Executive Intelligence Review, Volume 25, Number 18, May 1, 1998
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
The Feasibility of Farm Revenue Insurance in Australia
THE FEASIBILITY OF FARM REVENUE INSURANCE IN AUSTRALIA Miranda P.M. Meuwissen1, Ruud B.M. Huirne1, J. Brian Hardaker1/2 1 Department of Economics and Management, Wageningen Agricultural University, The Netherlands 2 Graduate School of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of New England, Australia ABSTRACT Arrow (1965) stated that making markets for trading risk more complete can be socially beneficial. Within this perspective, we discuss the feasibility of farm revenue insurance for Australian agriculture. The feasibility is first discussed from an insurer's point of view. Well-known problems of moral hazard, adverse selection and systemic risk are central. Then, the feasibility is studied from a farmer’s point of view. A simulation model illustrates that gross revenue insurance can be both cheaper and more effective than separate price and yield insurance schemes. We argue that due to the systemic nature of price and yields risks within years and the positive correlation between years, some public- private partnership for reinsurance may be necessary for insurers to enter the gross revenue insurance market. Pros and cons of alternative forms of a public-private partnership are discussed. Once insurers can deal with the systemic risk problem, we conclude that there are opportunities for crop gross revenue insurance schemes, especially if based on area yields and on observed spot market prices. For insurance schemes to cover individual farmer’s yields and prices, we regard the concept of coinsurance as crucial. With respect to livestock commodities, we argue that yields are difficult to include in an insurance scheme and we propose aspects of further research in the field of price and rainfall insurance. -
The Financial Crisis and Its Impact on the Electric Utility Industry
The Financial Crisis and Its Impact On the Electric Utility Industry Prepared by: Julie Cannell J.M. Cannell, Inc. Prepared for: Edison Electric Institute February 2009 © 2009 by the Edison Electric Institute (EEI). All rights reserved. Published 2009. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system or method, now known or hereinafter invented or adopted, without the express prior written permission of the Edison Electric Institute. Attribution Notice and Disclaimer This work was prepared by J.M. Cannell, Inc. for the Edison Electric Institute (EEI). When used as a reference, attribution to EEI is requested. EEI, any member of EEI, and any person acting on its behalf (a) does not make any warranty, express or implied, with respect to the accuracy, completeness or usefulness of the information, advice or recommendations contained in this work, and (b) does not assume and expressly disclaims any liability with respect to the use of, or for damages resulting from the use of any information, advice or recommendations contained in this work. The views and opinions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect those of EEI or any member of EEI. This material and its production, reproduction and distribution by EEI does not imply endorsement of the material. Published by: Edison Electric Institute 701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20004-2696 Phone: 202-508-5000 Web site: www.eei.org The Financial Crisis and Its Impact on the Electric Utility Industry Julie Cannell Julie Cannell is president of J.M. -
Securitization of Insurance Liabilities
RECORD OF SOCIETY OF ACTUARIES 1995 VOL. 21 NO. 2 SECURITIZATION OF INSURANCE LIABILITIES Instructors: HANS B!2HLMANN* SAMUEL H. COX Recorder: SAMUEL H. COX Securitization of insurance liabilities allows capital to enter insurance markets more efficiently by establishing insurance-based securities. The mortgage market has been securitized, and it may be possible to make a similar market for insurance liabilities. This should be of interest to actuaries working in reinsurance (the Chicago Board of Trade options are in direct competition with property and casualty reinsurers), investments, or financial management. MR. SAMUEL H. COX: I'm from Georgia State University. This session is on securifiza- tion of insurance risk. Hans Biihlmann is the main instructor for this teaching session. Hans will give a presentation on some ideas about securifization of insurance risk. In the second period I'll give some specific examples from the Chicago Board of Trade's insur- ance futures and options. A third period will allow for discussion. Hans is visiting us from the Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich, where he is a professor of mathematics. He is also former president of the Institute and former dean of faculty. He serves on the board of Swiss Re and is involved in a number of other activities in the actuarial profession in Europe. With that brief introduction, I'll turn it over to Professor Bfihlmarm. MR. HANS BIJHLMANN: A symposium will beheld next week at Georgia State University. It is about alternative risk transfers, alternative in the sense that, until now, risk transfers in insurance have typically been done through the channel of reinsurance. -
The Rise of Commercial Empires England and the Netherlands in the Age of Mercantilism, 1650–1770
The Rise of Commercial Empires England and the Netherlands in the Age of Mercantilism, 1650–1770 David Ormrod Universityof Kent at Canterbury The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 1RP, United Kingdom The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge, CB2 2RU, UK 40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia Ruiz de Alarc´on 13, 28014 Madrid, Spain Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa http://www.cambridge.org C David Ormrod 2003 This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2003 Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge Typeface Plantin 10/12 pt System LATEX2ε [] A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 0 521 81926 1 hardback Contents List of maps and illustrations page ix List of figures x List of tables xi Preface and acknowledgements xiii List of abbreviations xvi 1 National economies and the history of the market 1 Leading cities and their hinterlands 9 Cities, states and mercantilist policy 15 Part I England, Holland and the commercial revolution 2 Dutch trade hegemony and English competition, 1650–1700 31 Anglo-Dutch rivalry, national monopoly and deregulation 33 The 1690s: internal ‘free trade’ and external protection 43 3 English commercial expansion and the Dutch staplemarket, 1700–1770 -
Lasting Impressions: Conservation and the 2001 California Energy Crisis
Lasting Impressions: Conservation and the 2001 California Energy Crisis Loren Lutzenhiser, Portland State University Rick Kunkle, Washington State University James Woods and Susan Lutzenhiser, Portland State University Sylvia Bender, California Energy Commission ABSTRACT This paper presents the results of a study of household conservation response to the California energy supply crises during the summer of 2001 and in the post-crisis year of 2002. It draws upon two statewide telephone survey waves, with matched consumption information from customer electricity bills, and weather data from various parts of the state. The analysis explores conservation behavior, energy attitudes, social and housing demographics, and estimated energy savings. We found that the conservation response to the crisis exceeded expectations in the energy policy community, with consumers showing surprising flexibility in their energy demands, and for reasons other than energy prices. While conservation actions (both behavioral and hardware purchase) were reported by a large majority of households, they were also somewhat socially segmented, and the resulting energy savings were not evenly distributed across the population. There was persistence of conservation a year after the crisis, as well as continuing concern by consumers about energy-related issues. As a result of the crisis experience, the routine functioning of the energy system seems to have been "problematized" for many Californians. Some implications of these findings for future energy efficiency and renewable energy policies are considered. The Problem Beginning in the summer of 2000, California experienced serious energy supply problems, sharp increases in wholesale (and retail) electricity and natural gas prices, and isolated blackouts. In response to the rapidly worsening electricity situation in California in late 2000, a variety of efforts were undertaken to enhance supply, encourage rapid voluntary reductions in demand, and provide incentives for actions that would result in load reductions. -
Energy Crisis Briefing
Name Date Energy Crisis Briefing Read and annotate the passage below. Introduction In October of 1973, members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) banned the export of petroleum (oil) to the United States. At the same time, they also lowered overall oil production within their countries, causing a decrease of petroleum available on the world market. This embargo caused a major energy crisis in the United States, where the cost of gas rose drastically and gas shortages led to long lines and rationing across the country. The embargo was lifted in March of 1974. Though the embargo itself only lasted about 5 months, its effects are still felt today. The Energy Situation in the United States in 1973 The economic and energy situation in 1973 made the United States especially sensitive to the oil embargo. For a variety of reasons, including the decline or depletion of some oil fields and the unintended effects of government economic policies, domestic production of petroleum was decreasing. At the same time, demand for energy was increasing. The difference between that demand and the supply of domestic oil was being filled by importing oil from other countries. Between 1950 and 1973, the percentage of United States energy demand supplied by foreign oil increased from 8% to 19%. This situation meant that the United States oil industry could not increase supply to fill the void created when the embargo was instituted. The market response was an increase in price. Effects on the United States Population and Economy The oil embargo quadrupled the cost of a barrel of oil within a short period of time. -
Is It Better Yet? Charting the Course of Various Asset Classes Through a Global Financial Crisis
July 2009 Vol. 1 No. 3 Is It Better Yet? Charting the Course of Various Asset Classes through a Global Financial Crisis N A FINANCIAL CRISIS, it’s often said, “all correlations go to 1.” That may or may not be the case. More certain, however, is that crisis-induced dislocations will move various asset classes and market indicators in surprising directions. I Those movements generally are most discernable once a crisis subsides and markets trend back towards normalcy. This Market Insights examines the performance of a number of different asset classes from the beginning of 2008 through the end of 2Q09. Using charts and commentary, we highlight a variety of interesting changes in financial markets during that span and discuss the possible causes of those shifts. In the timelines of each chart, we’ve denoted important milestones that provide context for each of the asset classes shown. Four of these events (the Bear Stearns takeover, Lehman bankruptcy filing, TARP program announcement, and S&P 500 2009 year-to-date low) are presented in all of the charts, and additional events of special relevance to the chart in question are also included. Is It Better Yet? Exhibit 1. U.S. High-Yield Credit Outperforms U.S. Large Cap Stocks 1 2 3 4 1.2 U.S. Fiscal Stimulus 1.0 0.8 0.6 1 Bear Stearns takeover BAC purchase 2 Lehman filing 0.4 of Countrywide 3 TARP announcement Normalized Total Return 4 S&P 500 2009 low Madoff 0.2 0.0 1Q08 2Q08 3Q08 4Q08 1Q09 2Q09 S&P 500 Barclays Capital U.S. -
The Current Peak Oil Crisis
PEAK ENERGY, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND THE COLLAPSE OF GLOBAL CIVILIZATION _______________________________________________________ The Current Peak Oil Crisis TARIEL MÓRRÍGAN PEAK E NERGY, C LIMATE C HANGE, AND THE COLLAPSE OF G LOBAL C IVILIZATION The Current Peak Oil Crisis TARIEL MÓRRÍGAN Global Climate Change, Human Security & Democracy Orfalea Center for Global & International Studies University of California, Santa Barbara www.global.ucsb.edu/climateproject ~ October 2010 Contact the author and editor of this publication at the following address: Tariel Mórrígan Global Climate Change, Human Security & Democracy Orfalea Center for Global & International Studies Department of Global & International Studies University of California, Santa Barbara Social Sciences & Media Studies Building, Room 2006 Mail Code 7068 Santa Barbara, CA 93106-7065 USA http://www.global.ucsb.edu/climateproject/ Suggested Citation: Mórrígan, Tariel (2010). Peak Energy, Climate Change, and the Collapse of Global Civilization: The Current Peak Oil Crisis . Global Climate Change, Human Security & Democracy, Orfalea Center for Global & International Studies, University of California, Santa Barbara. Tariel Mórrígan, October 2010 version 1.3 This publication is protected under the Creative Commons (CC) "Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported" copyright. People are free to share (i.e, to copy, distribute and transmit this work) and to build upon and adapt this work – under the following conditions of attribution, non-commercial use, and share alike: Attribution (BY) : You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author or licensor (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work). Non-Commercial (NC) : You may not use this work for commercial purposes. -
Can Nuclear Power Solve the Energy Crisis?
A lightly edited version of this article appeared in the “Symposium” section of Insight on the News on 27 August 2001. Hunter and Amory Lovins's original text is printed below. Q: Can nuclear power solve the energy crisis? The Titanic wasn’t supposed to sink, but, well, it did. The Titanic of the energy business, nuclear power, did too, but proponents want to get it under steam again. Given the current mania about a supposed energy crisis, it’s worth understanding why nuclear power, won’t float. Nuclear plants can’t solve the immediate problems facing us (they’re slow to build, and recent blackouts in the West were not caused by a lack of generating capacity). And nukes suffer from a more fundamental problem: they can’t compete in any energy market. Nuclear power already suffered the greatest collapse of any enterprise in the industrial history of the world. Overwhelmed by huge construction and repair costs, it achieved less than 1/10th the capacity and 1/100th the new orders officially forecast a quarter-century ago. No vendor has ever made money selling reactors. Even today, if a nuclear power plant cost nothing to build, it would be cheaper to write it off (and give away electricity-saving equipment to displace the nuke’s power) than to operate. Only such centrally planned electricity systems like Russia propose new nuclear plants. Free markets shouldn’t follow their lead. “If a thing is not worth doing,” said economist Lord Keynes, “it is not worth doing well.” Even ignoring nuclear’s tendency to spread bomb material and know-how, produce toxic waste, invite sabotage, and cause uninsurable accidents, it is simply uncompetitive and unnecessary. -
Market Organization and Structure Larry Harris Los Angeles, USA Contents
1 Market Organization and Structure Larry Harris Los Angeles, U.S.A. Contents: LEARNING OUTCOMES ......................................................................................................................................... 3 1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................................. 3 2 THE FUNCTIONS OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM .................................................................................... 4 2.1 HELPING PEOPLE ACHIEVE THEIR PURPOSES IN USING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM ................................................. 4 2.1.1 Saving .................................................................................................................................................... 5 2.1.2 Borrowing .............................................................................................................................................. 5 2.1.3 Raising Equity Capital ........................................................................................................................... 6 2.1.4 Managing Risks ..................................................................................................................................... 7 2.1.5 Exchanging Assets for Immediate Delivery (Spot Market Trading) ...................................................... 7 2.1.6 Information-Motivated Trading ............................................................................................................. 8 2.1.7 -
The 1973 Oil Crisis by Sarah Horton
The 1973 Oil Crisis By Sarah Horton In October of 1973 Middle-eastern OPEC nations stopped exports to the US and other western nations. They meant to punish the western nations that supported Israel, their foe, in the Yom Kippur War, but they also realized the strong influence that they had on the world through oil. One of the many results of the embargo was higher oil prices all throughout the western world, particularly in America. The embargo forced America to consider many things about energy, such as the cost and supply, which up to 1973 no one had worried about (Spiegelman). In order to understand the main cause of the oil crisis one must first know the history of the region and the Arab- Israeli conflict. World War II a Zionist state, known as Israel, was created on 56% of the land that was formerly known as Palestine. This state served as a homeland for Jews. The local Arabs were enraged by the fact that the Palestinian land had been taken to create this state. They refused to acknowledge Israel as an independent state. The Arabs began to launch efforts to recapture the land that they felt was rightfully theirs. This created the Suez-Sinai War. The British and the French sided with the Israelis in order to punish Nasser for nationalizing the Suez Canal. The strong Israeli military forces quickly defeated the Arabs. The Arabs responded to this defeat by uniting. In 1967 Israel launched the Six-Day War, claiming much land. In 1973 Arab forces retaliated. On Yom Kippur, the holiest Jewish holiday, Arab forces attacked, backed by Soviet technology (The Mid-east Oil Crisis). -
Short- and Long-Term Markets
www.energyinnovation.org 98 Battery Street, Suite 202 San Francisco, CA 94111 [email protected] WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKET DESIGN FOR RAPID DECARBONIZATION: LONG-TERM MARKETS, WORKING WITH SHORT-TERM ENERGY MARKETS BY STEVEN CORNELI, ERIC GIMON, AND BRENDAN PIERPONT ● JUNE 2019 Competitive electricity markets will play TABLE OF CONTENTS an important role in rapid decarbonization of the power sector. WHY LONG-TERM MARKETS? 2 Competitive markets can drive the HOW OUR PROPOSALS ADDRESS KEY efficient development, financing, and CONCERNS 6 operation of an evolving, innovative, and CRITICAL DIFFERENCES IN THE THREE low-cost mix of resources that can also PROPOSALS 11 ensure reliability and safety. These SUMMARY 13 abilities may well be critical to the successful transformation of the electric APPENDIX 15 sector to a zero-carbon platform for an entirely clean energy sector. Efficient prices are essential features of competitive markets. They underlie markets’ ability to attract investment, ensure a least-cost resource mix capable of meeting consumer needs, and allocate risks to those best able to manage them. Yet today’s clean energy technologies have characteristics that raise concerns about whether current wholesale electricity market designs will support price levels sufficient to sustain – directly or indirectly – investment in the types and mix of resources needed to achieve deep decarbonization. In our view, current market designs, combined with high levels of variable renewable energy (VRE) resources with negligible short- run marginal costs, face a serious risk of failing to produce market price signals sufficient to sustain the investment needed for successful decarbonization. This is a particular concern since VRE appears certain to play a large and critical role in the rapid decarbonization of the power sector, due to the low and falling costs of wind and solar power in many regions and their ability to be deployed quickly.