Williams, P D 2018 Strategic Communications for Peace Operations: stability The African Union’s Information War Against al-Shabaab. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 7(1): 3, pp. 1–17, DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.606

RESEARCH ARTICLE Strategic Communications for Peace Operations: The African Union’s Information War Against al-Shabaab Paul D. Williams

Despite widespread agreement that effective strategic communications are a necessary part of complex peace operations, many missions struggle to generate relevant capabilities and implement effective campaigns. This article analyzes the experiences of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) as a case study of this problem. Specifically, it examines how the United Nations (UN) tried to fill the gap by hiring a consortium of private firms known as the AU-UN Information Support Team (IST) to wage a strategic communications campaign against al-Shabaab. The IST’s goal was to drive, as well as communicate, AMISOM’s success, improve the mission’s media presence, and develop a communications strategy. The IST played an innovative and important function for AMISOM but suffered from several significant challenges that reduced its effectiveness. The conclusion therefore identifies four main lessons from AMISOM’s experiences that could improve strategic communications for peace operations.

Introduction see also Duffey 2000). There have also been There is very little scholarly literature on how periodic calls for specific missions to improve to design and implement effective strategic their strategic communications capabilities communications for peace operations. The (e.g. Boutellis and Fink 2016: 24–25). few examples have focused on the need for The lack of scholarly attention is surpris- the United Nations (UN) to manage public ing given that several international organi- opinion in its mission areas and utilize new zations engaged in peace and security communications technologies through effec- activities have long recognized the impor- tive information strategies (e.g. Lehmann tance of developing a strategic communi- 1999; Lindley 2004; Betz and Papper 2015; cations policy. Both the UN and European see also Lehmann 2015; Oksamytna 2017) Union (EU), for example, have a Strategic or recommended that UN peacekeepers Communications Division that deals with develop cultural awareness, i.e. ‘the ability peace operations as part of their Department to attain knowledge about the particular cul- of Public Information and European External tural characteristics of the people of a certain Action Service, respectively. Similarly, NATO terrain (state or region)’ (Bellou 2014: 579; has a strategic communications policy and a specific military concept for it (NATO The George Washington University, USA 2009, 2010). Effective strategic communica- [email protected] tions have also been widely recognized as a Art. 3, page 2 of 17 Williams: Strategic Communications for Peace Operations necessary part of countering insurgencies that was subsequently developed. Third, suc- (e.g. Petraeus 2008) and combating terror- cessful strategic communications require ism (e.g. Fink and Barclay 2013). more than just institutional capacity in the At the UN, it is now widely agreed in prin- mission; they also require sustained, high- ciple that ‘a broad-based, well-resourced and level political support from the key stake- accurately evaluated strategic communica- holders beyond the mission to ensure that tions plan’ is a necessary part of managing the agreed policies are implemented. ‘evolving expectations and build[ing] lasting Following the scholarly literature, I define support among central constituencies’ for its strategic communications as ‘the purposeful contemporary peace operations (Challenges use of communication by an organization to Forum 2015: 1). However, this is rarely imple- fulfill its mission’ (Hallahan et al 2007: 3). Or, mented, prompting the 2015 High-Level more precisely, as the ‘coordinated actions, Independent Panel on United Nations Peace messages, images, and other forms of sign- Operations (HIPPO) to recommend that com- aling or engagement intended to inform, munications teams must be deployed to influence, or persuade selected audiences to ensure ‘interactive two-way communications support national objectives’ (Paul 2011: 3). with the local people’ and peace operations Its principal methods include audience anal- must possess ‘modern and appropriate com- ysis, goal setting, and message strategy. munications approaches and technologies’ In UN peace operations, such tasks are (HIPPO 2015: §309). normally the remit of the Public Information At the African Union (AU), however, the Unit (PIU). However, the AU’s lack of capabili- Commission’s only strategic communications ties in this area meant that when AMISOM capability is the Directorate for Information deployed to Mogadishu in March 2007, it and Communication, which focuses on the did so without the ability to wage an effec- day-to-day communications about its gen- tive strategic communications campaign. For eral activities. The AU Commission’s Peace its first two years, AMISOM had virtually no and Security Department has no dedicated media presence or proactive communication strategic communications capability. In strategy and operated with a ‘bunker mental- 2016, there was an attempt to develop a pub- ity’ whereby media briefings were sporadic, lic information policy and capacity for AU poorly organized, the messaging confused peace operations but it has not been com- and the tone defensive (IST 2012: 78). The pleted. It drew heavily on the communica- resulting information vacuum played into tions strategy developed for the AU Mission the hands of opposition forces and under- in Somalia (AMISOM) (Interview, AU official, mined AMISOM’s operational effectiveness. 3 December 2017). In particular, AMISOM’s reputation with This article therefore uses AMISOM as a case local Somalis and key international partners study to illustrate the importance of devel- suffered from: incoherence of its narrative; oping effective strategic communications for opaqueness and lack of transparency; and peace operations engaged in enforcement problems related to civilian and AMISOM and stabilization activities and the challenges casualties and human rights violations perpe- posed in the AU’s case.1 Among other things, trated by the mission’s personnel (Interview, it concludes that the AU has thus far oper- former UNSOA official, 28 September 2017). ated without a dedicated strategic communi- To remedy this situation and counter al- cations capacity for its peace operations and Shabaab’s narrative of events, in November should develop one soon. Second, not only 2009 the UN Support Office for AMISOM was AMISOM deployed without the capacity (UNSOA) contracted a consortium of pri- to conduct an information campaign, its con- vate firms that established the AU-UN tributing countries were not always willing Information Support Team (IST). Utilizing to implement the communications strategy techniques employed in a variety of war Williams: Strategic Communications for Peace Operations Art. 3, page 3 of 17 zones, the IST’s goal was to drive, as well as efforts to promote a strategic narrative about communicate, AMISOM’s success, improve AMISOM and Somalia. The second section the mission’s media presence and develop discusses the major challenges faced by the a communications strategy. Working with IST, paying attention to the roles of AMISOM’s AMISOM’s tiny PIU, the IST devised key stra- contributing countries. The conclusion iden- tegic information objectives related to main- tifies four main lessons that should be drawn taining the cooperation and support of the from AMISOM’s experiences with strategic local population, informing international communications. As well as relevant official opinion of AMISOM’s progress in order to documents and scholarship, the article draws sustain support from troop-contributing on interviews with relevant experts and per- countries (TCCs) and donors, and promot- sonnel involved in these activities as well as ing a culture of peace and non-violence internal, unpublished documents given to in Somalia to create an environment for the author. national reconciliation. Especially between 2010 and late 2012, AMISOM’s Strategic Communications the IST actively countered al-Shabaab’s stra- AMISOM’s principal objective in the strate- tegic narrative in several respects, including gic communications realm was to prevent building greater confidence in the mission al-Shabaab dominating the narrative about and its effects. Later, however, several factors Somalia. It therefore devoted considerable coalesced that reduced AMISOM’s ability to time and effort to understanding how al- deliver effective strategic communications. Shabaab conducted its media operations. First, the environment in which the IST was Although al-Shabaab’s strategic communi- asked to operate changed, most notably cations are not the focus of this article, it AMISOM’s expansion beyond Mogadishu should be noted that the militants have run and the inclusion of new TCCs (Kenya, a very capable, multifaceted media and infor- Djibouti, Sierra Leone, and Ethiopia), which mation operations campaign for over a dec- eroded the mission’s coherence. Second, dur- ade (see ICG 2010; Hansen 2013; Anzalone ing late 2012 and early 2013, the UN and AU 2016; Kriel 2017). They have consistently, competed over which organization should and sometimes accurately, depicted succes- lead politically in Somalia, which made the sive Somali ‘governments’ and AMISOM’s IST’s tasks more challenging. When the UN contributing countries as weak, corrupt and Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) deployed from illegitimate. Al-Shabaab’s two most impor- mid-2013, there was a significant increase tant tools were radio and the Internet: it ran a in international civilian staff in Mogadishu, Ministry of Information that used a network which meant the IST was pulled in multiple, of FM radio stations (and some TV stations) sometimes contradictory, directions. Finally, known as al-Andalus and its rebranded media by the time a new set of firms took over the department Al-Kataib Media Foundation and IST contract in late 2014, the IST had in some News Channel produced material across mul- respects developed a different relationship tiple platforms in English and Somali, and with AMISOM, particularly over the scope for then branched out into Swahili, Norwegian, the IST’s strategic communications experts to Swedish and even Urdu. give autonomous advice to AMISOM’s lead- Al-Shabaab’s strategic communications ership. Unfortunately, this coincided with were certainly not news to AMISOM, which polling evidence that showed AMISOM’s rep- conducted extensive analysis of them. The utation with local Somali civilians reduced practical issue was translating a sophisti- significantly during 2015 and 2016. cated understanding of al-Shabaab’s opera- To address these issues, this article pro- tions into an effective plan to combat them, ceeds in two main parts. It begins by pro- with the correct priorities and appropriate viding an overview of the AU-UN IST and its resources. Art. 3, page 4 of 17 Williams: Strategic Communications for Peace Operations

Origins of the IST Somali-language radio station, having previ- The origins of AMISOM’s strategic com- ously established similar radio stations in the munications capabilities lie in the deploy- DRC, Central African Republic and Croatia ment of the UN Support Office to AMISOM (IST 2012: 9–10).2 In terms of personnel, (UNSOA) in mid-2009 (see Williams 2017). the IST built a team of consultants and staff Shortly after deploying to Mogadishu, recruited from the region and AMISOM TCCs UNSOA’s leadership concluded that AMISOM as well as from Somalia itself who worked out could not adequately communicate with of London, Nairobi and Mogadishu (IST 2012: the local population under the existing 29, 31). There were about 20 employees in conditions. So, it contracted a service pro- the general IST and approximately another vider to mount an information campaign 50 running Radio Bar-Kulan. By early 2011, in support of AMISOM. In November 2009, the forward team in Mogadishu was about AMISOM signed a Support Implementation ten strong. Agreement on Public Information whereby a consortium of three firms was hired to drive The IST’s Objectives and Methods its strategic communications to a variety of At the time the IST contract began, target audiences (IST 2012: 3, 5). The three AMISOM’s strategic information objectives firms would subsequently form the AU-UN were: to maintain cooperation of the par- Information Support Team (IST). ties and the support of the local population; The UN concluded that in Somalia private inform international opinion in order to firms would provide more effective opera- sustain support from the mission’s TCCs and tions than their standard PIU approach. As a partners; and to foster a culture of peace senior UNSOA official recalled, the primary and non-violence (IST 2012: 7). This was reason for establishing a commercially con- all very well but AMISOM had no means to tracted capability was that it provided ‘a implement these objectives. Its own PIU had means for the UN to transfer risk to a deploy- only one member of staff until 2011, when able commercial entity’ (Interview, former two new personnel were recruited (AMISOM UNSOA official, 3 August 2017). This was 2011: §82). AMISOM could also call on the largely because the intense insecurity in lone Public Information Officer the UN had Mogadishu precluded the deployment of UN seconded to Addis Ababa to help boost the staff there. As was the case with UNSOA, a AU Commission’s capability in this area contracted capability permitted the deploy- (Wikileak Cable 2010: §2). But that was it. ment of personnel, as well as considerable Even by early 2017, AMISOM’s PIU had just flexibility in approach. This was not entirely one officer and one assistant (de Coning et unprecedented, since the UN had previously al 2017). In retrospect, the IST team con- utilized contractors in some of its peacekeep- cluded: ‘The resulting information vacuum ing operations, including in South Sudan and hostile misrepresentations of AMISOM’s and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) role played into the hands of opposition where they played a role in the establishment forces and undermined AMISOM’s ability of local radio stations (Interview, former IST to accomplish its mandate’ (IST 2012: 78). official, 20 July 2017). One senior IST official at the time therefore Initially, the IST consortium comprised saw the consortium as ‘a desperate and ulti- of Bell Pottinger (part of Chime mately very successful attempt to reverse Communications plc), which provided the the appalling headlines emanating from strategic oversight and production research Mogadishu about AMISOM’ (Richard Bailey and project management; Albany Associates cited in Kriel 2017: 53). Ltd, which led on project strategy and Hence it was the IST that embarked on direction, press news, and media develop- implementing a new information strategy for ment; and Okapi Consulting, which set AMISOM. It did so through six core lines of up Radio Bar-Kulan in Somalia, a credible effort (IST 2012: 8). First, it provided strategic Williams: Strategic Communications for Peace Operations Art. 3, page 5 of 17 communications and information support to East African, New Vision, Monitor and New execute a strategic communications plan.3 Times newspapers. Thousands of printed Second, it provided research, monitoring desktop and wall calendars were also pro- and analysis to map the information ecology duced. The IST also facilitated media visits to and media landscape of Somalia, track public Mogadishu for international journalists and opinion, and test products to measure cam- from the TCCs and potential TCCs. In 2010, it paign effect. Third, it established Radio Bar- began holding media training workshops in Kulan, which went on air on 1 March 2010 Nairobi for key AMISOM staff to equip them and began 24-hour broadcasting exactly with skills in handling the media (AMISOM one year later.4 The content was intended 2010: §82). to emphasize the growing level of normalcy The IST also started to produce radio in Mogadishu, that the population could shows and video documentaries to sup- openly criticize al-Shabaab, and that it was port AMISOM’s activities. Examples include legitimate of the TFG to relax al-Shabaab’s “Gate of Hope,” “Somalia back from the restrictions, such as watching football and brink,” “AMISOM Hospital,” and the “Mayor texting freely (Interview, former IST official, of Mogadishu.” In 2014, the UPDF also pro- 20 July 2017). The IST’s fourth task was to duced a 23-minute film about AMISOM’s establish a fast, professional and consistent successes titled “Heroes in the Horn.” One media capability for AMISOM. As part of this particularly significant example came in 2010 it would produce and disseminate audio- when the production team produced “The visual material to support AMISOM’s work Misleaders,” a radio drama of ten 30-minute and messages. Finally, it would conduct out- episodes exploring al-Shabaab’s recruitment reach to ordinary Somalis, key leaders and methods that aired on Radio Shabelle. A the diaspora. follow-up ten-episode series “Happy People In addition to organizing press confer- Can’t Be Controlled,” aired on Radio Frontier ences, briefings and releases, and weekly during 2011 (IST 2012: 59–60). Video docu- information meetings to coordinate with mentaries were also produced, usually based partners at the UN compound in Nairobi, on material filmed by embedded reporters, the IST also developed a variety of products for example, from the frontlines of the battle to strengthen AMISOM’s media presence, for Mogadishu in 2010 and 2011, with the including a website for the mission launched KDF before the final assault on Kismayo in in March 2010 (AMISOM 2010: §81).5 A 2012, and clearing the road from Mogadishu media observatory site was implemented in to Baidoa (Interviews, IST official, 3 January June 2010 and shortly thereafter a summary 2013, former IST official, 20 July 2017). of media reporting, including monitoring of The IST was also keen to promote a more al-Shabaab-affiliated radio.6 Daily situation secure environment in which journalists reports were also compiled and transmit- could work within Somalia as part of its ted to the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa. media sector development. With sixty-two Several publications were developed includ- journalists killed in Somalia between 1992 ing the AMISOM fortnightly and quarterly and 2017, it was one of the most dangerous bulletins, which distributed about 4,000 cop- places in the world to be a journalist (CPJ ies to international stakeholders. These were 2017). This goal sometimes extended to the intended to keep stakeholders informed, IST helping to provide physical security to maintain morale within the mission, and journalists. For example, the IST established promote local ownership of the Somali the Mogadishu Media House complete with peace process (IST 2012: 52). Numerous op- computers and Internet access as a safe eds were also drafted on behalf of AMISOM’s house for journalists to meet, stay and work senior leadership and published in such (IST 2012: 55). In another episode in 2011, outlets as Foreign Policy magazine and the the IST provided equipment and technical Art. 3, page 6 of 17 Williams: Strategic Communications for Peace Operations support to the staff of Radio Shabelle who civilian staff across the region, AMISOM were trying to relocate out of an al-Shabaab- troops, and UN partners). controlled part of Mogadishu (Interview, for- mer IST official, 20 July 2017). This part of As well as outreach to media houses, particu- the IST project was called “Lifeline.” lar attention was paid to ‘potential change The overall goal of AMISOM’s new com- leaders’ in each of these audiences, i.e. actors munications strategy was: ‘To obtain broad with status and respect to act as opinion popular support and understanding of the leaders (IST 2012: 22). role of AMISOM in protecting the sover- eignty, rebuilding the national institutions The IST’s Core Narratives and their and safeguarding natural resources as well as Impact to promote the implementation of the peace The IST’s core narrative about AMISOM and agreement through supporting an all inclu- Somalia had several dimensions (IST 2012: sive Somali dialogue’ (IST 2012: 15). The IST 24, 25, 79, 25). First, it emphasized that the proceeded to work on two main strands of Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was a this to reinforce the profile, credibility and transitional mechanism ‘to prepare the way for legitimacy of AMISOM, and to undermine the establishment of legitimate and account- the narratives produced by ‘obstructionists’: able public institutions, which respond to the insurgents, criminals, warlords, pirates etc. desires and aspirations of the Somali people’ (IST 2012: 20). It also tried to ensure there (IST 2012: 24). Second, AMISOM was por- was a coherent AMISOM message and that trayed as representing the whole of Africa and the mission’s personnel adhered to a single a friend of Somalia, not an invading force. In narrative (that challenged misconceptions) particular, the IST promoted a narrative that and explained their mandate and intentions AMISOM and the TFG were working in a con- to the Somali people. The IST summarized its structive alliance to stabilize the country. In work as an attempt to promote three prin- contrast, the IST depicted al-Shabaab as being ciples of consistent and credible messaging, controlled by foreigners linked to al-Qa’ida and confidence that the peace process could (IST 2012: 5). A third strand was to emphasize be reinforced through public participation that AMISOM’s progress depended on contin- and dialogue (IST 2012: 17). ued support of its TCCs but ‘chiefly on the par- The IST organized its activities to engage ticipation of Somalis themselves’. four clusters of target audiences (IST 2012: 21): For Somalis, the message was that AMISOM is here to help; for the region, AMISOM was • Somali audiences (especially political portrayed as the natural African reaction to leaders, clan leaders, displaced people, a fire in a neighbor’s house; and for inter- local civilians, and rebels); national audiences AMISOM was depicted • regional audiences (Somalia’s neighbor- as having a positive effect by providing an ing countries, other regional players, opportunity for political dialogue but it refugees, and the region’s civilian needed additional troops and donor support population); (IST 2012: 26–27). • international audiences (notably the By early 2012, the IST was focused on dis- government and military of AMISOM’s seminating four basic stories to support the TCCs, international organizations, the transition from war to peace. These focused Somali diaspora, NGOs with a presence on explaining how the TFG was established in Somalia and the region, and other and what it was trying to achieve, a story of organizations with a credible global how the security environment was improv- reach); and ing, a story about trying to achieve a settle- • internal audiences (namely, AMISOM’s ment and reconciliation between Somalis, leadership and spokespeople, AU and a story focused on the negative traits Williams: Strategic Communications for Peace Operations Art. 3, page 7 of 17 and activities of what the IST called the the IST’s work as its staff were pulled in mul- “obstructionists” (IST 2012: 33). As one sen- tiple, sometimes contradictory directions. ior IST official put it, ‘We needed to change In addition, a fourth round of similar the messaging around AMISOM and Somalia: IST polling of 1,031 adults conducted dur- From conflict to post-conflict. From destruc- ing March and April 2013 in Mogadishu tion to reconstruction. From failed state to and its environs suggested that 59% felt emerging statehood’ (Interview, IST official, 3 AMISOM had been ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ effective January 2013). at providing security for the local commu- Evidence from the IST’s own polling sug- nity, although surprisingly, only 844 of the gests that their efforts were not in vain. The 1,031 people polled had heard of AMISOM IST initially conducted three waves of opin- (IST 2013). Local respondents also urged ion polling in November 2009, October– AMISOM to provide more training for the November 2010, and December 2011 to Somali National Army (SNA) (mentioned by January 2012 (IST 2012: 37–38). Using a 70% of respondents) and disarm militias sample of 1,150 people in Mogadishu and (43%). On the other hand, the same survey its environs, the three polls indicated a sig- revealed only 50% of respondents viewed nificant positive shift in AMISOM’s reputa- AMISOM as a ‘friendly force’ compared to tion (IST 2012: 81ff). In January 2010, almost 30% who felt it was not. Furthermore, more one-third of Somalis polled said AMISOM than half of all respondents believed Kenya was in Somalia to cause harm. By December (61%) and Uganda (54%) –AMISOM’s most 2011, however, this figure had dropped to prominent troop-contributing countries at 9%. This was important because until 2011, the time – were involved in Somali affairs for ‘the perception that AMISOM was the prime their own interests rather than for the inter- cause of civilian casualties in Mogadishu as a ests of Somalis (the answer in Burundi’s case consequence of indiscriminate shell fire was was 48%, Djibouti 45%, and Sierra Leone the single most potent message deployed by 39%). On the positive side, similar polling Al-Shabaab, undermining much of AMISOM’s conducted in October–November 2013 saw broader success both with Somalis them- a rise in the proportion of respondents who selves and the international community’ (IST viewed AMISOM as a friendly force – an aver- 2012: 49). By late 2011, the IST could claim age of 65% of respondents across Mogadishu, that charges of civilian casualties caused by Beledweyne, Kismayo, Baidoa and Marka AMISOM had ‘practically disappeared’ (IST (Interview, IST official, February 2014). 2012: 86). By the end of 2012, the IST concluded A Shift in Approach that AMISOM was seen as a ‘trusted local Spurred in part by the changing external partner’ rather than ‘a foreign occupier’ and environment noted above, in late 2013 a al-Shabaab as foreign-led and al-Qa’ida-affili- basic system of Task Order (approvals) was ated (IST 2012: 92). More generally, AMISOM put in place to de-conflict the use of IST was being hailed as a potential model for resources by the UN and AU, and to try and responding to other international crises refocus the IST’s activities, which UNSOA (e.g. Freear and de Coning 2013). And yet, at thought had lost momentum in the chang- the same time the strategic terrain started ing environment (Interview, former UNSOA to shift. With AMISOM’s expansion beyond official, 3 August 2017). This perturbed some Mogadishu and the inclusion of two new IST staff because it was seen as altering the TCCs (Kenya and Djibouti), the AU mission previous arrangement where the contrac- became more disjointed as it shifted into sta- tors – who were the strategic communica- bilization mode (Lotze and Williams 2016). tions professionals – generated the concepts And in 2013 political competition between of work and then implemented them, to the AU and UN began to surface and affect a more stifling situation where tasks were Art. 3, page 8 of 17 Williams: Strategic Communications for Peace Operations generated top-down (Interview, former IST arrangement previously put in place contin- official, 20 July 2017). There was also a grow- ued under the new IST management. ing sentiment that the new arrangement Under these new arrangements, there was intended to get the IST to do more ‘crass were notable elements of both continuity public relations’ work for the AU (Interview, and change at the IST. For example, the new former UNSOM official, 10 March 2017). team remained approximately 50-strong, AMISOM’s media operations thus came to maintained a predominance of Somali speak- resemble the more standard UN PIU format ing local staff in the field, and continued to rather than the IST’s earlier more autono- organize media and communication pre- mous, research-led approach. It also brought deployment trainings for AMISOM personnel more internally-focused products and mis- (Interview, IST official, 7 September 2017). sion paraphernalia and merchandise such as Although 37 such trainings were conducted AMISOM calendars, T-shirts, bags, etc. This between December 2014 and September reflected an increasing focus on production 2017, the challenge was to keep them regu- (i.e. the number of outputs became key) lar enough to meet the demands posed by rather than the need to generate influence high turnover of AMISOM personnel. The IST and specific political effects that reduced also continued to produce official video pro- the risks to AMISOM’s reputation with local gramming, such as the ‘AMISOM in Action’ Somalis. There was also a noticeable decrease series examining key aspects of the mission’s in the number of media visits, although this operations. usually fluctuated due to several factors, The approach to research products dis- including the tempo of AMISOM operations played elements of both continuity and and the new Federal Government developing change. The IST continued to compile its own embryonic capacity and hence the research products as directed by AMISOM. IST – which had provided accommodation, These included assessments of the SNA, SPF, life support and security for visiting journal- and countering al-Shabaab propaganda, as ists – became less vital. One outside journal- well as studies on the voices of ex-combat- ist, suggested that this might also have been ants and women’s roles in Somali politics. due to the fact that AMISOM was increasingly It was noticeable, however, that the new only sharing media that independent jour- arrangements saw a shift to a more central- nalists ‘weren’t interested in – such as your ized approach. Whereas previously, AMISOM typical public relations products, ribbon-cut- leadership received some research products ting, ceremonies etc. – and suppressed the sent to them by the strategic communication things we were, often because it made them advisers at IST, the new arrangement saw IST look bad, incompetent or beaten’ (Tristan only able to respond to AMISOM’s requests McConnell cited in Kriel 2017: 78). for communications support (Interviews, In late 2014, the IST transitioned from the IST official, 6 September 2017; UN official, original private firms, which lost the new 28 September 2017). The former arrange- UN contract (Kriel 2017: 53). It was won by ment granted more autonomy to the strate- Aethos, a specialist communications divi- gic communications professionals to advise sion of Aegis Defence Services Ltd, which AMISOM. was then subsequently bought out in 2015 In terms of novelty, at the strategic level, by another private security company, Garda. during 2015 and 2016, AMISOM (together Despite the change in contractors, some of with UNSOM) reconfigured their communi- the personnel remained the same. For exam- cation strategy based around a three-pronged ple, some senior Aethos personnel had pre- campaign to push a security narrative viously worked for Bell-Pottinger/CHIME (themed as ‘Safe and Secure Somalia’), a and numerous lower-ranking staff simply political narrative (themed as ‘Our Somalia’), changed contracts. The Tasking Order and a future-state narrative (themed as Williams: Strategic Communications for Peace Operations Art. 3, page 9 of 17

‘Self-Reliant Somalia’) (UNSOM-AU 2016: of Somalia. In particular, AMISOM’s opera- 10). Operationally, there were some novel tions were credited with facilitating signifi- advances in the social media realm with new cant improvements in education (68%), the AMISOM Facebook and Instagram accounts competence of the SNA (52%), freedom to established. An outreach unit was also set use/own land (50%), and the ease of doing up. This consisted of two staff operating out business (49%) (Ipsos 2015: 7). Interestingly, of the fortified Jazeera Hotel, very close to residents in Beledweyne felt significantly the Mogadishu International Airport. In mid- safer than those in Mogadishu, Kismayo and 2017, the IST expanded these efforts when Baidoa. This correlated with strongly positive one Somali member of the outreach IST views of AMISOM’s Djiboutian contingent, personnel was deployed to each of Baidoa, which was playing a significantly larger role Beledweyne, and Kismayo (Interviews, IST in managing local disputes there than the official, 6 September 2017; UN official, 28 TCCs deployed in other parts of the country. September 2017). In early 2016, the US Kismayo, in contrast, with mostly Kenyan donated to AMISOM ‘Radio-In-A-Box’ com- troops, had the highest proportion of dissat- munication capabilities in order to broad- isfaction with AMISOM. cast pro-Federal Government, pro-AMISOM However, the next major survey conducted and anti-al-Shabaab content to local target during June and July 2016 saw AMISOM’s communities across south-central Somalia popularity significantly diminish among (AMISOM 2016b). This gave AMISOM an local civilians. This survey polled 2,306 additional form of outreach, which broadcast adults in Mogadishu, Baidoa, Beledweyne, news messaging as well as dramas, Somali Kismayo and Garowe (Ipsos 2016; see also music, and talk shows featuring community UNSOM-AU 2016: 26–30). The context in call-in. AMISOM deployed the ‘Radio-In-A- which it was undertaken was mixed. On the Box’ in each sector except Kismayo, which one hand, almost all the socio-economic indi- did not implement the program (Farsight cators measured by the IST improved across Africa Group 2017: 6, 18). Somalia during 2015–16, except cost of liv- ing (UNSOM-AU 2016: 3, 24). On the other, A Decline in Local Support there was a significant overall decline in per- Despite these various initiatives, AMISOM ceptions of security and AMISOM engaging faced a significant strategic communications in less constructive ways with the local popu- problem between 2014 and 2016 as the IST’s lation. Overall, support for AMISOM reduced opinion polling showed that Somali public by over half from 64% to 28%, and nearly opinion of the mission had become consid- half of Somali citizens polled (48%) wanted erably less favorable. AMISOM to leave immediately. In polls of 2,000 Somalis from Mogadishu, In more detail, 62% of respondents said Baidoa, Beledweyne and Kismayo conducted they received no services from AMISOM in between December 2014 and February 2015, 2016 compared to only 32% in 2014. Overall, the IST found significant positive local per- local support for AMISOM fell significantly ceptions of AMISOM (IST 2015). For exam- from 2014, when 64% of respondents had ple, 76% of respondents had some or a lot a lot or some support for AMISOM, to just of ‘confidence’ and 80% had some or a lot 28% in the 2016 survey. There was also a of ‘trust’ in AMISOM military, although the drop in satisfaction of AMISOM’s perfor- statistics for AMISOM police and civilian mance. Whereas in 2014, 64% were very or components were considerably lower. 52% somewhat satisfied with AMISOM (with the strongly or somewhat agreed that AMISOM worst figures coming from respondents in presence would assist the Somali people to Baidoa and the best from Beledweyne), in achieve peace, and over 60% felt positive 2016 the figure had dropped to 37% (with that AMISOM would enable the stabilization the worst figures coming from respondents Art. 3, page 10 of 17 Williams: Strategic Communications for Peace Operations in Mogadishu and the best from Kismayo). statements that were produced, the security Incredibly, by 2016, only 15% of respondents situation, which made information-gathering viewed AMISOM as friendly and 55% saw very difficult; a lack of Crisis Communications it as an unfriendly force. The worst figures guidelines; irregular media briefings; and the (and a huge reversal from the previous year) lack of high-level information coordination came from Beledweyne where 64% now meetings since March 2011 (AMISOM 2012: saw AMISOM as unfriendly and only 13% as Annex D, 10). In addition, AMISOM’s tiny PIU friendly. The most positive figures this time bemoaned the fact that it was overshadowed around came from Kismayo where 22% saw by the IST. In reality, however, there was no AMISOM as friendly and 42% saw it as viable route for the PIU to meet AMISOM’s unfriendly. In 2014, 56% had seen AMISOM strategic communications needs without the as a friendly force and only 14% saw it as IST. One senior IST official also complained unfriendly. This was reflected in the overall that AMISOM had to operate within a rather assessment that by June 2016 47% had no different set of rules than al-Shabaab, which confidence at all in AMISOM; 30% some little often relied on gory and gratuitous ‘shock confidence; and only 14% had a lot of confi- and awe’ tactics in its media (Interview IST dence in the mission. official, 6 September 2017). Similar research conducted for UNSOM Of course, probably the most fundamental confirmed these negative trends. By 2016, challenge was the operating environment AMISOM was generating more negative than in Somalia, which was exceptionally hostile positive reactions from local Somalis, includ- with few secure locations available for IST ing the perception that despite receiving staff to live and operate. They ended up stay- much higher remuneration, AMISOM per- ing on Bancroft Global Development’s facili- sonnel were working in ‘safer’ zones com- ties until a separate compound was built pared to the SNA troops who were more for them within AMISOM’s main base at the exposed. Criticisms over human rights abuses Mogadishu International Airport in 2012. by AMISOM personnel also remained promi- Security concerns also restricted the amount nent and intensified calls for AMISOM to of activity IST personnel could undertake in handover to Somali security forces (UNSOM the sectors beyond Mogadishu. 2016: 5, 16). A second, and perhaps surprising problem was selling some of the concepts to skepti- Key Challenges for AMISOM’s cal AMISOM commanders. An early example Strategic Communications of this challenge was the difficulty the IST Although the IST provided AMISOM with an faced with regard to Radio Bar-Kulan when enormous boost to its strategic communi- it became apparent that some of the AU’s cations capacity, it also suffered from some senior leadership thought they would be major challenges and limitations. Indeed, getting ‘Radio AMISOM’. This reflected the one of the IST’s own retrospective conclu- Ugandan primacy in AMISOM at the time sions was that AMISOM never achieved the and the UPDF’s experience in the Ugandan desired press ‘rhythm’ and remained essen- bush wars, which saw strategic communica- tially reactive in its approach to strategic tions as essentially pro-AMISOM propaganda communications (IST 2012: 106). Similarly, (Interview, former IST official, 20 July 2017). AMISOM itself identified a range of ongoing In Somalia, however, what was required public information challenges. In late 2012, was an impartial and credible news outlet these were summarized as understaffing; that was balanced, which meant at times lack of proper coordination and informa- being critical of AMISOM. Indeed, Albany tion-sharing; laborious statement clearance Associates advertised Radio Bar-Kulan as procedures that delayed information dissem- ‘a trusted independent, impartial observer ination and inadequate harmonization of the of affairs in the country run by Somalis’.7 Williams: Strategic Communications for Peace Operations Art. 3, page 11 of 17

This was unexpected and caused friction expected but it should not have come at the with some of AMISOM’s senior leadership. expense of strategic engagement with other Arguably the turning point came after al- audiences. It also reflected the wider ten- Shabaab’s failed Ramadan Offensive in dency of the TCC contingent commanders to August and September 2010 when IST staff report back to their home capitals rather than embedded with AMISOM on the front-lines through the AMISOM force headquarters. produced useful footage and escorted inter- Especially in the first few years, there was national media personalities, which even- also a problem of considerable mistrust of tually changed the perception of AMISOM the local Somali population, which meant from invaders to liberators. Overall, the IST local IST staff were often excluded from concluded it took about a year to dispel the entering AMISOM camps (Interview, former UPDF’s initial assumptions (IST 2012: 46). IST official, 20 July 2017). Since the IST first The IST found that AMISOM’s civilian established a presence in AMISOM’s sec- component was also reluctant to engage in tors, these personnel had been Somali staff its strategic communications plan. In one (Interview, UN official, 28 September 2017). sense, the IST’s relations with AMISOM force Another dimension of this challenge was headquarters had been good in terms of noted by prominent Somali intellectual, access because the project lead was a senior Faisal Roble, who argued there was a ten- Ugandan who had been press secretary to sion between AMISOM’s stated agenda of Yoweri Museveni during the civil war. But improving Somali governance and the fact while AMISOM’s military came around, the that most of its TCCs (with the exception of IST concluded that the civilian component Kenya and Sierra Leone) were run by auto- ‘remained reluctant to shoulder its responsi- cratic regimes. There was an apparent contra- bilities with regard to the political commu- diction, he argued, between AMISOM acting nications process’ (IST 2012: 35). This meant to ‘steward Somalia to democracy’ while its the IST had to do it for them. Having the ‘Godfather’ – Ugandan President Museveni head of mission based outside of Somalia (in – ‘believes only in one party democracy!’ Nairobi) with only short trips to Mogadishu (Roble 2013). In some emergency cases, the also made it harder for AMISOM to main- IST had to try and build AMISOM’s reputa- tain consistently positive relationships tion as a source of credible information while with local leaders (Interviews, IST official, 3 some of its TCCs were caught lying. This was October 2012; UPDF officer, 14 August 2012; particularly apparent in relation to casualties AMISOM official, 15 August 2012). and illicit trading of commodities. As veteran A third set of challenges revolved around British journalist Tristan McConnell, who the IST’s relationship with the governments covered al-Shabaab for more than a decade of AMISOM’s contributing countries. In sum, put it: ‘the tendency of Kenya in particular to AU and UN personnel would repeatedly con- lie in its press statements means that we’ve tend with AMISOM TCCs pursuing their own, reached the thoroughly disheartening situa- national communications goals, which often tion in which the terrorists seem more hon- ignored the IST’s advice. This was particularly est than the government’ (cited in Kriel 2017: apparent on information related to casual- 70). Al-Shabaab’s media products frequently ties (both locals and peacekeepers). Several highlighted the Kenyan government’s lies. dimensions of this challenge arose. First, as But the IST had only very limited contact, noted above, the military forces initially dis- coordination and influence over the KDF played a limited understanding of strategic since they were often reluctant to accept any communications. As a result, when they did of the IST’s advice (Interview, former UNSOA deploy national media teams to their sectors, official, 3 August 2017). This situation per- they tended to only produce news that was sisted, as was evident in the Kenyan govern- focused on their own country. This was to be ment’s incoherent media response to the Art. 3, page 12 of 17 Williams: Strategic Communications for Peace Operations battles at its bases at El Adde in January 2016 was quoted in local Somali media as saying and Kulbiyow in January 2017 (see Williams ‘I don’t want to defeat Al-Shabaab. I would 2016). rather scatter them to prolong my mission’ It was also noted that the example set by (Abdisamad 2014). Widely broadcast across the United States on some of these issues did Somali radio and other media sources, this not help. As journalist Robyn Kriel noted, gave the impression that AMISOM peace- there tended to be intense secrecy about US keepers did not want their mission to suc- strikes against al-Shabaab, which had taken ceed until they had made enough money to place for over a decade and were often left build their houses or buy cars back home. unexplained. There was also little willingness IST officials also noted that the quality of to reveal any video footage from strikes as media training varied across contribut- was done elsewhere, including Iraq, Pakistan ing countries. It was implemented first for and Syria (Kriel 2017: 74–75). This reinforced Uganda, then Burundi, and then expanded the view of AMISOM TCCs that operational to the other TCCs. While the UPDF pre- security should override strategic communi- deployment package was generally praised, cations and they remained secretive about the performance of KDF officers came in for various aspects of their operations. As the considerable criticism (Interviews, Ugandan IST acknowledged, probably more than any journalist, 15 August 2012; IST official, 3 other issue, debates over acknowledging mil- October 2012). itary casualties ‘led to serious issues of cred- The IST also faced several organizational ibility’ (IST 2012: 56). challenges. Like most international actors The unhelpful attitude of some of the operating in Somalia, it suffered at times TCCs was also reflected in the limited media from a lack of resources, a high turnover of training available to most AMISOM person- personnel, and the inappropriate hiring of nel, especially in the early years. Although professionals who ‘lacked cultural under- the IST continued to provide pre-deploy- standing, linguistics but also those with ment and some other media and communi- insight into the Somali culture’ (Stephen cations trainings, it also regularly identified Harley cited in Kriel 2017: 72–73). The IST’s the need for more and better training as research component, for instance, struggled a weakness. As noted in AMISOM’s 2013 to produce consistently reliable and accurate Strategic Directive, ‘Ensuring that accurate products intended to help senior leaders information about the mandate, objectives better understand the operating environ- and operations of AMISOM is disseminated ment. But while this was partly a problem as widely as possible, both within Somalia of limited resources, it was also due to inse- and beyond, is important with regards to curity, and perhaps most fundamentally to ensuring the success of AMISOM opera- the complexity of Somalia’s clan dynamics tions and the attainment of the mandate and the shifting alliances between differ- of the Mission’ (AMISOM 2013: section ent armed actors. For example, even after 19g). And yet numerous mission person- ten years, the AU, UN and even the Federal nel continued to make mistakes and there Government did not have an accurate list was little evidence of AMISOM’s military of who was in the Somali National Army! component seriously buying into such There was also some controversy about the declarations. lack of Africans in senior management roles In early 2013, for example, one of with British ex-media, ex-armed forces and AMISOM’s key spokespeople had no prior ex-political communications personnel pre- training in this area (Interview, UK military dominant (Interview, UNSOM official, 10 adviser to AMISOM, 28 February 2014). March 2017). Probably the most infamous case occurred These challenges and limitations generated in March 2014 when a Burundian officer missed opportunities to damage al-Shabaab’s Williams: Strategic Communications for Peace Operations Art. 3, page 13 of 17 brand. To take just two examples, in 2011, DC suggest that its work helped shift the one visiting journalist reported on how tide against al-Shabaab’s initially dominant AMISOM missed a good chance to exploit evi- narrative. dence of al-Shabaab’s regular references to As circumstances changed, however, so sexual imagery and its abuse of women.8 In AMISOM’s strategic communications needed one captured al-Shabaab position, AMISOM to evolve as the nature of the threat from al- troops found ‘the walls covered with doodles Shabaab altered, as the mission brought on of the most obscene type,’ including scenes more TCCs, as the new Federal Government of rape, bestiality and half-man, half-beast of Somalia started to establish its own, albeit depictions not usually associated with pious embryonic, strategic communications, and Islamists. The discovery prompted one UN as the UN established a more significant field official to joke that ‘to neutralize al-Shabaab presence in Somalia. Despite the challenges as a fighting force, all AMISOM needed to do and shortcomings discussed above, the IST was to fly in two planeloads of prostitutes played an innovative and important function from Bangkok and ferry them up to the front’ for AMISOM. With an expanded UN mission (Fergusson 2013: 117). authorized in 2013 and the shift into more of Another more recent example came in a stabilization mode from 2014, the terrain 2016 when the UN Secretary-General docu- had shifted. This put a premium on support- mented that al-Shabaab had been recruit- ing the Somali authorities, which, like other ing and using children to fight in some of components of AMISOM, had not been the their bloodiest battles (Kriel 2017: 62–63). IST’s priority. Despite being given ample time to respond Arguably the most basic lesson is that to the story, it took two weeks for AMISOM deploying a peace operation without the to formulate a counter-message (AMISOM capabilities to wage an effective strategic 2016a). As Robyn Kriel (2017) argued, this communications campaign is a major error. was a perfect occasion for AMISOM to paint To ensure this is not repeated, the AU needs al-Shabaab as cowards who pushed young a standing strategic communications capa- children out front to fight their battles, but bility equipped to develop policy and plans, the opportunity was missed. One former IST build coherence, as well as support robust official concluded that such lost opportuni- communications operations in all its peace ties reflected a broader and ‘consistent failure operations. Naturally, the precise nature of to message in any way against al-Shabaab’s the strategic communications capabilities high-profile attacks. There is no preparatory should be constituted in accordance with the work in terms of reporting suspicions, no needs on the ground. rapid response messaging once the incident A second lesson is to ensure coherence starts [and] no follow-up messaging to clarify between a clear vision and sound policy to what happened’ (Stephen Harley cited in guide strategic communications. The mis- Kriel 2017: 86–87). sion leadership should clearly articulate the desired effects and clarify how particular audi- Lessons ences can be influenced to support the mis- The preceding analysis suggests that there sion’s goals. Moreover, as seen in AMISOM’s was no viable route for AMISOM’s tiny PIU case, it is not enough to devise a coherent to meet the mission’s strategic communica- policy; it must also be implemented by the tions needs. Without the IST, AMISOM would countries contributing to the mission. To have had almost zero capabilities in this area. be effective also means building trust and Moreover, as part of the IST’s broader strategic remaining credible. Here, the issue of casual- communications strategy, polling evidence ties (both civilians harmed by AMISOM and and broader debates about AMISOM in Addis the mission’s own casualties) most clearly Ababa, New York, Brussels and Washington demonstrated how the absence of a coherent Art. 3, page 14 of 17 Williams: Strategic Communications for Peace Operations policy between the AU and the mission’s TCCs electoral processes and facilitating could have a disastrous impact on strategic humanitarian assistance. For a detailed communications. It was therefore unsurpris- history of the mission see Williams 2018. ing that the IST sometimes struggled to build 2 Once established, project management trust both with some of the mission’s contin- of Radio Bar-Kulan was handed to Albany gents and with local Somali audiences. and Okapi Consulting dropped out of the A third lesson is that effective strategic consortium. communications in AMISOM required an 3 It also provided some support for the expeditionary mindset and a willingness to UN in Somalia and also the Federal take risks, including to generate and support Government, for instance by provid- media access in difficult circumstances. Like ing vital equipment to the Ministry of UNSOA’s operations with regard to logistics, Information to support Radio Mogadishu. this could only plausibly be delivered in the 4 See www.bar-kulan.com. early years by a contractor capability rather 5 See www.amisom-au.org. than a standard UN format PIU. And like 6 See www.Somali-media.org and UNSOA, the IST’s experience demonstrates www.somaliamediamonitoring.org that in such an insecure and fluid environ- respectively. ment as Somalia, contractual arrangements 7 Albany Associates, http://www.albanyas- need to build in flexibility and a willingness sociates.com/projects/somalia [accessed to take some risks. In this case, the IST was 25 July 2017]. initially designed to ensure a strategically 8 Al-Shabaab fighters regularly committed focused and decentralized approach to pro- acts of sexual violence and abuse, includ- ject design, which was subsequently cur- ing against children. See, for example, UN tailed from 2013. But given the need to learn documents A/70/836-S/2016/360, 20 and evolve quickly on the job, the ability to April 2016, §116, §118; S/2017/249, 15 take risks was crucial. April 2017, §55–56. Finally, a related lesson is that the need for expertise about local conflict dynam- Acknowledgements ics means that IST-like operations probably Financial assistance that facilitated research need a predominantly local team in order and travel was provided by SOAR grants from to ensure sustainable success. The challenge the Elliott School of International Affairs at facing AMISOM early on was the absence of a the George Washington University. I am also Somali commercial capability able to manage grateful to the two anonymous reviewers for an effort of the scope, scale, and complexity their suggestions. of the IST (Interview, former UNSOA official, 3 August 2017). The situation improved over Competing Interests time and the IST maintained over 50% local The author has no competing interests to staff. But it remained difficult to hire and declare. retain the best people and the issue was sometimes complicated by AMISOM’s initial Author Information mistrust of Somalis, which often raised prac- Paul D. Williams is Associate Professor in the tical obstacles to running an effective cam- Elliott School of International Affairs at the paign such as the inability to co-locate. George Washington University, USA; email: [email protected]. Notes 1 AMISOM’s mandated tasks have evolved References well beyond the realm of peacekeeping, Abdisamad, A S 2014 AMISOM must leave including VIP protection, war-fighting, Somalia before ‘Mission Creep’ sets counterinsurgency, stabilization, and in. The Star (Kenya), 11 March. http:// state-building as well as supporting www.the-star.co.ke/news/2014/03/11/ Williams: Strategic Communications for Peace Operations Art. 3, page 15 of 17

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How to cite this article: Williams, P D 2018 Strategic Communications for Peace Operations: The African Union’s Information War Against al-Shabaab. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 7(1): 3, pp. 1–17, DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.606

Submitted: 04 December 2017 Accepted: 20 December 2017 Published: 06 February 2018

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