Belarus: an Emerging Civic Nation? a B C Renee L

Nationalities Papers Vol. 39, No. 3, May 2011, 425–440 Belarus: an emerging civic nation? a b c Renee L. Buhr ∗, Victor Shadurski and Steven Hoffman aDepartment of Political Science, University of St. Thomas, Saint Paul, Minnesota, USA; bFaculty of International Relations, Belarusian State University, Minsk, Belarus; cUniversity of St. Thomas, Saint Paul, Minnesota, USA (Received 22 June 2010; final version received 19 January 2011) Early commentators on the newly independent Belarusian state of the 1990s indicated that there was something lacking in Belarusian identity. The people did not seem to respond powerfully to the new symbols of the state, use of the national language intermingled with Russian, and economic concerns appeared to trump popular concerns with promoting Belarusian language or culture. Other former Soviet states were embracing ethnic national ideals, and as such, many assumed that Belarus should follow a similar path. However, as an examination of the history of the Belarusian territory demonstrates, a national ideal based on ethnicity was problematic in Belarusian society, and as such, the ethnic notions of Belarusian identity forwarded by some Belarusian elites failed to appeal to the masses. Instead, Belarus seems better suited to a more inclusive civic identity than an exclusive ethnic one. This research examines the nature of contemporary Belarusian identity, with particular attention to the civic versus ethnic aspects of that identity. We argue that although Belarusian identity is obviously in flux and subject to heavy debate, it is currently demonstrating more civic aspects than ethnic ones. This finding is based on original survey data obtained in Belarus in 2009 and 2010. Keywords: Belarus; nationalism; civic identity; primordialism; ethnic identity; survey results Introduction In 1991, the newly independent Belarusian government embarked on a national revival that appeared similar to that of many other East European states. The Soviet flag was abandoned in favor of the white-red-white flag of the Belarusian Peoples Republic, efforts were Downloaded by [University of Chicago] at 17:15 13 March 2013 made to declare Belarusian the only state language, and 27 July was christened as a new holiday to commemorate Belarus’s independence from the USSR. In short, the most active elements in the Belarusian Parliament appeared to be embracing a future where Belarusian would be a key language of the Republic and where memories of the pre-Soviet and post- Soviet experience would be equally important. However, in 1995 a referendum called by President Lukashenka on the flag, languages, and holidays altered this trajectory of change. The white-red-white flag was abandoned in favor of a modified version of the Soviet flag while Russian officially joined Belarusian as a state language. The apparent rejection of pre- and post-Soviet symbols and their replace- ment by Soviet-era ones led scholars to conclude that Belarus was shunning its national identity and moving backwards on the road from self-determination (Marples, Belarus). ∗Corresponding author. Email: [email protected] ISSN 0090-5992 print/ISSN 1465-3923 online # 2011 Association for the Study of Nationalities DOI: 10.1080/00905992.2011.565319 http://www.informaworld.com 426 R.L. Buhr et al. Given that a number of post-Soviet states, including the Baltic counties and Ukraine, had embraced non-Soviet symbols in order to demonstrate their claims to a new, nationa- listic future, it is perhaps understandable that this conclusion should have been drawn at the time. In our view, however, this conclusion was unwarranted or at least requires re- evaluation at this point. The ethnolinguistic identities that seemed a good match for many former Soviet states appear to be a mismatch for Belarus’s history and society. Rather than taking the dismissal of an “ethnic” identity as a wholesale shunning of their national identity on the part of Belarusians, it seems prudent to consider that there are other forms of nationalism that do not require adherence to a particular language or ethnic group which may be more consistent with Belarusian history and culture. Thus, this paper addresses a key question about contemporary Belarusian national identity: is an identity coalescing among the Belarusian public, and if so, what shape is that identity taking? We begin from the position that a “nation” requires that people recog- nize one another as co-nationals and distinguish themselves from the “other.” If we find evidence that there is an “us” and “them” awareness among Belarusians, the follow up question would be: what ties bind that group? Is it about so-called hard boundaries like birthplace, language, and religion, or are those bonds based on soft boundaries such as “feeling Belarusian,” recognizing Belarus’s history and government, and long term residence? Using a new survey instrument based on Elizabeth Theiss-Morse’s (Theiss- Morse) work on the nature of American nationalism (adapted for use with a Belarusian audience), we aim to understand which ties are most salient in Belarusian society today. Our survey data indicates that Belarusians do feel a common identity, for example, they “identify with the Belarusian people” and agree on the general traits of Belarusians (trustworthy, unselfish, and tolerant). The survey then attempts to distinguish the salience of hard versus soft boundaries of Belarusian identity. The results of the survey indicate that the contemporary Belarusian national identity more closely resembles a “civic” form characterized by soft boundaries than an “ethnic” identity that relies upon birthplace and language. This paper first examines the existing literature on Belarusian identity. This literature has found that ethnic (referred to by Geertz as “primordial”) ties fail to resonate with much of the population, which brings to mind the question of civic identity. As such, we turn to a discussion of civic versus ethnic identity. We then provide a brief summary of the territorial, linguistic, and religious history of the region, which provides us with the potential ethnolinguistic aspects of contemporary Belarusian identity. Throughout this summary we also discuss the factors that support the creation of a more civic identity; Downloaded by [University of Chicago] at 17:15 13 March 2013 these include the difficulty of establishing clear religious and linguistic boundaries in pre- Soviet times and the Soviet nationalities policies which promoted both civic and ethnic markers of identity. At this point we turn to examination of two original surveys conducted in Belarus in 2009 and 2010. The results of these surveys appear to indicate that contemporary Belarusian identity is developing more along civic rather than ethnic lines. Belarusian nationalism: existing arguments and a new lens A number of scholars have made an effort to explain the bases of Belarusian nationalism, most of which focuses on nationalist rhetorics that have appeared among Belarusian elites in the post-Soviet era. Initially, two elite rhetorics caught the attention of scholars, the first referred to by Leshchenko (339) as “national identity building practices,” a position that advocates a more ethnic version of Belarusian nationalism. Leshchenko labels the second as “Soviet identity building” which promotes the closeness between the Nationalities Papers 427 Russian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian people, and advocates a common future for these states. A third route toward Belarusian identity is alluded to by Leshchenko, however, when she indicates that for instrumental reasons, there is an effort to “reconcile” Belar- usian sovereignty and Soviet identity among political elites, especially President Luka- shenka. Ioffe (“Unfinished Nationbuilding” 48) expands on Leshchenko’s formula, suggesting the term “Creole” (a nod to a number of Belarusian writers1) for the compro- mise position between Belarusian and Soviet identity. These national ideals and findings about the appeal of these rhetorics to the Belarusian population will be discussed in the following section. According to Goujon, Leshchenko, and Ioffe (“Unfinished Nationbuilding”), the national identity builders’ version of the Belarusian national identity traces its roots to a pre-Soviet European culture. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth are the key polities of reference and a number of purported characteristics of these polities have been attributed as the historical legacy of a distinct Belarusian political and ethnolinguistic identity. Elites of this persuasion argue that the Grand Duchy’s political system was relatively democratic for its time, and as the inheritor of this tradition, Belarus should embrace democratic practices in their contemporary political system (Marples, “Europe’s Last Dictatorship”). They advocate, and for a short time in the early 1990s, established, the white-red-white flag of the Belarusian People’s Republic and the Pahonia coat of arms of the Grand Duchy as the national symbols of Belarus (Leshchenko). They are particularly suspicious of any symbol that harkens back to the Soviet era and attempted to remove these from the public domain while serving in parliament from 1991–1995. These same elites also argue that since the Belarusian people are a distinct ethnos, they should determine their own path forward, independent of Russian influence. In a similar vein, they argue that Russia’s cultural dominance over Belarus in the Tsarist and Soviet era has prevented the Belarusian

Load more