Ethics and Ideology in Engineering Curricula

Author: Rui M. L. Ferreira, IST, Technical University of Lisbon, Av. Rovisco Pais, 1049-001 [email protected]

Abstract  Engineering ethics is becoming a particularly valorised course in engineering curricula. Applied ethics educators in Anglo-Saxon universities often defend the case-study approach as the most effective way to introduce students to real-world ethical problems. In this text is pointed out that teaching engineering ethics involves constituting individuals as a social/professional group and, in that sense, is ideology conveying. The main concern addressed in this text is that engineering schools are not supplying students with the means to understand to role of ideology in the way they perceive, experience and act upon the world. Some emphasis is given on the analysis of synthetic case-studies in order to show that the case-study approach may overlook important issues concerning the production of reality. By recalling that there is no practice except by and in an ideology, it is concluded that the case-study approach is not ideology-free but embedded in the material existence of an ideological apparatus, in the sense of Althusser. It is claimed that unless these ideology-related problems are discussed in classrooms, topic h) of the accreditation criteria of ABET, “…the engineer must have… the broad education necessary to understand the impact of engineering solutions in a global/societal context;”, mirrored in many countries, is not being properly addressed.

Index Terms  Engineering Ethics, Ethics, Ideology.

ETHICS AND IDEOLOGY. MAPPING THE TERRAIN

Ethics and the development of contemporary industrial societies

In his autobiographical notes, published in 1970, J. L. Borges, assuming himself as an “amateur Protestant”, expresses his admiration for the “people in the United States” inasmuch as they are prone to “approach things ethically”. In the same paragraph, Borges confesses that he condones with “skyscrapers, television, plastics, and the unholy jungle of gadgets”, associated to the US society, only because of American’s will to “act ethically”, synonym, to Borges, of being able to supersede self convenience. The reference to Protestantism, linking ethics and industrial progress deserves further attention. In one of Max Weber’s best known works, [27], it was pointed out that there was an apparent connection between Protestantism and the rise of capitalism, a connection that could be rooted in “the rational ethics of ascetic Protestantism” ([27], p.45). Seventeenth century Calvinism proneness to pursue work with a spirit of rational enterprise that eschewed waste and purposeless adventurism, would suit the development of industrial capitalism. Weber noted, however, that such a hypothesis ought to be further elaborated and only malice would drive one to claim that he actually affirmed that Protestant ethics was a cause of mercantilism and then of capitalism. The hypothesis was soon refuted by Tawney [25], which inverted Weber's argument, advancing economic changes as a basic contribution to the religious changes. The discussion about the prolegomena of industrial capitalism in face of Protestant ethics was passed over in silence by most of 20th century historians and philosophers or, like Braudel ([4], pp. 505-507), deemed as simplistic and sterile as a basis for a model of development. De Landa [7] proposes a non-linear material history of the development of human societies. In doing so, he describes the evolution of Western societies as a complex, contingent, process where flows of mass (including biomass), energy and information intercept in time and space, sometimes “hardening themselves”, coagulating and forming structures either in the form of meshworks or of hierarchies. Industrial capitalism occurs as a particular combination of meshworks (e.g., institutions for overseas commerce, continuum of Creole dialects) and hierarquies (slave trade, administrative enforcement of colonial languages) over the different, geological, biological and linguistic strata. The fact that industrial capitalism appears to have evolved to be the dominant socio-economic mode of human organization is incidental and no conclusions regarding the future should be drawn from it. In De Landa’s words [7], p. 273 “[the] world […] does not posses a latter of progress, or a drive toward increased perfection, or a promised land, or even a socialist pot of gold at the end of the rainbow. [It] is governed not only by nonlinear dynamics, which makes detailed prediction and control impossible, but also by nonlinear combinatorics, which implies that the number of possible mixtures of meshwork and hierarchy, of command and market, of centralization and decentralization, are immense and that we simple cannot predict what the emergent properties of this myriad combinations will be”.

International Conference on Engineering Education July 21–25, 2003, Valencia, Spain. 1 The easy conclusion drawn from De Landa’s non-linear materialist account of history is that human actions do not fully determine the future organization of society since initial conditions are not enough do specify a non-linear, sometimes chaotic system. Another, more important, conclusion is that the flows of energy-matter, densifications, accelerations, formation of meshworks and hierarchies can be driven by human action. It is only the outcome of the bifurcations that is unknown, not necessarily the paths that to it. For instance, Methuen treatise (1703) was desired by English and Portuguese as a way to restore trade, for which previous treatises were inefficient. It was not possible to predict that the treatise, while boosting the production of wine, would result in an inhibition to the development of the industrial revolution in Portugal. Thus, although impossible to predict the exact shape of future social organization, the drive to look back and comprehend the influence of intentional human action on the course of historical events is very strong. And this was what was actually attempted by Weber. That there are economically significant aspects associated to the conduit of a given community or, imprecisely, to a particular ethic, is a matter of little discussion, even in De Landa’s view. But it is our privileged standpoint in the timeline that allow us to look back into the past and postulate connections between communities’ particular moral practises or particular political decisions and the success of particular modes of socio-economic organization. Thus, it should made clear that any determinist thinking whose aim is to put a given moral practice as a prominent cause of the economical and technological development should be dismissed as fallacious because i) it disregards the high non-linearity of the interaction of the concurring forces and ii) presupposes the objectivity of the historical disciplines. This last point will be addressed in the next section.

Ideology and the subject

Discussing the objectivity of the historical disciplines would lead one to embark in a long epistemological debate. Skipping the debate and jumping to the desired conclusions, let Borges be invoked again when stating that “every author creates his own precursors. His work modifies our conception of the past, as it will modify the future.” [3]. In other words, ascribing meaning to historical evidence implies using the “structures and the logic” (Laroui [16], p. 58) of the present. This is where the notion of ideology becomes necessary. According to Althusser [1], there is no practice except by and in an ideology. This is true even for scientific practice and in historic analysis, even if Althusser does not fully admits it. Thus, there is no neutral stand point while accessing historical evidence; all express particular ideological apparatuses. Ideology is thus one of the conditions for the existence of history inasmuch as any historical narrative is an expression of an ideological standpoint. Of course, producing history is but one of the fields where ideology operates. Althussser’s presentation of the role of ideology must be further explained. The key point is that the role of ideology is to provide individuals within any society with a false representation of their “real conditions of existence” [1], p.140. It is somewhat strange that the disjunction between appearance and reality, fervently opposed by most Western thinkers at least since Nietzsche [20], seems to be retrieved by Althusser. That is not exactly the case. Reality must be understood as the concrete conditions that inhere in the relations of production of a given society. The proper functioning of these relations of production, or economical basis, is a necessary condition for the survival of that society. But the way relations of production are truly organised and articulated is not necessarily the same way as these same relations are perceived by the subject. A parenthesis must be made to explain the status of the subject. According to Althusser, the subject must be understood under the thesis that all subjectivity is itself an ideological construction. The category of the subject is only constitutive of all ideology insofar as all ideology has the function of constituting concrete individuals as subjects. Ideology interpellates (calls forth into being) concrete individuals as concrete subjects. Thus, ideology displays an imaginary relation which produces false consciousness on the part of all who are constituted within it as individuals. The set of all imaginary relations is called reality. Closing the parenthesis, it can be concluded that the way relations of production truly operate is inherently unknown because the subject is constituted in ideology at the same time reality is produced. There appears to be a contradiction in Althusser’s display of the subject. If it is solely in ideology that we constitute ourselves as subjects what is it that allows us to note it? And if all subjectivity is ideological how can subjects apprehend the true relations of production? Althusser’s argument appears to be unsound and will not be presented. De Landa’s, [7], material account of the development of Western societies and Foulcault’s account of social relations as determined in terms of power [11] provide an alternative way out of that contradiction. The totality of the relations of production is a complex combination of meshworks and hierarchies at the economical level. Its exact form is beyond the comprehension but its evolution and, in particular, the evolution of the relations of power within it, is observable. An imaginary laboratory would grant one the means of manipulating the fluxes of matter, energy and information were the relations of power are bred. Following De Landa, “an experimental bottom-up” ([7], p.44), attitude toward reality would allow one to observe what particular modes of production would cease to be reproduced and what new would be stimulated if particular power relations were, for some contingent reason, broke. In other words, if an individual or group of individuals missed the interpelation within a given social organization what would be the consequences for that organization? History might be considered such laboratory. For instance by evading the feudal system of production the bourgeoisie could not help being revolutionary since was setting the foundations of a new paradigm of relations of

International Conference on Engineering Education July 21–25, 2003, Valencia, Spain. 2 production. This was what gave Marx the impression the there was a positive progression towards an ultimate social organization. Of course breaking the relations of power need not be accidental; each subject may which to position oneself at odds with the ideological apparatus that interpelates him, if he is willing to endure the consequences. These might be as serious as loosing the status of ‘subject’, as Foulcault’s account of the mental or prison institutions clearly demonstrates (cf. [11]). Back to the question on how does one know that it is in ideology that one is constituted as a subject. The answer must be in terms of Foulcault’s the concept of knowledge, that it is a relative term occurring in the nexus of power relations. Thus one knows that ideology has a “material existence” ([1], p. 170) when one experiences the consequences of one’s positioning across “political charged boundaries” ([21]) in society. In other words, setting forth the hypothesis of one’s coming into being in ideology, not only the question of the reproduction of the modes of production is answered but also the possibility of acquiring the consciousness of the process if one chooses, or is given the chance, to position himself not according to the call of the dominant ideological apparatus. This result introduces the need for competing ideological apparatuses. The associated concept of positioning will be addressed further on. What should be clear form this discussion is that the fact that the subject is constituted in ideology is not a self- defeating argument, rendering inevitable the immobility of the all the social and economic structures. Quite the contrary, the very fact that ideology is a conceivable notion is a good indication that it is possible to move across ideological apparatus, or “politically charged boundaries” using the terms of [21].

Altusser’s view on ideological apparatuses. The educational ideological apparatus

It was stated before that ideology provides a form of enlistment that secures the reproduction of the conditions of production. It is important to understand what is meant by ‘securing the reproducing the relations of production’. Althusser [1] stated, after a study of Marx's theory of the state, that it is a necessary condition of any form of social organization that it is able to reproduce the conditions which ensure its continued existence. The continued existence of a mode of social organization lies in its capacity to reproduce the conditions of production, as it produces. This will be brought about through: i) the reproduction of the productive forces, and ii) the reproduction of the existing relations of production. The reproduction of productive forces comprises the reproduction of the means of production, i.e., raw materials, machinery, buildings, computer networks, etc… and the reproduction of labour power. The latter is ensured by wages, of course, but also by the reproduction of labour skills and by reproduction of the submission to the rules of the established order. The types of skill to be reproduced are determined “according to the requirements of socio-technical division of labour, its different ‘jobs’ and ‘posts’” such as manual workers, teachers or engineers. But Althusser stresses that the institutions responsible of reproducing skills do so while ensuring the subjection to the ruling power. It is in a context of ideological subjection that the conditions for the reproduction of the skills of labour power best operate. As for the reproduction of the relations of production, these are carried out through an Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA), distinct and specialized institutions, such as churches, educational institutions, notably schools, the family, media, cultural institutions, etc.... The articulation, within the state, of the economic base and the superstructure requires a repressive set of institutions (the army, the police, the courts, the prisons, cf. [11]), the Repressive State Apparatus (RPA). The role of the RSA consists essentially in securing by force favourable political conditions while the ISA secures the reproduction of the relations of production, behind the shield provided by the RSA. The most relevant ideological apparatus of the ISA is the educational ideological apparatus. School is sometimes conceived as an ideology-free zone, an institution “purged of ideology”. For Althusser this is simply not the case. The educational ideological apparatus has a major role in the reproduction of the conditions of production. Effectively sorting and filtering of individuals at different ages and different levels of “know-how”, provision is made for the fulfilment of the demands of the productive structures, thus contributing to the reproduction of the relations of production. Additionally, ideological subjection is present in the curricula, as pointed out by [16] in the context of the history of colonial domination. As stated before, the result of the operation of the educational ideological apparatus and other ideological apparatuses is a form of enlistment, a call forth in to being, the ideological operation becoming a subject. The problem of securing the reproducing of the conditions of production is thus solved under theses premises: a given form of social organization secures its continued existence when the ISA, particularly the educational ideological apparatus are successful in its function of “interpellating concrete individuals as concrete subjects”, [1], p. 171. As seen before this is not always the case, which leads one to believe that while ideology is omnipresent, becoming a subject can occur outside the form of enlistment proportioned by the dominant ideology, the ISA; it can occur in alternative ideological apparatuses. And this is actually the condition for social change. As alternative ideological apparatuses become prominent, the associated modes of production substitute those of the former ISA.

Teaching technology and ethics in the educational ideological apparatus

International Conference on Engineering Education July 21–25, 2003, Valencia, Spain. 3 One must now turn to the way of scientific or technological disciplines are taught within the educational ideological apparatus. As scientific practice, in its most ‘pure’ or in its technologically applied from, is mostly driven by economical and political considerations [10], it is clear that all scientific activity has an ideological dimension. Marcuse [18] alerted for the overwhelming ideological power of technology, threatening to dehumanise social relations. His critique was centred in the “advanced industrial society, in which the technical apparatus of production and distribution […] tends to become totalitarian [since] it determines not only the socially needed occupations, skills, and attitudes, but also individual needs and aspirations”. This particular form of alienation was denounced by many other authors. In is critique of Marcuse’s work, Habermas [12] explains that the “scientification of technology”, characteristic of the evolution of the latest forms of monopolistic capital, may allow for new and sophisticated forms of social domination by technocracy. Yet all of these considerations appear to be absent from most the academic curricula of most science and engineering schools. Vesilind & Gunn [26], p. 34, write in 1998 that “the education and training of modern engineers is usually to positivist for their own good. Engineers are carefully taught to be pragmatic, logical, rational, sensible and systematic in their approach to problems. These are useful and absolutely necessary attributes, but they also tend to alienate the engineer from the rest of society.” On the other hand, engineers have long realised that “engineering is inextricably tied to people, it cannot be just an applied physical science but also an applied social science”. An althusserian account of ideology would lead one to perceive this fact as a consequence of the replication of the conditions of production; early stages of industrial development required a hierarchic and mechanicist organization that did not valorised holistic approaches. As for the teaching of ethics, previous paragraphs have stated that ideology has no outside. This raises the question of the autonomy of ethics when all operations for ascribing meaning, including, ethical judgments, are ideology laden. Marx affirmed that morality is a particular mode of production. For Althusser the role of moral is that of protecting the modes of production and the stability of the institutions that ensure these modes of production. While it is important to stress that ethical concerns are not reducible to ideological ones, it is also of great importance to highlight that ethical questions are posed within the very same ideological apparatus that conforms all other human activities. Thus, i) not all questions about human values became ethical questions, ii) the way ethical questions are formulated is ideology-laden. To claim the first of the above items, one can invoke Vesilind & Gunn [26], p.80, who, unsuspected of being Marxists, point out that “in extremely inegalitarian societies, ethical questions concerning the relation of superior to inferior never arise. The exploiting class does not regard the exploited class as part of the moral community. In very sexist or racist societies, women or minorities are viewed as property to whom no ethical obligations are owed.” There is no reason to believe that the “extremely inegalitarian” premise is of any use. The point is that being inegalitarian or not is a judgement of ideological nature. The second items will be illustrated in the next section, in the precise context of engineering ethics. From this discussion it should be kept that one can only talk about the autonomy of ethics when rooted in a particular mode of social organisation. When different modes of socioeconomic organisation are set in contact, ethical questions become visibly laden with ideology. For instance, in the Roman Republic the question on whether or not slave work is admissible would never be seriously formulated. And not because Ethics, understood as a philosophy of morality was not well developed. Simply, within that reality, the question would be dismissed as silly or, at best, mildly provocative. The same question in the first half of 19th century in America carried heavy political implications, aside from the ethical ones.

ENGINEERING ETHICS AND IDEOLOGY

Engineering ethics. The primacy of the professional ethics paradigm

The previous sections were dedicated to explain that ethics and ideology are not unrelated subjects. Borges was invoked in the beginning of the second section because his comment enrols many of the complex themes that must be approached when speaking about engineering ethics. If one concedes, as [25] that Christianity was given an ideological dimension with Calvinism and the Puritanism in the New World, then one can claim that the predisposition to “approach things ethically” was an ideological feature of the American society. But what captured Borges attention was not this truism. The fact is that the type of ethical approach in Anglo-Saxon societies, particularly in technology-related problems, the case-study approach, is particularly visible. This approach is defended as the most effective way to introduce students to real-world ethical problems as it preserves the complexities of moral choice without engaging in, allegedly, dull subtleties of philosophical discourse for which future engineers would not feel particularly endowed (cf. [26], [19]). Herkert [14] points out that the pedagogical framework of engineering ethics education has evolved primarily toward utilization of case studies and codes of ethics, only in some instances supplemented by an introduction to moral theory. Johnston’s et al. [15] expose a new paradigm for the teaching of engineering within a global economy. Important emphasis is placed on practice which implies that the training engineer learns its practice while exposed to concerns of the community. This way it will be possible to form “professional engineers who can listen, recognise the validity of community concerns, views and requirements, and are able to set up a genuine dialogue”. How about non-Anglo-Saxon societies? Didier et al. [8] point out that engineering ethics is a discipline shaped by the cultural background of those who develop it, thus influence by

International Conference on Engineering Education July 21–25, 2003, Valencia, Spain. 4 the dominant philosophical tradition, religious background, the way the engineering profession is organized and education. The word ‘ideology’ is never mentioned but the above statement is almost equivalent to affirming that each educational ideological apparatus engenders its own engineering ethics. Didier et al. proceed their reasoning engineering ethics stating that “two main approaches seem to be prevalent in Europe today: the first relates to professional ethics as discussed in the USA since the 1950s, the second relates to a new discipline that is developing in Europe, that of the ethics of technology.” The strong lead of the professional ethics paradigm as the general framework for approaching ethical aspects in engineering is undoubtedly related to the maturity of the subject in Anglo-Saxon countries. But it must not be forgotten that the dissemination of the ethics and social organization of Western countries is at the root of what broadly is called the process of globalisation. It will be argued next that the professional ethics paradigm is deeply rooted in the ideology associated to the expansion of the values that promote global market as understood in Western countries and Japan.

Ethics and globalisation

It is well-known that engineering codes of ethics exist since the beginning of the 20th century (see [28] for a history of engineering ethics in America). Yet, the debate on the best way to teach engineering ethics is not yet finished (cf. the debate between John Ladd and Judith Lichtenberg in [26], pp. 210-225). It has been dominated by the teleological/deontological opposition and generally resumed to a debate between act- or rule-utilitarians and defenders of the primacy of a code of ethics. Consensual appears to be the importance of the case-study approach. Perhaps more important than accompanying this debate is to accompany the genealogy of the concerns expressed in the case-studies. The fact is that securing the conditions of production, i.e., securing the existence of a given mode of social organization brings with it particular ethical concerns. For instance, when monopolistic capitalism was being formed (cf. [7], p. 83) large companies organised themselves according to highly hierarchical models borrowed from the military institution. De Landa [7] gives the example of America’s first big business, railway industry. At that time beaurocratic loyalty was of paramount importance. Many case studies echo this concern to this day. Whistle blowing is probably one of the most serious ethical topics today, as the fierce competition among large corporations may harm individuals or communities. One of the main ideological issues today is to know whether or not capitalism “has evolved to a post industrial stage”, in the words of Daniel Bell, cited in [7]. Is capitalism based on a smashing terciarization of productive activities or is there, ultimately, an important industrial infrastructure to support growth. Associated to this growth of the importance of information transfer, an important number of case studies that are concern with the proper use of information have arisen. A third family of ethical dilemmas appears as the modes of production inherent to global capitalism secure their continued existence. A parenthesis should be opened to state the material conditions of the global market. It requires intense flows of information but also of mass and energy; people migrate according to economic, cultural and political gradients and so does non-human bio-mass. More skilled workers tend accumulated in more technologically dense areas. A particular dramatic example is called ‘brain migration’ a process through which less developed communities loose human potential. Raw materials and energy flow from technologically incipient regions to highly technological ones. The flow of finished goods is much more homogeneous although not isotropic; an economic sorting process guides the flow of sophisticated goods away from economically depressed communities. Cultural globalisation and economic glocalization dissociate technological development and socio-economic development. Closing the parenthesis, it should be stated that for the global capitalism to thrive, the first issue to be secured is the existence of a community, desirably heterogeneous, that is able to understand a common language and to condone with a dominant culture paradigm. It is clear that English is today’s lingua franca mostly because of the weight of American interests in global economy. It is thus a fact that economic globalisation is mostly driven by a cultural ‘Americanization’ (cf. [23], p. 22), increasing dependence on highly technologic means of production (only accessible to a few Western states, notably America and Japan), fast transfer of information and conscious dissemination of a common language. Then, by whatever means, ideological apparatuses must make the macroscopic impacts of global trade appear as natural, i.e., necessary in face of the intrinsic characteristics of the communities set in contact. For instance, it is broadly documented that poor communities tend to be further impoverished while wealthy ones manage to achieve unprecedented wealth; all of this within the framework of an unambiguous rise in global richness [23]. Curiously, lines of thought similar to Weber’s hypothesis on capitalism and Protestant ethics are still fostered at times. To answer the problem of why some nations are rich and others poor, some propose that moral immaturity induces technological and immaturity or vice-versa, according to the needs. Laroui [16] explains how the dominant discourse, eminently colonialist, saw the Magreb as an area “asking to be colonised” because the natives were unable to develop technologically and, as a consequence, unable to evolve morally. Black [2], addressing explicitly the problem of the richness of the nations, sees the lack of “moral institutions” as a cause of technological and social underdevelopment. In common with the colonialist discourse, [2] subtlety express the conviction that, sometimes, civilisation must be imposed by force. The civilisational potential of the Pax Romana was abundantly cited. The dominant ideology is not marked by such radical discourses; they are, and have been, easily proved wrong. A long sorting process rendered the discourses within the dominant ideological apparatuses more subtle. Yet, as global business

International Conference on Engineering Education July 21–25, 2003, Valencia, Spain. 5 sets in contact members of different cultures in a unprecedented fast way, the dominant discourse is seen to have clear difficulty to accommodate difference. As d’Apolonia puts it “tolerance makes sense only if it is based on a real acknowledgement of the other, in the terms of that other. Tolerance cannot be conditioned to the degree of approximation of a collective [global] identity.” [6], p. 91. In what follows next it will be shown that the dominant discourse, within the dominant educational ideological apparatus is still a long way to acknowledge the other, in his, or hers, own terms. It is also claimed that the way by which engineering ethics is taught, with a great emphasis on the case study approach, falls short on complexity when it come to address issues of cultural difference.

Ideology-laden ethical case studies and essays

The effects of the dominant discourse can be made visible by observing the way young engineers from western countries perceive their profession in the global market. A good example is given by the winning essays of ASCE’s 2001 Daniel W. Mead Prize, whose rules demanded the reflection upon ethical concerns in civil engineering practice while in the global market. In the first of these essays, [17], it is claimed that while working outside the US, “[the ethical behaviour] should also be extended to overseas work, even in areas where there may be a difference in the perceived acceptability of a particular action or decision”. The main concern, thus, is that moral the permissiveness found “overseas” may corrupt the US practitioner, ultimately hurting the natives of that “overseas” region. Moreover, the way young engineering professionals in western countries much probably see globalisation is expressed in the following lines: “[…] the civil engineering marketplace is shifting from a traditional work environment to an ever-expanding global work area where services are rendered throughout the world regardless of country or continental borders. While this is an exceptionally exciting and potentially rewarding business climate to deal in there is also a heightened value placed on ethical decision making when engineers are called to work overseas.” Globalisation becomes thus the imaginary locus of overseas commerce. And conversely, overseas commerce is the sole reason for the word “globalization” to be bore in the title. A case study, borrowed form [26], but displaced into a foreign country, is invoked to explain the potential ethical challenges. Local ethical standards may be “different” and natives may not be obliged by law or any code of conduit to act ethically, even if it does harm to their own countrypersons. This discourse reveals the same simplistic perception of the cultural other that has been poisoning the relations between economically developed countries and countries struggling with economic difficulties since the Berlin summit [16]. It is not that young engineers do not acknowledge that diversity is also moral diversity. In a second paper, [24], it is acknowledged that different cultures breed different morals and ethical values. Quite conscious of the role of diversity, the author finds it undesirable that engineering practitioners should search for an international code of ethics. Foreign countries house other values and beliefs, associated to different history and languages. Also, within the same country it is possible to find different ethical values on the many communities in the US. The author also acknowledges that gender issues can be of great importance. At last, the author claims that even if such code is accomplished, inertia within the engineering community would hinder its effective application. The paper shows a mature understanding of many issues of engineering practice while “applied social scientists”, using the terms of [26]. Yet, while moral diversity is acknowledged, the examples given to illustrate it show some bias. Gender issues are exemplified with the “middle-east women”, allegedly dispossessed of voice. The “middle-east” is again invoked to show that international agreements are often disrespected; the author recalls that the Geneva rules for the treatment of prisoners of war were disregarded by the Iraqis during the Iran-Iraq war. As a conclusion, the author argues that the general answer for ethical problems involving different communities must lie in the mutual predisposition to “meet half-way”. Making provision to meet these ends, the author suggests that other cultures should be “researched”. Despite the colonialist resonance of the statement, this may very well be unavoidable. In order to prevent that the clash of cultures becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, the study of the cultural other, as well as that of the cultural I must be enforced. And it should not be forgotten that the ‘anthropologic tent’ approach must be carefully avoided so that the results of the mutual study are more than the legitimisation of colonial prejudices. Indeed young engineers do acknowledge that diversity is also moral diversity. But as seen in the previous example there as an ideological bias that inevitably renders the moral of the I better, or superior than the moral of the other. Moral superiority of the American practitioner is the structuring concept in the third contest paper, [5]. The author believes that “[…] in the Engineers’ Creed (NSPE, 1954) the professionalism of an engineer is held to very high standards.” The main claim is that the US engineer cannot condone with the practice submitting gifts or money as a means to obtain contracts. Forgetting that the US were, between 1966 and 1968, the only country that explicitly accepted gift giving as business practice, the author analyses the legislation of New Zealand and Japan in search of clear rules that inhibited this practice. Having found none such rules and claiming that most countries do not have an engineering code of ethics, the author concludes by the superiority of the US practitioner when it comes to moral concerns. The suspicion that the case-study approach is providing a rather narrow understanding of the challenges of the global market is cast when the author affirms that “the detailed analysis of available case studies demonstrates that although we may venture in other parts of the world to practice engineering, we remain accountable to the high ethical standards upon which

International Conference on Engineering Education July 21–25, 2003, Valencia, Spain. 6 we have built the foundations of our quest to become professional civil engineers.” Obviously it is not the teaching of engineering ethics that is leading young engineers in western countries to believe that their moral standards are better than those of other countries. The point to be made is that it is very difficult to dissociate ethics from ideology. The case-study approach is an attempt to provide reflections upon events can actually occur during practice, “real” situations, for short. The problem is that all reality is built in ideology. Reality is a subjective construction; a consequence of the constitution of the subject, not a cause. Engineering ethics curricula must be able to address this issue.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In this text it was defended that there is no linear liaison between the moral practices of a given community and that community’s technological, economical and, ultimately, social development. The link between ethics and social and economic development is mediated by, and occurs in, ideology. The discourse of ethics and, in particular, the teaching of engineering ethics, is one of the discourses that form an ideological apparatus. Engineers, as a social/professional group are formed within an educational ideological apparatus. The main concern addressed in this text is that engineering schools are not supplying students with the means to understand to role of ideology in their practice, both at the technical and at the social level. Engineering ethics explicitly confronts engineers with the duality of their status of applied scientists; while most of the time they are applied physical scientists, in this context they must show skills of applied social scientists. Unfortunately the former status might somehow frustrate the latter. Engineers tend to forget that the object of study of ethical problems is the totality of the relations among the intervenients. It cannot be detached from the subject that studies it. Both object and subject are inextricably bonded and are simultaneously constructed within the dominant discourse. This is particularly visible and when practitioners of different cultural backgrounds meet as a result of the economical globalization. The technical examples are drawn to reproduce physical empirical data of reliable source. In social sciences reliability acquires new dimensions as the act of observing binds the observer and the observed in the process of constructing the reality. Literally, reality is produced as it is observed. Thus, it can be claimed that the case-study approach, while apparently retaining the core of the ethical debate, overlooks most of the complexities of social construction. In particular, it is overlooked the fact that reality is not a sterilized base upon which to build a reliable case but “discursive construction” within ideology. On the contrary, reality is built in language and social practice. In Marx words, “the objects of the simplest ‘sensorial certainties’ exist to man as a function of the social evolution, the development of the industry and commercial interchanges.” Or, resorting to a more contemporary vocabulary, “reality is not […] an unproblematic given in which there is a single objectively correct way of perceiving, but as something which is itself discursively constructed.”, [9], p. 56. For instance, a current trend is to use the Middle East as a source of examples that call for ethical stands on corruption and on beaurocratic loyalty. Needless to say the continued use of these metonymies will make the “clash of civilisations” a self-fulfilling prophecy. It must be granted though that there is considerable debate on the best way to teach engineering ethics [26], [22], mostly dominated by the teleological/deontological opposition. Some, like [22] claim that “the contribution of philosophy for [applied] ethics should be methodological rather than substantial.” That is to say that the deontological approach, leading to ethical codes, must now give pace to teleological approaches, act- or rule-utilitarian, for instance. That debate does not exhaust the theme, nor it should, because there is nothing universal about any code of ethics nor about utilitarianism. As [21] argue, one has to know whose definition of good is to be used in order to apply a “greatest good” approach. Finding ethical common ground is thus something worth being taught, as [24] implies, although it is not necessary accomplishable. This raises the problem or being able to understand the moral reasons of the cultural other, as well as a capacity to perform one’s own moral archaeology. It is actually not difficult to find conceptual background to approach these issues on otherness. Harphan [13] points out that “the notion of an otherness with integrity is applied to discussions of, for example, the constitution of the subject, the status of the object of knowledge, representations of imperial or colonial power, […] gender and canon formations, [and on] the condition of our understanding of history.” All of these issues are potentially present in engineering ethics problems, notably those concerning engineering practice in the global market. Again [13], “the other does not simply exist; it imposes responsibilities, obligations, constraints, regulations: it claims its rights.” In order grant the cultural other more than tolerance, each individual must make the case for the legitimacy of his claims. The key concept is that of positionality. Since the universal subject is long dead, “the positional stance is intended to mediate between two opposing views: a humanist view of the subject as an autonomous, rational agent and a post- structuralist view of the subject as a linguistic performance”, [21]. Positionality is an attempt to overcome the problems that come with the will to speak for others: it can result in an unself-conscious paternalist or imperialist appropriation of another’s position or it can result in a guilty silence, mistakably taken as collective silence. It has thus an ideological dimension; the movement through ideological apparatuses that can provide the subject to understand the mechanisms of is own call forth into being. These subjects transcend the realm of professional ethics. What Didier, [8], calls the European tradition of thought, namely issues of ethical impacts of technology, should be incorporated in a broader course of ethics and cultural studies

International Conference on Engineering Education July 21–25, 2003, Valencia, Spain. 7 where ideology-related issues are debated. This is the best way to ensure that young engineers do understand their role as a social actors and, in particular to ensure that they are provided with the “[…] the broad education necessary to understand the impact of engineering solutions in a global/societal context.”, borrowing the terms from the ABET criteria.

REFERENCES

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[4] Braudel, F. (1979) − ‘Civilisação Material, Economia e Capitalismo. Tomo II: Os Jogos da troca’. Teorema, Lisboa, Ed. 1992.

[5] Cochran, J. (2002) – ‘Erasing Ethical Borders’. J. of Professional Issues in Eng. Education and Practice. 128, 3, pp. 112-115. [6] D’appolonia, A. C. (1998) – ‘Los Racismos Cotidianos’. Bellaterra. Barcelona. [7] De Landa, M. (1997) – ‘A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History’. Swerve, New York. [8] Didier, C. (2002) − ‘Engineering ethics at the Catholic University of Lille (France): research and teaching in a European context’. Euro. J. of Eng. Edu., 25, 4, pp. 325 – 335. [9] Evans, D. (1996) − ‘An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis’. Routledge, New York.

[10] Feyerabend, P. (1975) − ‘Contra o Método’. Relógio d’Água, Lisboa, Ed. 1993.

[11] Foulcault, M.; Russ, J. (1979) – ‘L'histoire de la folie’. Hatier, Paris. [12] Habermas, J. (1968) – ‘Ciencia y Técnica como ‘Ideología’’. Tecnos, Madrid, Ed. 1997. [13] Harpham, G. G. (1992) − ‘Getting it Right: Language, Literature, and Ethics’. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

[14] Herkert, J. R. (2000) − ‘Engineering ethics education in the USA: content, pedagogy and curriculum’. Euro. J. of Eng. Edu., 25, 4, pp. 303–313.

[15] Johnston, S.; Mcgregor, H.; Taylor, E. (2000) − ‘Practice-focused ethics in Australian engineering education’. Euro. J. of Eng. Edu., 25, 4, pp. 315- 324. [16] Laroui, A. (1994) – ‘Historia del Magreb desde los Orígenes hasta el Despertar Megrebí. Un ensaio interpretativo’. Mapfre, Madrid. [17] Lecher, S. (2002) – ‘Ethical Procedures for a Global Economy’. J. of Professional Issues in Eng. Education and Practice. 128, 3, pp.109-110. [18] Marcuse, H. (1964) – ‘One Dimensional Man. Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society’. http://cartoon.iguw.tuwien.ac.at/christian/marcuse/odm.html. [19] Martin, M. W. (1989) − ‘Ethics in Engineering’, McGraw-Hill, New York.

[20] Nietzsche, F (1888) – ‘Généalogie de la Morale’. Flammarion, Paris, Ed. 1996. [21] Pendlebury, S.; Enslin, P. (2002) – ‘Representation, Identification and trust: Towards an Ethics of Educational Research’. In ‘The Ethics of Educational Research’, Mike McNamee & David Bridges (Eds.) pp. 59-69. Blackwell, Oxford. [22] Small, R. (2002) – ‘Codes are not Enough: What Philosophy can Contribute to the Ethics of Educational Research’. In ‘The Ethics of Educational Research’, Mike McNamee & David Bridges (Eds.), pp. 89-110. Blackwell, Oxford. [23] Sousa Santos (2001) – ‘Os Processos da Globalização’. In ‘Globalização, Fatalidade ou Utopia’, Boaventura Sousa-Santos, (Org.). Afrontamento, Porto. [24] Storsteen, M. (2002) – ‘Ethics of the Global Frontier’. J. of Professional Issues in Eng. Education and Practice. 128, 3, pp. 110-112. [25] Tawney, R. H. (1926) − ‘Religion and the Rise of Capitalism’. Harcourt, Brace & World, New York.

[26] Vesislind, P. A.; Gunn, A. S. (1998) – ‘Engineering, Ethics and the Environment’. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. [27] Weber, M. (1905) – ‘The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism’, Routledge Classics, New York, Ed. 2001. [28] Zandvoort, H.; Van De Poel, I.; Brumsen, M. (2000) − ‘Ethics in the engineering curricula: topics, trends and challenges for the future’. Euro. J. of Eng. Edu., 25, 4, pp. 291-302.

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