Losing the Syrian Grassroots. Local Governance Structures Urgently

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik ments German Institute for International and Security Affairs m Co Losing the Syrian Grassroots WP Local Governance Structures Urgently Need Support Doreen Khoury S The Syrian grassroots civilian opposition has been the primary engine of the popular uprising against the regime of Bashar Assad. Local arrangements for self-organization have evolved from so-called local coordination committees (LCCs), which are mainly involved in media work and the organization of protests. They have created sophisticated structures of civilian administration in the liberated areas of Syria. Currently, the protracted violence, sectarianism, radicalization, lack of coordination among rebel forces and deteriorating social conditions are putting the survival of these LCCs and local opposition councils in serious jeopardy. The achievements in bottom-up mobilization and organization, as well as the inclusiveness of these new organizations, could be crucial assets in building a democratic Syria. However, without outside support, already fragile state institutions, as well as the LCCs and local opposition councils, are in danger of collapse as communities face the dangers of disintegration. The Syrian popular uprising against the tum for its own purposes, the regime Baath regime did not occur in a vacuum; it created a structure of top-down “civil was the result of accumulated grievances, society organizations” (CSOs) under the of young people in particular. Upon assum- umbrella of the Syria Trust for Develop- ing power in 2000, President Bashar Assad ment – organizations that were emptied had attempted to project an image of open- of political content and under strict regime ness and modernity, both domestically and tutelage (notably, by the First Lady, Asma internationally, by easing state repression Assad). Some activists continued to work and allowing for the formation of dozens in these structures, simultaneously muting of political discussion forums. Yet, when their political and social reform ambitions the regime began to feel that it was losing and trying their best to get some implicit its monopoly over the public arena, forums reform messages across. Many of these ac- were closed down, activists – including tivists emerged as revolutionary organizers elected members of parliament – were im- when the uprising broke out in 2011. prisoned and the “Damascus Spring” came Besides these mainly urban-based net- to an abrupt end. To control this newly dis- works of educated and well-connected indi- covered public space and use the momen- viduals probing a precarious margin of dis- Doreen Khoury is a Fellow in the project “Elite change and new social mobilization in the Arab world” realized by the Stiftung SWP Comments 9 Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). The project is funded by the German Foreign Office in the framework of the transformation February 2013 partnerships with the Arab World and the Robert Bosch Stiftung. It cooperates with the PhD grant program of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung and the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung. 1 sidence, informal networks of young people privileges, thus contradicting the regime’s with common grievances also existed in the discourse of equal opportunity, which had huge, partly illegally constructed belts of originally given it legitimacy, and aggravat- settlement that surround the major Syrian ing feelings of inequality. cities, populated mostly by recent migrants from the increasingly impoverished coun- tryside. Sharing overcrowded areas at close Development of the grassroots quarters, young people in these suburbs opposition in 2011–2012 forged relations and lines of solidarity. Young activists were inspired by Tunisian Internet clubs and groups to clean and im- and Egyptian mass protests and bolstered prove neighborhoods, for example, sprang by the newly discovered Arab solidarity up that had no political agendas but were in the popular struggle against dictators. still closely monitored – and at times sup- The initial stages of the revolution were pressed – by a regime suspicious of any a genuinely spontaneous popular revolt form of social organization that it did not against the excesses of the regime. In mid- control. In 2011, these two types of net- March 2011, residents of the southwest works, which developed outside the Syria city of Deraa reacted with outrage at the Trust umbrella, provided activists with brutalization by the security forces of valuable resources of mutual trust and young boys who had sprayed anti-regime local knowledge that were crucial during graffiti around the city. Deraa was already the initial phase of the uprising. under severe social pressure because of the influx of internal migrants from the drought-ridden northeast. Protests and Syrian youth grievances ensuing clashes with security forces esca- By 2011, severe pent-up grievances began lated, culminating in the first nationwide to surface, in particular among the younger mass protest after Friday prayers on March generation populating the suburbs of 25, 2011. Damascus and Aleppo and provincial cities It was mostly the youth that led the like Deraa and Homs. A particular source grassroots mobilization in the months that of rancor was the glaring disparity between followed. They sustained the revolution by the modern, glamorous image projected organizing and documenting protests and by the presidential couple and the dim acts of civil disobedience and by motivating prospects of most young Syrians. Syria’s people to join protests. The grassroots free higher education system allowed many movement constructed a new public space young people to enter university, but it as it overturned the Baath party’s political also created a huge gap between their and cultural hegemony, often employing aspirations and the available opportunities. satire and humor. Crucially, during much In addition, many discovered that their of the revolution, it succeeded in consoli- degrees had not prepared them for many dating and prioritizing national affiliations professions due to an education system over sectarian and ethnic ones. that allowed little space for free initiative. Organization and mobilization were Young Syrians had also tired of the regime’s achieved primarily through the formation radical foreign policy rhetoric, which iso- of the tansiqiyyat, or local coordination com- lated Syria and made it difficult to travel or mittees, which began as meetings of young connect with other people. This was com- activists in neighborhoods and towns across pounded by the flagrant corruption of the the country. For a generation that grew up regime and the excessive activities of state in a repressive police state, this was a cru- security officers and the infamous shabiha cial first step in breaking the regime’s psy- (mafia-like structures of extortion linked chological grip on society, as activists built to the secret services), who paraded their trust among each other. In many areas, SWP Comments 9 February 2013 2 they built on the years of underground mid-2011, armed divisions (later known local dissidence mentioned above. as the Free Syrian Army, or FSA) – made up Except for organizing protests, media of civilians and defected Syrian Army sol- work was initially the primary activity of diers – began to form in response to regime the LCCs. Activists with no prior media violence. Activists in many places then co- experience became “citizen journalists,” ordinated with FSA divisions and posted communicating with eyewitnesses and lookouts to warn of approaching regime international media outlets. Their media security forces. Medical teams and shelters offices expanded to include many expatri- were also set up to treat wounded demon- ate activists who had either already been strators. Over time, media teams became abroad for some time or fled regime per- more sophisticated in documenting demon- secution. Activists smuggled in mobile strations and regime violence against pro- phones, satellite modems and computers, testers and conveying information to the allowing them very early in the revolution outside world. to offer a narrative of the uprising that In the tightly controlled capital of countered the regime’s, mainly through Damascus, acts of civil disobedience were social media networks such as Facebook, organized to rattle the regime and break but later also through websites and online its confidence. For example, Ayyam al Hur- LCC magazines. Video clips of protests and riya (Freedom Days) – a loosely structured regime violence filmed on mobile phones civil society network of activists, mostly were uploaded onto social media websites from Damascus and Aleppo – organized and aired by the major satellite television numerous acts of defiance, including plac- stations – Al-Jazeera in particular. ing loudspeakers in the central squares of As a rule, membership of an LCC was Damascus for playing revolutionary songs. originally constituted in a spontaneous These actions countered the regime’s propa- fashion. Committees would typically begin ganda that the capital city was untouched with about 15 to 20 people and then often by the revolution. expand to include hundreds. It was im- portant for the activists to have a body that spoke for them and shielded them from Building a national narrative the regime, by arranging safe houses and Behind the supposed nationalism and secu- helping citizens flee from intelligence larism of its official ideology, the Baath re- officers, for example. This kind of solidarity gime had, for decades, deliberately

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