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Online Publication Date: 01 August 2007 To cite this Article: Hatfield, Gary , (2007) 'Did Descartes Have a Jamesian Theory of the Emotions?', Philosophical Psychology, 20:4, 413 - 440 To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/09515080701422041 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515080701422041

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The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. © Taylor and Francis 2007 Downloaded By: [Hatfield, Gary] At: 17:05 13 July 2007 fa ‘xiigfc’ 19,vl ,p 4) ecre edta h oycauses body the that held Descartes 449). p. 2, vol. An (1890, responses: fact’’ bodily ‘‘exciting of an perceptions of are emotions just that emotion contended James William Introduction 1. Mind– Behavior; James of William Theories Passions; Relations; Mechanistic Rene Brain Instinct; Emotion; two Methodology; Historical the of Evolution; and Theories defended, Cognitive is Keywords: theories. centuries recent or the to across motivational compared internal positions are no these theories of methodological have The comparing learning. of feelings through initially acquire legitimacy subsequently emotions bare they through which Jamesian evolved content, are has cognitive selection. that response Emotions natural instinctual James, which an Darwinian to states. cognitive accompany and that According but stirrings a perceptual noncognitive harm), progress. by physiological triggered in is or conscious are already that benefit, which responses behavior bodily nonetheless instinctive novelty, the passion, by caused continue regards are mental to emotions (as will a situation the contribution. cause mental motivates the without also of alone, processes processes representation physiological run of physiological initially result beings a These human as Even processes mechanical. bear initial entirely the the are that from causes of running proposed ‘‘appraisal’’ and Descartes then an fear differ. as produce they such that here that intervention From response cognitive response situation. behavioral any or initial without object bodily an bear) the causes a a also from response flight causes bodily as this (such that stimulation held Both sensory emotion. an which to according orsodnet:Gr afed eateto hlspy oa al nvriyo Pennsylvania, of University 10.1080/09515080701422041 (online)/07/040413-28 DOI: Hall, 1465-394X (print)/ISSN Logan 0951-5089 ISSN Philosophy, of [email protected] Email: Department USA. 19104-6304, Hatfield, PA, Philadelphia, Gary to: Correspondence Rene Hatfield Gary Emotions? the of Theory Jamesian a Have Descartes Did 413–440 pp. 2007, August 4, No. 20, Vol. Psychology Philosophical ´ ecre n ila ae a ‘oyfrt’tere ftepsin remotions, or passions the of theories first’’ ‘‘body had James William and Descartes is u ‘eln’ fte‘bdl hne’ olwn pnteperception the upon following changes’’ ‘‘bodily the of ‘‘feeling’’ our ß ´ 07Tyo Francis & Taylor 2007 ecre;Ebdmn;Emotions; Embodiment; Descartes; Downloaded By: [Hatfield, Gary] At: 17:05 13 July 2007 ‘asd anand n teghnd’b ri ciiyta ohcue and causes both that 11:349*). activity (AT brain are body to that the by According soul’’ in event. the strengthened’’ changes an of reflects and emotions or or object maintained, sensations an or ‘‘caused, to ‘‘perceptions response are in passions usually Descartes, mind, the in ‘‘passions’’ 414 h eypsiiiyo ennflcmaio.Tosrso ocrshave concerns of sorts Two comparison. of meaningful terminologies a primary of distinct indeed or possibility involve advisability the very and question would the scholars years, some separated ‘‘emotions,’’ 250 are and theories ‘‘passions’’ nearly the When theories. by two the historically between topic on of commonality deserving and versions. is subsequent it articulated, with because fully comparison and more by precursors, originality known, its of better than grounds is understood it better therefore because and is that Presumably, benchmark. mto,a ntefmu xml rmJmsaotfa n lgt ned both felt Indeed, afraid the flight. feel and to we fear prior that about running causally held James start from we response ‘‘body that example bodily denied have famous authors the philosophers the in and make both as authors precede i.e., theories emotion, Both stimulation passions, Such classification: sensory and theories. this mere emotions first’’ about beyond experienced right going the something events cause is bodily There that 20). suggested 9, pp. 1984, huh ev sbnhak o h yeo hoyta hyisatae James’ instantiate. they of that history theory of the type theory, in ‘‘James–Lange’’ of the positions the point for emotion—or Some the of benchmarks misses theory comparisons. it as retrospective influence, serve causal such chronological thought possible make any on regards we that, Cartesian. as be why protest could correct theory is might James’ this while One Jamesian, While be Jamesian? complex can’t emotions theory Descartes’ have or grounds, may passions that the of and learning adult and triggers. or their experience developed as and factors past cognitive infant reflect the in that Second, emotions emotions). emotions original primitive of between taxonomy did, distinguished exhaustive first Descartes an both (but envision body perturbations not, bodily did are from James ‘‘subtler’’ result and which or not ‘‘primitive’’ ‘‘cerebral’’ do emotions, or which between James) emotions, (James) and (James) (Descartes distinguished ‘‘coarser’’ ‘‘intellectual’’ higher or are and theorists positions responses, ‘‘standard’’ their both in or similarities cognitive First, some (Descartes) differ innate that assign overlooked. claim theories did I two Further, frequently Descartes passions. whereas the the emotions, that to the is content of argue situation the content acknowl- I of original ‘‘appraisal’’ While scouted, the cognitive emotions. a just theory, the James’ to similarities In fundamentally. assign generic they the that edging structures functional and behaviors. causal appropriate situationally producing for system bodily a of products causal together classed sometimes are theories their changes, Alquie bodily F. (editor of consequence a oprtv rjc uha h rsn n sue oecneta continuity conceptual some assumes one present the as such project comparative A aesrcue yiqiya nase oteqeto:WsDsats theory Descartes’ Was question: the to answer an as inquiry my structured have I the on focusing by Descartes and James of theories the compare to is purpose My as arise passions or emotions some that held both James and Descartes Because .Hatfield G. ´ nDsats 93 o.3 p 7–7,n ;Clon&Solomon, & Calhoun 1; n. 975–976, pp. 3, vol. 1973, Descartes, in , eas erun we because eas efe afraid feel we because hyhl htfa n lgtaedistinct are flight and fear that held They . 1 2 si sotncle—soesuch one called—is often is it as atog ete exactly neither —although not atof part Downloaded By: [Hatfield, Gary] At: 17:05 13 July 2007 rwfroig raclrtdhatrt stekyt i hoyo emotions of theory his to key the is rate or heart ‘‘feel’’ accelerated or we brow-furrowing, what bodily this not emotion (2:449). of perception the are emotion Our as the (2:442). behaviors ‘‘is’’ perceive body’’ own response we such subject’s that the but in reaction’’ terminates ‘‘emotional run, ‘‘usually The to emotions. as us ‘‘perceive’’ cause may reactions nawdrcneti re oeaut h ofitn nepeain that interpretations conflicting the evaluate theory his to consider order to need in we context time, same wider James the content what a At understand to emotions. in us to allow will ascribes theory the initially of aspect this on Focusing eas fbdl ecin htocri sa h ih f .. bear. a e.g., of, sight the at us in occur that reactions bodily of because h eiiayo sn ocpuldsicin rmaltrpro nanalyzing in period later a from emotions. distinctions the (Hatfield, conceptual of inevitable supports theory using (2003) Descartes’ is Radner of properly. terms done any legitimacy when day In illuminating the present today. is and acceptable using past 109) be 103, theories what would pp. of 2005a, said past they matter of what the description whether distinguishing event, of reading and that by context from between avoided said be historical relations can authors their it in the but in real, respond theories about is I distortion past and retrospective which of particular, danger to the in diversity, second, conceptual emotions and the terminological present. about the produce discipline, teleology to a false order a selectively in fit only to then or exists and tastes, past modern framework the fit privileged to which one science theories in a if older arise as distorts of dangers even the theories or These in historians describes and ones. history’’ concepts present ‘‘whig Second, with current and theories uses ‘‘motivation.’’ ‘‘presentism’’ past and of of ‘‘passions’’ or comparison dangers Descartes’ historical the separating ‘‘emotion’’ against ’’ caution gulf of commonly conceptual Danziger ‘‘vast concepts climate. a intellectual and later finds whereas cultural 37) psychology, foreign of the p. a discipline and in (1997, modern century situated the 17th are to the works between belong Descartes’ continuity works useful James’ 2005) no Smith, century: 15; virtually 19th p. is 1997, there (Danziger, that psychology of believe historians some First, raised. been eevdve,Jmssi htw r ‘fadbcuew rml’ (2:450), tremble’’ we because ‘‘afraid are we the that the for said in known James fact, widely In view, run.’’ is received we the emotion because from ‘‘afraid of passage are theory celebrated we that 1894) statement 23–26, paradoxical ch. seemingly 1890, (1884, Feelings James’ as Emotions of Theory James’ 2. ‘‘embodied’’ and ‘‘noncognitive,’’ ‘‘cognitive,’’ with some is end theories. by what their followed I in comparisons, on consciousness. cross-century and remarks of responses legitimacy comparative the bodily on between reflections relation some the of accounts ae’issec hteoin r elnso oiyeet uha trembling, as such events bodily of feelings are emotions that insistence James’ uvyJms hoyfrt olwdb ecre’ter.My theory. Descartes’ by followed first, theory James’ survey I as psychology about presuppositions own its carries objection first The rnilso Psychology of Principles hti h lee oreo this of source alleged the is that hlspia Psychology Philosophical x x .Rgrigthe Regarding 5. oprstheir compares 4 4 oeo these of Some e se per 3 i.e., 415 . Downloaded By: [Hatfield, Gary] At: 17:05 13 July 2007 epne h epneaie yisic.Frhr ae loe hthbtand habit modulating that and allowed triggering James in role Further, a instinct. play by do arises cognition response The response: eairaie rmadsr oaheea n n steeoe‘‘secondary’’: effects therefore emotions. secondary is developed hence the developed and and in desirable empirically Voluntary role of end a stock These 442). an a play (2:486–488). acquire achieve (2:384, we outcomes before to mechanisms experience foreseeable previous desire neural have a must innate We from from arises ‘‘primary’’: brain) are arise behavior emotions and central behavior, originally instincts impulsive initial James, (i.e., They or For the behavior. Instinctive on ‘‘cerebro-mental’’ voluntary consequences: James, and important’’ did perception, emotions, ‘‘more as its sense focus, as and first counts of change, will perception I sequence that emotion. the behavior, the three-step beyond ensuing to subject the feeling, other applies If further or outward scowling). a as it signs well the outward as bodily blushing; rate these to such include (heart whether and perceives not stimulation, restricted or to expressions to observable response not outwardly in are facial changes is changes broadly, of by body 518.) here the ‘object’ feelings p. in used ‘‘expression’’ 1894, our defines as ‘‘situations,’’ of expression’ or (James expression ‘emotional 1:275, the object. 191, term or p. perception The sensory sensory 1884, A circumstances, a feeling: environmental initial an of from results imagining movement of class Each circulation, blood affects it. classes turn three of yielding muscles, in parts voluntary movements: the various which of and to viscera, stimulus’’ glands, change,’’ least ‘‘sensorial sweat the effects A at respiration, ‘‘cerebro-mental impressions. their or sense a spread are body, feelings feelings entire provokes parts’’ such upon its the of initiators of attendant to primary all events system The and brain nervous each and the the organism, view, through entire that his the and In of movement, movement a (2:372). produces a feeling is consequent possible movement are every the question ‘‘that in held movements James The feeling. 23). upon (ch. and movement’’ original of production of ‘‘the theory examine. his therefore upon must built we is which emotions instincts, developed an modified and produces original of that theory complex causal to the ascribe in not out, response does turns he it functional in As but a 88). objects p. emotion, ‘‘exciting’’ find 1987, to Gordon, does respond 130; to p. James 1994, us functional (Damasio, guiding ways the in useful ignoring play adaptively the feelings, reactions of brute contend emotional Others or noncognitive that 212). as 223), the role p. emotions p. 1992, of renders (Demos, 1994, ‘‘bad’’ James theory (Ellsworth, or that ‘‘dangerous’’ situation ‘‘cognitive’’ as the e.g., body’s a of itself, the situation of James light ‘‘appraisal’’ in cognitive to a response involve ascribe physiological emotions interpreters which to Some according emotions, inspired. has it 416 .VlnayDes (2:382) Deeds. Voluntary and 3. Emotion; of Expression Performances; 2. Impulsive or Instinctive 1. ae lcdteeoin ihnagnrcgopo hnmn htrsl in result that phenomena of group generic a within emotions the placed James .Hatfield G. original mtosterl fiiitn that initiating of role the emotions developed mtos James’ emotions. Downloaded By: [Hatfield, Gary] At: 17:05 13 July 2007 elxv)tigr o eair n elnsta rgnlywr aeinstinctive bare reflexes, bear). were instinctual originally a (hence that impulsive original as or feelings our automatic and (e.g., as for behaviors serve responses. stimulus emotions) for available including developed the triggers the not reflexive) (2:76–79), (in identifies later is sensations may or content but such classifies associated to that Such of content content processes automatic associative add resulting cognitive the the (1:221–222), subsequently classifies thoughts practice he than experience instinct-triggering music), our rather of ‘‘feelings’’ of perceptions guiding initial are piece the stimuli consciously a Although (1:13). play by ‘‘semi-reflex’’ cerebral to as behaviors the actions learning through habitual in (running as loop learn neural (e.g., we broader guidance a When of conscious result cortex). without (2:384). the habitual ‘‘automatically,’’ as as occur 116), type’’ well as (1:12–13, that innate reflex behaviors also only but not learned) general include knee-jerks (hence Reflexes as normal: such ‘‘the become phenomena has closed-loop under than narrow broadly more responses ‘‘reflex’’ walking, defines instinctive He and classifies crawling, James standing, up, sitting crying, (2:403–405). clasping, others instincts among the biting, have babies sucking, Human (2:385). of impulsively and instinctively so does caught h a’ hsn h os n t len h o r ntntv.Telo who lion The instinctive. behaviors. are instinctive dog the of hungry, fleeing range its when and prey broad in mouse distance a the a chasing described at cat’s or at The James body, present animal’s (2:384). the provoked be environment’’ with are contact may responses his in Instinctive that stimuli sequence. previous sensory developmental basis a ‘‘determinate without innate of by part and an as arise ends, have & or Stout, Instincts birth the Baldwin, see 1901–1905). of 1900, circa Morgan, foresight ‘‘instinct’’ Lloyd on without (2:383; performance’’ ends, the in certain education produce guidance. cognitive to initial of as any consequence or a to basis as cognitive relation generations a in later without selection, specific through advantaged stimulus– natural propagate a comparatively heritable would advantageous, to be An sequence response. behavior would response instinctive adaptive that offspring lack an that its conspecifics toward and tendency an it heritable if of stimulus, Thus, a process (2:683–688). Lamarckian a exhibited behavioral variations through ‘‘accidental’’ envisioned animal by insight among such James or selection their (2:678–683). agent natural of view, characteristics Darwinian designing results acquired a the his of by on’’ inheritance In either ‘‘pass mediated who (2:678–688). animals cognitively individual been selection accordance not in have natural (2:384), adaptations environments that to Darwinian acknowledges adapted James minutely unguided. with is (initially) behavior aware and are being or automatic They animal’s ‘‘conduct’’ are the animal. behaviors without the the end of that it; adaptive preservation serve of are they the because toward behaviors impulsive tend The or that instinctive stimuli. results determinate yield to they because response in behaviors adaptive ntnt r ‘muss’twr pcfcbhvosi h aeo pcfcstimuli. specific of face the in behaviors specific toward ‘‘impulses’’ are Instincts ae ie tnaddfnto fisic ‘stefclyo cigi uhaway a such in acting of faculty the ‘‘as instinct of definition standard a cited James producing initially in impulses and instincts to role large a accorded James stalks rywe seen, when prey springs hnna,and near, when hlspia Psychology Philosophical devours hti has it what seeks 417 Downloaded By: [Hatfield, Gary] At: 17:05 13 July 2007 ecin( eair n h mtoa epne( eln)aedsic set of aspects distinct are instinctive feeling) The (a fear. process: response feel complex emotional we single the and a and of withdraw, some because behavior) we withdraw from (a don’t something, withdraw we reaction perceive that naturally held We may famously feeling: we James noted, the angry; As feel fear. feel also and and combative sights a fellows have our may We and to (2:409–421). response fear naturally and 195). ferocity, be p. anger, Pugnacity, (1884, may responses: arises talk conspecifics stage-fright professional when a our giving as to of settings, occasion social response the conventional animal on highly bare in response evoked triggers a instinctive reflexively An historical as situations: the novel arose fade to from may selection that generalize natural instinct with through the may as them then habit, instincts fixed food, the that Finally, its fix which bury (2:400). to to after instinct trace unsuccessfully habit, the without tries for the who found initiate squirrel is to caged opportunity is a no function if adjustment, instinct’s conscious fades; sake The to instinct the subject beings. the for be human implanted may in habits are least Such instincts and (2:402). at ‘‘most habits’’ stage, that to developmental speculates rise certain James giving a of fact, at In subsequently play child later. A toward it transitory: they tendency lose are instinctual instincts that Further, they an attachment. days, objects have an several may such for moving for hoods impulse with other the blindfolded lose kept to may are they habitual, attach hatching, becomes on attachment similarly If, do original encounter. to artificial Their don’t continue (2:396). after will hen they they hatched a and see and being, newly first human they a of Chicks after or even duck habit. mediation so a by follow the to shaped learn through will be incubation but, ends, can cognition, of instincts means–end representation Moreover, conscious without and is memory instinct the of 418 t curn.Cncosespasarl nti rcs yfntoigt lc an place to functioning A by (1:141). framework process avoid cognitive this to means–ends in or a occur into role to behavior a it animal’s plays for suitable Consciousness remember preparations occurring. can make animal even its may the and (2:390), instinctive it, memory’’ anticipate an with and once ‘‘animals in foresight—because occurred means–end has of response devoid blind—i.e., always not nhsdsuso fhmnisics ae nlddsvrlta nov emotional involve that several included James instincts, human of discussion his In ae nit htisics‘aentawy ln rivral’ 239.Te are They (2:389). invariable’’ or blind always not ‘‘are instincts that insists James ecini p og ate n ne nopatclrltoswt h exciting the instinctive with the relations practical while into body, enter and own farther subject’s go (2:442) the to object. apt in an is excites terminates reaction instinct an usually excites that one reaction object though well Every color, as and another. emotion voice one the in into sign. though latter itself imperceptibly face, other organic betrays these shade the fear all other inhibited, in the suppress and anger are and struck, the may deeds be read circulation, not we outward may and breathing, the blow remain, When still his expressions ways. not affect his emotional specific in etc., and alterations in fear, characteristic love, visage, provoke functions but rage, the and deeds, from of outward separate Objects to attitude them man them. keep a with to prompt impossible go only been which has excitements it instincts emotional the of speaking In .Hatfield G. mtos oee,fl hr fisics nta h emotional the that in instincts, of short fall however, Emotions, . ntntv ecin n mtoa xrsin thus expressions emotional and reactions Instinctive subsequent ntne edntbe. not need instances first occurrence Downloaded By: [Hatfield, Gary] At: 17:05 13 July 2007 n eeis(:8–8) oegnrly hsmasta,i ae’ter,objects and theory, instincts James’ threats in of of that, consideration account means or James’ our this awareness in the generally, in initial More point fixed any Nonetheless, (2:383–385). central involve evolutionarily benefits responses. not a and been do those is have they in It that may reason. emotions explicit and that or survival, for reasoning implicit our means–ends ancestors to no serve is reflexes and may threat neural survival response our bare a its to are such call threat object’’ responses that perceived we about to no emotional what system object, of and nervous sensory effects the instinctual 1884, a bodily of in Because adaptation reflex theory 194). connate the the the (p. summarized of to he feeling due As effects the fear. ‘object,’ but and nothing response flight is with behavioral ‘‘emotion bear, a the of cause perception themselves: also goose changes limbs, (2:452). not) bodily weakened stirrings’’ the lips, may ‘‘visceral trembling is breathing, and feeling shallow (or bumps, the heart, of quickened may a content fear, emotion; original fear For The that felt 1). of are ‘‘fear cause that Figure effects it LeDoux’s emotion (see The bodily to does the (contrary the produce proper. felt nor that be processes as emotion fear to The emotion 50). of the the p. for 1996, emotion occur interpretation, is not outward the need feeling by that behavior the caused with indeed, This internal not along that fear. is feel and, we behavior’’ as and withdraw, emotion object, response the to frightful IS the us physiological occur to they physiologically causes as respond changes we instinct same behavior, the fear of The feeling our (2:449). that and fact, exciting the oiycags(‘mtoa xrsin’)ta r et ti nemotion. to an yields leads is object it it as an felt, inasmuch are and to instinct, that response an expressions’’) is instinctive (‘‘emotional it changes an object, bodily the as toward to’’), inasmuch response apt behavioral ‘‘is that a (‘‘usually,’’ implies tendencies of passage terms in this speak to tendency James’ Discounting perceptual this indicates that arrow and dashed changes bodily The by changes. caused those is of relation. that perception event ‘‘cerebro-mental’’ a a constitutes is emotion felt The 1. Figure nJms hoy eaehrwrdt epn ocranpretos uha the as such perceptions, certain to respond to hardwired are we theory, James’ In h oeo ae’ter ‘sthat ‘‘is theory James’ of core The mtoa rua,acrigt ae.Tesldarw hwcua relations. causal show arrows solid The James. to according arousal, Emotional R A E B events cerebral nerves, organs, Sense h oiycagsflo ietytepreto of perception the directly follow changes bodily the (bear image) feeling Perceptual hlspia Psychology Philosophical bodily stirrings) (perception of Felt emotion (stirrings) effects Other bodily (running) action Instinctual 419 ’’ Downloaded By: [Hatfield, Gary] At: 17:05 13 July 2007 oiaetebo;w r oe otebo yarfe cinta precedes not that does action have reflex originally feeling a they The James; by content. anger. for blow motivational feelings of the or just to feeling evaluative are (such moved Emotions no the anger-behavior (2:550–552). are produces produces feeling emotions we that pleasures the also process blow; cause instinctively potential same blow) the of They that the foresight motivate a anger. seen, any objects of striking have or feelings we the pain as to objects As or that pains. some and pleasure they are present or Rather, behavior find without believe (2:549–550). pain angry he us, not pain to and move and does does us pleasure originally pleasure he goad that nor felt, through naturally but allows as us ones, (1:143), fear, James move action only the flee. that originally that to to the denies denies guides us only are also and motivating not he motivators in but James original role afraid 223). are a p. we plays 1992, because run Vallelonga, cognitive we (see on motivators take original appraisals. subsequent to cognitive are by these responses the view, triggered view James’ emotional be In to to danger. allow come and in meaning may which are we we evidence developments, that and through sign fear-reflex, cognitively cognitive a bear bear as a original fear detecting of emotions, our of emotion our trigger result a appraise not although as to would However, fear phenomenological come that feel (2:451). may to behind’’ repeated come we left may appraisals, oft nothing we no have James’ involve we content originally of the find emotions from ‘‘we perturbations brief bodily emotion, of main an another perception of the is the subtract but we an causes, if is not their that, or is argument point adaptation.’’ states perturbations, bodily ‘‘connate internal This these a of to feeling. of perception response cognitive result bare a a a or as as appraisal and itself, tremble are shapes emotion and They those the run bear: bear-motions; Second, us a and make as bear-shapes naturally bear of motions a perceptions of sense classifications or cognitive ‘‘feelings’’ not are perceptions triggering esr ecpin vabdl epne otesnoysiui,Jmsdescribes James stimuli), sensory by the as caused to are perceptions responses responses bodily these emotional although (via First, perceptions senses. sensory ‘‘exciting.’’ two as in perceived and initially noncognitive, are they they because evolution); by response (instilled a response provoke a not provoke do they because ‘‘exciting’’ are initially 420 mto.I n ae eblee htcmol,a npplro ‘‘romantic’’ or popular in emotional as ‘‘secondary’’ to commonly, rise give that perceptions sensory believes an initial is the he really music, appreciation to case, responses ‘‘cold’’ it any such such whether if In wonders emotion, emotion. ‘‘intellectual James an (2:471). arise is called’’ that which be feelings thing, a can aesthetic of pure music), appreciation are in ‘‘cerebral’’ that These a (as contends from perturbations. alone James the bodily perceptions (2:449) scholarship. further as sensory good any upon such ‘‘coarser’’ of without founded (2:468–472), the piece are emotions a emotions or ‘‘subtler’’ to ‘‘higher’’ 189) the or some music aside p. to left (1884, response I emotional ‘‘standard’’ doing, so the In calls emotions. he those responses, sbr ecpin fbdl hne,Jmsa mtosaentthemselves not are emotions Jamesian changes, bodily of perceptions bare As codnl,Jms hoyo u rgnleoin a ihl ecasfe as classified be rightly may emotions original our of theory James’ Accordingly, hsfr aefcsdo ae’acuto ai ntnta n emotional and instinctual basic of account James’ on focused have I far, Thus .Hatfield G. feelings ahrta as than rather 5 thoughts 12122.Teoriginal The (1:221–222). Downloaded By: [Hatfield, Gary] At: 17:05 13 July 2007 tnadlbl ev ieyfrJms ups.BtJmscnieskoldeof other knowledge and considers James Those But ‘‘anger’’: purpose. or James’ ‘‘fear’’ for as nicely may such serve that headings labels similarities under are standard any there nor together believed responses grouped James emotional that be mean among not differences does systematic Which no (2:454). purpose’’ some serves it a ayidfntl’ 244.Tesac o ie aooyi uxtc ‘‘ as quixotic: and true is as taxonomy be fixed to a seen individuals is for different emotions of search the emotions The of possible the of classification (2:454). number why indefinitely’’ the and to vary limit exist, no may may is there which and why reflex emotions see a different immediately effects triggers ‘‘we what the out, on account plays associations it into learned how arise Taking and typically differences reflexes. individual emotions cerebromotor innate all instinctive that of of exhaust believed other cocktail all that James which a emotions’’ 1980). from from ‘‘basic (Plutchik, the elements of as derived to serve list are background that a emotions or evolutionary discern 1992) an (Ekman, to see phenomena seek emotional also not who did James authors basic emotions, recent nonmotivating James’ some and to change Contrary noncognitive reflexes. not adaptive are does instilled ‘‘adult’’ originally evolutionarily fact from or emotions this arise that that ‘‘secondary’’ But feelings is 1999). so-called in which Barbalet, as accommodates account, danger, also (1994, in theory Damasio (see are to James’ emotions we Contrary hypothesis. that 130–139), marker’’ signal ‘‘somatic pp. learned 8) of a ch. afraid become (1994, are are we Damasio’s may and that to we animal fact likely ferocity, If as The approaching effective recognize (2:553). response. an we tendencies with that love behavioral situations associated pugnacious the in is our response evoke provoke anger anger our will that trigger to foresee find seek instinctually we therefore may that we that objects sorts, objects seek pugnacious from may ourselves we feels, wean for can trigger we subject anger. a that are or triggers with fear so emotional provoke shaping, our associated shape, such become purposefully lead can may to has instincts individuals and that instincts that habits from arise to element emotions presence; appraisal since an cognitive Further, by include invisible anger. angered element must pugnacious a are slight an ‘‘intellectual’’ we the hence If of an of emotion. perception and is an the slight, trigger fear norm professional to perceived expected comes the a that an events appraisal evoke of violate cognitive sequence a events may (2:419), a that supernatural, expectations evoke the perception originally of our the don’t fear that become as ‘‘baffles’’ objects may such experience, to We emotion, that anger of 518). complex or p. a result fear (1894, In a of them. before responses than as instinctual response of may, our emotional theory link object different ‘‘any a an that with contends and that associated James instincts recognize 470). both 466. must for 437, triggers emotion’’ 433, the 414–415, shape (2:411, can emotions development cognitive and formation constituted (2:469–471). emotions excitations (‘‘coarse’’) bodily standard of are feelings which by association, on based reactions ial,w hudnt ae’attd oadtxnme fteemotions. the of taxonomies toward attitude James’ note should we Finally, love that way the like we If aspect. motivational a on take may emotions Developed Habit factors. cognitive engage which emotions, developed the mentioned have I ‘ natural hlspia Psychology Philosophical ’ sayother any as fonly if , any 421 Downloaded By: [Hatfield, Gary] At: 17:05 13 July 2007 is ato the of the Part in First continued 1664), as in Body physiology, Human posthumously animal published in program and the his larger revised, his mind, in be to the described relation body upon to in the first to act passions understood that aside on correspond best processes human is set physiological which considered theory focused I complex ‘‘passions,’’ Descartes by reason Descartes caused Descartes’ Because that perceptions emotions. on James, for ‘‘coarser’’ focus and like James’ accounts, and operates theoretical Again emotions instance) his this intellectual brain. in (in a emotions that 147). (even the mind 91, caused us (see a. immaterial of mind affected 441, an of has 11:397, in independently theory play 4:601–610, arise his (AT a emotions in God that intellectual James of fact from love differed the intellectual He an from or caused the arise as play), body may such sad distinguished emotions, that intellectual he purely joy James, from intellectual Like ‘‘passions,’’ 10:217) called (1649/1989). (AT he book writings which earliest emotions, published his last from his passions and to emotions the engaged Perceptions Descartes as Passions of Theory pragmatically Descartes’ (2:477–485), 3. hand. at arisen task the have for responses needed are reflex as labels process various taxonomic evolutionary such the the adopting investigate to which and questions, individuals, aroused taxonomic by various reactions of ‘‘eternally physiological in the Instead objects is characterizing various emotions. on nothing by focus attendant that to the investigators conclusion to invites the he action extend reflex individually of to considered in complex when him fixed’’ a ‘‘indefinitely’’ led from vary developmentally, arise reflexes classification typically that and mere view emotions than his that knowledge plus theory scientific reflexes, causal of form His advanced description. more and a be to causes 422 yapaigt ‘ol’ nhsve,ol ua enspsessouls possess beings human mere only are view, animals his nonhuman explained thought); In and had 55–59). ‘‘soul.’’ consciousness (6:46, Aristotelians machines them a the affords that to (which day purely functions through appealing Descartes’ animal explain of to by many sought Aristotelianism he scholastic processes program, that the physiological material animism his and Aristotelian In Galenism the 1992). with both (Hatfield, break in sharp found a was marked character mechanistic its estv oe;aditleta n ainlfntost ainlpower rational a could, he to animals nonhuman functions in rational that show and to sought intellectual Descartes to 2000). and functions Michael, cognitive (see low-level power; functions and motor, vital sensitive sensory, ascribed soul; a the accounts of Aristotelian power sensa- vegetative cognition. a motion, of to grades animal various reproduction, and nutrition, tion, including functions, psychological h rsoeincnetof concept Aristotelian The ideas, physiological Galenic incorporated physiology Descartes’ Although .Hatfield G. witni 6714 n ulse n16) n umrzdi the in summarized and 1664), in published and 1647–1648 in (written asoso h Soul the of Passions raieo Man on Treatise psyche (1649/1989). , anima frtwitni 6013,subsequently 1630–1633, in written (first rsu xeddt ohvtland vital both to extended soul or , x ) o xml,h edthat held he example, for 4); ecito fthe of Description 6 Downloaded By: [Hatfield, Gary] At: 17:05 13 July 2007 n eas,lk es ecpin,te r ‘bcr n ofsd’(nhstechnical his are some (in they confused’’ are by and that proper ‘‘obscure and are strengthened passions sense); they the perceptions, and sense that like maintained, because, explains and He caused, 11:349*). refer are (AT we the perceptions spirits’’ that that defines soul the Descartes and the of body. of movements it own emotions ’s and or self to from sensations the arise or particularly of to ‘‘perceptions seem state as that body, the AT feelings proper or to itself, passions the bodies contrast soul the in external to’’ the soul own, on to’’ the its ‘‘refer report ‘‘refer of as we recognizes passions we self (which the the (which soul term that the I thirst of 25). 23), passions a. and a. and 11:347, 11:346, hunger 24), AT a. as objects, 11:346, external AT such to’’ ‘‘refer sensations we internal (which perceptions sense include aiisadnua ue nele ohsnoyadmtrfunctions. hydraulic motor his and in sensory both function brain underlies through brain spirits tubes of animal neural of workhorse and flowing cavities the the for which was in used scheme Descartes that scheme—a that physiological matter name the fluid spirits,’’ subtle ‘‘animal are the question in ‘‘spirits’’ The soul. asdi h idtruhteato ftebody. the of action the through mind the in caused causal the provide also They passions. 7:229–230). that the (AT mechanisms for behavior mechanisms denied these basis human that physiological to he of maintained ascribed of much he 8A:17), and for he set 11:202), account time, 7:78, consciousness (AT common same fashion (AT a the clockwork that in At animals soul operate press). held nonhuman in this and Hatfield, Descartes of 3:85; human (AT power Because animals intellectual to soul. sentience the animals immaterial other on from differ an supervenes the beings Human of possessing 427). of achievements 7:230, task cognitive (AT in including soul denying low-level the the behavior, as of accepted In animal power counted he sensitive all Aristotelians functions. 11:202), for the (AT cognitive that account animals behaviors to low-level all mechanisms some to physiological souls providing also sensitive but and sensory, vital, vegetative functions all only motor not explain and alone, processes physiological mechanical through le uta h he aual le h of(T720.Aana ihJms eare we James, with as Again 7:230). (AT wolf the flees naturally sheep the as just flee, etterefcsi h ri 1:7–8) swt ae,Dsatssget that suggests Descartes James, with As have that (11:177–185). animal brain the reflexive the with a in encounters prior effects the of their be or may left 11:192–193), processes (AT (AT brain it’’ These instinct to intervention. of contributing mental the result any soul in without the ‘‘excited nerves i.e., without be 38), organs can ‘‘the a. the flight affect 11:358, of cause also disposition that purely the fear processes that by these feel merely and contends to body flee,’’ us to he legs cause the James, that bear. move Like processes) the that from (brain bear. run spirits us a animal make frightful be can The unnamed intervention, to mental an without imagine of processes, speaks can physiological Descartes we example, which one In animal, situation. the to respond ecre edta ‘asos’aepoel ocle eas hyaepassively are they because called so properly are ‘‘passions’’ that held Descartes h asosaecue yafo faia prt htas asstebd to body the causes also that spirits animal of flow a by caused are passions The 9 o oiin;ta hyare they that volitions; not , ratmtcbdl ehns iet nidvda ua en to being human individual an directs mechanism bodily automatic or emotions ntesneo xiain rdsubne nthe in disturbances or excitations of sense the in sensations eas erciete passively them receive we because 7 asosproper passions hns eie,te‘‘passions’’ the defined, so When hlspia Psychology Philosophical hyaefeelings are They . 8 423 Downloaded By: [Hatfield, Gary] At: 17:05 13 July 2007 rxmt as’ ftepsin,i ae osnet a htsc ttsaethe are states such that say to most sense and to ‘‘last no itself, the makes soul are it they the While passions, and objects states: the brain them, of out cause rule cause’’ that can proximate We objects them. external refer we the which them, more cause Or, that represent? the states passions confusedly’’? raises the and This do ‘‘obscurely 17). What represent a. them they passions: 11:343*, receives do the (AT What ‘‘always of them’’ specifically: soul objects by the the represented of passions, are situationally question the that a including things tells Descartes the perceptions, toward undertaken. from all already will has for 87). body the that a. the that incline 11:393, us sort (AT that the both of perceptions behavior or appropriate thing, confused’’ bad present a and must as naturally passions ‘‘obscure bear as the the that will or means the thing, this of good 166), of a account 7:58, feeling as 1:366, Descartes’ the (AT running that Given good fact running. the the also keep to only but drawn to not the bear include us the toward arrangements flee inclines tend These us fear 6). that makes a. he that of interaction 11:331, mechanism mind–body what arrangements bodily 7:89; the (AT of instituted to body rules the Naturally functionality the of nature’’: well-being this of of and of of theory structures teachings Darwin’s origin bodily functional ‘‘the Lacking the a preservation. terms in ascribes bodily itself elsewhere Descartes at passion selection, the aimed and are natural response both bodily They the context. both places passage This ‘‘use’’ the describing in point this explains the passions: heart Descartes of the doing. part of the already not is is around body it the warmth what of sighs perception as our or but such James. warmth, groans, with responses this contrast blushing, feel by internal We passion, as 97). and such a. 112) 11:402, signs (AT passions, a. external may the 11:411, that both effects cause (AT bodily including further conditions from it, proper bodily accompany passion the although distinguished Descartes Further, day, not body. are the passions which both the sensations, of on a internal diverges state with is Descartes (prior passions the emotion itself run. the or to passion contrasts passion person the He the that the scores. denied that motivates he development) held and same body, cognitive James the the to of fundamentally. of state differs the product of it perception further respects, a some is in fear our run. rather us make but that run, processes we physiological because afraid not 424 oeiiilcniae o h bet ftepsin ngnrlicue h brain The include: general in passions the of objects the for candidates initial Some are they rather, Descartes; to according feelings, blind not are passions The with along go to will the enjoining of effect further the have passions Cartesian theory James’ to similar is passions the of account body-first Descartes’ Although gtto ftesiista sal asste ipsstebd othe to body the disposes same 52) the a. them 11:372, as (AT causes just things. volition, usually those the this of will that execution in to the persist soul spirits to to the conducive and the dispose movements They useful of alone: are this us agitation in tells consists passions nature the things all of use the .Hatfield G. ftepsin.I htmd es,w ih losyta h bet of objects the that say also might we sense, made that If passions. the of ecpin of perceptions hs nenlcniin.A a tnadi his in standard was As conditions. internal those are ecpin of perceptions Downloaded By: [Hatfield, Gary] At: 17:05 13 July 2007 efi oie stelcso h sadness. the of 25), locus a. that 11:347, the find (AT We as soul phenomenology: posited the of to’’ is of point ‘‘referred self perceptions a are confused be they while to and for seems obscure itself, this are soul passions the of the although state that the object, unlikely primary seems their it as 51). Finally, object be a. 11:371–372, external can (AT an objects reason require external apparent them: not no of for do all cause sad passions Descartes not or Hence, while do joyful they Second, feel passions, 23). may our a. we of Sometimes, 11:346, many cause (AT objects objects external external that latter to allows the internal external them of only ‘‘refer’’ out and saying we rule perceptions, that external can external with proper we passions of Similarly, contrasts explicitly 23). the discussions a. as perceptions, 11:346, Descartes’ those objects 87–88, cause 7:79–80, contradicts that (AT states assertion perception brain that the are but perceptions internal and external hyaes ietd h asosrpeetol he eei ye fsituation: desire, of hatred, types (love, generic passions be five three other not only the which need and represent in situation, cases passions passions novel uses a the The he represents content directed. Although wonder their so 52). investigating are when a. by be object, they 11:372, passions can specific senses a (AT these our on understand us objects’’ focused to can their important we are by that that ways moved suggests different many He and how joy, 69). ‘‘in desire, investigating hatred, a. such love, of 11:380, Wonder, typology passions: (AT a primitive sadness six offers potentially of Descartes list are it. his that to with situations situations important various otherwise of one or any harmful, in beneficial, being as complex mind–body the h rsraino h oyadhneo h idbd complex. mind–body the of toward hence tend and that that movements body external processes the produce physiological of also preservation beings, passions the human the to In prior body. toward causally animal tend are they the nonhuman and In of passions, 11:193). preservation felt (AT without the pursuit ones’’ occur the injurious movements of in processes external and avoidance either these These the animals, serve human in beings: that or both human movements things ‘‘external in desirable in of executing passions occur for the that body objects the cause the processes in novel prepare that physiological expressed to and as certain attending animals view, of and nonhuman his the function 106), with priming accords the a. beast, conception the (11:406, of This Fleeing desires 75). complex: obtain that a. mind–body mind to (11:384, of the action states or induce for respond body to body important to the concerned or are for will passions harmful, useful 11:372, the the are beneficial, (AT that move us clear say it to passions directly make important the examples doesn’t or that He harmful, beneficial, 52). means are a. he that things this, to By appropriately from ‘‘useful.’’ Away that is action: things like. definite what will the a to or to something, will soul maintain the the moves to induce confusedly that something, to and way toward obscurely but a something, passions in soul the that situation the means the of Which represent ‘‘useful.’’ state are the us on tells nature report to not is peln oteecnieain,Ipooeta h atsa asosrepresent passions Cartesian the that propose I considerations, these to Appealing nthe In Passions primary ecre eet eea ie httepsin nueu owill to us induce passions the that times several repeats Descartes , secondary bet ftepsin,o w rud.Frt Descartes First, grounds. two on passions, the of objects bet ftepsin a ildsusshortly). discuss will I (as passions the of objects 10 oevr h ucino h passions the of function the Moreover, hlspia Psychology Philosophical we r a,adtesu as soul the and sad, are o what for 11 u his But . Treatise 425 , Downloaded By: [Hatfield, Gary] At: 17:05 13 July 2007 srr ruuulrslsfo ri rcs ln peual eitdb the by mediated (presumably alone process brain object a the 11:380–381, of from (AT memory), ‘‘representation’’ results corporeal impression the unusual doctrine, brain the upon or body-first keep the rare his force to as with and causing great there’’ accordance object it In with preserve the 70). and advance a. upon strengthen to to fixed is, organs impression it where sense this brain as the the by object in by place the then disposed the and represents spirits consideration, that great or of brain accorded being one’s motion harmful, of in worthy beneficial, impression consequently and the rare the by first complexes. are mind–body ‘‘caused and passion passions bodies our the the to of relation objects in of situation secondary a objects only of aspects and important primary perceptions sense The of sensory passions. Individual objects situations. primary harmful are or beneficial objects either represent sadness) and joy, 426 h i rmtv asositrc ihvrigcrusacsadwt ahother each with and circumstances varying sadness). with and interact hatred passions and maintain primitive joy, to six or and The avoid love or desire, approach do to to (as or will object the does), the motivates wonder motivational the it abandon (as a which or object representing of under an virtue harm) as on in its content, attention itself appropriate or cognitive fix passion a benefit, situationally has its the passion a novelty, The regards (its in aspect. he situation stimuli the James, sensory of with character to contrast the respond In the to and manner. to ability ‘‘desirable,’’ attention the of instigating processes 2). or in Figure ‘‘novel’’ (see will it of the toward aspect action guide or passion the object and under perception object interwoven food. the the acquiring perceive of toward focus we the will hence object the and the draws passions passion; passion the the of the of the object and object secondary desirable); object; desire; the the as is is the an (hence food) preserved present body (the or senses the attained senses the be for of the to beneficial good sequence, as a or it causal of retain to presence usual to respond want the us processes makes In brain food), that the good. (e.g., passion a object present causes ‘‘desirable’’ just a then a respond, spirits of secure first of presence flowing must the same spirits to this The animals, only and complex. nonhuman not in mind–body do the focusing they or as body by the doing for good mind is passion is attention. the body mind’s the and the the wonder; also what the of fix but feeling novel; continuing organs secondary the the sense as toward will of is the focus senses object will the the the this the of hence object and mark draws 75). the passion make processes passion; a. the the brain of 11:384, of to object object (AT the the primary reflection’’ object; the preserve serves and is an to novelty ‘‘attention present proper) as of senses so state passion The site a feeling attendant in brain the (the ‘‘understanding’’) object; that the (the to on wonder directed flow organs to sense of the spirits keep to the and causes impression also novelty of osehwti ok,ltu osdrfrtwne,te eie odri a is Wonder desire. then wonder, first consider us let works, this how see To ieJms ecre eonzdcmlxt n eeomn ntepassions. the in development and complexity recognized Descartes James, Like bodily to attributes he and approach, object, body-first sensory the James a with on shares Descartes focuses desire of or wonder of passion the way, this In that something retain to want to soul the cause may spirits the desire, of case the In .Hatfield G. 12 n h etr ftebanipeso htpoie h mark the provides that impression brain the of feature the and Downloaded By: [Hatfield, Gary] At: 17:05 13 July 2007 nlecdb i hoyta ontv lsiiain rs ylann ahrthan rather learning by was arise mechanisms classifications did nonconscious cognitive than of that a role theory mechanisms attributed the his physiological toward relevant by 1994) attitude influenced nonconscious adaptively James’ Damasio, to to Further, significant to James. role a responding gave itself (contrary psychological in authors by Descartes both greater body mechanisms although the situations, bodily that what argue in environmental nonconscious shall also I to and section, are role this differed emotions they In the but do. what emotions, can of the of conceptions theories their body-first in held Consciousness both and James Responses and by Descartes Bodily so on James do and Descartes must 4. it passion, their a passions, doctrine. triggers body-first such 11). the thought with ch. of a accordance 1997, in that James, psychology body, (S. case the the complex influencing each 11:445–454, is suspected, (AT adults, in do in be passions Nonetheless, development well; as which their might it will generosity, and the of use As interactions, influences passion to spirits, The 153–161). resolve passion. of the a flow a. not a and is by will and produced free alone is thought concerns counterpart. on a. generosity its depends 11:443–445, as of it AT virtue mental (e.g., virtue mental the passion a mental cases, the has The causes generosity, these then passion, In that important does scheme: One spirits Descartes 149–151). of causal flow 54). mediated a a. bodily cause 11:373–374, attitudes his (AT contradict self developed one’s here involving or not triggers others pride, cognitive generosity, toward have scorn, may attitudes esteem, wonder) mental as of such species these, (all of humility Some and passions. other the all form the to and interaction, body–mind indicate arrows states. mental dotted are relations The boxes causal dashed or states. causation, body–body mental domain: single between a within relations causal indicate 2. Figure R A E B aso ffa asdb er codn oDsats h oi arrows solid The Descartes. to according bear, a by caused fear of Passion nerves and organs Sense image) gland (bear from pineal Flow ofspirits bear image of Perceptual frightening bear as Perception of passion running and that causes Brain state of fear Passion hlspia Psychology Philosophical from bear) keep running (inclination to Effect onwill running caused Bodily 427 Downloaded By: [Hatfield, Gary] At: 17:05 13 July 2007 tmlsiiilycue hnei h eerlnrossse,ti hneis change this system, nervous sensory cerebral a the When in 2:1–3). change (1:222, a emotions the causes both subsequent included initially the James and feelings, stimulus is such It state effects). Among sensory characteristic (1:222). its ‘‘thought’’ initial of a knowledge not gain and ‘‘feeling,’’ anything thing a state us the tell mental classify doesn’t perceptual a we it but Such when initial but act know (1:221). thing, cognitive an acquaintance’’ a a of not with with is ‘‘knowledge us It start acquaints calls consciousness. James of emotion, what stream the rather the of is yield part is that feeling This stirrings feeling. flight). causes internal of also course the the bear and alter causal the to own their intervene of are have might fear themselves mind image of may the feeling and brain the (e.g., processes and effects the bodily bear the the beings, of of effects perception human brain subsequent mental the contributing’’ In The in soul perception. bear 38). conscious the the a ‘‘without a. of i.e., image 11:358, sensory mediation, the (AT conscious material, without purely animal running are nonhuman) bear causes or physiological the (human material from the and lead run initially processes to that of Descartes mental processes theories. conscious the out Descartes’ Because between processes. and physical divide his strict between the a differences drew and some understand mental adopted us 2004). help the 2002b, subsequently Hatfield, both see 1904, sense-data; constructed to (James, akin that entities 5–6). perception-like monism prominent theories, ch. several monadic neutral to dualism, (1:24n, a opposition substance epiphenomenalism firm physicalism, his Mind-denying and record theory: did of rejects he types he but mental Yet relation, the between mind–body animals. the (1:182) parallelism’’ In nonhuman ‘‘empirical physical. an to and of human consciousness favor of in causation such dualism hence substance extends and guidance but the with the agrees in behavior, hand He perform figures of consciousness. consciousness to out lack of that entirely rejects able Descartes conceive animals he nonhuman be to But that (1:130). enough should theory acts’’ Cartesian bold which intelligent been apparently mechanism widely first and nervous complicated having was contribution: self-sufficing of Descartes’ behavior completely credit acknowledges James a the from human 5). belongs contribution ch. and Descartes genuine (1890, ‘‘To animal mechanisms day any James’ nervous all without in Whether discussed system for 19th. causal account the closed consciousness—could in a it as appreciated alone—acting others, among (1884), 7had1t etre Rsnil,14;Sto,19;Vrain 1953); Vartanian, 1998; Sutton, the human 1940; in many (Rosenfield, discussed centuries and widely 18th animal was and the all processes 17th physiological their toward that mechanistic claim contemporaries from compare Descartes’ his arise system. and behaviors shall nervous James the of I of attitude capacities the section, shaped Descartes behavior subsequent theories. that adaptive recent the more content with In theories cognitive noncognitive passions. and innate cognitive the the respectively to rejected James attributed evolution. through 428 ae,b otat edta h rgnlisiculpoessta edt flight, to lead that processes instinctual original the that held contrast, by James, can perceptions conscious and processes physiological between parallelism James’ ecre’cneto ftesrn oeo hsooia ehnssi producing in mechanisms physiological of role strong the of conception Descartes’ .Hatfield G. Principles eddntdledel notemtpyiso the of metaphysics the into deeply delve not did he , about t(uha ecm to come we as (such it 13 Huxley Downloaded By: [Hatfield, Gary] At: 17:05 13 July 2007 oeohrwy lhuhalwn aua eeto ooeaeo stimulus– on naı operate of tenet to a selection it natural considered of in allowing interesting he categories as Although pairings, or to dangerous response way. according as objects content other perceive however, innately perceptual some would not, we our did that determine so James thought, (1:140–141). to with consciousness evolution accordance in of allow knowledge structure and that readily memories, means–ends the thought perceptions, of more the of other operations with to consciousness them available it to perception connect makes that can presence renders consciousness initial bear the The in of perception directable. present and are cognizable, and associable, bear, behavior dangerous. the attendant is from bear run any the to because cognitive impulse so an does established have it will animal that have it an understand bear, that may a we foresee encountering will time once first memory’’ danger, (bear-classifica- its ‘‘with thoughts after signal so, Similarly, other to not etc.). and do danger-ideas, does come tions, bear-images bear may between may a connections It perceptions (associative) of ends. subsequent perception subsequent and supplement original our associatively means our that Although situation with a perceptions. connections about insights their and have evaluations finding by emotions might the and thought, ‘‘steers’’ of Consciousness seeking (2:629). axioms evolution basic Darwinian (1:144). the context. through including that itself’’ arisen functional suggests consciousness, he or regulate of evolved, biological structure to actually a consciousness internal complex in how explain it too to places claiming grown ‘‘organ’’ Without system an consciousness nervous calling the a His for added steering organ ‘‘an of is sake consciousness James, mere to According development. Descartes. are cognitive for and is instinctual emotions is it initially as subsequent no run James, to possessing to animal the the and according getting reflexive awareness, of and work means–ends The lacking perceptions power. motivational thought, initiating of devoid the perceptions, also that James theorist. and unguided Darwinizing experience held the through of to organism occurs the products ultimately of (1:140–141)—and as thought reflection the and in arises reflexive first survival as organism’s the them of regards Consciousness he evolution. directedness the because means–ends to excludes instincts also James and to from themselves. emotions directedness emotions and and means–ends instincts instincts intrinsic trigger original denies initially that James is perceptions But being conscious conscious (1:141). the A ends’’ behavior. for and ‘‘fighter activity parallel. mental a in both sensation guides conscious that directedness a and ends carry perceptions that sense type initial the its both of as yield sensation are that conscious feelings events a emotional brain has that The event concomitant. brain natural A (2:382): event ‘‘cerebro-mental’’ a htoeae nteojcso xeine(:4–4)t aho classifications fashion to (2:646–647) experience adaptation of an objects evolve as classify the content to on tendency classificatory cognitive operates our or that viewed he conceptual Instead, having (2:629–630). structures ‘‘cerebro-mental’’ o ae,tefc htteeoincuigpreto,teeoinisl,and itself, emotion the perception, emotion-causing the that fact the James, For into directly enter to it allows conscious is perception instigating the that fact The means– by characterized is thought conscious 5), ch. (1890, James to According efacto de otiuino elxv eair othe to behaviors reflexive of contribution ¨ eSecrs ospoethat suppose to Spencerism ve hlspia Psychology Philosophical 429 Downloaded By: [Hatfield, Gary] At: 17:05 13 July 2007 lo h vlto fcnet n ftecgiieapasl oie ntheir in posited appraisals cognitive the who of (see today, and emotions theorists concepts the of psychoevolutionary of theories learning many evolution the from the to differs allow influence thus of evolutionary development He restricted the mechanism. assigned and He learning (2:632). to interests conceptualization pragmatic our with accordance in 430 vlaieo ocpulcnett ecpinchrswt i srbn less ascribing his with coheres perception to to content flexibility behavioral conceptual or evaluative el ecre aetennosiu uoaao ‘ahns’ta edsrbdin described he that as ‘‘machines’’ behavior or learned automata much nonconscious the habit- but the behaviors that gave instinctive physiolog- Descartes held only nonconscious well. not scheme, but guide Descartes’ which to In mechanisms direction sensations (1:118). ical only inattentive’’ conscious if ‘‘usually kind,’’ without are some we of formed ‘‘consciousness requires are always formation habits some that vlto,bth i o xedtemcaimo aua eeto ocognitive to selection natural of Darwinian mechanism through the consciousness extend of material not function the did in the he found explain not but to content evolution, brain of a sought possessed relation, James state causal brute mental brain. dualism, by a his that, produces of such framework simply interaction the state mind–body and Within of usefulness subject: laws the the posited to portray he situation naturally God given passions or a that nature of Descartes, so be importance For relation learned. also mind–body be emotional the may must of up ends which relation sets of the harm, world empiricist, conscious and the the James benefit to For feelings of pain. and considerations pleasure in be with motivators associated emotional natural to the causing world regarded of He conscious function motivating. the the intrinsically process are bodily that However, harmful mind a function. the of to that states avoid ascribe serves to to consciousness unwilling means–ends will too, was the the James, James For of move beneficial. home passions the the The seek is passions: and mind the the of Descartes, effects For motivating states. conscious of or 1992; mental many Hatfield, and (see we ‘‘psychological’’ that of as Functions mechanization 1992). soul: describe a Vidal, sensory would 11:202), Aristotelian contemporaries (AT the Descartes’ characterization mindless of own the functions of Descartes’ many psychology bodily of by Cartesian ‘‘psychology’’ from This a is, permit. stimulation—arise with machine later further sensory would go James to of than willing automata patterns was he past Accordingly, that alone. to imagine general mechanisms appropriate response to situationally exhibit willing of in or development was speech behavior the Descartes the as not genuine that functions—such did shows in all psychological it Descartes some engage imitate But since could (6:56–57). overstatement, to machine ability an mindless reasoning disposed [the is corporeal a when claim be that make this This machines—will think (11:185). naturally of similar of present’’ consequence other ‘‘can patterns is many A soul] automaton past men—or mind. real to the a that adjusted movements that of be absence is to the memory behavior in animal’s stimulation, an sensory allow connections Such ae’uwligest lo h ntnta ytmt otiuedirectly contribute to system instinctual the allow to unwillingness James’ ecre n ae r nprilareeti eciigakyapc fproperly of aspect key a describing in agreement partial in are James and Descartes Treatise .Hatfield G. h blt ofr soitv oncin ncroel(ri)memory. (brain) corporeal in connections associative form to ability the non osiu uoaata a ecre.Jmsallowed James Descartes. had than automata conscious x below). 5 Downloaded By: [Hatfield, Gary] At: 17:05 13 July 2007 95.DsatsadJmswr xmnn mto,nteointalk. emotion not emotion, examining were James with and contrast by Descartes emotions, panhuman whom Wierzbicka, 1991; some authors 1995). (Russell, are conceptualization for even and emotions language allow indeed emotion the defense specific and culturally that its thesis, view in controversial the cites a on Danziger is rests This scientific ‘‘emotions’’ constructions. of natural social discussions modern current to of alien conception 1997). the (Hatfield, century dates 18th and the psychology from of Greeks, origin psychology the ancient puts matter, which the subject curriculum, on university with based the definition in a broader place a theoretical and of with than methods, contrast discipline definition than by rather a manner, sociological as century basic rather 20th psychology narrow a a of experimental a recency as the on as psychology Smith, depends Boring’s and and of Danziger in identity For 1979) purpose, 2002a). the (Hatfield, the (O’Donnell, fix served science to originally seeking applied myth of origin Smith in hands, This discipline and a (1929) century. assumptions as (1997) arose 19th theoretical first Danziger psychology late own phenomenon. that the story their psychological conventional the and a accept both psychology as (2005) of emotions discipline the current the the about to discussed of 2005). he origin connected Smith, that the 1997; historically deny (Danziger, and emotions the some as the world call recommended Nonetheless, another James some we in that and (1:409). see favor Descartes phenomena place 77) attention now with but n. on cited psychology psychology, (2:43 Wolff he of perception and Christian historians on automatism, author Berkeley neural 18th-century of from in Descartes placed context arguments across He theories comparisons: theoretical psychological such comparing with standard the comfortable of was practice a role. James the that centuries. defend as the in must I serve useful first can but it more ones, 2003), attention Shapiro, so more 2003; receiving is Radner, and theory 1997; Descartes’ James, known that of Descartes’ S. now right but better (e.g., theory. past, by the theory was quasi-Cartesian in body-first or comparison a benchmark theory of passions the held Descartes, as James’ the James serving in of of priority. that doctrine honor theory body-first conclude the the deserves Jamesian to theory of a now statement had ought clear Descartes we a found whether Having asking History emotions. by in Emotion began of I Theories ‘‘Noncognitive’’ and ‘‘Cognitive’’ On 5. perceived to learning. significance of unthought-like and product reflexive, meaning a to as introduces limited objects consciousness are while dualism processes effective brain responses, an nonconscious retained overcome he to function: states, seeking of ‘‘cerebro-mental’’ While his emotions. with and dualism instincts substance accompany might that contents azgrsasrin(97 .5 htDsats ako ‘asos’i conceptually is ‘‘passions’’ of talk Descartes’ that 5) p. (1997, assertion Danziger’s about presuppositions own their carry historians such of claims prescriptive The recent more with theories James’ and Descartes’ compare will I section this In discipline hlspia Psychology Philosophical spoesoaie in professionalized as 431 Downloaded By: [Hatfield, Gary] At: 17:05 13 July 2007 ie’ta xed akt h nin res(io,20,p 2.Hr ede not does is he Here psychology 12). p. that 2003, mental (Dixon, argues about Greeks words: thought ancient than he systematic the the of track to concepts (2005), tradition back on broader extends Smith focus a that to life’’ and to refer better to (1997) used is himself ‘‘sometimes Danziger it Dixon Indeed, to purposes, passions’ 1791). the some Contrary Kindblad, of for & ‘psychology (2003, Zander that phrase claim 1877; the recognizes his (Maillet, discontinuity, belie occur conceptual languages including not to two should languages, due latter other that, the in in 4) works p. work focus French; emotion His and emotion. analysis considering Latin, of German, careful his concept the Dixon’s precluded the than English sentiment. rather collapsed ‘emotion’ term on and word one appetite, English 19th this the affect, the that on in and focuses passion, psychology, use of secularized widespread notions a into of earlier came badge first a ‘emotion’ thought. as term European century in the concepts that emotion contends in of and (2003) Dixon Dixon they discontinuity cites conceptual relative, historical 85–86) pp. culturally strong our (2005, ways of Smith within score, some support that in fall On culture. are our James results to relative their and are if Descartes even then that ancestry, extent linguistic the to Moreover, 432 etil cu ntogto h mtos esol fcus lorecognize also course should of they we needed. should and as We Historically, context, occur, emotions. and 160–162). content, they the aim, on where pp. in thought differences resemblances 1980, primary in 50; family or occur p. Plutchik, basic 1999, certainly and (Damasio, of 193; continuities lists lists extended sadness. p. acknowledge recent more and the several 1992, of on joy, on list appear Ekman, desire, appear others his the hatred, by sadness and attested and love, emotions, is surprise surprise), theory these, (or recent Of Wonder more conceptual the passions: with event, writing primitive any excludes In Descartes’ James emotions. emotions; of the other continuity from like content an responses motivational will, passive as and the are cognitive desire motivates desires that includes content passional Descartes cognitive that have excluded: and emotions or that believes included he entail but are differences emotion, states theoretical and The affective before emotions. some authors to that James other content whereas cognitive after feelings, assigned and determine James noncognitive before after bare to authors are attempt emotions Some of and that change: confounding the held original possible historical the Moreover, with between by differences complicated division game. is theoretical their time the across with differences (Griffiths, in and James, remainder similarities remain and ‘‘folk’’ emotions, Descartes a that then and developed emotions 9), feelings, kind basic natural constructed ch. including a groupings, socially 1997, not few is kinds, a emotion natural If into could are matter. discussions fall is subject their phenomena common emotion of emotional a subset If but as some factors. kind least substantive natural at this then several have 2000), on (Charland, depends kind thing natural a same the about ‘emotions’. talking and emotion terms) in other differences (and ‘‘science-and-religion specific ‘passions’ the between his stress investigates, to he outside that necessary vocabulary lying be not purposes may it historical historiography,’’ for that acknowledges h usino hte ecre,Jms n oercn hneswr all were thinkers recent more and James, Descartes, whether of question The .Hatfield G. word pyhlg’btthe but ‘psychology’ concept fmna ie ute,Dxn(03 .16) p. (2003, Dixon Further, life. mental of Downloaded By: [Hatfield, Gary] At: 17:05 13 July 2007 fetv eair(:7–8) hr fetvns smaue ntrso survival of terms in measured is stimulus–response yielded effectiveness reflexes embodied those where because (2:678–688), these selection behavior Darwinian effective blind Rather, behind through lay arise (1:141). reasoning might means–ends reflexes ‘‘intelligence’’ genuine so-called in no food) that their this ‘‘apparently of insisted not to behavior (presence but reflexive respond circumstances are some (1:130), called that external intelligent’’ James they ways and manner. food) appropriate in but situationally of behave a processes, lack mechanisms. to (e.g., rational designed bodily states cognitive are internal unintelligent mimic Animals to may evolved rational. emotions genuinely mechanisms of of embodied triggers reviews.) result These for original 1, the ch. the 2005, are attributed Prinz, and emotion 1, pt. propose 1997, underlying (1990) Griffiths, Cosmides and (See appraisals Tooby mechanisms. that it. relation the says to in responding situation which for current that theory, the resources circumstances. appraise subject’s appraisal be that the happy states to cognitive in may cognitive detailed happiness complex arousal are as a physiological emotions situation, articulated dangerous situation; (1991) a cognitive current Lazarus in of the fear type of as of a light interpreted in proposing appraisal states by physiological cognitive one’s contents of one’s emotion interpretations cognitive for are responses account Emotions bodily 1987; theory: to judgments. that finding implicit generic (Gordon, (1915) or too Cannon’s propositionalists hasty are updated by (1962) modern constituted Singer are and and emotions Schachter that 55–56) hold pp. 1976) Solomon, 2005, Knuuttila, (see innate ascribe not do significant emotions. they conscious of Descartes, to a unlike content processing from and cognitive that James start psychological like not nonconscious world however, need stimuli; invoking processes sensory the are in these Damasio to that and and holding LeDoux perception, responses in of Descartes positions automatic to The meaning. closer embodied in cognitive on are mind take 1999) in subsequently emotions (1994, had Damasio James that Similarly, reflexes. and contends instinctive sees Descartes adaptive, where (1996) both with situation, what emotions LeDoux current linking like revival, the something Jamesian of means appraisals and ‘‘appraisal’’ (noncognitive) Cartesian physiological mixed nonetheless as responses a which emotions emotional In some theory, trigger 1931). noncognitive to a (Cannon, emotional discriminations was of cognitive variety James’, adaptive developed the visceral like permitted yield yield to His, that of perceptions feelings. processes perception sensory conscious (thalamic) with on variety interact subcortical the that depend produce on and to behavior but not specific context contents, do sufficiently 1930s, emotional not emotions are of the case the any From perception in bodily that which supremacy. James’ stirrings, showing discredited various for having by as James, vied seen theory since widely are have was they discussions 1927) theories (1915, that In Cannon noncognitive held situations. second and to the cognitive responses whereas situations, feeling of noncognitive representations cognitive are ecre n ae ohswteeoin saatv elxs Descartes reflexes. adaptive as emotions the saw both James and Descartes Stoics Ancient emotions. the of theories cognitive of types various are There emotions that held first the that is James and Descartes between contrast central A hlspia Psychology Philosophical 433 Downloaded By: [Hatfield, Gary] At: 17:05 13 July 2007 suigta ero er sisicie iheprec emgtcm operceive to come might we ‘‘bad’’ experience with as instinctive, bear experience. is the through bears avoidance of with fear linked that been Assuming have they because ‘‘bad’’ as perceived (2:683). suffices outcome action’’ the to about tendencies bring produced to accidentally of selection ‘‘natural Darwinian ontv rol eodrl o n hte hymv sa ontv motivators cognitive as us inherently move are they emotions whether to whether and content so, of motivational secondarily questions and only The or cognitive anti-Cartesian. cognitive of was denial it its emotion, In Cartesian. it. was have would mechanisms, shape James and to the Descartes more factors both guiding as cultural in emotions, via learning or adult of and social triggers or habit and and for content biological the 1996) role both a of permitting (Mithen, allow account thereby case an emotions, content any hands, in mind Jamesian would innate In Whether content 2001). evolved of mind: (Donald, of mechanisms accretion learning evolution generalized the the through concerning turn as in debates evolves question teeth and were This current as emotion. and can such of with emotions, theory claws attitude the connects evolutionary of bear’s Darwinizing an dimensions into James’ the cognitive Descartes, bring by whether of to described as question recognition so extended open perceptual be an should innate is an It fix threatening? also not it somatic linking 1999) the (1994, by to Damasio’s but to responses precursor good, visceral the is or theory. our theory marker of bad James’ way, awareness as this an In not things things. good, with the or representations bad of are sensory things representations neutral that yielding us tell by would bodies initially our world, the with interactions hti navnaeo awna xlntoso ntnt n mtos Such emotions: of and means instincts a by of explanations behavior become a James, means Darwinian on For for can of ‘‘bearness.’’ purchase allow even advantage feeling its explanations or an or gain ‘‘danger’’ a is or initially bear-classification that Such ‘‘badness’’ not of a bear-shape. content does with representational it or is association But it bear-image bare selected, through bear-idea. a is a as representation behavior side as stimulus a conceptualized the if such conceived account, James James’ pairing. feeling, stimulus–response In a relief. as Cosmides, into selected & difference and Tooby this memory, 1991; brings Lazarus, representations, 1; posit ch. 1975, theorists (Fodor, 1990). processes mechanism outcomes not), nonconscious of brain such or of calculation special-purpose dynamics modularized internal a processes, the cognitive (whether in describing nonconscious In encapsulated of 1983). product (Fodor, or a as ‘‘modularized’’ (‘‘reflexive’’ behavior sense) ‘‘automatic’’ perhaps broad are such see James’ mechanisms who reflex in authors Jamesian recent behavior some and with Cartesian step the of regard, out this In reproduction. and 434 ae’psto ugssta pi-asr sd)a es oetig oet be to come things some least at aside) (pain-causers that suggests position James’ ae’ter fteeoin,i t noaino dpie elxv bodily reflexive adaptive, of invocation its in emotions, the of theory James’ could why bear, the from withdraw to tendency innate an fix could evolution If h a nwihJmsivkdDri oepanaatdisiciebehavior instinctive adapted explain to Darwin invoked James which in way The .Hatfield G. – nsreasoning ends because opoueta eut(80 :7–8) nhsview, his In 2:678–688). (1890, result that produce to result efe usle hikn akfo t o ayo our of many For it. from back shrinking ourselves feel we htaat en oed ihu eurn any requiring without ends to means adapts that Downloaded By: [Hatfield, Gary] At: 17:05 13 July 2007 Notes and Moral as in served Professorship Scheiter Seybert assistant. Krisanna Pennsylvania. Adam research of the my University by the part at Philosophy in Intellectual supported was work This Acknowledgements behavior these produce on work that further these coordinating to in mechanisms answers benchmarks questions. as James’ central serve adaptive and some, Descartes’ for reflexive, may, about questions Clarity of open. remain byproducts noncognitively, are or 1 eeecst ecre’wrsaet h aiaino h dmadTneyedition, Tannery and Adam the of pagination the to are works Descartes’ to References [1] 4 ae is ulse i ocpino h ‘netd’odraogfa,rnig and running, fear, among order ‘‘inverted’’ the of conception his published first and James volume by (1890), James [4] to are section this in references all identified, otherwise Unless [3] of that and theory his between similarities acknowledged 443–446) pp. 2, vol. (1890, James [2] 6918) o ovnec,Iapn h rgnlatcenme oteA citation AT the to number article the original For the 36). a. append 11:356, the AT I For (e.g., translations. convenience, most of for margins the Soul 1649/1989); 356 in the printed p. are 11, of numbers vol. AT Passions (e.g., 11:356’). number ‘AT page as and cited volume is by ‘‘AT’’), abbreviated (1964–1976, Descartes ra hs ok oehr(otayt io,20,c.7.I hsatce ontconsider not a do as I article, (1894) this In James 7). so ch. regard and 2003, I 23–26), Dixon, ch. to 519). (1890, (contrary among and together p. (1884) works himself, James (1894, these he in treat theory that presented I theory the brevity’’ his the describing ‘‘slapdash of characterizing in the elaboration in consistent run’’ of used we example because an had his ‘‘afraid as others, In phrase also response. the below, and emotional uses discussed the passages James precede as original may emotions, which, that on running, response we article instinctive that the 1894 wrote an mentioning he be around, not to case denied considered tremble,’’ the explicitly he turned we He he because 1890. when but in ‘‘afraid frightened, verbatim are are passage we the because repeated run we and is that 190), (1890) (p. 1884 James in sections, trembling subsequent ambiguity. in avoid number; to chapter needed and where by James, cited or on explicitly the 2:450) is (e.g., is focus number My emotion theory, page 212). an James’ p. theory.’’ in 1994, Lange, ‘‘James’ (Lang, that, for of emotions activity speak the feeling; physiological will are of I a that class feelings is wider the emotion theories the causes two an of the that subclass James, suggested cardiovascular since For have to substantially: Scholars came theory. subsequently differ ‘‘James–Lange’’ theory the contexts James’ as and known theoretical approach, be ‘‘body-first’’ their in on (1885/1922) ‘mind’ Lange 356). 7:161, term spoke (AT he the intent contexts the such religious in preferred without case, and soul psychology), he present of including philosophy, the French), natural italicize in and I in (metaphysics available, as AT readily writing translation, is in translation a no (originally as where alter (*); citation, asterisk to an the necessary by ‘‘Early followed it is the citation found AT For I’ve 1664/1998). Where (Descartes, 1991). translation 1–5), (AT Gaukroger’s Principles correspondence Stephen 10), (AT use Writings’’ I 11), AT A A,Iflo otnhm tohf,Mroh n en Dsats 1984– (Descartes, Kenny and Murdoch, Stoothoff, Cottingham, follow I 8A), (AT yqoain sal olwSehnVs’ rnlto (Descartes, translation Voss’s Stephen follow usually quotations my , 11:519 ial,atog ecre sstetr su’above ‘soul’ term the uses Descartes although Finally, . raieo Man on Treatise Discourse and ecito fteHmnBody Human the of Description A 6), (AT hlspia Psychology Philosophical Meditations A ) and 7), (AT (also 435 Downloaded By: [Hatfield, Gary] At: 17:05 13 July 2007 436 1]Teei iie aalls mn ecre’trescesv sso h hae‘erefer ‘we phrase the of uses successive three Descartes’ among parallelism limited a is There [10] 6 ecre sd‘asos satcncltr o ru fbd asdsae htw would we that states caused body of group a for term technical a as ‘passions’ used Descartes [6] such partitioned (1890) James objects, extra-brain to relation mind’s the addressing Earlier, [5] 9 agihmsuidteoii fterfe ocp,wihh 15,p.34 eie nthe in defined 3–4) pp. (1955, he which concept, reflex the of origin the studied Canguilhem [9] and 2005b), (1992, Hatfield (2003), e.g., Beyssade see interaction, function, brain mind–body Cartesian of of details the account On Descartes’ about [8] questions aside leave here I [7] .Hatfield G. ue hs sg io 20,p 0)blee ih aegvnrs otemodern the in to emotions David rise Jamesian in with given term passions have the Cartesian might of of source believes classing 4), the my p. 108) defend 2003, be p. I Dixon, may of (2003, term. citing Descartes category Dixon English 86, by broader p. usage ‘emotion’ a not 2005, whose of implies Smith, are Hume, usage he to but spirit likeness, this passions in this indeed to the (contrary noting and it ‘‘like’’ soul’’ in applied are the 147); he of it that a. and ‘‘emotions considered joy, 11:440, he 11:350) intellectual (AT Still, (AT caused as 28). mind but body such a. the term 11:350*, states, ‘‘agitate’’ technical (AT intellectual that a mind purely as states the ‘emotion’ for in term occurring appropriate the changes especially use aspect. any not con to did or it He pro applied emotions. a as under volitions classify produced consciousness some reasonably in behaviors, objects and present rejecting emotions developed) here developed or are ‘emotions’ which some welcoming of term while emotions, (all involve the instincts, consciousness, movements, using originally outside feeling-caused certainly ‘‘reflexively’’ of instincts almost classes volitions; is major that three James and claim the Second, my for which First, aspect. shorthand emotions, belying result. con as developed this apparently and the against aspect, of pro tell here con considerations a speaking Two or be James. pro could for James a motivational not under are objects ‘‘It emotions perceive ‘‘emotional’’: us the of make and analysis rejects his ‘‘cognitive’’ or welcomes with the connection into in relations emotion of maintains. (1992) theory Averril later as feeling, a religious developed James whether asospoe r,nntees bcr n ofsdpretosta eaet our the to that relate explains that subsequently Descartes perceptions sad. confused feels and self we of obscure report Before The a is nonetheless, gland. self: as referred soul pineal are, as the be the to soul proper them may from the ‘‘refer’’ passions well flowing they of might spirits which we state passions, animal the to the by of subject. cause nature caused know the don’t experiencing proximate are understand people their most no passions that as assumes were which the felt Descartes are that 25)—i.e., it of a. effects 11:347, if and ‘‘whose internal (AT perceptions known’’ as itself, are commonly and they object soul because do soul objects external the we own our perceptions; the in external to such (AT passions to of to the objects passions refer sensations represented We sensations the and our and external causes refer sensations, the not refer as internal body We our sense-perceptions, to sensations 23–25). external a. to 11:346–347, respect with to’, and responses wide both these (1970) response, Fearing James, reflexive cerebrum. of or with notions mass various narrow. brain As of central development the animals. historical or through the nonhuman activity ‘‘reflex’’ examines neural automatic, and of of involuntary, loop notion of human a involve group wider in anatomical a James’ behaviors identify lower on did by reflexive Descartes However, mediated actions, Willis). automatic those for ‘‘semi-reflex’’ not) from cerebellum, did and Descartes (the (which responses structures distinguishing automatic by concept mediated the cerebrally developed first Willis Thomas that ‘arwlo’ es led etoe ( Boyle). Robert mentioned and already Galileo sense with loop’’ (along Descartes’ ‘‘narrow promoted his represented he of philosophy’’ they that ‘‘mechanical outlook but the scientific of today, new resources see the fanciful a using time, which, seem function brain (on may explain interactionist to spirits attempt causal Animal a (1998). or Sutton sort 2005b). 87, some n. of 306, p. occasionalist 1998, an Hatfield, was he whether hm’(:1) ako ecmn n eetn ugssta emotions that suggests rejecting and welcoming of Talk (1:216). them’’ x ) trigfo htdfnto,h concludes he definition, that from Starting 2). knows can hm n tinwardly it and them, rsn bet under objects present x 5. Downloaded By: [Hatfield, Gary] At: 17:05 13 July 2007 ahu,C,&Slmn .C 18) nrdcin nC ahu .C ooo (Eds.), Solomon C. R. & Calhoun C. In Introduction. (1984). C. R. Solomon, & C., Calhoun, esae .M 20) nsnoymtrmcaim nDsats odrvru reflex. versus Wonder Descartes: in mechanisms sensory–motor On (2003). J.-M. Beyssade, ablt .M 19) ila ae’ter feoin:Fligi h picture. the in Filling emotions: of theory James’ William (1999). M. J. Barbalet, oig .G (1929). G. E. Boring, adi,J . tu,G . ly ogn .(9110) ntnt nJ .Blwn(Ed.), Baldwin M. J. (Ed.), In Instinct. Donnelly (1901–1905). E. C. Morgan, M. Lloyd In & F., emotion. G. Stout, of M., theory J. Baldwin, other James’s William (1992). R. J. Averril, References 1]Sto 19)adohr,icuigCtiga 17)adGurgr(95 p 278–290), pp. (1995, Gaukroger and (1978) Cottingham including others, and (1998) Sutton [13] (not brain the in impression the that says Descartes 70, Article from quoted passage the In [12] the of ‘‘good the of notion the whether of question a is there metaphysics Descartes’ In [11] hti nemotion? an is What nB ilso .Gma (Eds.), Gombay A. & Williston B. In hoyo oilBehaviour Social of Theory uaiyBooks. Humanity itoayo hlspyadpsychology and philosophy of Dictionary James William of Association. legacy Psychological the Reinterpreting osiuns)t ohmnaias otnigta eivkdfl estosand sensations felt 2005b, (Hatfield, invoked reflective interpretation this to he reject I press). opposed that behavior. in animal (as contending nonhuman explain sentience animals, to genuine passions nonhuman denied to actually consciousness) Descartes Hatfield, whether see more, question (for article present as the hence of and scope impressions, the previous represent beyond 2007). to are dissimilar they would as questions do alone impression These memory non-intentional the ‘‘rare’’? Or corporeal mark other the case to beings? which (or function in concerning relation human to objects, have causal those in representational questions to mind-independent resemblance) cause their a as raises such they of relation, inherit virtue This that in they states rare. objects Must mental external as the impressions. object from brain content an of 6). ‘‘represents’’ content a. representational 11:330–331, state) clock, (AT broken mental constructed’’ a is like a it that, which one i.e., ‘‘for human ‘‘broken,’’ movements is well-functioning the that a performs body longer presupposes a no leaves complex press). mind mind–body in the the 1992, machine; (Hatfield, bodily of might design we existence machine-like machine, the the a its invokes as considering Further, body subsequently by the conceiving well-functioning Descartes In its 7:89). Moreover, to assess (AT this generalize body’’ machines. however, [human] not the as may clocks; of and animals of ‘‘well-being ‘‘errors’’ by ascribed functioning of suggested be the discussions can as about God other complex, or 7:85) mind–body nature and (AT whether the 1978, concerns VI to passage Meditation Rodis-Lewis, relation in in (e.g., wording understood officially scholars some be Some has must body attributions. 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