<<

U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs National Institute of Justice IN SHORT

➡TCOWARD RIMINAL JUSTICE SOLUTIONS www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij FEB. 06 NCJ 212976

Telephony Implications of Voice over Protocol

Key Points

■ Voice over allows ■ Traditional techniques for emergency location voice to be transported digi­ services at public safety answering points as tally through a network using Internet well as methods for intercepts and Protocol (IP) standards. electronic surveillance (wiretaps) are ineffec­ ■ Commercial IP-based services are tive or are not functional with IP-based quickly proliferating as an alternative to tradi­ telephony. tional wire-line consumer telephony services.

Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) communications Many , or nearly free, personal / refers to all types of conversational voice informa­ PDA-based VoIP telephony applications are readily tion including voice (telephony) or voice available for download and use via the Internet. from a land mobile system. VoIP-based tele­ Application developers take advantage of abundant phony is one of the fastest growing telecom tech­ online network capacity to facilitate free Internet- nology sectors. Two VoIP categories are particularly only voice calls with optional access to the public- relevant to public safety: VoIP telephony on public switched for a modest fee. telephone networks and VoIP technology within Devices with VoIP software can communicate public safety radio systems. nomadically, functioning at any location where network access is available. VOIP MARKET TREND Many and commercial telephony service PUBLIC SAFETY CONCERNS providers are migrating to IP-based infrastructure, Identifying 911 Emergency Calls. Potential public taking advantage of cost savings and efficiencies safety concerns related to VoIP-based telephony inherent in an IP transport network. In addition, technology include its inability to provide traditional nontraditional service providers are emerging to location identification (Enhanced 911, or E911) compete with incumbent providers by selling serv­ services for 911 emergency calls placed to a public ice that uses the Internet, cable network safety answering point (PSAP). IP-based telephony infrastructure, or other nonincumbent IP infrastruc­ equipment is not tied to a specific location like wire- ture to provide access to core transport network line based plain old telephony service (POTS). An facilities. In fact, many IP telephony services never IP-based telephone can be transported from location touch the traditional telephone network. to location, and therefore traditional caller location

Office of Justice Programs ■ Partnerships for Safer Communities ■ www.ojp.usdoj.gov services are not available to the emergency call CONCLUSION taker, creating PSAP procedural issues. Public safety officials and emergency call takers Meeting FCC Requirements. Recent rulings by the must be aware of these issues, and until pending Federal Communications Commission (FCC)1 man­ regulations are fully implemented and the associat­ date that commercial VoIP service providers must ed technology is available, officials must address provide E911 services correct PSAP, but the develop­ them through and the use of best prac­ ment, implementation, and processes associated tices. The National Emergency Number Association2 with these are very immature. In­ and the Association of Public-Safety Commun­ correctly configured consumer IP devices, or ications Officials3 are spearheading an effort to iden­ devices that are moved after a location has been tify and address regulatory issues associated with pinpointed, can provide false location information VoIP telephony technology and emergency location to an emergency call taker. A portable IP-based services with the FCC. In addition, the Federal telephony device operating through one or more Bureau of Investigation, through its CALEA4 public WiFi access points will not even Implementation Unit, has established a law enforce­ provide the limited details that are conveyed via ment executive forum to address intercept and sur­ a typical cellular telephone device. veillance issues associated with VoIP telephony. Conducting Surveillance. The FCC ruling also requires that a notice be attached to commercial FOR MORE INFORMATION VoIP devices that do not connect to a 911 operator. ■ NIJ CommTech Web site: An area of lesser concern is taxation and E911 http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/topics/commtech/. assessment fees. As service users drop traditional ■ services and migrate to unregulated VoIP networks, Regional National Law Enforcement and disposition of E911 fees and taxes associated with Corrections Technology Centers: the traditional telephone service is not well defined, Northeast (Rome, NY) 888–338–0584 and rules differ from State to State. Southeast (Charleston, SC) 800–292–4385 Another public safety concern is that traditional Rocky Mountain (Denver, CO) 800–416–8086 voice intercept and electronic surveillance tech­ Western (El Segundo, CA) 888–548–1618 niques are disrupted. New techniques, tools, and infrastructure access methods are required to facili­ Northwest (Anchorage, AK) 866–569–2969 tate surveillance of IP-based telephony services. Rural Law Enforcement Technology Center The nature of IP-based network transport makes 866–787–2553 the paths of IP packets through the network unpre­ dictable and more difficult to intercept. Very often NOTES IP addresses associated with a specific IP-based 1. FCC Order 05–116 can be found at http:// telephony device will change regularly, making it hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/ difficult or nearly impossible to target a single FCC-05-116A1.pdf. device or user. Strong end-to-end encryption between IP devices can also be implemented at 2. Additional information can be found at minimal cost, further compounding the surveillance http://www.nena.org/About_Contact/index.htm. efforts of law enforcement agencies. 3. Additional information can be found at http://www.apcointl.org. 4. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act: Additional information can be found at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ usamay2001_4.htm.

*NCJ~212976*

This document is not intended to create, does not create, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedur­ al, enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or criminal. Opinions or points of view expressed in this document represent a consensus of the authors and do not represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. The products and manufacturers discussed in this document are presented for informational purposes only and do not constitute product approval or endorsement by the U.S. Department of Justice.