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ISLAMIC Repuijllc of AFGHANISTAN MINISTRY of TRANSPORT CIVIL AVIATION OPERATION

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ISLAMIC Repuijllc of AFGHANISTAN MINISTRY of TRANSPORT CIVIL AVIATION OPERATION ISLAMIC REPUIJLlC OF AFGHANISTAN MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT CIVIL AVIATION OPERATION REPORT ON INVESTIGATION OF ACCIDENT KAM AIR 8-737-200 AIRCRAFT EX-037 NEAR KABUL INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT ON 03 FEBRUARY, 2005 FEIJRUARY 2006 ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT CIVIL AVIATION OPERATION Kabul, Afghanistan AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT CONTROLLED FLIGHT INTO TERRAIN KAM AIR B-737-200 AIRCRAFT EX-037 NEAR KABUL INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT 03 FEBRUARY, 2005 Abstract: This report explains the accident involving Cl Boeing 6-737-200, operated by Kam Air Air1ine that impacted mountainous terrain near the Kabul International Airport while on a revenue night from Heral to Kabul on February 3, 2005. Safety issues in this report include the conduct of approaches into airports with mountainous terrain and limited radar coverage. Recommendations concerning these issues are made for the Ministry of Transport of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Military Approach Control. TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARy.................. ........... _____ _. _........... .. .... ..... ................ 1 1_ FACTUAL INFORMATI ON ......... .. __ __ ____ ._................. .... ............. ... .___ 3 1_ 1. History of Flight... ................ _.__ _______ ... ....... .............................. .. _3 1.2. Injuries to Persons _________ .. _........... ... .... .......... ......... ....... __ _____________ .... 5 1.3. Damages to Aircraft .. ____ ______ ..................................... .......... .. ____ .. 5 1.4. Other Damages __________ ........................... .... ............ __ _____ ........ 5 1.5. Personal Information ............. ........ 5 1_ 6. Aircraft Information ............ ............. 6 1.7. Meteorological lnrormation __ ... ... ...................... 8 1.S. Aids to Navigations ...... ____________ _.... ....... ......................................... 8 1.9. Communication ......... _____________ _____ ........................... ..... ..... ...... .......... 8 1.10. Aerodrome Information ______ .... _.... ............................. .... .. ..... ............... 8 1.11 . Flight Data Recorder (FOR) & Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) ....... ..... 9 1.12. Wreckage Information .................. _____________ ................ ................... .. 11 1.13. Medical and Pathological Information. .................................... .. 11 1.14. Investigation ___ ___... _.. ___ __ ___ __ _11 1.15. Fire. ____________ ... _.. _........ .......... ___ 12 1.16. Survival Aspects .. ...... ...................................... __ ___ __ __ ________ ............ 12 1.17. Tests and Research ........................ _. _______ ___ _________ . ... ..... ... 12 1_18. Organizational and Management Information . __ ___ ___ ____ ______ ____.... ...... 12 2. ANALySiS... ........................................ ..... ... .... ..... __ . _________ . ..... 13 3. CONCLUSIONS ............................... _____ ................ 17 3. 1 Findings ....................................... ______ _______ ___ __ _____ __ __...... ..... 17 3.2 Probable Cause ..... ........... lS 4_ SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS .......... ............. .. ... ........... ........ 19 5. AFGHAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE CRASH OF KM F 904 ..... 20 5_ 1 Communication Capability .................................................................... 20 5.2. Navigational Aid and Safety Measures ............... .. ........... ....... ... ........... 20 5_3_ ApproaCh Procedures Changes............................ ............................... 20 6. ANNEXES ................................................................................................ 21 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY On February 3, 2005. a Boeing 737-242 aircraft (the "Aircraft") with Kyrgyz Republic registration EX-037. operated by Phoenix Aviation, was conducting Kam Air Flight 904 from Herat to Kabul. There were a total of 105 occupants on board the Aircraft, includin9 eight crew members and ninety-seven passengers. The Aircraft was cruising at flight level 270 when it contacted Bagram Radar Approach Control ("Bagram") for descent and landing. The flight was normal until it failed to level at flight level 130 during the VORlDME approach. At 1043:24 UTC, Bagram cleared the flight to descend at its discretion and to expect the VOR approach to runway 29. The prevailing weather was also passed on to the Aircraft. Visibility was reported 2 kilometers with snow, ceiling 2200 feet broken. wind calm and altimeter setting QNH 1016. AT 1043:58 UTC , when the Aircraft was 35 miles west of the Kabul VOR. radar contact was established with Ba9ram. The Aircraft was advised by Bagram to cross the VOR at or above flight level 130 and cleared it for the VORlOME approach to runway 29. At 1048:41 UTC the Aircraft reported flight level 130. Bagram again cleared the Aircraft for the VOR approach to runway 29 and advised the Aircraft to report procedure turn inbound. The crew replied that they would report proceeding inbound for the VOR approach to runway 29. This was the last transmission from the Aircraft. At about 1050:11 UTC, Bagram stated that radar contact had been lost with the Aircraft. Bagram and Kabul Air Traffic Control Tower attempted to locate the Aircraft through radar and radio communication, but were not successful. Search for the Aircraft was delayed and hampered due to a severe snowstorm in the region. The Aircraft was located approximately three days later by an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) helicopter approximately 30 kilometers southeast of Kabul International Airport at N 36 27.900 E 69 30.185. The Aircraft was destroyed by force of impact from colliding with the mountain. All 105 occupants on board the Aircraft had received fatal injuries. Subsequently, all bodies were recovered and identifted. The Flight Data Recorder (FOR) was recovered. but the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) could not be found. The FDR was sent to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) laboratory in the United States for read out. No data was found recorded_ ISLAMIC REPUBLIC Of' AFGHANISTAN MINISTRY OF TItANSHlRT CIVIL AVIATION OI'll!RATIONS DII!I'ARTWlII!NT Alrcrllft Accident Inve.tigatlon Report Kam Ai, Flight 904 Accident Date: February 3, 2005 The investigation was severely affected due 10 non-availability of FOR and CVR data read ouls. The investigation was finalized 10 the extent possible based on the limited evidence available. The investigation revealed that the Aircraft did not proceed to the VOR as instructed by the air traffic controller and descended below the minimum assigned altitude prior to being established on any segment of the approach . As a result, the Aircraft collided with a mountain. The cause of descending below the assigned altitude could not be detennined due to inadequate data and evidence. ---------------_._----- 2 ISLAMIC R ~ pueLlC 0' A,G"AHISTAN MINISTRY Of' TRANSPORT CIVIL A ... IATlON OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT Aircraft Accid.nt In ....stigation R.port Kam Air Flight 904 Accident Date: February 3, 2005 1. FACTUAL INFORMATION 1.1. History of Flight On February 3, 2005. Kam Air Flight 904 (KMF 9(4), a Boeing 737·242 holding Kyrgyz Republic Registration EX"()37 (the "Aircraft") chartered pursuant to a wet lease agreement by Kam Air, a company registered and licensed under the laws of Afghanistan and holding an Air Operator Certificate (AOC) issued by the Ministry of Transport of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, from Phoenix Aviation. a company registered under the laws of the United Arab Emirates, departed from Herat (Afghanistan) to Kabul (Afghanistan) at 1002 UTC with 97 passengers and eight crew members on board . The Aircraft was registered with the Civil Aviation Authority of the Kyrgyz Republic. The estimated time of arrival (ETA) at Kabullntemational Airport was given to be at 1055 UTC. The pilot of KMF 904 made his initial transmission 10 Bagram Raclar Approach Cootrol (hereinafter "Bagram1 at approximately 1041 UTC. Bagram replied that "aircraft calling Bagram you were weak and broken up, give me a call in another one zero miles." The pilot of KMF 904 responded "Roger." At 1042:29 UTC the pilot contacted Bagram again and said "Bagram, Kam Air 904 is 45 [nautical miles] from Kabul VOR, we·re squawking 4743, request descent" Bagram requested the type of aircraft and altitude. The pilot advised that they were operating a Boeing 737 at flight level 270. At 1043:13 UTC the pilot reported that his position was 40 miles from Kabul and again asked for descent clearance. Bagram responded that the Aircraft could descend using Visual Flight Rules (VFR) at the captain's discretion and that Kabul was landing runway 29. Bagram also advised KMF 904 of the prevailing weather • ... wind calm, visibility is 2 kilometers with snow, they are SVFR, the ceiling is 2200 [feet] broken, 5000 (feet] broken and the QNH is 1016, expect a VOR approach runway 29." At 1043:50 UTC, Bagram requested !he pilot to "Ident" and the pilot did so. At 1043:58 UTC Bagram said "904 radar contact 35 miles west, cross the VOR at or above flight level 130. You·re cleared the VOR approach runway 29." The crew responded "Roger, cleared for the VOR approach Runway 29 ... ." The approach plate for Kabul indicated that the approach is the VORlDME runway 29 but the Bagram air traffic controller and the pilot continually refer to it as the VOR approach. At 1050:11 , Bagram said. "KMF 904, radar contact lost." Them was no response by the flight crew and there were no further communications with the night crew. According to the Bagram
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