Belarus: an Emerging Civic Nation? a B C Renee L

Nationalities Papers Vol. 39, No. 3, May 2011, 425–440

Belarus: an emerging civic nation? a b c Renee L. Buhr ∗, Victor Shadurski and Steven Hoffman

aDepartment of Political Science, University of St. Thomas, Saint Paul, Minnesota, USA; bFaculty of International Relations, Belarusian State University, Minsk, Belarus; cUniversity of St. Thomas, Saint Paul, Minnesota, USA (Received 22 June 2010; ﬁnal version received 19 January 2011)

Early commentators on the newly independent Belarusian state of the 1990s indicated that there was something lacking in Belarusian identity. The people did not seem to respond powerfully to the new symbols of the state, use of the national language intermingled with Russian, and economic concerns appeared to trump popular concerns with promoting Belarusian language or culture. Other former Soviet states were embracing ethnic national ideals, and as such, many assumed that Belarus should follow a similar path. However, as an examination of the history of the Belarusian territory demonstrates, a national ideal based on ethnicity was problematic in Belarusian society, and as such, the ethnic notions of Belarusian identity forwarded by some Belarusian elites failed to appeal to the masses. Instead, Belarus seems better suited to a more inclusive civic identity than an exclusive ethnic one. This research examines the nature of contemporary Belarusian identity, with particular attention to the civic versus ethnic aspects of that identity. We argue that although Belarusian identity is obviously in ﬂux and subject to heavy debate, it is currently demonstrating more civic aspects than ethnic ones. This ﬁnding is based on original survey data obtained in Belarus in 2009 and 2010. Keywords: Belarus; nationalism; civic identity; primordialism; ethnic identity; survey results

Introduction In 1991, the newly independent Belarusian government embarked on a national revival that appeared similar to that of many other East European states. The Soviet flag was abandoned in favor of the white-red-white flag of the Belarusian Peoples Republic, efforts were Downloaded by [University of Chicago] at 17:15 13 March 2013 made to declare Belarusian the only state language, and 27 July was christened as a new holiday to commemorate Belarus’s independence from the USSR. In short, the most active elements in the Belarusian Parliament appeared to be embracing a future where Belarusian would be a key language of the Republic and where memories of the pre-Soviet and post- Soviet experience would be equally important. However, in 1995 a referendum called by President Lukashenka on the flag, languages, and holidays altered this trajectory of change. The white-red-white flag was abandoned in favor of a modified version of the Soviet flag while Russian officially joined Belarusian as a state language. The apparent rejection of pre- and post-Soviet symbols and their replace- ment by Soviet-era ones led scholars to conclude that Belarus was shunning its national identity and moving backwards on the road from self-determination (Marples, Belarus).

∗Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]

ISSN 0090-5992 print/ISSN 1465-3923 online # 2011 Association for the Study of Nationalities DOI: 10.1080/00905992.2011.565319 http://www.informaworld.com 426 R.L. Buhr et al.

Given that a number of post-Soviet states, including the Baltic counties and Ukraine, had embraced non-Soviet symbols in order to demonstrate their claims to a new, nationa- listic future, it is perhaps understandable that this conclusion should have been drawn at the time. In our view, however, this conclusion was unwarranted or at least requires re- evaluation at this point. The ethnolinguistic identities that seemed a good match for many former Soviet states appear to be a mismatch for Belarus’s history and society. Rather than taking the dismissal of an “ethnic” identity as a wholesale shunning of their national identity on the part of Belarusians, it seems prudent to consider that there are other forms of nationalism that do not require adherence to a particular language or ethnic group which may be more consistent with Belarusian history and culture. Thus, this paper addresses a key question about contemporary Belarusian national identity: is an identity coalescing among the Belarusian public, and if so, what shape is that identity taking? We begin from the position that a “nation” requires that people recognize one another as co-nationals and distinguish themselves from the “other.” If we find evidence that there is an “us” and “them” awareness among Belarusians, the follow up question would be: what ties bind that group? Is it about so-called hard boundaries like birthplace, language, and religion, or are those bonds based on soft boundaries such as “feeling Belarusian,” recognizing Belarus’s history and government, and long term residence? Using a new survey instrument based on Elizabeth Theiss-Morse’s (Theiss- Morse) work on the nature of American nationalism (adapted for use with a Belarusian audience), we aim to understand which ties are most salient in Belarusian society today. Our survey data indicates that Belarusians do feel a common identity, for example, they “identify with the Belarusian people” and agree on the general traits of Belarusians (trustworthy, unselfish, and tolerant). The survey then attempts to distinguish the salience of hard versus soft boundaries of Belarusian identity. The results of the survey indicate that the contemporary Belarusian national identity more closely resembles a “civic” form characterized by soft boundaries than an “ethnic” identity that relies upon birthplace and language. This paper first examines the existing literature on Belarusian identity. This literature has found that ethnic (referred to by Geertz as “primordial”) ties fail to resonate with much of the population, which brings to mind the question of civic identity. As such, we turn to a discussion of civic versus ethnic identity. We then provide a brief summary of the territorial, linguistic, and religious history of the region, which provides us with the potential ethnolinguistic aspects of contemporary Belarusian identity. Throughout this summary we also discuss the factors that support the creation of a more civic identity; Downloaded by [University of Chicago] at 17:15 13 March 2013 these include the difficulty of establishing clear religious and linguistic boundaries in pre- Soviet times and the Soviet nationalities policies which promoted both civic and ethnic markers of identity. At this point we turn to examination of two original surveys conducted in Belarus in 2009 and 2010. The results of these surveys appear to indicate that contemporary Belarusian identity is developing more along civic rather than ethnic lines.

Belarusian nationalism: existing arguments and a new lens A number of scholars have made an effort to explain the bases of Belarusian nationalism, most of which focuses on nationalist rhetorics that have appeared among Belarusian elites in the post-Soviet era. Initially, two elite rhetorics caught the attention of scholars, the ﬁrst referred to by Leshchenko (339) as “national identity building practices,” a position that advocates a more ethnic version of Belarusian nationalism. Leshchenko labels the second as “Soviet identity building” which promotes the closeness between the Nationalities Papers 427

Russian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian people, and advocates a common future for these states. A third route toward Belarusian identity is alluded to by Leshchenko, however, when she indicates that for instrumental reasons, there is an effort to “reconcile” Belar- usian sovereignty and Soviet identity among political elites, especially President Luka- shenka. Ioffe (“Unfinished Nationbuilding” 48) expands on Leshchenko’s formula, suggesting the term “Creole” (a nod to a number of Belarusian writers1) for the compromise position between Belarusian and Soviet identity. These national ideals and findings about the appeal of these rhetorics to the Belarusian population will be discussed in the following section. According to Goujon, Leshchenko, and Ioffe (“Unfinished Nationbuilding”), the national identity builders’ version of the Belarusian national identity traces its roots to a pre-Soviet European culture. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth are the key polities of reference and a number of purported characteristics of these polities have been attributed as the historical legacy of a distinct Belarusian political and ethnolinguistic identity. Elites of this persuasion argue that the Grand Duchy’s political system was relatively democratic for its time, and as the inheritor of this tradition, Belarus should embrace democratic practices in their contemporary political system (Marples, “Europe’s Last Dictatorship”). They advocate, and for a short time in the early 1990s, established, the white-red-white flag of the Belarusian People’s Republic and the Pahonia coat of arms of the Grand Duchy as the national symbols of Belarus (Leshchenko). They are particularly suspicious of any symbol that harkens back to the Soviet era and attempted to remove these from the public domain while serving in parliament from 1991–1995. These same elites also argue that since the Belarusian people are a distinct ethnos, they should determine their own path forward, independent of Russian influence. In a similar vein, they argue that Russia’s cultural dominance over Belarus in the Tsarist and Soviet era has prevented the Belarusian people from developing their own genuine national identity; as such, they advocate minimizing the influence of Russia over Belarus, both in terms of culture and politics (Sahm; Leshchenko). In linguistic terms, the “nationalist” perspective on Belarusian identity calls for promotion of the Belarusian language in both government and everyday use. The Russian language should be removed from state use and discouraged in schools in favor of Belar- usian. From this perspective, the 1995 referendum granting state status to both Belarusian and Russian is considered a step backwards (Goujon). Some, such as the Belarusian Popular Front, go so far as to advocate a specific version of Belarusian, Tarashkevich Downloaded by [University of Chicago] at 17:15 13 March 2013 Belarusian, which predates the more common Soviet-era 1933 Narcomauka version made popular through Soviet education policies (Goujon; Sahm). However, this is a deba- table point; the key point of agreement among “nationalists” appears to be the desire to increase the use of Belarusian and disincentivize the use of Russian and trasianka,a hybrid language of Russian and Belarusian. A number of scholars have indicated that this “national” identity has been unpalatable to Belarusians. Leshchenko, for example, indicates that the more extreme nationalists, who advocate a strict and rapid shift to everyday use of Belarusian and take a strong anti-Russian stance, failed because they did not take into account the recent history of Belarus (337). The economic development of Belarus happened primarily during the Soviet era, and the Russian language was a part of that development, particularly in the urban areas. Ioffe (“Unfinished Nationbuilding”) seconds this point, indicating that many Belarusians either speak trasianka or had parents who spoke it, thus making it difficult for many to accept the hard nationalist focus on promoting Belarusian and 428 R.L. Buhr et al.

denigrating trasianka and Russian. It is likewise difficult to eschew the memory of the Great Patriotic War, and the ties this provides to Russia, in a country where monuments to the war and memories of extreme hardship and heroism are still very much a part of the “public square.” These points lead logically into the next school of thought on Belarusian identity, referred to by Leshchenko as “Soviet” in nature. Those who advocate a “Soviet” version of Belarusian identity present an image of a Belarusian nation that is a brother to the Russians and Ukrainians and emphasize the symbols and heroes of the Soviet era and a shared destiny between Belarusians and Russians. Key identifiers include the efforts of the Belarusian partisans in World War II, the resistance of the Belarusian population to Nazi tyranny, and symbols of the Soviet era, including the current flag and the remaining presence of the BSSR emblem in public places (Sahm; Ioffe “Understanding Belarus”). One need only step outside the Minsk train station to see just how prominently these symbols are displayed in the everyday life of Belarusians. The sentiment here, however, appears to harken back to the days when Russia was “first among equals.” This set of elites sees the heavy use of the Russian language as normal in Belarusian society and concludes that the loss of Belarusian would not be considered a serious detriment to Belarusians as a people (Goujon). The Belarusian language has also been denigrated by this camp on occasion, dismissed as an underdeveloped language, or worse, simply a dialect of Russian, while Russian is considered a language of culture and civilization. This school, not surprisingly, recommends a foreign policy position that is closely aligned with Russia, both economically and politically (Eke and Kuzio; Leshchenko). In the early years of the post-Soviet Republic, it was not uncommon for this elite discourse to recommend reunification or incorporation with Russia; most, however, have simply advocated for economic, military and political union, perhaps along the lines of the Euro- pean Union. This discourse was promoted by the Lukashenka regime in the mid- to late- 1990s (Leshchenko). Leshchenko argues that this version of national identity has gained more support than the “nationalist” one, mainly because it addresses those elements of history that appear salient to the Belarusian population. Thus, the Soviet era is recognized here as an important element of Belarusian identity and it does not require that people abandon the Soviet parts of their history, whether that history focuses on the economic development of the state or the wartime aspects. According to Marples, “official support of such memories has helped to solidify the Lukashenka regime as well as strengthen the links with Downloaded by [University of Chicago] at 17:15 13 March 2013 Russia” (Marples, “Europe’s Last Dictatorship” 902). This school also does not require that Belarusians who currently favor use of Russian learn to speak “proper” Belarusian, however defined by elites, a considerable obstacle for those who speak predominantly Russian or trasianka. And since Belarus has the largest percentage of self-described Belarusians who speak Russian as their primary language (Ioffe, “Understanding Belarus”; Gorenburg), this is a significant challenge to any party who hopes to shape the national identity in a way that is critical of Russian speakers. The 1995 referendum on language, which provided equal status for both Russian and Belarusian languages and which 83.1% of voters voted in favor of, is likely a reflection of this existing language dynamic (Goujon). While this school of thought successfully appeals to Belarusians’ use of Russian and memory of the Soviet era, it has suffered from its foreign policy direction. Advocating closer relations with Russia has been problematic, especially as the popularity of reunification with Russia has dropped, from 24% supporting in 2003 to only 12% in 2005 Nationalities Papers 429

(Drakohurst, cited in Ioffe, “Unfinished Nation Building” 42), and the relationship with Russia has become more contentious. Gas price conflicts between Belarus and Russia, and Putin’s assertion that union would require Belarus’s absorption by Russia have soured the public on having too close a relationship with their massive neighbor (Leshchenko 341). As the desire to remain sovereign has risen, the more “Russophile” aspects of this school of thought have become a liability. As a result of these factors, a third position has gained ground. Labeled by some as “Creole” (Ioffe, Understanding Belarus), this interpretation of Belarusian national identity acknowledges the accomplishments of Soviet Belarus, including the economic gains made in Belarus during the Soviet era as well as resistance to Nazi occupation. But it also pays homage to Belarusian culture, part of which is language and part of which is a distinct, if difficult to define, sense of “localness” (Pershai), as well as a strong stance on Belarusian self-determination. Thus, while Soviet-Russophiles have toyed with the idea of reunification with Russia, a Creole discourse calls for continued independence and sovereignty of the Belarusian state and people (Leshchenko; Ioffe, “Unfinished Nation Building”). Proponents of this version of national identity appear willing to tolerate the use of Russian language for now, with the hopes of making the use of the Belarusian language more common in the long term. This position has gained popularity with the population and with the President himself in the past 10 years. President Lukashenka has made a point of “standing up to Russia” in gas price disputes, and couches much of his criticism of Russia in terms of defending Belarusian sovereignty (Ioffe, “Unfinished Nation Building”). While the reasons why this compromise would be more appealing are apparent from the discussion of the weaknesses of the “national” and “Soviet” projects discussed above, Creole nationalists face a fundamental issue, namely, defining just where the “Soviet” part ends and the “Belarusian” part of Belarus begins. Is it really just the desire to remain sovereign that distinguishes the Soviet model from the Creole? And why are particular parts of each of the national and Soviet narratives appealing while others are not? The ambiguities that define the current sense of national identity in contemporary Belarus are rooted in both historical realities and in a theoretical literature that offers multiple grounds for asserting a claim of national consciousness. In the discussion that follows, we argue that both of these factors, namely the early Soviet nationalities policies that to a great extent define contemporary Belarus and the theoretical debates over “civic” and “ethnic” nationalism, share equal responsibility for the lack of clarity in the debate over the true character of Belarusian nationalism. Downloaded by [University of Chicago] at 17:15 13 March 2013

Civic and ethnic nationalism In his 1963 work, Clifford Geertz discusses the evolution of nationalism in newly independent states of Africa, the Middle East, and other post-colonial parts of the world. Geertz offers two accounts of the nationalisms that define this period, the first being a “civic” nationalism “maintained not by calls to blood and land but by vague, intermittent, and routine allegiance to a civil state, supplemented to a greater or lesser extent by governmental use of police powers and ideological exhortation” (Geertz 110). Note that this definition does not assume that the state is a democracy or is “Western” in nature2 nor does it consider civic nationalism to be somehow superior to an ethnic one.3 Instead, Geertz portrays civic nationalism as, at root, a condition where the population identifies with the state rather than the ethnic characteristics outlined below and that the state plays a role in the definition.4 430 R.L. Buhr et al.

Primordial (referred to in this paper as “ethnic”) nationalism is, on the other hand, defined by Geertz according to a number of fixed elements including assumed blood ties, race, language, region, religion, and custom (109–113). These characteristics are often referred to as “givens” in that it is impossible to voluntarily change one’s blood ties, race, or place of birth. The difficulty of doing so remains stubbornly evident even in a world of sometimes breathtaking technological and social transform- ation. Thus, while one may voluntarily change their religion, the experience in Bosnia in the early 1990s indicates that religion can also resemble a blood tie or race charac- teristic, where a person’s religious background is determined according to that of their ancestors and not the one they currently practice. This is particularly the case when those who are defining you as the “other” base their decisions on your purported ancestral religion. Finally, it is important to note that civic and ethnic versions of nationalism are not mutually exclusive. The characteristics of each version often interact to form a holistic national identity.5 However, we often find that one narrative, whether civic or ethnic, dominates in a given society and as such these labels can be useful points of departure for the comparison and study of national identities.

Historical and political factors in building Belarusian national identity For Belarus, a better understanding of what is no doubt a dynamic national consciousness that merges elements of both civic and primordial identity begins with the country’s pre-modern history. In examining the history of the territory that is now Belarus, one immediately realizes that a “simple” primordial explanation for the current shape of Belarusian identity is lacking. The territory was once an integral part of a number of larger political units: Kyivan Rus’ (900s–1200s), the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (1300s–1569), the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1569–late 1700s)6, and the Russian empire (1790s7 –1917). Dominant languages and religions varied over time, and different ruling regimes left their mark on Belarusian history and society. The city of Polotsk, located in current-day Belarus, was a key principality of Kyivan Rus’. One of the founding tribes of Kyivan Rus’, the Kryvitshi (together with Dregovitshi and Radimitshi), is considered a critical predecessor to today’s Belarusian population. While the principality was Belarusian in character and had a reputation for trying to hold onto its sovereignty, it also comprised part of the larger whole of Kyivan Rus’; thus it supports either an exclusionary version of Belarus’s primordial nature (indicating Downloaded by [University of Chicago] at 17:15 13 March 2013 that it was a nation distinct and sovereign from its neighbors at this early period in time) or a pan-Slavic version (emphasizing the commonality of Belarusians, Ukrainians, and Russians.) This dual interpretation is further complicated by the tendency in later years to distinguish between “russkii” (those who had inhabited the Ukrainian and Belarusian portions of Kyivan Rus’), and “moscovii” (those who had inhabited Moscow), which demonstrates a difference in self-identiﬁcation of descendants of Kyivan Rus’. The Grand Duchy and the Commonwealth were by all accounts multilingual, multi- confessional, and multiethnic. The dominance of the Belarusian and Polish languages varied according to the time period one examines. During the latter part of the Grand Duchy era, things Belarusian enjoyed their “Golden Age.” In the sixteenth century, publications in the early Belarusian language were published and the Codex of Law was put into force, marking one of the ﬁrst government efforts to establish rule of law. Frantsysk Skaryna’s bible, translated into a Belarusian variety of Church Slavonic, further established the Belarusian linguistic legacy of these early days. Nationalities Papers 431

According to Snyder the use of Church Slavonic as the language of government changed with the 1569 Lublin Union, a document drafted only in the Polish language. Gradually, Polish became the lingua franca used by the political and business elites, although Belarusian remained in circulation, mostly for use in the home (Sahm). The use of Polish continued for a number of years, even after the territory fell under the control of the Russian Empire. In these years, cities increased their multicultural character, eventually encompassing large Jewish and Russian populations. In a revealing quote, Snyder indicates “the linguistic flexibility so valuable to the early modern Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth and Grand Duchy of Lithuania was a burden upon anyone who might have wished to advance a modern Belarusian linguistic nationalism” (41). Thus, the “primordial” language of Belarus will always be a point of debate. The dominant religion likewise varied according to the era; elites could be Orthodox or Catholic, and many experimented with Protestantism for a short time during the mid- 1500s (Snyder). Attempts to bridge the gap between the Catholic faith of the Polish Kingdom and the Orthodoxy of the Grand Duchy resulted in the creation of the Uniate or “Greek Catholic” church (Plokhy). Under Russian rule in 1839, the Uniate Church was absorbed into the Orthodox Church. As with language, the core religion of Belarus is a point of contention. A nationalist movement requires intellectuals, and Belarusian intellectuals did not emerge on the scene until quite late, compared to some of their European neighbors. By the late 1800s some intellectuals began actively promoting a Belarusian culture based on the language used mostly by the peasant population, combined with the historical legacy of the Grand Duchy. In many cases, these proponents were Polish speakers from the urban districts, not literate peasants and native speakers of the language. This was reflected in the use of Polish orthography in the Belarusian-language publications pro- duced by some intellectuals (Snyder). Just as these intellectuals began their quest to develop a Belarusian national culture, the Russian Tsars became increasingly concerned about the subversive potential of nationalism (as a result of the 1863 uprisings), and publications in Belarusian were banned within the Russian Empire. As such, more active policies of Russification were put into effect, replacing the previous tolerance of Polish as the dominant language. In 1905, the Tsars’ restrictions on the use of the Belarusian language were eased, allowing for more popular use of the language in publications. An official grammar of the Belarusian language was compiled, and Belarusian language schools emerged on the scene shortly thereafter.8 The lifting of the Tsars’ restrictions coincided with the advent of Belarusian language newspapers, making this Downloaded by [University of Chicago] at 17:15 13 March 2013 policy change even more significant. Belarusian moved out of the private home sphere and into the public journalistic sphere. The easing of restrictions on the use of the Belarusian language did not come to a halt with the success of the October Revolution. Indeed, the Bolsheviks promoted an ethnic version of identity in the hopes of breaking with those exclusive ties and evolving toward a civic identity – one based on shared ideologies, class ties, and loyalty to the state, not language or kinship (Slezkine). According to Hirsch, Soviet state-sponsored evo- lutionism was “premised on the belief that ‘primordial’ ethnic groups were the building blocks of nationalities and on the assumption that the state could intervene in the natural process of development and ‘construct’ modern nations” (8, emphasis in original). Soviet indoctrination required “double assimilation,” namely, the simultaneous assimilation of individuals into both the “national” and Soviet identity (Hirsch; Gorenburg). This made for a Soviet nationalities policy that had a split personality from its very origins and later seems to have led to the varying trajectories that post-Soviet identities have taken. 432 R.L. Buhr et al.

Thus, in the early years of Bolshevik rule, Moscow actively promoted the trappings of nationhood throughout the Soviet Union through the policy of korenizatsiia (“nativiza- tion”). This included efforts to educate students in their “own” languages (say, Uzbek for those of Uzbek ancestry), establishment of a literary version of the local languages where needed, and at the behest of the Peoples Commissariat of Nationalities (Narkom- nats), cultural exhibits exalting the arts, crafts, and (acceptable) heroes of the nation in question. Intellectual activity was aimed at developing the national identity to its fullest, and Moscow instituted policies calling for the promotion of a national Communist elite (Suny; Slezkine). With the rise of Stalin’s power and the subsequent Great Retreat of the 1930s, much of this was scaled back, oftentimes in brutal fashion, with Belarusian intellectuals falling victim to the same purges experienced in many of the non-Russian republics (Marples, Belarus; “Europe’s Last Dictatorship”) . In particular, nationalists who forwarded an interpretation of identity associated with the Grand Duchy were subject to being labeled anti-Russian. Belarus underwent a period of Russification under the Stalin regime and those of his successors. While Belarusian was a state language from the inception of the BSSR, it was joined by Russian, Polish, and Yiddish from 1924–1939, and from that time until the end of the USSR both Russian and Belarusian were used as official languages until the end of the Soviet Union.9 The number of Belar- usian language schools decreased during the Soviet period, and common use of Belarusian likewise decreased in this era, in favor of Russian (Ioffe, “Understanding Belarus”).10 Nonetheless, national development continued to form an important part of Soviet society in subsequent years. Individuals with the right national identity had opportunities in the government as a result of their nationality, national languages were still taught and national culture that was consistent with Soviet ideology was promoted. However, at the same time that nationalism was being promoted, the idea of a universal proletarian identity was also being fashioned. That identity was based, if not in theory then in practice, on Russian language and culture. Thus, the right national identity and the ability to speak the national tongue were key elements to gaining elite status in the non-Russian republics, but so was an understanding of Russian language and culture. As the years wore on, the Soviet identity of the republics increased as their elites became more immersed in the dominant Russian culture (Gorenburg). As went the elites, so went the average citizen, and with the change in policy to allow parents to choose their childrens’ language of instruction, school children with non-Russian national identities increasingly learned Russian in place of, or in concert with, their “own” language (Suny; Goujon; Wanner). Downloaded by [University of Chicago] at 17:15 13 March 2013 As Russification increased in many of the SSRs, the tensions between the titular ethnolinguistic national identity and the competing Russian culture became apparent. The independent states that emerged from the break up had two potential identities from which to choose: they could emphasize the ethnic titular identity, but this would require shunning the Russian one (Laitin). Alternatively, they could embrace the co-existence of their titular national identity and a Russian one – this ruled out any ethnic national identity and would force national elites to develop a civic identity with which to hold the multilingual nation together. With Gorbachev’s perestroika, the ethnolinguistic aspects of national identity were permitted more space in the public domain. Communist party officials under intense pressure from Belarusian intellectuals and student organizations began to promote Belar- usian language, using it in their speeches and memos, and organizing courses in the language for Belarusian citizens. In 1986, Belarusian writers, artists and intellectuals sent a letter to Gorbachev, advocating greater support for use of the Belarusian language. Nationalities Papers 433

The Communist party attempted to adopt these positions in order to legitimize the continued rule of the party and to channel the public enthusiasm for perestroika and glasnost. Perhaps unfortunately, momentum was lost with the break-up of the Soviet Union, as the population and government turned to the economic and political challenges of being a newly independent state. Some of the passion for things distinctly Belarusian bled over into the early Republic of Belarus parliaments in the early 1990s, mostly advocated by enthusiastic parliament members who proposed the white-red-white ﬂag and use of the Belarusian language. However, by the 1995 referendum on language and the Belarusian ﬂag, that effort appeared to have lost public support.

Belarus survey findings The combination of an at best complicated primordial history and the facts of a Soviet-style state creation process make it difficult to characterize the specific nature of Belarusian national identity. In order to better understand this phenomenon, two small, but suggestive surveys were carried out. The first of these surveys sought the opinions of a group of university students enrolled in the School of International Relations at Belarusian State University (BSU) and was completed in the Fall of 2009 (N 50).11 The students polled in the survey reported a strong and developing sense of Belarusian¼ national identity, a not very surprising result given that they have little experience with anything but an independent Belarusian state and have, throughout their lives, been sub- jected to the nationalist appeals of the regime. Given these influences, it would be much more surprising if the students failed to demonstrate a heightened awareness of their Belarusian-ness. Nonetheless, the increasing sense of being Belarusian begins with the most fundamental of personal identities, namely, the self-imposed ethnic attribution. Thus, 90% report themselves as “being Belarusian.” Students are also assertive regarding the importance of another key marker of national identity, the Belarusian language, with some 56% of the respondents understanding Belarusian, rather than Russian, as their native language. Students also report themselves as being well-versed in the language, with 70% reporting that they can speak, write, and read Belarusian. The fact that over three-quarters of the students speak primarily Russian at home makes their enthusiasm for the Belarusian language even more striking. Students are also anxious about the consequences of language loss, with well over two- thirds feeling that “the oblivion of the Belarusian language will lead to the erosion of Downloaded by [University of Chicago] at 17:15 13 March 2013 Belarusian identity.” Despite these concerns, students demonstrate a high degree of opti- mism about the future of the Belarusian language, with almost two-thirds arguing that Belarusian may become the language of everyday communication, at least in the “distant” if not the immediate future. Language enthusiasm is also reflected in the desire on the part of a majority of the students to have their children attend a Belaru- sian-language school. Students are also highly supportive of state measures designed to further all-things Belarusian. While substantial majorities think that such actions must be taken gradually and with tact, there is little doubting the reservoir of support for such action. Indeed, nearly half of the students consider it their moral and civic duty to ensure the expansion of the Belarusian identity “into all societal spheres.” Other measures that might accom- plish this goal include developing Belarusian culture and art, expanding the number of Belarusian-language schools and daycare centers, conferring upon Belarusian the status of the sole official language, expanding the number of subjects taught in Belarusian in 434 R.L. Buhr et al.

colleges and secondary schools, and, most importantly, requiring political leaders to use Belarusian. All are strongly supported by the respondents. Whatever their enthusiasm about a strongly Belarusian future, they cannot be described as naive when it comes to acknowledging the continuing influence of Russia on the realities of everyday Belarusian life. Indeed, 40% of the respondents felt that the Russian influence was a primary factor in preventing Belarusian from being a language of mass communication. They also identified a myriad of ways in which this influence is manifested, ranging from fairly obvious economic, cultural, and geographic factors to a continuing imperial attitude on the part of the Russian regime. While the results of this survey suggest that a sense of nationalism is emerging in contemporary Belarus, it would be a mistake to draw too many conclusions from such a small slice of Belarusian opinion, if for no other reason that students are hardly a representative sample of Belarus. While they are not necessarily drawn from elite groups, they nonetheless have above-average educational levels and are urban rather than village dwellers, an important distinction both historically and in contemporary Belarus. The results are nonetheless suggestive, particularly since they correlate well with Ioffe’s (“Belarusian Iden- tity”) results (Buhr, Shadurski and Hoffman). In order to further test the veracity of the findings, a second, far more ambitious, instrument based upon Elizabeth Theiss-Morse’s Who Counts as An American: the Boundaries of National Identity was developed. Using a “snowball” methodology, 100 persons living in Belarus were surveyed by students of the Faculty of International Relations of Belaru- sian State University. While the survey population again does not constitute a scientific sample of the Belarusian population, the respondents match the demographic profile of the Belarusian population in several important respects, namely the gender, religious and ethnic balance of the country. Thus, the survey population consists of some 46 male and 54 female respondents, an 80/20 split between self-identified Orthodox and Catholic respondents, and an ethnic mix found in Belarus, i.e. 84 of the respondents reported being born in Belarus while 10 were of Russian origin, four of Polish and two of Ukrainian origin. The most significant departure from the general population was the fairly high level of education reported in the survey, with four out of five respondents reporting at least some university-level education. It is clear that the survey participants feel strongly that they are part of a larger national collective. This can be seen in responses to a number of questions in the survey meant to demonstrate that people recognize themselves as part of a larger community of Belaru- sians. The responses to some questions also lay out key characteristics that respondents Downloaded by [University of Chicago] at 17:15 13 March 2013 ascribe to Belarusians. These results are included in Table 1. All but one participant

Table 1. Recognition of and identiﬁcation with a Belarusian identity.

Question Yes No N/A I identify with the Belarusian people 99 1 I feel strong ties to the Belarusian people 93 7 Sense of personal obligation to other Belarusians (charitable giving) 93 7 I feel proud to be Belarusian 97 1 1 I am proud of the history of Belarus 73 22 4 Belarusian characteristics (politically informed) 63 31 Belarusian characteristics (unselﬁsh) 97 3 Belarusian characteristics (tolerant) 99 1 Belarusian characteristics (trustworthy) 97 2 Nationalities Papers 435

agreed with the statement that they “identify with the Belarusian people” and 93 agreed that they “feel strong ties to the Belarusian people” although there is some marked differences within demographic cohorts, particularly in regards to gender, i.e. while all 54 of the female respondents reported feeling strong ties, only 84% of the males indicated a similarly strong sense of kinship. A sense of personal obligation to their fellow Belarusians was also very strong. Indeed, 100% of the respondents felt obligated to help in the event of a crisis or disaster in the nation, an amount almost equal to those willing to pay taxes (n 99) and give money to charities (n 93). On the other hand, many fewer people are¼ willing to volunteer in their local community¼ (n 71); this is, perhaps, an indication of the country’s relatively immature civil society. ¼ The obligations that respondents feel towards their fellow Belarusians might be explained in part by the positive characteristics they ascribe to Belarusians. Thus, except in regards to political awareness, where almost one-third considered Belarusians to be uninformed about politics, there was virtual agreement that Belarusian people are unselfish, tolerant and highly trustworthy. The strong sense of a collective identity and personal obligations flowing from that identity extends to a deeper sense of personal identity. Thus, almost two-thirds of the respondents agreed with the statement that “being a Belarusian is important to the way I think of myself as a person.” In fact, being Belarusian is superior or on par with connections to a number of sub-national identities, including those who share similar religious beliefs (41%) and, in particular, others from the same region (66%) or the same city or village (72%), as presented in Table 2 below. These results are perhaps indicative of the “localness” that is so often said to be at the core of the Belarusian character; nonetheless, these results also indicate that national identity is a key competitor with these more local identities. Interestingly, while gender matters little in regards to personal identity, there is significant variation by age. While all but one of the respondents over the age of 50 felt a keen sense of being Belarusian, a minority of respondents (42%) between the ages of 30 and 39 felt a strong sense of Belarusian identity. The sentiment rebounds amongst those between the ages of 20 and 29, with a strong 68% agreeing that being Belarusian is important to their personal sense of identity. The effect of the Great Patriotic War amongst the older cohort and the inculcation of Belarusian national identity programming amongst the younger respondents is likely relevant to explaining the variation amongst the age cohorts. This strong sense of national identity exhibited by these respondents does not translate Downloaded by [University of Chicago] at 17:15 13 March 2013 into an uncritical assessment of all things Belarusian. On the one hand, virtually all of the

Table 2. Belarusian vs. subnational identity. Very strongly Strongly Do not strongly Question identify identify identify Being Belarusian is important to the way I 64 36 think of myself How strongly do you identify with others 2 39 58 with similar religious beliefs? How strongly do you identify with others 11 55 32 from your region? How strongly do you identify with others 13 59 27 from your city/village? 436 R.L. Buhr et al.

respondents feel a great sense of pride in being a Belarusian (n 97) and almost three- quarters of the respondents take great pride in Belarusian history,¼ an encouraging fact given the contested character of even thinking in terms of a “Belarusian” history in the first place. At the same time three-quarters of the respondents felt that Belarus is a better country than most other countries (n 77) and two-thirds (n 67) would prefer Belarus over any other country as a place¼ to live, though 17 of the¼ 41 (42%) of the respondents aged 20–29 expressed a preference for living in a place other than Belarus. On the other hand, attitudes about the current state of affairs are decidedly less positive. Thus, the overwhelming majority of people, regardless of age or gender, reported being either “not very proud” or “not at all proud” of the way democracy works in Belarus (n 95), Belarus’ political influence in the world (n 80), or of the country’s economic achievements¼ (n 79). The only departure from this¼ overall pessimistic assessment is that younger respondents¼ do feel a bit more pride in Belarus’ political influence, though even in this case, no respondent, including members of the younger cohort, reported being “very proud” in this or of any other area of achievement. Despite the strong sense of Belarusian identity evident amongst the respondents, there remains a good deal of uncertainty over what makes a person Belarusian in the first place. Indeed, the lack of convergence around what Theiss-Morse refers to as “hard group boundaries,” or those factors that people sometimes understand to be markers of national identity, is clearly evident. Ethnic markers of identity seem to continue to hold little salience to the individuals surveyed here. In this survey, the questions intended to target ethnic markers of identity included: to be able to speak Belarusian, to have been born in Belarus (or stated another way, to be “from” the territory of Belarus), and to be an Ortho- dox Christian. As Table 3 indicates, none of these are considered essential to being “truly Belarusian” in the opinion of the respondents. No doubt, the most surprising result is that a majority of respondents do not consider the ability to speak Belarusian as a critical mark of Belarusian identity, despite the increasing use of Belarusian in daily discourse, particularly amongst the young and more well-educated (Buhr, Shadurski and Hoffman). Indeed, whereas older cohorts are evenly split on the importance of speaking Belarusian, the younger aged populations are uniformly less concerned about the use of the Belarusian language; in the 20–29 and 30–39 year old cohorts, 60% of respondents indicated that speaking Belarusian was not an essential trait for a true Belarusian. On the other hand, what we have been referring to as markers of a civic nationalism are of central importance in defining who is versus who is not a Belarusian. Thus, 98% of the respondents agreed that respect for the nation’s laws and institutions, as well as freedom Downloaded by [University of Chicago] at 17:15 13 March 2013

Table 3. Hard vs. Soft Boundaries: What makes someone “truly Belarusian?”.

Question Important Not Important N/A Soft boundaries: Have lived in Belarus for most of one’s life 92 7 1 Possess Belarusian citizenship 70 29 1 Respect the state’s laws and institutions 98 2 Value freedom and equality 98 2 Value the independence of Belarus 82 17 2 Hard boundaries: Born in Belarus 30 69 1 Speak Belarusian 41 55 4 Orthodox Christian 11 88 1 Nationalities Papers 437

and equality, were critical to being “truly Belarusian” while a slightly smaller 92% considered long-term residence, as opposed to be born in, the country as important for establishing Belarusian-ness. At the same time, 82 of the 100 respondents felt that valuing the “independence of Belarus from other countries” was an important consideration in being Belarusian.12 A somewhat smaller, though still impressive, 70% of the respondents agreed that formal state citizenship was a key determinant of being truly Belarusian. In sum, at least among this sample of well-educated but otherwise typical residents, Belarusian national identity is gravitating towards a form of civic nationalism unhinged from the ethnic. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that that some 83% of the respondents felt that “feeling Belarusian” was adequate for being a Belarusian, an attitude which will, no doubt, cause nationalists of the ethnic variety no small measure of discomfort.

Conclusion The history of the territory on which Belarus is located provides a wide array of national options. Belarus certainly has a long history and a legitimate claim to European-ness due to the legacy of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. However, it may also lay claim to a shared history with Russia and Ukraine, whether it is based on their principalities in Kyivan Rus’ or their incorporation into the Russian Empire or Soviet Union. The Soviet Union played a strong role in shaping national identities in the Soviet Socialist Republics, but it sent mixed signals from the start. While the USSR presumed its ability to “construct” “primordial” nations, the end goal was to provide the people of the SSRs with an ethnolinguistic national identity that would then wither away in favor of a civic, Soviet identity. This nationalism project left the SSRs with a number of directions they could take in shaping their national identity in the post-Soviet era. Many of the former Soviet states have chosen an ethnic version, and this has perhaps conditioned us to expect that an ethnic identity is the most “appropriate” for former Soviet states. After all, Lithuania and its Baltic neighbors followed this formula and are quite successful states. However, as Ukraine indicates the combination of national development and Russification under the Soviet regime has made the emergence of such an ethnolinguistic identity problematic; what about the citizens of eastern Ukraine who prefer to speak Russian? Are they Ukrainian? They believe they are, but an ethnolinguistic definition of the Ukrainian nation must exclude them from the “nation” and place them into the category of “the other.” This has been a source of tension in Ukrainian politics.13 Belarus has the same difficulty as Ukraine in trying to adopt an ethnic definition of the Downloaded by [University of Chicago] at 17:15 13 March 2013 nation. Belarus has the highest level of linguistic Russification of all of the former Soviet states. While an initial effort was made to establish Belarusian as the official language, this left those Russian-speaking Belarusians feeling left out. It appears that for the time being Belarusians prefer a civic national identity; one that accepts the fact that Russian will continue to coexist alongside the Belarusian language, with the hope that use of Belarusian will increase in subsequent generations. Regardless, there is a sense of “Belarusian- ness” emerging and a strong belief that Belarus has an independent future. This leads us to a number of questions for future research. Perhaps we should take a closer look at the states of the former Soviet Union that seem to be “denationalized.” Is the population really unaware or uninterested in their national identity, or are they trying to square the circle of national identity with a multilingual or multiethnic population in much the same way as Belarus? How do they define “us” versus the “other?” Are other civic nations emerging in post-Soviet states? And what is the impact of developing a civic, rather than ethnic, definition of the nation? The answers to these questions may provide us 438 R.L. Buhr et al.

with a deeper knowledge of both the future of the former Soviet states and the nature of nationalist revival in general.

Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank David Marples, Curt Woolhiser, and the panellists at the 2010 Association for the Study of Nationalities Convention for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of the paper. Thanks also to Dr. Florian Bieber and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions for revising the current paper. We are also grateful for the efforts of the students in the Faculty of International Relations at the Belarusian State University in conducting the survey. Particular thanks go to Maryia Nekrashevich for her assistance with recording the survey data.

Notes 1. Ioffe cites a number of Belarusian authors in this context, including Bulgakau, Abushenka, and Babkou. 2. This definition stands in opposition to Kohn’s work dividing nationalisms into Western and Eastern varieties. Particularly in the case of Belarus, the lack of public interest in ethnic national characteristics makes it difficult to attribute “Eastern” nationalism to this state, as these are an essential part of Kohn’s “Eastern” definition. Likewise, Belarus’ history of national development, some of which was state-led (such as under Soviet nationalities policy), would fit better with Kohn’s discussion of state-led Western varieties. As such, this distinction between Eastern and Western nationalisms seems a poor fit for the country of interest in this research. 3. This addresses Brubaker’s concern with conflating the term civic with “democratic” or norma- tively superior. No such intention exists in this case; the role of the state in promoting nationalism, either during the Soviet or in the post-Soviet era, is in no way assumed to be benign or lacking self-interest. In Belarus as in other states, the state is likely to promote the image that best maintains their power and seems to resonate with the population (for scholarly discussion of this, see Smith, Nations and Nationalism). 4. Brubaker argues that the term civic should be replaced with the term “state-framed.” However, the evidence does not support that the Belarusian population is responding only to the identity- building project of the government. If they were, why did support for union with Russia decrease in the Belarusian population (according to polling results) even while President Lukashenka officially endorsed one in the 1990s? The lack of agency this term would imply for the Belarusian population seems to be problematic in this case, as public opinion on national questions has been known to diverge from the official government line. 5. The current state of nationalism in Lithuania illustrates the dynamic nature of these theoretical streams. While national identity is to a large extent based on ethnic ties and language, the state Downloaded by [University of Chicago] at 17:15 13 March 2013 also provides a number of minority protections and evidences a strong democratic nature considered sufficient to meet the high standards of the European Union (Budryte and Pilinkaite- Sotirovic). In this respect, Lithuania might well represent the sort of mid-way point envisioned by Benedict Anderson, who, at least in his later work, attempted to reconcile the starkly primordial traditions represented by among others, Herder, Renan, and Mazzini, and the civic-mind- edness of Gellner and his adherents. Rather than assuming that a population currently fitting a primordial formula will remain such for all time, it should be expected that civic and primordial elements will be a point of continuing debate and that the shape of nationalism in any state will change based on the actions of political elites, interest groups, and the interests of the government itself (Armstrong). 6. An end date for the end of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth is disputable. Initial portions of the Commonwealth’s territory were lost to Austria, Prussia, and Russia in 1772; some Belarusian portions were lost in 1772 (Polotsk), 1774 (Minsk), 1791, then again in 1793. The new Constitution of May 1791 legally restructured the Commonwealth in an attempt to centra- lize the government but lead to its further demise; by 1795 the Commonwealth was no more. 7. An exact date for the start of Russia’s control of the territory that is now Belarus is disputable, for the same reasons cited in the previous footnote. Nationalities Papers 439

8. The version of Belarusian established in the first grammar (Tarashkevich) is distinguishable from the Soviet version (Narcomauka) promoted from 1933 onward (Goujon). This is where the contention among Belarusian nationalists regarding the appropriate Belarusian language originates. 9. There was no mention of “official” languages in the BSSR Constitution and Russian and Belarusian were both used in government capacities. 10. Russification was a particular challenge to survival of the Ukrainian and Belarusian languages, due to the similarities between the three languages. Someone who spoke Russian could grasp the gist of a conversation in Ukrainian or in Belarusian, making the incentive to learn the titular languages even less compelling than in other states that spoke unrelated languages, i.e. Lithua- nian and other Baltic languages (Gorenburg). The existence of hybrid languages that melded the titular language with Russian (trasianka in Belarus and surzhyk in Ukraine) likewise reduced the incentive to learn the titular language (Wanner). Gorenburg indicates that Ukraine is second only to Belarus among the former SSRs for its high level of Russification. In 1959, 12.2% of those who self-identified as Ukrainian listed Russian as their preferred language; by 1989 18.8% responded in such a fashion. The corresponding numbers for Belarus are 15.3% and 28.5% (Gorenburg). 11. The instrument used in this survey was identical to one developed by Grigory Ioffe in “Belar- usian Identity” and which reported the opinions of 65 Belarusian high school teachers. 12. Regarding Belarusian independence, a much higher percentage of the 20–29 age cohort (27 % versus 9% for all other age cohorts combined) considers independence relatively unimportant, perhaps reflecting a lack of personal experience with being part of the old Soviet Union and a latent assumption that an independent Belarus is simply in the nature of things. 13. For example, see Malanchuk.

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