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The Powers of the European Parliament

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The Powers of the European Parliament BRIEFING The powers of the European Parliament SUMMARY Since its inception in 1951, the European Parliament has come a long way. Initially a consultative body composed of delegations of national parliaments, it became a directly elected institution, obtained budgetary and legislative powers, and now exercises influence over most aspects of EU affairs. Together with representatives of national governments, who sit in the Council, Parliament co-decides on European legislation, in what could be seen as a bicameral legislature at EU level. It can reject or amend the European Commission's proposals before adopting them so that they become law. Together with the Council of the EU, it adopts the EU budget and controls its implementation. Another core set of European Parliament prerogatives concerns the scrutiny of the EU executive – mainly the Commission. Such scrutiny can take many forms, including parliamentary questions, committees of inquiry and special committees, and scrutiny of delegated and implementing acts. Parliament has made use of these instruments to varying degrees. Parliament has the power to dismiss the Commission (motion of censure), and it plays a significant role in the latter's appointment process. Parliament has a say over the very foundations of the EU. Its consent is required before any new country joins the EU, and before a withdrawal treaty is concluded if a country decides to leave it. Most international agreements entered into by the EU with third countries also require Parliament's consent. Parliament can initiate Treaty reform, and also the 'Article 7(1) TEU' procedure, aimed at determining whether there is a (risk of) serious breach of EU values by a Member State. In this Briefing An evolving institution Parliament as legislator Budgetary powers Parliamentary scrutiny Investiture of the European Commission Agenda-setting 'Constitutional' foundations of the EU International agreements EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service Author: Laura Tilindyte Members' Research Service PE 642.278 – November 2019 EN EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service An evolving institution Since the establishment of the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, the European Parliament has come a long way. Initially a consultative body composed of delegations of national parliaments, it has continually and successfully pushed for more powers and increased parliamentarisation of the EU political system.1 Soon after its establishment, the Assembly renamed itself the European Parliament (1962). It then obtained budgetary prerogatives (1970, 1975), became a directly elected institution (1979) and obtained legislative powers (1986). The number of areas in which Parliament decides on an equal footing with the Council has grown continually over time, as has Parliament's role in the Commission's appointment process, the conclusion of international agreements and scrutiny of Treaty provisions on democratic principles delegated decision-making (delegated and implementing acts). Over time, Parliament Article 10 TEU has become an equal partner in the 'triangle' 1. The functioning of the Union shall be founded on of EU law-making institutions (Parliament, representative democracy. Council and Commission) and now exercises 2. Citizens are directly represented at Union level in the 2 influence over most aspects of EU affairs. As European Parliament. the only directly elected institution at EU level, the European Parliament is at the core Member States are represented in the European Council by of representative democracy, which forms the their Heads of State or Government and in the Council by their governments, themselves democratically accountable foundation of EU democracy (Article 10(1) of either to their national Parliaments, or to their citizens. the Treaty on European Union, TEU). It remains a continually evolving institution, Article 14 TEU whose ascent should be seen in the broader 1. The European Parliament shall, jointly with the Council, context of developments that have been exercise legislative and budgetary functions. It shall crucial in shaping the EU's institutional exercise functions of political control and consultation as landscape. These include, for instance, the laid down in the Treaties. It shall elect the President of the advent of direct elections (1979), successive Commission. Treaty reforms strengthening both the 2. The European Parliament shall be composed of supranational and the intergovernmental representatives of the Union's citizens. [...] elements of the EU political system, the 3. The members of the European Parliament shall be elected emergence of the European Council as a fully for a term of five years by direct universal suffrage in a free fledged impetus-giving EU institution, and and secret ballot. the un-ending quest for increased legitimacy of the EU political system. Parliament as legislator As is the case with most parliaments, legislative work is at the core of the European Parliament's activities. Together with representatives of national governments sitting in the Council, Parliament co-decides on European legislation as part of what could be seen as a bicameral legislature at EU level. It rejects, adopts or, commonly, amends Commission proposals. Parliament's involvement depends on the policy area and may imply (a) being consulted, (b) giving consent or (c) co- legislating on an equal footing with the Council (ordinary legislative procedure). In addition, in a few cases, EU Treaties envisage the adoption of a legislative act by Parliament, after obtaining the consent of the Council and/or the Commission (d). This is the case, for example, concerning the right to set up committees of inquiry (Article 226 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) and regarding the statute of the European Ombudsman (Article 228 TFEU). The consultation procedure (a) involves the Council obtaining Parliament's opinion before adopting a legislative act, but this opinion is not binding on the Council. This procedure applies, for example, in the area of family law rules with cross-border implications (Article 81(3) TFEU). The 2 The powers of the European Parliament consent procedure (b) means that Parliament may essentially veto a measure but not amend it (e.g. measures to combat discrimination on grounds other than nationality, Article 19(1) TFEU). The ordinary legislative procedure (c) consists of the joint adoption of an act by the European Parliament and the Council on a proposal of the Commission. Here, both legislators need to agree on an identical text before it becomes law, which may take up to three readings in each of the institutions. This process can take typically 18, and even as much as 40, months, from the Commission's proposal until the act’s signature.3 Some acts, however, are adopted exceptionally quickly, as was the case for the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) and some Brexit- related legislation during the 2014-2019 parliamentary term.4 More often than not, this process is accompanied by 'trilogues' – informal negotiations between the co-legislators aimed at reaching agreement on a particular file. The number of areas in which Parliament co-legislates in the ordinary legislative procedure has grown over time and, currently, most legislative acts are adopted following the ordinary legislative procedure, including laws concerning the EU's internal market, the environment, consumer protection, data protection, regional development, agriculture and fisheries, security and justice, energy, etc. During the 2014-2019 legislature (8th parliamentary term), the EU legislature adopted a total of 401 acts under the ordinary legislative procedure (compared with 488 during the 2009- 2014 parliamentary term). Most were in the areas of justice and home affairs, economic and monetary affairs, environment, public health and food safety.5 Parliament has no or only limited legislative powers in the areas of, for example, taxation, health services, education and foreign policy. The above demonstrates that Parliament is an important player in the EU legislative process; although the final outcome generally also depends on the action of other institutions and compromises forged in the course of often lengthy and complex negotiations. Furthermore, Parliament's legislative powers depend on the area involved and vary considerably. It is in this context that, in 2017, Parliament called for the remaining special legislative procedures (consultation or consent) to be replaced with the ordinary legislative procedure. Budgetary powers Together with the Council, Parliament is one arm of the EU's 'budgetary authority' – it sets the budget and controls its implementation. Here, too, Parliament has long sought greater powers, which continue to vary depending on the procedure involved. Regarding the revenue side of the budget, Parliament's role is the least developed (consultation procedure), as Member States have traditionally been eager to keep control over the EU's 'own resources'. The latter are largely financed by contributions from Member States based on their gross national income, contributions based on national value added tax income and customs duties imposed on imports. Here, the Council decides unanimously and after consulting Parliament; a national ratification process is also involved (Article 311 TFEU). On the expenditure side of the budget, Parliament's powers are more far-reaching. The long-term (seven-year) financial perspective
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