<<

RAPID LIVELIHOODS ASSESSMENT IN SOUTHERN

TYRE CAZA (S OUTH LEBANON ) AND CAZA (N ABATYEH )

Map Source : UN OCHA

Final Report Date: 29 th August, 2005

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Save the Children carried out a rapid in the central part of , covering much of Tyre and Bint Jbeil cazas, from August 18 th to 24 th . The objective was to provide a qualitative description of pre-conflict livelihood patterns in the area and to assess how those activities had been affected by the conflict.

The population in the areas of the south assessed rely on various combinations of farming (mainly tobacco), remittances from relatives living overseas, local shops and services, daily labour in agriculture and in businesses and services and a small amount of formal employment. Some families keep cattle and goats, but the numbers are quite small in this area. Between 60-80% of people are involved in agriculture, but most of those do not rely on it alone as tobacco growing is not very lucrative.

Incomes were said to be on average around US$500 per month, with the less well off sections of the population reliant on daily labour earning around US$330 per month. This income was more than adequate for purchasing basic needs, and thus levels of absolute poverty were very low.

Physical conflict-related damage has mainly been in the form either of severe damage to a large portion of homes and businesses in some villages, or of destruction of a limited number of specific buildings within otherwise undamaged areas.

The 34-day conflict led to the displacement of most of the population for 20-30 days in July and early August. The timing of this is significant for livelihoods because: (a) This is the harvesting period for tobacco, which runs from June to August. In less damaged villages, it is likely that at least 40% of the tobacco harvest has been lost. In more damaged villages where fear of unexploded ordnance is hindering the return to the fields the harvest loss will continue rising until UXOs are cleared. (b) It is the peak season for the return of overseas-resident Lebanese, who normally swell village populations by up to 50% from June/ July to September, providing an injection into the local economy through their spending and contributing to a peak period for construction and non-agricultural daily labour.

From the admittedly limited interviews carried out, it appeared that there is a strong economic capacity to cope with the damage. Many families are able to use savings, to receive support from relatives and the wider community, and to manage by cutting expenditure on non-essential items.

Furthermore, the volume of response to the crisis from a variety of sources has been very significant. Food aid is being supplied (and promised to continue) in enormous quantities relative to needs.

Two of the main interventions required to restore livelihoods to normal are the reconstruction of homes and businesses, and the clearance of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXOs). The latter is vital to enable some harvest to be salvaged and, later, to enable land preparation to begin for next year’s season. Additional resources to speed up this process and to reach lower-priority agricultural lands would be extremely valuable.

It is recommended that compensation be paid to cover economic damage from the conflict, such as lost tobacco harvest or damaged capital equipment for businesses. There is a real risk, however, that daily labourers would not benefit from this, as their losses are in terms of employment rather than any physical items. To prevent creating greater inequality, it is suggested that those groups should also receive some compensation for lost earnings.

1

1. B ACKGROUND & C ONTEXT

On the 12 th of July, 2006, a faction of attacked a group of Israeli soldiers on the . 7 soldiers were killed and 2 soldiers were kidnapped. then entered Lebanon, and the subsequent escalation of armed hostilities in Lebanon led to the displacement of over 500,000 people and a deteriorating humanitarian situation.

With the coming into force of a ceasefire on Monday August 14 th , there was a rapid return of most of the displaced population to the south. Those whose homes have not been damaged have returned there, with others whose homes are now uninhabitable staying with relatives or renting accommodation in less affected towns, and visiting their homes during the day to see what work can be done.

Tyre and Bint Jbeil cazas (districts), which comprise most of the area south of the Litani river and bordering Israel, were some of the areas worst-affected by the conflict, with serious destruction to homes, businesses and infrastructure, and access to farmland restricted by the risk of unexploded ordnance (UXOs).

Save the Children carried out emergency interventions to support children during the displacement, and sent a multi-sectoral assessment team to re-assess needs in the changed post-ceasefire context. The purpose of the livelihoods part of the assessment was to understand how the recent conflict had affected the livelihood strategies of different population groups within the assessed area, and what impact that has had (a) on their immediate ability to economically access food and non-food needs, and (b) medium- to long-term livelihood prospects.

It is hoped that the assessment will be useful for those planning interventions in these areas who require a broad overview of livelihood patterns.

2. M ETHODOLOGY

The assessment was carried out over a 7-day period from August 18 th to 24 th , including one day in and six days of fieldwork based form Tyre (Sour). It was led by an experienced Food Security & Livelihoods Advisor, working as part of a multi-sectoral Save the Children team.

The assessment used qualitative research techniques, involving a review of available secondary information and semi-structured interviews with community members, shopkeepers/ businessmen, Municipalities, local and international NGOs and UN agencies. Information was probed and crosschecked between different sources and verified as much as possible with observation. Sphere Minimum Standards for food security assessments in disasters were followed. The focus was on answering 3 core questions: • What were pre-conflict livelihood patterns (disaggregated according to socio- economic patterns and considering seasonality)? • How was each source of income affected by the conflict? • What external support would be required to return to pre-conflict status?

The emphasis was on understanding the overall picture rather than getting quantified information. Through these interviews and discussions it was hoped to provide an overview of who the most vulnerable groups might be, and what support they would

2

require. Vulnerability was understood broadly as being a function of exposure to a shock (in this case the conflict) and capacity to cope with that shock.

11 villages were visited in the central parts of Tyre and Bint Jbeil cazas (districts) 1. These were purposively chosen to reflect a mix of levels of damage from the conflict, and were concentrated in the central part of the south where there was said to be less activity in food security and livelihoods by other agencies. While the picture from these villages is considered to be quite representative of the central areas, it does not apply to the western coastal strip (where irrigated banana and fruit farming is more important), and may not apply to the more mountainous eastern border area where livestock play a greater role in livelihoods.

Access was constrained somewhat by security, with some roads remaining uncleared for travel, and within villages visited it was often not possible to travel away from main roads due to the risks from UXOs and landmines. An additional constraint was that the assessment was carried out soon after the ceasefire as the population was coming to terms with the effects of the conflict. In this context it was often understandably difficult to get objective information, and the situation was developing rapidly as more support arrived.

3. P RE -CONFLICT LIVELIHOOD PATTERNS

3.1 Overview of Livelihood Patterns

Lebanon is a middle-income country, and although the south of the country is considered relatively resource-poor, income levels are nonetheless significantly higher than in most other contexts where humanitarian agencies operate.

In terms of livelihood patterns, the area south of the Litani could broadly be divided into three zones (not counting the urban area of Tyre): - A coastal strip of approximately 5km, with a greater emphasis on irrigated banana and citrus fruit production - A central zone, with tobacco and olives as the main agricultural crops, but still with quite built-up areas along the main roads - A more hilly/ mountainous eastern area with lower population density and greater reliance on livestock in addition to tobacco.

This assessment only covered the central tobacco-growing area. The population in that area rely on various combinations of farming, remittances from relatives living overseas, local shops and services, daily labour in agriculture and in businesses and services and a small amount of formal employment. Some families keep cattle and goats, but the numbers are quite small in this area. Between 60-80% of people are involved in agriculture, but most of those do not rely on it alone as tobacco growing is not very lucrative.

3.2 Wealth Groups

It was not possible to develop a typical “wealth breakdown” for this area, as the livelihood patterns are relatively complex, and no activity being exclusive to any one

1 See Annex 1 for a list of locations visited and their P-Codes.

3

wealth group. However, it can be said that those more reliant on daily labour are less well off than others. Tobacco farming is carried out across the wealth spectrum, and remittances also seem to be received by many families. However, overseas remittances can play a very large role in making some families significantly better off than others. Food production is not particularly important to the wealth of families. Most families do have some small vegetable and fruit production, and while this can be important for dietary diversity, it does not seem to be a determining factor of wealth. Wheat production in this area is very limited. Wealth, therefore, is best distinguished simply by income levels.

Incomes were said to be on average around US$500 per month, with the less well off sections of the population reliant on daily labour earning around US$330 per month. This income was more than adequate for purchasing basic needs, and thus levels of absolute poverty were low.

The poorest families tend to be those very few elderly-headed or female-headed households who do not live with other relatives. Children in those chronically poor families are often involved in labouring or trades from aged 12 years and upwards. However even those families usually benefit from local support networks and many receive exemptions from direct healthcare and education costs.

3.3 Seasonality

There is a strong seasonal element to production and income patterns. The dry summer months are a peak period for daily labourers and businesses. Both benefit from the influx of overseas-resident Lebanese and their spending in the area. It is also the harvesting period for tobacco. The seasonal calendar for the area is shown below.

May Aug Nov Nov Sep Sep Dec Feb Feb Mar Jun Jun Jan Apr Oct

Activity Jul

Rainfall Peak Light Light Peak Peak Tobacco Sell Nursery Transplant Harvest/ Dry Dry and bale Sell Agric Labour Peak – Olives Tobacco Non Agric Peak Labour Return of Peak Diaspora (2006 Conflict) X x

3.4 Description of Main Pre-Conflict Livelihood Strategies

3.4.1 Tobacco Farming 60-80% of the population was said to be involved in tobacco in one way or another, including daily labouring. Families either own their land or rent from others. Tobacco production is licensed by the government, and an annual license has to be purchased to engage in tobacco farming (except for those who began farming before 1990, who received permanent licenses). The government limits its purchases to 400kg per farmer, and pays around US$6-8 per kg.

4

The farming cycle for tobacco is long. Seedlings were said to be grown in January/ February, and then transplanted to the fields in March and April, and left to mature without the need for irrigation. Transplanting is the most labour-intensive activity and often requires the help of external labourers. The harvest occurs from June to the end of August or early September, with leaves being picked daily off the plants as they become ready. They are then put on lines and hung to dry for 1 month indoors and 10 days outdoors, before being packed in bales. They are finally sold to the government around December/ January.

Much of the money earned goes to paying off bank loans, and the profit from tobacco is said to be quite low. Hence for many, tobacco farming is only one of a number of activities carried out. Revenue from tobacco is often around US$3,000 per year.

3.4.2 Remittances Southern Lebanon has contributed heavily to the large Lebanese diaspora living in North America, West Africa, Australia and elsewhere, and to the population in Beirut. The extent of the population movement can be illustrated by some approximate population figures provided by the Municipalities in villages visited:

Total Registered Living Year-Round Additional Summer Village from the Village Elsewhere Residents Residents Bint Jbeil 60,000 56,000 4,000 2,000 8,500 4,500 4,000 1,000 Kafra 15-16,000 11-12,000 4,000 9,000

The overseas residents contribute significantly to livelihoods in the south both through remittances to their families, and via their spending within the local economy when many of them return for the summer months. There are also significant numbers of southern Lebanese living elsewhere in the country, especially in south Beirut. While this group also provides remittances, on average foreign remittances are worth more.

3.4.3 Daily Labour – Agriculture Much of the work on farms is done by family members themselves – including children. However, certain tasks are very labour-intensive and time-bound, particularly transplanting, and this is the main activity for which labourers are employed. The other time when work can be found is for harvesting olives, which was said to be concentrated in early October. There was significant variation in the reported wage rates. The most common figure reported was US$13 per day (LL20,000/ day), although some reported wage rates of up to US$25-30 per day.

3.4.4 Shops, Trades and Services Most of the villages visited are relatively built up, especially the closer one gets to Tyre, and have (or had) a variety of shops, businesses and services in each, ranging from small food shops, to mechanics, to builders and decorators, to satellite television providers. These are typically quite small businesses but are an important source of revenue and employment in the area.

3.4.5 Daily Labour – Construction and Services Construction is a very important activity during the summer months, with much of the activities being contracted by those resident overseas. This is the biggest source of daily labour opportunities. A smaller number of casual jobs are also available in shops and businesses, and in homes (e.g. gardening). Wage rates were quite consistently reported to be LL20,000 per day (equivalent to US$13/ day, or about US$330 per month working six days a week).

5

This work is very seasonal, and those involved are typically the same people who do agricultural labour at other times of the year, while some also own or rent tobacco farms. It was roughly estimated that 30-50% of the population might fall into this category of daily labourers 2. For those solely involved in daily labour, there were very few reported opportunities for work in winter, and it is said to be normal for this group to work for six to eight months of the year only. In the remaining months, they either live off saved earnings from earlier in the year or borrow money in the form of buying supplies on credit from shopkeepers.

3.4.6 Formal Employment A variety of diverse formal employment opportunities exist in the area, including in education and healthcare, the government and military. These only tend to employ a small number of people in each village. Salaries obviously vary according to the job, but for example, a driver may earn US$400/ month, while the starting salary for a teacher is around US$500/ month.

3.4.7 Children’s Labour Overall, school enrolment and attendance rates in south Lebanon are high. Nonetheless, children were reported to engage in much of the same work as adults from the age of 15 upwards. This includes helping with daily labour both on-3 and off- farms, or apprenticeships in skilled activities. The reasons for not continuing education at these ages were said to be mainly related to issues of quality of education or lack of interest, rather than due to economic difficulties in paying for school costs.

However, there were reported to be children who drop out of school earlier and more from economic reasons, and begin work around aged 12. These children were said to be predominantly in the few households headed by women who do not receive support from their extended family. It was not possible to find and interview such families in the short time available for this assessment, however from the description of them from other interviewees, it is likely that they are a marginalised and chronically poor group.

2 Some of these will also be among the 60-80% who are directly or indirectly involved in tobacco farming. It was not possible to determine the numbers only doing casual labour, only doing tobacco farming or doing both. In fact, such a simplification may not even be appropriate. 3 Children as young as 5 were sometimes said to get involved in relatively light agricultural work with their families.

6

4. E FFECTS OF THE CONFLICT ON LIVELIHOODS

4.1 Physical Damage Conflict damage is either in the form of relatively localised strikes on individual houses and businesses within villages, or very heavy damage affecting over 60% of houses and businesses either in a concentrated area or in the entire town. On the road to Bent Jbeil, by far the worst-affected town was Siddiquine. Yater has also suffered a lot of damage, while the central business area of Bent Jbeil has been badly damaged, with wider but less structural damage in the rest of the town. has severe damage but only in a small part of the town. Other towns such as Hannouiye, , Haris and Haddata appear only to have had specific houses and businesses destroyed. Further north, Sifra, and Ghandariya received quite a lot of damage, while Ech Chhabiye and Deraghaiya had less damage.

From observation, the closer to Tyre one is, the more life appears to be back to normal. For example, Qana looked quite lively with shops and businesses open, while places further away such as Tebnine and seemed quieter, except for cleaning-up activities.

The level of physical damage within a village has a significant bearing on the economic impact of the conflict. For many of the sources of income described below, the impact has been described according to the level of destruction in the village.

4.2 Functioning of Markets In an area such as south Lebanon where the vast majority of food is purchased rather than produced for own consumption, the functioning or otherwise of food markets is a key determinant both of food security and of the most appropriate response to any food insecurity.

Markets (in the form mainly of shops and supermarkets) appear largely to be operating normally, with the obvious exception of the few heavily-damaged villages, where shops have been destroyed. The closer one gets to Tyre, the easier it is to find food available. However, even in the worst-affected areas, functioning shops could be found within at least 5km. Food is visibly available in the shops that are open, including fresh fruits and vegetables. Much of the dry foods are old pre-conflict stock. Some people reported not wanting to buy old stock for fear that it is out of date.

Prices are said to have increased since the conflict typically by 10-20%, mainly driven by increases in fuel costs. This was not mentioned as a problem by any interviewees, however, and was only raised in response to direct questioning on the topic. As significant amounts of food aid are beginning to arrive in the area, it is likely that people are simply not purchasing as much food as before.

During the assessment period fuel was available in the fuel stations that have not been destroyed 4. However many fuel stations appeared to have been targeted for bombing. While old stocks are still being used, fuel stations associated with major oil companies said they had no worries about getting new stocks. Vehicles are moving quite freely on roads that have been declared safe for passage, with some slight delays where bomb damage has limited the width of the road. Some of these roads would not be suited to very large trucks at present. More roads are being declared safe on a daily basis.

4 However fuel queues were observed further north as the assessment ended, and media reports suggest that fuel supplies have been hindered by the continuing Israeli naval blockade.

7

4.3 Impact of the Conflict on Sources of Income

Insofar as possible, the information on the impact of the conflict comes from those affected. However, in some cases the observations of the assessor indicated inconsistencies with what was reported. What follows tries to reconcile any inconsistencies and provide as balanced a view as was possible under the circumstances.

4.3.1 Tobacco Farming Tobacco farming has been affected mainly by the displacement of population at a key time in the cropping season. Harvesting of tobacco usually occurs in June, July and August, and is an ongoing process, with leaves being picked over a prolonged period as they mature. As a result of displacement, some of the harvest matured but has not been picked, resulting in some of the crop drying up and becoming worthless. Many have claimed that 100% of the crop has been destroyed, but in a more in-depth interview, one farmer from Siddiquine estimated that he had lost 40% of the crop (which roughly accords with being absent for 1 month out of a 2.5 – 3 month harvesting period), while farmers in Qana were observed to be continuing harvesting. Also, tobacco does not require irrigation, therefore lack of water is not an issue for this crop or for olives. It appears that where the bombing was less widespread, the losses of tobacco should not be total.

Where there has been serious bombing damage, tobacco crops may also have been damaged/ destroyed by the blasts, or – more significantly - access to crops has been limited due to UXOs. However, this may not be as widespread as is commonly said. In villages where a small number of buildings had been destroyed, families were observed to be continuing with harvesting.

4.3.2 Remittances The flow of overseas remittances should be largely unaffected by the conflict, and indeed it is possible that they could increase in response to needs for reconstruction. Most banks and Western Union offices are open, therefore money should flow as normal. Remittances from families living in Beirut, however, could have been affected as most people from the south of the country live in south Beirut, which was heavily affected by the bombing.

4.3.3 Daily Labour - Agriculture This appears unaffected at present, simply because this is not a season where work is usually available. The current agricultural activities of tobacco harvesting and drying seems to be largely family work, without a need for outside help. There will potentially be a delayed impact on this group, however, if economic support is not provided to tobacco farmers, thus affecting next year’s production and associated employment.

4.3.4 Shops, Trades & Services Those premises damaged and destroyed by bombs are obviously very seriously affected, and it will take a long time for them to re-open.

Those not damaged will have lost at least a month’s income from closure during the conflict, and possibly more if owners have not returned or they have decided to remain closed for some other reason. Also, this was a peak time of year for businesses as it was the time that many of the diaspora had returned for vacations and typically inject a lot of spending into the local economy. Currently, businesses

8

are beginning to re-open in some areas, while others talk of remaining fearful about the ceasefire and being pre-occupied by other things or just being scared, and therefore they are not yet working. Those businesses should return to normal quickly, however. In Tyre, for example, business has almost completely returned to normal, after having been quiet until just one week ago.

4.3.5 Daily Labour – Construction and Services In relatively undamaged areas, urban casual labouring opportunities should only have been affected insofar as employers have not returned (but most apparently have). In the short-term, as mentioned above, some people are not returning to work or being employed due to lingering fears about security. They are currently managing with savings and with support from family and (gradually) support from outside agencies. If security remains OK, there may actually be a windfall period of high employment with the re-building work that will inevitably follow the recent conflict.

In heavily damaged areas, however, the incomes of casual labourers will be badly affected as they will not find much local employment in the short term, and do not have much savings to fall back on.

4.3.6 Formal Employment It was not possible to get enough information on the impact on formal employment in the time available, and specifically on whether public employees will continue to receive salaries or be re-assigned to other areas if their place of work has been destroyed.

4.4 Coping Strategies and Support Mechanisms

From the admittedly limited interviews carried out, it appeared that there is a strong economic capacity to cope with the damage. Many families are able to use savings, to receive support from relatives and the wider community, and to manage by cutting expenditure on non-essential items. When asked how spending patterns have changed as a result of the conflict, even daily labourers responded with things like “selling my mobile phone”, “ reducing smoking” and “not buying chocolate”. Thus it is stressed that the situation in Lebanon is very different from other emergencies in recent years that Save the Children and other international agencies have responded to.

Furthermore, the volume of response to the crisis from a variety of sources has been substantial. Food aid is now being supplied in very large quantities, albeit for a short intended time period. ICRC reports that they have covered the needs in the south up to the present time, while WFP has food in its pipeline for 200,000 people until the end of October. And this is not to mention smaller pipelines from other agencies, bilateral supplies from governments such as Qatar, and the intra-community support being provided.

Even if the commodity basket falls far short of what people are used to consuming, it nonetheless constitutes a saving to them, i.e. they do not have to spend money that they otherwise would have spent on those items. Similarly, many are receiving hygiene kits, there are promises of waivers of healthcare and education costs, and many families are being supported by relatives.

Reconstruction of homes and businesses is expected to be carried out by Hezbollah (via Jihad al-Bina), and already they are registering people in the south for compensation of up to US$12,000 to cover a year’s rent of temporary

9

accommodation and furniture costs (and this cash is already being provided in south Beirut). Media reports suggest that up to US$300 million in cash is expected to be disbursed within another 2 weeks 5. Mines clearance is another vital activity to enable some harvest to be salvaged and, later, to enable land preparation to begin for next year’s season. This is being carried out by the Lebanese army, MAG and UNIFIL, but additional resources to speed up this process and to reach lower-priority agricultural lands would be extremely valuable.

It is not clear whether compensation will be paid to cover economic damage from the conflict, such as lost tobacco harvest or damaged capital equipment for businesses. However, there are some anecdotal reports that this will be prioritised after the compensation for loss of housing. There is a real risk, however that daily labourers will not benefit from this, as their losses are in terms of employment rather than any physical items. To prevent creating greater inequality, it is suggested that those groups should also receive some compensation for lost earnings.

5. C ONCLUSIONS

Overall, considering not only the damage from the conflict but also the capacity to cope and the responses committed to already, the evidence collected during this assessment suggests that south Lebanon is a very resilient area, and that the conflict will not create long-term poverty within the areas affected. There will certainly be short- to medium-term stresses for some and income levels will undoubtedly decline, but these stresses will mainly be in the form of a decline in the quality of life rather than a lack of economic access to essential goods and services. Economic activity is resuming at speed, and intra-community support mechanisms appear to be proving remarkably strong.

It should be emphasised that this is not intended to under-state the wider impact of the conflict. There are serious and urgent needs in other sectors, particularly water and sanitation, UXO clearance and awareness, child protection and education. Furthermore, should the promised compensation for physical damages not materialise, the picture could be very different, and the time needed for a return to pre-conflict status would be very much prolonged.

Of all those affected, those reliant on daily labour and those for whom tobacco is the only source of income are considered most at risk of economic stress. The latter could be supported if compensation is provided for economic damage in addition to physical damage, however the former are likely to be excluded from formal compensation schemes.

6. R ECOMMENDATIONS

- Promised compensation schemes will be very valuable in aiding reconstruction and should be completed.

- Compensation for economic damage should also be considered, particularly for tobacco farming and to support the re-establishment of small businesses.

- Food aid programmes should be limited both in time and in scope to cover only the immediate needs of the least well-off sections of communities in highly

5 See Daily Star, August 24, 2006: “Hizbullah Deluges Economy in Dollars”

10

damaged villages. Furthermore, the food availability and market conditions indicate that cash-based responses are more appropriate than the provision of in- kind food aid.

- The need for livelihoods interventions by international and local NGOs is likely to be only for very localised and targeted programmes for those who “fall through the cracks”.

- International NGOs considering funding for livelihoods should look carefully at the value-added of interventions in this sector over and above those already pledged, and it is strongly recommended that funds be prioritised for sectors with greater needs such as water and sanitation, mine/ UXOs clearance, education and child protection.

- A further review of the livelihoods situation and the progress of economic recovery should be carried out in approximately 6 weeks once emergency programmes have scaled down and the scope of promised responses has become clearer. At that point, any gaps in coverage or additional needs may become more apparent.

11

Annex 1: Locations Visited and P-Codes 6

Village Name Casa Mohafaza P-Code Villages in which Interviews Were Carried Out Derdghaiya Tyre South Lebanon LBN 63039 Qana Tyre South Lebanon LBN 63089 Siddiqine Tyre South Lebanon LBN 63100 Srifa Tyre South Lebanon LBN 63102 Zabqine Tyre South Lebanon LBN 63113 Bent Jbail Bint Jbeil Nabatyeh LBN 41008 Froun Bint Jbeil Nabatyeh LBN 41018 Ghandouriye Bint Jbeil Nabatyeh LBN 41019 Kafra Bint Jbeil Nabatyeh LBN 41025 Yater Bint Jbeil Nabatyeh LBN 41044 Marjeyoun Nabatyeh LBN 43013 Observations Only Hadatha Bint Jbeil Nabatyeh LBN 41020 Haris Bint Jbeil Nabatyeh LBN 41022 Tebnine Bint Jbeil Nabatyeh LBN 41042 Deir Qanoun en Nahr Tyre South Lebanon LBN63038 Hanaouiye Tyre South Lebanon LBN 63051

Annex 2: About Save the Children

Save the Children is the world’s largest independent organisation for children, making a difference to children’s lives in over 110 countries. From emergency relief to long-term development, Save the Children helps children to achieve a happy, healthy and secure childhood. Save the Children listens to children, involves children and ensures their views are taken into account. Save the Children secures and protects children’s rights – to food, shelter, health care, education and freedom from violence, abuse and exploitation.

Save the Children’s presence in Lebanon dates back to 1949, when health services were provided to Palestinian refugees in shelter camps. Today, we support a wide variety of programmes across Lebanon and the Middle East. We aim to have an impact on the lives of children with disabilities, refugee children and economically destitute children. All our work aims to ensure that basic services, such as education, health and social welfare, are less discriminatory and more open to all children. In particular, we aim to deliver quality education for children in the region. We stress the need to give children a say in matters that affect them, and support local organisations to help them design and run their own projects.

6 P-Codes or Place Codes are standardised references for settlements within Lebanon. A full list of P-codes along with their GPS coordinates is available on UN-OCHA’s “Virtual HIC” website, www.virtualhic.org

12