Japan and the Jews of Manchuria Beginning in 19311

Chapter 6

As we discussed briefly above, the first contact between Japan and a rel- atively large Jewish population took place during the Japanese Siberian Intervention, from 1918 to 1922. That operation was designed to help White Russian forces defeat the Bolsheviks and destroy the newly established Communist regime in that country. At the time, some 25,000 Jews living in a number of cities in East Siberia found themselves between the hammer and the anvil following the Bolshevik Revolution. On the one hand they were hounded by the newly established Far East Republic which was soon replaced by the Communist regime, which charged them with anti-Bolshevik tendencies, and on the other they were charged by the White Russians, the enemies of the Reds, of being loyal communists who supported the new regime in the Soviet Union and were busy spreading communist ideology in East Asia. After the Japanese troops returned home from Siberia in 1922 and the communist regime stabilized itself in Siberia, the fate of the Jews in that part of Russia was akin to that elsewhere in the Soviet Union: they were tolerated by the new regime, but their religion, language, and school system were proscribed. Zionism was outlawed, and emigration from the Soviet Union became highly restricted. Of the 25,000 Jews in Siberia, several thousand fled south across the Manchurian border. This area, formally under Chinese sovereignty, had been increasingly under Russian influence since the beginning of the twentieth century. Even before the Russo-Japanese War the Jews there had enjoyed a special status under the Tsarist regime, which had encouraged them to settle in cities like Harbin, Mukden, and Dairen to cement the Russian presence in Manchuria. By 1900 approximately 45 Jews lived in Harbin. The community grew to 300 only two years later, and in 1915 the number of Jews residing in Harbin was estimated at 12,000 souls. They made their living in trade, services, and exports and imports, with a few working in industry or the hotel 50 UNDER THE SHADOW OF THE RISING SUN

business. The community was well-organized and maintained synagogues, schools, and health, welfare, and charitable institutions. Community members spoke mainly Russian. Among them were the Olmert family, including the grandfather and father of Ehud Olmert (1945-), who would eventually become prime minister of Israel. After the October 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, the legal status of the Jews of Harbin became problematic. Some were now Soviet nationals, but the majority of them were in effect stateless and thus under the protection of the local Chinese warlord Chang Tso Lin (1876-1928). In the absence of a strong central government, they had few defenses from their virulent enemies the White Russians, who like the Jews were exiles from the Soviet Union. The White Russians embarked on a systematic campaign to turn the Japanese government and officers belonging to the Kwantung Army headquarters in Manchuria against the Jews. The Kwantung Army was responsible for the security of the Japanese enclave in the Liaotung Peninsula, whose major cities were Port Arthur and Dairen. On the eve of the Japanese occupation in 1931, a White Russian fascist party was established in Harbin. The Japanese army wanted above all to ensure stability and social order in Manchuria. Intercommunal tensions were highly undesirable for them.

After the Occupation of Manchuria by Japan After Japan’s occupation of Manchuria in late 1931 and early 1932 and the establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo, the Jews of Manchuria found themselves under direct Japanese rule. Since many lacked any nationality, and those of Russian origins were formally Stateless Russian Emigrants, they were at the mercy of the Japanese army, the true masters of Manchukuo. They sought the protection of the Japanese army mainly from the White Russian émigrés, who never tired of accusing them of various crimes, including maintaining contact with the enemies of Japan and disloyalty to the new puppet regime of Manchukuo. When the Soviet Union sold its holdings in the Southern Manchurian Railway to Japan in 1935, the Russian government no longer felt any obligation to protect the Jews of Soviet nationality, resulting in the departure of almost half of the Jewish community from Harbin, Mukden, and other towns. The number of Jews in Manchuria dwindled to less than 6,000. Many of the emigrants went south to Shanghai, a few traveled to the United States, and some even Japan and the Jews of Manchuria Beginning in 1931 51 immigrated to Palestine. At this stage, however, the economic position of some of the wealthy Jews remained intact. Among the wealthy families were the Zykman, Skidelsky, and Kavalkin families. The Jewish leadership understood very early that in order to survive it would have to collaborate with the puppet regime of Manchukuo, and that this meant it would truly be collaborating with the headquarters of the Kwantung Army. The com- mander of that force became Japan’s ambassador to Manchukuo, and was thus the de-facto ruler of that country, which by 1937 was recognized only by Japan, Germany, Italy and El Salvador. Among the officers who served in the Japanese supreme command, and mainly among that group that became known as the “Manchuria Faction,” a number of ideas were discussed regarding how to exploit the Manchurian Jews to help Japan gain recognition of the Manchukuo puppet state by additional countries and above all how to obtain foreign economic aid for the development of Manchuria’s industry. Among those who supported this line of thought were Colonels Itagaki Seishiro (1885-1948) and Ishihara Kanji (1889-1949). Quite early in the occupation, it dawned on the Japanese leadership that the hopes they had pinned on the quality of Manchurian coal and steel were highly exaggerated.2 In order to develop these two key resources, vast sums of money would be required, and some officers thought that it would be possible to mobilize international Jewry to raise the necessary funds. The minimal amount required was estimated at between two to three bil- lion dollars, an astronomical sum and even more so for those times. Those Japanese officers and civilian bureaucrats who supported the idea hoped that wealthy Jews, mainly in the United States, would invest in Manchuria. Hence, it was imperative not to harm the Jews in Manchuria in any way. Once again, Japan’s ignorance and total lack of understanding of world Jewry was evident. Even the few officers who were considered Jewish experts failed to realize that while Jews were wealthy in certain countries, their political clout even in the United States was almost non-existent. They were even unable to change America’s drastic immigration laws to allow tens of thousands of German and Austrian Jewish refugees to find haven in the United States. In the midst of the Great Depression, there was no chance that any wealthy Jew would invest in the development of Manchuria’s industries, let alone promote an aggressive Japanese policy in East Asia. The idea of using the power of rich Jews was not new; it had initially been discussed by a number of Japanese foreign ministry officials in 1921. Now it surfaced again. At this time the officers discussing the situation 52 UNDER THE SHADOW OF THE RISING SUN

basically thought that it would be beneficial for Japan to establish good working relations with the Jewish community in Manchuria, and allay their fears that the Japanese might support White Russian hooliganism and even antisemitic outbursts in that country. They feared that anti-Jewish inci- dents, if mentioned in the American media, would create an unpleasant image for Japan at the very time that it wanted to demonstrate the benev- olent nature of its rule in Manchuria. The local Jewish leadership under Dr. Abraham Kaufman (1885-1971) recognized the need to collaborate with the Japanese authorities in order to ensure the survival of the slowly diminishing Jewish communities of Harbin, Mukden, and Dairen. For their part, the Japanese authorities adopted a “divide and rule” policy regarding the Jews and the White Russians. They did not ban the Russian fascist party, but they did restrict its activities. On a number of occasions they used White Russians as special police officers to spy on the Chinese, Koreans, and Jews. The Japanese authorities also permitted the publication of a fascist Russian publication Nash Pot (“Our Way”), which called for killing the Jews. During the 1930’s and early 1940’s, the main enemies of the Manchurian Jewish communities continued to be the White Russians. This dire situation meant that the Jews had to rely on the Japanese authorities to protect them from the Russian ultra-nationalists. This suited the Japanese rulers of Manchuria well, and to counterbalance the Russians, they now encouraged Zionist bodies such as the Beitar Youth Movement.

The Fugu Plan At the same time as Japan was considering the benefits of seeking Jewish capital, the President of the Southern Manchurian Railway Matsuoka Yosuke (1886-1946) and the Chairman of the Manchurian Heavy Industries Association Oikawa Yoshisuke (1880-1967) toyed with the idea of settling some fifty thousand European Jews in Manchukuo. They would, it was believed, bring with them not only capital but also technological know- how and managerial skills. The idea was developed in an article written by Oikawa in 1934 called “A Plan to Settle Fifty Thousand German Jews in Manchukuo.” The underlying assumption was that the Jews Germany wanted to get rid of would be seeking a refuge wherever they could settle and invest their capital. Here, Oikawa stated, was an opportunity for Japan to steer a highly desirable population to Manchukuo. It is highly doubt- ful that he had ever heard of the so-called “Transfer Plan” arranged by the Japan and the Jews of Manchuria Beginning in 1931 53

World Zionist Organization and the German government in 1933, whereby the newly installed Nazi regime of Germany would allow Jews to immigrate to Palestine and transfer their capital to that country. Key Japanese officials such as finance ministry official Kishi Nobosuke (1896-1987), a future minister in Tojo’s wartime cabinet and later prime minister of Japan in the late 1950’s, supported this idea, as did other finance ministry officials. The idea—which never amounted to an operational plan in its full meaning—was described in retrospect by writers Marvin Tokayer and Mary Swartz in their 1979 book The Fugu Plan. Fugu is a word for blowfish, which has some poisonous flesh and some edible parts, and which is a much sought-after delicacy. The idea was suggested by Inuzuka’s January 18, 1939, report to the Navy General Staff, which stated that “The Jews are just like a fugu (blowfish). It is very delicious but unless you know well how to cook it, it may prove fatal.” The reference indicated that Jews spread poison in the societies in which they lived, but that they could also be highly beneficial if properly monitored and controlled. In the end, this idea remained on paper and was never accompanied by a serious, detailed, and well thought-out operational plan. Those who espoused it never determined who would be responsible for obtaining the necessary permits from the government in Tokyo, who would prepare the required infrastructure in Manchuria, who would approach and recruit those German Jews deemed eligible and mobilize their capital, and who would contact the Nazi regime to start things moving. There was never any serious effort by a responsible Japanese government body to interest German Jews and attempt to persuade them to migrate to Manchuria. The proponents of this idea never even contacted international Jewish organizations such as the World Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Congress, or the World Zionist Organization. The causes for the failure of the idea to get off the ground were varied, and were partly the result of the planners’ inability to implement such an ambitious and grandiose plan. There was also a total lack of basic knowledge on the topic, and no one had even begun to prepare the ground-work for such an undertaking. But the main reason seems to be the reticence of the Japanese government in Tokyo as well as the puppet regime of Manchukuo and their reluctance to become involved in such a scheme. In Tokyo there was less and less enthusiasm for collaborating with Jewish factors because of the government’s growing ties with Nazi Germany, especially after the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936. As German-Japanese ties grew stronger and warmer, and Germany became a strategic asset to Japan, any 54 UNDER THE SHADOW OF THE RISING SUN

measure that could be interpreted as helping Jews or encouraging German Jews to remove their capital from Germany was seen as counter-productive. Meanwhile, the Japanese military authorities in Manchukuo may have thought that the settlement of German Jews there would be a positive step in the development of that region, but they may also have feared that it would endanger their ties with the White Russian population in that country, a population far larger and more influential than the local Jewish community. They followed a policy designed to avoid alienating the two communities and acted to alleviate the fears of the Jews by making sure that there would be no outbreak of violent antisemitism. At the same time, they also made strong efforts not to alienate the local White Russian community. The final outcome of this policy was contrary to what they wanted to achieve: not only did it fail to attract German Jews, but it caused a growing flight of wealthy Jews from Manchuria, many of whom resettled in Shanghai, where entry visas were not required. By the middle of the 1930’s the Harbin Jewish community had shrunk from 15,000 to less than 3,000 individuals. Even the intervention of the Japanese consul general in Harbin, General Morishima Morito (1896-1975), who met with the leaders of the community periodically in order to pacify them, did not yield any results. The idea that the settlement of such a large number of Jewish refugees in Manchuria would improve Japan’s image in the American media was preposterous from the beginning, and naturally backfired. Those who toyed with it failed to understand that American Jews had no intention of investing in Manchuria in the depths of the Great Depression. Furthermore, an investment in Manchuria would only anger the American government, which opposed the occupation of that country by Japan and in 1932 had adopted a policy of non-recognition (also known as the Stimson Doctrine). There were also several Japanese officers who argued that Japan must distance itself from anything connected to Jews and Judaism in view of what they believed to be the Jews’ constant scheming to control the world through their nefarious activities. This group based its arguments on The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which as noted had been translated into Japanese in the mid-1920’s. How could Japan seek Jewish help to advance its economy at the same time that the rootless Jews were considered the world’s great- est danger by the Germans—Japan’s own allies? Those who opposed turn- ing to the Jews claimed that many Jews were disguised Soviet agents who could undermine Japanese society from within. The counter-view was that at least an effort should be made to harness the Manchurian Jewish community to promote Japan’s interests. The task was assigned to officers in the Japan and the Jews of Manchuria Beginning in 1931 55

Intelligence Section of the Kwantung Army, and specifically in the Special Services unit, whose main role was to spy on Russians suspected of sup- porting the Soviet Union, mobilize White Russians, and create anti-Soviet front organizations. In 1934 this unit established the Office for Russian Émigrés and made sure that some of its members obtained senior posts in the Russian Fascist Party, which was otherwise made up of anti-Bolshevik, antisemitic White Russian émigrés. One of the first measures they took was designed to stop attacks on Jews by White Russians, attacks that had reached their peak in the years 1931-1932 with the kidnapping and subse- quent murder of the son of a wealthy Jew by the name of Kaspe, who owned the largest hotel in Harbin, the Moderne.3 Attacks on Jews in Manchuria led to criticism by various Jewish communities overseas, mainly that of Shanghai. One of the Shanghai community’s leaders, Nessim Benjamin Ezra, the editor of the Jewish Messenger, was received by Japan’s Deputy Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru (1887- 1957) in the fall of 1934 to protest these attacks. Shigemitsu promised that Japan would maintain law and order in Harbin. The Japanese government feared adverse news items on this topic in the American media, and attributed these stories to Jewish sources—hence the need to appease the Jews.

The Far Eastern Jewish National Congress4 Another reason Japan felt the need to mobilize the Manchurian Jews was the fear that they, too, would join the boycott against Nazi Germany’s goods that had been proclaimed by international Jewish organizations, mainly in the United States, following the onset of anti-Jewish persecution in Germany. The boycott of German goods proved, to those Japanese who believed in it, that the Jews had vast power and influence and could severely harm Germany’s economy if they so desired. The boycott issue became more acute after Japan joined Germany in the Anti-Comintern Pact of November 1936. Now there grew the realization that it would be useful to organize a regional Jewish body that would help advance Japan’s goals in Manchuria, China, and even in South East Asia. The position of those who called for the utilization of imaginary Jewish power won over those who advised Japan to keep away from any thing that smacked of Jews. The task of organizing the Jewish communities in Manchuria and later in all of East Asia fell to Japan’s number-one Jewish expert, Colonel Yasue 56 UNDER THE SHADOW OF THE RISING SUN

Norihiro. Since his visit to Palestine in 1927 he had fulfilled a number of mid-level roles in the Japanese army, but apparently he was not that busy, as he also found time to write books and articles on Jews and deliver lec- tures to civilian and military groups. In his publications he wrote that the Jews endangered the world, spread dangerous thoughts, and were plan- ning a global revolution to destroy the existing world order and establish a universal socialist regime that would help their cause. The need to mobilize the Jews of Manchuria became more significant after the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, a war that caused much anger in the United States and Britain, especially at the end of 1937 following the atrocities committed by Japanese troops in Nanjing. Yasue was assigned to the Kwantung Army Headquarters as an expert on Jewish affairs and once again served under Major General Higuchi Kiichiro, who was chief of the Intelligence Bureau of Harbin for the Kwantung Army. One of the first things he did was shut down the Russian language news- paper Nash Pot, the mouthpiece of the Russian antisemites in Manchuria. Higuchi had previously served as military attaché in the Japanese embassy in Warsaw, had a number of Jewish friends, and was aware of the plight of the Polish Jews. When he arrived in Harbin he developed friendly ties with Dr. Abraham Kaufman, the veteran leader of the Jewish community there. The Jewish experts also helped prepare a position paper for the chief of staff of the Kwantung Army, General Tojo Hideki (1884-1948), who would later serve as Japan’s wartime prime minister from 1941-1944. The document contained detailed instructions to the Japanese authorities in Manchukuo intended to ease the entry of a certain number of Jewish refugees into that territory. It was determined that the entry of Jews who had a certain amount of funds would be permitted. The implementation of these instructions was left to the discretion of local border officials, mainly in the border town of Manchuli, on the Manchurian-Siberian border where the Trans-Siberian train stopped. This train carried many of the Jews who chose the Siberian route to escape from Central Europe. Since they did not have a visa to Japan or entry permits to the Soviet Union, it was evident that if they were not allowed into Manchuria they would be sent back to Germany or Austria. Tales of their plight reached Harbin, and Dr. Kaufman was able to persuade Higuchi to allow a large number of these refugees to enter Manchuria. They were met at the Harbin station by members of the Zionist youth movements and were housed temporarily in a Jewish-owned hotel called Astoria. They were then taken to Dairen, from whence they sailed to Shanghai. Japan and the Jews of Manchuria Beginning in 1931 57

Japan’s attitude toward the Jewish refugees now became an important issue, since it also involved German-Japanese relations. The problem, as noted above, was how to avoid doing anything positive for the Jews that would harm Japan’s ties with Nazi Germany while also avoiding alienating American Jews, whose economic power was seen by Japan as dominant. In view of such conflicting considerations, the Japanese high command had to navigate the political waters carefully, and once again they turned to their chief expert. Yasue’s recommemdation was to establish a regional council of the Jewish communities in East Asia, which would serve as the umbrella organization for the Jews of Manchuria, Northern China, and even Japan. For that purpose he recruited the heads of the Harbin Jewish community, led by Dr. Abraham Kaufman and Lev Zykman. Colonel Yasue was aware that Dr. Kaufman had contacts with the World Jewish Congress and various American Jewish organizations, as well as with the Zionist Executive in Jerusalem. Another possible reason for the creation of this organization was that the Jewish experts believed that the Manchurian Jewish leadership would be able to establish ties with American Jewry, which was seen as highly influential at the time. The American media was full of stories about the atrocity known as “rape of Nanjing,” and the Japanese government felt the necessity of limiting the damage done by the publicity of the crimes committed by Japanese troops in the Chinese capital. The culmination of this activity was the convening of the First Congress of the Jews in East Asia in Harbin on December 26, 1937, with over five hun- dred people in attendance. Among those present were a number of senior Japanese officers, headed by General Higuchi, and there were even some White Russian observers. Order was maintained by uniformed members of the local Beitar Youth Movement. The gala opening session of the congress was covered by Japanese reporters. The speeches given by the Japanese officers stressed the need for the Jews to identify with Japan’s struggle for peace and harmony. In East Asia, its fight against Bolshevism, and its demand for a rightful place in the sun. The Jewish speakers expressed their strong iden- tification with Japan’s “rightful struggle” and supported its desire to achieve for itself a place in the sun (defined in this case as becoming the leading regional superpower). Major General Higuchi stressed in his speech that the government of Japan and the Japanese people held no prejudices against Jews and did not subscribe to racist ideology. He stated that they welcomed close, friendly ties with the Jews and were prepared to cooperate with them in the economic and commercial spheres in Japan as well as in other countries. 58 UNDER THE SHADOW OF THE RISING SUN

In his response, Dr. Kaufman emphasised the fact that Jews residing in Japanese-controlled areas enjoyed full equality and were not discrim- inated against because of their race. They were willing to cooperate with Japan and Manchukuo in an effort to create a new order in East Asia under Japan. At the conclusion of the three-day conference, a governing body was established, led by Dr. Kaufman but under the close supervision of Colonel Yasue, who became the link between the Japanese authorities and the congress. As noted above, one of the immediate results was the granting of transit entry permits into Manchukuo for thousands of Jewish refugees who were stranded in Manchuli on the Soviet border on their way to Shanghai, the United States, and any other destination that would accept them. Years later, Kaufman (who immigrated to Israel in 1961) explained that the Jews of Harbin had no choice but to collaborate with the Japanese authorities in order to survive. This argument was repeated by his son Theodore (1923-2012) in his own memoirs.5 The Congress met again in December 1938 and December 1939. The fourth gathering was due to take place in Dairen in December 1940, but the German government asked Japan to cancel it. Japan, having signed the Axis Pact with Germany and Italy ten weeks earlier, decided to comply. This marked the end of this body, which was in reality an instrument of the Japanese army meant to control the Jews or at least gain some pro- paganda benefits. Yasue was removed from his post as Jewish expert in Dairen. Captain Inuzuka would emerge later in Shanghai, once again as a Jewish expert. One of the results of the Far Eastern Congress, however, was salutary. The Japanese army in Manchuria and Northern China understood that the highest echelons of their commanders were involved in this enter- prise, and thus the Jews were left on their own in that part of China, their institutions untouched until Japan surrendered in 1945. In their capacity as heads of the Congress, Kaufman and Zykman vis- ited Japan a number of times during 1938-1940 and met with Japanese cabinet members. Yasue and Kaufman even came up with the idea of sending Zykman to America to meet the heads of the American Jewish Congress as the representative of the East Asian Jews. Their plan was to mobilize the American Jewish leader Rabbi Stephen Wise (1874-1949) in an effort to improve Japan-American relations. The Japanese officers apparently thought that Zykman could have a mollifying effect on American Jewish leaders, and that they in turn could prevent the worsening of commercial ties between Japan and the United States and even avert the possibility of economic sanctions against Japan that would seriously harm Japan’s military Japan and the Jews of Manchuria Beginning in 1931 59 preparations for a future war against the United States. Zykman’s role would be to tell American Jewish leaders that Japan treated the approximately 15,000 Jews under its control in East Asia fairly. Wise’s angry response was written on November 22, 1938, some two weeks after “Kristallnacht” in Germany, and rejected outright the notion that American Jews would support Japan, a fascist state like Germany and Italy. He informed Zykman that he was not even prepared to discuss the matter, regardless of the reasons that Zykman was seeking his help. This setback did not deter Yasue, who continued to maintain close ties with Dr. Kaufman.6 Another Japanese idea was considered in 1939 by Yasue, Inuzuka, and the Japanese foreign ministry official Ishiguro Shiro. It regarded the possibility of creating an autonomous Jewish area near Shanghai, similar to the Soviet Jewish autonomous region of Birobijan. It is unclear how seriously the Japanese government treated this idea, which was never implemented, but it is indicative of the thinking of the two experts on Jewish matters in the Japanese army.7 After Japan joined Germany and Italy in the Axis Pact in late September, 1940, Lev Zykman was invited on December 31 to dinner at the home of Japan’s Foreign Minister Matsuoka, the man who more than any other Japanese leader had pushed for Japan to join the Axis pact. Matsuoka, who knew the Manchurian Jewish leaders from his tenure as chairman of the Southern Manchurian Railway, attempted to allay Zykman’s fears that Japan might also adopt some of Germany’s antisemitic policies, saying that Germany’s racial policies did not obligate Japan, and that the Jews in Japan and the territories under its control would not be harmed by Nazi-style anti-Jewish measures. He made it clear that he was speaking on behalf of the Emperor of Japan, and added that neither Hitler nor Ribbentrop had ever asked Japan to adopt Nazi Germany’s racist policies toward the Jews. Zykman, who held a Polish passport, reported on what was said at this meeting to the Polish ambassador in Tokyo, Thadeusz Romer, who in turn reported it to the American ambassador Joseph Grew. Two years earlier, in December 1938, the government of Japan reached the conclusion that it had to adopt a more precise policy regarding the thousands of Jewish refugees who were now crowding its consulates and embassies in Europe, desperately seeking to escape from the Nazi terror. Japan’s diplomatic and consular representatives in several European capi- tals requested clear-cut guidelines regarding issuing visas to the growing number of Jewish refugees. A committee of five ministers convened for that purpose issued a statement that said in clear terms that expelling the Jews 60 UNDER THE SHADOW OF THE RISING SUN

from Japanese-held territories would violate the principle of racial equality and that Japan would refrain from doing so. It also added that in view of the need to mobilize foreign capital for the purpose of Japan’s war economy, the Jews in China, Japan, and Manchukuo would be treated fairly and the migration of valuable people, such as engineers and capitalists, would be encouraged. The decisions of this committee will be described in greater details in the following chapter. On February 27, 1939, Foreign Minister Arita Hachiro (1884-1965) stated in Japan’s Upper House that “Jews residing in Japan will be treated like other foreign residents…. Jews reaching Japanese shores must obey Japan’s immigration laws but they will not be denied entry only because of their race.”8 However, the instructions sent out to Japanese consular officials told them to severely limit the issuing of entry permits to Japan and Manchukuo.

Manchurian Jews during the Pacific War By early 1941 there remained in Harbin, Mukden, and Dairen some two thousand Jews, who had managed to survive the entire Pacific War with- out persecution and were even able to maintain their communal institutions intact because they collaborated with the Japanese army and because they were treated by the Japanese as Russian citizens. During the war, the Japanese authorities appointed an adviser to every Jewish organization. His task was to approve various requests, mainly in the sphere of cultural and religious activities. These were usually permitted. The Harbin community, although cut off from the rest of the world and receiving no outside finan- cial help from the American Joint Distribution Committee or other Jewish organizations, maintained itself. In 1943, the Japanese authorities rejected a request by the Zionist Revisionists in Harbin to hold a commemoration ceremony for the World Zionist Revisionist Movement founder and revered leader Zeév Jabotinsky, who had died in America in September 1940. The authorities’ explanation was that he had died in America, with which Japan was at war. Dr. Kaufman explained that Jabotinsky was an anti-British free- dom fighter who had even been jailed by them in Palestine in 1920 and later exiled from that country. The ban was rescinded and the ceremony was held. Two years earlier, as a token of their appreciation, on March 14, 1941, the Jewish community of Manchuria had even registered Major General Higuchi and Colonel Yasue in the Golden Book of the Jewish National Fund in Jerusalem in recognition of the help offered to Jewish refugees Japan and the Jews of Manchuria Beginning in 1931 61 who sought shelter in Manchuria. Even the small German community in Harbin, which spawned a Nazi youth movement, maintained good relations with Jews who escaped from Germany and remained in Harbin for the duration of the war. The Harbin Jewish community managed to carry on its normal life through the war unscathed. Some of its members even continued to go to their summer homes on the seashore.9 Fifty Jewish children from Shanghai were invited to a summer camp in Dairen in the summer of 1940. Harbin also escaped the carpet bombing of most major Japanese cities by American bombers. A week before Japan surrendered, on August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and the Soviet army invaded Manchuria. The Russian authorities wasted no time in arresting Jews of Soviet nationality, but most of them were soon released. With the onset of civil war in China between the Nationalists and the Communists, most of the Jews fled to Shanghai, Israel, or the United States. Dr. Kaufman was captured by the Russian army in 1945 and served as a doctor in forced labor camps in Siberia until he was released in 1956. The Manchurian Jewish community ceased to exist for all intents and purposes after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949.

The Jewish Community of Tianjin10 Another small Jewish community existed in Tianjin (also known as Tientsin) and miraculously survived the war almost intact. Its origins go back to the mid-nineteenth century, when Russian Jews began to arrive there. In 1890 a Russian Concession was created in Tianjin, and in 1901 the “Tientsin Hebrew Association” was established. A plot for a Jewish burial ground was purchased in 1904. The number of Jews swelled after the 1917 Russian Revolution and Manchuria’s occupation by Japan, and by the mid-1930’s the Jewish populaton grew to some 3,500, boasting well-known primary and secondary schools that had been established in 1925. Almost the entire community consisted of Russian Jews, and Japan’s determination not to strain its ties with Russia helps explain why they survived the war. Before the war, the community members traded mainly in furs and lived in an area known as the British Quarter. On the eve of the Pacific War the community, although it dwindled in numbers from 3,500 to 1,500, maintained a country club and a synagogue. Jewish holidays were observed, and a Zionist chapter was created. The Tianjin community also served the needs of the few Jews who lived in Beijing and Qingdao. 62 UNDER THE SHADOW OF THE RISING SUN

Quingdao The first Jewish settlers in Qingdao were German Jews who arrived after the German government took over the Shandong provice as part of its sphere of influence at the end of the nineteenth century. More came after the October 1917 Russian Revolution, the majority of them stateless Russian Jews. Japanese records show the existence of a Jewish school that catered to some 220 children. Tiny Jewish communities also existed in Manchuli, Dairen (Dalian or Dalny), Mukden, and Hailar. Their populations consisted predominantly of Russian Jews who arrived after the Bolshevik Revolution, as they did not have to travel far. They looked to the Harbin community as their source of education and kosher food.

Beijing China’s northern capital had never possessed a Jewish community or a synagogue. This can be explained by two reasons: the first was the absence of wealthy Jews who could support communal institutions and welfare societies as they did in other areas of China. The second was the fact that Beijing was never included in any concessions arrangement with the foreign powers and was not a treaty port, and thus few Jews had any incentive to settle there. Several German Jewish professors, however, did teach in Beijing University, among them Rudolf Lowenthal (1904-1996). In 1938 it was estimated that around 120 Jews lived in Beijing, among them 40 French citizens, 30 British, 20 Americans, and 10 Soviets. The rest were classified as stateless—in most cases, Russian Jews whose passports had been revoked. Many Jews in Beijing probably represented foreign companies. As a rule, the Jews who lived in Manchuria and China proper did not become involved in local politics. They played no role in nationalist or communist party politics and showed no visible interest in what was happening in China in the interwar era. One of the main reasons for that behavior was, of course, lack of knowledge of the language; the second was the desire not to become involved in issues that mattered little to them. Key to this is the fact that most of the Jews in China never viewed China as their permanent home (with the exception of the Baghdadi Jews in Shanghai and Hong Kong). The Russian Jews did not see China as the end of their travels, and nor did Jewish refugees fleeing from Nazi Germany starting in 1933. Both groups hoped to seek refuge in western countries, and indeed did so immediately after the war ended in 1945. Japan and the Jews of Manchuria Beginning in 1931 63

The Jews who lived in Manchuria and China had no special antip- athy to the Japanese occupiers. On the contrary, the Japanese military attempted to protect them from the White Russians and did not go out of its way to persecute them after occupying the major cities of China beginning in July 1937 and increasingly after Pearl Harbor. As we shall see, the Japanese allowed Jews to travel through Japanese-controlled areas, mainly to Shanghai, and did not create a separate Jewish ghetto in that city until the spring of 1943.