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Negation, Scope and the Descriptive/Metalinguistic Distinction

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Negation, Scope and the Descriptive/Metalinguistic Distinction 1 NEGATION, SCOPE AND THE DESCRIPTIVE/METALINGUISTIC DISTINCTION Jacques Moeschler ([email protected]) 1. INTRODUCTION This paper is about negation and scope. Its main purpose is to try to build a general semantics- pragmatics interface framework where scope issues are explicitly described in a formalism accounting for scope properties of logical operators in natural language and their pragmatic interpretation. What is striking about negation is that it does not require a specific syntactic domain to trigger different scope effects. In other words, as far as French is concerned, ordinary negation is always a constituent negation, whereas it takes a whole proposition in its scope. More surprisingly, French negation does not occupy, as in most languages, a preceding position relative the constituent it modifies (the verb), but follows it. This is a very odd property, which is solved when negation is complete as in written French, where the expletive ne precedes the verb. So, in (1) for instance, there are two ways, and not three, of expressing a negative sentence: (1) a. Pierre ne vient pas. b. Pierre vient pas. c. * Pierre ne vient. ‘Peter does not come.’ One of the implications for a semantic and pragmatic comprehension of (1b) is to understand how negation can scope over the verb first, and scope over the whole sentence, as expressed in (2): (2) Pierre vient pas > Pierre pas [vient] > pas [Pierre vient] This issue, which mainly concerns the syntax-semantics interface, will not be discussed here.2 What we are concerned with here is the contrast between (3a) and (3b): (3) a. Pierre ne vient pas. b. Pierre ne vient pas, il court. In (3a), the scope of negation is given by (4a) – that is, negation scopes syntactically over the verb and semantically over the clause, whereas in (4b), negation does not scope over the clause, but over the speech act: 1 The author thanks Denis Delfitto, Luigi Rizzi and all the participants to SWIGG09 at Neuchâtel for their comments on the first presentation of this paper. Thanks to Gabriela Soare for her help in the revision of my paper. 2 What could be conjectured is that, as it has been demonstrated in the case of adverbials, the verb moves from a position after negation to a position before it: Pierre [ne pas [vient]] > Pierre [ne [vient] pas]. For more precise analyses, see Pollock (1989), Belletti (1990) and Chomsky (1991). GG@G (Generative Grammar in Geneva) 6:29-48, 2010 © 2010 Jacques Moeschler 30 JACQUES MOESCHLER (4) a. pas [Jean vient] b. pas [THE SPEAKER ASSERTS [Jean vient]] (3a) is traditionally described as a case of metalinguistic negation. In metalinguistic negation (Horn 1985, 1989), speakers use the standard negation just in order to make explicit that he cannot assert the clause that negation scopes over. What is surprising with metalinguistic negation is that first it does not require a specific morphological nor a syntactic device to convey a metalinguistic meaning, and second that a following string must be realized in order to insure the metalinguistic meaning. For instance, (3a) cannot in any context receive a metalinguistic meaning, whereas in (3b) the metalinguistic reading is the only possible one. Now, if such a difference occurs between these two simple uses of negation, the question is following: first, why does ordinary or descriptive negation not require a sequencing, for instance such as the one illustrated in (5): (5) Pierre ne vient pas, il reste chez lui. ‘Peter is not coming, he is staying at home.’ Second, what is the semantic and lexical limit between a corrective use and a metalinguistic use? For instance, is (6) an example of metalinguistic negation or a simple corrective use? (6) Pierre ne part pas, il arrive. ‘Peter is not leaving, he is arriving.’ As we see, the semantics-pragmatics issue leads us to a domain implying a lot of lexical semantics, and not only issues of scope. The aim of this paper is to give a rationale for the derivation of the interpretation of ordinary and metalinguistic negations. Our main hypothesis, following Carston (1994, 1996, 2002) and Moeschler (1997, 2006), is that negation takes wide scope at logical form and scopes over its specific domain (a verbal constituent) at the level of pragmatic derivation. In other words, referring to structures like (4a) and (4b), (4a) will be the typical semantic representation for the ordinary negation, and this representation will be specified, at the level of explicature to a representation as (7): (7) [Jean [pas-vient]] The way a representation like (4b) can be derived is the second aim of this paper. More generally, I will extend the domain of metalinguistic negation to capture the logical and pragmatic properties of utterance as (8), where negation scopes over a presupposition (8a), an implicature (8b) and a speech act (8c): (8) a. The king of France is not bald, since there is no king of France. b. Anne doesn’t have three children; she has four. c. I don’t advise you to clean your room, I order you. 2. A LONG STORY FOR A BIG ISSUE Let us start with the beginning of this story, that is, Russell’s analysis of definite descriptions (Russell 1905). Russell’s analysis leads to a classical distinction between external and internal negation: external negation has in its scope a full logical proposition, containing no free NEGATION, SCOPE AND NEGATIVE EVENTS 31 variables, whereas internal negation has in its scope a propositional function, i.e. a non- propositional form containing free variables. The king of France example is a good example to illustrate the formal difference between external and internal negation: (9) The king of France is bald. (10) The king of France is not bald. (11) The king of France is not bald, since there is no king of France. (9) and (10) have a common presupposition, that is, (12): (12) There is a unique king of France. (12) is a presupposition in the sense of the classical semantic definition of presupposition, that is, a proposition entailed by a positive clause and its negation (Gazdar 1979). This presupposition is cancelled in (13), and such an effect is responsible for the metalinguistic interpretation of (11). In other words, one possible paraphrase of (11) is the traditional metalinguistic description: (13) I cannot assert that the king of France is bald, since there is no king of France. Now the issue is the following: since the negative clauses in (10) and (11) are identical (the king of France is not bald), how can we account for their different interpretations. Russell’s analysis is a logical one, which is based on the analysis of (9): (9) is an existential sentence composed of the conjunction of three propositional functions3, as given in (14): (14) ∃x [K(x) ∧ ¬∃y[(y≠x) ∧ K(y)] ∧ B(x)] ‘There is an x such that x is king and there is no y such that y is different of x and king, and x is bald.’ Now what are the possible insertions for negation? Logically, there are four possible solutions, since negation is a propositional operator and applies, to a full proposition or a propositional function. (15) gives the four possible insertions for a negation in (14): (15) a. ¬∃x [K(x) ∧ ¬∃y[(y≠x) ∧ K(y)] ∧ B(x)] b. ∃x [¬K(x)∧ ¬∃y[(y≠x) ∧ K(y)] ∧ B(x)] c. ∃x [K(x) ∧ ¬ ¬∃y[(y≠x) ∧ K(y)] ∧ B(x)] d. ∃x [K(x)∧ ¬∃y[(y≠x) ∧ K(y)] ∧ ¬B(x)] (15a) is a consistent reading and corresponds to the wide scope reading of negation: it means that there is NOT such an x that is a king, that is unique and bald. The reading fits the interpretation in (11); that is, the denial of a presupposition, or the metalinguistic use of negation (13). So the first conclusion is that the wide scope of negation cancels existential presuppositions. 3 A propositional function is a logical form containing at least one free variable, that is, a variable that is not bound by a quantifier. Taken individually, K(x), ¬∃y[(y≠x) ∧ K(y)] and B(x) are propositional functions. 32 JACQUES MOESCHLER (15b) and (15c) are inconsistent readings with the negative clause the king of France is not bald. Why? (15b) asserts the existence of an individual, that is, a unique individual who is not king of France and bald. Even if this description would imply that we are all kings of France except one person, this description does not fit with the content of the negative clause the king of France is not bald. The only possible description corresponding to (15b) is something difficult to express, maybe (16): (16) The only one who is not king of France is bald. (15c) is not consistent with the meaning of the negative clause either, because it states that there is a king who is not unique and bald. (17) could be a possible linguistic expression of (15c): (17) The kings of France are bald. So, the last logical possible reading is (15d): it states that there is a unique king of France who is NOT bald. Here, negation is internal, that is, modifies a propositional function (Bx). This reading is the exact reading of the ordinary negation of (9), that is, (10). So negation can have, relative to the logical form given in (14), only two targets: the whole proposition and the propositional function corresponding to the description of the predicate. Now, we have a very nice explanation of the two readings: external negation has in its scope a quantified logical form, that is, a full interpretable proposition; internal negation has in its scope the predicate (bald) its argument (the king of France) modifies.
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