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US Policy Toward Kyrgyzstan and the Closing of Manas Transit Center

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US Policy Toward Kyrgyzstan and the Closing of Manas Transit Center Central Asia Policy Brief No. 19 December 2014 US policy toward Kyrgyzstan and the closing of Manas transit center Emil Joroev, Roger Kangas, Erica Marat For years, the United States has stated that leaving the Manas transit center would be detrimental to its security mission in Afghanistan. Now that the transit center is closed, can we assess any strategic loss for the US in relation to Afghanistan? Or was that mostly a tool to secure a direct channel of communication with Kyrgyz authorities? Emil Joroev The transit center at Manas Airport was an important asset for the US in car- Emil Joroev, Deputy Director, rying out operations in Afghanistan, and its closure is certainly a net loss for OSCE Academy, Bishkek, Kyr- US forces. It remains difficult to assess the significance of this loss more pre- gyzstan. cisely, given that many aspects are involved: from the downsizing of the American presence in Afghanistan, to the greater costs of logistics between Erica Marat, Assistant Profes- Afghanistan and the nearest US bases in the region, to financial gains and sor at the College of Interna- losses from the center closing down. With the crucial year of 2014 closing, it tional Security Affairs, National is now clear that the US will continue a non-trivial presence in Afghanistan, Defense University. and thus holding on to the base at Manas would be a desirable asset, had it been possible. Roger Kangas, Academic Dean and Professor of Central Asian However, the meaning of the center at Manas is said to be broader than Studies at the Near East South simply supporting Western operations in Afghanistan. Another important Asia Center for Strategic Studies part of the equation is the fact that, the Manas center was a channel of direct at National Defense University. communication to authorities in Kyrgyzstan, and more importantly, provided a physical presence for the US in a region that was traditionally claimed by Russia as part of its sphere of influence.. However, this notion is even more speculative and bound to remain matter of guesses and unfounded asser- tions. The opinions expressed here are those of the author only and do not represent the Cen- tral Asia Program. CENTRAL ASIA POLICY BRIEF No. 19, December 2014 Roger Kangas tracts and rumors of the base’s true purpose only added to the tensions. The Manas Transit Center was a critical transportation and supply node for the US These unintended consequences of the Department of Defense during the later pe- base’s presence had an adverse effect on riod of the ISAF mission, especially after the US-Kyrgyz relations and the embassy found ground lines of communication via Pakistan itself having to focus more on those matters became less reliable. In 2011, when there than it otherwise would have liked. In June were over 100,000 US troops in Afghanistan 2009, the Manas Air Base was renamed the (and over 150,000 total coalition troops), “Manas Transit Center” to diminish any Manas played a critical role. Were it to have concern that the facility was permanent and been closed at that time, it would most like- to focus on its’ primary function: the supply ly have been detrimental to the overall se- and support of the missions in Afghanistan. curity mission. However, as forces started In spite of that, the facility’s presence re- to depart from 2011-onward, accelerating mained a point of contention with the Kyr- in 2013 and 2014, the necessity of Manas gyz leadership and population and conse- naturally decreased. When the handover of quently a less effective means of communi- the transit center took place in June 2014, cation between the two governments. the US/ISAF forces remaining in Afghani- stan could state that their supply and transit Erica Marat needs were being sufficiently managed by other routes. As the United States made it clear in negoti- ating the 2014 contract on the Manas base, Interestingly, the Manas Transit Center be- its strategic value was its proximity to Af- came a channel of communication with the ghanistan. Tens of thousands of US and Kyrgyz authorities over time, but that was NATO troops passed through the base each not its initial intent. The US embassy in month. The base also served as a refueling Bishkek generally has had good ties with site for military aircraft. Withdrawal of the the government of Kyrgyzstan—from the base complicated transit and refueling pro- Akayev presidency to the present—and cedures for coalition troops. prior to 2001, relations focused largely on non-security matters. The establishment of the Ganci Air Base (shortly thereafter re- Given the change of strategic paradigm named the Manas Air Base) in December linked to the Ukrainian crisis, does the 2001, became a way in which the Kyrgyz closure of the Manas transit center en- government could support the US missions danger Kyrgyzstan’s sovereignty and its in Afghanistan—Operation Enduring Free- strategic room of manoeuver toward Rus- dom and the ISAF mission. Over time, as this sia and China? particular link strengthened and the facility expanded, it became a more important Emil Joroev component of the US-Kyrgyz relationship. Had the transit center not been closed, it This had both positive and negative aspects. would most likely have contributed to the It created jobs for locals and infused a sig- anxiety and a high level of perceived risks in nificant amount of money into the local Kyrgyzstan vis-à-vis Moscow. The Ukrainian economy and also enhanced a US security crisis has, for a moment, accentuated that presence in the country. On the other hand, potential and brought real negative “conse- from 2005-onward, the government in quences” related to non-compliance with Bishkek endured intense pressure from Russian regional interests. The Kyrgyzstan fellow Collective Security Treaty Organiza- government initially voiced support for tion and Shanghai Cooperation Organization Ukrainian self-determination and state in- members—especially Russia and China—to tegrity, only to learn that such free expres- close the base for geopolitical reasons. Con- sion was not welcomed by their “strategic troversies surrounding the base fuel con- partners.” The continued presence of the 2 CENTRAL ASIA POLICY BRIEF No. 19, December 2014 Manas transit center would not have signifi- the CSTO, remained a perceived rival to cantly changed the path of recent develop- Manas, although the missions were funda- ments for Kyrgyzstan. The consequences mentally different. The US-supported Trans- could affect Kyrgystan in either negative or it Center would not have been a factor to positive ways; as a bulwark for Kyrgyzstan’s Kyrgyzstan becoming further engaged with independence, but also as a particular irri- Russia, militarily or through other organiza- tant for Moscow, thereby leading to real tions like the Eurasian Economic Union. diversionary action from Kremlin. Erica Marat In general, possibly due to the weakness of Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy circles, the By ending US military presence, Kyrgyzstan transit center was never a serious asset in significantly decreased its space to maneu- the country’s relationship with others. The ver among other regional powers. Bishkek history of the Kyrgyz-US partnership over is now faced with the challenge of balancing the base suggests that Bishkek always between Russia and China, with the Kremlin wished the base to be a little-noticed, quiet often taking a more aggressive posture to- cash source; instead, it persisted— wards achieving its goals, as seen in Ukraine especially since 2005—in being one of the and Crimea. For the foreseeable future, Rus- top issues with Bishkek-Washington and sia’s political influence will overshadow especially Bishkek-Moscow relations. Re- China’s economic pull. Over the next decade, gardless of the the transit center, Bishkek however, China’s economic presence in never thought of America as a committed Kyrgyzstan might translate into political partner for Kyrgyzstan’s difficulties with influence as well. either Beijing or Moscow. Roger Kangas The closure of the Manas transit center is also, and maybe above all, an economic Kyrgyzstan has experienced pressure from loss for Kyrgyzstan. Do you think this fi- Russia and China for much of the past dec- nancial aspect is a ‘push factor’, for the ade—especially because of the Transit Cen- Kyrgyz authorities, to favor their coun- ter’s presence. With the US no longer mili- try’s membership in the Eurasian Union? tarily present in the country, these pres- sures remain, albeit now focused on the Emil Joroev need of Kyrgyzstan to remain within the security and economic orbits of these larger There have not been any studies that tried countries. At present, it is unclear as to to assess the direct implications of the whether Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and transit center closure for Kyrgyzstan’s aspi- the crisis between those two countries will rations to join the Eurasian Union. Finan- be repeated in Central Asia. cially, the closure of the center was certain- ly a major fallout in Kyrgyzstan’s budget— Ukraine, and Georgia before it, expressed something that the government should have interests in establishing stronger ties with known long in advance and prepared for Western economic and security organiza- but generally did not. Cash-strapped, Kyr- tions. The countries of Central Asia have gyzstan’s leadership looked out for sources much different relations with Russia and it to compensate the hole, and Moscow has would seem at present that there is little come out generally as the default address. danger in these countries, including Kyrgyz- Moscow’s support, however, has been tied stan, which would raise similar concerns for to Kyrgyzstan’s staying the course toward Russia.
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