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NPA-OPS 44 (JAR-OPS 1) Cabin Crew Exit Training

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NPA-OPS 44 (JAR-OPS 1) Cabin Crew Exit Training NPA-OPS 44 (JAR-OPS 1) Cabin Crew Exit Training NPA-OPS 44 (JAR-OPS 1) Cabin Crew Exit Training CJAA/OPS DIV Page 1 of 33 29/05/2006 Adopted at JAAC 06-2, May 2006 NPA-OPS 44 (JAR-OPS 1) Cabin Crew Exit Training NPA-OPS 44 NPA to JAR-OPS Part 1 (Commercial Air Transportation Aeroplanes) This NPA is comprised of:- 1. Explanatory Note 1.1. Regulatory Background 1.2. Regulatory Impact Assessment 2. Text Proposals For ease of reference, the proposals are shown in much the same format as they would appear in the JAR. Thus, Section 1 material is shown in columnar format and Section 2 reads across the page. The proposed changes to the text are shown by a combination of strikeout and bold italics. The latter indicates proposed new text (or numbering). Paragraph/s affected:- Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 1.1010 Conversion and Differences Training Paragraph (c) (1) Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 1.1015 Recurrent Training Paragraph (c) (1) Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 1.1020 Refresher Training Paragraph (a) (3) IEM ACJ OPS 1.1005/1.1010/1.1015/1.1020 Representative Training Devices Paragraph (2) (c) New Para 3 Comment Response Document (CRD) CJAA/OPS DIV Page 2 of 33 29/05/2006 Adopted at JAAC 06-2, May 2006 NPA-OPS 44 (JAR-OPS 1) Cabin Crew Exit Training 1. Explanatory Note 1.1. Regulatory Background 1.1.1 This NPA originated from a proposal to examine the issues regarding the current text of Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 1.1010 (Conversion and differences training) paragraph (c) (1), Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 1.1015 (Recurrent training) paragraph (c) (1), Appendix 1 to JAR- OPS 1.1020 (Refresher training) paragraph (a) (3) and IEM ACJ OPS 1.1005/1.1010/1.1015/1.1020 in respect of cabin crew exit training, to determine if changes are required in order to provide clarification and leave no doubt as to what is actually required. This proposal takes into account recommendations made by the United Kingdom Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB). Such recommendations were made in respect of unsatisfactory levels of cabin crew training for exit operation identified by the AAIB during investigations into emergency evacuations. 1.1.2 Introduction In an emergency requiring an evacuation of an aeroplane, the cabin crew are responsible for rapidly and effectively evacuating passengers through the emergency exits and down the evacuation slides, where installed. The first action to be taken by cabin crew members is to ensure that there are no external hazards that might affect the safe evacuation of passengers. The next action is to open emergency exits and to deploy the evacuation slides, where installed. This is a vital part of a cabin crew members safety responsibility and this is enforced by JAR-OPS 1.1025 which states that “…. each cabin crew member undergoes a check covering the training received in order to verify his proficiency in carrying out normal and emergency safety duties.” The current text in Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 1.1010 paragraph (c) (1) states that an operator shall ensure that “Each cabin crew member operates and actually opens all normal and emergency exits for passenger evacuation in an aeroplane or representative training device….”. Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 1.1015 paragraph (c) (1) states: “An operator shall ensure that, at intervals not exceeding 3 years, recurrent training also: (1) includes the operation and actual opening of all normal and emergency exits for passenger evacuation in an aeroplane or representative training device.” Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 1.1020 paragraph (a) (3) states ‘The operation and actual opening of all normal and emergency exits for passenger evacuation in an aeroplane or representative training device’. The associated IEM ACJ states: “A representative training device may be used for the training of cabin crew as an alternative to the use of an actual aeroplane or required equipment”. The IEM ACJ also states: “Where practicable, exits in all modes of operation (particularly in relation to method of operation, their mass and balance and operating forces)...”. 1.1.3 Types of Emergency Exits and how they operate Aeroplane doors and exits differ considerably in their design and operating capabilities and characteristics. The following is a brief summary of exits and their basic operating systems: • Exits without assist evacuation slides: These include floor level exits on aeroplane types which have sill heights of less than 6 foot or Type III or Type IV exits which apart from Airbus A320, Boeing 757 and Boeing 767, do not have off-wing evacuation slides. For exits that are not equipped with evacuation slides there is usually only one mode of operation and that is in the manual mode. In other words there is no difference in the operation of the exit in normal operation to that of an emergency CJAA/OPS DIV Page 3 of 33 29/05/2006 Adopted at JAAC 06-2, May 2006 NPA-OPS 44 (JAR-OPS 1) Cabin Crew Exit Training evacuation. • Exits without power assist means: These include some with Type I floor level exits such as the Boeing 737 and MD 80 series aeroplanes. These exits are equipped with an evacuation slide which has to be manually dragged from the slide bustle when the exit is in the armed mode with the girt bar attached to the cabin floor at the door sill. The physical effort needed to open the exit and deploy the evacuation slide will differ between aeroplane types and will very much depend on the size and weight of the evacuation slide. • Exits with power assist means: An exit with a ‘power-assist’ system is one which when the door handle has been operated and initial door motion has been achieved, an assist system takes over powering the door open and dragging the slide from the slide bustle. Such systems were first installed on Type ‘A’ exits on wide-bodied aeroplanes in order to accommodate the much larger dual lane slides required by JAR/FAR 25. These ‘power-assist’ systems are now installed on narrow-bodied aeroplane types such as the Boeing 757, Airbus A319/320/321. If the ‘power-assist’ system fails then the slide can still be deployed but will again depend on the physical effort described above. More recently there has been a new development with floor level Type I exit slides being installed in an external compartment just below the exit (eg. Airbus A321 and as also proposed for A380 upper deck slides). • Type IV exits: These are the smaller of the self-help exits that have a removable hatch normally operated by passengers and ejected through the exit aperture. Type IV exits are not equipped with evacuation slides. These exits are only found on narrow-bodied aeroplane, eg. Fokker F27, small commuter aeroplane and executive jets. Type IV exits are not ‘power-assisted’. • Type III exits: Slightly larger than Type IV exits and usually significantly heavier but with basically the same procedure for operation. They are usually located in the middle of the aeroplane over the wing, but can also be located under the wing, eg. BAe 146-300. In the case of the Airbus A319/320, Boeing 757 and Boeing 767 these exits have an integral off-wing evacuation slide installed in an exterior compartment. Since the evacuation slide is not attached to a girt bar or installed inside an internal bustle, there is no additional force required to operate the exit in the armed mode. In fact some of these exits remain in the armed mode at all times apart from maintenance checks. Conventional Type III exits are not ‘power-assisted’. • Boeing new generation Type III exits: Although similar in design in terms of size and weight, the new generation Type III exits installed on Boeing 737-600/700/800 series aeroplanes have a semi-automatic operation. The single action of operating the exit handle opens the exit outwards with the hatch remaining connected to the aeroplane by the installation of an upper hinge. • Type I exits: Type I exits are normally installed on narrow-bodied aeroplane, but can also be found on wide-bodied designs such as the Boeing 767 (ie. Doors 3). Type I exits are equipped with an evacuation slide when the exit sill height exceeds 6 feet. Some Type I exits are equipped with evacuation slides and ‘power-assist’ systems as described above. • Type A exits: Type ‘A’ exits are only to be found on wide-bodied aeroplane and are required to be equipped with dual lane evacuation slides. All Type ‘A’ exits are equipped with ‘power-assist’ systems in order to meet the ease of operation requirements of JAR/FAR 25. This is necessary in order to accommodate the difficulty of dragging the much larger and heavier slide out of the slide bustle. Achieving door opening and slide deployment without an active ‘power-assist’ system CJAA/OPS DIV Page 4 of 33 29/05/2006 Adopted at JAAC 06-2, May 2006 NPA-OPS 44 (JAR-OPS 1) Cabin Crew Exit Training would be very difficult for a single crew member and would probably require the assistance of another crew member or a passenger. 1.1.4 Summary of exit types: There are basically four types of exits in respect of modes of operation, which are as follows: a) Exits which do not have evacuation slides and therefore are only operated in the manual mode. b) Exits which have evacuation slides attached by means of a girt bar and without a ‘power-assist’ system.
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