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(C) 2002-2012 Ludovic Rousseau # # This Program Is Free Software

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(C) 2002-2012 Ludovic Rousseau # # This Program Is Free Software # # smartcard_list.txt # Copyright (C) 2002-2012 Ludovic Rousseau # # This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify # it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by # the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or # (at your option) any later version. # # This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, # but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of # MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the # GNU General Public License for more details. # # You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License # along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software # Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA # 02111-1307 USA # # This list contains a match between an ATR and a card type # The list is sorted for edition purposes # # You can get the latest version of this file from: # http://ludovic.rousseau.free.fr/softwares/pcsc-tools/smartcard_list.txt # # $Id: smartcard_list.txt 6228 2012-02-19 13:25:29Z rousseau $ # # syntax: # ATR in regular expression form # \t descriptive text # \t descriptive text # \t descriptive text # empty line 3B 02 14 50 Schlumberger Multiflex 3k 3B 02 53 01 Gemplus GemClub Memo 3B 04 00 00 00 00 Laundromat payment card 3B 04 07 3C 85 92 OLD Spanish Prepaid phone cards (pesetas) provided by Telefonica 3B 04 07 3C 85 9A OLD Spanish Prepaid phone cards (pesetas) provided by Telefonica 3B 04 07 3C 89 10 OLD Spanish Prepaid phone cards (pesetas) provided by Telefonica 3B 04 07 3C 89 18 OLD Spanish Prepaid phone cards (pesetas) provided by Telefonica 3B 04 07 3C 89 92 OLD Spanish Prepaid phone cards (pesetas) provided by Telefonica 3B 04 07 3C 89 9A OLD Spanish Prepaid phone cards (pesetas) provided by Telefonica 3B 04 07 3C 8C 10 OLD Spanish Prepaid phone cards (pesetas) provided by Telefonica 3B 04 09 9C 2B 83 T.P.G. - CART@BONUS 20CHF (Transport) http://www.tpg.ch/fr/titres-de-transport/moyens-de-paiement/carte-prepay ee-cartabonus.php 3B 04 17 3C CC E0 prepaid payphone card, issued by Telefónica Comunicaciones Públicas (http:// www.cabitel.es) 3B 04 41 11 77 81 Sample Mifare DESFire contactless smartcard from Phillips 3B 04 41 11 77 B1 IBM JCOP 30 contactless 3B 04 49 32 43 2E German Health Insurance Card "LogCard" from concept2.com (a indoor rower manufacturer) I2C card 3B 04 92 23 10 91 Siemens SLE 4432/42 card 3B 04 99 FF FF 90 Madrid prepaid parkimeters parking card 3B 04 A2 13 10 91 PM2P Chipkarte SLE 4442, Code FFFFFF Bahn BKK (Deutsche Bahn AG - Insurance Company) NH Hotels World fidelization card 3B 04 C9 D0 F1 40 Cuban prepaid phone card provided by ETECSA 3B 05 68 01 01 02 05 Certinomis card (electronic certificates) Schlumberger Cryptoflex ActivCard 3B 06 00 10 01 D6 C5 46 HID ProxKey II FOB http://www.hidglobal.com/documents/proxkey_ds_en.pdf 3B 06 01 02 10 .. .. .. ISOProx II Card: http://www.hidglobal.com/documents/isoprox_ds_en.pdf 3B 06 81 24 80 80 90 00 10€ credit card for TV & telephone in Jerez de la Frontera hospital's rooms. The maker can be found at www.isernsa.com (ISERN Medical Telecomunications) 3B 06 A2 13 10 91 90 00 C3P2K SAMPLE CARD (C3PO, S.L) 3B 09 41 04 11 DD 82 2F 00 00 88 1k contactless Mifare 3B 0A 20 62 0C 01 4F 53 45 99 14 AA GSM-SIM BEN (1800MHz) 3B 0A 21 00 26 07 4F 53 45 98 08 F8 ORGA test systems GSM phase 2+ test SIM. 3B 0E BC E1 CA AF C2 DF BC AD BC D3 C3 DC BF A8 German "Versichertenkarte" Healthcare card 3B 0F 00 65 46 53 05 16 05 71 DF 00 00 00 45 50 53 Feitian ePass3000, Feitian formatted 3B 0F 00 65 46 53 05 16 05 71 DF 00 00 00 80 6A 82 Feitian ePass3000, OpenSC formatted 3B 0F 00 65 46 53 05 30 05 71 DF 00 00 00 80 6A 82 Fetian epass3000 3B 0F 80 22 15 E1 5A 00 20 00 30 21 03 31 21 03 00 RSA SecurID SID800 token 3B 0F 80 6A 16 32 46 49 53 45 53 8C E0 FF 07 90 00 GSM-SIM Sonera (from 1998) 3B 0F FF C1 B5 CC 72 CA 00 00 .. Mifare Std 1K 3B 15 11 12 CA 07 14 CF PlatformaHD (Russia) DRE Crypt 4AE1:14 3B 15 13 80 53 41 52 03 Eutron CryptoIdentity (ATMEL AT903232C - 6464C Cryptographic processors, 64KB EEPROM, RSA 2048) 3B 15 18 2E 00 5C 00 01 China Unicom 64k OTA 3B 15 94 C3 02 08 16 01 GSM-SIM EMT (Estonia) 3B 16 94 71 01 01 00 27 00 Cingular GSM SIM Card 3B 16 94 71 01 01 05 02 00 GSM SIM Bouygues Telecom 3B 16 94 81 10 06 01 .. .. Schlumberger Cyberflex Access 16K 3B 16 94 81 10 06 01 81 2F Schlumberger Cyberflex Access Augmented Crypto 3B 16 94 81 10 06 01 81 3F Schlumberger Cyberflex Access Crypto 3B 16 95 D0 00 45 F7 01 00 Telefónica O2 Czech Republic, a.s. - O2 sim card - 173285 / SIM64ND.GO0 http://www.o2.cz 3B 16 96 41 73 74 72 69 64 Gemalto .NET v2.0 3B 17 11 80 65 AF 03 42 00 D8 TELE2 SPB SIM Russia 3B 17 13 9C 12 02 01 01 07 40 Schlumberger Cyberflex Access Developer 32k 3B 17 94 18 01 01 01 01 41 93 T-Mobile SIM card 3B 17 94 18 01 01 02 01 41 49 white SFR SIM card 3B 17 94 18 02 01 25 01 41 93 AT&T Wireless GSM SIM Card 3B 17 94 20 01 01 0A 02 41 43 KPN SIM card 3B 17 94 20 05 01 10 01 41 FF CLARO SIM card (ex CTI Movil) 3B 17 94 80 65 D0 01 6C F2 BE CMCC sim cards with TD-SCDMA support 3B 17 94 89 01 02 01 02 41 87 Vodafone/Omnitel 16K GSM SIM 3B 18 94 53 0D 06 77 24 07 FF 02 GSM SIM Tele2 Estonia, prepaid (Telecommunication) 3B 19 14 55 90 01 01 01 00 05 08 B0 Schlumberger Multiflex 8k 3B 19 14 55 90 01 02 01 00 05 04 B0 Schlumberger Multiflex 4k 3B 19 14 59 01 01 0F 01 00 05 08 B0 Schlumberger Multiflex 8k 3B 19 94 31 02 05 10 45 98 01 02 4E GSM-SIM EMT (Estonia) 3B 1B 94 80 69 07 05 21 11 00 80 00 00 00 Aircel SIM (Telecommunication) 3B 1C 94 43 48 49 50 44 52 49 56 45 30 30 31 SCM Chipdrive MyKey MasterKey 24k 3B 1F 11 00 67 42 41 46 49 53 45 53 52 66 FF 81 90 00 Finnish student id card 3B 1F 11 00 67 80 42 46 49 53 45 10 52 66 FF 81 90 00 Nokia branded SC (Setec) 3B 1F 11 00 6A 01 38 46 49 53 45 10 8C 02 FF 07 90 00 GSM-SIM Saunalahti (from 2004) Finnish cell phone operator "Sonera" SIM card (from 2002) 3B 1F 11 00 6A 31 36 46 49 53 45 13 8C 02 FF 07 90 00 GSM-SIM card - Telenor Mobil - http://www.telenor.com/ 3B 1F 11 80 6A 16 32 46 49 53 45 15 8C E6 FF 07 90 00 GSM SIM card - Tele2 Estonia - http://www.tele2.ee 3B 1F 11 80 6A 32 37 46 49 53 45 12 8C 00 FF 07 90 00 Setec Test card, SetCOS 3.7.2, rel 1.3 3B 1F 11 80 6A 32 37 46 49 53 45 12 8C 02 FF 07 90 00 GSM-SIM DNA Finland (from 2001) 3B 1F 11 80 6A 80 34 46 49 53 45 53 94 00 FF 07 .. .. Setec SetCos 3.4 3B 1F 11 80 6A 80 34 46 49 53 45 53 94 36 FF 07 90 00 SetCOS 3.4.0c RSA SecurID 3100 3B 1F 94 00 6A 01 38 46 49 53 45 10 8C 02 FF 07 90 00 GSM-SIM Saunalahti (from 2004) 3B 1F 94 80 31 00 73 12 21 13 57 4A 33 05 30 32 34 00 Tron - MVNO Malaysia SIM Card (Giesecke & Devrient SIM) http://www.tron.my 3B 1F 94 80 6A 16 32 46 49 53 45 15 8C E6 FF 07 90 00 GSM-SIM Sonera (from 2002) 3B 23 00 00 36 41 81 Schlumberger Payflex 4k SAM 3B 23 00 35 11 80 Schlumberger Payflex 1k User 3B 23 00 35 11 81 Schlumberger Payflex 1k SAM 3B 23 00 35 13 80 Schlumberger Cyberflex Access Campus 3B 23 00 35 13 FF Schlumberger MicroPayflex 3B 23 00 35 41 80 PayflexHID (idenfitied by Sun Ray Services) 3B 24 00 .. .. .. 45 Conax 3B 24 00 30 42 30 30 ComHem Digital-TV smartcard (Sweden) TNK Telewizja Na Kartę (Poland) - Conditional access system : Conax (Norwa y) http://telewizjanakarte.pl/ 3B 24 00 80 72 94 43 MPCOS-3DES 64K \ EMV Filter (Gemplus) 3B 26 00 00 26 40 00 90 00 Schlumberger, purse? 3B 26 00 11 01 6D 03 OLD CajaMadrid Visa Cash, ID card for Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Madr id (about 1998) 3B 26 00 11 04 5C 03 90 00 Caixa Abierta (Barcelona, Spain) Cash/Visa Electron 3B 26 00 11 06 23 03 90 00 Tarjeta de la Seguridad Social (Spanish Social Insurance Card) 3B 26 00 31 08 6C 03 90 00 VISA ELECTRON from Caixa Catalunya bank card (www.caixacatalunya.es) for students in UPC university of Barcelona (Spain) (www.upc.es) 3B 27 00 80 65 A2 .
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