RESEARCH ARTICLE Electoral Rules and Manufacturing Legislative Supermajority: Evidence from Singapore Netina Tan Department of Political Science McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada Email:
[email protected] and Bernard Grofman Department of Political Science and Center for the Study of Democracy University of California, Irvine, U.S.A. Email:
[email protected] (Received 5 May 2017) Biographies Netina Tan is an Associate Professor of Political Science at McMaster University. Her dissertation from the University of British Columbia, “Hegemonic Party Rule in Singapore and Taiwan” received the 2011 Vincent Lemieux Prize for the best Ph.D. thesis submitted at a Canadian institution. Her work on electoral authoritarianism, gender and governance in East and Southeast Asia has appeared in Electoral Studies, International Political Science Review, Politics and Gender and Pacific Affairs and other university presses. Bernard Grofman is the Jack W. Peltason Endowed Chair of Democracy Studies at the University of California, Irvine, He studies representation and electoral systems design and is a specialist on constituency boundary drawing (redistricting). His research on this paper was supported by the Peltason Chair and by the UCI Center for the Study of Democracy. 2 Abstract Electoral authoritarian regimes usually preserve the dominance of the ruling party through electoral fraud, violence and intimidation. This paper focuses on the subtler forms of manipulation that undermine electoral integrity and democratic outcomes. Specifically, we examine how an unusual electoral rule, involving multimember districts (MMDs) elected through plurality bloc voting for party slates, exaggerate the legislative seat shares of the People’s Action Party (PAP) in Singapore. This rule, used also by other electoral authoritarian regimes, facilitates the manipulation of district magnitude and gerrymandering, especially the “stacking ” form, to produce a large disproportionality which distorts the seats-votes linkage.