Durham E-Theses The impact of the composition and behaviour of the Palestinian leadership on the outcome of the Madrid and Washington negotiations 1991-1997 Khatib, Ghassan How to cite: Khatib, Ghassan (2007) The impact of the composition and behaviour of the Palestinian leadership on the outcome of the Madrid and Washington negotiations 1991-1997, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/2455/ Use policy The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details. Academic Support Oce, Durham University, University Oce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP e-mail: [email protected] Tel: +44 0191 334 6107 http://etheses.dur.ac.uk 2 THE IMPACT OF THE COMPOSITION AND BEHAVIOUR OF THE PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP ON THE OUTCOME OF THE MADRID AND WASHINGTON NEGOTIATIONS 1991-1997 Ghassan Khatib THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY The copyright of this thesis rests with the author or the university to which it was submitted. No quotation from it, or information derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author or university, and any information derived from it should be acknowledged. UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 2007 . 0 \ 1 2 FEB 2008 TABLE OF CONTENTS DEDICATION __________~-----------------------IV ACKNOWLEDGMENTS V ABSTRACT VI ACRONYMS VIII DECLARATION IX Copyright IX INTRODUCTION & METHODOLOGY 1 Methodology 2 Structure of Chapters 9 CHAPTER ONE: The Literature Survey 13 Introduction 13 A Focus on the Process 14 A Focus on the Outcome 20 The Palestinian Leadership and the Peace Process 25 Conclusion 36 CHAPTER TWO: The Emergence and Nature of the Palestinian Leadership 39 Introduction 39 The Formation of the Palestinian Leadership Post-1948: Building the Outside 39 The Impact of the 1967 War: Fatah Wins Over the Arab States 54 1970-1982: The Decline of the Outside and the Rise ofthe Inside 57 1982 -1991: The Intifada Consolidates the Inside Leadership and Revives the Outside Leadership 67 Conclusion: One Leadership in Two Parts 74 CHAPTER THREE: Palestinian Participation in the Peace Process: The Madrid Conference and Washington Negotiations 76 Introduction 76 The Palestinian Leadership's Decision to Participate in the Peace Process __ 78 The Nature of the Palestinian Participation in the Peace Process 87 Strategies to Offset Structural Vulnerabilities: Selecting the Palestinian Delegation --~------~--~-----------------------------------95 Palestinian Negotiation Performance at Madrid and Washington 99 Conclusion 109 CHAPTER FOUR: The Oslo Agreement- 1993 112 Introduction 112 The Oslo Process and the First Agreement 113 The Impact of Internal-External Leadership Relations on the Oslo Process and First Agreements 122 Did Oslo Demonstrate Poor Performance and a Weak Agreement? 132 The Impact of Objective Factors 142 Conclusion 144 II CHAPTER FIVE: The Negotiations over the Implementation of the Declaration of Principles 147 Introduction 147 The Palestinian Response to the Declaration of Principles 148 Negotiations over Gaza-Jericho (The Gaza-Jericho Agreement) and the Paris Protocol --------------------------------------------------- 154 The Israeli Withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho 157 From Cairo Agreement to the Interim Agreement 172 The Interim Agreement: Negotiations, Content, Analysis and Implementation 176 Implementation and the Deterioration into Violence 193 Conclusion 197 CHAPTER SIX: Palestinian Leadership and Palestinian Authority_ 200 Introduction 200 The Establishment of the Palestinian Authority 201 The Election of the Raa'es and the Palestinian Legislative Council 205 The First Palestinian Elections 209 A 'New' Political Elite 212 The Economic Status of the Palestinian National Authority 219 The Council Responds 225 Conclusion 232 CONCLUSIONS 235 BIBLIOGRAPHY 244 APPENDICES 260 United Nation Security Council Resolution 242 260 United Nations Security Council Resolution 338 261 US Letters of Assurances on the Terms of the Peace 261 US-Soviet Letter of Invitation to the Peace Talks in Madrid 262 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements 264 Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area 276 Protocol on Economic Relations 286 Israeli- Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 306 III DEDICATION This thesis is dedicated to my late mother, Fatima, as well as my wife, Salwa, and my children, Rasha, Abdalwahab and Omar. Thank you for standing by me. IV ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank profusely the many people who assisted me along the way as I conceptualized and then sat down to write this thesis. First and foremost, Emma Murphy, my supervisor, offered tireless support. Before her, my first supervisor Tim Niblock also provided invaluable guidance. Charmaine Seitz helped me in editing the text, as did Rosemary Barbeau. I must also acknowledge Isabelle Daneels and Jamil Rabah, who first introduced me to Durham University and encouraged me along the way. The entire staff of the Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre, particularly Mana! Warrad, Khader Khader and Samar Hawari, supported me in innumerable ways over the years. And I would also like to express my gratitude to those who gave me their invaluable time in interviews for this thesis. v -~~-~ -~~-~--------------- ----~~---~ ---- ABSTRACT This thesis examines the composition and behaviour of the Palestinian leadership during the peace process, from the Madrid conference in 1991 to the breakdown of Oslo in 1997. Through an historical survey, an assessment of the structure and documents of the peace process, and an analysis of the strategies ofthe Palestinian leadership, it demonstrates that the invitation to the peace process arrived when the Palestinian leadership in exile outside was at its weakest, simultaneously seeking to further weaken it by restricting participation in the peace talks to Palestinians from the OPT except East Jerusalem. The outside leadership decided to fall back on the strong political support and loyalty of the leadership by appointing a delegation from inside in order to avoid the political danger of exclusion and marginalization. The Palestinian delegation from inside was selected from individuals with credibility and the credentials of struggle, which meant that they were loyal to the inside's main source of power, the Palestinian public in the OPT. Thus the relationship between the inside and outside leaderships was complementary: the inside needed the legitimacy and political access of the outside, and the outside needed the unity and representation of the inside. This mutual opportunism exposed, however, each leadership's differences in structure and priorities, which stemmed from their different realities. Because its priorities and approach prevailed, the outside manipulated the inside delegation to encourage secret but direct talks between the PLO and Israel in Oslo, in parallel with the talks in Washington. The Oslo talks' lack of structure and terms of reference, the absence of a third party, as well as the missing expertise ofthe negotiators from the OPT, who had personal knowledge of both the Israelis and the terrain, led to weak Palestinian performance and a weak agreement. This, combined with an unfavourable environment created by Israel's expansion of illegal settlements, the asymmetry of power, and the biased position ofthe US mediator, led to a flawed implementation of the agreement. Among the unfortunate outcomes was the creation of a Palestinian Authority that was structurally dependent on and compromised by Israel, which thereafter affected the Palestinian leadership's implementation of subsequent agreements. Thus, the thesis concludes that a vicious cycle was created where problematic structure, delegation composition, and the leadership and delegation's behaviour led to poor process, VI which in turn brought about flawed agreements, which influenced the Palestinian performance, in tum. VII -------------------------------- ACRONYMS DFLP Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine DOP Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements ISGA Interim Self Government Authority JMCC Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre JWC Joint Water Committee PA Palestinian Authority PCP Palestinian Communist Party PECDAR Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine PISGA Expanded Outline of a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Arrangement: Concepts, Preliminary Measures and Elections Modalities PLC Palestinian Legislative Council PNC Palestinian National Council PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization OPT Occupied Palestinian Territories or the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip UNLU Unified National Leadership of the Uprising Vlll DECLARATION I, Ghassan Khatib, the author of this research declare that the content of this thesis is my original work. None of the material contained in this study has previously been submitted by me for a degree in this