The Unbreakable Circle: an Intellectual History of Michel Foucault
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View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by CSUSB ScholarWorks California State University, San Bernardino CSUSB ScholarWorks Electronic Theses, Projects, and Dissertations Office of Graduate Studies 3-2014 The nbrU eakable Circle: An Intellectual History of Michel Foucault Chris MB Moreland California State University - San Bernardino, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd Recommended Citation Moreland, Chris MB, "The nbrU eakable Circle: An Intellectual History of Michel Foucault" (2014). Electronic Theses, Projects, and Dissertations. Paper 8. This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Office of Graduate Studies at CSUSB ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses, Projects, and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of CSUSB ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE UNBREAKABLE CIRCLE: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF MICHEL FOUCAULT A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of California State University, San Bernardino In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in Social Sciences: History by Christopher Marc Bettis Moreland March 2014 THE UNBREAKABLE CIRCLE: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF MICHEL FOUCAULT A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of California State University, San Bernardino by Christopher Marc Bettis Moreland March 2014 Approved by: Dr. Timothy Pytell, Committee Chair, History Dr. Tiffany Jones, Committee Member © 2014 Christopher Marc Bettis Moreland ABSTRACT The following is a chronologically ordered internal intellectual history of Michel Foucault. The objective of this analysis is to determine whether or not Foucault provides a viable critical social theory of bourgeois society. In order to examine this topic, I trace the development of Foucault’s thought during his early, pre-archaeological stage, his archaeological stage, and his genealogical stage. I frame Foucault’s stages as attempts to overcome Kant’s subject/object division— or the paradox that man operates as both a meaning-giving subject and an empirical object—that one encounters in discourses pertaining to the social sciences. Foucault’s pre-archaeological stage is characterized by two humanistic modes of thought: hermeneutics and phenomenology. Hermeneutics involves the interpretation of historical events in pursuit of existential meaning. By contrast, phenomenology seeks to uncover meaning in subjective experience. After the publication of Mental Illness and Psychology , Foucault rejects hermeneutics and phenomenology on the grounds that the search for meaning through interpretation will inevitably obscure truth under endlessly multiplying interpretations. Neither method offers a coherent resolution to the subject/object division. Foucault’s archaeological method attempts to overcome the subject/object division by studying the relationships—or patterns appearing in language— between empirical observations. Archaeology does not account for the truth- value associated with codified empirical observations (or statements). In other iii words, archaeology studies the language patterns comprising claims to objective truth. Archaeology consequently assumes a relativistic and objective position that escapes the subject/object division. However, this method suffers from internal instabilities; the rules governing language pertaining to empirical observation are objective, yet the analysts are themselves a product of these rules. This contradiction casts doubt up archaeology’s claim to objectivity. Foucault’s genealogical method does not seek to resolve Kant’s subject/object division; rather, genealogy embraces the notion that the interaction between subject and object remains unknowable. Genealogy, therefore, retains archaeology’s relativistic stance regarding claims to truth while forgoing the former method’s pursuit of objective analysis. During his genealogical stage, Foucault directs his attention away from language patterns and toward the interaction between power and knowledge. Foucault conceptualizes power as a multidirectional, decentralized, and self-perpetuating force that manifests itself as the material result of interpersonal, institutional, and society-level conflicts. Knowledge complements power by defining normal and abnormal behavior. In doing so, knowledge establishes the cognitive field comprising the individual’s self-concept. Genealogy is an analytic of the power/knowledge interaction; the method provides a relativistic means of conceptualizing the reciprocal influence between force relations and discourses. While genealogy does not constitute an objective critical theory, the method has a concrete basis in the form of the positive manifestations of the power/knowledge interaction. iv Based on my assessment of the above methods, I conclude that genealogy is a viable social theory. Moreover, Foucault consistently deconstructs narratives comprising bourgeois society. From this recurrence it is apparent that Foucault is a para-Marxist; he provides a critique of bourgeois society and attempts to test the limits of individual experience within that society. This conclusion supports the continued relevance of Foucauldian analysis in the social sciences. v TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ..........................................................................................................iii CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION Background and Statement of the Problem ............................................... 1 Purpose of Study ....................................................................................... 3 Review of Literature................................................................................... 4 Organization and Method........................................................................... 6 Limitations of Study ................................................................................... 7 CHAPTER TWO: ORIGIN OF METHOD Kant, Phenomenology and Hermeneutics................................................ 10 Mental Illness and Psychology................................................................. 28 Madness and Civilization ......................................................................... 50 The Birth of the Clinic............................................................................... 79 CHAPTER THREE: THE PROMISE OF ARCHAEOLOGY Structuralism versus Archaeology ........................................................... 90 Invisibly Ordered Discourse..................................................................... 95 The Death of Man and the Impasse of Humanism................................. 104 CHAPTER FOUR: GENEALOGY vi Nietzsche and the Genealogical Method ............................................... 119 Power and the Soul ............................................................................... 133 The Power/Knowledge Interaction ......................................................... 141 Discipline and Punish............................................................................. 146 CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION...................................................................... 165 ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................................................ 168 vii CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION Background and Statement of the Problem There is a wealth of secondary literature on Michel Foucault (1926-1984). Secondary sources tend to examine Foucault’s life and work from well-worn perspectives: biographical accounts relate Foucault’s theories to surrounding political, social, historical and personal context; methodological surveys meta- analyze Foucault’s methods; and academic fields examine his relevance within their respective disciplines. Despite the wide coverage Foucault receives, there is no universally accepted consensus with regard to his legacy. What, if anything, does Foucault leave us with in terms of methodology? Does Foucault provide a viable critical social theory? James Miller, author of Foucault’s biography, The Passion of Michel Foucault , argues that Foucault’s relativism undermines the utility of his theories: “Hostile to the encyclopedic ideal in the human sciences and to transcendental claims in philosophy, Foucault left behind no synoptic critique of society. No system of ethics, no comprehensive theory of power, not even … a generally useful historical method.” 1 Certainly, Foucault’s insistence on avoiding persuasive arguments with definitive applications makes it difficult to situate him 1 James Miller, The Passion of Michel Foucault. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 19. 1 within the confines of a modern utilitarian narrative. To assess Foucault from within that narrative, however, would contradict Foucault’s intention to remain undefined by the boundaries of persuasive discourse. This begs the question: can one assess Foucault—and by what standard—when his theories defy and identify potential distortions brought about by assessment? Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, professors at the University of California, Berkeley and coauthors of the analysis of Foucault’s work, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics , do not dispute the notion that Foucault’s theories are unapologetically relativistic: “We have no recourse to objective laws, no recourse to pure subjectivity, no recourse to totalizations of theory. We have only the cultural practices which have made us what we are. To know what that is, we have to