Comment: Fascism and the History of Pre-War : The Failure of a Concept Author(s): Peter Duus and Daniel I. Okimoto Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Nov., 1979), pp. 65-76 Published by: Association for Asian Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2053504 . Accessed: 11/01/2013 04:29

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This content downloaded on Fri, 11 Jan 2013 04:29:39 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions VOL. XXXIX, No. I JOURNAL OF ASIAN STUDIES NOVEMBER 1979

Comment Fascismand the Historyof Pre-WarJapan: The Failureof a Concept

PETER Duus DANIEL I. OKIMOTO

Old paradigmsnever die; theyjust fadeaway, thoughoften not soon enough. Historians and political scientistshave managed to abandon a numberof misleading descriptiveor analyticalconcepts they had once used in talkingabout pre-warJapanese politics-"liberalism" and "democracy,"for example. But the metaphorof fascismpersists, which is surprising,given the conceptual and empirical difficultiesinvolved. Since the revivalof studies of Europeanfascism in the I96os, therehas been much debate on what the termmeant in its originalcontext. Definitions of fascism come in all shapes and sizes, some preciseand some diffuse,some mutuallycon- tradictory.The broadestof them attemptto associate fascismwith a particular historicalstage in the developmentof industrialsociety. Marxists-among whom thereare deep internecinedisagreements-generally identify fascism as thedictator- ship of monopolycapital drawn by its internalcontradictions into policies of oppres- sion at home and expansionabroad.1 Non-Marxist scholars have advancedsimilar arguments: they suggest that while fascismmay not be an inevitablestage in capitalist development,it does constitutean avenue that some capitalistsocieties follow into modernization.2This developmentalapproach is richlysuggestive, but it suffersthe usual defectsof "stage theories"-rigid periodizationof history, arbitraryassumptions about the "normal"mode ofdevelopment, notions of linearity in development,and vague explanationsof causality. Studies of modernization betrayingsimilar biases have passed fromthe scene, especiallyin politicalscience, where theywere once orthodoxy,and even some of theirprincipal advocates have since reconsidered.3 Some scholarshave attemptedto describefascism in staticterms. Historians like Ernst Nolte, for example, have characterizedfascism as a particularintellectual style,4while otheranalysts have viewed it in termsof its class or social bases,5 or have looked at it simplyas a formof political movement.6One comes away from

PeterDuus is AssociateProfessor of History and 3See Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Director of the Center for East Asian Studies at Change," ComparativePolitics 3, no. 3 (April 197 I): StanfordUniversity. Daniel I. Okimotois Assistant 283-322. Professorof Political Science at StanfordUniversity. 4Ernst Nolte, ThreeFaces of Fascism (New York: 1 Tanaka S6gor6,Nihon Fuashizumu-shi (: Holt, Rinehartand Winston, I966). Kawaide Shob6, I960). 5 SeymourM. Lipset, PoliticalMan (New York: 2 See A. F. K. Organski, The Stagesof Political Doubleday, 1959). Development(New York: AlfredKnopf, I965); Bar- 6 JuanJ. Linz, "Some Notes Toward a Compar- ringtonMoore, Jr., SocialOrigins of Dictatorship and ative Study of Fascism in Sociological Historical Democracy(Boston: Beacon Press, I966); and H. A. Perspective," in Walter Laqueur, ed., Fascism:A Turner, "Fascism and Modernization," World Readers'Guide (Berkeley: Univ. of CalifomiaPress, Politics24, no. 4 (July I972): 547-64. 1976), pp. 3-12 1. 65

This content downloaded on Fri, 11 Jan 2013 04:29:39 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 66 PETER DuUS AND DANIEL I. OKIMOTO

readingmuch of this literaturewondering if the authorsare talkingabout the same phenomenon. Effortsto associate fascismwith a particularclass or social base describeit variouslyas a movementof the "pettybourgeoisie in townand country," "a middleclass movementrepresenting a protest against both capitalism and socialism, big business and big unions," "one of severalgroups of the Mittelstandand the capitalistbourgeoisie," "the small peasantand agriculturallabourers," or "the vast masses of ex-combatants"who foughtin World War I. That leaves in just about everybody. Leaving aside the empiricaldifficulties, the logical problemsinvolved in for- mulating an adequate definitionof fascismare formidable.By drawing narrow definitionalboundaries one mightcapture the experiencesof one particularnational society-Nazi Germany,for example-but only at the cost of leavingno roomto accommodatethe differentexperiences of another society, such as Franco'sSpain. As James Gregor has pointed out elsewhere,it is difficultenough to finda precise definitionthat is broadenough to accommodateboth Italy and Germany.7If, on the otherhand, one draws the boundariestoo loosely,a large numberof cases may be encompassed,but the fitin particularcases will be so imperfectthat the explanatory value of the conceptwill vanish.It could be arguedthat lumping Germany and Italy togetherwith Salazar's Portugalor Quisling's Norwayglosses over differencesso fundamentalas to renderthe definitionmeaningless. In short,if findinga minimal core of characteristicsshared by all fascistcountries in Europe is difficult,then the task is virtuallyimpossible if we tryto include China or Japan or Korea. After surveyingthe scholarlypublications on European fascism,Gilbert Allardycehas come to doubt whethera genericdefinition-even one thatwould apply to Germany and Italy-is feasibleat all.' Some mightdismiss these definitional problems as nominalisthairsplitting, and argue that the real task is to studyJapan in the I930S by comparingit to European fascistregimes. But this approachalso has seriousflaws. Many analystsof Japanese "fascism" have taken pains to point out how the Japanesecase differedfrom the European,and vice versa.Maruyama Masao's influentialessay provides the best such formulation.He pointsout thatin Japanthere was no mass movementand no cult of the supremeleader, but a heavystress on agrarianism,a centralrole formilitary officers,and so forth.9But neitherMaruyama, nor anyoneelse until recently,has pressed on to the obvious conclusion:the Japanesecase is so dissimilarthat it is meaninglessto speak of Japan in the I930S as a "fascist"political system.Some- timesincidental differences add up to an essentialdifference. To compound the problem, therehas been a tendencyin studies of Japanese fascismto conflatelevels of analysis.Attention has been fixedon the macrosocietal level, specificallythe political system,which has been characterizedas "fascist." Implicitly,and sometimesexplicitly, the restof thesociety-the microlevelas well as the macrolevel-is assumed to reflectthe characteristicsof the centralpolitical

A. JamesGregor, TheIdeology of Fascism (New Problemof 'JapaneseFascism,"' ComparativeStudies York: Free Press, I969). in Societyand Historyio, no. 4 (July I968): 40I- 8 Gilbert Allardyce, "What Fascism Is Not: I 2. Thoughtson the Deflationof a Concept,"American 9 Masao Maruyama, Thoughtand Behaviourin HistoricalReview 84, no. 2 (April I979): 367-88. ModernJapanese Politics (New York: OxfordUniv. See also George M. Wilson, "A New Look at the Press, I963).

This content downloaded on Fri, 11 Jan 2013 04:29:39 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions FASCISM AND THE HISTORY OF PRE-WAR JAPAN 67 system.What happensat the microsocietallevel is an extensionof whathappens at the macrosocietallevel: ifthere is an "emperorsystem" or "fascism"at thetop, then there must be a whole seriesof "emperorsystems" or "fascisms"below. In other words, thereis a tacit assumptionof a high degreeof consistencythroughout the political culture.Common sense, on theother hand, tells us thateven in a societyas homogeneousas Japan's,there are wide variationsin valuesand behaviordependent on geographicalor class differences.The neglectof microlevelempirical studies-of small groups, organizations,or communities-has leftus no veryconcrete picture of the lowerlevels of Japanese society in the I930s. To fleshout theabstractions that macrolevelanalyses offer us, we needmore research of the sort that Irokawa Daikichi has done on the I87os and i88os and Kano Masanao has done on the I9IOS and I920s. By highlightingcontradictions and countercurrentsduring the periodsof thejiyliminken movement and of Taisho "democracy,"both have enrichedour sense of thoseperiods and correctedoversimplified aggregate portrayals. This is not to say that therewere no "fascists"in Japan,or that therewere no "fascistmovements" or "fascistideas" about. Fascistsmay have been part of the totalpolitical scene, but onlyas a minorside current.This is evidentfrom the fate of self-designatedor putativefascists and fascistmovements during the I930s. Kita Ikki, Nakano Seigo, Nagata Tetsuzan, and Araki Sadao all have been plausibly describedas fascists,yet consider their respective fates: Kita Ikkiended up beforean armyfiring squad; Nakano was forcedto commitseppuku; Nagata was assassinated by a fellowofficer; and Araki, the most successfulof the group, was kept out of high-levelgovernment positions until the late I930s. As Fletchershows, even the Showa Kenkyiukaimembers who flirtedwith European fascism as a model forJapan were neverable to put theirideas into practice.Perhaps we shouldstop pondering whydemocracy failed in pre-warJapan,and considerinstead why fascism failed. Or betteryet, perhapswe should abandonthe paradigmof fascismas one that has served its purpose but is no longerparticularly useful. The applicationof the conceptto Japan in the I930S has certainlyhelped us to ask betterquestions, but it is doubtfulthat it can help build any bettermodels or suggestany new lines of inquiry. The impositionof a genericdefinition of fascism-even assumingagree- menton such a definitioncould be reached-is bound to lead eitherto fundamental distortionsin interpretingthe Japanese case or to the conclusionthat the fitis not verygood. Unless it is possibleto workout a morecomplex typology of fascism that would account fornational and regionalvariations, the hazardsof using the fascist paradigmas an analyticaltool are likelyto offsetits benefits. This is not to say thatcomparative research is notlegitimate, or thatJapan must be treatedsui generis.We merelywish to call attentionto the manyproblems that bedevil the studyof Japanese fascism, and to suggestthe need for greater theoretical clarificationor fornew paradigmsto replacethe old. More important,we wish to emphasize that concernwith the phenomenonof fascismhas deflectedattention fromother intriguing questions that still needto be askedabout the I930s, and that maylead to moreuseful perspectives. First of all, while we can agree that "fascism"is not an apt tag forthe total political system,why was it thatfascist rhetoric or fascistideas had so muchappeal in the I930s? Why did similarsearches for a consensualideology appear in Japan, Italy,Germany, and otherparts of Europe? Second, how do we accountfor those featuresof the Japanesepolitical system redolentof thepolicies and structuresadopted by thefascist regimes in Europe?If it

This content downloaded on Fri, 11 Jan 2013 04:29:39 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 68 PETER DuUS AND DANIEL I. OKIMOTO does not all add up to fascism,then what does it add up to? Is therea more appropriaterubric for what happened in the I93os? Third, should we continueto see the I930S as a deviationfrom a normalcourse that led towardbourgeois democracy through the I920S, or as part of an ongoing patternof responseto the outsideworld that had characterizedJapan since the era? To what extentwere domestic developments contingent upon and determined by the externalcontext and the internationalenvironment? Just as the shape of the world in the mid-nineteenthcentury helped to determineJapan's internal politics then, did not the shape of the world in the I920S and I930S shape Japanese domesticpolitics?

The Problem of Ideology

At firstglance, the question of why fascistideology was in the air duringthe I930S mightnot seem hardto answer.After all, the ideas of Sh6waKenkyukai and other radical rightintellectuals were resonantwith the collectivistethic that was deeply embeddedin the politicalculture and nurturedby the official"family state" ideology. All were consensualideologies hostile to ideas of personalfreedom or individualautonomy, and all valued social solidarityabove personalindependence, social obligations above individual rights,and social conformityover individual autonomy.Was the fasciststrain in Japanesethought during the I930S anything morethan a manifestationof cultural continuity? This argument has been advanced in perhaps its most explicit form in Kamishima Jir6's essays on "emperorsystem fascism." He tracesthe origins of I930S ideologyto the structureof village social relations,which shaped the values and behaviorof the bulk of the Japanesepopulation before World War 11.10 The problem with this line of analysisis thatit does not explainwhy structural factors and the collectivistethic produceda fascistideology only in the I930S and not before.Why, forexample, did it have littleor no effecton the intellectualelite in the I920S, when left-wingideology carriedthe day? Clearly, a more complex explanationis required. While the collectivistethic may have provided some of the importantunspoken assumptionsof fascist thinking in the I930s, its emergencehas to be seenwithin the broadercontext of the socioeconomicdevelopments from I910 throughthe I930S. It was during this period that the processof economicdevelopment and indus- trializationbegan to havea majorimpact on all segmentsof Japanese society. By the end of World War I, I9 percentof the labor forcehad moved into manufacturing and construction,and ifthe service industries are included,43.4 percentof the labor force had been concentratedin the modernsector; 28 percentof the GNP was producedby the manufacturingindustries; including the services, the modern sector had alreadyaccounted for 62 percentof the GNP. Perhapsmore importantthan thesequantitative changes was theemergence of corporate capitalism, and ofa small but militantlabor movement.These vociferoussocial forceswere not easily con- tained by appeals to the familystate ideology devised in the I89os or by the operation of the collectivistethic more diffuselyembedded in Japanesepolitical culture. This developmentrequired a new political theory-and if possible a new

10 Kamishima Jir6, "Mental Structureof the (December I967): 702-26. EmperorSystem," The Developing Economies 5, no. 4

This content downloaded on Fri, 11 Jan 2013 04:29:39 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions FASCISM AND THE HISTORY OF PRE-WAR JAPAN 69 political practice-that would meld these forcesinto the same consensualframe- workadumbrated by theseearlier modes of sociopolitical thought. The debate over whetherfascism in Europe was modernistor anti-modernistis quite suggestivein thisconnection, especially since many intellectuals in the I940S spoke about the need to "overcomethe modern."This did not mean abandoning industrialization,urbanization, social differentiation,achieved status, or any other items on the shoppinglists of modernizationtheorists. Rather, it referredto the need to overcomethe dominationof Westernculture at home and abroad, and to returnto a more authenticindigenous "spirit." It could also mean the rejectionof two specificmodels of industrialization-the capitalist laissez-faire and thesocialist- whichhad competedwith one anotherin Europeansocial thought until the emergence of fascistideology in the I920S. Both modelsaccepted a specificimage of humans as "economic animals," at once individualisticand motivatedby pursuitof material satisfaction. In a provocativepre-war essay, Peter Drucker suggested that fascism in Europe meant the "end of economicman," i.e., thecollapse of the imagedefined by classic liberaleconomic theory. " It was a rejectionof homo economicus, the dynamic, interest- maximizingactor at the centerof both the liberaland Marxistversions of modern- ization. In place of a rationalitydirected toward individual well-being, self-pro- claimed fascistideologues in Europe asserteda goal of collectivewell-being to be achieved througha rearrangementof the marketsystem. The specificsof that rearrangementwere less importantthan theirpurpose: the eliminationof social competitionand conflict,with all theirdebilitating side effects.As Fletcherpoints out, these concernswere sharedby the Sh6wa Kenkyukaiintellectuals. They were also shared by those who, like Kita Ikki, wanted a "revolutionfrom above" to forestallthe possibilityof "revolutionfrom below." Conflictcould be forestalledby uprootingthe social inequitiesthat spawned it. Fascistideology among the intellectualswas thereforenot simplya warmedover versionof the "familystate" ethic. The latterstill remainedalive and well in Kokutai no hongi,Shinmin no michi,and othernativist tracts of the I930S, but its audience was to be found among the educated and semi-educatedmasses, not among the intellectuals.The intellectualsdesired not a returnto the "collectivist"relations of a pre-industrialagrarian society, but theformation of a newstyle of collectivism more or less in tune with industrializedsociety. They soughta formof social coherence that accommodatedboth the realityof economicdevelopment and "traditional"or neotraditionalvalues. In thissense, fascist thought was an attemptto resolveone of the centralcontradictions of Meiji developmentalstrategy. The Meiji oligarchshad pursued economic growththrough the initiativeof privatecapital (withgovernment assistance and direction,to be sure)while promot- ing an anticapitalistethic throughthe educationalsystem. The strainsof this cultural dissonanceproduced the rampant"Japanist" and "restorationist"move- mentsof the I92OS and I930s, and to a largeextent facilitated the downfallof the business-dominatedparty regimes. The intellectualsof the I930S proposedto deal with this contradictionby creatinga social orderthat modulated the profit-seeking impulses of the capitalists(and the wage-seekingimpulses of the proletariat)by

11 PeterDrucker, The End ofEconomic Man (New York:John Day, I939).

This content downloaded on Fri, 11 Jan 2013 04:29:39 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 70 PETER DUUS AND DANIEL I. OKIMOTO simplifyingthe social structure,and by eliminatingthe marketmechanism as the principalmeans forthe allocationand distributionof social goods. They wishedto achieve social harmonyand consensuswith institutional reforms that contained and redirectedindividual materialistic motives in the nameof higher collective purposes ratherthan throughappeals to traditional"collectivist" values. A consistentintel- lectual themeof the late I930S stressedthe virtuesof kyodo-cooperation,and the suppressionof individualneeds or wantsto furtherthe goals ofthe collectivity. It should be noted,however, that this ideological disposition did notnecessarily imply unqualifiedsupport for the state. Miki Kiyoshi,for example, often displayed a profounddistrust of dirigistpolitics or dictatorialleadership, and considered collectivismdirected from above a "falsecollectivism." He stressedthe importance of open lines of communicationbetween the mass of the people and theirrulers. The subtle interplaybetween the emphasison the collectiveand the need to respondto the masses is one that requiresfurther exploration in studiesof intellectualdevel- opmentsin the I930S. Perhapsthe emergence of theworking class movementin the 1920S had lefta residueof doubt about theefficacy of elitist politics.

The Problem of Elite Politics

Elitist politics of the I930S are strikinglydifferent from Italian politicsof the I920S and Germanpolitics of the I930S. One of thedistinctive features of fascist political systemsin Europe-i.e., regimesfounded by successfulfascist move- ments-is the ruptureof elite continuity.In both Germanyand Italy, defunctor complacentliberal-left regimes were supplantedby leaderswho proclaimedthem- selves visionaryrepresentatives of youth,spirit, will, and action. "Revolution"is a term that has been applied to the Fascist seizureof power in Italy and the Nazi seizure of power in Germany.But wherecan one findan analogousmoment in the historyof Japan during the I 930S and I940s? The assassinationof Premier Inukai in I932 is one possibility,but power was not transferredto the assassins,or even to those they supported. It went instead to a very respectablesenior admiral not particularlyknown for his youth, spirit, will, or action. Similarly,the military revoltin I 936 disturbedthe entrenched elite but did notdisplace it. The leadersof the I930S, as evenMaruyama tacitly suggests, were "the brightest and the best," not the posturers,street fighters, and misfitswho took power in fascist Europe. With occasional exceptionslike Konoe Fumimaro, most were bureaucratsnot so verydifferent from the leaderswho had dominatedin the I920S. They weregraduates of Teidai, theNational Military Academy, or theNational Naval Academy-products of the meritocraticprocess of elite recruitment.Furthermore, while the numberof militarypremiers and othercabinet ministers increased signifi- cantly,and while the politicalparties no longersupplied the majorityof thecabinet members,the same elites were representedin the governmentsof the I930S as had been representedin the earlierdecade. The substitutionof thejushin (senior states- man) forPrince Saionji as the principalcabinet-maker did not topplethe ascendancy of theseelites, nor did it alterthe heavilybureaucratic character of the government. One cannothelp feelingthat the I930S representednot a breakdownof "democratic" government,but the stabilizationof bureaucraticgovernment. R. P. G. Stevenhas arguedthat the politics of the I930S resultedfrom constitutional forces that had been workingthemselves out sincethe I89os: politicalleaders of theperiod finally learned

This content downloaded on Fri, 11 Jan 2013 04:29:39 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions FASCISM AND THE HISTORY OF PRE-WAR JAPAN 71 to live with what he calls "hybridconstitutionalism."12 David Titus has suggested thatwe mightcall thisthe "privatizationof political conflict."'3 Both authors suggest that politics in the I930s, at leastat the levelof cabinetformation, was businessas usual ratherthan a revolutionarybreak. If "fascist"is not a veryuseful adjective to describeall this, then what is? It might be most usefulto see the I930S as the formativeperiod of a managerialstate or polity, in whicha dirigistbureaucracy became the centralelement in the forma- tion and executionof nationalpolicy, especially with respect to economicand social development.In a sense,of course,this was nothingnew-except thatthe scope of state interventionand managementexpanded considerably during the I930S. Since the I 8gos, sub-oligarchicbureaucratic leaders, jealous of theirautonomy as servants of the emperor,had been impatientwith the intransigenthaggling that went on in the Diet. Many had also become convincedof the need to forestallthe disruptive consequencesof industrializationthat had affectedthe European nations. As Kenneth Pyle, Sumiya Mikio, and othershave suggested,during the post-Russo-Japanese War period elementsin the Home Ministrybureaucracy attempted to manage the futurecourse of social developmentin the countryside-and perhapsbroaden the popular base of bureaucraticpower-by creatingartificial community structures closelyintegrated with the administrativestructure. "1 The mergingof local shrines, thepromotion of pseudo-gemeinschaft organizations like the Seinendanand theZaig6 Gunjinkai,and theshoring up oflocal elitesthrough the propagation of the H6tokusha all representedan attempt to create bureaucraticleverage in local communities where none had existed before. Did these policies representan attemptby the bureaucracyto enlarge its sphereof competence?Did they expressin a modern contextthe didacticfunction of officials that was partof the Tokugawabureaucratic tradition?Or werethey a harbingerof attemptsto createa managerialpolity in the I930S? It would be misleadingto draw sharplines of continuitybetween the develop- ments in the I9IOS and what happened in the I930S. Those who expressedthe powerfulmanagerial impulses of the 1930S simplyignored the countrysidefor the most part, and concentratedinstead on the alterationof relationshipsbetween privatecapitalism and the statebureaucracy. This was easierto control,though not necessarilymore effective, than earlier attempts to controlthe countryside had been. The central nervoussystem of corporatecapitalism was far more accessible and controllablethan the amorphous mass of local communities,and moresusceptible to bureaucraticpenetration of the corporatedecision-making process. At the same time, however,the leadersof corporatecapitalism-unlike the dispersed,divided, and relativelyweak local elites-had powerfulpolitical allies. Ikeda Seihinand G6 Seinosuke were more formidablesubjects to controlthan village leadersor local

12 R. P. G. Steven,"Hybrid Constitutionalism I973): 5 i-66; idem,"Advantages ofFollowership: in PrewarJapan, " TheJournalofJapanese Studies 3, GermanEconomics and JapaneseBureaucrats, no. I (Winter I977): 99-I33. I890-I92 5," The Journal ofJapanese Studies i, 13 David A. Titus, Palace and Politicsin Prewar no. I (AutumnI974): I27-64; SumiyaMikio, Politics(New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1974). "KokumintekiVuijiyon no t6goto bunkai,"in 14 Kenneth B. Pyle, "The Technology of Ito Sei, ed., Kindai Nihon shisoshikoza (Tokyo: : The Local Improvement ChikumaShob6, I 960), 5: 5 i- io6. MovementI 900-I 9 I 8, "JAS 3 3, no. I (November

This content downloaded on Fri, 11 Jan 2013 04:29:39 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 72 PETER DUUS AND DANIEL I. OKIMOTO landlords;in theirbattles to establishcontrol over corporate capitalism, the mana- gerial bureaucratsoften emerged bloody if not bowed. Why were corporateleaders of the I930S so difficultto control?Unlike the pioneer entrepreneursof the Meiji period, who were more heavilydependent on officialpatronage, they had loyaltiesto theirown organizationsthat sometimes conflictedwith the collectiveinterests of the state. The rhetoricof serviceto the nation sprang easily to their lips, but when the chips were down theychose to defendthe interestsof theirfirms rather than those of the collectivity.Precisely for this reason,it was importantfor the bureaucracyto crushcorporate independence. Corporate leaders sought autonomy in decision-making,which was as bad as materialisticprofit-seeking because it representeda defense of the private against the public. The hardpolitical battlesof the late I930S werefought not over the budget or foreignpolicy, but over the extentto which the bureaucracycould definethe limits of corporatedecision-making. The National ElectricalIndustries Law, the Economic MobilizationLaw, and theso-called Hoshino Plan foreconomic control all promptedintense debate in the Diet, and led to confrontationbetween the bureau- cracyand big businessleadership. The bureaucraticplanners of the late I930S did not rejectthe conceptof privateproperty or the utilityof individualinitiative, but they were even more suspicious of the wastefulnessand arbitrarinessof the free marketmechanism than Meiji leadershad been. This made themvulnerable to the chargeof being "red"-as corporateleaders often said theywere. In consideringthe elite politics of the I930S we should perhapspay more attentionto this issue-the attemptto substitutebureaucratic rationality for market rationalityin the allocationof scarce resourcesand in the distributionof rewards fromthe productiveprocess. There are parallelshere, to be sure,with the fascist era in Europe. The point to emphasize, however,is not thatJapan was "fascist"or "proto-fascist,"but thatfascism in Europe was a subspeciesof the generalimpulse towardmanaged economies that was on the rise all overthe worldin the I930S- and that has survivedinto the postwarworld as well. In otherwords, rather than stressthat Japan resembledthe Europeanfascist regimes, let us ratherremember that all these regimesgrappled with a commonproblem: political economiesthat did not functionwell in the face of world economic crisis. Let us abandon the ethnocentricbiases inherentin attemptsto findfascism in Japanand searchinstead foralternative paradigms that might fit both cases. We realize, of course, that constructingparadigms that can be used eitheras alternativeor supplementalapproaches to studiesof fascismis easiersaid thandone, especiallygiven the imperfectstate of macro-theoryin the social sciences.But the difficultyof the task should not deter us frommaking the effort.One paradigm currentlypopular among students of comparative politics is thatof "corporatism,"a broad and diffiseconcept which encompasses a wide arrayof approaches,but which emphasizes the vigorous role played by the state as the dominantactor in the political system. Unlike theoriesof pluralism,which stresscompetition between vying interestgroups and the balancingof power among institutionsof govern- ment,15 corporatism views the state as an active,powerful entity. The stateis seenas determiningwhat groups fromthe privatesector will be heardand what policies

15Robert A. Dahl, WhoGoverns? Democracy and Powerin an AmericanCity (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press,I 96I).

This content downloaded on Fri, 11 Jan 2013 04:29:39 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions FASCISM AND THE HISTORY OF PRE-WAR JAPAN 73 will be followedrather than as respondingmechanically to interestgroup lobbying or public demands.6 The notion of an assertivestate, powerfulenough to sub- ordinate or at least moderateprivate interests, either through the impositionof coercive sanctionsor throughinstitutional cooptation, is fundamental.It poses a strikingcontrast to capitalisttheories which see the roleof the stateas facilitatoror neutralregulator of the political system,which functions on a more or less "self- steering"basis throughthe unfetteredoperation of the marketmechanism. 17 What happens in such politicalsystems is oftendetermined by the stateat virtuallyevery stage of the political processes-from "inputs" (which interestgroups articulate needs), to "conversions"(how theseinterests are processedor filtered),and finally, to "outputs" (which policies are formulatedand implemented,and with what consequences). In spite of its pitfalls,the conceptof corporatismforces us to takea harderlook at the dynamicinteraction between the state and the privatesector. The role and power of interestgroups cannot be determinedsimply by isolating individual organizationsand assessingtheir influence in termsof resources available. Using the notionof corporatism,we can see how weak privateinterest groups were in pre-war Japan. Consider,for example, the fate of laborunions, which have been thebasis for political oppositionin most industrializedstates. Only approximately7 percentof the total labor force,or roughly420,000 workers,were organized into labor unions just prior to the war. Moreover,the labor unions were enterprise-centeredrather than organizedacross industrialsectors-as is still the case today. Such structural factorsmade it verydifficult for groups outside the public sectorto establishstrong foundationsfor opposition to thestate. The labormovement in pre-warJapan fell far short of commandingthe kind of power that might have given disenfranchised groups the capacityto forcethe state to respondto theirinterests. It is not sur- prisingthat by the end of 1940 Japaneselabor unions had been whollycoopted into the IndustrialPatriotic Association, which served to mobilizelabor for the wartime effort. Other interestgroups-with the exceptionof big business-were also weak. Even ifthey had been strong,it is doubtfulthat they could haveinfluenced political outcomes, much less have resistedthe statewhen theirinterests collided. This was in part because intermediatinginstitutions, such as the political parties, were unwilling or unable to turn interestgroup needs into policies congenial to the groups themselves.This was especiallytrue of politicalparties, the primaryaggre- gators of privateinterests, which had struggledto grasppower in the 1920s, and saw it slip away duringthe middle and late 1930s. AlthoughGordon Bergerhas argued that interestpolitics continuedactively even afterthe dissolutionof the partiesin I9401, partyability to articulatethese interests had substantiallydeclined fromwhat it had been a decade before. The corporatistapproach is potentiallyuseful for placing the events of the 1930S in a broadlycomparative framework, and fordrawing attention to the collective

16 Philippe Schmitter, "Still the Century of 17 The full implicationsof Karl Deutsch's term Corporatism?,"Review of Politics 36 (JanuaryI974): "self-steering"are discussed in Nervesof Govern- 85-I3I; idem, ed., "Corporatismand Policy- ment(New York: Free Press, I 966). Making in ContemporaryWestern Europe," Com- "I Gordon M. Berger, PartiesOut of Powerin parativePolitical Studies io, no. io (April I977): Japan, 1931-1941 (Princeton: PrincetonUniv. 7-27. Press, I977).

This content downloaded on Fri, 11 Jan 2013 04:29:39 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 74 PETER Duus AND DANIEL I. OKIMOTO interestsof the stateand to its vigorousrole in shapingpolicies. New questionsare raised and new approachesencouraged. Let us hasten to add, however,that the concept of corporatismis still a long way fromconceptual clarity and method- ological rigor.Indeed, at its presentstage of refinement,it suffersfrom many of the same problemsthat plague studies of fascism:uncertainty over levels of analysis, lack of definitionalclarity, and normativebiases, forexample. We allude to it here only as a way of suggestingthat thereare viable alternativesto the concept of fascism.By calling attentionto a differentset of questions,new paradigmsmight provide, at the very least, freshperspectives on problemswhich are no longer illuminatedby the diagnosticgaze of fascism.Whether corporatism or any other theoreticalparadigm leads us out ofthe intellectual wilderness remains to be seen. In light of the difficultiesinherent in macro-theory,perhaps the studyof the I930S would benefitmost from focusing on middle-rangequestions. Many important empiricalquestions need to be answeredif we are to understandwhat happenedin pre-warJapan, a numberof them relatedspecifically to the role ofJapan's bureau- cracies. If communicationand informationare sourcesof power in modernnations, as Karl Deutsch has so insightfullyargued,"9 how adequate were the levels of informationavailable to bureaucraticpolicy-makers? How much in-fightingwas therebetween the variousministries of state?To what extentis it a distortionto considerthese ministriesunified entities? Were the key bureaucracies,such as the Ministryof Commerceand Industryand the FinanceMinistry, plagued by internal disunityand by what has come to be regardedas "bureaucraticpolitics"? Of the various models of decision-making-the unitaryrational actor, organizational and bureaucraticprocesses, the cyberneticand perceptualmodels-which providesus with the most convincingexplanation of how the bureaucraciesbehaved? How did bureaucratsinfluence or attemptto influenceother elites? How successfulwere they? By answeringsuch middle-rangequestions, we mightfind ourselves in a positionto understandthe largerpuzzle of how and why bureaucraciesin Japanhave wielded such extraordinaryde factopower when theirde jure authorityhas been limited. Research on such questionsshould also enrichthe theoreticalliterature on policy- making, and perhaps revealcontinuities and discontinuitiesbetween the political stylesof thepre-war and postwarperiods.

The Problem of InternationalContext

A fullunderstanding and analysisof domesticpolitics in the I930S also requires that attentionbe given to the internationalsetting. In an age of growinginter- national interdependence,which the period betweenthe Firstand Second World Wars clearlywas, internationalforces had a profoundimpact upon domesticdevel- opments,and vice-versa.So complexwas the patternof interdependencethat seek- ing to disentanglethe domestic situation from the internationalis bothdifficult and hazardous. Labeling one set of developmentsthe causal or independentvariable and the otheras the dependentvariable may distort the complexityof their interactions. Here is yet anotherarea in which past studies of fascismhave oftenbeen more confusingthan helpful. For a varietyof reasons,many studies of Japanese fascism have placed overriding emphasison domesticfactors, even in explainingJapan's foreign policy. ForMarxist

19 Deutsch, Nervesof Government.

This content downloaded on Fri, 11 Jan 2013 04:29:39 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions FASCISM AND THE HISTORY OF PRE-WAR JAPAN 75 scholarsthe emphasisis understandable,given their ideological disposition to extra- polate fromdomestic structure to internationalbehavior. Lenin, of course,viewed imperialismand militaryexpansionism as externalmanifestations of domesticcon- flicts.The view is sharedby a non-Marxist,Barrington Moore, who arguesthat if incomeand wealthhad been moreequitably allocated in the countryside,domestic demand would not have experienceda slump sufficientlyserious and sustainedto prompt the Japanese to seek overseas marketsand resourcesthrough military conquest.20 There is nothinginherent in Marxistthought that forbids giving proper weight to internationalfactors. Indeed, some of the most thought-provokingworks in internationalrelations theory are currentlybeing writtenby scholarswho are either Marxistor have been heavilyinfluenced by Marxistthought. One ofthe most widely discussedof theseis ImmanuelWallerstein's The Modern World-System, which stresses the importanceof keeping the internationalsystem of capitalismin mind when seekingto understandhow particularpolitical regimes came intoexistence and why theyacted as theydid.2' Wallersteindevelops the notionof a core, semiperiphery, and peripheryin the internationalsystem, which he feelsprovided the external contextfor national development.Another approach is taken by the dependency theorists,who see advanced capitalist countriesin possessionof a whole set of advantages-capital, militaryarms, managerialskills, technology,and so on operatingat the core of the internationaleconomy, and dominatingdeveloping nations at the periphery,which are dependentand vulnerableto exploitation. Whethersuch systemicapproaches can be fruitfullyapplied to the case ofJapan in the 1930S is not clear; few scholarshave tried. While the preoccupationwith the domesticmanifestations of fascismcertainly does not precludean explorationof the linksbetween domestic structure and regionaland internationalsystems-and indeed ought to requiresystematizing such links-the literatureso faris not noteworthy forstudies of this sort. Serious studieswhich relateforeign forces to domesticdevelopments have been done by Sadako Ogata, JamesCrowley, and others,and it is surprisingthat so fewof their findingshave been incorporatedinto the study of fascism. Only Noam Chomsky,a nonspecialist,has addressedthe issue in provocativefashion.22 It seems to us thatan understandingof the 1930S requiresmuch wider and moresystematic analysisof the internationalsystem than has been done so far.We need to know,for example, how decisive an impact the world depressionhad on Japan's political economy. What were the directand indirectconsequences for political stability? How much weight can be attributedto systemicfactors in accountingfor Japan's aggressivebehavior? If the researchof RobertNorth and Nazli Choucriis valid, the answerwould seem to be a greatdeal. Northand Choucriconstruct a frameworkof analysis based upon the interplayof certainaggregate forces at work: aggregate demand is determined,in theirformulation, by the level of populationinteracting with the state of technologyin relationshipto the availabilityof resources.Using

20 See Moore, Social Origins. I973), pp. 142-76. 21 Immanuel Wallerstein, The ModernWorld- 22 Noam Chomsky, "The Revolutionary System(New York: Academic Press, I974). See Pacifismof A. J. Muste: On the Backgroundsof also FerdinandE. Cardoso, "AssociatedDependent the ," Bulletin of ConcernedAsian Development," in AlfredStephan, ed., Author- Scholars3 (March i969): 27-50. itarian Brazil (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press,

This content downloaded on Fri, 11 Jan 2013 04:29:39 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 76 PETER DuUS AND DANIEL I. OKIMOTO this indicatorof aggregatedemand, the authorsthen arriveat estimatesof the probabilityof conflictby calculatingthe ratioof demandto capabilities.23 Applica- tion of the model to the case ofpre-war Japan seems, on the basis ofaggregate data, to yield a fairlyclose fit. With the growthof Japan's populationand economic infrastructure,coupled with the loss of export marketsand access to overseas resources,the strainson finiteresources built up to a point wherethe incentivesto engage in war wereoverwhelming. How muchof an impactdid the loss ofoverseas marketsand resourceshave? If economicincentives drove Japanese leaders to expand the country'scolonial empire, then these incentives may have indirectlyinduced the domesticchanges already noted-the emergenceof "fascist"ideology and the urge towarda managerialpolity. All of this suggeststhat thereare gaping holes in our knowledgeof how the externalenvironment affected pre-war Japan. There is a growingbody of theoretical literaturein the fieldof internationalrelations which can be usefullytested on the case of pre-warJapan. Instead of remainingtransfixed by the need to explain the aberrationalphenomenon of fascism-or forthat matter, the failureof democracy, or the derailingof political development-we need to press beyondthe orthodox concernsof the past to formulatenew questions,build new models,and test these empiricallywithin a broad spectrumof heretoforeunexplored perspectives. The study of fascism-in spite of all the problemsalluded to here-has produceda numberof valuable works,particularly those of MaruyamaMasao. But the fieldhas come to a stage wherethe problemsand costs of continuingthis line of inquiry outweigh the benefits.One of the underlyingreasons for the postwarflurry of Japanese studies on fascism-the psychologicalneed to identifywho or what was responsiblefor the tragedyof the Second World War-may have passed. So, too, may the scholarlyrationale for directing so muchattention to thissubject.

23 Robert North and Nazli Choucri,Nations in Conflict(San Francisco:W. H. Freeman,I975).

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