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Law and Economics Prof. Daniel L. Chen, JD, PhD http://nber.org/~dlchen/ Law and Economics Readings: Topic I: Consequences of Normative Commitments 1. Theory: Design of Legal Institutions • Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner. Filling gaps in incomplete contracts: An economic theory of default rules. The Yale Law Journal, 99(1):87{130, October 1989 • Lucian Arye Bebchuk. Litigation and settlement under imperfect information. The RAND Journal of Economics, 15(3):404{415, 1984 • Gary S. Becker. Crime and punishment: An economic approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76(2):169{217, 1968 • Roland B´enabou and Jean Tirole. Laws and norms. Discussion Paper series 6290, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn, Germany, January 2012 • Daniel L. Chen. Gender violence and the price of virginity: Theory and evidence of incom- plete marriage contracts. Mimeo, University of Chicago, 2004 • Daniel L. Chen. Mechanism design theory. University of Chicago Lecture Notes, 2005 • Ronald H. Coase. The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics, 3:1{44, October 1960 • Robert Cooter. Unity in tort, contract, and property: The model of precaution. California Law Review, 73(1):1{51, January 1985 • Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen. Law and Economics. Pearson Education, 6 edition, 2011 • Harold Demsetz. Toward a theory of property rights. The American Economic Review, 57(2):347{359, 1967 • Aaron S. Edlin and Stefan Reichelstein. Holdups, standard breach remedies, and optimal investment. The American Economic Review, 86(3):478{501, 1996 • Jan Eeckhout, Nicola Persico, and Petra E. Todd. A theory of optimal random crackdowns. The American Economic Review, 100(3):1104{1135, 2010 • Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart. The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration. The Journal of Political Economy, 94(4):691{719, 1986 • Oliver Hart, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny. The proper scope of government: Theory and an application to prisons. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4):1127{ 1161, 1997 1 • Bruce Hay and Kathryn E. Spier. Manufacturer liability for harms caused by consumers to others. The American Economic Review, 95(5):1700{1711, December 2005 • Bengt Holmstrom. Moral hazard in teams. The Bell Journal of Economics, 13(2):324{340, 1982 • Louis Kaplow. An economic analysis of legal transitions. Harvard Law Review, 99(3):509{ 617, 1986 • Louis Kaplow. Rules versus standards: An economic analysis. Duke Law Journal, 42(3):557{ 629, December 1992 • Louis Kaplow. Burden of proof. Yale Law Journal, 121(4):738{1013, January 2012 • Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell. Any non-welfarist method of policy assessment violates the pareto principle. Journal of Political Economy, 109(2):281{286, 2001 • Avery W. Katz. Foundations Of The Economic Approach To Law. Interdisciplinary Readers in Law Series. Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 1998 • Paul Klemperer. Auctions: Theory and Practice. Princeton paperbacks. Princeton Univer- sity Press, 2004 • Ming Li and Kristof Madar´asz. When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests. Journal of Economic Theory, 139(1):47{74, 2008 • Jeffrey Liebman and Richard Zeckhauser. Schmeduling. Unpublished paper, Harvard University, 2004 • Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green. Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press, 1995 • A. Mitchell Polinsky. An Introduction To Law & Economics. Aspen Publishers, 4 edition, 2003 • A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell. The uneasy case for product liability. Harvard Law Review, 123(6):1437{1492, April 2010 • George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein. The selection of disputes for litigation. The Journal of Legal Studies, 13(1):1{55, 1984 • Bernard Salanie. The Economics of Taxation. MIT press, 2003 • Steven Shavell. Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law. Harvard University Press, 2004 • John Simpson and Abraham L. Wickelgren. Naked exclusion, efficient breach, and down- stream competition. The American Economic Review, 97(4):1305{1320, 2007 • Hal Varian. Microeconomic Analysis. W. W. Norton Co, 3 edition, 1992 2 2. Theory: Explaining Legal Institutions • Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. Why did the west extend the franchise? democ- racy, inequality, and growth in historical perspective. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(4):1167{1199, November 2000 • Alberto Alesina and Paola Giuliano. Culture and Institutions. Journal of Economic Lit- erature, forthcoming, 2015 • Roland B´enabou and Jean Tirole. Belief in a Just World and Redistributive Politics. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(2):699{746, 2006 • Daniel L. Chen and Jo Thori Lind. The political economy of beliefs: Why fiscal and social conservatives and liberals come hand-in-hand. Working paper, July 2014 • Raquel Fern´andezand Dani Rodrik. Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Pres- ence of Individual- Specific Uncertainty. American Economic Review, 81(5):1146{1155, December 1991 • Raquel Fern´andezand Richard Rogerson. On the Political Economy of Education Subsidies. Review of Economic Studies, 62(2):249{262, April 1995 • Raquel Fern´andezand Richard Rogerson. Income Distribution, Communities and the Qual- ity of Public Education. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111(1):135{164, 1996 • Camilo Garc´ıa-Jimeno. The political economy of moral conflict: An empirical study of learning and law enforcement under prohibition. Econometrica, Revise and Resumbit, 2015 • Nicola Gennaioli and Andrei Shleifer. Judicial fact discretion. The Journal of Legal Studies, 37(1):1{35, 2008 • Nicola Gennaioli and Andrei Shleifer. The evolution of common law. The Journal of Political Economy, 115(1):43{68, 2007 • Edward L. Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer. Legal origins. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4):1193{1229, 2002 3. Empirics: Exploiting Variation in Legal Rules • Joshua D. Angrist and Victor Lavy. Using maimonides' rule to estimate the effect of class size on scholastic achievement. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(2):533{575, 1999 • Joshua D. Angrist and Alan B. Krueger. Instrumental variables and the search for iden- tification: From supply and demand to natural experiments. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(4):69{85, 2001 • Joshua D. Angrist and J¨orn-SteffenPischke. Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiri- cist's Companion. Princeton University Press, 2008 • Joshua D. Angrist. The perils of peer effects. Labour Economics, 30:98{108, October 2014 3 • Joshua D. Angrist and Alan B. Krueger. Empirical strategies in labor economics. In Ashenfelter and Card, editors, Handbook of Labor Economics, volume 3, chapter 23, pages 1277{1366. Elsevier, 1999 • David Autor. Labor Economics. MIT Lecture Notes • David H. Autor, John J. Donohue, and Stewart J. Schwab. The costs of wrongful-discharge laws. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 88(2):211{231, 2006 • Martha J. Bailey. \Momma's Got the Pill": How Anthony Comstock and Griswold v. Connecticut Shaped US Childbearing. The American Economic Review, 100(1):98{129, 2010 • Shubham Chaudhuri, Pinelopi K. Goldberg, and Panle Jia. Estimating the effects of global patent protection in pharmaceuticals: A case study of quinolones in india. The American Economic Review, 96(5):1477{1514, 2006 • John J. Donohue and Justin Wolfers. Uses and abuses of empirical evidence in the death penalty debate. Stanford Law Review, 58(3):791{845, 2005 • Esther Duflo. Empirical methods. MIT Lecture Notes, 2002 • Franklin M. Fisher. Multiple regression in legal proceedings. Columbia Law Review, 80(4):702{736, 1980 • Michael Frakes. The Impact of Medical Liability Standards on Regional Variations in Cesarean Utilization: Evidence from the Adoption of National-Standard Rules. American Economic Review, 103(1):257{276, February 2013 • Leora Friedberg. Did unilateral divorce raise divorce rates? Evidence from panel data. The American Economic Review, 88(3):608{627, 1998 • Michael Greenstone. The impacts of environmental regulations on industrial activity: Ev- idence from the 1970 and 1977 clean air act amendments and the census of manufactures. Journal of Political Economy, 110(6):1175{1219, 2002 • Michael Greenstone, Paul Oyer, and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen. Mandated Disclosure, Stock Returns, and the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments. The Quarterly Journal of Eco- nomics, 121(2):399{460, May 2006 • Guido Imbens. Regression discontinuity designs, 2007. NBER Lecture Notes • Guido Imbens. Discrete choice models, 2007. NBER Lecture Notes • David H. Kaye and David A. Freedman. Reference Guide on Statistics, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence. The National Academic Press, 2 edition, 2000 • Ilyana Kuziemko. How should inmates be released from prison? An assessment of parole versus fixed-sentence regimes. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128(1):371{424, 2012 • Christian Leuz and Peter Wysocki. Economic consequences of financial reporting and disclosure regulation: A review and suggestions for future research. Working paper, 2008 • Giovanni Mastrobuoni. Optimizing Behavior During Bank Robberies: Theory and Evidence on the Two Minute Rule. Working paper, University of Essex, January 2015 4 • Giovanni Mastrobuoni. Police disruption and performance: Evidence from recurrent rede- ployments within a city. Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series 758, University of Essex, January 2015 • Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny. Law and finance. The Journal of Political Economy, 106(6):1113{1155, 1998 • Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers. Bargaining in the shadow of the law: Divorce laws and family
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