DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Studies in Intelligence (1997) SOURCES METHODS EXEMPT ION3B211 NAZI WAR CR114ES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2001 2006 A Persistent Emotional issue CINs Support to the Nazi War Criminal Investigations Kevin C. Ruffner

The story of escaped Nazis after the investigations and placed the names collapse of the Third Reich in 1945 of some 60,000 individuals on a has long gripped novelists and Holly- "watch list" that alerts US immigra- wood screenwriters and provided the tion officials to prevent their entry grist for such box office hits as The into the United States.' Boys From Brazil and The ODESSA File. Since the 1970s, the topic has also provided steady fare for histori- Continuing Suspicions ans and journalists anxious to explore supposed cabals between Despite these efforts, doubts persist 6 6 American intelligence agencies and in some circles as to whether the such personalities as Josef Mengele, United States Government has been Separating fact from fiction the "Angel of Death" at Auschwitz, fully honest about this emotion- about the alleged postwar and former Austrian President Kurt charged issue. For example, Christo- Waldheim, a German intelligence pher Simpson, in his 1988 book, relationships between officer in the Balkans during World Blowback: America's Recruitment of American intelligence and War II.' Nazis and Its Efficty on the , its former German enemies asserts that "US intelligence agencies Separating fact from fiction about did know—or had good reason to and collaborators is both the alleged postwar relationships suspect—that many contract agents difficult and confusing. between American intelligence and they hired during the Cold War had its former German enemies and col- committed crimes against humanity laborators is both difficult and on behalf of the Nazis. The CIA, the 99 confusing. The General Accounting State Department, and US Army Office (GAO), at the request of the intelligence," Simpson states, 'each US Congress, has conducted two created special programs for the spe- major investigations since 1977 to cific purpose of bringing former ascertain whether the US Govern- selected Nazis and collaborators to ment assisted in the immigration of the United States. Other projects these individuals to the United States protected such people by placing and later concealed Federal involve- them on US payrolls overseas."' ment. In addition, the Immigration The fact that most US intelligence and Naturalization Service (INS) records from this time period are still and, later, the Department of Jus- classified only lends greater mystery tice's Office of Special Investigations to the issue. All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis (OSI) have proceeded with indepen- expressed in Studies In Intelligence are those of dent inquiries since the mid-1970s. The CIA comes under particular the authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central OSI, dedicated solely to the investiga- scrutiny because of its secrecy and Intelligence Agency or any other US Government tion, denantralization, and reputation. Over the years, observers entity, past or present. Nothing In the contents deportation of individuals who vio- have charged that: should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an articles factual lated US immigration laws by statelnents and Interpretations. covering up illegal activities during • CIA, and its predecessor organiza- World War II, has stripped 52 peo- tions such as the Office of Strategic ple of their citizenship and removed Services (OSS, 1942-45), the Strate- Kevin C. Ruffner has served on another 44 since 1979. In addition, gic Services Unit (SSU, 1945-46), CIA's History Staff. OSI has conducted nearly 1,500 and the Central Intelligence Group

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(CIG, 1946-47), employed German • CIA covered up its these activities also started its separate investigation intelligence personnel as sources of from Congressional and other at the same time. information. Afterward, the CIA Federal investigators. sponsored the new West German In May 1978, the GAO released its intelligence service, an organization The extent to which the Agency is formal report, Widespread Conspiracy under the control of officers of the guilty or innocent of these charges is To Obstruct Probes ofAlleged Nazi defunct German general staff. The a matter of continuing debate among War Criminals Not Supported by ranks of the organization sheltered historians. Certainly, the Agency's Available Evidence—Controversy May many officers of the German SS and own secretiveness and its previous Continue. Regarding CIA's involve- SD whose loyalty to the new West public scandals color the debate. For ment, the GAO found that in its German Government remained in decades, the CIA faced little public search for information on 1 1 I doubt. scrutiny of its operations or the iden- alleged Nazi war criminals, the tity of its agents. But the Bay of Pigs Agency had no records on 54. Of the remaining 57, CIA had references, • CIA and its predecessor organiza- debacle in 1961, highlighting the CIA-sponsored, ill-fated invasion of such as newspaper articles and gen- tions employed former collaborators eral correspondence with other of the Third Reich, primarily from Cuba and the Agency's reliance on Cuban émigrés, cracked CIA's pic- Federal agencies, on 35. That left 22 Eastern and Southern Europe, ini- individuals with whom CIA admit- tially as sources of information and ture-perfect mirror. Controversies in Vietnam later in the decade only ted to GAO investigators that it had later as operational assets for activi- a more substantial relationship. In an ties behind the Iron Curtain. increased concern among Americans about CIA's accountability. During unnamed case, CIA sponsored the the 1970s, a series of Congressional immigration of a "senior official of • CIA, including the Office of Policy investigations pointed to extensive the German Foreign Ministry during Coordination (OPC, 1948-52). problems within CIA and presented the Nazi era" to the United States. brought Germans and East Europe- an image of the Agency as a "rogue The remaining 21 had contact with ans to the United States to provide elephant." CIA either overseas or after their detailed information on the Soviet immigration co America; some were Union. paid, while the Agency declined to use others.4 GAO's First Investigation • CIA, including OPC, formed "secret GAO noted that the CIA assisted armies" from various émigré groups The Nazi war criminal investigations only one person to immigrate to the in Europe and trained them in the followed in the wake of these scan- United States. At the same time, the - States. The ranks of these dals at the instigation of two Agency employed others where groups inauded num—eiOiis former aggressive Congressional leaders, "unproven allegations existed indicat- collaborators of Nazi Germany, and Representatives Joshua Eilberg and ing that some of the individuals of some of these people remained active Elizabeth Holtzman. Frustrated by whom operational use was subse- in other CIA projects. the slow pace of the INS in review- quently made had been members of ing its own records, Congress finally wartime organizations." The CIA demanded that the GAO determine employed these individuals after they • CIA evacuated Nazi war criminals and collaborators through "rat lines" whether the INS or any other govern- had been screened by Federal agen- in southern Europe, allowing them ment agency had conspired to cies and permitted to enter the United States. The Agency denied to escape justice by relocating them obstruct legal action against alleged Nazi war criminals living in the that it employed any individual incognito in South America. United States. Congress made this "against whom allegations of war request in January 1977, marking crimes were well-founded." The • CIA abused its legal authority to the beginning of the first GAO inves- report reiterated CIA's contention bring Soviet and Soviet Bloc defec- tigation. The Special Litigation Unit, that these people were "all strongly tors and other persons of interest to a new office within INS and the anti-Communist and their willing- the United States. immediate predecessor to the OSI, ness to cooperate and their

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44 The Nazi war criminal investigation is now the longest running knowledgeability were the definitive investigation in CIAs General Counsel (OGC), the Direc- factors leading to their use by CIA."6 torate of Operations, and the Office history, extending for two of Personnel Security are among the The 1978 GAO Report unleashed a full decades primary offices that respond to OSI storm of criticism about the use of requests for information. While the alleged Nazi war criminals by the Agency and OSI experienced some United States. Congressman Eilberg 99 teething problems during the early blasted the Federal Government years of the investigations, a routine because "this report makes clear that Formation of OSI procedure has evolved. OGC's the CIA and FBI were more inter- attorneys undertake dose consulta- ested in using these people and As a result of continuing frustration tion with OSI to protect legitimate getting information from them than with the course of the Nazi war crim- national security interests if it in conducting any background inves- inal investigations, Congresswoman appears that a CIA asset is involved tigation as to their wartime activities Holtzman strengthened US immigra- in an investigation. The CIA has or pursuing allegations that they tion laws to "exclude from admission were war criminals."6 The GAO's into the United States aliens who never deflected OSI from any investi- investigation, however, denied that have persecuted any person on the gation or prosecution of any there was any evidence of a conspir- basis of race, religion, national ori- individual for concealing illegal war- acy to obstruct justice, although it gin, or political opinion, and to time activities. claimed that it did not enjoy full facilitate the deportation of such access to governmental records. aliens who have been admitted into The two agencies achieved a major "GAO's investigation," the report the United States."'" Holtzman also breakthrough in 1981, when a Fed- stated, "was hindered by the effect of called for the formation of the Office the passage of time on the availabil- of Special Investigations in the Crim- eral court stripped Otto Albrecht ity of information and limited access inal Division of the Department of Alfred von Bolschwing of his citizen- to agencies' records." Justice. This made the Justice ship. Perhaps the most important Department, not the INS, responsi- Nazi war criminal case involving a ble for the Nazi war criminal CIA asset, Bolschwing had been one Frank C. Carlucci, then Deputy investigations. Director of Central Intelligence, pro- of the Agency's leading agents in Aus- tested to the GAO that "we would tria after World War II. The Before OSI was created, the various German-born Bolschvving had previ- like the record to show that we were INS investigations had been haphaz- ously served as an officer in the AzEepared at. all times to make corn- ard and incomplete. Journalists SS 6"-"pi#Vrties(approp riately sanitited to dominated the field, and allegations and was the SD's representative in protect intelligence sources and were often based on unverifiable Rumania in 1941, when - methods) available for review by the sources. While it took OSI some ists launched a pogrom against investigators to validate their time to establish its working proce- Jewish residents of Bucharest. conclusions."' Despite Carlucci's dures and to resolve the problems of Bolschwing also concealed from his contention, Congress felt that the its predecessors, the Department of CIA case officers the fact that he had GAO report had been a disappoint- Justice and CIA reached agreements worked in the same office with Adolf ment. Congressman Eilberg, in open in 1980 concerning name-trace pro- Eichmann in the 1930s. CIA learned hearings later in the summer of cedures. After that, CIA and OSI about Bolshwing's close relationship 1978, exclaimed that "it is just regret- instituted a regular reporting sys- table that so much time and man- tem—a process that continues. with Eichmann after the latter's hours and money was expended and abduction by Israel in 1960. Several we have so little to show for it."' The The Nazi war criminal investigation years before that event, CIA brought GAO's failure, in large part, was is now the longest running investiga- Bolschwing to the United States, and blamed on CIA's restrictions on tion in CIA's history, extending for he received American citizenship in access to its records. two full decades. The Office of 1959."

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Another GAO Investigation • In the spring of 1983, OSI Director resources that had immediate intelli- Allan A. Ryan, Jr. assumed the lead gence potential." These "resources" in the Barbie investigation. Several included former Nazi intelligence The Nazi war criminal investigations months later Ryan issued a report personnel and collaborators. The took an unexpected turn in May that clearly demonstrated that the GAO investigated some 114 individ- 1982, when John Loftus, a former US Army had employed Barbie as an uals and provided detailed OSI attorney, announced on CBS- agent in Germany and had spon- summaries on 12. Of this latter num- that numerous TV's 60 Minutes sored his escape from Europe. The ber, CIA was involved with five with branches of the US Government, Ryan report absolved the CIA of any "undesirable or questionable back- including the Army, the FBI, the wrongdoing, but it highlighted the grounds" who had received aid to CIA, and the State Department, had entangled webs of the Allied intelli- move to the United States. The employed Nazis and brought them gence services in Austria, Germany, GAO "found no specific program to to America after the war. Further- and Italy in the decade after 1945. aid the immigration of undesirable more, Loftus charged that these same Ryan also explored the Army's use of aliens," and it concluded that "its agencies had refused to support the "rat lines" from Europe—escape review was sufficiently broad and GAO's 1977-78 investigation. These routes that apparently served several unrestricted to state that this report allegations sparked an immediate purposes. 14 Fairly portrays the conditions that response on Capitol Hill and gener- existed following World War II." 16 ated considerable media attention. 12 A slew of other major war criminal cases followed the Barbie case—so Even so, the GAO's report admitted The upshot was a new GAO investi- many that the 1980s can be referred that while it was "not denied access gation that took another three years to as the decade of Nazi war crimi- to any documents requested ... intelli- and unearthed thousands of docu- nals. No sooner had the ink dried on gence agencies often assign projects ments from numerous agencies. This the pages of the Ryan report than innocuous names which do not time, the Agency granted the GAO OSI undertook the examination of reflect the projects' purposes and, investigators full access to its records Robert Jan Verbelen, a member of a therefore, we cannot assure that we in an effort to avoid the controversy Flemish SS group, and his employ- requested all relevant projects' files." that marred the first GAO ment by US Army intelligence in With the passage of time, the destruc- examination. Austria and Germany. While the Ver- tion of records, and the death of belen report did not attract as much participants, "we cannot be com- public attention as the Barbie investi- pletely sure that we have obtained all gation, it confirmed that American relevant information or that we have A Surge of Cases intelligence, especially the Counter identified all Nazis and Axis collabo- Intelligence Corps, had been slip- rators assisted by US agencies to While the GAO plowed through shod in its recruitment of agents." immigrate to the United States." " mountains of records, new events With this statement, the GAO has raised further questions about US left room for further speculation intelligence activities during the early GAO's Findings about the US Government's actions years of the Cold War. In 1983, during the Cold War. Bolivia extradited , "the In the summer of 1985, the GAO butcher of Lyon," to France to stand released its second report, entitled trial for his crimes in that country Nazis and Axis Collaborators Were Mengele and Waldheim during the German occupation. Used To Further US Anti-Communist Reporters quickly ascertained that Objectives in Europe--Some Immi- In 1985, the Mengele investigation Barbie had, in fact, escaped from grated to the United States. After years created a media frenzy as sightings of posrwar Germany with the assistance of research through 150,000 files the German doctor were reported of American intelligence." 'Whether and interviewing numerous surviving throughout South America. While the United States continued to sup- American intelligence officers, the the case appeared to be solved with port him in South America remained GAO concluded that "US intelli- the discovery of Mengele's remains in unclear. gence used anti-Communist July of that year in Brazil, questions

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66 With the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the fall of the Soviet Union, the Nazi camps; the use of anti-Semitic propa- war criminal investigations ganda; the mistreatment and have been rejuvenated by execution of Allied prisoners of war; an influx of new sources and the reprisal execution of civil- ians. The report, however, did not and witnesses. address whether Waldheim had post- war intelligence connections with the East or West." Consequently, whether he had any contact with either Western and Eastern intelli- American, Soviet, or Yugoslav intelli- gence services is still a matter of gence services. conjecture.22

The CIA once again fell suspect and, over the years, there have been demands that the Agency disclose More Cases, More Demands any holdings that it might have regarding the Austrian diplomat/poli- With the demise of the Warsaw Pact tician.19As early as 1980, and the fall of the Soviet Union, the AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS Congressman Stephen J. Solarz Joseph Mengele. He used this photo in 1956, Nazi war criminal investigations expressed interest in Waldheim's when he applied for an identity card in have been rejuvenated by an influx early life, and he put questions in Argentina under his true name. of new sources and witnesses. 23 The writing to Waldheim and to Director OSI and the CIA continue to cooper- of Central Intelligence William ate in the form of name traces; in still lingered concerning his escape Casey. The Agency's Office of Legis- fact, the CIA is a leading source of from Europe and his postwar activi- lative Counsel told Congressman information for individual Nazi war ties. Once again, American Solarz that "we believe that Wald- criminal investigations. intelligence, especially CIA, came heim was not a member of the Nazi under close scrutiny. Another OSI Youth Movement, nor was he investigation cleared the Agency and involved in anti-Jewish activities." In The end of the Cold War also all other American intelligence organs addition, the CIA provided a brief spurred demands that the CIA open of any connection with Mengele.'8 synopsis of Waldhcim's military its files to the public. Former Con- record and said there were no indica- gresswoman Holtzman, New York's -fflo.sentitive nature of the-Nazi war tions that Waldheim had comptroller and then candidate for criminal investigations is best illus- "participated directly or indirectly in the US Senate, wrote the CIA in trated by the Kurt Waldheim case in anti-Jewish activities."20 1992 and asked- for complete disclo- 1986-87, in which an international sure of records concerning Klaus figure, a former secretary general of The Agency's response to Solarz Barbie and Otto von Bolschwing. the UN and soon-to-be Austrian resulted in great embarrassment in "In the process of employing these president, stood accused of hiding both Congressional hearings and dur- people and bringing them to safe his role in World War II. While ing OSI's examination into haven in the United States and else- Waldheim had long admitted his ser- Waldheim's wartime activities. As a where, laws were broken, lies were vice in the German Army, he had result of OSI's 1987 report, the US told, and the President, Congress, never fully described the extent of his Attorney General placed Waldheim's and other government agencies and activities in the Balkans, a region name on the "watch list" to prevent the public were deceived," Holtzman marked by numerous Nazi atrocities. his entry into the United States. OSI asserted, 'but we still don't know the The fact that Waldheim rose to such concluded that Waldheim had partic- whole story. Forty-seven years after high levels after the war led many ipated in the transfer of civilians to the end of World War II, it is time observers to question whether he the SS for slave labor; the mass for the American people to find out enjoyed a special relationship with deportation of civilians to death the truth.""

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A Mixed Record The Nazi war criminal investigations and collaborators as well as their pointed out the government's sloppy American case officers. Although the recruitment measures in Europe. World War II generation is fading, In many ways, however, the truth While CIA and other intelligence the issue lives on. While the bulk of has already been revealed. A careful agencies used individual Nazis and reading of the various investigations the OSS and SSU records have been their collaborators as assets, there is declassified and transferred to the reports and a thorough inspection of no evidence of a specific program to the declassified US intelligence National Archives, thorough histo- recruit these people as a group. In ries of these agencies and their records indicate that CIA and other bringing such people to the United American intelligence agencies had a operations have yet to be written. States, Allan Ryan, in his Memoirs as Likewise, continued classification of mixed track record during the Cold director of OS!, says the government after Nazi Ger- CIA's records hampers the efforts of War. Within weeks assisted in the immigration of a historians to determine the full many's defeat, American intelligence "small roomful of people at the very extent of the Agency's efforts during (not to mention British, French, and most." In Ryan's view, postwar the Cold War. Many of the Agency's Soviet intelligence) embarked on vari- American immigration laws, suffer- ous projects to draw upon the ing from imprecise standards and critics will not be satisfied until every document is open expertise of the German intelligence weak enforcement, allowed far for public exami- services. Initially designed to thwart greater numbers of Nazi war crimi- nation and that, in itself, will raise the resurrection of a Nazi under- nals and collaborators to enter the new questions and further ground movement, these sources also United States than any covert US controversies. proved valuable for information on intelligence project.2s the USSR as tensions developed between the East and West. By 1947, the use of German intelligence NOTES Cooperation and Controversy figures and their collaborators had become a fixture of all intelligence CIA has been straightforward in its I. Public interest in Nazi war criminals services in Europe. can be seen in numerous publica- dealings with Congress and the OSI tions since the mid-1970s, such as: over the past 20 years concerning Mark Aarons and John Loftus, The CIA, perhaps more than its Nazi war criminals. Because of the Unholy Trinity: How the Vatican's Army counterparts or those of other richness of CIA's records, the Justice Nazi Networks Betrayed Western foreign services, exercised some cau- Department closely cooperates with Intelligence to the Soviets (New York: tion about using these sources. It the Agency. While it took time to St. Martin's Press, 1991); Charles initially opposed the use of East develop this steady working relation- Ashman and Robert J. Wagman, 41.---trsipean*aigtd .groups, and the ship, the investigations have clearly Nazi Hunteri: The Shocking True nascent West German intelligence benefited from the Agency's partici- Story of the Continuing Search for Nazi - service. It reluctantly worked with pation. Nonetheless, CIA will not War Criminals (New York: Pharos Books, 1988); Howard escape from the enduring legacy that these groups, as much to oversee Blum, Wanted': The Search for Nazis them as to gain intelligence about preceded its own formation. The in America (New York: Quadrangle/ the Soviets. As the pace of the Cold public is intrigued by tales of escaped The New York Times Book Com- War picked up, CIA's expansion also Nazis, and CIA's own mystique pany, 1977); John Loftus, The brought a tremendous growth in its lends itself to the belief that it Be/ants Secret, ed. Nathan Miller overseas operations. The quality of directed classified operations that (New York: Paragon House, 1989, these projects varied, and CIA soon allowed such people to escape from rev. ed. 1982); Allan A. Ryan, Jr., abandoned a number of projects as justice. The media and self-pro- Quiet Neighbors: Prosecuting Nazi failures, including the recruitment claimed Nazi hunters quickly link War Criminals in America (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, and training of "hot war" contin- the Agency to any new rumors of 1984); and Christopher Simpson, gency forces. .A new organization in one Nazi fugitive or another. Blowback: America's Recruitment of an old game, CIA needed to learn Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War the ropes, and it made mistakes in This controversy will outlive its par- (New York: Weidenfeld and Nichol- the process. ticipants—the accused war criminals son, 1988).

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2. Rick Atkinson, "Nazi Hunters are O'Toole and Morton Mintz, "US Mengele: A Report to the Attorney Still at War, Fighting a Losing Bat- Probes Report Nazi Collaborators General of the United States (Wash- tle," The Washington Post, 27 August Were Helped to Immigrate," The ington, DC: Department of Justice, 1995, pp. Al and A22. Washington Post, 18 May 1982, p. 1992). A3; Thomas O'Toole, "Nazis 3. Simpson, Blowback, p. xiv. Brought to US to Work against Sovi- ets in Cold War," The Washington 19. A.M. Rosenthal, 'The Waldheim Post, 20 May 1982, pp. Al and A20; File," The New York Times, 24 4. United States General Accounting and Thomas O'Toole, "The Secret Office, Comptroller General of the Under the Little Cemetery,' November 1989, p. A35. Widespread Conspir- The United States, Washington Post, 23 May 1982, pp. Rosenthal's columns about Wald- acy to Obstruct Probes of Alleged Nazi Al and A5. helm helped persuade a member of War Criminals Not Supported by Congress co introduce a bill to open Available Evidence-Controversy the Agency's records on all Nazi war May Continue, GGD-78-73 (Wash- 13. Ralph Blumenthal, "Ex-Chief of ington, DC: General Accounting Gestapo in Lyon is Linked to US criminals. Office, 1978), pp. 33-34. Intelligence," The New York Times, 8 February 1983, pp. A-1 and A-9. 20. Frederick P. Hitz, Office of Legisla- 5. Mid tive Counsel, to Congressman 14. US Department ofJustice, Criminal Division, Klaus Barbie and the Stephen J. Solarz, 31 December 6. Press Release, "Report to Eilberg United States Government: A Report 1980. Charges Ties with CIA, FBI," 17 to the Assistant Attorney General May 1978. Criminal Division, US Department of 21. Justice (Washington, DC: US US Department of Justice, Criminal 7. Cover statement, 1978 GAO Department of Justice, 1983). For a Division, In the Matter of Kurt Wald- Report. For further details, see the retrospective look at the CIC's role helm (Washington, DC: US Report's "Scope of Review," pp. 4-6. in Austria during this time, sec Department ofJustice, 1987). James V. Milano and Patrick Bro- 8.. Frank C. Carlucci to J. K. Fasick, gan, Soldiers, Spies, and the Rat Line: International Division, GAO, 18 America's Undeclared War against the 32. For example, see Robert Edwin May 1978. Soviets (Washington, DC: Brassey's, Herzstein, Waldheim: The Missing 1995). Years (New York: Arbor House/Will- 9. US Congress. House Subcommittee iam Morrow, 1988) and Eli M. on Immigration, Citzenship, and 15. US Department of Justice, Criminal Rosenbaum and William Hoffer, International Law of the Commit- Division, Robert Jan Verbelen and Betrayal. The Untold Story of the tee on the Judiciary. Alleged Nazi the United States Government: A Kurt Waldheim Investigation and War Criminals. 95th Cong, 2nd/ Report to the Assistant Attorney Gen- Cover-Up (New York: St. Martin's sess 19-21 Jtily. 1978 p. 28. eral, Criminal Division, US Press, 1993). Department ofJustice (Washington, 10. US Congress, House, PL 95-549 DC: US Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization 1988). 33. Michael Isikoff, "Nazi-Hunting Act-Nazi Germany, 95th Cong., Office is Busier than Ever," The 2nd sess., 1978. 16. United States General Accounting Washington Post, 3 May 1993, pp. Office, Comptroller General of the A17, and Jane Mayer, "With Cold 11. The best source of information on United States, Nazis and Axis Colktb- War Over, More Escaped Nazis orators Were Used to Further U.S. OSI's early years and the Face US Deportation," The Wall Bolschwing case is found in Ryan, Anti-Communist Objectives in Street Journal, 16 April 1991, pp. Al Quiet Neighbors. Europe-Some Immigrated to the United States, GAO/GGD-85-66 and A4. (Washington, DC: GAO, 1985), 60 Minutes, 16 12. "Nazi Connection," pp. 29-40. May 1982. For immediate press reac- 34. Elizabeth Holtzman to Robert M. tion to Loftus's charges, see Dale Gates, 26 March 1992. Russakoff, "American Officials 17. Ibid., pp. 6-7. Accused of Aiding Nazi Collabora- tors." The Washington Post, 17 May 18. US Department of Justice, Criminal 35. Ryan, Quiet Neighbors, pp. 4-5, 1982, pp. Al and A6; Thomas Division, In the Matter ofJosef 328-329.

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