Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Co m ments

Losing the Syrian Grassroots WP Local Governance Structures Urgently Need Support

Doreen Khoury S

The Syrian grassroots civilian opposition has been the primary engine of the popular uprising against the regime of Bashar Assad. Local arrangements for self-organization have evolved from so-called local coordination committees (LCCs), which are mainly involved in media work and the organization of protests. They have created sophisti- cated structures of civilian administration in the liberated areas of . Currently, the protracted violence, sectarianism, radicalization, lack of coordination among rebel forces and deteriorating social conditions are putting the survival of these LCCs and local opposition councils in serious jeopardy. The achievements in bottom-up mobili- zation and organization, as well as the inclusiveness of these new organizations, could be crucial assets in building a democratic Syria. However, without outside support, already fragile state institutions, as well as the LCCs and local opposition councils, are in danger of collapse as communities face the dangers of disintegration.

The Syrian popular uprising against the tum for its own purposes, the regime Baath regime did not occur in a vacuum; it created a structure of top-down “civil was the result of accumulated grievances, society organizations” (CSOs) under the of young people in particular. Upon assum- umbrella of the Syria Trust for Develop- ing power in 2000, President Bashar Assad ment – organizations that were emptied had attempted to project an image of open- of political content and under strict regime ness and modernity, both domestically and tutelage (notably, by the First Lady, Asma internationally, by easing state repression Assad). Some activists continued to work and allowing for the formation of dozens in these structures, simultaneously muting of political discussion forums. Yet, when their political and social reform ambitions the regime began to feel that it was losing and trying their best to get some implicit its monopoly over the public arena, forums reform messages across. Many of these ac- were closed down, activists – including tivists emerged as revolutionary organizers elected members of parliament – were im- when the uprising broke out in 2011. prisoned and the “ Spring” came Besides these mainly urban-based net- to an abrupt end. To control this newly dis- works of educated and well-connected indi- covered public space and use the momen- viduals probing a precarious margin of dis-

Doreen Khoury is a Fellow in the project “Elite change and new social mobilization in the ” realized by the Stiftung SWP Comments 9 Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). The project is funded by the German Foreign Office in the framework of the transformation February 2013 partnerships with the Arab World and the Robert Bosch Stiftung. It cooperates with the PhD grant program of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung and the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung.

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sidence, informal networks of young people privileges, thus contradicting the regime’s with common grievances also existed in the discourse of equal opportunity, which had huge, partly illegally constructed belts of originally given it legitimacy, and aggravat- settlement that surround the major Syrian ing feelings of inequality. cities, populated mostly by recent migrants from the increasingly impoverished coun- tryside. Sharing overcrowded areas at close Development of the grassroots quarters, young people in these suburbs opposition in 2011–2012 forged relations and lines of solidarity. Young activists were inspired by Tunisian Internet clubs and groups to clean and im- and Egyptian mass protests and bolstered prove neighborhoods, for example, sprang by the newly discovered Arab solidarity up that had no political agendas but were in the popular struggle against dictators. still closely monitored – and at times sup- The initial stages of the revolution were pressed – by a regime suspicious of any a genuinely spontaneous popular revolt form of social organization that it did not against the excesses of the regime. In mid- control. In 2011, these two types of net- March 2011, residents of the southwest works, which developed outside the Syria city of Deraa reacted with outrage at the Trust umbrella, provided activists with brutalization by the security forces of valuable resources of mutual trust and young boys who had sprayed anti-regime local knowledge that were crucial during graffiti around the city. Deraa was already the initial phase of the uprising. under severe social pressure because of the influx of internal migrants from the drought-ridden northeast. Protests and Syrian youth grievances ensuing clashes with security forces esca- By 2011, severe pent-up grievances began lated, culminating in the first nationwide to surface, in particular among the younger mass protest after Friday prayers on March generation populating the suburbs of 25, 2011. Damascus and and provincial cities It was mostly the youth that led the like Deraa and . A particular source grassroots mobilization in the months that of rancor was the glaring disparity between followed. They sustained the revolution by the modern, glamorous image projected organizing and documenting protests and by the presidential couple and the dim acts of civil disobedience and by motivating prospects of most young Syrians. Syria’s people to join protests. The grassroots free higher education system allowed many movement constructed a new public space young people to enter university, but it as it overturned the Baath party’s political also created a huge gap between their and cultural hegemony, often employing aspirations and the available opportunities. satire and humor. Crucially, during much In addition, many discovered that their of the revolution, it succeeded in consoli- degrees had not prepared them for many dating and prioritizing national affiliations professions due to an education system over sectarian and ethnic ones. that allowed little space for free initiative. Organization and mobilization were Young Syrians had also tired of the regime’s achieved primarily through the formation radical foreign policy rhetoric, which iso- of the tansiqiyyat, or local coordination com- lated Syria and made it difficult to travel or mittees, which began as meetings of young connect with other people. This was com- activists in neighborhoods and towns across pounded by the flagrant corruption of the the country. For a generation that grew up regime and the excessive activities of state in a repressive police state, this was a cru- security officers and the infamous cial first step in breaking the regime’s psy- (mafia-like structures of extortion linked chological grip on society, as activists built to the secret services), who paraded their trust among each other. In many areas,

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they built on the years of underground mid-2011, armed divisions (later known local dissidence mentioned above. as the Free , or FSA) – made up Except for organizing protests, media of civilians and defected Syrian Army sol- work was initially the primary activity of diers – began to form in response to regime the LCCs. Activists with no prior media violence. Activists in many places then co- experience became “citizen journalists,” ordinated with FSA divisions and posted communicating with eyewitnesses and lookouts to warn of approaching regime international media outlets. Their media security forces. Medical teams and shelters offices expanded to include many expatri- were also set up to treat wounded demon- ate activists who had either already been strators. Over time, media teams became abroad for some time or fled regime per- more sophisticated in documenting demon- secution. Activists smuggled in mobile strations and regime violence against pro- phones, satellite modems and computers, testers and conveying information to the allowing them very early in the revolution outside world. to offer a narrative of the uprising that In the tightly controlled capital of countered the regime’s, mainly through Damascus, acts of civil disobedience were social media networks such as Facebook, organized to rattle the regime and break but later also through websites and online its confidence. For example, Ayyam al Hur- LCC magazines. Video clips of protests and riya (Freedom Days) – a loosely structured regime violence filmed on mobile phones civil society network of activists, mostly were uploaded onto social media websites from Damascus and Aleppo – organized and aired by the major satellite television numerous acts of defiance, including plac- stations – Al-Jazeera in particular. ing loudspeakers in the central squares of As a rule, membership of an LCC was Damascus for playing revolutionary songs. originally constituted in a spontaneous These actions countered the regime’s propa- fashion. Committees would typically begin ganda that the capital city was untouched with about 15 to 20 people and then often by the revolution. expand to include hundreds. It was im- portant for the activists to have a body that spoke for them and shielded them from Building a national narrative the regime, by arranging safe houses and Behind the supposed nationalism and secu- helping citizens flee from intelligence larism of its official ideology, the Baath re- officers, for example. This kind of solidarity gime had, for decades, deliberately worked gave people a sense of ownership of the to divide society along sectarian, ethnic, streets and created a sense of community – regional and, increasingly, social cleavages. an important fuel for activism. Its military strategy for suppressing the Street protests consisted of more than uprising used similar tactics, cutting off just people shouting slogans. They often towns from each other, by disrupting road required extensive organization. Not only travel and communication. LCCs, in turn, did lighting and sound systems have to created networks of solidarity that had be arranged, but slogans also had to be co- never existed before. Many activists dis- ordinated between LCCs so that the politi- covered regions in their own country they cal message would be unified and consis- had not known before, especially peri- tent. The Friday protest themes became a pheral, neglected villages, which became defining feature of the revolution. Thou- important centers of defiance against the sands of people voted on a theme for an regime. By early 2012, there were approxi- upcoming Friday protest through the mately 400 different tansiqiyyat in Syria. Syrian Revolution 2011 Facebook page, in- Volunteers were from all backgrounds. dicating strong solidarity and communica- The dangers of sectarianism were on the tion among activists and citizens. Around activists’ minds early on. Regime propa-

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ganda consistently portrayed opponents as by Alawite women to Sunni neighbor- Islamist extremists. The regime resorted hoods. to the same tactics as the uprising gained momentum, thus scaring religious minori- ties (and secular Muslims) into remaining Building structures of loyal to the regime, and preventing the type local governance of broad social alliances that had occurred The initial success of the LCCs was due to in Tunisia and Egypt. Memories of past their decentralized and non-hierarchical violence (above all, the massacre of structures and their integrative nationalist February 1982, which occurred during the message, which allowed them to adapt regime’s crackdown on the Muslim Brother- quickly to changing situations and made hood after an armed revolt), as well as the them radically different from the tradition- disproportionate presence of Alawites in al opposition parties and figures, which the security services and shabiha paramili- were beset by rigid hierarchies and ideolo- taries, further increased the danger of the gies. As the revolution gained momentum, uprising sliding into a sectarian confronta- however, there was a realization that better tion between Alawites and Sunni Muslims. organization was needed to withstand the Moreover, Syrian Kurds, who have histor- regime’s pressure. ically suffered under the Assad regime from Activists working in LCCs at the village discrimination and repression, have also or neighborhood level began to coordinate been subjected to sectarian attacks, both with nearby committees, thereby creating a vocal and military. Whereas many young more networked structure. At the district Kurds joined anti-regime protests, tradi- and city levels, revolutionary councils were tional Kurdish political parties took a more formed to coordinate the activities of local cautious view of the revolution, simultane- LCCs and, after mid-2011, also with armed ously fearing regime reprisal and the Arab opposition groups. At the national level, nationalist and Islamist tone of the oppo- the Syrian Revolution General Council, as sition. The Democratic Union Party (Partiya the main national grassroots coalition, pro- Yekîtiya Demokrat, or PYD) – which is the moted the activities of the regional revolu- main Syrian Kurdish party and an offshoot tionary councils, and served as the main of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya media outlet and interlocutor. Karkerên Kurdistan) – has been accused of By mid-2012, regime forces started to being co-opted early on by the regime, and withdraw, or were ejected by opposition there have been clashes in the northeast armed groups, from a growing number of (where Syrian Kurds are predominant) areas, in particular in the north and north- between the PYD and opposition west of the country. In the void they left armed groups. behind, those grassroots organizations Hence, young people formed groups to started to evolve into ad hoc structures of prevent a rise in sectarianism. For example, local government. LCC activists were the the Nabd Coalition for Syrian Civil Youth is main nuclei of the local councils, which a cross-sectarian movement with branches were planned for – and developed in – in several cities that was set up spontane- various secret meetings in March 2012, ously by young activists in mid-2011. The and endorsed by a number of FSA leaders Coalition has addressed the increasing in- anxious to consolidate their gains on the fluence of Jihadi fighters, has promoted ground. LCC activists also sought and unity among sects, distributed flyers, and obtained the support of citizens and local organized campaigns against sectarianism community leaders. When the National and violence. Activities have included Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Alawite women smuggling mobile phones Opposition Forces (more commonly known to anti-regime areas as well as visits now as the Syrian National Coalition) was

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formed in November 2012, local councils Civilian and military structures representing the 14 Syrian provinces Since the rise in power of the FSA battalions (muhafazat) joined. In early February 2013, and Jihadist armed groups such as Jabhat the 14 provincial councils met in Istanbul al-Nusra, one of the main questions to to discuss an internal regulations charter be raised is about their relationship with and setting standards on the expenditure of the LCCs and local councils. Critics of donations. Heads of councils discussed the the armed groups have accused them of humanitarian situation in their provinces, weakening the grassroots movement and their attempts at resuming some state ser- eroding popular support for the revolution, vices (like reopening schools, for example), and of transforming the newly democra- and the many problems they face in terms tized public sphere into an area of conflict. of food shortages, poor access to medical It is too simplistic, however, to put the care, etc. grassroots and the armed opposition on Beyond resuming some state services, a opposing sides, as both are struggling main objective of these structures has been against the regime – and they are cooper- to maintain the social fabric and provide ating, if to varying degrees. Most FSA leadership in communities threatened with divisions are made up of Syrians; they not disintegration, in particular because of the only include defected soldiers, but also worsening humanitarian crisis and grow- many civilians who have taken up arms ing displacement. against the regime. They mostly stem from Local councils in , in the north- the economically disenfranchised rural and east of , where regime urban lower classes. Their legitimacy is forces withdrew in late July 2012, have derived mainly from their role as the pro- been more successful than others in taking tectors of the revolutionary street, especial- control of abandoned state institutions ly in the absence of international protec- and have striven to keep life going (e.g., tion. The state’s weakness in rural areas by organizing a health insurance system; gave legitimacy to the local tribal leaders clearing rubble caused by bombardment; who first led protests against the regime, fundraising; and aid distribution), despite and later headed local FSA divisions. aerial bombardment. In al-Bara village But while the FSA and the grassroots (Jebel Azzawiyah region in northern Syria), opposition may be on the same side in the the local council set up a five-member fight against the regime, there have been council of elders, which deals with all legal conflicts over priorities in some regions. issues and is part of a traditional system The FSA’s priority has been to take over of conflict resolution. key spots in a number of towns, whereas In some cases, a local council’s strength activists’ priorities have been to limit can be gauged by its ability to negotiate destruction and protect civilians. Locals in with the regime on equal terms on, for Manbij, for example, were angered when example, electricity distribution (e.g., in a planned cultural festival had to be can- Kabboun, a Damascus suburb, as was the celled because the local FSA division de- case in early 2013) or the exchange of pris- cided to take a small local airport without oners of war (e.g., in Zabadani, a resort coordinating with the local council, leading town outside Damascus, in March 2012). to regime airstrikes in the area. These cases suggest the regime’s tacit In some areas, battalion leaders have acknowledgment of the opposition local started to act as warlords, claiming liber- councils as the de facto authorities in the ated areas as “their” territory. Some FSA areas over which it has lost control. battalions have also committed human rights violations, such as extra-judicial exe- cutions, looting, kidnapping and extortion. Such behavior undermines any attempts to

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build civilian structures, and opposition Thus, when FSA battalions – comprised of activists claim that the regime deliberately non-local fighters – entered Aleppo, civilian spares battalions acting in this way, hoping opposition structures formed afterwards, that they will help undermine the popu- thus giving armed rebels supremacy. FSA larity of the revolution as a whole. divisions launched military operations However, there are numerous examples often without coordinating with the civil- across Syria of successful cooperations ian structures, and activists began to de- between the civilian and armed opposition. monstrate against FSA and Islamist groups. In , Deraa and Kafrnabel, LCCs and In general, local civilian opposition struc- local councils have remained strong, de- tures are weakened when FSA divisions – spite the presence of armed groups. In expanding their operations – move out- Kabboun, activists have said that there is side their localities to liberate other areas a clear division of responsibilities between (often joining other divisions), and fail to the LCC (media outreach, political activ- adequately coordinate with the locals. Civil- ism), the local administration council ian-military relations can become especially (municipal services and local judiciary), acrimonious, when FSA divisions entrench and the local FSA division (security, aid and themselves in the town center, thus pro- resource distribution on behalf of the local voking heavy regime bombardment. council). In principle, several factors can be iden- tified that affect the quality of the relation- Cooperation suffers when there are ship between local civilian structures and several armed groups in one area fighters operating in a given area: Armed rebels of Islamist orientation have been a main focus of media coverage, yet the plethora of armed groups operating Cooperation works better where militants under the label of the FSA is differentiated are rooted in their area of operation by far more than just religious zeal. What This is obvious in Aleppo province, where is also important is their attitude toward there was a stark difference in how the civilian structures. Some armed groups revolution progressed in Aleppo city and simply fail to grasp that the military’s role the countryside. In the countryside, where is to provide security and not to control there was greater support for the revolu- society, as had been the case under the tion, LCCs were formed first to organize Baath regime. In East , for example, revolutionary activity. As soldiers defected a district in the Rif Dimashq Province, the from the regime’s army, LCCs from their local military council formed a local coun- hometowns sheltered them. The local FSA cil within its own structure, appointing a division in Atareb village began, for ex- military man from outside the area to lead ample, with two defected soldiers from the it. In this case, the military council saw area and then grew as more defected sol- itself as the main political authority. diers joined. In this case, there was cooper- Several FSA divisions also sometimes ation between the FSA division and the LCC operate in the same area without coordi- because they were bound by village ties. nating with each other, making it impossi- In Aleppo city, in contrast, support for ble for the LCC or local council, in turn, to the revolution was more ambivalent, partly coordinate with them. As many citizens do because the regime, until mid-2012, main- not differentiate between civilian opposi- tained very tight control of security over tion structures and FSA divisions, activists the city and partly because Aleppo citizens and local council members have to deal were mostly reluctant to openly move with citizens’ anger toward violations or against the regime (with Aleppo university excesses committed by FSA divisions, over students being the general exception). which they have little influence.

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LCCs and local councils are financially Islamist funding has also extended to weak vis-à-vis FSA and Islamist-armed LCCs and local councils; Midan (a Damas- groups cus neighborhood) LCC, for example, is The ability of LCCs and local councils to reported to be receiving its funding from remain active and hold their ground vis-à- local sheikhs, who in turn receive dona- vis armed groups has also been affected tions from foreign Islamist sources; several by poverty. Many activists are fleeing the members of Douma LCC were also reported country not just to avoid persecution by the as receiving considerable Salafist funding regime’s security forces, but also because (with the remaining secular members they lack the money to support themselves receiving considerably less from other or their families against the backdrop of sources). Syria’s economic collapse. Consequently, LCC activists either give up their activities because they cannot afford to continue, ask Self-organization falters where the FSA for money – thus losing some of sectarianism prevails their independence to the FSA – or accept Initially, reports of some armed groups foreign funding, which sometimes comes engaging in sectarian violence were white- with strings attached. Also, many donors washed by Syria’s internal and external refuse to give funding to the civil struc- opposition. But as sectarianism became an tures because they fear it will be used by unavoidable problem – with resentment the FSA. increasingly expressed by radicalized seg- In Arbeen (a Damascus suburb), the ments of the opposition against Syrian LCC’s influence, for example, has dropped religious and ethnic minorities perceived because it lacks money vis-à-vis the local to be siding with the regime – civil society FSA division. Local councils also require organizations have campaigned extensive- much more funding than they are receiving ly against it. Many commanders of major at the moment to remain in operation. An rebel groups as well as local activists have $8 million donation from Qatar to the worked against sectarian attacks, but more Syrian National Coalition was distributed and more people want revenge against to the 14 provincial local councils in late regime militias and supporters, many of 2012, but this is a miniscule amount and whom are Alawites. Acts of retribution does little to address the humanitarian have been reported not just against Ala- crisis, at least in the medium-term. Many wites, but against Christians as well, who towns need material donations (i.e., medi- are perceived to be on the regime’s side. cine, food, shelter, etc.) more than they Rising sectarian sentiment has also need money, since in many “liberated affected the formation of local councils in areas” there is little left to buy. areas where there is an ethnic and sectarian Conversely, some FSA battalions – but in mix. For example, tensions (between Arabs particular Islamist groups, such as Jabhat and Kurds; and between Muslims, Al- Nusra (which, contrary to some reports, and Christians) in the Damascus suburbs of is not comprised of only foreigner fighters) , Tadamon and Rokn Aldeen have – are awash with cash from foreign sources. made the formation of local councils diffi- Not only do they lure some activists by pay- cult. ing salaries, but they are providing food and money to populations that are on the brink of starvation, thus further adding Conclusions and recommendations to the generally positive image they have Syria’s future political culture and its acquired through combat prowess and ability to continue as a united and inclu- disciplined behavior, in contrast to other sive country once the Baath regime falls rebel units. depends in many ways on the civilian grass-

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roots opposition. As the violence continues Provide sufficient funding, through the in Syria, the sustainability and legitimacy Syrian National Coalition (recognized as the of the civilian opposition structures are in sole legitimate representative of the Syrian jeopardy, however. While some LCCs and people by all EU countries and the United local councils have had some success in fil- States), to local councils to allow them not ling the roles of the state and providing only to maintain themselves, but to provide much needed services in their towns and humanitarian assistance to citizens and to villages, others, due to the challenges noted carry out essential state services. This will above, are finding it difficult. The danger is give local councils, rather than warlords that without adequate and consistent sup- and Jihadists, control over the provision port from the international community, of services, and thus boost their role. local grassroots organizations are in danger Provide funding to private initiatives and of becoming merely a voice and not a mean- international NGOs (such as Medecins sans ingful actor, mainly because they are not Frontières, Medico International or Adopt a

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und in a position to address the humanitarian Revolution) who can deliver aid unbureau- Politik, 2013 crisis. In the mid-term, this will also have cratically and effectively in liberated and All rights reserved huge effects on who calls the shots in Syria: embattled areas, and help to provide for

These Comments reflect the weaker the civilian structures are, the the hundreds of thousands of internally solely the author’s views. less likely armed groups – whether FSA or displaced Syrians.

SWP Jihadi – will allow civilian leadership to Provide funding to LCC and CSO activists Stiftung Wissenschaft und take over. to prevent them from burning out and Politik German Institute for Western governments have been too leaving the country. The multiple networks International and slow in taking significant action in support created on the ground still exist, even if an Security Affairs of these domestic civilian structures, while increasing number of activists have fled. Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 regional actors, like Qatar and Saudi These networks, especially those working 10719 Berlin on combating sectarianism, need to remain Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Arabia, have channelled funding to specific Fax +49 30 880 07-100 armed groups in Syria, particularly the solid through financial support. Recently www.swp-berlin.org ones with Salafi or Jihadi orientation. This exiled activists need financial support as [email protected] indecision on the part of Western govern- well, so that they stay in the region and ISSN 1861-1761 ments has led to the loss of credibility on come back during the transition. Instead of

the Syrian streets and has enhanced the donors spending most of their funding on These Comments are profiles of the well-funded Jihadi groups, capacity-building training, activists should published as part of the project such as Jabhat al-Nusra, in many Syrian be funded so they can survive and remain Elite Change and areas. In a war-torn country, where destitu- active on the ground. New Social Mobilization tion and displacement are rife, the ability Establish a donor office for the coordi- in the Arab World. For more information see to provide humanitarian aid and protection nation of support, in close cooperation www.swp-berlin.org/en/ becomes a political issue: failure to do so with the Syrian National Coalition, to chan- swpprojects/arab-elites-and- socialmobilization.html not only affects the local opposition leader- nel funding to, amongst others, authentic ship, but also people’s perceptions of the homegrown civil society organizations. The

Further reading: West. Trust Fund to be established by Germany To maintain the relevance and power of and the Emirates for the Friends of Syria Muriel Asseburg and Heiko Wimmen Syrian LCCs and local councils and to im- Group will certainly be a step in that direc- Civil War in Syria. prove the chances of post-conflict peace and tion. It is important, however, that all prin- External Actors and Interests an inclusive political system, European ciple donors join forces so as to avoid cross- as Drivers of Conflict SWP Comments 43/2012, policy-makers should adopt the following funding effectively in the future. December 2012 measures: www.swp-berlin.org/ fileadmin/contents/products/ comments/2012C43_ass_ wmm.pdf

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