DOCSLIB.ORG

State of the Industry: Russian Oil's Present & Future

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
State of the Industry: Russian Oil's Present & Future State of the Industry: Russian Oil’s Present & Future Vadim Makhov, Chairman of the Board, OMZ Mikhail Margelov, Vice President, OMZ Tom Reed, Chief Executive Officer, JKX Thane Gustafson, Senior Director & Advisor, Russian & Caspian Energy, IHS Maxim Nechaev, Director, Consulting, Russian & Caspian Energy Matthew Sagers, Managing Director, Russian & Caspian Energy, IHS (Chair) FEBRUARY 2016 GEOPOLITICAL ISSUES OF OIL TRANSPORTATION Mikhail V. Margelov, Vice-president, Transneft, JSC © 2016 IHS. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Geopolitical issues of oil transportation / February 2016 Geopolitics C H I N A C H I N A M O N G O L I A © 2016 IHS. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 2 C H I N A Geopolitical issues of oil transportation / February 2016 Transneft, JSC N O R W A Y Barents sea S W E D E N F I N L A N D Moscow Oil Product Pipeline Sever project 45.000 Ust-Luga Primorsk 500 22 M 90 % POLAND miles LITHUANIA St. Petersburg B E L A R U S Zapolyarye Kuyumba – Taishet U K R A I N E R U S S I A N Zapolyarye – Purpe F E D E R A T I O N Purpe PS ESPO Sea of Yug project Okhotsk Novorossiysk Kuyumba Tikhoretsk Samotlor Leadway to Komsomolsky Refinery Samara Tuapse Volgograd Komsomolsk-on-Amur Taishet Khabarovsk Existing mainline pipelines Legend Angarsk Mainline pipelines under construction and designed pipelines Existing mainline oil products pipelines Sea of Japan Designed mainline oil products pipelines M O N G O L I A Construction of mainline pipelines Kozmino SSOP C H I N A C H I N A Construction of mainline oil products pipelines © 2016 IHS. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 3 C H I N A Geopolitical issues of oil transportation / February 2016 Russian oil export: European direction - Friendship pipeline Pipeline Designed transport capacity Friendship pipeline facilities Friendship 81 mln t/year pipeline Russian oil Northern Direction Southern Direction © 2016 IHS. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 4 Geopolitical issues of oil transportation / February 2016 European direction: Baltic Pipeline System, Baltic Pipeline System - II Pipeline Primorsk Seaport Designed Russian transport Destination capacities (BPS-I) facilities Federation Ust-Luga Seaport Baltic Pipeline System, Primorsk 60 mln (BPS-II) Seaport t/year Amsterdam, Baltic Pipeline System - II Rotterdam Ust-Luga 30 mln etc. Seaport t/year Belarus Germany Poland Czech Ukraine Slovakia Hungary Bosnia and Herzegovina © 2016 IHS. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 5 Geopolitical issues of oil transportation / February 2016 Eastern direction of Russian oil export: Eastern Siberia – Pacific Ocean pipeline system Republic of Sakha Krasnoyarsk Region Legend - oil pipeline in operation ESPO-I - PSs under construction ESPO-II - PSs under modernization Khabarovsk Region Amur - PSs in operation Republic of Region - sea terminal Buryatia PS №21 Irkutsk «Skovorodino» Pipe-end Region PS «Taishet» Transbaikal Mohe Region The People’s Republic of China «Kozmino» Mongolia Daqing SSOP © 2016 IHS. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 6 Geopolitical issues of oil transportation / February 2016 International Association of oil transporters International Association of oil transporters Total length of IAOT members’ trunk pipelines is more than 50 thousand miles © 2016 IHS. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 7 Geopolitical issues of oil transportation / February 2016 Caspian pipeline consortium Black Sea Russian Federation PS Atyrau PS Astrakhan PS Kropotkin PS Komsomolsk Tengiz Novorossiysk Kazakhstan Caspian Sea The largest international oil transportation project with participation of Russia, Kazakhstan and world’s leading oil companies Was established for construction and operation of the trunk oil pipeline more than 930 miles long © 2016 IHS. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 8 Geopolitical issues of oil transportation / February 2016 Transneft, JSC Thank you for your attention! Transneft, JSC +7 (495) 950-81-78 www.transneft.ru © 2016 IHS. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 9 State of the Industry: Russian oil’s present and future Matthew J. Sagers, Thane Gustafson, John C. Webb, Maxim Nechaev 23 February 2016 © 2016 IHS. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Key themes • General resilience of Russian production to challenges of 2015 • Evolution of international sanctions and their impact on Russia’s oil sector • Implications of the tax maneuver and industry’s search for alternative financing mechanisms © 2016 IHS. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 2 Main factors in resilience of Russian oil production Matthew J. Sagers, Managing Director, Russian and Caspian Energy Advisory Service and Eurasian Transportation Forum, IHS, +1 202 857 5178, [email protected] © 2016 IHS. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 3 Slight upward tick in oil production continued in 2015, supported by resurgent development drilling • Oil output up 1.4% in 2015, to 534.0 million Index of monthly Russian crude oil production (month of previous year = 100) metric tons (MMt) (10.73 MMb/d) 103 102 • Main growth ingredients include 101 • Ongoing condensate boom: Estimated 17.6% jump in 100 99 condensate output in 2015, to 30.0 MMt (707,000 b/d) • New field development: East Siberian growth slowing, but remains key factor along with other frontier regions Source: IHS Energy © 2016 IHS • “Brownfield” redevelopment, especially in Volga-Urals Index of monthly Russian development drilling • Development drilling rebounded in 2015 (month of previous year = 100) • Development drilling volumes fell by 7% in 2014: first annual 130 120 drop since 2009 110 100 • Number of meters drilled surged by 11.3% in 2015 overall 90 (and by over 20% during several individual months, year on 80 year) Source: IHS Energy © 2016 IHS © 2016 IHS. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 4 But gradually slowing trend in Russian oil production seen month on month signals fragility of growth • Reduced cash flows from lower prices and Monthly Russian oil production inability to borrow ultimately leads to lower 47 45 capital expenditures (capex), including less 43 MMt 41 development drilling, new field development 39 37 • Size and diversity of Russian oil patch provide flexibility to minimize impact on near-term production for companies: shifting investment to projects with shorter gestation periods Source: IHS Energy © 2016 IHS • So near-term impact virtually negligible, although longer term West Siberian versus other Russian oil may be more of a problem production 350 300 • Moderating and offsetting West Siberian 250 200 decline remain key challenges MMt 150 100 • Yamal-Nenets condensate boom cushions West Siberian decline, but oil production in Khanty-Mansiysk, accounting for about 45% of Russian total, down by 2.9% in 2015 (versus West Siberian oil production Other Russian oil production *Preliminary estimate. 1.6% decline for 2014 overall) Source: IHS Energy © 2016 IHS © 2016 IHS. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 5 Upstream oil capex by Russian majors continues to rise in ruble terms, but declines in dollar terms in 2014–15 owing to devaluation Composition of capital investment in oil extraction Composition of capital investment in oil extraction in in Russia for Russian oil majors (rubles) Russia for Russian oil majors (dollars) Devaluation in 2009 and 2014–15 1,200 30 1,000 25 800 20 600 15 400 10 Billion rubles Billion dollars 200 5 0 0 Categories other than production Categories other than production Equipment not included in industrial construction Equipment not included in industrial construction Exploration drilling Exploration drilling Development drilling Development drilling Industrial construction Industrial construction Source: IHS Energy © 2016 IHS Source: IHS Energy © 2016 IHS © 2016 IHS. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 6 For Russian oil industry, decline in oil price largely offset by dual impacts of ruble depreciation, tax regime structure • Ruble depreciation cushioned oil companies: World oil price and ruble-dollar exchange rate, 2014–16 most of their production costs paid in rubles, 120 80 80 60 while export revenues earned in dollars 40 40 20 • Ruble value closely tied to oil revenues and oil prices $/bbl 0 0 US Dated Brent, Dated • Development drilling cost dynamic illustrative Rubles/dollar Dated Brent Exchange rate (rubles per dollar) Note: RHS = right-hand side. • Average capex per meter almost flat in ruble terms in 2015, but Source: IHS Energy © 2016 IHS declined by estimated 38% in dollar terms Change in Russian oil majors’ per unit • Oil sector tax structure also mitigated impact development drilling costs in rubles and dollars, of price decline on industry 2015 versus 2014 (est.) 120 • Key Russian oil taxes—upstream mineral resources extraction 80 tax (MRET) and export duty—tied to export price of Urals Blend: 40 Russian budget captured ~85% of each incremental revenue Index 0 dollar when prices rose = (2014100) Ruble capex per meter Dollar capex per meter • So when oil prices fell, most of reduction in revenue absorbed by Source: IHS Energy 2014 2015 © 2016 IHS federal budget rather than companies © 2016 IHS. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 7 Decline in incremental production from new fields, as companies shift spending to less capital-intensive upstream projects • Particularly sharp drop in new field activity New Russian oil production (oil from fields put in in 2015 operation during previous five years) • Production from fields brought on stream in last five 50 1000 years fell by 52.4%, to only 19.4 MMt (about 390,000 b/d) 40 800 • Development drilling at new fields down by 31.2%, to 1.1 million meters 30 600 • Number of new well completions at new fields fell MMt 24.2%, to 405 20 400 Thousand b/d Thousand • Volume of “new oil” has fallen to level last 10 200 seen in early 2000s • But number of new well completions at all 0 0
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Geopolitical Impact on Transformation of Territorial Organization of Russian Pipeline Transport in the Post-Soviet Time
    International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy ISSN: 2146-4553 available at http: www.econjournals.com International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, 2016, 6(4), 782-788. Geopolitical Impact on Transformation of Territorial Organization of Russian Pipeline Transport in the Post-Soviet Time Tatyana I. Pototskaya1*, Alexander P. Katrovskiy2, Vladimir I. Chasovskiy3 1Department of Geography, Natural-Geographical Faculty, Smolensk State University, Smolensk Oblast, Russia, 2Department of Service and Tourism, Smolensk Humanitarian University, Smolensk, Russia, 3Department of Geography, Land Use and Spatial Planning, Institute of Environmental Management, Territorial Development and Urban Construction, Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Russia. *Email: [email protected] ABSTRACT The article presents the research on transformation of territorial organization of Russian pipeline transport in the post-Soviet time, considering its relations with neighbouring countries. The research identifies general ways of such transformation: The influence of Russia’s desire to escape from the dictate of the transit countries exporting energy; the impact of Russia’s struggle for the transportation of gas and oil extracted in the Caspian Sea basin; the influence of the struggle for the transportation of oil and gas in the Asia-Pacific region. A new database including the main pipelines and sea ports in Russia, revealed correlations in the development of pipeline transport in the post-Soviet period with the development of infrastructure of the country’s sea transport. The article identifies positive changes in the transport infrastructure (construction of Russian alternative pipeline projects), which will reduce the degree of Russian dependence on relations with neighbouring countries, as well as negative changes (construction of alternative Russian pipeline projects).
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Oil and Gas Challenges
    Order Code RL33212 Russian Oil and Gas Challenges Updated June 20, 2007 Robert Pirog Specialist in Energy Economics and Policy Resources, Science, and Industry Division Russian Oil and Gas Challenges Summary Russia is a major player in world energy markets. It has more proven natural gas reserves than any other country, is among the top ten in proven oil reserves, is the largest exporter of natural gas, the second largest oil exporter, and the third largest energy consumer. Energy exports have been a major driver of Russia’s economic growth over the last five years, as Russian oil production has risen strongly and world oil prices have been very high. This type of growth has made the Russian economy dependent on oil and natural gas exports and vulnerable to fluctuations in oil prices. The Russian government has moved to take control of the country’s energy supplies. It broke up the previously large energy company Yukos and acquired its main oil production subsidiary. The Duma voted to give Gazprom, the state- controlled natural gas monopoly the exclusive right to export natural gas; Russia moved to limit participation by foreign companies in oil and gas production and Gazprom gained majority control of the Sakhalin energy projects. Russia has agreed with Germany to supply Germany and, eventually, the UK by building a natural gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea, bypassing Ukraine and Poland. In late 2006 and early 2007, Russia cut off and/or threatened to cut off gas or oil supplies going to and/or through Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Belarus in the context of price and/or transit negotiations — actions that damaged its reputation as a reliable energy supplier.
    [Show full text]
  • Wiiw Research Report 367: EU Gas Supplies Security
    f December Research Reports | 367 | 2010 Gerhard Mangott EU Gas Supplies Security: Russian and EU Perspectives, the Role of the Caspian, the Middle East and the Maghreb Countries Gerhard Mangott EU Gas Supplies Security: Gerhard Mangott is Professor at the Department Russian and EU of Political Science, University of Innsbruck. Perspectives, the Role of This paper was prepared within the framework of the Caspian, the the project ‘European Energy Security’, financed from the Jubilee Fund of the Oesterreichische Na- Middle East and the tionalbank (Project No. 115). Maghreb Countries Contents Summary ......................................................................................................................... i 1 Russia’s strategic objectives: breaking Ukrainian transit dominance in gas trade with the EU by export routes diversification ............................................................... 1 1.1 Nord Stream (Severny Potok) (a.k.a. North European Gas Pipeline, NEGP) ... 7 1.2 South Stream (Yuzhnyi Potok) and Blue Stream II ......................................... 12 2 The EU’s South European gas corridor: options for guaranteed long-term gas supplies at reasonable cost ............................................................................... 20 2.1 Gas resources in the Caspian region ............................................................. 23 2.2 Gas export potential in the Caspian and the Middle East and its impact on the EU’s Southern gas corridor .................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • US Sanctions on Russia
    U.S. Sanctions on Russia Updated January 17, 2020 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R45415 SUMMARY R45415 U.S. Sanctions on Russia January 17, 2020 Sanctions are a central element of U.S. policy to counter and deter malign Russian behavior. The United States has imposed sanctions on Russia mainly in response to Russia’s 2014 invasion of Cory Welt, Coordinator Ukraine, to reverse and deter further Russian aggression in Ukraine, and to deter Russian Specialist in European aggression against other countries. The United States also has imposed sanctions on Russia in Affairs response to (and to deter) election interference and other malicious cyber-enabled activities, human rights abuses, the use of a chemical weapon, weapons proliferation, illicit trade with North Korea, and support to Syria and Venezuela. Most Members of Congress support a robust Kristin Archick Specialist in European use of sanctions amid concerns about Russia’s international behavior and geostrategic intentions. Affairs Sanctions related to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are based mainly on four executive orders (EOs) that President Obama issued in 2014. That year, Congress also passed and President Rebecca M. Nelson Obama signed into law two acts establishing sanctions in response to Russia’s invasion of Specialist in International Ukraine: the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Trade and Finance Ukraine Act of 2014 (SSIDES; P.L. 113-95/H.R. 4152) and the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (UFSA; P.L. 113-272/H.R. 5859). Dianne E. Rennack Specialist in Foreign Policy In 2017, Congress passed and President Trump signed into law the Countering Russian Influence Legislation in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA; P.L.
    [Show full text]
  • FSU/CEE Insight: Russia Special
    Analytics. Studies. Modelling.The Oil and Gas Market’s Independent Research Centre. FSU/CEE Insight: Russia Special Issue 17 | 2-May-19 Weekly Report Editorial Nightmare Supply Scenario for FSU/CEE Refiners A full halt on Druzhba flows has refiners along the line scrambling to find alternative crude supplies Outage to affect Poland and Germany much less than Belarus A prolonged Druzhba outage would put an estimated 600,000 b/d of refining capacity at risk s we write this, flows along crude imported via the Druzhba have also been affected. However, it one of the oldest, longest, and pipeline always remained the also means that flows to Russia’s A most important pieces of oil baseload crude in these refineries. biggest export terminal, the Baltic pipeline infrastructure in the world Hence the current outage is an port of Primorsk, have not been are severely disrupted. We are of extremely significant event, contaminated. course referring to Russia’s Druzhba particularly as it may take months (Friendship) pipeline, which remains rather than weeks for the pipeline to A note on the contamination. We the lifeline to several Eastern return to normal operations. understand that the strategy being European and FSU refineries. The employed by the Russians is to northern leg of the pipe supplies Flows stopped after it became blend the crude down to levels Belarus, Poland, and eastern evident that the crude flowing along where the organic chlorides are no Germany, while the southern leg the pipeline was contaminated by longer high enough to cause serves refineries in Hungary, organic chloride in concentrations of problems.
    [Show full text]
  • Argus Nefte Transport
    Argus Nefte Transport Oil transportation logistics in the former Soviet Union Volume XVI, 5, May 2017 Primorsk loads first 100,000t diesel cargo Russia’s main outlet for 10ppm diesel exports, the Baltic port of Primorsk, shipped a 100,000t cargo for the first time this month. The diesel was loaded on 4 May on the 113,300t Dong-A Thetis, owned by the South Korean shipping company Dong-A Tanker. The 100,000t cargo of Rosneft product was sold to trading company Vitol for delivery to the Amsterdam-Rotter- dam-Antwerp region, a market participant says. The Dong-A Thetis was loaded at Russian pipeline crude exports berth 3 or 4 — which can handle crude and diesel following a recent upgrade, and mn b/d can accommodate 90,000-150,000t vessels with 15.5m draught. 6.0 Transit crude Russian crude It remains unclear whether larger loadings at Primorsk will become a regular 5.0 occurrence. “Smaller 50,000-60,000t cargoes are more popular and the terminal 4.0 does not always have the opportunity to stockpile larger quantities of diesel for 3.0 export,” a source familiar with operations at the outlet says. But the loading is significant considering the planned 10mn t/yr capacity 2.0 addition to the 15mn t/yr Sever diesel pipeline by 2018. Expansion to 25mn t/yr 1.0 will enable Transneft to divert more diesel to its pipeline system from ports in 0.0 Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr the Baltic states, in particular from the pipeline to the Latvian port of Ventspils.
    [Show full text]
  • Joint Stewardship of the Barents Sea: Russian and Norwegian Policy Expectations for Preventing Offshore Oil Spills
    Joint stewardship of the Barents Sea: Russian and Norwegian policy expectations for preventing offshore oil spills Item Type Thesis Authors Bouffard, Troy J. Download date 04/10/2021 20:10:16 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/11122/6818 JOINT STEWARDSHIP OF THE BARENTS SEA: RUSSIAN AND NORWEGIAN POLICY EXPECTATIONS FOR PREVENTING OFFSHORE OIL SPILLS By Troy J. Bouffard, B.A. A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Arctic and Northern Studies © Troy J. Bouffard APPROVED: Brandon M. Boylan, Committee Chair Mary F. Ehrlander, Committee Member Brian Kassof, Committee Member Mary F. Ehrlander, Director Arctic and Northern Studies Program Todd Sherman, Dean of the College of Liberal Arts Michael A. Castellini, Interim Dean Graduate School Abstract As Arctic environmental conditions fluctuate, ongoing economic-related agreements established for the Barents Region continue to support and attract Norwegian and Russian oil- producing expeditions within the shared maritime zone. Increased industrial activity throughout the Circumpolar North heightens the need to understand the factors that influence policies responsible for protecting the environment - in particular, preventive measures. Agency theory provides the framework for an analysis of various dynamics that influence the Norwegian and Russian governments (principals) as they develop and enforce rules that regulate petroleum industries (agents). The research question asks about differences between the prevention policies of the two nations even though both acknowledge a very similar need to protect the Barents. Since the regulatory and governance structures cannot fully explain the differences between the two countries’ prevention policies, the hypothesis presents an argument that the strategic goals of Norway and Russia in the global political economy provide sufficient conditions for policy divergence.
    [Show full text]
  • 2020 Annual Report
    Online Annual Report Gazprom Neft Performance review Sustainable 2020 at a glance 62 Resource base and production development CONTENTS 81 Refining and manufacturing 4 Geographical footprint 94 Sales of oil and petroleum products 230 Sustainable development 6 Gazprom Neft at a glance 114 Financial performance 234 Health, safety and environment (HSE) 8 Gazprom Neft’s investment case 241 Environmental safety 10 2020 highlights 250 HR Management 12 Letter from the Chairman of the Board of Directors 254 Social policy Technological Strategic report development Appendices 264 Consolidated financial statements as at and for the year ended 31 December 2020, with the 16 Letter from the Chairman of the Management Board 122 Innovation management independent auditor’s report About the Report 18 Market overview 131 2020 highlights and key projects 355 Company history This Report by Public Joint Stock Company Gazprom Neft (“Gazprom 28 2020 challenges 135 Import substitution 367 Structure of the Gazprom Neft Group Neft PJSC”, the “company”) for 2020 includes the results of operational activities of Gazprom Neft PJSC and its subsidiaries, 34 2030 Strategy 370 Information on energy consumption at Gazprom collectively referred to as the Gazprom Neft Group (the “Group”). 38 Business model Neft Gazprom Neft PJSC is the parent company of the Group and provides consolidated information on the operational and financial 42 Company transformation 371 Excerpts from management’s discussion and performance of the Group’s key assets for this Annual Report. The analysis of financial condition and results of list of subsidiaries covered in this Report and Gazprom Neft PJSC’s 44 Digital transformation operations interest in their capital are disclosed in notes to the consolidated Governance system IFRS financial statements for 2020.
    [Show full text]
  • Preliminary Calculation of the EROI for the Production of Crude Oil and Light Oil Products in Russia
    Sustainability 2014, 6, 5801-5819; doi:10.3390/su6095801 OPEN ACCESS sustainability ISSN 2071-1050 www.mdpi.com/journal/sustainability Article Preliminary Calculation of the EROI for the Production of Crude Oil and Light Oil Products in Russia Alexander Safronov and Anton Sokolov * Laboratory of Geology of Oil and Gas Fields, Institute of Oil and Gas Problems SB RAS, Oktyabrskaya 1, Yakutsk 677980, Russia; E-Mail: [email protected] * Author to whom correspondence should be addressed; E-Mail: [email protected]; Tel.: +7-4112-390-620. Received: 14 May 2014; in revised form: 25 July 2014 / Accepted: 25 August 2014 / Published: 1 September 2014 Abstract: Russia is one of the world’s largest producers of energy resources. The production of energy resources in Russia is profitable both economically and in terms of energy production. Currently, Russian oil and gas companies have a policy of increasing energy efficiency, which will led to an increase in the energy return on investment (EROI) of both oil and gas production as a whole, and of separate companies in particular. By our calculations, the EROI for oil production in Russia differs for the different companies, and in 2012 was in the range of 22–35:1. The EROI for light oil products in 2012 was in the range of 5–13:1. Keywords: EROI; oil production; Russia 1. Introduction Over the last 110 years, the annual consumption of energy resources in the world has increased 20 times from 0.6 in 1900 to 12.4 billion tons of oil equivalent (toe) in 2012 [1,2].
    [Show full text]
  • Key Determinants for the Future of Russian Oil Production and Exports
    April 2015 Key Determinants for the Future of Russian Oil Production and Exports OIES PAPER: WPM 58 James Henderson* The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its members. Copyright © 2015 Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (Registered Charity, No. 286084) This publication may be reproduced in part for educational or non-profit purposes without special permission from the copyright holder, provided acknowledgment of the source is made. No use of this publication may be made for resale or for any other commercial purpose whatsoever without prior permission in writing from the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. ISBN 978-1-78467-027-6 *James Henderson is Senior Research Fellow at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. i April 2015 – Key Determinants for the Future of Russian Oil Production and Exports Acknowledgements I would like to thank my colleagues at the OIES for their help with this research and to those who also assisted by reviewing this paper. In particular I am very grateful for the support and comments provided by Bassam Fattouh, whose contribution was vital to the completion of my analysis. I would also like to thank my editor, Matthew Holland, for his detailed corrections and useful comments. Thanks also to the many industry executives, consultants, and analysts with whom I have discussed this topic, but as always the results of the analysis and any errors remain entirely my responsibility. ii April 2015
    [Show full text]
  • RUSSIA INTELLIGENCE Politics & Government
    N°85 - October 9 2008 Published every two weeks / International Edition CONTENTS FINANCIAL CRISIS P. 1-3 Politics & Government c FINANCIAL CRISIS The game of massacre in Moscow c The game of massacre in The financial crisis has turned into a game of massacre in Moscow. October 6, 7 and 8, the Rus- Moscow sian stock market had to suspend operations several times, which did not prevent some shares from ARMY plunging by unimaginable proportions. Gazprom lost close to a quarter of its value in one session, No- c Serdyukov draws the lessons from the war in rilsk Nickel close to 40%, these two firms being probably the worst hit because they are the indus- Georgia trial standard-bearers of the Moscow marketplace and are especially the most “liquid” assets. The ALERT entirity of the listed Russian oil sector (including Transneft and Novatek) is worth today a bit less c Russia-Iceland : the than 130 billion dollars, or the equivalent of the value of the Brazilian company Petrobras according underside of a loan with to simulations by Russian analysts, which gives an idea of the price that Russia is paying in the cur- interest rent financial crisis. Even if the collapse of the Russian markets is totally exaggerated, investors consi- FOCUS der that Russia combines three major risks : a liquidity crisis in the banking sector despite massive c Anti- corruption campaign, support by the public authorities, a heavy indebtedness by the major industrial and energy compa- national cause or lost cause nies and the drop in oil prices and most of the primary commodities, on which the economic activity BEHIND THE SCENE is based.
    [Show full text]
  • Wiiw Research Report, No
    A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Astrov, Vasily Research Report The Russian Oil and Gas Sector: Facing the New Challenges wiiw Research Report, No. 294 Provided in Cooperation with: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw) - Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche (wiiw) Suggested Citation: Astrov, Vasily (2003) : The Russian Oil and Gas Sector: Facing the New Challenges, wiiw Research Report, No. 294, The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw), Vienna This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/204066 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu wiiw Research Reports No. 294 February 2003 Vasily Astrov The Russian Oil and Gas Sector: Facing the New Challenges Vasily Astrov The Russian Oil and Vasily Astrov is wiiw research economist.
    [Show full text]