally have remained aloof from elections (in 2019 and 2020), Netanyahu did national elections. Turnout among this seg- not obtain a majority for a purely right- ment of the population stood at 63.4 per wing government; but, other than this, the cent in 2015 (20th Knesset) and 59.2 per List was unable to reap any benefits from cent in 2019 (22th Knesset), which gave the its record number of seats. alliance 13 mandates on each occasion. In 2020 (23rd Knesset), it peaked at 64.8 per cent, whereby the Arab List became the Competing for Arab Votes largest opposition party in the parliament with 15 mandates. This new-found strength Because the Joint List remained excluded meant that Arab parties – and thus Arab from any decision-making processes and votes – were increasingly perceived as had no possibility to exercise any influence, having political relevance. For its part, the there was growing discontent over the Arab List hoped that one day it would be course being pursued by Odeh. For its part, able to cast off the role of outsider. the Islamic Movement (Ra’am) began to After the last election, in 2020, the Arab split away from the alliance – a develop- parliamentary deputies used their new situa- ment that was expedited by Netanyahu’s tion to publicly throw their unanimous sudden change of course. Faced with a col- support behind a Jewish candidate – the lapsing government coalition, the prime first time they had done so since 1992 when minister found himself looking for new Yitzhak Rabin won the elections. The Arab allies. On several occasions, he was able to parties backed Benny Gantz so that he would reach agreement on tacit cooperation with be the first to conduct coalition talks. Their Mansour Abbas, the head of the Islamic hope was that Netanyahu would be replaced Movement. For example, in early December as prime minister. 2020 parliamentary deputies from this party However, although Gantz was able to absented themselves during voting on the strengthen his negotiating position with dissolution of the Knesset in order not to the help of Arab votes, he distanced himself have to vote with other deputies from the from the Joint List and broke his promise Joint List for the resignation of the Netan- not to join a coalition government led by yahu government. Moreover, Abbas pre- Netanyahu. The so-called national unity vented the role played by the prime minis- government formed by Zionist parties from ter in the submarine corruption affair from the Right to the Centre-Left was aimed at being investigated. SWP Comment 18 March 2021 2 After the Knesset had been dissolved in Meretz a left-wing Zionist party, has December 2020 and new elections sched- introduced three Arab candidates in fourth, uled for March 2021, Netanyahu launched fifth and ninth positions on the new party his election campaign by visiting several list with which it launched its election Arab cities. They included Nazareth, Israel’s campaign. In fifth and fourth positions are largest Arab city, where he received a cere- Issawi Frej, who has already represented monial welcome from Mayor Ali Salam. For Meretz in the Knesset once, and Ghaida the first time in its history, Netanyahu’s Rinawie Zoabi, the co-founder and former party, Likud, is fielding a Muslim Arab as a director of the Injaz non-governmental candidate in the upcoming election: Nail organization, which advocates the pro- Zoabi is slated to hold a ministerial post for fessionalization of Arab local politics. The Arab affairs in a future Netanyahu govern- order of the candidates on this list is note- ment. Although he ranks only 39th on the worthy as Meretz has never nominated party’s list of candidates, Netanyahu has more than one Arab candidate for the top promised he will enter the parliament in positions. Under the leadership of former the event that Likud forms the new coali- General Ehud Barak, it focused entirely tion. The means to this end is the so-called during the last elections (in March 2020) Norwegian Law, which allows future minis- on the potential left-wing Zionist Jewish ters to give up their parliamentary seats in electorate and declined to run any Arab favour of others. candidates. Netanyahu’s radical turnaround is to be The Labour Party (Avoda) is pursuing a explained, above all, by the possibility of similar course. After having participated in his political survival being secured by Arab the government of national unity through votes. Amid dwindling support within the several deputies and even provided two ranks of Likud after a group led by his long- ministers, it has chosen the direct opposite time associate Gideon Saar split away and approach for the upcoming election under because of the ongoing corruption trials, the new leadership of Merav Michaeli. With the prime minister is politically weakened. the Muslim film director Ibtisam Mara‘ana At the same time, the split in the Arab List and Amir Khniffes, a member of the Druze serves his strategic goals: if the Islamic Move- religious community, it is fielding two Arab ment makes it into the Knesset, he can candidates in seventh and fifteenth place. hope to enjoy its backing; if it does not, the These rankings do not offer very good pros- right-wing bloc of his supporters will be pects of entering the parliament, while strengthened since the Arab List is likely to Mara‘ana was almost disqualified from lose some mandates. According to the latest running in the election over anti-Zionist polls, it will have only nine or ten seats. comments. Nevertheless, the line-up has The prime minister’s rapprochement a symbolic significance that is crucial for with Israeli Arabs has rapidly changed the expanding the party’s electorate and under- way in which other Jewish parties are deal- scores the party’s renewed overtly left-wing ing with this group.
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