Central Asia Policy Brief

No. 19

December 2014

US policy toward and the closing of Manas transit center

Emil Joroev, Roger Kangas,

Erica Marat

For years, the United States has stated that leaving the Manas transit center would be detrimental to its security mission in . Now that the transit center is closed, can we assess any strategic loss for the US in relation to Afghanistan? Or was that mostly a tool to secure a direct channel of communication with Kyrgyz authorities?

Emil Joroev

The transit center at Manas Airport was an important asset for the US in car- Emil Joroev, Deputy Director, rying out operations in Afghanistan, and its closure is certainly a net loss for OSCE Academy, , Kyr- US forces. It remains difficult to assess the significance of this loss more pre- gyzstan. cisely, given that many aspects are involved: from the downsizing of the American presence in Afghanistan, to the greater costs of logistics between Erica Marat, Assistant Profes- Afghanistan and the nearest US bases in the region, to financial gains and sor at the College of Interna- losses from the center closing down. With the crucial year of 2014 closing, it tional Security Affairs, National is now clear that the US will continue a non-trivial presence in Afghanistan, Defense University. and thus holding on to the base at Manas would be a desirable asset, had it been possible. Roger Kangas, Academic Dean and Professor of Central Asian However, the meaning of the center at Manas is said to be broader than Studies at the Near East South simply supporting Western operations in Afghanistan. Another important Asia Center for Strategic Studies part of the equation is the fact that, the Manas center was a channel of direct at National Defense University. communication to authorities in Kyrgyzstan, and more importantly, provided a physical presence for the US in a region that was traditionally claimed by Russia as part of its sphere of influence.. However, this notion is even more speculative and bound to remain matter of guesses and unfounded asser- tions. The opinions expressed here are those of the author only and do not represent the Cen- tral Asia Program. CENTRAL ASIA POLICY BRIEF No. 19, December 2014

Roger Kangas tracts and rumors of the base’s true purpose only added to the tensions. The Manas Transit Center was a critical transportation and supply node for the US These unintended consequences of the Department of Defense during the later pe- base’s presence had an adverse effect on riod of the ISAF mission, especially after the US-Kyrgyz relations and the embassy found ground lines of communication via Pakistan itself having to focus more on those matters became less reliable. In 2011, when there than it otherwise would have liked. In June were over 100,000 US troops in Afghanistan 2009, the Manas Air Base was renamed the (and over 150,000 total coalition troops), “Manas Transit Center” to diminish any Manas played a critical role. Were it to have concern that the facility was permanent and been closed at that time, it would most like- to focus on its’ primary function: the supply ly have been detrimental to the overall se- and support of the missions in Afghanistan. curity mission. However, as forces started In spite of that, the facility’s presence re- to depart from 2011-onward, accelerating mained a point of contention with the Kyr- in 2013 and 2014, the necessity of Manas gyz leadership and population and conse- naturally decreased. When the handover of quently a less effective means of communi- the transit center took place in June 2014, cation between the two governments. the US/ISAF forces remaining in Afghani- stan could state that their supply and transit Erica Marat needs were being sufficiently managed by other routes. As the United States made it clear in negoti- ating the 2014 contract on the Manas base, Interestingly, the Manas Transit Center be- its strategic value was its proximity to Af- came a channel of communication with the ghanistan. Tens of thousands of US and Kyrgyz authorities over time, but that was NATO troops passed through the base each not its initial intent. The US embassy in month. The base also served as a refueling Bishkek generally has had good ties with site for military aircraft. Withdrawal of the the government of Kyrgyzstan—from the base complicated transit and refueling pro- Akayev presidency to the present—and cedures for coalition troops. prior to 2001, relations focused largely on non-security matters. The establishment of the Ganci Air Base (shortly thereafter re- Given the change of strategic paradigm named the Manas Air Base) in December linked to the Ukrainian crisis, does the 2001, became a way in which the Kyrgyz closure of the Manas transit center en- government could support the US missions danger Kyrgyzstan’s sovereignty and its in Afghanistan—Operation Enduring Free- strategic room of manoeuver toward Rus- dom and the ISAF mission. Over time, as this sia and ? particular link strengthened and the facility expanded, it became a more important Emil Joroev component of the US-Kyrgyz relationship. Had the transit center not been closed, it This had both positive and negative aspects. would most likely have contributed to the It created jobs for locals and infused a sig- anxiety and a high level of perceived risks in nificant amount of money into the local Kyrgyzstan vis-à-vis Moscow. The Ukrainian economy and also enhanced a US security crisis has, for a moment, accentuated that presence in the country. On the other hand, potential and brought real negative “conse- from 2005-onward, the government in quences” related to non-compliance with Bishkek endured intense pressure from Russian regional interests. The Kyrgyzstan fellow Collective Security Treaty Organiza- government initially voiced support for tion and Shanghai Cooperation Organization Ukrainian self-determination and state in- members—especially Russia and China—to tegrity, only to learn that such free expres- close the base for geopolitical reasons. Con- sion was not welcomed by their “strategic troversies surrounding the base fuel con- partners.” The continued presence of the

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Manas transit center would not have signifi- the CSTO, remained a perceived rival to cantly changed the path of recent develop- Manas, although the missions were funda- ments for Kyrgyzstan. The consequences mentally different. The US-supported Trans- could affect Kyrgystan in either negative or it Center would not have been a factor to positive ways; as a bulwark for Kyrgyzstan’s Kyrgyzstan becoming further engaged with independence, but also as a particular irri- Russia, militarily or through other organiza- tant for Moscow, thereby leading to real tions like the Eurasian Economic Union. diversionary action from Kremlin. Erica Marat In general, possibly due to the weakness of Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy circles, the By ending US military presence, Kyrgyzstan transit center was never a serious asset in significantly decreased its space to maneu- the country’s relationship with others. The ver among other regional powers. Bishkek history of the Kyrgyz-US partnership over is now faced with the challenge of balancing the base suggests that Bishkek always between Russia and China, with the Kremlin wished the base to be a little-noticed, quiet often taking a more aggressive posture to- cash source; instead, it persisted— wards achieving its goals, as seen in Ukraine especially since 2005—in being one of the and Crimea. For the foreseeable future, Rus- top issues with Bishkek-Washington and sia’s political influence will overshadow especially Bishkek-Moscow relations. Re- China’s economic pull. Over the next decade, gardless of the the transit center, Bishkek however, China’s economic presence in never thought of America as a committed Kyrgyzstan might translate into political partner for Kyrgyzstan’s difficulties with influence as well. either Beijing or Moscow.

Roger Kangas The closure of the Manas transit center is also, and maybe above all, an economic Kyrgyzstan has experienced pressure from loss for Kyrgyzstan. Do you think this fi- Russia and China for much of the past dec- nancial aspect is a ‘push factor’, for the ade—especially because of the Transit Cen- Kyrgyz authorities, to favor their coun- ter’s presence. With the US no longer mili- try’s membership in the Eurasian Union? tarily present in the country, these pres- sures remain, albeit now focused on the Emil Joroev need of Kyrgyzstan to remain within the security and economic orbits of these larger There have not been any studies that tried countries. At present, it is unclear as to to assess the direct implications of the whether Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and transit center closure for Kyrgyzstan’s aspi- the crisis between those two countries will rations to join the Eurasian Union. Finan- be repeated in Central Asia. cially, the closure of the center was certain- ly a major fallout in Kyrgyzstan’s budget— Ukraine, and Georgia before it, expressed something that the government should have interests in establishing stronger ties with known long in advance and prepared for Western economic and security organiza- but generally did not. Cash-strapped, Kyr- tions. The countries of Central Asia have gyzstan’s leadership looked out for sources much different relations with Russia and it to compensate the hole, and Moscow has would seem at present that there is little come out generally as the default address. danger in these countries, including Kyrgyz- Moscow’s support, however, has been tied stan, which would raise similar concerns for to Kyrgyzstan’s staying the course toward Russia. Interestingly, any concern that Rus- joining the Customs and then the Eurasian sia had with the Manas Transit Center was Economic unions. counter-balanced with the enhancement of the Air Base, located not far from Thus, in a situation lacking viable alterna- Bishkek. This facility, which is technically a tives, the closure of the base was of course contribution of the Kyrgyz government to one of “push factors” for Kyrgyzstan toward

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CENTRAL ASIA POLICY BRIEF No. 19, December 2014 the Eurasian union integration. However, it stan: a desire to cut off military assistance, would be too strong to suggest this as the programs, engagement, and other forms of decisive or otherwise commanding factor bilateral activity simply as a reaction to the for Kyrgyzstan’s ever-growing pivot toward transit center being closed down. Moscow. Had Kyrgyzstan had a serious and realistic option of staying out of these inte- These factors, however, are most likely neg- gration processes, it possibly would choose ligible in the range of issues that the Kyrgyz so. However, for many eminent reasons (all government has to evaluate when enhanc- generally revolving around the many “but- ing its ties to, and potentially within, the tons” that Kremlin holds for hurting Kyr- Eurasian Economic Union. Kyrgyz workers gyzstan), that is not viewed as a viable op- in Russia, energy transfers, broader region- tion by the Kyrgyz leadership. al trade, and other issues are more relevant to President Atambayev’s decision to en- Roger Kangas hance his country’s standing within the Eurasian Economic Union. The economic loss experienced by the clo- sure of the Manas Transit Center is two- Erica Marat fold. First, there are the direct revenues acquired by the base itself. These range The closure of the Manas base has had a from the payments to the government of significant impact on Kyrgyzstan’s economy. Kyrgyzstan for the usage of the actual Ma- Bishkek has lost roughly $150 million in nas Airport runways, payments for the annual payments. But this will not be the property and other in-kind remunerations, main push factor affecting a decision by as well as the salaries for the hundreds of Kyrgyzstan’s authorities about joining the locals who worked on the base. Even the Eurasian Union. Russia’s constant demand money spent by US and other personnel to limit the US presence on Kyrgyzstan con- during their stay in the country itself will be tinues to be the main factor. a real loss.

There is a second form of “economic loss” to Can the US counterbalance the closure of the country: a few years ago, the Washing- Manas by a different type of engagement ton-based Center for Strategic and Interna- in Kyrgyzstan? Will the security focus be tional Studies (CSIS) conducted a study that progressively replaced by an emphasis on showed when US troops leave a country economic development, human capital, or following a mission, the amount of total US rule of law? support for that country declines by 30-60 percent. Now, that report focused on coun- Emil Joroev tries at war, or where there was a peace- keeping mission following a conflict. Kyr- Does the United States have sufficient stra- gyzstan does not fit that category, but be- tegic or economic interests to try and save cause the Manas Transit Center function its relationship with Kyrgyzstan without the was combat-related, there could very well transit center? Generally, the answer has be residual effects for the country in terms been negative, and for plausible reasons. of how the US government proceeds to en- Kyrgyzstan is too little, politically too fickle gage with Kyrgyzstan. (especially in its promise of democratiza- tion), and increasingly under the spell of Policy officials and analysts note how “dese- Russia. The cost that the US would incur to curitizing” US engagement in Central Asia salvage the relationship do not seem worth broadly will result in less government assis- it for the US to become a serious option for tance going to the region. Indeed, the FY15 Kyrgyzstan’s great-power friends. The US is budget and the anticipated FY16 budgets not likely to match Russia’s investments or show a decline in funding to the region. interest in Kyrgystan.. Moreover, one could even see an element of punitive behavior with respect to Kyrgyz-

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If it were possible, the United States’ close commitment to, and support of, the Kyrgyz engagement with Kyrgyzstan would be de- government. Removing all expenditures sirable for both sides for various reasons. In related to that mission from the broader the larger line of confrontation or differ- scope of US-Kyrgyz relations, shows a con- ences with Russia, maintaining a positive sistent, but modest engagement by the US and strong relationship with Bishkek would government. In the 1990s, programs focus- be an asset for US foreign policy. For Kyr- ing on democratization, human rights and gyzstan, such engagement would be one economic privatization were well- fledgling hope to withstand the tight hug of represented. Today, it is less likely that the Russia. But as noted above, better/strong Kyrgyz government would welcome such Bishkek-Washington links can cause more efforts. As with nearly all post-Soviet states, serious complications for Bishkek-Moscow discussing political freedoms and human relations, and officials in Bishkek certainly rights are less well-received today. The do not wish to have such complications. challenge for the US Embassy in Bishkek and the US officials who engage with Kyr- In considering this question, it is also help- gyzstan is how best to use the limited re- ful to unpack Kyrgyzstan, which is not an sources available to ensure that the US has internally coordinated actor, but a society, an effective and positive presence in the where the government is joined by a largely country. pro-Russian general population, the active civil society groups sharply divided along Erica Marat pro-Russian/anti-US and vice-versa posi- tions, and pro-democracy groups for whom Perhaps the United State’s greatest strength maintenance of active American presence in is its soft power capability. The US can re- Kyrgyzstan’s public life and development is tain its influence in Kyrgyzstan by expand- an important. The balance of all these dif- ing educational exchange programs for high ferent quarters seems to tilt in favor of Rus- school and university students, as well as sia, which further makes it difficult for the for mid-career professionals. The programs United States to break a new and more via- must focus on a wide variety of areas, in- ble route to strong engagement with Kyr- cluding the humanities, economics, policy gyzstan. studies, security, media, health care, and the natural sciences. To date, some of the pro- Roger Kangas grams financed by US government agencies and NGOs have succeeded in building the This question gets to the very heart of what capacity of local journalists, teachers, gov- the United States should or can do in Cen- ernment employees and security experts. tral Asia now that the ISAF mission in Af- ghanistan is coming to an end. Since 2001, Furthermore, the US can work with local the US has viewed the Central Asian states entrepreneurs by sharing international ex- largely through the lens of “security,” specif- perience with doing business in other de- ically “Afghan security.” Even though a US veloping economies. Specifically, the United military presence will remain in Afghani- States can help facilitate communication, stan for the near future, as part of the Reso- introduce Kyrgyz entrepreneurs to their lute Support Mission, Central Asia will most counterparts in neighboring countries, and likely be less relevant to US decision- provide education about investment strate- making regarding it. Add to this changing gies. dynamic the reduction in US foreign assis- tance overall, as noted earlier, one can logi- Finally, the US must help countries like Kyr- cally conclude that there will not be a capac- gyzstan develop informational independ- ity to increase engagement in other non- ence. That is, countries need outside assis- security areas. tance to establish and support media outlets that would offer alternatives to Kremlin- In the future, the Manas Transit Center may controlled coverage of current affairs. To- be seen as an aberration in terms of US day, the majority of the Kyrgyz public, in-

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CENTRAL ASIA POLICY BRIEF No. 19, December 2014 cluding top political leaders, is overwhelm- ingly under the influence of Russian media. Outlets like RFE/RL and Voice of America are good alternatives, but they are not suffi- cient. Because it relies on local independent reporting, RFE/RL in particular must be further expanded to include TV and radio broadcasts. It should broaden its coverage of regional and international affairs as well.

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