By Donald R. Adams, Jr. the BEGINNING of INVESTMENT
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By Donald R. Adams, Jr. SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY AT CARBONDALE THE BEGINNING OF INVESTMENT BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES T HE CREDIT for the establishment of investment banking as 1a means for the large scale marketing of securities is generally assigned to Jay Cooke of Philadelphia. Cooke's activities in marketing the Civil War issues of the Federal Government and his subsequent attempt to employ the same techniques in the sale of Northern Pacific Railroad securities are judged to mark a turning point in the history of financial intermediation.' This judgment rests on several innovations which Cooke utilized in his role as financial intermediary. In short, it is asserted that "unlike his contemporaries, who dealt with persons of large fortune, Cooke placed loans with small banks and local capitalists."' This democratization of the capital markets, scholars contend, opened an entirely new set of alternatives for the purveyors of private and public debt at the same time as it introduced small and medium sized savers to the opportunities of the securities market. This paper does not seek to denigrate the importance of Cooke's contributions to the development of investment banking but does seek to correct the impression that the Civil War was the stage for the first true investment banking operation of any consequence. Nearly a half century prior to the establishment of Jay Cooke's banking house a transaction took place which allowed the be- leagured Treasury to tap the financial resources of a wide spectrum of both institutional and individual savers at a time when the nation's needs were critical. * This research was supported in part by a Fellowship of the American Council of Learned Societies. I. See, for example, Henrietta M. Larson,Jay Cooke Private Banker (Cambridge, 1936) especially pp. 427-430. 2. Krooss and Blyn, A Histoty of Financial Intermediaries (New York, 1971), p. 105. 99 100 DONALD R. ADAMS, JR. II The War of 1812 was a divisive one for America. Politically, the country was split along sectional lines which reflected a bitter dispute between the nation's major parties. Republican radicals urged strong measures against Great Britain in retaliation for the harassment of ships, trade, and sailors. If Canada could be acquired in the bargain, so much the better. In New England, the increasingly moribund Federalist party was able to rekindle support by espousing an anti-war policy in keeping with that section's economic self-interest. The declaration of war with Britain in June 1812 caught the nation militarily and financially unprepared despite the long train of events which preceded it. As early as 1809, Albert Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury, had anticipated belligerency but felt that such a conflict "must be carried on principally by loans." In keeping with Republican philosophy, the Secretary proclaimed that "no internal taxes of any description need be imposed. All that the Treasury required," asserted Gallatin, "was to double the import duties; to limit the system of drawbacks; either to repeal or to complete the partial non-intercourse law, and to reform the system of accountability in the Army and Navy Departments." By the end of 1812 Gallatin and the administration had ample reason to regret their pre-war fiscal conservatism. The conscious attempt to hold the line on military spending during the preceding decade necessitated the appropriation of over $10,800,000 for national defense purposes. 4 Records reveal that total spending for the military and naval establishments rose from $3,998,394 in 1811 to $15,777,163 in 1812.5 Viewed in an alternative fashion, defense spending rose from less than one-third of total federal outlays to better than 70 percent in a single year.' Compounding matters was the House Ways and Means Committee's estimate indicating deficits of nearly $14,000,000 for the years 1813 and 1814. 3. Henry Adams, The Writings of Albert Gallatin (Philadelphia, 1879), 1: 382. 4. American State Papers, Finance, #368, 2: 539. 5. Ibid., #453, p. 919. 6. In percentage terms, only World War II was more expensive. Between 1942 and 1945 defense expenditures were 77 percent of the total budget. BANKING INVESTMENTS to] 7() 18 9.136, PO=78- 1. 102 DONALD R. ADAMS, JR. A federal loan of $11,000,000 authorized on 14 March 1812 had been a failure. With little or no participation by European financiers, with no Bank of the United States to shore up a sagging capital market, and without the cooperation of New England bankers and capitalists, the Treasury's first subscription netted only $6,118,900.? Subsequent subscriptions were equally dis- appointing and to finance the government's needs Gallatin was forced to obtain from a reluctant Congress the authority to issue Treaury notes in lieu of 6 percent stock.' In total, the Treasury was able to borrow $13,100,200 during 1812. Of this sum $7,415,200 was in the form of bonds bearing 6 percent interest; $2,150,000 was in the form of loans on special contract; and $3,535,000 was accounted for by Treasury notes.9 The cities of Philadelphia, New York and Baltimore accounted for over 72 percent of all 6 percent stock and over 84 percent of all Treasury notes. Banks accounted for some $9,130,000 or nearly 70 percent of the total and Philadelphia alone accounted for over 41 percent of all bond sales to individuals. '° As the year 1813 opened federal expenditures continued to grow more rapidly than receipts and the Treasury's estimates of needed borrowing approached the $15,000,000 mark. The coming year loomed as a critical one in the affairs of the Treasury and the nation. Privately, Gallatin was pessimistic. In a memorandum prepared for President Madison, the Secretary assessed the Treasury's needs and added "I think a loan to that amount to be altogether un- attainable. From the banks," said Gallatin, "we can expect little or nothing, as they have already lent nearly to the full extent of their faculties." And, he added bleakly, "all that I could obtain this year from individual subscription does not exceed 3,200,000 dollars." 1' 7. American State Papers, Finance, #375, 2: 564. 8. These obligations were "not to exceed, in the whole amount which may ultimately not be subscribed to the loan." The notes bore interest on denominations over $100 and were redeemable by the treasury in one year from the date of issue. In the mean- time they were receivable in payment of duties, taxes, and other debts due the govern- ment of the United States. 9. American State Papers, Finance, #380, 2: 580. Special Contract loans were those made by banks whose charters restricted purchases of federal stock and bore the same 6 percent rate of interest. 10. American State Papers, Finance, #380, 2: 590. 11. Adams, p. 528. BANKING INVESTMENTS 103 In an attempt to avoid a public subscription, Gallatin attempted to tap the private fortunes of Philadelphia and New York. He chose as an intermediary in this operation, David Parish, the son of Hamburg banker, John Parish. The Secretary proposed to Parish that he join Stephen Girard of Philadelphia and John Jacob Astor and Herman Le Roy of New York in the purchase of $10,000,000 of government stocks. Parish's reluctance caused this scheme to fall through much to the consternation of Gallatin. On 5 March 1813, Gallatin wrote to Madison that "my reliance on Parish is not great, he . positively refused to join with Le Roy and Girard and with Mr. Astor in making proposals for ten millions of the loan. I had set that going and if it had succeeded I would not have opened the loan by subscription."' On 8 February 1813 Congress authorized the Treasury to borrow $16,000,000 at 6 percent and public subscriptions were invited by means of a Treasury circular of 20 February.'3 Subscriptions were to be taken on 12 and 13 March at nineteen banks in eleven key cities across the nation. A letter from Gallatin to Madison on 5 March reflected the anxiety which gripped the administration. "Dear sir," said the Secretary, "we have hardly money enough to last till the end of the month. If therefore, there be any arrange- ments discretionary with the President . which are susceptible of extension or curtailment ... it is desirable that they should not be concluded till after that day [ 17 March] ... as we will then be enabled to form correct estimates of our projects; and it is better, in case of failure, to limit ourselves to what is strictly necessary than to be compelled to take retrograde steps. In the meanwhile," concluded Gallatin, "the prospect not being favorable, permit me earnestly to submit the propriety of cutting by the root militia expenses, and of reducing the Western expenditures to what is necessary for defensive operations. ... " 4 When the books closed on 13 March Gallatin's worst fears had been realized. Only $3,956,400 of the loan was taken. In Phila- delphia, the nation's financial center and a Republican strong- hold, the response was particularly disappointing. The chartered 12. Ibid. pp. 532-533. 13. The 6 percent interest was enhanced by the addition of a I percent annuity for 13 years from 1 January 1813. 14. Adams, pp. 532-533. 104 DONALD R. ADAMS, JR. institutions of the city accounted for only $371,200.'5 Stephen Girard's private banking house received $122,600 in subscriptions, with Girard personally taking $100,000.' By a notice of 18 March, Gallatin announced the reopening of the subscription books, this time for a full week, between 25 and 31 March.