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International Conference Game Theory and Management The Tenth International Conference Game Theory and Management 07-09 July, 2016 Saint Petersburg, Russia Organized by Saint Petersburg State University and The International Society of Dynamic Games (Russian Chapter) The Conference is being held at Saint Petersburg State University Volkhovsky per., 3, St. Petersburg, Russia Program Committee Leon Petrosyan (Russia) - chair; Nikolay Zenkevich (Russia) - co-chair; Eitan Altman (France); Jesus Mario Bilbao (Spain); Irinel Dragan (USA); Gao Hongwei (China); Andrey Garnaev (Russia); Margarita Gladkova (Russia); Sergiu Hart (Israel); Steffen Jørgensen (Denmark); Ehud Kalai (USA); Andrea Di Liddo (Italy); Vladimir Mazalov (Russia); Shigeo Muto (Japan); Yaroslavna Pankratova (Russia); Artem Sedakov (Russia); Richard Staelin (USA); Krzysztof J. Szajowski (Poland); Anna Tur (Russia); Anna Veselova (Russia); Myrna Wooders (UK); David W.K. Yeung (HongKong); Georges Zaccour (Canada); Paul Zipkin (USA); Andrey Zyatchin (Russia) Program Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg State University Volkhovsky per., 3, St. Petersburg, Russia Thursday, July 07 08:45 – 09:30 REGISTRATION 3rd floor 08:45 – 09:30 COFFEE Room 307 09:30 – 09:50 WELCOME ADDRESS Room 309 09.50 – 10:55 PLENARY TALK (1) Room 309 11.00 – 12:00 PLENARY TALK (2) Room 309 12:10 – 14:00 LUNCH University Center 13:30 – 14:00 COFFEE Room 307 14:00 – 16:30 PARALLEL SESSIONS (T1) Room 209, 410 16:30 – 16:50 COFFEE BREAK Room 307 16:50 – 19:00 PARALLEL SESSIONS (T2) Room 209, 410 19:00 – 22:00 WELCOME PARTY Room 309 Friday, July 08 09:30 – 10:00 COFFEE Room 307 10:00 – 11:00 PLENARY TALK (3) Room 309 11:10 – 12:10 PARALLEL SESSIONS (F1) Room 209, 410 12:20 – 14:00 LUNCH University Center 13:30 – 14:00 COFFEE Room 307 14:00 – 16:30 PARALLEL SESSIONS (F2) Room 309, 209, 410 16:30 – 16:50 COFFEE BREAK Room 307 16:50 – 19:00 PARALLEL SESSIONS (F3) Room 209, 410 Saturday, July 09 09:30 – 10:00 COFFEE Room 307 10:00 – 11:00 PLENARY TALK (4) Room 309 11:10 – 12:10 PARALLEL SESSIONS (S1) Room 209, 410 12:20 – 14:00 LUNCH University Center 13:30 – 14:00 COFFEE Room 307 14:00 – 16:30 PARALLEL SESSIONS (S2) Room 209, 410 16:30 – 17:00 COFFEE BREAK Room 307 17:00 – 17:30 CLOSING SESSION Room 209, 410 19:00 – 22:00 CONFERENCE BANQUET Restaurant “Academia” 2 Thursday, July 07 08:45 – 09:30 REGISTRATION, 3d floor 08:45 – 09:30 COFFEE, room 307 09:30 – 09:50 WELCOME ADDRESS. GRAND HALL, room 309 Co-chairs – Leon Petrosyan and Nikolay Zenkevich 09:50 – 10:55 PLENARY 1. GRAND HALL, room 309 Chair – Vladimir Mazalov Jean-Jacques Herings, Maastricht University (The Netherlands) Equilibrium and Matching under Price Control 11:00 – 12:00 PLENARY 2. GRAND HALL, room 309 Chair – Victoria Kreps Eilon Solan, Tel Aviv University (Israel) Multiplayer Stochastic Games: Techniques, Results, and Open Problems 12:10 – 14:00 LUNCH1 13:30 – 14:00 COFFEE, room 307 14:00 – 16:30 W1: PARALLEL SESSIONS DGA-1: room 209 Dynamic Games and Applications - 1 Chair – Anatolii Kleimenov 14:00 – 14:25 Guennady Ougolnitsky and Anatoly Usov Comparative Analysis of Efficiency of the Methods of Sustainable Management in Hierarchical Differential Games 14:25 – 14:50 Vladimir Ushakov, Alexander Matviychuk and Andrey Ushakov Solution of Control Problems of Nonlinear Systems on a Finite Time Interval 14:50 – 15:15 Anna Rettieva Discrete-time Dynamic Potential Games 1 Lunch will be held at the University Center’s restaurant, Birzhevaya liniya, 6 3 15:15 – 15:40 Dmitrii Serkov On joint fixed points in chain-complete posets 15:40 – 16:05 Aleksandr Chentsov and Dmitrii Serkov The elements of the operator convexity in the construction of the programmed iteration method 16:05 – 16:30 Anatolii Kleimenov Aggressive behavior in non-antagonistic positional differential two- person games PRS: room 410 Pooling, Risk and Stability Chair – Jing Fu 14:00 – 14:25 Maria Nastych Strong Nash equilibrium in oligopoly market with horizontal integration 14:25 – 14:50 Anastasiia Reusova Strategic Alliance Stability Factors 14:50 – 15:15 Alexey Soloviev Minimax estimation of Value-at-Risk under hedging of American contingent claims on a discrete financial market 15:15 – 15:40 Stefanos Leonardos and Costis Melolidakis Cournot competition with an external supplier under capacity constraints and demand uncertainty 15:40 – 16:05 Igor Asanov Do We Learn From Mistakes of Others? A Test of Observational Learning in the Bandit Problem 16:05 – 16:30 Jing Fu Information pooling game in an interactive multi-portfolio optimization framework 16:30 – 16:50 COFFEE BREAK, room 307 16:50 – 19:00 W2: PARALLEL SESSIONS CGA-1: room 410 Cooperative Games and Applications -1 Chair – Elena Yanovskaya 4 16:50 – 17:15 Valery Vasilev On some fuzzy extensions of TU cooperative game 17:15 – 17:40 Anna Khmelnitskaya, Gerard van der Laan and Dolf Talman Generalization of binomial coefficients to numbers on the nodes of graphs 17:40 – 18:05 Natalia Naumova Reactive and semi-reactive bargaining sets for games with restricted cooperation 18:05 – 18:30 Elena Yanovskaya A characterization of the Nash Maximum Product (NMP) solution for Faird Division problems 18:30 – 18:55 Gabriel Turbay Auction Equilibrium in Coalition Formation DGA-2: room 209 Dynamic Games and Applications -2 Chair – Alexander Tarasyev 16:50 – 17:15 Yurii Averboukh Value multifunction for deterministic mean field game 17:15 – 17:40 Denis Kuzyutin, Maria Nikitina and Irina Marchenko Time-consistent cooperative solutions in multistage games with vector payoffs 17:40 – 18:05 Ovanes Petrosian Random Informational Horizon in Looking Forward Approach for Cooperative Differential Games 18:05-18:30 Igor Shevchenko and Dusan Stipanovic Smooth approximations for minimum and maximum functions and their use in the strategy design 18:30-18:55 Alexander Tarasyev and Nikolay Krasovskii Dynamical Equilibria in Bimatrix Coordination Games 19:00 – 22:00 WELCOME PARTY2 2 Welcome party will be held at the Grand Hall, room 309, 3d floor 5 Friday, July 08 09:30 – 10:00 COFFEE, room 307 10:00 – 11:00 PLENARY 3. GRAND HALL, room 309 Chair – Leon Petrosyan Eric Maskin, Harvard University (USA) Elections and Strategic Voting: Condorcet and Borda 11:10 – 12:10 T1: PARALLEL SESSIONS CSC: room 410 Collaborative Supply Chain Chair – Max van Dijk 11:10 – 11:30 Anastasiia Ivakina and Ekaterina Zenkevich Supply chain cooperation modeling: trends and gaps 11:30 – 11:50 Yulia Lonyagina and Nikolay Zenkevich Nash Equilibrium and Bargaining Solution in Multi-Echelon Distributive Supply Chains with Linear Demand 11:50 – 12:10 Max van Dijk Cross-Border Collaboration in European-Russian Supply Chains: Integrative Approach of Provision on Design, Performance and Impediments IISG: room 209 Incomplete Information and Search Games Chair – Ryusuke Hohzaki 11:10 – 11:30 Misha Gavrilovich and Victoria Kreps Games with asymmetric incomplete information as games with symmetric incomplete information and asymmetric computational resources 11:30 – 11:50 Semyon Mestnikov and Nikolay Petrov The Sufficient Conditions k*-detection in the Simple Search Game on the Plane 11:50 – 12:10 Ryusuke Hohzaki A Search Game with Incomplete Information on Detective Capability of Searcher 12:20 –14:00 LUNCH 6 13:30 – 14:00 COFFEE, room 307 14:00 – 16:30 T2: PARALLEL SESSIONS GTMA-1: room 410 Game Theory and Management Applications - 1 Chair – Igor Bykadorov 14:00 – 14:25 Marina Sandomirskaia Nash-2 equilibrium: definition, interpretation, applications 14:25 – 14:50 Natalia Nikitina and Evgeny Ivashko The Price of Anarchy in a Game for Drug Discovery 14:50 – 15:15 Pavel Konyukhonskiy and Victoria Holodkova Game theory methods in the analysis of economic and political interaction at the international level 15:15 – 15:40 Yulia Ibragimova and Fedor Sandomirskiy Competitive Market Mechanisms for Fair Division of Indivisible Goods 15:40 – 16:05 Alexander Sidorov and Jacques-Francois Thisse Social Welfare under Oligopoly: Does the Strengthening of Competition in Production Increase Consumers' Well-Being? 16:05 – 16:30 Igor Bykadorov, Andrea Ellero, Stefania Funari, Sergey Kokovin and Pavel Molchanov Painful Birth of Trade under Classical Krugman’s Monopolistic Competition DGA-3: room 209 Dynamic Games and Applications - 3 Chair – Leon Petrosyan 14:00 – 14:25 Ershov Dmitriy Non-negative IDP in differential game of limited resource extraction 14:25 – 14:50 Yin Li Dynamic Shapley Value for 2-stage cost sharing game with spanning tree 14:50 – 15:15 Mario Alberto Garcia-Meza and Maria Nastych A non-cooperative differential game of advertising goodwill: application to the real estate market of St Petersburg 7 15:15 – 15:40 Ekaterina Gromova and Anna Tur On a Differential Game of Pollution Control with Random Terminal Instants 15:40 – 16:05 Stewart John Blakeway, Ekaterina Gromova, Dmitry Gromov, Anna Kirpichnikova and Nikolay Timonin A dynamic game on a mobile ad-hoc network 16:05 – 16:30 Leon Petrosyan Construction of Strongly Time-Consistent Subcore in Dynamic Games NGA-1: room 410 Networking Games and Applications -1 Chair – Vladimir Mazalov 14:00 – 14:25 Vladimir Matveenko, Alexei Korolev and Anastasia Alfimova On dynamic stability of equilibrium in network game with production and externalities 14:25 – 14:50 Hongwei Gao, Han Qiao, Shou-Yang Wang and Meng-Ke Zhen The algorithm and model of pairwise stable networks 14:50 – 15:15 Nikolay Bazenkov and Vsevolod Korepanov Farsighted network formation with locally-informed players 15:15 – 15:40 Elena Parilina and Artem Sedakov Stable Cooperation in a Game with a Major Player 15:40 – 16:05 Maria
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