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UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository) Autocratic immigration policymaking The illiberal paradox hypothesis Natter, K. Publication date 2018 Document Version Final published version Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Natter, K. (2018). Autocratic immigration policymaking: The illiberal paradox hypothesis. (IMIn Working Papers; No. 147), (MADE project paper ; No. 4). International Migration Institute Network. https://www.migrationinstitute.org/publications/autocratic-immigration-policymaking- the-illiberal-paradox-hypothesis General rights It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). Disclaimer/Complaints regulations If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible. UvA-DARE is a service provided by the library of the University of Amsterdam (https://dare.uva.nl) Download date:01 Oct 2021 Working Papers Paper 147, November 2018 Autocratic immigration policymaking: The illiberal paradox hypothesis Katharina Natter MADE project paper 4 This paper is published by the International Migration Institute Network (IMIn). IMIn does not have an institutional view and does not aim to present one. The views expressed in this document are those of its independent author. its independent authors. The IMIn Working Papers Series The IMIn working paper series presents current research in the field of international migration. The series was initiated by the International Migration Institute (IMI) since its foundation at the University in Oxford in 2006, and has been continued since 2017 by the International Migration Institute network (IMIn).The papers in this series (1) analyse migration as part of broader global change, (2) contribute to new theoretical approaches, and (3) advance understanding of the multi-level forces driving migration and experiences of migration. Abstract Open immigration policy changes are often cast as a feature of democracy and restrictive immigration policy changes as a feature of autocracy. This paper shows that the relationship between political regime type and immigration policy change is not as clear cut. Empirical evidence suggests that the substance of immigration policy change — in terms of openness or restrictiveness — does not significantly differ between democracies and autocracies. However, political regimes shape immigration policy dynamics, with autocracies having more leeway than democracies to open (or restrict) immigration according to their economic, geopolitical, or domestic priorities. Autocracies can more easily enact open immigration policy reforms compared to democracies if they wish to do so, a dynamic I call the ‘illiberal paradox’ and illustrate with empirical examples from across the globe. I also outline the limits of the autocratic openings on immigration, related to policy implementation, sudden policy backlashes and migrants’ integration rights. To move towards more global immigration policy theories, this paper suggests combining analyses that identify ideal types of democratic or autocratic immigration policymaking with studies of the nuances of real-life political practices. This would allow scholars to conceptualise immigration policy dynamics across the entire democracy- autocracy spectrum, for instance by capturing authoritarian practices within formal democracies and democratic practices within formal autocracies. Keywords: immigration policy, policymaking, political regimes, political practices, democracy, autocracy Author: Katharina Natter, Sociology Department, University of Amsterdam, [email protected] Funding: the research leading to these results is part of the MADE (Migration as Development) Consolidator Grant project and has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Community's Horizon 2020 Programme (H2020/2015‐2020)/ERC Grant. IMIn Working Papers Series 2018, No. 147 2 Contents 1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 4 1.1 Defining key concepts ......................................... 5 1.2 Outlining the argument ........................................ 6 2 The substance of immigration policy change ........................................................................... 7 2.1 Declared immigration policy objectives ........................ 7 2.2 Enacted migration policy changes ............................. 10 3 The dynamics of immigration policy change .......................................................................... 13 3.1 The liberal paradox .......................................... 13 3.2 The illiberal paradox ........................................ 15 3.3 Empirical illustrations ...................................... 17 4 Concluding thoughts: Where to go next? .............................................................................. 20 4.1 Integrating analyses of political practices and ideal-typical regime dynamics .............................................. 20 4.2 Towards a global theorization of immigration policymaking .... 22 References ................................................................................................................................. 24 IMIn Working Papers Series 2018, No. 147 3 1 Introduction Immigration policies have received growing attention from academia over the past decades. Today, the literature offers various theories of immigration policymaking. However, their applicability is almost always restricted — explicitly or implicitly — to so-called Western liberal democracies (Boswell, 2007; Castles, 2004a; Freeman, 1995, 2006; Hampshire, 2013; Hollifield, 1992; Joppke, 1998a, 1998b; Meyers, 2000; Sassen, 1996).1 Among the most prominent and widely cited theories features the ‘liberal paradox’. Hollifield (1992) pioneered the term to explain why, despite growing politicization of immigration and popular calls for restrictions, open immigration policies have prevailed across ‘Western liberal-democracies’. He argued that liberal democracies are confronted with contradictory drivers when elaborating their immigration policies. On the one hand, the dominant ideology of economic liberalism pushes (labour) markets to globalise and immigration regimes to open up. On the other hand, the political logic of democratic nation-states is dominated by electoral objectives and national identity concerns and therefore seeks to limit immigration. Complementing this argument, other researchers have pointed to the fact that immigration policies in liberal democracies have a built-in tendency to liberalise because powerful employer lobbies succeed in pushing governments to open immigration (Freeman, 1995). Also, legal constraints, such as constitutional or international norms and their enforcement through national courts, limit the extent to which liberal democracies can restrict immigration (Joppke, 1998a; Sassen, 1996). As a result of these dynamics, discourses about immigration, which respond mainly to national audiences, tend to be more restrictive than policies in practice — policies that also have to integrate the demands of markets and international norms. Immigration policy is therefore often characterised by a ‘discursive gap’ (Boswell, 2007; Joppke, 1998a). By linking the liberal-democratic character of Western states to the open nature of their immigration policies, the literature has suggested a ‘regime effect’: Despite restrictive discourses, democracy is said to align with de-facto open immigration policies. The reverse assumption, namely that autocracies go together with restrictive immigration policies, has received less academic attention. Yet it seems intuitive: If autocratic state curtail their citizens’ socio-political rights, why should they grant them to foreigners? For a long time, studies that examine immigration policymaking in autocracies have been lacking or have remained apart from theoretical discussions. This is partly because autocratic policymaking is assumed to be centralized and devoid of negotiations dynamics — and thus of minor interest to scientific investigation — and partly because scholars have presumed that apart from the wealthy Oil monarchies of the Gulf, few people migrate to autocracies, as these are usually places people leave.2 Therefore, the ‘regime effect’ — linking democracy and open immigration policies — has largely remained at the level of an educated guess. This paper explores the existence of a ‘regime effect’ in immigration policy and in particular the ways in which autocracy shapes states’ immigration policy dynamics. In doing so, it draws on the 1 The term ‘Western liberal democracy’ is rarely (if ever) explicitly defined in the migration literature, which is highly problematic. In fact, authors use the term as a shortcut to set the boundary condition of their theory, applicable to an ‘exclusive club’ of ‘rich, developed’ countries (for a more thorough literature