Issue Brief Number 14 July 2015 Documenting Small Arms and Light Weapons A Basic Guide Introduction of accurate identification of arms and both civilian and military weapons that munitions, the basic elements of arms fire a projectile, with the condition that This Issue Brief was written with a tracing, and the relevant legal frame- the unit or system may be carried by an range of professionals in mind. For work, this Issue Brief offers a step-by- individual or a small number of people, those who are involved in the military step approach to documenting small or transported by a pack animal or a or law enforcement communities, or arms and light weapons. It also features light vehicle. This Issue Brief covers who spend time in conflict zones as a section on safety procedures (see techniques applicable to the following journalists or with non-governmental Box 1) and guidelines for undertaking small arms and light weapons: organizations (NGOs) or government documentation work in the field (see agencies, this Brief should provide some Box 2). The Brief concludes with a section small arms: handguns, rifles and insight into the often-murky world on the weapon that is most commonly carbines, assault rifles, shotguns, of arms identification. It is designed observed in conflict zones: the AK rifle sub-machine guns, and light and to serve as a basic how-to guide for and its variants, copies, and derivatives. medium (‘general-purpose’) machine recording relevant identification char- guns; and acteristics of small arms and light light weapons: heavy machine weapons that may be encountered Scope of this Issue Brief guns, grenade launchers, portable in the field. The primary purpose of There is no universally accepted defini- anti-aircraft guns, portable anti- the brief is to ensure that all essential tion of a ‘small arm’ or a ‘light weapon’. tank guns, recoilless rifles, rocket data is recorded accurately, so that a The Small Arms Survey largely adopts launchers, portable anti-tank guided specialist may make a conclusive iden- the proposal put forward by the 1997 weapons (ATGWs), man-portable tification. UN Panel of Governmental Experts, air defence systems (MANPADS), After reviewing the definitions of which considers portability a defining and mortars of calibres up to and small arms and light weapons, the value characteristic. The Panel’s list includes including 120 mm. Other organizations may have slightly different definitions. The UN and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, for instance, include only mortars of ‘less than 100 mm’ (UNGA, 1997; OSCE, 2000). These definitions exclude common mortars in 100 mm and 120 mm cali- bre (see Berman and Leff, 2008, p. 27), which are often employed in much the same manner as their smaller- calibre counterparts (such as 81 mm or 82 mm mortars). Why is it important to identify arms and munitions accurately?1 Arms and munitions are evidence. A journalist documents mortar projectiles in Iraq, 2013. Source: C.J. Chivers/The New York Times Many carry marks that, combined http://www.smallarmssurvey.org 1 with their physical characteristics, Marking: Unmarked weapons gen- Armament Research Services identify them uniquely. If they can be erally cannot be identified uniquely. (ARES), and Conflict Armament identified uniquely, their ownership While a weapon’s design may Research, or official government history may be traced and the point enable interested parties to identify or UN reports. at which they were diverted into the its manufacturer, markings indicat- Put simply, identification enables illicit sphere revealed. Arms tracing ing the manufacturer and country tracing. This Issue Brief concerns itself can help uncover illicit supply channels of manufacture are almost always mainly with the first aspect of arms trac- and identify arms diversion, thereby indispensable to tracing. The pres- ing: identifying unique weapons through providing a firm basis for disrupting ence of a unique serial number a combination of their physical identi- such trade and prosecuting those allows one weapon to be distin- fication characteristics and markings. involved in it. In recent years, the guished from hundreds or thousands international community has come of others that may have been pro- to recognize that arms tracing can be duced at a particular factory. International policy and central to efforts designed to detect, Moreover, if countries mark the legal framework and hence address, the illicit prolifera- weapons that they import, tracing International instruments, such as politi- tion and misuse of small arms. efforts are far more likely to succeed. cally binding agreements and legally Why attempt an arms tracing pro- Record keeping: Key elements of binding treaties, provide important cedure in a country that is experiencing a weapon’s history—in particular, architecture to support the control of or has recently emerged from armed changes in ownership—must be illicit arms. Following is a brief sum- conflict? Illicit arms transfers fuel con- recorded (in print, in databases, and mary of some of the more important flict and allow protagonists to rearm with photographs) for tracing to be instruments relating to small arms for war or crime after hostilities have possible. Records must be accurate, and light weapons. ceased. In both contexts, ‘conflict trac- comprehensive, and retrievable if In December 2005, the United ing’ may be used to monitor potentially investigators are to have any chance Nations General Assembly adopted escalatory influxes of weapons and to of piecing together the weapon’s his- the International Tracing Instrument investigate particular cases of concern. tory. Essential information includes (ITI),2 a politically binding instrument Arms tracing is enabled by the accurate the weapon type and model, its that formalized the importance of mark- identification of the arms or munitions serial number, and the party to ing, record-keeping, and cooperation in question; conversely, it is hindered which it was transferred. in tracing to help combat the spread by inaccurate identification. Cooperation in tracing: Even if of illicit small arms and light weapons. the necessary marking and record- Specifically, the ITI requires states Arms tracing keeping requirements have been met, to ensure the marking of all manufac- tracing efforts will be brought to a Arms tracing has been defined as: tured small arms and light weapons swift halt if the countries of manu- with the name of the manufacturer, the systematic tracking of illicit facture or import—or trading enti- the country of manufacture, and a small arms and light weapons found ties within those countries—do not serial number. In addition, the mark- or seized on the territory of a State cooperate with tracing requests. ing of the weapon type/model, calibre, from the point of manufacture or After having identified the weapon and year of manufacture is encouraged the point of importation through uniquely, an investigator seeking trac- (UNGA, 2005, para. 8a). If possible, the lines of supply to the point at ing assistance typically approaches imported small arms and light weap- which they became illicit (UNGA, the countries of manufacture or ons are to have markings permitting 2005, para. 5). import for help. Sometimes inves- identification of the country and year The first step in any tracing opera- tigators contact relevant trading of import. They must also ensure a tion is to identify the weapon of interest companies directly. Thereafter, they serial number is present (para. 8b). on the basis of its physical character- follow the record-keeping chain for- With regard to record-keeping, states istics and markings. Then, with the ward in time—if possible, to the are required to keep records of manu- cooperation of the states that manufac- point at which the weapon was facture for at least 30 years, and all other tured or imported the weapon, the diverted from the last legal custo- records, including those on imports and second step is to track changes in own- dian into the illicit sphere. In many exports, for at least 20 years (para. 12). ership through available documentary cases, tracing procedures designed The ITI also outlines how states are to records. The ultimate, often elusive to identify arms transferred to con- cooperate with tracing requests, by pro- goal of weapons tracing is to identify flict zones may draw on existing viding, subject to narrow exceptions, the point in the transfer chain at which research that has identified regular information sought by the requesting the (typically) legal weapon entered the trafficking routes and patterns of state that is relevant to the tracing of illicit market. Three pillars—marking, illicit weapons flows. Sources may illicit small arms and light weapons. record-keeping, and cooperation—are include analysis by organizations The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) has essential to successful tracing. such as the Small Arms Survey, a broader scope and covers a wide 2 Small Arms Survey Issue Brief Number 14 July 2015 range of conventional weapons, as well physical security and stockpile manage- specialist. It is important to note that as, for certain purposes, ammunition ment inspection, fieldwork provides most organizations and individuals and parts and components, but narrows the raw data analysts need to draw do not require the ability to identify its regulatory focus to international broader conclusions. Fieldwork may weapons on sight; for most NGOs that transfers of weapons. The ATT is legally be supported or enhanced through the work on arms and munitions issues, binding for states parties. collection of data from other sources, maintaining an extensive staff of spe- The UN Programme of Action3 such as mainstream media, social cialists to cover all of the possible arms covers small arms and light weapons media, and reports by relevant organ- and munitions would be impractical and includes commitments on such izations or government agencies. and prohibitive.