Historically Speaking The U.S. Army and the Great Depression

he news of late has been eerily remi- By Brig. Gen. John S. Brown a government that knows how to deal Tniscent of our slide into the Great U.S. Army retired with a mob.” Depression. Once again, a perfect storm In March 1933, newly elected President combining declining demand, indebtedness, income in- Franklin Delano Roosevelt took a far less confrontational equities, speculative business practices, corporate malfea- approach. Waving aside concerns about deficit spending, sance and hemorrhaging confidence is shaking our eco- he quickly enacted a virtual “alphabet soup” of new federal nomic foundations. Fail-safes such as the FDIC and Social agencies. Most of these were designed to have a direct and Security, and the federal government’s enhanced capabili- immediate impact on working families, and some were ties to react, will undoubtedly mitigate the worst that simply federal job creation programs. The Civil Works Ad- could happen, but most analysts predict we are in for pro- ministration provided jobs to four million Americans, and longed hard times and a difficult recovery. Without overre- the Public Works Administration pumped $3.3 billion (a acting to contemporary circumstances, it might be worth- huge sum at the time) into construction and infrastructure. while to reflect on the ramifications our nation’s greatest Both initiatives drew heavily on the expertise of the Army economic disaster had on our Army. Corps of Engineers. Desperate people do desperate things. During the Great The Civilian Conservation Corps, which ultimately put Depression, waves of layoffs, foreclosures, estate auctions approximately two-and-a-half million young men to work and other bad news precipitated public unrest and often on arduous outdoor projects, involved the Army even more public violence. The initial government reaction was dismis- heavily. Only the Army had the cadre and expertise neces- sive of what it interpreted as yet another business cycle. sary to mobilize, organize, transport, billet, feed and employ When the government belatedly responded, it was with fed- so many previously unskilled laborers on short notice. The eral loans to organizations at the top of the economic ladder experience ultimately proved a worthwhile rehearsal for in the expectation that beneficial results would trickle down World War II. It also softened the Army’s image from that of through the economy as a whole. They did not, certainly not public enforcer to that of collaborative partner in commu- immediately. The most ambitious initiative, the Reconstruc- nity relief efforts. Throughout the Great Depression, the tion Finance Corporation, was widely derided as a “million- Army served as a federal reservoir of tools, skills, talents aire’s dole.” A rising tide of public violence pitted local gov- and organizational capability. Most, but not all, of the results ernments against fractions of their own people. When were happy. An initiative to have the Army Air Corps take violence exceeded the capabilities of local police and corpo- over airmail delivery from allegedly monopolistic commer- rate security guards (the private armies of the day), the cial carriers resulted in eight planes wrecked and a dozen Army was called upon to fulfill constitutional responsibili- pilots killed or injured during the initial weeks. ties to “suppress insurrections” and “insure domestic tran- The Army did not downsize with respect to manpower quility.” By and large the respondents were National Guardsmen in the service of their states, but not always. In the summer of 1932, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Douglas MacArthur person- ally commanded federal troops evicting the so-called Bonus Army of World War ess I veterans and their families from the District of Columbia. Men, women and children were teargassed and chased down by infantry and cavalry, and their shantytowns were burned to the ground. Much of the public was shocked, but an unrepentant President Herbert Hoover exclaimed, “Thank God we still have

The Bonus Army, some 15,000 to 20,000 World War I veterans seeking early payments of bonuses, camps on the National Mall, Wash- ington, D.C., during the Great Depression. Theodor Horydczak, Army Signal Corps/Library of Congr Theodor Horydczak,

86 ARMY I December 2008 during the Great Depression. It was too valuable both to backstop police powers and to facilitate relief efforts. It did, however, experience considerable degradation in its immediate preparedness for warfighting. A 1936 review, for example, was not particularly reassuring when it con- cluded that the troops earmarked for mobilization during the first 30 days of an emergency would be adequately supplied “except for airplanes, tanks, combat cars, scout cars, antiaircraft guns, searchlights, antiaircraft fire control equipment, .50-caliber machine guns, pontoon equipment … organizational motor equipment … gas masks, radio and telephone equipment, and equipment for medical reg- iments.” One wonders whom they might have considered themselves ready to fight.

The idea of employing defense spending to stimulate the chives economy was not alien to Roosevelt’s New Dealers, but Ar tended to focus on geographically (and thus politically) spe- cific job creation and the technical sector more than on over- National all military shortcomings. Expenditures on naval rearma- A Civilian Conservation Corps crew places 24-inch concrete pipe at a camp west of Boise, Idaho. ment dwarfed those spent on the Army from 1934 on. In 1938, Roosevelt proposed a breathtaking expenditure of ooking back, we can be reasonably confident that our $500 million dollars to build 10,000 modern aircraft, when Lcurrent economic slump will be nowhere near as se- he had opined $17 million in procurement would be suffi- vere as that of the Great Depression. There nevertheless cient for the rest of the Army. In fairness, most of these may be useful lessons in the experiences of that era. The planes were envisioned for sale to the British and French, Army remains the only organization capable of coping but the imbalances underscore distortions introduced when with domestic disturbances should local police forces fail. military effectiveness per se is not the object of procurement. Along with its semiautonomous Corps of Engineers, the The Great Depression was a worldwide phenomenon, and Army also remains the nation’s largest reservoir of organi- some populations overseas became even more desperate than zational capability and immediately deployable skills and our own. In countries wherein democracy and liberal capital- talents. Depending upon future circumstances, its capabili- ism had but shallow roots, both were swept away. Hitler ties as a public enforcer or its capabilities as a collaborative came to power in Germany, militarists rose to the top in relief partner—perhaps both—may well come into play. Japan, and authoritarian regimes seized or tightened grips on Whatever our aspirations for transformation or modern- power in a number of other countries. Capitalist democracies ization, they will undoubtedly be degraded by economic enacted prohibitive tariffs to protect their own economies, in- hard times. If defense spending is employed as an eco- hibiting cooperation and further damaging their economic nomic stimulus, it seems likely to play for the Navy and prospects in the long run. Preoccupied with domestic con- Air Force far more so than for the Army. Most consequen- cerns, Americans turned a blind eye as authoritarian regimes tially, the American people and their government will be set out on paths of intimidation, aggression and conquest. understandably distracted from events overseas. If democ- Sister democracies similarly ignored the coming storm. racy and liberal capitalism are discredited abroad by eco- During this period, the Army, to its credit, sustained ef- nomic dysfunction, it will only benefit our present and fective educational programs, contemplated mobilization prospective adversaries. We will live in a more dangerous and war plans, and laid down an intellectual framework world. As has happened before, the Army and its sister that would serve it well in World War II. It fell further and services will be called upon to do more with less overseas further behind in its practical and physical preparedness, until the American people once again return their attention however. This mismatch between the ever-growing mili- to the external dangers of the world they live in. ( tary capabilities of authoritarian regimes and its own ever- diminishing warfighting capability would be the most sig- Recommended Reading: nificant consequence of the Great Depression with which Garraty, John A., The Great Depression (New York: the U.S. Army would have to contend. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986)

BRIG. GEN. JOHN S. BROWN, USA Ret., was chief of military Millett, Allan R. and Murray, Williamson, editors, history at the U.S. Army Center of Military History from Decem- Military Effectiveness, Volume II: The Interwar Period ber 1998 to October 2005. He commanded the 2nd Battalion, 66th (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1988) Armor, in Iraq and Kuwait during the Gulf War and returned to Weigley, Russell F., History of the United States Army Kuwait as commander of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, (New York: Macmillan, 1967) in 1995. He has a doctorate in history from Indiana University.

December 2008 I ARMY 87