Cins Support to the Nazi War Criminal Investigations Kevin C
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DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Studies in Intelligence (1997) SOURCES METHODS EXEMPT ION3B211 NAZI WAR CR114ES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2001 2006 A Persistent Emotional issue CINs Support to the Nazi War Criminal Investigations Kevin C. Ruffner The story of escaped Nazis after the investigations and placed the names collapse of the Third Reich in 1945 of some 60,000 individuals on a has long gripped novelists and Holly- "watch list" that alerts US immigra- wood screenwriters and provided the tion officials to prevent their entry grist for such box office hits as The into the United States.' Boys From Brazil and The ODESSA File. Since the 1970s, the topic has also provided steady fare for histori- Continuing Suspicions ans and journalists anxious to explore supposed cabals between Despite these efforts, doubts persist 6 6 American intelligence agencies and in some circles as to whether the such personalities as Josef Mengele, United States Government has been Separating fact from fiction the "Angel of Death" at Auschwitz, fully honest about this emotion- about the alleged postwar and former Austrian President Kurt charged issue. For example, Christo- Waldheim, a German intelligence pher Simpson, in his 1988 book, relationships between officer in the Balkans during World Blowback: America's Recruitment of American intelligence and War II.' Nazis and Its Efficty on the Cold War, its former German enemies asserts that "US intelligence agencies Separating fact from fiction about did know—or had good reason to and collaborators is both the alleged postwar relationships suspect—that many contract agents difficult and confusing. between American intelligence and they hired during the Cold War had its former German enemies and col- committed crimes against humanity laborators is both difficult and on behalf of the Nazis. The CIA, the 99 confusing. The General Accounting State Department, and US Army Office (GAO), at the request of the intelligence," Simpson states, 'each US Congress, has conducted two created special programs for the spe- major investigations since 1977 to cific purpose of bringing former ascertain whether the US Govern- selected Nazis and collaborators to ment assisted in the immigration of the United States. Other projects these individuals to the United States protected such people by placing and later concealed Federal involve- them on US payrolls overseas."' ment. In addition, the Immigration The fact that most US intelligence and Naturalization Service (INS) records from this time period are still and, later, the Department of Jus- classified only lends greater mystery tice's Office of Special Investigations to the issue. All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis (OSI) have proceeded with indepen- expressed in Studies In Intelligence are those of dent inquiries since the mid-1970s. The CIA comes under particular the authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central OSI, dedicated solely to the investiga- scrutiny because of its secrecy and Intelligence Agency or any other US Government tion, denantralization, and reputation. Over the years, observers entity, past or present. Nothing In the contents deportation of individuals who vio- have charged that: should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an articles factual lated US immigration laws by statelnents and Interpretations. covering up illegal activities during • CIA, and its predecessor organiza- World War II, has stripped 52 peo- tions such as the Office of Strategic ple of their citizenship and removed Services (OSS, 1942-45), the Strate- Kevin C. Ruffner has served on another 44 since 1979. In addition, gic Services Unit (SSU, 1945-46), CIA's History Staff. OSI has conducted nearly 1,500 and the Central Intelligence Group COORDINA(dWITH .)---/e) _ 103 War Criminal (CIG, 1946-47), employed German • CIA covered up its these activities also started its separate investigation intelligence personnel as sources of from Congressional and other at the same time. information. Afterward, the CIA Federal investigators. sponsored the new West German In May 1978, the GAO released its intelligence service, an organization The extent to which the Agency is formal report, Widespread Conspiracy under the control of officers of the guilty or innocent of these charges is To Obstruct Probes ofAlleged Nazi defunct German general staff. The a matter of continuing debate among War Criminals Not Supported by ranks of the organization sheltered historians. Certainly, the Agency's Available Evidence—Controversy May many officers of the German SS and own secretiveness and its previous Continue. Regarding CIA's involve- SD whose loyalty to the new West public scandals color the debate. For ment, the GAO found that in its German Government remained in decades, the CIA faced little public search for information on 1 1 I doubt. scrutiny of its operations or the iden- alleged Nazi war criminals, the tity of its agents. But the Bay of Pigs Agency had no records on 54. Of the remaining 57, CIA had references, • CIA and its predecessor organiza- debacle in 1961, highlighting the CIA-sponsored, ill-fated invasion of such as newspaper articles and gen- tions employed former collaborators eral correspondence with other of the Third Reich, primarily from Cuba and the Agency's reliance on Cuban émigrés, cracked CIA's pic- Federal agencies, on 35. That left 22 Eastern and Southern Europe, ini- individuals with whom CIA admit- tially as sources of information and ture-perfect mirror. Controversies in Vietnam later in the decade only ted to GAO investigators that it had later as operational assets for activi- a more substantial relationship. In an ties behind the Iron Curtain. increased concern among Americans about CIA's accountability. During unnamed case, CIA sponsored the the 1970s, a series of Congressional immigration of a "senior official of • CIA, including the Office of Policy investigations pointed to extensive the German Foreign Ministry during Coordination (OPC, 1948-52). problems within CIA and presented the Nazi era" to the United States. brought Germans and East Europe- an image of the Agency as a "rogue The remaining 21 had contact with ans to the United States to provide elephant." CIA either overseas or after their detailed information on the Soviet immigration co America; some were Union. paid, while the Agency declined to use others.4 GAO's First Investigation • CIA, including OPC, formed "secret GAO noted that the CIA assisted armies" from various émigré groups The Nazi war criminal investigations only one person to immigrate to the in Europe and trained them in the followed in the wake of these scan- United States. At the same time, the - States. The ranks of these dals at the instigation of two Agency employed others where groups inauded num—eiOiis former aggressive Congressional leaders, "unproven allegations existed indicat- collaborators of Nazi Germany, and Representatives Joshua Eilberg and ing that some of the individuals of some of these people remained active Elizabeth Holtzman. Frustrated by whom operational use was subse- in other CIA projects. the slow pace of the INS in review- quently made had been members of ing its own records, Congress finally wartime organizations." The CIA demanded that the GAO determine employed these individuals after they • CIA evacuated Nazi war criminals and collaborators through "rat lines" whether the INS or any other govern- had been screened by Federal agen- in southern Europe, allowing them ment agency had conspired to cies and permitted to enter the United States. The Agency denied to escape justice by relocating them obstruct legal action against alleged Nazi war criminals living in the that it employed any individual incognito in South America. United States. Congress made this "against whom allegations of war request in January 1977, marking crimes were well-founded." The • CIA abused its legal authority to the beginning of the first GAO inves- report reiterated CIA's contention bring Soviet and Soviet Bloc defec- tigation. The Special Litigation Unit, that these people were "all strongly tors and other persons of interest to a new office within INS and the anti-Communist and their willing- the United States. immediate predecessor to the OSI, ness to cooperate and their 104 War Criminal 44 The Nazi war criminal investigation is now the longest running knowledgeability were the definitive investigation in CIAs General Counsel (OGC), the Direc- factors leading to their use by CIA."6 torate of Operations, and the Office history, extending for two of Personnel Security are among the The 1978 GAO Report unleashed a full decades primary offices that respond to OSI storm of criticism about the use of requests for information. While the alleged Nazi war criminals by the Agency and OSI experienced some United States. Congressman Eilberg 99 teething problems during the early blasted the Federal Government years of the investigations, a routine because "this report makes clear that Formation of OSI procedure has evolved. OGC's the CIA and FBI were more inter- attorneys undertake dose consulta- ested in using these people and As a result of continuing frustration tion with OSI to protect legitimate getting information from them than with the course of the Nazi war crim- national security interests if it in conducting any background inves- inal investigations, Congresswoman appears that a CIA asset is involved tigation as to their wartime activities Holtzman strengthened US immigra- in an investigation. The CIA has or pursuing allegations that they tion laws to "exclude from admission were war criminals."6 The GAO's into the United States aliens who never deflected OSI from any investi- investigation, however, denied that have persecuted any person on the gation or prosecution of any there was any evidence of a conspir- basis of race, religion, national ori- individual for concealing illegal war- acy to obstruct justice, although it gin, or political opinion, and to time activities.