Podcast Script Episode 4: the Systemic Risk Exception
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U.S. V. Connie Moorman Willis
Case 5:17-mj-01008-PRL Document 1 Filed 02/07/17 Page 1 of 14 PageID 1 AO 91 (Rev. 11/11) Criminal Complaint UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT for the Middle District of Florida United States of America ) v. ) ) CONNIE MOORMAN WILLIS Case No. ) 5: 17-mj-1008-PRL ) ) ) Defendant(s) I CRIMINAL COMPLAINT I i I, 1~he complainant in this case, state that the following is true to the best of my knowledge and belief. On or about the date(s) of Feb. 4, 2011 through Jan. 25, 2016 in the county of Marion in the I Middle District of Florida , the defendant(s) violated: ! j Code Section Offense Description 18 u.s.c. 1 sec. 656 Theft by a Bank Employee 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1341 Mail Fraud Tnis criminal complaint is based on these facts: I I See attached affidavit. I lifl Continued on the attached sheet. Charles Johnsten, U.S. Postal Inspector Printed name and title Sworn to before me and signed in my presence. Date: ~-1 - :lo Ir City and siate: Ocala, Florida Philip R. Lammens, U.S. Magistrate Judge Printed name and title I ! Case 5:17-mj-01008-PRL Document 1 Filed 02/07/17 Page 2 of 14 PageID 2 S'FATE OF FLORIDA CASE NO. 5:17-mj-1008-PRL I IOUNTY OF MARION AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT I, Charles Johnsten, being duly sworn, state as follows: INTRODUCTION 1. I am a United States Postal Inspector and have been so employed since I obcember 2016. -
Goldman Sachs Presentation to Bank of America Merrill Lynch Banking and Financial Services Conference
Goldman Sachs Presentation to Bank of America Merrill Lynch Banking and Financial Services Conference Harvey M. Schwartz Chief Financial Officer November 17, 2015 Cautionary Note on Forward-Looking Statements Today’s presentation and any presentation summary on our website may include forward-looking statements. These statements are not historical facts, but instead represent only the Firm’s beliefs regarding future events, many of which, by their nature, are inherently uncertain and outside of the Firm’s control. It is possible that the Firm’s actual results and financial condition may differ, possibly materially, from the anticipated results and financial condition indicated in these forward-looking statements. For a discussion of some of the risks and important factors that could affect the Firm’s future results and financial condition, see “Risk Factors” in our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2014. You should also read the forward-looking disclaimers in our Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2015, particularly as it relates to capital and leverage ratios, and information on the calculation of non-GAAP financial measures that is posted on the Investor Relations portion of our website: www.gs.com. The statements in the presentation are current only as of its date, November 17, 2015. Investing & Lending Segment Debt and Equity Forward Overview Loans Investments Outlook Average Firmwide Net Revenues 2010 to 2015YTD1 Investing & Lending Includes lending to clients across the firm as well as -
OTP Morning Brief
22 JUNE 2021 OTP Morning Brief • Western Europe's stock markets picked up, benefiting from Christine Lagarde's words • The sentiment improved in the USA, despite Fed officials' continued hints at monetary tightening • The EUR/HUF sank near 353 yesterday, when the MNB governor's hawkish article was published. • The MNB is expected to raise interest rates today; its size may determine the HUF's exchange rate. • Most of Asia's indices headed higher today; Brent climbed to USD 75 www.otpresearch.com 1 22 JUNE 2021 Western Europe's stock exchanges shifted into higher gear on Christine Lagarde’s words Western Europe's stock markets started the week with gains: Germany's DAX jumped 1.0%, reversing Friday's fall, the UK's FTSE rose by 0.6%, and the Stoxx600 closed 0.7% higher. It was the words of Christine Lagarde, the ECB's President, that set markets in motion. Speaking at a hearing in the European Parliament, she spoke about maintaining loose monetary conditions and dispelled fears about the spill-over effects of US inflation in Europe. Cyclical sectors have risen; the winners of the day in the Stoxx600 were vehicle manufacturers, chemical, and materials stocks. Retail companies also did well: the UK-based Morrisons food chain skyrocketed 35% after rejecting a GBP 5.5bn takeover bid from Clayton, Dubilier & Rice. Their rivals also jumped: Tesco advanced 1.7%, and Sainbury’s surged 3.8%. The Stoxx600 Health Sector Index stagnated, even though CureVac plummeted more than 10% on suspicion of insider trading; last week, the biopharmaceutical's stock price of fell as clinical trials pointed to low efficacy of its covid vaccine. -
Merrill Edge Select Funds1 Listing Created As of April 26, 2013
Merrill Edge SelectTM Funds Merrill Edge Select Funds1 Listing created as of April 26, 2013. To help simplify your investing experience, Merrill Lynch investment professionals have developed a proprietary screening process based on quantitative analyses for mutual funds offered through Merrill Edge. Each quarter we take into account risk and performance measures to highlight up to five no-load and load waived funds with no transaction fees for each fund category. Generally, no one metric determines the outcome of any selection, and metrics may have different weights in the filtering process. The Merrill Edge Select Funds are ranked by information ratio and displayed alphabetically. Visit merrilledge.com for details on Merrill Edge Select Funds selection criteria. Domestic Equity Fund Name Security Symbol Asset Class Large-Cap Growth JOHN HANCOCK US GLOBAL LEADERS USGLX Domestic Equity GROWTH FD T ROWE PRICE BLUE CHIP GROWTH FD TRBCX Domestic Equity TCW SELECT EQUITIES FUND TGCNX Domestic Equity T ROWE PRICE GROWTH STOCK FUND PRGFX Domestic Equity ALGER SPECTRA FUND SPECX Domestic Equity Large-Cap Value T ROWE PRICE VALUE FUND TRVLX Domestic Equity NUVEEN DIVIDEND VALUE FUND FFEIX Domestic Equity AMERICAN CENTURY INCOME & GROWTH BIGRX Domestic Equity FD NLD JOHN HANCOCK DISCIPLINED VALUE FUND JVLAX Domestic Equity RIDGEWORTH LARGE CAP VALUE EQUITY SVIIX Domestic Equity FUND © 2013 Bank of America Corporation. All rights reserved. I ARD6A740 I 4/2013 Domestic Equity cont. Fund Name Security Symbol Asset Class Mid-Cap Growth HIGHMARK GENEVA -
525000000 Freddie Mac Citigroup Global Markets Inc. Bofa Merrill
PRICING SUPPLEMENT DATED November 13, 2017 (to the Offering Circular Dated February 16, 2017) $525,000,000 Freddie Mac Variable Rate Medium-Term Notes Due August 21, 2018 Issue Date: November 21, 2017 Maturity Date: August 21, 2018 Subject to Redemption: No Interest Rate: See “Description of the Medium-Term Notes” herein Principal Payment: At maturity CUSIP Number: 3134GB4C3 You should read this Pricing Supplement together with Freddie Mac's Global Debt Facility Offering Circular, dated February 16, 2017 (the "Offering Circular"), and all documents that are incorporated by reference in the Offering Circular, which contain important detailed information about the Medium-Term Notes and Freddie Mac. See "Additional Information" in the Offering Circular. Capitalized terms used in this Pricing Supplement have the meanings we gave them in the Offering Circular, unless we specify otherwise. The Medium-Term Notes offered pursuant to this Pricing Supplement are complex and highly structured debt securities that may not pay a significant amount of interest for extended periods of time. The Medium-Term Notes are not a suitable investment for individuals seeking a steady stream of income The Medium-Term Notes may not be suitable investments for you. You should not purchase the Medium-Term Notes unless you understand and are able to bear the yield, market, liquidity and other possible risks associated with the Medium-Term Notes. You should read and evaluate the discussion of risk factors (especially those risk factors that may be particularly relevant to this security) that appears in the Offering Circular under “Risk Factors” before purchasing any of the Medium-Term Notes. -
NETSUITE ELECTRONIC BANK PAYMENTS Securely Automate EFT Payments and Collections with a Single Global Solution
NETSUITE ELECTRONIC BANK PAYMENTS Securely Automate EFT Payments and Collections with a Single Global Solution Electronic Bank Payments brings to NetSuite complementary electronic banking functionality Key Features that includes Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) • Automated payment batch allows multiple payments, customer refunds and customer payment batch creation stemmed from payments (direct debits), as well as check fraud different batch criteria, controls and payment deadlines. prevention through the Positive Pay service offered by leading banks. It helps ensure that • Approval routing and email alert notification enables additional payment employees and vendors are paid on time authorization prior to payment processing. and customer bills are settled automatically. With support for a wide range of global and • Enhanced EFT capabilities with filtering options support bill display, partial payments, local bank formats, Electronic Bank Payments bill management and other controls. provides a single payment management • Automated direct debit customer solution worldwide. collections to settle outstanding invoices. Electronic Bank Payments creates files of • Payment management options include payments or direct debit information in bank’s payment batch queuing, rollbacks, reversals predefined file format ready for import into with notations and automated notifications. banking software or submission to the bank • Positive Pay anti-fraud capabilities with online, thus lowering payment processing proactive notification to banks processing expenses by eliminating checks, postage and the checks. envelopes, and saving time as well. In addition, • Support for more than 50 international it supports management of large payment bank formats with Advanced Electronic runs (typically up to 5,000 payments per file) Bank Payment License customers having with the ability to process reversals and partial the flexibility to add more. -
Systemic Risk Through Securitization: the Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure
Revised Feb. 9, 2009 Systemic Risk Through Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure by Patricia A. McCoy, * Andrey D. Pavlov, † and Susan M. Wachter ‡ Abstract This paper argues that private-label securitization without regulation is unsustainable. Without regulation, securitization allowed mortgage industry actors to gain fees and to put off risks. During the housing boom, the ability to pass off risk allowed lenders and securitizers to compete for market share by lowering their lending standards, which activated more borrowing. Lenders who did not join in the easing of lending standards were crowded out of the market. In theory, market controls in the form of risk pricing could have constrained heightened mortgage risk without additional regulation. But in reality, as the mortgages underlying securities became more exposed to growing default risk, investors did not receive higher rates of return. Artificially low risk premia caused the asset price of houses to go up, leading to an asset bubble and creating a breeding ground for market fraud. The consequences of lax lending were covered up and there was no immediate failure to discipline the markets. The market might have corrected this problem if investors had been able to express their negative views by short selling mortgage-backed securities, thereby allowing fundamental market value to be achieved. However, the one instrument that could have been used to short sell mortgage-backed securities – the credit default swap – was also infected with underpricing due to lack of minimum capital requirements and regulation to facilitate transparent pricing. As a result, there was no opportunity for short selling in the private-label securitization market. -
Dexia Credit Local LEHMAN BROTHERS
OFFICIAL STATEMENT DATED MAY 31, 2006 NEW ISSUE RATINGS: FITCH: AAA/F1+ MOODY’S: Aaa/VMIG1 S&P: AAA/A-1+ BOOK-ENTRY ONLY In the opinion of Bond Counsel, assuming continuous compliance with certain covenants described herein, and subject to the conditions stated herein under “Tax Exemptions,” under existing law, (a) the interest on the Notes is excludable from gross income for Federal income tax purposes, and (b) the interest on the Notes is not an enumerated preference or adjustment for purposes of the Federal alternative minimum tax imposed on individuals and corporations; however, such interest will be taken into account in determining adjusted current earnings for the purpose of computing the alternative minimum tax imposed on corporations, and may be subject to the branch profits tax imposed on foreign corporations engaged in a trade or business in the United States. As described herein under “Tax Exemptions,” other Federal income tax consequences may arise from ownership of the Notes. It is also the opinion of Bond Counsel that, under existing law of the State of Maryland, the interest on the Notes and profit realized from the sale or exchange of the Notes is exempt from income taxation by the State of Maryland or by any of its political subdivisions; however, the law of the State of Maryland does not expressly refer to, and no opinion is expressed concerning, estate or inheritance taxes or any other taxes not levied directly on the Notes or the interest thereon. $50,000,000 MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND CONSOLIDATED PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT BOND ANTICIPATION NOTES, 2006 SERIES A Dated: Date of Issuance Due: June 1, 2026 Price: 100% CUSIP No. -
Citi Acquisition of Wachovia's Banking Operations
Citi Acquisition of Wachovia’s Banking Operations September 29, 2008 Transaction Structure Transaction Citi acquires Wachovia’s retail bank, corporate and investment bank and private bank Details businesses – Citi pays $2.2 billion to Wachovia in Citi common stock – Citi assumes substantially all of Wachovia’s debt; preferred stock excluded – Wachovia remains a publicly-traded holding company consisting of its retail brokerage and asset management businesses Capital Citi expects to raise $10 billion in common equity from the public markets Citi issues preferred stock and warrants to FDIC with a fair value of $12 billion at closing, accounted for as GAAP equity with full Tier 1 and leverage ratio benefit Quarterly dividend reduced to $0.16 per share immediately Regulatory capital relief on substantially all of the $312 billion of loss protected assets Risk Mitigation Citi enters loss protection arrangement with the FDIC on $312 billion of loss protected assets; maximum potential Citi losses of $42 billion – Citi is responsible for the first $30 billion of losses, recorded at closing through purchase accounting – Citi is responsible for the next $12 billion of losses, up to a maximum of $4 billion per year for the next three years – FDIC is responsible for any additional losses – Citi issues preferred stock and warrants to FDIC with a fair value of $12 billion at closing Approvals FDIC approved; subject to formal Federal Reserve approval and Wachovia shareholder approval Closing Anticipated by December 31, 2008 1 Terms of Loss Protection -
Inward Remittance — Quick Reference Guide
Inward Remittance — Quick Reference Guide How to instruct a Remitting Bank to remit funds to your account with BOCHK Please instruct the Remitting Bank to send a detailed payment instruction in SWIFT MT103 format to us using the below SWIFT BIC of BOCHK. To designate BOCHK as the Beneficiary’s bank, please provide below details. SWIFT BIC: BKCHHKHHXXX Bank Name: BANK OF CHINA (HONG KONG) LIMITED, HONG KONG Main Address: BANK OF CHINA TOWER, 1 GARDEN ROAD, CENTRAL, HONG KONG Bank Code: 012 (for local bank transfer CHATS / RTGS only) Please provide details of your account for depositing the remittance proceeds. Beneficiary’s Account Number: Please provide the 14-digit account number to deposit the incoming funds. (Please refer to Part 3 for further explanation.) Beneficiary’s Name: Please provide the name of the above account number as in our record. Major Clearing Arrangement and Correspondent Banks of BOCHK CCY SWIFT BIC Name of Bank Details Bank of China (Hong Kong) Ltd - RMB BKCHHKHH838 BOCHK’s CNAPS No.: 9895 8400 1207 Clearing Centre CNY BKCHCNBJXXX Bank of China Head Office, Beijing Direct Participant of CIPS (Payment through CIPS) BKCHCNBJS00 Bank of China, Shanghai Correspondent Bank of BOCHK in the mainland CCY SWIFT BIC Name of Bank CCY SWIFT BIC Name of Bank AUD BKCHAU2SXXX Bank of China, Sydney NOK DNBANOKKXXX DNB Bank ASA, Oslo Bank Islam Brunei Darussalam NZD BND BIBDBNBBXXX ANZBNZ22XXX ANZ National Bank Ltd, Wellington Berhad CAD BKCHCATTXXX Bank of China (Canada), Toronto SEK NDEASESSXXX Nordea Bank AB (Publ), Stockholm CHF UBSWCHZH80A UBS Switzerland AG, Zurich SGD BKCHSGSGXXX Bank of China, Singapore DKK DABADKKKXXX Danske Bank A/S, Copenhagen THB BKKBTHBKXXX Bangkok Bank Public Co Ltd, Bangkok Commerzbank AG, Frankfurt AM COBADEFFXXX CHASUS33XXX JPMorgan Chase Bank NA, New York EUR Main BKCHDEFFXXX Bank of China, Frankfurt USD CITIUS33XXX Citibank New York GBP BKCHGB2LXXX Bank of China, London BOFAUS3NXXX Bank of America, N.A. -
Lista Banków Przyjmujących Przelewy Europejskie (Stan Na 01.10.2010)
Lista banków przyjmujących przelewy Europejskie (stan na 01.10.2010) BELGIUM ING BELGIUM SA/NV BBRUBEBB FORTIS BANK NV/SA GEBABEBB DEXIA BANK BELGIUM N.V GKCCBEBB KBC BANK NV BRUSSELS KREDBEBB LA POST SA DE DROIT PUBLIC PCHQBEBB AACHENER BANK EG, FILIALE EUPEN AACABE41 ABN AMRO BANK (BRUSSELS BRANCH) BELGIUM ABNABEBR ABK ABERBE21 ANTWERPSE DIAMANTBANK NV ADIABE22 ARGENTA SPAARBANK NV ARSPBE22 AXA BANK NV AXABBE22 BANK OF BARODA BARBBEBB BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA BRUSSELS BBVABEBB BANQUE CHAABI DU MAROC BCDMBEB1 BKCP BKCPBEB1 CREDIT PROFESSIONNEL SA (BKCP) BKCPBEBB BANCA MONTE PASCHI BELGIO BMPBBEBB DELTA LLOYD BANK SA BNAGBEBB BNP PARIBAS BELGIQUE BNPABEBB BANK OF AMERICA, ANTWERP BRANCH BOFABE3X BANK OF TOKYO MITSUBISHI NV BOTKBEBX BANK VAN DE POST BPOTBEB1 SANTANDER BENELUX BSCHBEBB BYBLOS BANK EUROPE BYBBBEBB JP MORGAN CHASE BANK BRUSSELS CHASBEBX CITIBANK INTERNATIONAL PLC CITIBEBX COMMERZBANK AG, ANTWERPEN COBA COBABEBB COMMERZBANK BELGIEN N.V/S.A. COBABEBB COMMERZBANK AG, BRUSSELS COBABEBX BANQUE CREDIT PROFESSIONEL DU HAINAUT SCRL CPDHBE71 CBC BANQUE SA BRUXELLES CREGBEBB CITIBANK BELGIUM SA CTBKBEBX BANK DEGROOF SA DEGRBEBB BANK DELEN NV DELEBE22 DEUTSCHE BANK BRUSSELS DEUTBEBE DRESDNER BANK BRUSSELS BRANCH DRESBEBX ETHIAS BANK NV ETHIBEBB EUROPABANK NV EURBBE99 VAN LANSCHOT BANKIERS BELGIË NV FVLBBE22 GOFFIN BANK NV GOFFBE22 HABIB BANK LTD BELGIUM HABBBEBB MERCATOR BANK NV HBKABE22 HSBC BANK PLC BRUSSELS HSBCBEBB THE BANK OF NEW YORK, BRUSSELS BRANCH IRVTBEBB BANK J. VAN BREDA JVBABE22 KBC ASSET MANAGEMENT KBCABEBB KBC FINANCIAL -
Systemic Moral Hazard Beneath the Financial Crisis
Seton Hall University eRepository @ Seton Hall Law School Student Scholarship Seton Hall Law 5-1-2014 Systemic Moral Hazard Beneath The inF ancial Crisis Xiaoming Duan Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship Recommended Citation Duan, Xiaoming, "Systemic Moral Hazard Beneath The inF ancial Crisis" (2014). Law School Student Scholarship. 460. https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/460 The financial crisis in 2008 is the greatest economic recession since the "Great Depression of the 1930s." The federal government has pumped $700 billion dollars into the financial market to save the biggest banks from collapsing. 1 Five years after the event, stock markets are hitting new highs and well-healed.2 Investors are cheering for the recovery of the United States economy.3 It is important to investigate the root causes of this failure of the capital markets. Many have observed that the sudden collapse of the United States housing market and the increasing number of unqualified subprime mortgages are the main cause of this economic failure. 4 Regulatory responses and reforms were requested right after the crisis occurred, as in previous market upheavals where we asked ourselves how better regulation could have stopped the market catastrophe and prevented the next one. 5 I argue that there is an inherent and systematic moral hazard in our financial systems, where excessive risk-taking has been consistently allowed and even to some extent incentivized. Until these moral hazards are eradicated or cured, our financial system will always face the risk of another financial crisis. 6 In this essay, I will discuss two systematic moral hazards, namely the incentive to take excessive risk and the incentive to underestimate risk.