2013-2014

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ISSN: 2165-9117 staff acknowledgments

EDITORS-IN-CHIEF he Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy would be remiss were it not to recog- Colin Eide T nize a number of individuals and institutions whose Averell Schmidt support proved invaluable to the production of this third edition. These include Martha Foley, publisher; MANAGING EDITORS Richard Parker, faculty advisor; and the HKS Jour- Jennifer Rowland nals Office, without whose patient guidance none of Sarath Ganji this would have been possible. Additionally, we would Chrissy Bishai like to thank Hilary Rantisi, Krysten Hartman, and Nada Zohdy the entire Middle East Initiative for their generous contribution to the journal’s long-term sustainability ASSOCIATE EDITORS and strategic vision; as well as Greg Harris, Jeffrey Seglin, and all those who participated in this fall’s Ed- Shirin Barol itors’ Workshops. We would especially like to thank Ali Gokpinar our staff for its commitment, hard work, and atten- Delphine O tiveness to detail, consistently demonstrated through- Janan Omar out the editing process. Jennifer Quigley-Jones Zane Preston

4 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 5 from the editors...

e are pleased to present the third edition of the the sole driver of Islamist political parties in Tunisia, WHarvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Pol- focusing us instead on their internal debates and icy. This volume is being published at a time of rapid political acumen. John Strickland points us to an transformation in the Middle East and North Africa. economic transformation with global consequences The euphoric uprisings of 2011 have met with fierce taking place in the region’s skies: the growth of Gulf resistance from resilient autocrats and the complex airlines. Lastly, spanning the politics of the Palestinian realities of reshuffled domestic politics. With corrup- Authority, the political economy of oil and gas, and tion scandals threatening the long-venerated Turkish the underpinnings of the region’s grassroots political model, an Egyptian military reasserting itself in polit- movements, this year’s staff interviews offer fresh ical life, and heated tribal disputes compromising an perspectives on pressing issues. already fragile Libyan state, which way the region is This year also marks the launch of our new website: headed remains altogether unclear. www.hksjmepp.com. We believe that now more than These volatile domestic transformations coincide ever, politics and public policy in the Middle East with regional diplomatic realignments. Nuclear and North Africa require constant engagement and diplomacy between Iran and the West has complicated assessment. For this, an annual publication alone is not the relationship between Washington and its sufficient. Our website is a forum in which to engage traditional allies in Israel and the Gulf. The Obama the policy and political issues of the region as they administration’s hesitance to intervene militarily in evolve in real time. It is also a place for us to expand Syria has at times further strained these ties. Meanwhile, the conversation beyond politics to questions of the unprecedented diffusion of Syrian refugees society, history, and even art. We envision this website risks destabilizing neighboring states and igniting a as a valuable extension of—and complement to—the region-wide conflagration. This year’s Journal sheds debate presented each year in our print publication. light on many of the dynamics underlying what we see We invite you to read, comment, and contribute in as a larger regional transformation. the coming weeks, months, and years. Only through Ibrahim Sharqieh opens the Journal with active debate and constructive engagement will we a commentary on the often overlooked plight of move toward sound policies capable of overcoming Palestinian “double refugees”—those first displaced the momentous challenges facing the region. It is an by conflict with Israel, displaced again by conflict in exciting time here at the Journal, and we hope you will Syria. Matthew Levitt provides our first feature join the conversation. article investigating the evolving strategic relationship between Hezbollah and Iran. Denise Natali analyzes the dynamics—new and old—of transborder Kurdish Colin Eide & Averell Schmidt politics. Todd M. Johnson and Gina A. Zurlo Editors-in-Chief focus our attention on demographic trends behind the Cambridge, MA, May 2014 flight of the region’s Christian communities. Karina Piser helps dispel the popular narrative of religion as

6 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 7 call for submissions contents DEADLINE: NOVEMBER 30, 2014

The Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy (JMEPP) is accepting submissions for its print and online publications. JMEPP COMMENTARY Preventing a New Displacement for is a nonpartisan policy review published at the John F. Kennedy 10 the Palestinian Double Refugees School of Government at Harvard University. The Journal presents a By Ibrahim Sharqieh diversity of advanced scholarship on issues of policy relevance to the contemporary Middle East and North Africa. FEATURES Submissions may discuss trends in politics, economics, development, Hezbollah and Iran’s Strategic Partnership military affairs, international relations, religion, or culture as they relate 16 By Matthew Levitt to public policy issues within the region. Transborder Kurdish Politics: Unity or If you plan to submit, please send an initial abstract of your proposed 28 Division? By Denise Natali work to [email protected] Ongoing Exodus: Tracking the Emigration 39 of Christians from the Middle East submission guidelines By Todd M. Johnson and Gina A. Zurlo JMEPP is seeking submissions for both its print and online publications. Balancing Islam and Political Contestation Appropriate submissions for the print edition include feature articles 50 in Post-Ben Ali Tunisia (1000-2,500 words), commentaries (500-1,500 words), and book By Karina Piser reviews (500-1,500 words). From Modest Beginnings: The Growth Appropriate submissions for the online edition will be fewer than 60 of Civil Aviation in the Middle East 1,000 words and may include commentaries and opinion pieces, news By John Strickland analyses, art and cultural reviews, as well as other types of analytic or creative content that provide new perspectives on political issues and policy challenges facing the region today. INTERVIEWS Breaking the Peace Negotiations Stalemate: An Interview with Dr. Hanan Ashrawi All submissions must be formatted in Microsoft Word (.doc or 69 By Colin Eide .docx) using the Chicago Manual of Style with citations provided as endnotes. All figures, tables, and charts must be submitted as separate, high-resolution files. Please submit a cover letter with your name, title Changing Dynamics in the Gulf: An and affiliation, mailing address, e-mail address, and daytime phone 73 Interview with Dr. Adnan Shihab-Eldin number. All work must be submitted to [email protected]. By Sarath Ganji

For more information, please visit our website: www.hksjmepp.com Contextualizing the Arab Awakenings: 77 An Interview with Srjda Popovic By Nada Zohdy

2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 9 Preventing a New Displacement pushed them from one place to accommodate them in special another. Syria was one of the camps like Al-Zaatari, it has for the Palestinian Double main destinations for displaced established strict procedures that Palestinians. Approximately make it nearly impossible for 540,000 Palestinian refugees Palestinians to gain entry. Some Refugees By Ibrahim Sharqieh lived in Syria before the fighting of the Palestinians that have began over three years ago. Most been admitted are constrained of them have now experienced to the campus of a converted alking to people in the narrow remain are trapped, victims of an the bitterness of a second technical college—an area Tstreets of Ayn al-Hilwe—the increasingly strict blockade. The displacement, and the conflict has called Cyber City—where their largest Palestinian refugee camp pro-Assad factions surrounding turned many of them into “double movement is tightly controlled in Lebanon— you frequently hear the strategically located camp refugees.” As of 31 March 2014, by Jordanian security. UNRWA a new term in their daily conver- have not allowed residents to leave roughly 270,000 Palestinians were has also reported cases of forced sations about the Syria conflict: or food to enter for months now, internally displaced , and at least deportation, where, in a blatant “Death Convoys” (Qawafel al- and approaching humanitarian 52,000 have fled to Lebanon, violation of international law, Mawt). It refers to Palestinian refu- convoys have been attacked. Small 12,000 to Jordan, 6,000 to Egypt, Palestinians have been dumped gees who fled the fighting in Syria, deliveries of food aid have recently and smaller numbers to Gaza, back across the border to fend for found no refuge in the neigh- made it through, but the United Europe, and elsewhere.5 The themselves.6 boring countries, and ultimately Nations Relief and Works Agency misery of displacement for the Lebanon has also been less decided to take part in the ex- for Palestine Refugees in the Near Palestinian double refugees has than welcoming to the double tremely dangerous voyages across East (UNRWA) say it is “nothing manifested itself not only in being refugees. Overwhelmed by an the Mediterranean to Europe. The like enough to meet the needs.”3 forced from their homes in Syria estimated 868,000 refugees and Lampedusa tragedy, where at least More Palestinian refugees are but also in the conditions they face ever-concerned with its sectarian 359 refugees drowned in October expected to starve if the blockade at their destinations. demographics, in August 2013 2013, was only one example.1 is not lifted. This is just the starkest Jordan has been flooded with Lebanon initiated a set of The Palestinians face sieges and example of how Syria’s Palestinian nearly 600,000 refugees from measures that significantly limits starvation in Syria and systematic refugees have been subjected Syria, raising serious concerns the entry of Palestinians. The discrimination in the neighbor- to what UNRWA has called ing countries if they manage to “extreme human suffering” since In a blatant violation of international law, Palestinians have been escape. The United Nations (UN) the beginning of the country’s dumped back across the border to fend for themselves. and all the neighboring countries conflict.4 have failed miserably to respond to The first displacement of over how many more it can new policy does not explicitly the latest Palestinian refugee crisis. Palestinians occurred during the accommodate. The small nation ban Palestinians, but the This must change immediately. 1948 Arab-Israeli War when also continues to host over government regularly uses its More than 125 Palestinians approximately 750,000 were 30,000 Iraqi refugees that fled arbitrary nature to effectively and Syrians have died of forced out of their homes and their country following the 2003 do just that. For example, a starvation and a lack of medical sought refuge in neighboring American invasion. The issue refugee can be returned simply treatment over the past nine countries. Israel continues to deny of taking in Palestinian refugees because he does not have a clear months in the besieged Yarmouk those refugees their right of return is particularly sensitive due to destination address like a hotel or refugee camp near Damascus.2 to their homes—even though the delicate balance between for not having a visa to travel to Most of Yarmouk’s more than it is prescribed by UN General Jordanians and Palestinians in the a third country. Lebanon has not 160,000 refugees have fled, but Assembly Resolution 194—and country. While Jordan continues established any camps, leaving the less than 18,000 people that so a series of regional crises have to receive Syrian refugees and the refugees to seek their own

10 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 11 vulnerable refugee in Jordan double refugees is a grievous while UNRWA was paying only moral and humanitarian dilemma. thirty-five dollars. Systems and This displaced population is policies created by the UN and the vulnerable not only to physical As of 31 March 2014, roughly 270,000 Palestinians authorities of host countries led suffering, but many types of were internally displaced , and at least 52,000 have twenty-nine-year-old Mahmoud, exploitation, such as price gouging fled to Lebanon, 12,000 to Jordan, 6,000 to Egypt, a Palestinian double refugee in and extremely low wages. Due and smaller numbers to Gaza, Europe, and elsewhere.5 Ayn Al-Hilwe to say, “Our dream to increased demand, rent for shelter throughout the country. to the refugees of the 1948 is that we Palestinian refugees apartments in Lebanon’s Shatila The Palestinian double refugees Arab-Israeli war that live in would just be treated like the refugee camp has jumped often end up in the already Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, Syrian refugees. This will help almost 300 percent since the overcrowded preexisting camps, historically struggles with funding us to cope with the harsh life of beginning of the Syria crisis. By such as Ayn al-Hilwe, which has and is underresourced by the UN. refuge.”8 This is not in any way not adequately addressing the added over 20,000 new refugees UNRWA’s reliance on donations to suggest that the Syrian refugees situation, the host nations are to its 70,000 residents who live and lack of a protection mandate are experiencing good conditions also creating risks for themselves. on a space of almost a square leaves the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. On the contrary, their Particularly in Lebanon, the mile. Multiple families regularly in constant limbo. UNRWA is situation is dire, and their suffering longer the government goes share single rooms, and food, limited to providing health and is mounting every day. This without providing the Palestinians water, and electricity are scarce. education services with no proper comparison endeavors to illustrate with legal methods of survival, Unlike Syrian refugees, the mandate to protect and advocate the flaws of the UN system and the more likely they will be to set Palestinians are not allowed to for Palestinian refugees. its inability to respond to this up their own illegal systems that work in Lebanon, exacerbating Though the UN High humanitarian crisis, in the hope will be difficult to eradicate in the their hardship. According to the Commissioner for Refugees that these issues can be rectified. future. Many Palestinians have current system, after one year, (UNHCR) is leading the effort This systemic discrimination is already overstayed their one-year each refugee must either pay a to care for the Syrian refugees, it perhaps most harmful in Egypt. residency limit and are now $200 fee or return to Syria before insists that Palestinian refugees UNHCR continues to claim that living in the shadows in constant attempting to reenter Lebanon. are exclusively UNRWA’s Palestinian refugees are not their fear of being deported back to Both options are clearly untenable. responsibility.7 Under UNHCR responsibility, UNRWA does not Syria. To be fair to the Lebanese The outcome is that the double protection, Syrian refugees are have a mandate in Egypt, and government, not a single case of refugees are living “illegally” in able to enjoy residency privileges Egyptian authorities refuse to deportation has been reported so Lebanon, making them vulnerable in Lebanon that Palestinian acknowledge the existence of far, but nevertheless, this shadow to all sorts of exploitation. refugees do not. Such privileges— Palestinian refugees on their soil life subjects them to exploitation The UN has utterly failed to in addition to others—enable to avoid Egypt being identified as and radicalization, threatening alleviate the misery of the Syrian refugees to infiltrate a “place of refuge.” As a result, to further destabilize these fragile Palestinian refugees. Despite the market in Lebanon and Palestinian refugees in Egypt countries. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon secure jobs and incomes. This are not receiving the aid—cash What is the answer for the constantly advocating that the is not the case for Palestinian assistance, medical care, education Palestinians? Some are actually UN work in a united fashion, double refugees. Cash assistance for children—that Syrian refugees refugees for the third or fourth bureaucratic and jurisdictional to vulnerable refugees varies enjoy. Egypt has also arbitrarily time, having been previously issues are negatively impacting depending on availability of arrested and detained Palestinian forced from Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinian double refugees. resources, but in December, for double refugees, even deporting Kuwait, or Iraq during the UNRWA, the UN agency example, UNHCR was paying several groups to Syria.9 region’s many conflicts. In 2003, responsible for providing aid seventy dollars a month per The crisis of the Palestinian Palestinian refugees who were

12 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 13 forced out of Iraq after the U.S. treat them fairly, like the other international community should intervene strongly in Egypt invasion ended up stranded in the Syrian refugees, especially take responsibility and contribute to ensure Palestinian double desert between Iraq and Jordan for with regard to entry and residency significant additional financial refugees are receiving the health, three years with no one accepting requirements. Lebanon especially resources to deal with the serious education, shelter, and protection them until they were finally sent must change its visa and residency challenge Jordan and Lebanon they need. Leaving the double to Brazil and Chile. There is no policies, allowing the Palestinian are facing. Israel should not be refugees vulnerable to the UN’s guarantee that the refugees that double refugees to remain in exempted from its responsibility conflicting mandates and systemic have now fled from Syria will be the country as long as the towards the first displacement of inconsistencies in addition to able to return when the situation conditions that caused them to the double refugees and contribute the brutal policies of Egyptian there improves. This long journey flee persist, and without paying today towards a solution especially authorities will only multiply of suffering that began with exorbitant fees. on applying the principle of the the “convoys of death.” It is in the establishment of Israel in Lebanon should also take the right of return. Moreover, other the interest of everyone to end 1948 and has since turned many domestically controversial step Arab countries should offer to the suffering of the Palestinian Palestinians into double, triple, of establishing refugee camps, host some of the refugees fleeing double refugees. One should not and quadruple refugees must end. or at the very least, expanding Syria. Many refugees have assume that they will be forever Israel bears a major responsibility the ones that exist. Leaving the excellent skills and can contribute passive participants in this misery. to market needs, especially in Eventually, they may very well the Gulf region. This approach take things into their own hands. ◆ It is in the interest of everyone to end the suffering of the is particularly important as it Palestinian double refugees. advances a dignified method Ibrahim Sharqieh is a foreign policy fel- of alleviating the suffering of low at the Brookings Institution’s Doha the refugees. Refugees could Center and adjunct professor at George- for the current situation because it refugees to roam the country contribute positively to Gulf town University in Qatar. He previously caused the original displacement has serious potential to create economies while supporting taught International Conflict Resolution and continues to deny the many security, economic, and themselves and their families at George Mason University and George refugees the universal right of humanitarian problems, both wherever they are taking refuge. Washington University. returning to their homes. This for the refugees and the country. The UN must better integrate experience has left no doubt It is time for Lebanon to define UNRWA within its system. 1 Agence France-Presse. “Lampedusa Migrant Shipwreck Toll Rises to 359,” 12 October that no shelter in the region or and address this issue—through The UN should recognize that 2013. the world presents a sustainable official registration and proper UNRWA is only mandated to 2 Amnesty International. “Syria: Yarmouk Under Siege - a Horror Story of War Crimes, alternative to returning to their residency regulations—rather than provide services such as health Starvation and Death,” 10 March 2014. own land. Applying the right of continuing to push it underground and education, and though it 3 BBC. “‘Aid Enters’ Besieged Damascus Camp return is the only solution to one and pretending it does not exist. tries its best to advocate for the of Yarmouk,” 18 January 2014. 4 Agence France-Presse. “U.N. Warns on Syria’s of the most horrific humanitarian However, Jordan and refugees, it does not have a proper Yarmuk Refugee Camp,” 9 January 2014. crises in the world today and Lebanon should not be left protection mandate like UNHCR. 5 UNRWA. “Syria Crisis Response Update with the entire responsibility of UN agencies must include (Issue No 73),” 7 April 2014. will save the region from further 6 UNRWA. “UNRWA Syria Crisis Response conflicts, radicalization, and handling their refugee influx just Palestinian double refugees in January–June 2013,” 21 December 2012. destabilization. because they happen to border their planning and studies—such 7 UNHCR officials. Author interview, Beirut, January 2014, and Amman, December 2013. As for countries currently Syria. The massive number of as needs assessments—and stop 8 Mahmoud. Author conversation, Ayn al-Hil- hosting the double refugees, refugees these two countries assuming that UNRWA is capable we, January 2013. Jordan and Lebanon should repeal have absorbed far exceeds their of handling all types of needs. 9 Amnesty International. “‘We Cannot Live Here Any More:’ Refugees from Syria in the policies that discriminate resources and has imposed a Finally, the UN must step Egypt,” 17 October 2013. against Palestinian refugees and heavy economic burden. The up to its responsibility and

14 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 15 Hezbollah and Iran’s Strategic instruction of Iranian intelligence. between Kanani, Musawi, and According to the testimony of then-Hezbollah security official Partnership By Matthew Levitt former U.S. military officials, two Hassan Nasrallah. Planning days after the bombing—on 25 meetings were held at the October 1983—the chief of naval Iranian embassy in Damascus, intelligence notified Adm. James often chaired by Ambassador ABSTRACT Lyons, then deputy chief of naval Mohtashemi, who helped operations, of an intercepted establish Hezbollah in the first message from 26 September place.7 All of these individuals Today, Hezbollah is more actively involved in international terrorist 1983, just a few weeks before the remained key players, and those plots than it has been since the late 1980s and early 1990s. But, as was barracks bombing. Sent from who are still alive are now in the case when the group first formed in the 1980s, the impetus for Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and higher leadership roles. Hassan Hezbollah’s surge in international violence and intervention in Syria Security (MOIS) in Tehran, the Nasrallah is serving as Hezbollah’s comes directly from Tehran—not Beirut. message instructed the Iranian Secretary-General; Mustapha ambassador in Damascus, Ali Baddredine is Hezbollah’s top Akbar Mohtashemi, to contact militant commander, having Husayn al-Musawi, the leader of replaced Imad Mughniyeh ver the past few years, a around Iran’s nuclear program Islamic Amal (a key precursor to following his assassination in 2008. Oseries of events have exposed and now focused on the increas- Hezbollah) and to direct him to In other words, when Hezbollah some of Hezbollah’s covert and ingly sectarian war in Syria. Hez- “take spectacular action against initially began to shift its attention militant enterprises in the region bollah’s behavior has confirmed the United States Marines” and toward Western targets—first in and around the world, challenging Director of National Intelligence the multinational coalition in Lebanon, later abroad—it was the group’s standing at home and James Clapper’s characterization Lebanon.4 In the words of Col. done at Iran’s behest. Today, Iran abroad. Well before Hezbollah of the relationship of Hezbollah Timothy Geraghty, commander and Hezbollah’s relationship announced its participation in the and Iran as “a partnership ar- of the Marine unit in Beirut at is stronger still—a strategic Syrian crisis fighting on behalf rangement[,] with the Iranians as the time of the bombing, “If partnership—which explains why of the Syrian regime, there was a the senior partner.”2 This “strate- there was ever a 24-karat gold Hezbollah is willing to incur such notable and significant increase in gic partnership,” as the National document, this was it.”5 high costs for actions it is taking at Iranian and Hezbollah terrorist Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Lawyers for the families in Iran’s behest around the world, in activities around the world. The Director Matthew Olsen put it, the Marine barrack bombing the region, and next door in Syria. State Department’s annual terror- “is the product of a long evolution suit found a former Hezbollah ism report noted a “marked resur- from the 1980s, when Hezbollah member—referred to as Syria: “Bad for the Brand” gence” of Iranian state sponsor- was just a proxy of Iran.”3 Mahmoud—who testified that Over the past couple of years, ship of terrorism in general. Most Ambassador Mohtashemi followed Hezbollah’s combatant role in worrying, it added, was that “Iran Hezbollah Origins: orders and contacted an Islamic Syria has become more formal and Hezbollah’s terrorist activity Still Relevant Today Revolutionary Guardsman and overt. At the same time, has reached a tempo unseen since This evolution began in the early named Kanani, who commanded intercommunal violence has the 1990s, with attacks plotted 1980s. The 1983 bombings of the Iranian Revolutionary increased significantly in Lebanon, in Southeast Asia, Europe, and the U.S. Marines and French Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Lebanon including gunfights between Sunni Africa.”1 While it surprised many, military barracks in Beirut are headquarters.6 Imad Mughniyeh and Alawite militants in Tripoli, the increased operational tempo well-known events. But few people and his brother-in-law, Mustapha between Sunnis and Shi’as in was no coincidence but part of a are aware that the bombings Baddredine, were named Sidon, and of course bombings coordinated strategy first centered were carried out at the direct operation leaders after a meeting by Sunni militants—including

16 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 17 Jabhat al-Nusrah in Lebanon—in claim responsibility” for it. They Syrian opposition undermines interference in the war in Syria, Shi’a neighborhoods in Beirut and could fire at Israel from either its long-cultivated image as a not a gentleman’s agreement that Hermel. Hezbollah’s stronghold Lebanon or Syria, the statement distinctly Lebanese “resistance” Lebanese citizens would only in the Dahiyeh (a predominantly continued, seeing as Hezbollah movement. slaughter one another across the Shi’a suburb south of Beirut) has “fired thousands of shells and Hezbollah has doubled down on border. been struck on multiple occasions, bullets upon unarmed Sunnis and its support for the Assad regime, So why has Hezbollah risked and even the Iranian embassy was their women, elderly and children, even after bombs started going its status as the champion of the the target of a 19 November 2013 and destroyed their homes on top off in the Dahiyeh. Hezbollah Palestinian cause? Why engage in double suicide bombing. of them.”9 leader Hassan Nasrallah was a sectarian war that threatens not By siding with the Assad But while taunts might be crystal clear: “If you are punishing only the stability of the fractured regime, its Alawite supporters, and expected from radical Sunni Hezbollah for its role in Syria, and deeply divided sectarian Iran, and taking up arms against extremist groups, Hezbollah I will tell you, if we want to society that is Lebanon but also Sunni rebels, Hezbollah has now faces challenges it never respond to the Dahiyeh explosion, Hezbollah’s place therein? placed itself at the epicenter of a would have anticipated just a few we would double the number To be sure, Hezbollah seeks to sectarian conflict that has nothing years ago. For example, the day of fighters in Syria—if they keep Assad in power for its own to do with the group’s purported before Nasrallah’s August speech, were 1,000 to 2,000, and if they and Iran’s interests. For years raison d’être: “resistance” to Lebanese President Michel were 5,000, they would become Syria has been a reliable patron Israeli occupation. As one Shi’a Suleiman called, for the first 10,000.” Indeed, Hezbollah—and of Hezbollah’s, a relationship Lebanese satirist put it, “Either the time ever, for the state to curtail Nasrallah himself—have cast their that only grew deeper under the fighters have lost Palestine on the Hezbollah’s ability to operate as lot in with Assad to the end. “If,” rule of Bashar al-Assad.13 By map and think it is in Syria,” he an independent militia outside the Nasrallah added, “one day came, 2010, Syria was not just allowing said, “or they were informed that control of the government.10 By and required that Hezbollah and I the shipment of Iranian arms to the road to Jerusalem runs through sending fighters to Syria, many go to Syria, we will do so.”11 Hezbollah through Syria but was Qusayr and Homs,” locations in Lebanese believe Hezbollah has At one point, Nasrallah tried to reportedly providing Hezbollah Syria where Hezbollah has fought put its interests as a group ahead paper over the fact that Lebanese long-range Scud rockets from its with Assad loyalists against Sunni of those of Lebanon as a state, Shi’as and Lebanese Sunnis were own arsenal.14 Hezbollah is keen rebels.8 something that flies in the face now openly battling one another to make sure that air and land The implication is clear: for of Hezbollah’s longtime efforts in Syria, and threatening to drag corridors remain open for the many Lebanese, Hezbollah is no to portray itself as a group that that sectarian fighting across delivery of weapons, cash, and longer a pure “Islamic Resistance” is, first and foremost, Lebanese. the border into Lebanon, by other materials from Tehran. fighting Israel, but a sectarian Now, the group that describes proposing that Lebanese Shi’as But, fundamentally, Hezbollah militia and Iranian proxy doing itself as the vanguard standing and Sunnis agree to disagree leaders are willing to risk the Assad and Khamenei’s bidding up for the dispossessed in the face over Syria. Addressing Lebanese group’s standing at home and at the expense of fellow Muslims. of injustice and that has always Sunnis, Nasrallah said in a speech in the region because they were And it, therefore, does not tried to downplay its sectarian last May: “We disagree over Syria. asked to do so by Iran. Hezbollah’s surprise that the pokes come from and pro-Iranian identities finds You fight in Syria; we fight in ideological commitment to extremist circles too. In June 2013, those assertions challenged over its Syria; then let’s fight there. Do Iranian Ayatollah Ruhollah the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, a refusal to abide by the Lebanese you want me to be more frank? Khomeini’s revolutionary doctrine Lebanon-based al-Qa’eda-affili- government’s official position of Keep Lebanon aside. Why should of velayat-e faqih—the rule ated group, released a statement noninterference in Syria. To the we fight in Lebanon?”12 But that of the jurisprudent—is a key challenging Nasrallah and his contrary, its proactive support pitch did not go over so well with source of tension since it means Hezbollah fighters “to fire one of a brutal Alawite regime Nasrallah’s fellow Lebanese, that the group is simultaneously bullet at occupied Palestine and against the predominantly Sunni who wanted an end to Lebanese committed to the decrees of

18 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 19 Iranian clerics, the Lebanese state, Hezbollah with sophisticated Mughniyeh’s assassination five from a Western intelligence its sectarian Shi`a community guided-missile systems, in part years earlier that led Hezbollah to service.25 Hezbollah operatives within Lebanon, and fellow Shi`a to deter future Israeli strikes engage in a wave of international with Canadian and Kuwaiti abroad. According to Hezbollah targeting either Lebanon or terrorist plots, the likes of which passports were arrested for their leader Hassan Nasrallah, “the Iran’s nuclear program. But the it had not carried out for many involvement in smuggling a car subject of the velayat-e faqih and weapons were primarily stored in years. bomb from Syria.26 The suspected the Imamate is at the heart of our Hezbollah warehouses in Syria Exiting a meeting with Syrian targets were American and religious doctrine, and any offense and were delivered to Hezbollah intelligence on the evening of 12 Israeli. Reportedly, Hezbollah’s to it is an offense to our religion.”15 via shared supply lines used February 2008, Imad Mughniyeh attacks were well planned and Nowhere has this tension been by both the Assad regime and climbed into his Mitsubishi Pajero coordinated with Syrian and more evident than in Syria. As Hezbollah. As such, the weapons and was killed instantly when Iranian intelligence.27 Despite the late as mid-2012, U.S. officials transfers were also believed by an explosive device, reportedly massive logistical support Qods believed the Assad regime would U.S. and Israeli officials to be inserted into the driver’s seat Force operatives provided for that crumble “within months.”16 But a means of giving Hezbollah headrest, went off, causing a plot, Hezbollah operatives still just months later, that assessment another reason for having vested massive explosion.22 Hezbollah failed to successfully execute the changed as intelligence revealed interests in the defense of the denied Mughniyeh’s existence attack. that Iran and Hezbollah were regime.18 Iran would work no less altogether while he lived but By late 2009, Iran’s interest in doubling down in defense of the decisively to uphold its end of the openly embraced him in death.23 Hezbollah’s operational prowess Assad regime. U.S. intelligence bargain, deploying senior Qods Following the assassination, focused less on local issues like assessments noted that Hezbollah Force commanders to personally Nasrallah promised, “Zionists, avenging Mughniyeh’s death and leader Hassan Nasrallah at first oversee the transfer of advanced if you want this sort of open more on the much larger issue of declined repeated requests from weapons systems to Hezbollah. war, then let the whole world combating threats to its nascent Iranian leaders, in particular The movement of such weaponry, hear, so be it! The blood of nuclear program. A shadow war Qods Force chief Gen. Qassem however, crossed an Israeli red Imad Mughniyeh will make between Iran and the West over Suleimani, for Hezbollah to send line, leading the Israeli Air Force them [Israel] withdraw from Iran’s nuclear program had been large numbers of experienced to carry out at least six different existence.”24 going on since April 2006, when fighters to fight on behalf of air strikes targeting weapons Within weeks, Hezbollah fifty centrifuges were destroyed the Assad regime. While some transfers for Hezbollah—some attempted the first of several at the Natanz nuclear facility Hezbollah leaders were inclined of which killed senior Iranian plots—this one targeting the when equipment—according to provide the fighters, others personnel like Gen. Hassan Israeli ambassador in Baku, to press reports was reportedly resisted what they (correctly) Shateri.19 In response, Iran began Azerbaijan—as part of Operation tampered with by American and feared would prove to undermine to smuggle these guided missiles Radwan (named for Mughniyeh, Israeli intelligence services in a their position in Lebanon and in smaller, component pieces that who also went by Hajj Radwan). cyberattack—malfunctioned.28 be, as one official put it, “bad could later be reconstructed on Plots were discovered in West But, in January 2010, a magnetic for the brand.” Nasrallah only arrival in Lebanon.20 Africa, Egypt, and Turkey, among “sticky bomb” killed Iranian acquiesced, officials explained, others, but none succeeded. physics professor Masoud Ali after receiving a personal appeal Operation Radwan A foiled attack in Turkey in Mohammadi outside his Tehran from Iranian Supreme Leader, Hezbollah flags were on display September 2009 proved to be a home, an act which Iran blamed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Iran, the at Shateri’s funeral, where a watershed event for Hezbollah on Israeli agents.29 According to Supreme Leader made clear, not representative of Supreme operational planners and their Israeli intelligence officials, furious only expected Hezbollah to act, Leader Khamenei spoke of Iranian sponsors. Turkish security Iranian leaders reached two but to act decisively.17 Shateri as “our very own Imad officials were able to uncover a conclusions after Mohammadi’s Iran, for its part, would provide Mughniyeh.”21 But it was plot after receiving information death: (1) Hezbollah’s Islamic

20 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 21 Jihad Organization (IJO)— on hold, and major personnel citizen. The bus driver and five cases like the one surrounding the Hezbollah’s international terrorist changes made. New operatives Israelis were killed, and thirty Lebanese-Canadian Bank (LCB). wing formerly led by Imad were recruited from the elite more were wounded.33 Two Why invite still more scrutiny by Mughniyeh—had to revitalize of Hezbollah’s military wing weeks earlier, another Hezbollah international law enforcement its operational capabilities and for intelligence and operational agent—a Lebanese-Swedish and intelligence agencies by carry out attacks to deter future training, while existing IJO dual citizen—was arrested in carrying out terrorist operations Israeli actions targeting the operatives were moved into new Cyprus for plotting a similar type around the world? Here, too, it is Iranian regime, and (2) the IRGC positions. At the same time, the of attack.34 In his defense, this Hezbollah’s strategic partnership would no longer rely solely on IJO invested in the development operative told Cypriot police, “I with Iran that swayed the group’s Hezbollah to carry out terrorist of capabilities and tradecraft was just collecting information decision making. Asked to expand attacks abroad—it would now that had withered on the vine about the Jews, and this is its targeting to include Israeli deploy Qods Force operatives to since the 2001 decision to rein what my organization is doing tourists, not as part of Operation do so on their own, not just as in operations.32 Moving forward, everywhere in the world.”35 Radwan but to further Iran’s logisticians supporting Hezbollah Hezbollah would continue to seek Even as Syria has dominated goal of deterring action against Hezbollah and Iran’s attention its nuclear program, Hezbollah and resources, their agents are stepped up and held up its part of Neither Iran nor Hezbollah incurred any real cost for the Beirut still being discovered around the this partnership, despite the risks bombings of the 1980s, the Khobar Towers bombing, their world—from Thailand to Nigeria involved. activities in Iraq during the coalition war, or their activities in Syria. and other spots in between. In September 2013, an Iranian with Conclusion: Conflict in Syria Belgian citizenship was arrested will not stay in Syria hit men.30 Even more than the loss to avenge Mughniyeh’s death, for conducting surveillance outside Thirty years ago, around the of its scientists, Tehran sought to but Operation Radwan would the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv.36 time Hezbollah first started address its damaged prestige—the be accompanied by a completely But again, why take the targeting Western interests, the image of an Iran so weak it could different operational track aimed risk? Over the past few years, group blew up the U.S. Marines not even protect its own scientists at deterring future Israeli action Hezbollah has suffered and French military barracks at home could not stand. targeting Iran’s nuclear program. several international setbacks, in Beirut. Today, Hezbollah Much finger-pointing ensued To avenge Mughniyeh, Hezbollah ranging from the indictment is more actively involved in between Hezbollah and the Qods had to strike a similarly senior of five members by the Special international terrorist plots than Force regarding where the blame target, but to deter future action Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) it has been since the late 1980s lay for the two years of failed against its nuclear program, investigating the murder of and early 1990s. In both cases, operations, culminating in the Iran concluded, Hezbollah need former Prime Minister Rafiq ironically enough, the impetus for botched attack in Turkey and then only hit softer targets, like Israeli Hariri, to a series of Treasury Hezbollah’s surge in international another failed plot in Jordan in tourists traveling abroad. Department designations of violence came directly from January 2010. Humiliated and Hezbollah’s first successful Hezbollah operatives around Tehran—not Beirut. Some under Nasrallah’s instructions, operation came in July 2012 when the world—naming specific Western intelligence agencies see Badreddine and Talal Hamiyeh a bus carrying Israeli tourists was operatives as terrorists, cutting the Iran-Hezbollah relationship “undertook a massive operational destroyed by a bomb in Burgas, operatives from the U.S. financial as so closely intertwined that they reevaluation in January 2010, Bulgaria. Three Hezbollah system, assessing operatives are reorganizing their operational which led to big changes within operatives were identified by for possible civil and criminal and analytical unit structures to the IJO over a period of a little authorities, including two Leba- penalties—to the exposure of allow for more cross-fertilization over six months.”31 During this nese-Canadian dual citizens and Hezbollah narco-trafficking and among and between Hezbollah, period, IJO operations were put one Lebanese-Australian dual money-laundering in high-profile Lebanon, and Iranian programs.

22 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 23 The U.S. intelligence community revealed that as of 2012, Khalil existential conflict. Today, the trafficking, and open intervention sees things much the same way, Harb, an advisor to Nasrallah, scale and scope of Hezbollah in Syria. no longer describing the bond is now in charge of Hezbollah’s and Iran’s international terrorist By virtue of engaging in between Hezbollah and Iran as Yemen portfolio, sending as much plots appear to have waned. such risky behaviors, Hezbollah a patron-proxy relationship but as $50,000 a month through And while some attribute this to and Iran expose themselves rather as a “strategic partnership” Saudi Arabia and the United Iranian moderation under the to domestic and international with Iran as the primary Arab Emirates to the leader of Rouhani presidency and in the scrutiny and create opportunities partner. The implications of a Yemeni political party.41 In context of nuclear negotiations, that Washington and its allies such an alliance are severe, and Kuwait, where protestors burned intelligence officials believe it is at should take advantage of to understanding them is critical to effigies of Hassan Nasrallah, the least, if not much more, related undermine their standings at developing effective policy related government began boycotting to Iran and Hezbollah’s all-in home and in the region. For to not only Hezbollah and Iran Iranian goods to demonstrate investment in Syria and a lack of example, in July 2013, the E.U. but also Lebanon, Syria, and the its anger with Hezbollah.42 In bandwidth to fully prosecute the banned the military wing of Middle East writ large. July 2013, the European Union war in Syria and an international Hezbollah following a successful Consider, for example, that (E.U.) designated the “military terrorist campaign at the same attack in Bulgaria and a thwarted while a tremendous amount wing” of Hezbollah as a terrorist time. Several intelligence agencies attack in Cyprus the previous year. of attention has been paid to organization, followed quickly by now see an Iran-Hezbollah The designation empowered the Sunni foreign fighters traveling similar actions by Bahrain and the relationship that is intimately twenty-eight E.U. member states to fight in Syria, at least as many Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). entangled when it comes to Shi’a to initiate preemptive intelligence Shi’a foreign fighters have gone Iran, too, is paying the price militancy around the world. Given investigations of Hezbollah to defend the Assad regime.37 of its adventurism in Syria and the likelihood that the Syrian activities in Europe, making Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi beyond. Iran supports the Assad conflict will not end anytime Europe a less attractive operating Shi’a militants from groups like regime and Hezbollah in Syria, soon, and that its repercussions environment for the group and Asaib Ahl al-Haqq and Kataib but the Gulf States are not idly will be felt across the region and threatening still further exposure Hezbollah make up a majority sitting by. They are pouring around the world for some time to of other Hezbollah activities of the Shi’as fighting in support resources into opposition Sunni come, a reorganization that allows on the continent. Hezbollah of the Bashar al-Assad regime.38 fighters in Syria, moderates operational and analytical units to and Iranian members have been Shi’as from Saudi Arabia, and extremists alike. Several better coordinate their approaches arrested elsewhere around the Bahrain, Côte d’Ivoire, Yemen, attacks have now occurred inside to Hezbollah and Iran is a step in world as well—from Thailand and Afghanistan have also Hezbollah-controlled territory the right direction. to Nepal to Nigeria—where reportedly gone to Syria to fight in Lebanon. And after the Bringing together those focused they have been found conducting on behalf of the regime.39 Iranians Iranian embassy was attacked on Hezbollah and Iran would surveillance or possessing large are present in smaller support in November 2013, killing 25 provide vision into the full range amounts of illegal, explosive and advising roles, although and injuring about 150 more, of risky behaviors Hezbollah materials. Exposing recently there have been reports Nasrallah accused Saudi Arabia’s and Iran are engaged in and Hezbollah’s illicit conduct through of additional deployments of intelligence service of being the would offer insights into why they a variety of tools—designations, various Iranian forces, including real power behind the attack.43 are willing to engage in such a prosecutions, investigations, etc.— sixty to seventy Qods Force The conflict in Syria has wide range of these behaviors not only fulfills a useful naming commanders.40 already deepened Iran and in the first place. For Hezbollah, and shaming function, it Hezbollah’s activities carried Hezbollah’s strategic partnership, this includes not just its militia also offers a way to force out at the behest of Iran extend and it will continue to do so as activities but also its involvement the group and its strategic beyond Syria. In August 2013, they fight to win what they—and in terrorism, transnational partner to incur costs for the U.S. Treasury Department their opponents—view as an organized crime, narcotics their illicit conduct. This is

24 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 25 Fate of Al Qa’eda Operative Held by Saudi gramme,” IISS Strategic Comments, 14 Feb- something sorely lacking and long and Blue Game Matrix programs Arabia,” The Long War Journal, 27 June 2013. ruary 2011; Sanger, David E. “Obama Order 10 in coming. and update them for a post-Iraq Barnard, Anne. “Pressed on Syria, Hezbol- Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran,” lah Leader Urges Focus on Israel,” New York New York Times, 1 June 2012. Neither Iran nor Hezbollah era that would focus on, but by no Times, 2 August 2013. 29 Cowell, Alan. “Blast Kills Physics Professor in incurred any real cost for the means be limited to, Hezbollah’s 11 Hashem, Ali. “Nasrallah Threatens to Dou- Tehran,” New York Times, 12 January 2010. Beirut bombings of the 1980s, and Iran’s roles in Syria. ◆ ble Hezbollah Forces in Syria,” Al-Monitor, 16 30 Israeli Intelligence officials. Author interview, the Khobar Towers bombing August 2013. 13 September 2012. 12 Voltaire Network. “Hezbollah Leader Hassan 31 Ibid. in 1996, their activities in Iraq Matthew Levitt is the director of the Stein Nasrallah’s Speech on Syria,” 25 May 2013. 32 Ibid. during the coalition war there, or Program on Counterterrorism and Intel- 13 Schiff, Ze’ev. “Don’t Underestimate Assad 33 CNN. “Israelis Killed in Bulgaria Bus Terror their activities in Syria today. As ligence at the Washington Institute for Jr.,” Haaretz, 2 August 2002. Attack, Minister Says,” 19 July 2012. 14 34 a result, they see such activities as Near East Policy. Previously, he served Lavie, Mark. “Israeli Officials: Syria Gave Weinthal, Benjamin. “Cyprus Jails Hezbollah Hezbollah Scuds,” Associated Press, 14 April Man for Plot to Kill Israelis,” Jerusalem Post, being relatively risk and cost free. as a counterterrorism analyst at the FBI 2010. 28 March 2013. There is precedent, however, for a and as the deputy assistant secretary for 15 Badran, Tony. “Hezbollah Is Being Elusive 35 Warrick, Joby. “Elaborate Surveillance revised approach. Responding to intelligence and analysis at the U.S. De- on Wilayat al-Faqih,” NOW Lebanon, 24 June Operation Raises Concerns about Broader Iranian and Hezbollah activities partment of Treasury. Most recently, he is 2009. Hezbollah Attacks,” Washington Post, 26 16 Entous, Adam, and Siobhan Gorman. February 2013. targeting coalition forces in Iraq, the author of Hezbollah: The Glob- “Behind Assad’s Comeback, A Mismatch 36 Fiske, Gavriel. “Iranian Arrested in Israel on a review of the U.S. approach al Footprint of Lebanon’s Party in Commitments,” Wall Street Journal, 31 Suspicion of Espionage,” Times of Israel, 29 to Iran and Hezbollah activities of God (Georgetown University Press, December 2013. September 2013. 17 37 in Iraq was conducted in the 2013). Ibid. Lund, Aron. “Who Are the Foreign Fighters 18 Entous, Adam, Charles Levinson, and Julian in Syria? An Interview with Aaron Y. Zelin,” summer of 2006. “There were E. Barnes. “Hezbollah Upgrades Missile Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1 no costs for the Iranians,” a U.S. State Department. “Country Reports on Threat to Israel,” Wall Street Journal, 2 Janu- 5 December 2013. Terrorism 2012,” 30 May 2013. ary 2014. 38 Dettmer, Jamie. “Number of Shia Fighters in senior administration official 2 Clapper, James, and Lt. Gen. Ronald Burgess. 19 BBC. “Syria Conflict: Israel ‘Carries Out Syria Could Rise Following Fatwa,” Voice of commented, explaining the “Senate Armed Services Committee Holds 44 Latakia Air Strike’,” 1 November 2013. America, 16 December 2013. reason for the policy review. A Hearing on Worldwide Threat to U.S. National 20 Entous, “Hezbollah Upgrades Missile Threat 39 Smyth, Phillip. “Terrorist Groups in Syria: new presidential directive soon Security,” Defense Intelligence Agency, 16 to Israel.” Hearing before the House Committee on For- authorized U.S. forces to kill or February 2012. 21 Lappin, Yaakov. “Analysis: Slain IRGC Man eign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Non- 3 Olsen, Matthew G. “The Homeland Threat capture Iranian operatives in ‘Important as Mugniyah’,” Jerusalem Post, 2 proliferation, and Trade, United States House Landscape and U.S. Response,” Testimony February 2013. of Representatives,” Phillip Smyth’s testimony Iraq. Coined “Counter Iranian before the Senate Committee on Homeland 22 Peri, Smader. “Explosion,” Yediot Ahronot, before House Committee, 20 November 2013; Influence,” the initiative included Security and Government Affairs, 19 Septem- 6 February 2009; Thomas, Gordon. “Mossad’s Ben Solomon, Ariel. “Report: Yemen Houthis measures to roll back Iranian ber 2012. Most Wanted: A Deadly Vengeance,” Indepen- Fighting for Assad in Syria,” Jerusalem Post, 31 4 CIA, “Hizballah Terrorist Plans Against U.S. successes in five different theaters dent, 16 February 2010. May 2013. Interests,” 6 December 1991; Peterson, et al. 23 Harik, Judith Palmer. Hezbollah: The 40 Saul, Jonathan, and Parisa Hafezi. “Iran from Lebanon to Afghanistan v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Ministry of Changing Face of Terrorism. I.B. Tauris, 2005, Boosts Military Support in Syria to Bolster and isolate the regime in Tehran. Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Informa- 173; Kramer, Martin. “Imad Who?,” Middle Assad,” Reuters, 21 February 2014. In Lebanon, for example, the tion and Security, United States District Court, East Strategy at Harvard, 14 February 2008. 41 U.S. Treasury Department. “Treasury Sanc- District of Columbia, Docket No. CA 01-2684, 24 White House authorized the BBC News. “Hezbollah Chief Threatens tions Hizballah Leadership,” Press release, 22 17 March 2003, 53. Israel,” 14 February 2008. August 2013. 5 intelligence community to engage D. Peterson, et al. v. The Islamic Republic of 25 Harel, Amos. “Six Foiled Hezbollah Attacks 42 AFP. “Kuwaitis Boycott Iran Goods, Protest in broadened operations targeting Iran, 55. Likely Behind Israel-Lebanon Tension,” against Hezbollah,” Al Arabiya, 12 June 2013. 6 Hezbollah’s engagement in a D. Peterson, et al. v. The Islamic Republic of Haaretz, 20 December 2009. 43 The Daily Star. “Car Bomb Kills 25 near Iran, Memorandum Opinion, United States 26 Rotella, Sebastian. “Before Deadly Bulgaria Iranian Embassy in Beirut,” 19 November spectrum of activities called the District Court, District of Columbia, 7 July 45 Bombing, Tracks of a Resurgent Iran-Hezbol- 2013; Khraiche, Dana, and Thomas El-Basha. Blue Game Matrix. 2008, 6–7. lah Threat,” Foreign Policy, 30 July 2012. “Saudi-linked Group Behind Iran Embassy At- 7 Today, the Iran-Hezbollah Ibid.; Jaber, Hala. Hezbollah: Born with a 27 Harel, “Six Foiled Hezbollah Attacks;” tack: Hezbollah,” The Daily Star, 4 December strategic partnership demands a Vengeance. Columbia University Press, 1997, Issacharoff, Avi. “Turkish Forces Foil Hezbollah 2013. 82. Attack on Israeli Target,” Haaretz, 9 December 44 Linzer, Dafna. “Troops Authorized to Kill similar approach. It’s time to dust 8 Birke, Sarah. “Hezbollah’s Choice,” New York 2009. Iranian Operatives in Iraq,” Washington Post, off the Counter Iranian Influence Times, 6 August 2013. 28 International Institute for Strategic Studies. 26 January 2007. 9 Joscelyn, Thomas. “Online Jihadists Discuss “Stuxnet: Targeting Iran’s Nuclear Pro- 45 Ibid.

26 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 27 Transborder Kurdish Politics: nationalist agendas over others. pockets of urbanized Kurds in Iraqi Kurds’ extensive autonomy Damascus, Istanbul, and Baghdad Unity or Division? By Dr. Denise Natali is enshrined in the 2005 Iraqi also integrated with Arab and Constitution and backed by Turkish elites as Ottoman citizens Ankara and world powers; and became part of Ottoman however, Kurdish autonomy in institutions.2 Boundaries of Syria is not recognized regionally exclusion existed, but they were ABSTRACT or internationally, while Kurdish largely based on religion rather demands in Turkey have limited than ethnicity. The “Other” backing. Instead of a cohesive was not the ethnic Kurd but the Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, and Syria are, for the first time, mobilizing movement that could potentially heterodox Muslim: Alevi, Kaka-i, simultaneously for Kurdish nationalism. Yet, political divisions in the redraw Sykes-Picot boundaries Yezidi, Druze, and Ismaili. two main nationalist tendencies—the Barzani strain and the Öcalan and create a unified Kurdish state During this period, Kurdish strain—have become salient . Kurds are also separated by geopolitical or statelets, modern transborder unity was also stifled by the realities, distinct historical trajectories, differing levels of support Kurdish politics have become salience of traditional power from regional actors, and distinct elite power structures. What are the increasingly complex, creating structures and by the geography policy implications? Although international actors cannot fully resolve more avenues for division. What of the Kurdish regions. Kurdish intra-Kurdish dynamics, they can pursue a more evenhanded approach are the implications of these communities resided in the that lessens the discrepancies in external support for different Kurdish trends on regional stability and outlying provinces of the Empire groups. And while keeping states together should certainly remain a resolving the Kurdish problem and were largely illiterate, tribal, priority to assuring regional stability, this effort should be pursued in a across borders? and agrarian. Loyalties were manner that effectively balances the commitment to territorial integrity based on the tribal sheikh, agha, with rising demands for group rights. Tribes, Sheikhs, and Sufi leader, and qaimaqam, and Ottomans: Fragmented not to an abstract Kurdish nation. Nationalism Absence of a standardized While nearly all Kurds in the language and communications or the first time since the cre- ungoverned spaces, and accessing Middle East and the diaspora network apart from Turkish Fation of modern Middle East- commercial and energy wealth. affirm a shared national identity or Arabic enhanced divisions. ern states, Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, The Kurdistan Region in Iraq based on a shared culture Kurmanji (Northern Kurdish) and Syria are mobilizing simulta- has become a base for transbor- (Kurdewarî), ethnicity, language, speakers in the Turkish and Syrian neously for Kurdish nationalism. der Kurdish groups, creating a history, and territory, they have provinces could not communicate Iraqi Kurds are seeking to secure political arena to unify Kurds and not consistently or uniformly with Sorani (Central Kurdish) their quasi-state with an indepen- advance Kurdish national interests mobilized as a national group speakers in the southern Kurdish dent energy sector. Turkish Kurds within and across borders. across space and time.1 During provinces of Iraq—many of are negotiating a peace process Still, transborder Kurdish the late Ottoman period, for whom were closely tied to Kurdish with the state and demanding politics are entrenched in the instance, the Sunni Islamic ties Sorani speakers in the Qajar democratic autonomy. Syrian distinct historical trajectories of that bound most Kurds together Empire. Kurds have recently declared their each Kurdish group, institutional were the same ones that linked Indeed, Kurdish nationalist own autonomous cantons. Some legacies, geopolitics, and them to Arabs and Turks. Sunni tendencies emerged late in the Kurdish groups are also taking traditional power structures. Kurds were part of the dominant nineteenth century in reaction advantage of the weakened Iraqi Kurdish communities also have Sunni Muslim millet and enjoyed to Istanbul’s centralizing and and Syrian states by penetrat- different levels of external certain privileges and alliances ethnicizing tendencies. Kurdish ing porous borders, controlling support that legitimize certain to the Ottoman Porte. Small tribal leaders revolted while

28 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 29 Kurdish intellectuals, such as the Sunni Islam as a common basis nationalist separatist group, the set up camps in Sulaymaniyah Bedirkhan brothers, travelled of citizenship that tied Kurds, Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), province under Patriotic Union between Istanbul, Damascus, Turks, and Arabs together, the established a base in the Bekaa of Kurdistan (PUK) leader and and Paris, establishing nationalist new mandatory powers and Valley of Lebanon, which was Iraqi President Jalal Talabani’s organizations and publications local elites emphasized ethnicity controlled by the Syrian army auspices. Similarly, thousands of written in Kurmanji and French. and secularism as official state from the early 1980s until 1999. PKK-affiliated Kurds from Turkey Still, while the Kurds lacked nationalisms. Turkey modernized Transborder Kurdish politics have resettled in Dohuk and the sufficient external support for and Turkified under the Kemalist have strengthened over time. Makhmur refugee camp outside statehood—a theme that has state-building project. More As state sovereignty weakened, Erbil. After its expulsion from become an integral part of their gradually, Iraq and Syria became external support for Kurds the Bekaa Valley and the capture nationalist discourse—internal secular, Arab nationalist Ba‘athist increased, regional alliances of its leader Abdullah Öcalan in fragmentations undermined states. Consequently, as Kurds and the balance of power 1999, the PKK established a new their own nationalist agenda. became ethnic minorities— shifted, and minorities started base in the Qandil Mountains in Rather than take advantage of discriminated against in the making claims for group rights. the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, the interwar political vacuum states in which they lived—they Post-conflict state-building where it continues to launch to unify under a nationalist developed a shared sense of operations, informed by the its cross-border, nationalist banner, Kurdish tribes and Kurdish ethnonationalism within “new humanitarianism” of the operations. notables remained at odds with and across borders.5 1990s, created opportunities Transborder Kurdish politics one another while maintaining The emergent sense of for victims of state repression have become more complex in Ottoman alliances. Kurdish tribal transborder Kurdish nationalism and subnationalist movements.7 recent years as the Iraqi Kurdish leaders participated alongside was reinforced by mobilizing After the 1990 Gulf War, Iraqi region has strengthened its internal Sunni Arabs and Turks in the structures: cross-border family Kurds became beneficiaries of sovereignty with the extensive Turkish nationalist movement ties, nationalist leaders, political international aid through the rights, revenues, and recognition it to safeguard Mosul province in parties, and external support. creation of no-fly zones in Iraq gained from the 2005 Constitution Iraq—the very territory of a Despite the new territorial and a safe haven in parts of and developed economically. proposed Kurdish state. Kurdish and administrative boundaries the Kurdish region in northern In contrast to earlier periods, sheikhs and the traditional stratum that divided Kurds across four Iraq.8 Foreign aid and security wherein Kurdish migrants were protested against “breaking the states, some groups continued assistance continued for over dissidents and refugees in isolated bonds of Islam with their Turkish to penetrate porous borders and a decade, helping to propel camps, Kurds repatriating to the and Arab brothers.” Leading maintain familial, tribal, and Kurdish nationalist institutions region after 2003 were largely Kurdish notables also criticized commercial-smuggling networks. and self-rule, embodied in the businessmen, entrepreneurs, the idea of Kurdish independence, Before and after Kemal Atatürk’s election of the Kurdistan Regional artists, intellectuals, and political arguing that it was “indignant to Turkish nationalist project Government (KRG) in 1992. elites seeking to generate wealth the Kurdish honor.”3 commenced in 1923, Kurdish The Kurdish safe haven and use their skills to develop a tribal leaders were killed, deported immediately became a magnet Kurdish homeland. As Erbil has Emergent Transborder Eth- westward, or expelled from the for cross-border nationalist become a regional business hub, it nonationalisms country. Many relocated to the groups and political dissidents. has attracted populations from the Kurdish politics and identities Kurdish regions of Syria—and Since its inception, over 200,000 outlying provinces of Dohuk and started to shift, however, with the to a lesser extent Iraq—forming Iraqi Kurds—having lived in Sulaymaniyah, as well as Kurdish demise of the Ottoman Empire socioeconomic and political Iran since the 1975 Barzani workers and students from Turkey, and the emergence of the states links that continue to the present revolution—have returned to Syria, Iran, and the diaspora. of Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and day. 6 Syrian-Turkish Kurdish ties Barzani strongholds. Meanwhile, These efforts are reinforced by Iran.4 Instead of building upon were reinforced when the radical Iranian Kurdish groups have diaspora activities largely in

30 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 31 Europe and the dozens of Iraqi Kurdish movement that would politics would likely be fractured These distinctions have been Kurdish delegations that represent undermine their territorial due to the different political spaces reinforced by different levels and advance Kurdish interests integrity. The governments of in which Kurdish nationalist of external support, which worldwide. Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran projects evolved. Although a have legitimized some Kurdish continue to co-opt Kurdish shared sense of ethnonationalism nationalist projects over others. Different States; Different groups and use them as regional has emerged in Iraq, Turkey, Kurds in Iraq have access to Nationalist Agendas proxies. Turkey and Iran have Syria, and Iran, Kurdish significant oil revenues and Given this shared Kurdish created spheres of influence in movements have also been shaped international recognition, national consciousness and the Badinan (Barzani) and Sorani by different elites, demands, and including a lucrative commercial opportunity to mobilize, why (Talabani-Gorran) regions of nationalist agendas. Whereas partnership with Ankara and have Kurds resisted unification? Iraqi Kurdistan respectively that tribal leaders and traditional large-scale energy projects. Kurds In contrast to earlier periods, the reinforce intra-Kurdish power power structures assumed a key in Turkey and Syria, however, weakened Iraqi and Syrian states struggles. Regional states also role in Iraqi Kurds’ nationalist have few resources and scant of the last decade have little or no maintain divide-and-rule policies politics, they had little place in external backing, largely due to control over Kurdish border areas. Turkey where Kurdish politics their ties to the PKK and Turkey’s Turkey has developed strong ties were largely defined by urbanized alliance to the West. Although with Iraqi Kurds and is seeking to leftists linked to radicalized and Ankara is engaged in a Kurdish resolve its own Kurdish problem. Even without these regional working-class groups. Syrian “peace process” and ceasefire with Some Kurdish groups have also state tactics, Kurdish trans- Kurdish politics have also been the PKK, it has thus far made become increasingly prominent shaped by the coexistence and no real steps toward recognizing players in the changing Middle border politics would likely competition between tribal and Kurdish political demands in Eastern political landscape, be fractured due to the leftist groups, as well as by strong Turkey. with significant external support different political spaces in cross-border ties to Kurds in Iraq Different levels of international and new access to hydrocarbon and Turkey. Each group also support and recognition revenues. Yet, rather than merge which Kurdish nationalist has a distinct political agenda. have enhanced development under a single Kurdish leader projects evolved. Kurds in Turkey, whose ethnic differentials between Kurdish and agenda, transborder Kurdish existence was denied from the groups and their nationalist politics have fractured among outset of the modern Turkish agendas. For instance, the Iraqi two main nationalist tendencies: state, seek constitutional reforms Kurdish quasi-state—with an followers of Ma‘sud Barzani and that reinforce traditional Kurdish that recognize their distinct ethnic estimated foreign direct investment supporters of Abdullah Öcalan. sociopolitical structures and identity, democratic autonomy, (FDI) of $5.5 billion9 and major Divisions also remain within and group rivalries. Turkey’s village and for some, Öcalan’s release international oil companies between Kurdish groups over guard system and state-created from prison. Iraqi Kurds, who (IOCs), foreign consulates, and distinct issues and balance of parties (Kurdish Hezbollah) have been recognized as a private sector investment in power politics, particularly as operate against the PKK. distinct ethnic group with its own its region—requires open and they relate to the Syrian civil Damascus’ tacit support of the language since 1925 and then as secure borders to assure a positive war, regional alliances (Turkey PKK and its Syrian affiliate, the an autonomous region since 1970, investment climate. To do so, and Iran), and governance in Democratic Union Party (PYD), seek economic independence. KRG leaders have negotiated Kurdish regions. challenges Barzani and Turk- Kurds in Syria seek citizenship pacts with Damascus (until These divisions are in many ish-supported Kurdish groups in status, de-ethnicizing the name 2010), Tehran, and Ankara that ways tied to geopolitical realities. Syria and across borders. of the Syrian “Arab” Republic, keep borders open in exchange Regional states have little interest Even without these regional and some form of administrative for Kurdish help in countering in seeing a strong and unified state tactics, Kurdish transborder decentralization. Kurdish nationalist dissidents

32 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 33 from Turkey, Syria, and Iran.10 in mediating Kurdish problems Erdoğan’s adversaries in source of division among Iraqi This nationalist survival strategy in Syria and Turkey—hosting southeastern Turkey. For instance, Kurdish groups. has helped enhance regional meetings, leading delegations, and the public ceremony in the For instance, while hosting and wealth and stabilize parts of the sending communiqués between historical Turkish Kurdish city supporting over 200,000 Syrian Kurdistan Region, but it also has different Kurdish groups across of Diyarbakır with Barzani, Kurdish refugees in the Kurdistan hindered the political agendas borders, including to Öcalan and Erdoğan, and renowned Kurdish Region and initially training of other Kurdish nationalist other PKK representatives.11 singers Şivan Perwer and İbrahim Syrian Kurdish Peshmerga groups, including the PKK/ Tatlıses in November 2013 (militia) to defend Kurdish rights, PYD in Turkey and Syria. In Which Kurdish Nationalism certainly evoked mass nationalist the KRG has refused to recognize contrast to Iraqi Kurds, absence Will Win Out? sentiment and support across Syrian Kurdish autonomy and is of access to Western support and Transborder Kurdish politics are Kurdish communities. Yet, the putting pressure on its military Turkish backing—alongside their unfolding amid shifting regional meeting was criticized by many wing, the People’s Protection Units leftist ideology—has encouraged alliances that undermine Kurdish Kurds for its intentions—an (YPG).14 During the Geneva II different regional alliances and unity. One challenge is the election campaign for Erdoğan conference in February 2014, strategies by PKK-influenced Ankara-Erbil alliance.12 While and platform for Barzani—while KNC representatives criticized groups. Instead of Turkey, these creating important commercial failing to resolve Kurdish problems the PYD for having declared groups have at different moments opportunities and a greater across borders. Barzani and autonomy in three cantons turned to Damascus, Baghdad, degree of energy security for the Erdoğan are further attempting (Cizîre/Jazira, Kobane/Ayn and Iran for support against KRG, Barzani’s partnership with to challenge the PKK/BDP al-Arab, and Efrîn/Afrin), stating the Turkish state and Barzani’s Erdoğan has also fueled internal by creating a Barzani-influenced that “their actions were unilateral Kurdistan Democratic Party struggles. This partnership party in southeastern Turkey and this does not represent a (KDP). developed as Iraqi President that can capture votes of secular, nation at all.”15 Additionally, Indeed, Iraqi Kurdish leaders Jalal Talabani and his PUK leftist Kurds.13 after failed attempts to unify the have tried to break down these weakened politically, the Gorran The Ankara-Erbil alliance has PYD and KNC, Barzani/KDP differences by reframing Kurdish opposition movement gained also backfired in Syria. Erdoğan has dismantled the bridge across national identity as being traction, relations between Ankara had hoped to use Barzani and the Tigris River connecting the “Kurdistani”—a citizenship and Baghdad deteriorated, and the KRG as a counterweight to Kurdistan Region with the Syrian regime inclusive of all populations vast petrodollars entered the the PKK/PYD. Yet, Ankara’s Kurdish region, closed the border, living in the Kurdistan Region of Iraqi Kurdish economy without ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, refused entry to PYD leader Iraq. To close the linguistic gap mechanisms for oversight and toleration of radical Islamic Salih Muslim, and has started between groups, KRG officials distribution. The centralized and groups crossing its borders into constructing a trench between and civil society organizations opaque control of KRG revenues Syria, and the unresolved Kurdish the two regions.16 PYD leaders, employ the two main dialects in has deepened patronage networks problem in Turkey have all in turn, have negotiated a border news broadcasts and publications linked to the KDP and PUK, undermined any potential alliance opening (Ya‘robīyah) with the while attempting to standardize reinforced traditional sociopolitical that could have formed between Iraqi federal government. Other and Latinize the Kurdish structures, and heightened the PYD, Barzani’s Kurdish Iraqi Kurdish parties, including language. The KRG also uses competition between political National Council (KNC), and the the PUK and Gorran, have its vast revenue base to organize parties. Syrian Opposition Council (SOC). challenged Barzani by recognizing Kurdish conferences, publications, The KRG’s privileged position Moreover, the problems plaguing the PYD and Rojava (West and cultural events that focus in Ankara has amplified power Turkey’s Syria policy are the same Kurdistan), welcoming its leaders on shared Kurdish histories and struggles between Barzani ones limiting Barzani’s influence to Sulaymaniyah province.17 national rights. Barzani also has and the PKK and the Peace over Kurdish majorities in Turkey become Erdoğan’s interlocutor and Democracy Party (BDP)— and Syria and have become a

34 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 35 Implications for Regional eventually Damascus. Similarly, external support for different Iraqi Kurdish case shows that Stability and Managing the the PKK and PYD leverage Kurdish groups. While continuing while economic gains cannot Kurdish Issue their own interests by securing to affirm state sovereignty and to entirely resolve deeply embedded The complexities of transborder support from Damascus, Iran, and situate Kurdish problems within political problems, they can create Kurdish politics reveal that Baghdad against Ankara, while particular states, third party actors new avenues of cooperation and concern or claims of Kurdish challenging and negotiating with should rethink their assumptions stability. Ankara can lead this statehood are misplaced. different Iraqi Kurdish groups. about sources of power and effort in the same way it has done Kurdish groups have a shared The greater challenge to influence across the Kurdish in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. national consciousness and large regional stability is the persistence regions. In particular, they should The larger dilemma is opportunities to mobilize, but of weakened states and power reassess policies that treat Ma‘sud balancing the commitment to they continue to pursue different vacuums that encourage Kurdish Barzani and Jalal Talabani as key state sovereignty and territorial or sole negotiators of the Kurdish integrity with rising demands for problems and include moderate group rights and decentralized The greater challenge to regional stability is the persistence of Kurdish leaders from Turkey and rule—outcomes of the very weakened states and power vacuums that encourage Kurdish land Syria in negotiation processes and democratization processes decisionmaking. In fact, relying espoused by the West. Keeping grabs, interethnic resource disputes, demographic shifts, refugee on Barzani to mediate Kurdish states together should certainly flows, and power struggles. demands across borders without remain a priority to assuring resolving the Kurdish problem regional stability. So too, in Turkey—all while al-Qaeda however, is the need to recognize political agendas. While Kurds land grabs, interethnic resource penetrates Syrian regions—has subnational political trends and in Turkey and Syria demand disputes, demographic shifts, enhanced PKK/PYD influence in assist state leaders in strengthening some form of autonomy within a refugee flows, and power struggles. Syria as well as internal Kurdish or rebuilding institutions to federal, decentralized structure, As Iraqi Kurds seek to strengthen power struggles. manage these challenges. ◆ they do not necessarily seek to their autonomy within the Turkey is central to these replicate the KRG in Iraq, which dysfunctional Iraqi state, Kurds efforts. Although Erdoğan is Dr. Denise Natali is a senior research fel- they perceive as a feudal and in Turkey and Syria will take directly dealing with Öcalan and low at the Institute for National Strate- closed political system. Similarly, advantage of the political vacuum Barzani as part of the Kurdish gic Studies, National Defense University Iraqi Kurds are unlikely to in Syria and assert their own peace process, he has largely (NDU), where she focuses on the politi- jeopardize their own relatively group rights. These efforts involve excluded leading BDP officials cal economy of Iraqi federalism, regional successful quasi-state for what they creating new facts on the ground and moderate PYD leaders, energy sector politics, and the transborder regard as extremist groups tied that challenge other nonstate who also influence Kurdish Kurdish issue. She is the author of The to illegitimate structures, such as actors and their political claims. localities in Turkey and Syria. Kurds and the State: Evolving National the PYD and PKK. Transborder They are likely to become the Incorporating these groups into Identity in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran (Syr- Kurdish politics are further source of future conflicts between private or public dialogues, while acuse University Press, 2005) and The entrenched in geopolitical realities Kurdish and non-Kurdish groups maintaining necessary restrictions Kurdish Quasi-State: Development and that require dealmaking between over land and resources, just as on the PKK, could bridge some Dependency in Post-Gulf War Iraq Kurdish elites and different central they have in post-Saddam Iraq. political gaps and encourage (Syracuse University Press, 2010). governments. Assuring the KRG’s Although international actors legitimate behavior. Equally survival is as much tied to securing cannot fully resolve intra-Kurdish important is creating opportunities revenues from Baghdad as it is dynamics, they can pursue a for economic development and in maintaining open borders and more evenhanded approach wealth generation in the Kurdish alliances with Turkey, Iran, and that lessens the discrepancies in regions of Turkey and Syria. The

36 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 37 1 Natali, Denise. The Kurds and the State: Evolving was replaced by Operation Northern Watch on National Identity in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran. Syracuse 1 January 1997, which extended until 17 May University Press, 2005, i; van Bruinessen, Mar- 2003. tin. Mullas, Sufis and Heretics: The Role of Religion 9 The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is among in Kurdish Society. Isis Press, 2000, 3–4; About 85 the leaders in FDI ($2.5 billion) in the Kurdis- percent of Kurds are Sunni Muslim and follow tan Region of Iraq, followed by Turkey and to the Shafi’i school of Islamic jurisprudence, a much lesser extent, Iran. and not the Hanafi school followed by their 10 During the civil wars in Iraq in the 1960s and Turkish and Sunni Arab neighbors. There are the Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988), the two main also Christian minorities among the Kurds, Iraqi Kurdish political parties—the Kurdistan largely in the Dohuk and Erbil regions of Iraq, Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union southeastern Turkey, and Urmia in Iran, and of Kurdistan (PUK)—fought against the Irani- heterodox Muslim sects including Yezidis, an and Iraqi regimes and each other. Kakais, and Alevis. Faili Kurds are Shi’a Kurds 11 Buldan, Perwin. “Ocalan woku hawari-yik originally from the Khanaqin region of Iraq. temasha-yi Barzani dekat,” Bas News, 25 2 Tejel, Jordi. Syria’s Kurds: History, Politics, and February 2014; Buldan, a Peace and Democ- Society. Routledge, 2009, 8 and 17. racy Party (BDP) parliamentarian, affirmed 3 Natali, The Kurds and the State, 77. that relations between Barzani and Öcalan are 4 The Kurdish regions of the Qajar Empire friendly despite “some differences that Öcalan and contemporary Iran were never part of a has with Barzani at times.” Kurdish state proposed in the Sèvres Treaty. 12 Turkey-KRG ties developed in the early The proposed Kurdish state was to include 1990s within the context of the embargoes parts of the Mosul vilayet in Iraq and partial against Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, the Kurdish regions in Turkey. food-for-fuel smuggling operations, and the 5 The population of Kurds in the Middle East, security pacts to check the PKK. During the the former Soviet Union, and the diaspora is Kurdish civil war from 1994 to 1998, the KDP difficult to ascertain due to the absence of an allied with Turkey and militarily engaged accurate and recent census. Estimated figures against the PKK. Ankara-Erbil relations were are about 25 million, with about 20 percent in severed in 1997, although the border was Turkey, 23 percent in Iraq, 10 percent in Iran, occasionally opened. and 8 to 10 percent in Syria. “Kurds,” World 13 Taştekin, Fehim. “New Party Linked to Bar- Directory of Minorities. zani Makes Play for Turkey’s Kurds,” Al-Mon- 6 Tejel, Syria’s Kurds, 17. itor, 24 November 2013; The Party’s slogan is 7 The literature on new humanitarianism is “Rebaz a Barzani,” or “On Barzani’s path.” vast. See Barakat, Sultan. “Post-War Recon- 14 Awene. “Wutebeyji parti heyresh dekateh ser struction and Development: Coming of Age,” YPG,” 25 February 2014. in After the Conflict: Reconstruction and Development 15 Hussein, Taha. “Kurdish Representative in in the Aftermath of War, ed. Sultan Barakat. I.B. Geneva II Criticizes PYD & Pushes for Negoti- Tauris, 2005, 1–32; and Fox, Fiona. “New ations,” MESOP, 17 February 2014. Humanitarianism: Does It Provide a Moral 16 DİHA. “KDP Strengthens Embargo on Ro- Banner for the 21st Century?,” Disasters, Vol. java, Opens Fire on Protesters,” 10 April 2014. 25, No. 4, 275–289. 17 MESOP. “Sabri Ok (PKK Leader) ‘Warns’ 8 Graham-Brown, Sarah. Sanctioning Saddam: KDP,” 18 February 2014; DİHA. “Rojava-Iraq The Politics of Intervention in Iraq. I.B. Tauris, Border Post to Be Opened Officially,” 19 1999; There were two no-fly zones in Iraq: February 2014; The KDP states that the KRG one in the Kurdish north that was part of is constructing the ditch for security reasons, Operation Provide Comfort and another in particularly to thwart al-Qaeda spillover from the south that was part of Operation Southern Syria. Turkey is building a ditch as well along Watch to protect Shi’a populations. Operation parts of the Turkey-Syrian border. Provide Comfort ended in December 1996 and

38 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy Ongoing Exodus: Tracking the Emigration of Christians from the Middle East By Todd M. Johnson and Gina A. Zurlo

ABSTRACT

The proportional decline of historic Christian communities in the Middle East is continuing. Christians were 13.6 percent of the region’s population in 1910 but only 4.2 percent in 2010; by 2025, they will likely constitute 3.6 percent. While Christians in the Middle East continue to suffer from war and conflict, the expansion of Christianity to the Global South and the postcolonial break between notions of “Western” and “Christian” are positive developments for communities under siege in the region. Christians from the Middle East are now present all over the world, and Christians from the Global South are increasingly drawn to the Middle East. Some of the region’s most pressing concerns can be addressed by advocating for freedom for all religious minorities in countries experiencing high restrictions on religion. Additionally, promoting interfaith dialogue where Middle Eastern Christians are in diaspora can serve to strengthen their ties with fellow religionists in their host countries and abroad.

Introduction (Iraq). After lamenting the de- In recent history, one of the most cline of Christians in Iraq and profound changes in the global surrounding countries, Patriarch religious landscape has been the Sako pleaded with Christians unrelenting proportional decline around the world not to forget the of historic Christian communities Christians of the Middle East. He in the Middle East. An impas- wrote, “The entire internation- sioned appeal for Christians in the al community should insist that region recently came from Patri- Christians remain in the Middle arch Louis Sako of the Chaldean East, not simply as minorities, but Catholic community in Babylon as citizens enjoying full equality

2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 39 under the law, and therefore in a position to continue to contribute Protestant, Orthodox, and the aim of producing the best (the Global North, which was to peace, justice, and stability.”1 Independent. It continues with a estimate for each religion in 95 percent Christian). By 2010, more focused look at Christianity every country in the world. Data the percentage of Christians Christians represented 13.6 in the Middle East over the same are sourced and available in the living in the Global North had percent of the Middle East’s period, highlighting key countries World Religion Database and World fallen to less than 40 percent, population in 1910 but only 4.2 that have experienced significant Christian Database.5 Projections with the majority of Christians percent in 2010. By 2025, we losses of Christians mainly due expect they will constitute 3.6 to war, conflict, and political By 2025, we estimate that 70 percent of all Christians will percent of the region. Their shifts.3 We consider three types diminishing presence is troubling of Christianity in the region: likely be living in the South when viewed in light of centuries historic churches (Orthodox of relative demographic stability: and Roman Catholic), modern through 2025 are built on a located in Africa, Asia, and Latin from 1500 to 1900, Christians missionary churches (Protestant hybrid model that utilizes the America. By 2025, we estimate were approximately 15 percent and Independent), and immigrant United Nations’ medium variant that 70 percent of all Christians of the region’s population.2 In churches (many traditions). cohort-component projections will likely be living in the South. addition, the Middle East is the Finally, the article concludes with of populations for five-year Between 1910 and 2010, the historic geographical origin of implications for policy—aimed periods, which are then modestly continent of Africa grew from 9.3 Christianity (as well as two other toward both Christians from the adjusted from the 2010 baseline.6 percent Christian to 48.2 percent Abrahamic faiths: Judaism and Middle East and those around Adjustments are based on analysis Christian. Asia, as a whole, also Islam). the world—in light of global of past differential growth rates saw its Christian percentage grow Over the course of the migration trends. of religious groups, factoring in from 2.4 percent to 8.3 percent.8 twentieth century, the Middle East The data presented in this historical patterns of religious In one sense, the shift to the experienced a host of dramatic article are the product of research switching and possible future Global South represents a return political and social challenges, by scholars in the developing attenuation of past trends. Finally, to the demographic makeup of including the carving up of discipline of international and most importantly for the Christianity at the time of Jesus— the region into nation-states by religious demography—the Middle East, these projections predominantly Southern—but colonial authorities, the rise scientific and statistical study of take into account how migration also depicts a vast expansion of of the Muslim Brotherhood in the demographic characteristics trends might alter the future Christianity into every country as Egypt, the emigration of colonial of religious populations, including religious composition of country well as to thousands of different expatriate communities, the their size, migration, vital statistics, populations.7 ethnicities, languages, and power of oppressive political and changes in self-identifica- cultures. regimes, and the founding of the tion.4 While there are thousands Changing Demographics of Our taxonomy of global State of Israel. At the beginning of data sources for religious Global Christianity Christianity is comprised of four of the twenty-first century, demography, three are especially Since 1910, Christians have major traditions. Roman Catholics these and other factors continue critical: first, censuses where either constituted approximately are all Christians in communion to encourage the exodus of a religion or ethnicity question one-third of the world’s with the Church of Rome, Christians from the region. is asked; second, smaller scale population. However, between including both baptized and This article will discuss the national surveys and polls; and 1910 and 2010, Christianity catechumens (potential converts demographics of Christianity third, data collected by religious experienced a profound shift in its prebaptism or young adults before around the world between 1910 communities themselves. Data geographic, ethnic, and linguistic confirmation). Orthodox refers to and 2010, including changes are analyzed, and discrepancies compositions. In 1910, more than members of the Eastern Orthodox in affiliation among the major reconciled by assessing the quality 80 percent of all Christians lived and Oriental Orthodox Churches, traditions: Roman Catholic, and congruency of sources with in Europe and Northern America both of whom consider themselves

40 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 41 in unbroken continuity with rebound in the wake of the fall Another immigration-related wars from 1975 to 1990; and the church founded by the New of European communism, their trend in the Middle East is the third, their decreasing influence Testament apostles. Protestants comparatively low birth rates arrival of missionaries into the in national affairs.10 Losses in are Christians affiliated with the and high death rates, and the region, primarily Protestants many Christian communities historical churches originating fact that Orthodoxy tends to and Independents. Protestants were already well underway by during the sixteenth-century be a nonproselytizing tradition. began arriving at the end of the 1970, but in the case of the three Protestant Reformation in Europe Protestants also experienced nineteenth century, intending to largest Christian populations at (i.e., Anglicans, Lutherans, slight percentage losses globally, reach out to Muslims. When this the time—Egypt, Lebanon, and Reformed/Presbyterians, Baptists, falling from 24.4 percent to turned out to be more difficult Syria—their decline accelerated Congregationalists, and others). 22.2 percent of all Christians than anticipated, most turned in the late twentieth and early Independents are members of between 1910 and 2010. Their their attention to the historic twenty-first centuries. Looking churches that are separated and in share of the global population Christian communities, causing toward 2025, the Christian some way distinct from historic de- also decreased, from 8.4 percent tensions over proselytism that presence in these countries is nominationalist Christianity (i.e., to 7.3 percent. Independents continue to the present day. expected to continue declining in African Independent Churches increased their share of both the Nine Middle Eastern countries percentage (as well as, for most and Chinese House Churches).9 total Christian population and the experienced significant declines in countries, in actual population). Among the four major global population. Independents the Christian percentages of their Of particular concern currently is traditions within Christianity, represented only 1.7 percent of populations between 1910 and Syria, where the civil war has now Roman Catholics represent all Christians in 1910, rising to 2010 (see Table 1): Egypt, Iraq, forced one million refugees into just over half of all Christians 16.6 percent by 2010. Their share Iran, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, neighboring Lebanon, including worldwide, growing from 47.6 of the global population also percent in 1910 to 51.6 percent increased, from 0.6 percent to 5.5 in 2010. Their percentage of percent. the global population also grew Among the four major traditions within Christianity, Roman slightly, from 16.6 percent in Changing Demographics of Catholics represent just over half of all Christians worldwide 1910 to 17.0 percent in 2010. Middle Eastern Christianity This, however, masks a steep The demographic situation of proportional decline of Roman Christians in the Middle East Catholics in Europe, with a is quite unique. Similar to the Palestine, Syria, and Turkey. Of large numbers of Christians. What simultaneous rise in Africa and global situation, Christianity in these, the most dramatic changes began as internal displacement Asia. The Orthodox have declined the Middle East has also changed have occurred in Lebanon, has now evolved into international as a percentage within Christianity dramatically over the past Turkey, Syria, and Palestine, migration.11 While some of this as well as among the global hundred years, with two dynamics each of which dropped over 10 might be temporary, it is likely that population. Severely impacted occurring simultaneously: first, percentage points over the century. many Christians will never return. particularly by communism, emigration, where historic Lebanon in particular dropped an At the same time, six Middle Orthodoxy dropped from 7.1 Christian communities are leaving astounding 43 percentage points, Eastern countries have had percent of the global population the region primarily for Europe, largely due to three factors: first, massive influxes of Christians, in 1910 to 4.0 percent in 2010. At North America, and Australia; lower birth rates, a consequence most notably since 1970. These the same time, the Orthodox fell and second, immigration, where of their comparatively higher include Bahrain, Kuwait, from 20.4 percent of all Christians Christian guest workers from economic status; second, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, in 1910 to 12.2 percent in 2010. outside the region are arriving emigration to the United States, and the United Arab Emirates The story of the Orthodox is to work mainly in oil-rich Australia, and various European (UAE). Bahrain and the UAE further nuanced by its subsequent Muslim-majority countries. countries, especially during the saw the greatest percentage

42 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 43 increase, each over 12 percentage Looking at the overall religious percent by 2025. Projections as missionary Protestants and points. These Christians are landscape of the Middle East to 2025 are based on current Independents, have maintained mostly migrants from the from 1910 to 2025, Christians Christian emigration trends and their size is by conversion of Philippines, South Korea, and were 13.6 percent of the region’s are particularly apparent in Iraq, Orthodox Christians, a matter other countries working in oil population in 1910 but only 4.2 Egypt, and, most currently, Syria. of deep concern for ecumenical production, construction, domestic percent by 2010, and it is likely If the political, economic, and/ relations. tasks, and other jobs in the service that they will only represent 3.6 or social conditions worsen in any industry. In all of these countries, percent of the population by of these countries, the numbers Policy Implications for the Christian communities are 2025. Muslims have grown from of Christians remaining in 2025 Christians in the Middle East expected to fluctuate little between 85 percent in 1910 to 92.3 percent could be much lower. and Around the World 2010 and 2025. in 2010, projected to reach 92.9 What does it mean for Christian Major Christian Traditions in populations in the Middle the Middle East East that now more Christians Orthodox Christians are the worldwide live in Africa, Asia, Table 1 – Christians by Country in the Middle East, 1910–202512 largest major Christian tradition and Latin America than in the in the Middle East. The countries West? From a political standpoint, Country 1910 % 1970 % 2010 % 2025 % with the most Orthodox the context of the early twentieth Bahrain 220 0.3% 8,200 3.9% 163,000 13.0% 211,000 13.4 Christians are Egypt (Coptic), century was vastly different from Cyprus 214,000 77.9% 469,000 76.4% 793,000 71.8% 905,000 71.5 Cyprus (Greek), and Syria that in the early twenty-first. From (Armenian, Greek, and Syrian), the carving up of the Middle East Egypt 2,263,000 18.7% 5,778,000 15.9% 7,876,000 10.1% 8,208,000 8.5 and each of these communities into nation-states by British and Iran 130,000 1.2% 268,000 0.9% 272,000 0.4% 317,000 0.4 dates back at least seventeen French authorities in the 1920s Iraq 171,000 6.3% 369,000 3.7% 448,000 1.4% 295,000 0.6 centuries. Emigration, however, to the 2003 invasion of Iraq by Israel 38,000 8.0% 79,000 2.8% 180,000 2.4% 160,000 1.8 has profoundly affected the U.S. and coalition forces, Western Jordan 16,600 5.8% 83,400 5.0% 172,000 2.7% 163,000 1.9 Orthodox churches, with their powers have had an outsized role Kuwait 240 0.3% 38,600 5.1% 264,000 8.8% 362,000 8.2 share of the regional population in the region. While in 1910, Lebanon 408,000 77.5% 1,436,000 62.5% 1,487,000 34.3% 1,534,000 30.4 falling from 11.8 percent in 1910 globally, it was more plausible to to only 2.7 percent in 2010, and consider “Christian” synonymous Oman 20 0.0% 3,900 0.5% 121,000 4.3% 188,000 3.9 likely continuing to 2.2 percent with “Western,” it is inaccurate to Palestine 39,600 11.6% 53,200 4.7% 74,600 1.9% 60,600 1.0 by 2025. At the same time, make such a connection now. Qatar 75 0.4% 4,900 4.4% 168,000 9.6% 224,000 8.4 Roman Catholics, Protestants, Many Christian communities Saudi 50 0.0% 18,300 0.3% 1,193,000 4.4% 1,525,000 4.5 and Independents have increased in the Global South already have Arabia their proportions of the region’s significant ties to the Middle Syria 314,000 15.6% 617,000 9.7% 1,119,000 5.2% 758,000 2.7 Christian population. For East. For example, the largest Turkey 3,354,000 21.7% 290,000 0.8% 194,000 0.3% 165,000 0.2 example, Roman Catholics were populations of people from 10 percent of all Christians in the Lebanese and Syrian backgrounds United Arab 80 0.1% 13,600 5.9% 1,061,000 12.6% 1,449,000 12.6 Middle East in 1910 but were 30 outside those countries live in Emirates percent in 2010. One reason for Brazil, which is home to over Yemen 5,000 0.2% 1,700 0.0% 39,200 0.2% 54,800 0.2 this increase is large numbers of ten million Brazilians of Arab Roman Catholic guest workers descent. Brazil—the world’s (such as Filipinos) in countries second-largest Christian country like Saudi Arabia. One way that (185 million Christians)—has smaller, newer traditions, such deepened economic and cultural

44 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 45 relations with the Middle East; have engaged in what they call a on a Coptic Christian wedding in work in advocacy organizations, former President Luiz Inácio Lula “Back to Jerusalem” movement, Cairo, killing three and wounding such as the Center for Religious da Silva was the first Brazilian sending missionaries along the eight; earlier that year, Copts Freedom at Washington-based head of state to officially visit the ancient Silk Road from China to in Egypt had been accused Hudson Institute. Tadros has region.13 Brazilian Christians have Israel.15 This vision is partially of backing the army’s plan to written numerous reports on the also increased both pilgrimage facilitated by China’s increased overthrow President Mohamed status of his community in Egypt, and mission to the region.13 economic interest in the Middle Morsi.18 In Syria, on 7 April 2014, claiming that while the Coptic In 1910, Christians in Europe East.16 These kinds of connections the Rev. Frans van der Lugt, a Church has a long and illustrious (except Eastern Europe) and between the Middle East and the Dutch Jesuit priest who offered history, it is now in danger of the United States represented Global South are likely to increase refuge to Muslim and Christian being tolerated only as a group 60 percent of all Christians concern for the diminishing families, was murdered in the of second-class citizens living in a worldwide; in 2010, it was only Christian presence in the region. Old City district of Homs amid Muslim-majority context.22 about 20 percent. Many Chinese, Another important dimension continued infighting among Christians from the Middle Brazilian, Nigerian, and Filipino is that the Arab Spring has made Syrian insurgents about the civil East are increasingly found Christians have developed life more difficult for religious war there, sending a clear message in environments more open increased interest in the Middle minorities, including Christians, to the remaining Christians to interfaith and ecumenical East because of family members but also Jews, Baha’is, and in the district.19 The rise in dialogue—particularly between working there as migrants and minority Muslim sects. The Pew social hostilities is part of the Judaism, Christianity, and Islam— because of its religious-histori- Research Center’s 2012 study explanation for why emigration in contrast to the more religiously of Christians has accelerated in polarized surroundings of recent years. many Middle Eastern countries. Christians from the Middle One among many important In 1910, Christians in Europe (except Eastern Europe) and the East are now present in many interfaith Christian scholars is United States represented 60 percent of all Christians worldwide; countries around the world, and Lebanon-born Martin Accad, who in 2010, it was only about 20 percent. émigrés are finding themselves is of Lebanese and Swiss ancestry arguing their case for asylum and lived in Lebanon during and/or advocating for their the civil war, later completing a communities back home. Coptic doctorate at the University of cal significance as the birthplace on religious freedom reported Christians in the United States, Oxford. Accad currently teaches of Christianity. Many Filipinos that the Middle East experienced for example, have taken U.S. State at Fuller Theological Seminary in particular have interpreted increases in social hostilities (by Department publications to task, in California and the Arab their overseas employment in private individuals, organizations, stating that they fail to address Baptist Theological Seminary sacred terms, especially women and social groups) while at the the role of local populations in Lebanon. He was a key working as domestic servants. same time maintaining high in the persecution of religious interlocutor following the release They are active in establishing governmental restrictions (laws, minorities in Egypt in light of of the 2007 “Common Word” Christian communities in their policies, and actions) on religion.17 passive governments.20 Egyptian document, signed by 138 Muslim host countries and often receive For Christians specifically, these immigrants in the United States, leaders, encouraging dialogue special training as missionaries. range from increased attacks both Christian and Muslim, were between Muslims and Christians.23 In addition, Christian guest on individuals, churches, and also outspoken critics of violence Additionally, in 2013, the Boston workers take advantage of being businesses in Egypt to massacres during the 2012 riots in Cairo.21 In Theological Institute, American in close proximity to Israel for in Christian-majority villages addition, prominent émigrés, such Jewish Committee, and American pilgrimage purposes.14 Since at in Syria. In October 2013, for as Samuel Tadros, an Egyptian Islamic Congress jointly hosted least the 1930s, Chinese Christians example, gunmen opened fired Coptic Orthodox Christian, a series titled “Pluralism, Peace,

46 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 47 and Prayer: Religious Pluralism in freedom for all religious minorities 1 Sako, Louis Raphael. “We Will All Lose If 13 Amorim, Celso. “Brazil and the Middle the Middle East.” Guest speakers in countries experiencing high Christians Flee the Middle East,” The Telegraph, East,” The Cairo Review of Global Affairs 2, 2011, 15 December 2013. 46–63. included prominent Jewish, social and/or governmental 2 Barrett, David B., and Todd M. Johnson. 14 Johnson, Mark et al. “Sacred Journeys, Christian, Baha’i, and Muslim restrictions. Additionally, World Christian Trends, AD 30-AD 2200. William Diasporic Lives: Sociality and the Religious religious leaders from the Middle promoting interfaith dialogue Carey Library, 2012, 323 and 327. Imagination among Filipinos in the Middle East as well as policy experts where Middle Eastern Christians 3 The Middle East is defined as seventeen coun- East,” in Diasporas: Concepts, Intersections, Identities, tries: Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, eds. Kim Knott and Seán McLoughlin. Zed and human rights advocates. In are in diaspora can serve to Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Books, 2010. one way or another, Orthodox, strengthen their ties with fellow Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United 15 Hattaway, Paul. Back to Jerusalem: Three Chinese Roman Catholic, Protestant, and religionists in their host countries Arab Emirates, and Yemen. House Church Leaders Share Their Vision to Complete Independent Christians all claim and abroad.◆ 4 Johnson, Todd M., and Brian J. Grim. The the Great Commission. InterVarsity Press, 2005. World’s Religions in Figures: An Introduction to Inter- 16 Simpfendorfer, Ben. The New Silk Road: How a the Middle East as their own national Religious Demography. Wiley-Blackwell, Rising Arab World is Turning Away from the West and and advocate on their behalf to Todd M. Johnson is a research fellow in 2013, 1. Rediscovering China. Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. governments and other interested the Study of Global Christianity at Gor- 5 Johnson, Todd M., and Brian J. Grim, eds., 17 Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. parties. don-Conwell Theological Seminary and World Religion Database. Brill, 2008; Johnson, “Rising Tide of Restrictions on Religion,” Pew Todd M., ed., World Christian Database. Brill, Research Center, 20 September 2012. All of these trends point a visiting research scholar at the Institute 2007. 18 BBC. “Egypt Gunmen Open Fire on Coptic to an uncertain future for on Culture, Religion, and World Affairs 6 Cohort-component projection is a method for Christian Wedding in Cairo,” 21 October 2013. Christians in the Middle East at Boston University. Gina A. Zurlo is projecting future population size by applying 19 Barnard, Anne. “Long a Survivor in Syria, a and their relationship with global a PhD candidate at Boston University’s age- and sex-specific factors for fertility, mortal- Dutch Priest is Slain,” New York Times, 7 April ity, and migration to each cohort in a baseline 2014. Christianity as a whole. Christians School of Theology and assistant direc- population. 20 See U.S. State Department’s annual Country from historic communities in the tor at the Center for the Study of Global 7 Johnson and Grim, The World’s Religions in Reports on Human Rights Practices and its periodic Middle East are now present all Christianity. Figures, 114. Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions; over the world, and Christians 8 Western Asia (a United Nations region) saw Gordon, Louis A. “Christians in the American a drop in its Christian population from 22.9 Court System,” The Middle East Quarterly 8.1, from all over the world are percent in 1910 to 5.7 percent in 2010. Western Winter 2001, 71–81. increasingly drawn to the Middle Asia includes all countries in the Middle East 21 Sacirbey, Omar. “U.S. Muslims, Copts East—economically, physically, except Egypt (which is in Northern Africa) and Appeal to Rioters to Stop Violence,” Religious and ideologically. The dual Iran (in South Asia). Western Asia also includes News Service, 19 September 2012. three additional countries not in the Middle 22 Tadros, Samuel. Motherland Lost: The Egyptian migration trends of Christians to East: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. and Coptic Quest for Modernity. Hoover Institution and from the region presents a 9 Johnson, World Christian Database. Press, 2013. unique challenge for supporting 10 Labaki, Boutros. “The Christian Commu- 23 Accad, Martin. “Loving Neighbor in Word Christians in the Middle East nities and the Economic and Social Situation and Deed: What Jesus Meant,” in A Common in Lebanon,” in Christian Communities in the Arab Word: Muslims and Christians on Loving God and as minority communities under Middle East: The Challenge of the Future, ed. An- Neighbor, eds. Miroslav Volf, Ghazi bin Muham- intense social and political drea Pacini. Clarendon Press, 1998, 252–253. mad, and Melissa Yarrington. Eerdmans, 2010, pressure. The expansion of 11 Sengupta, Kim. “The Plight of Syria’s 157–161. Christianity to the Global South Christians: ‘We Left Homs Because They Were Trying to Kill Us’,” The Independent, 2 Novem- and the postcolonial break ber 2012. between notions of “Western” 12 Johnson and Grim, World Religion Database; and “Christian” can be viewed Many media reports and some academic sourc- as positive developments for es mention that the 1987 Iraq census claimed 1.4 million Christians in the country. This Christians under siege in the contradicts all other sources, including data Middle East. International from the Catholic and Orthodox churches. See relations and public policy can Habbi, Yusuf. “Christians in Iraq,” in Christian address some of their pressing Communities in the Arab Middle East: The Challenge of the Future, ed. Andrea Pacini. Clarendon concerns by advocating for Press, 1998, 294–304.

48 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 49 Balancing Islam and Political tudinous descriptions that project- While pre-election surveys reveal ed outcomes rather than assessed that Ennahda was three times Contestation in Post-Ben the unraveling political process—a more popular than its closest gritty, hard-fought battle towards rivals,3 the party still took heed to Ali Tunisia By Karina Piser democratic consolidation. avoid being conflated with former This article explores NCA extreme Islamist actors. George deputies’ perceptions of Ennahda, Washington University professor ABSTRACT the Islamist party with the Marc Lynch describes a June plurality of assembly seats, in 2011 conversation with Ennahda’s order to reveal the principal fault President Rachid Ghannouchi On 26 January 2014, the Tunisian Constitution passed with lines—both between Ennahda who recalled having “instructed overwhelming support, over two years after the National Constituent and the opposition and within [the party’s] supporters not to Assembly (NCA)—the body elected in 2011 to draft a new charter— Ennahda itself—that shaped the come to the airport to meet first convened. Pride and relief resounded throughout the assembly as Constitution’s evolution and will him upon his return for fear of politicians from across the ideological spectrum united over their success influence the political sphere creating images reminiscent of in bookmarking a first phase in the country’s political transition. During in years to come. I base my Khomeini’s return to Iran.”4 the constitution drafting period, assembly members repeatedly stalled analysis on existing literature and Maintaining this moderate edge over Islam’s role in Tunisian politics and law, a debate that divided and interviews with NCA deputies was particularly important in polarized a nascent political arena. While religion was indeed a divisive and members of civil society allaying the fears of the Tunisian question during this period, the reality of Tunisia’s political landscape is conducted between 8 August electorate, for whom the memory more complex than an Islamist-secular dichotomy explains. Exploring 2013 and 1 November 2013 of Algeria’s bloody civil war the schisms within Ennahda itself—the Islamist party that held the in Tunis. Field research began (1991-2002) following an Islamist plurality of seats in the NCA—offers a useful lens through which to in the immediate aftermath of party’s electoral victory remains understand Islam’s role in the constitutional transition. the assassination of opposition vivid. deputy Mohammed Brahmi—the That considered, Ennahda’s third political assassination since religious character was not the sole Ben Ali’s fall—which provoked factor informing its popularity; he Constitution’s completion and scholars immediately latched the withdrawal of sixty-one the uprising was neither religious Tcame three years after the onto the Tunisian uprising as a opposition members and the nor secular. Protesters denounced popular uprising that toppled beacon of hope for a region in subsequent suspension of the corruption, nepotism, and Tunisian president Zine al Abidine turmoil as neighboring countries’ NCA. This article also considers political repression—what Yadh Ben Ali, during which millions of challenges to dictatorship quickly the provisions discussed during the Ben Achour, jurist and former Tunisians from divergent back- devolved into bloodbaths. The January 2014 debates that broke dean of the Law School in Tunis, grounds united under the refrain interim government suspended months of political deadlock and described as “civic, modern, of erhal (leave), demanding that Ben Ali’s Constitution by March led to the Constitution’s passage [and] the fruit of modern the dictator step down.1 Their and organized elections to form with 200 out of 216 votes. forms of communication . . . rapid success in peacefully ousting a National Constituent Assembly Ennahda, an Islamist party an individualist revolution.”5 Ben Ali sent waves of eupho- (NCA). When international ob- repressed under Ben Ali, earned Ennahda’s victory, then, did not ria throughout the country that servers deemed the elections “free 41 percent of seats in the NCA reflect popular support for Islamist reverberated across the region as and fair,”2 the transition seemed elections and, shortly thereafter, ideology or a revolt against Egyptians, Libyans, and Yemenis on the right track, turning the formed a coalition with runner-up Ben Ali’s alleged secularism; were inspired by Tunisia’s display page on a history of manipulated secularist parties Ettakatol and Tunisians revolted against his of citizen empowerment. Analysts elections. Journalists offered plati- Congress for the Republic (CPR). closed politics that had forced the

50 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 51 party underground. Voters also party oscillated along an entire and officially announced that the Constitution crystallize the appreciated Ennahda’s highly spectrum of religiously charged Shari’a would not be present in transition’s political character organized campaign platform, proposals. Ennahda’s behavior the Constitution.11 and shed light on the sources which stood out compared to its during the constitution drafting By shifting between extreme of pressure that shaped the competition. In explaining the period challenges a binary proposals and subsequent text’s evolution. The degree party’s rise to power, Ennahda’s framework for understanding clarifications, Ennahda exposed of compromise evident in the religious ideology should not Islamist parties and reveals its fragile blueprint, plagued new Constitution in large part overshadow its strategic outlook its membership to comprise a by divergent worldviews and reflects Ennahda’s willingness and the politics inherent to spectrum of “moderate” and contradicting external pressures to cede on a number of points, democratic consolidation. “fundamentalist” elements. that undermined its homogeneity. but opposition members offer With an Islamist party taking Tunisians were initially Despite Ghannouchi’s varied interpretations of the the reins, religion’s compatibility persuaded by what party leader denunciation of Shari’a law, party’s behavior. Salma Baccar, with a civil state became the Ghannouchi had described as Ennahda deputy Sadok Chourou a former filmmaker and member question of the hour. This Erdogan’s model of moderate proceeded to publicly announce of the center-left Al-Massar interrogation is not unique Islam, compatible with democratic the party’s desire for Islam to party, insisted that Ennahda to the recent Arab uprisings; governance. Yet, they soon guide the country,12 shortly never actually compromised scholars have given greater became wary and decried the after suggesting a constitutional and predicted in August 2013 attention to Islamic societies’ party’s “doublespeak” and provision to criminalize that Ennahda would continue to democratic potential since hypocrisy.8 Just two months blasphemy.13 These internal pursue Islamic law as a national Samuel Huntington’s “Clash after the NCA started its work, schisms resurfaced when party framework, even if it did so of Civilizations” in 1993. In Ennahda released a constitutional member and soon-to-be Prime progressively. She also insisted deconstructing a “monolithic and project that included Shari’a as Minister Hamadi Jebali publicly that the party concealed its unidimensional” characterization the primary source of Tunisian described Ennahda’s role in compromises in subtler but equally of political Islam, this school of law, introducing religious establishing a “sixth caliphate” in nefarious proposals. “When they analysis distinguishes between rhetoric unparalleled in Ben Ali’s Tunisia, referring to the transition retracted Shari’a, they came back “moderates” or “centrists,” who Constitution, which made no as a “divine moment” in Tunisia’s with a defense of ‘good moral openly embrace civic rights in mention of Islamic texts.9 Shortly new “State of God.”14 Uproar standards’ (bonnes moeurs), conjunction with Islamist ideology, thereafter, Ennahda deputy Sahbi ensued on the street and within which . . . creates a slippery slope and “fundamentalists,” whose Atig described those demanding the Assembly. In yet another towards Islamic law.”16 radicalism threatens democratic a separation between Islam and confirmation of disaccord within NCA deputy and member stability.6 Ghannouchi expressed politics as a “threat to the structure the party and in response to of the centrist Al Joumhouri the movement’s commitment of Islamic thought,”10 provoking public hostility, Jebali retracted his coalition Noomane Fehri believed to pluralism even while in exile fear among secular Tunisians position just days later, reiterating that Ennahda deliberately in the 1990s,7 earning the party who sensed that the party would Ennahda’s attachment to the adopted religiously conservative a “moderate” label. Once prove more conservative than its “republican, democratic model.”15 stances, heeding to the parties Ennahda was elected to lead the campaign packaging indicated. more “extreme” members— NCA, observers tried to decode Citizens and human rights groups Compromise Versus fully aware of their provocative Ennahda’s ideology in order to erupted in response, demanding Consensus in Tunisia’s nature—only to subsequently forecast whether or not an Islamist that the party stay true to its New Constitution acquiesce in order to appear party could do justice to the campaign promises and establish Ennahda’s vacillation between moderate. “It’s a smokescreen,” uprising’s demands for dignity and a secular basis for the country’s varying degrees of religiosity he explained. “They bring an freedom. But, as the constitution legal framework. Ultimately, and some of its members’ final issue to its maximum, one they drafting process unfolded, the Ghannouchi ceded to pressure attempts to insert Shari’a into know nobody will support—

52 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 53 Shari’a law . . . would be [a the summer of 2013, creating religiously conservative segment executive director of the watchdog ridiculous constitutional mandate] a tense political atmosphere in of Tunisians would serve them organization Al Bawsala Selim in a society like Tunisia’s, and Tunis. Michael Ayari, a researcher well in future elections. In Kherrat explained “religion was [Ennahda is] fully aware. And for International Crisis Group, renouncing Shari’a, Ghannouchi at the center of political debate then the opposition, the activists, echoed this sentiment: “When explained his position: “If we when Ennahda brought up the human rights organizations Ennahda . . . shift[s] its rhetoric, maintain our demand concerning Shari’a and complementarity reject, and Ennahda comes when they talk to Salafists and Shari’a, we’re not sure that it between men and women. But back, saying that they’re for a to the Brookings Institution, will receive a 51 percent vote . . that’s no longer the case; it’s no consensus-driven process, and they that’s their thing. And then you . after all, there’s no difference longer about that. Today, we’re seem like a middle-of-the-road have all the others saying, ‘that’s between Islam and Shari’a, but concerned with how we’re going political party.” Mr. Fehri further disgusting.’ Maybe it is, but that’s there are people that are afraid to finish this constitution.”21 After developed his theory, arguing that, part of politics. It’s dirty, but it’s of it . . . the time will come when months of political paralysis, amidst public backlash, “they part of the game. It’s an arena Tunisians will be convinced of deputies returned to the assembly make administrative appointments where everyone struggles and Shari’a.”20 While some secularists floor to cast a final vote on the on local, regional, and national fights. We have an elected body; considered this to represent the Constitution in January 2014, and levels. Ennahda is not a it’s by nature political.”19 party’s insidious extremism, it discord over religion resurged. democratic political actor, aiming more likely reflects Ghannouchi’s Certain proposed amendments— attempt to delicately balance a like one to include “the people’s diverse electorate. Ennahda was attachment to Islam’s teachings “...you have all the others saying, ‘that’s disgusting.’ Maybe it is, but forced to acquiesce to external as an example of superior values, that’s part of politics. It’s dirty, but it’s part of the game.” demands—from secular Tunisians, considering that Islam is a civil society, international fundamental principle of modern organizations, and the West—to society and universal human “de-Islamicize” its constitutional rights” in the preamble or another for cooperation, but they create Political Contestation in Tu- project in the spirit of democratic to mandate the Quran and Sunna that appearance as a diversionary nisia’s Evolving Democracy consensus, while simultaneously as the “principal sources of tactic to hide their ultimate goal Mr. Ayari’s contention is critical to preserving its raison d’être. Its legislation”—that fundamentally of locking the state apparatus.”17 understanding the dynamics that behavior is thus not mysterious transform the Constitution’s spirit Many non-Islamists share Mr. underscore the political sphere’s or uniquely linked to its Islamist suggest that the religious divide Fehri’s grievance and argue that evolution in post-Ben Ali Tunisia. character but simply reflects a may endure throughout Tunisia’s Ennahda is attempting to “stack The opposition’s grievances over fragmented political movement transitional process. the bureaucracy with loyalists . . Ennahda’s beguiling behavior struggling to survive in a period of During the political transition’s . by replacing civil servants with are mere reactions to partisan democratic consolidation. first three years, democratic incompetent bureaucrats loyal to posturing in democratic debate—a Despite this clear tension, both apprenticeship weighed on Ennahda.”18 new phenomenon for Tunisia’s between the Assembly’s camps and Ennahda’s unity; individual Opposition deputies’ criticisms nascent political class, accustomed within Ennahda itself, references members evolved politically are politically charged, more to decades of single-party rule to Islamic law would not appear as the constitution drafting closely informed by perception that quashed debate. Ennahda in any of the three formal drafts process unfolded, challenging than reality, and should thus be responded with compromise to that preceded the Constitution’s the party’s cohesion. Ennahda treated skeptically. Generally, the secularists’ outcries that routinely finalization. For months, it deputy Latifa Habashi, the opposition depicted Ennahda followed its members’ defenses seemed that disagreement over first deputy to suggest that the bitterly, particularly during their of “extreme” positions but also Islam’s role had been put to rest. Constitution enshrine the State’s boycott of the Assembly during recognized that a politically and In an October 2013 interview, civility, lamented that some of

54 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 55 her colleagues had moved away rights” provides insight into actors in established democracies political culture conditioned by from the “campaign spirit” in deputies’ erratic behavior across also defend a wide range of decades of authoritarianism. pushing for Shari’a law.22 Religion the spectrum. The amendment, views under one party label. This Viewing the NCA as a theatre for reemerged in the January debates which bears a subtle but certain diversity is not a function of the partisan rancor in a burgeoning precisely because of the party’s religious tone absent from other party’s hypocrisy or deceit but a political landscape is essential to hybridity. Voting records from national legislation, only received natural byproduct of pluralism; understanding the rudimentary these debates, available on Al seven favorable votes. Curiously, political survival takes precedent bases of democratic consolidation. Bawsala’s website, confirm that Ennahda unanimously rejected over strict views—even if the party The rifts forged during the Islam’s legal role was not only a the amendment, but a strange might be religious. constitution drafting process force that divided the opposition amalgam of deputies from a “Ennahda is attached to a are grafted onto the current and the majority but fractured myriad of religious and secularist certain vision of history,” alleged Tunisian political landscape. But, Ennahda itself. opposition parties supported it. Dr. Ben Achour, “that makes them while alliances are drawn along Twenty-two Ennahda deputies Two opposition deputies who convinced that God’s will, more Islamist-secular lines, the issues at voted in favor of amending Article supported the article—Salma importantly than the people’s, is stake do not necessarily pertain 1, which states Islam is Tunisia’s Mabrouk (Al Massar) and Selim the reason they’re in power.”23 to religion. Secular politicians religion, to include the Quran Ben Abdessalem (Nidaa Tounes), In his view, this hierarchy criticize Ennahda’s allegedly and Sunna, but seventeen voted both originally members of requires supporters to clarify lackluster counterterrorism against (thirty-nine abstained). the secular Ettakatol—have the relationship between Islamic policy and failure to restore Ennahda deputies also split regularly renounced what they and positive law. For Ennahda, the economy. Some have even eighteen-to-fifteen on a similar perceive as Ennahda’s desire to resolving this question resided in accused Ennahda of involvement amendment that would add a Islamicize Tunisia and, during political, rather than theological, in political assassinations; after clause that would make Islam the interviews, repeatedly expressed calculations, dividing the party. Chokri Belaïd’s death, 40,000 “principal source of legislation” their commitment to secularism. Dr. Ben Achour’s portrayal that Tunisians gathered in front of (fourty-six abstained). The split While shifts in partisan alliances or Ennahda’s political posturing is the Interior Ministry to denounce vote complicates what continues “political nomadism” are natural inextricably linked to its religiosity Ennahda’s leadership, labeling to be a monolithic portrayal of in young democracies, secularists is common among secularists but Ghannouchi an “assassin.” Selim Ennahda, a party still defining voting for religiously charged neglects to consider that political Ben Abdessalem, initially a itself while simultaneously provisions is a far more puzzling strategy, rather than religious member of the secular Ettakatol playing an important political trend that indicates the political zeal, might play a greater role party who joined Nidaa Tounes role in Tunisia’s shift from landscape’s malleability over three in Ennahda’s governance and in 2012, insisted that Ennahda authoritarianism. years into the transition. dialogue with opposition deputies. routinely downplayed Salafist Ennahda is not the only party A major analytical error in Ennahda’s increasingly violence, going so far as to assert whose alliances are difficult approaching Tunisia’s transition visible chasms underscore its that “if you ask any Ennahda to trace. An amendment to is the tendency to oversimplify shifting rhetoric regarding member whether or not he feels the preamble replacing “on complex events. Observers Islam’s controversial place in more politically allied with the the basis of Islam’s teachings” attempted to order the chaos Tunisian society, a question democratic opposition or with with “expressing our people’s that necessarily followed Ben whose persistent ambiguity will Salafists, I am sure he would say attachment to Islam’s teachings Ali’s fall, a period during which continue to divide the political the latter.”24 Selim’s insistence as a superior example of diverse political actors strived to sphere and drive debate. This reveals the extent to which comprehensive principles, assert themselves politically for tumult is the fruit of democratic Ennahda’s attempt to maintain considering that Islam is a the first time. At the same time, consolidation; the transition’s religious voters and avoid adopting fundamental principle of modern these phenomena are not unique first phase constituted an initial a hard-line stance against Salafists humanity and universal human to transitioning societies. Political step towards democratizing a negatively hurt its performance

56 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 57 Karina Piser is a Master’s candidate Chourou, Sadok. “Le people est musulman, and alienated secular politicians Peace, points to declining in International Security at Sciences et veut gouverner selon le charia islamique,” against the backdrop of a public support for Ennahda as SHEMSFM Tunisie, 25 October 2012. Po’s Paris School of International Chourou, Sadok. “ANC: Sadok Chourou population with little trust in the a fundamental challenge to the Affairs and research assistant at the remet la question de la charia sur le tapis (inter- party. “notion of the ‘Islamist threat’— European Council on Foreign Rela- view),” Jawhara FM, 24 October 2012. Many of Tunisia’s liberal the idea that . . . Islamist forces tions. She has worked at the United Business News. “Ennahdha invite Hamas et Hammadi Jebali parle du 6ème Califat,” 14 and leftist parties have united would never leave power once Nations Office of the High Commis- 25 November 2011. around these grievances under they acquired it.” The party’s sioner for Human Rights in Tunis Leaders. “Hamadi Jebali ‘clarifie’ sa position the increasingly popular Nidaa waning popularity due to its poor and the National Democratic Institute au sujet du 6ème Califat,” 15 November 2011. Tounes (“Call for Tunisia”) performance—consequences of in Washington, DC. She graduated Baccar, Salma. Personal interview, 3 Septem- coalition, launched in 2012. its attempt to balance identity and ber 2013. summa cum laude from the Univer- Fehri, Noomane. Personal Interview, 17 Non-Islamist parties and coalitions political pragmatism—suggests sity of California, Davis and has October 2013. like Nidaa Tounes should pay that Ennahda’s full integration published articles on North African Lang, Hardin et al. “Tunisia’s Struggle for heed to Ennahda’s political into democratic processes could politics in Foreign Policy, World Political Pluralism After Ennahda,” Center for posturing and governance record translate to its watered-down American Progress, Policy paper, April 2014. Politics Review, World Policy Ayari, Michael. Personal interview, 14 Octo- as they craft their strategies for religiosity in the future. Journal, and the Cairo Review. ber 2013. the transition’s next phase. In the International actors aiming to Horchani, Salah. “Tunisie: Sacrée Sharia! 2011 campaign, secular parties influence Tunisia’s democratic Chaque fois qu’on la pousse par la porte, les criticized Ennahda’s religious trajectory should not lose sight of 1 Gobe, Eric. “Tunisie an I: les chantiers de islamistes la font revenir par la fenêtre!,” Medi- apart, 2 January 2014. character rather than responding this inevitable shift in Ennahda’s la transition,” L’Année du Maghreb, VIII, 2012, 433–54. Kherrat, Selim. Personal interview, 11 Octo- to its platform and, absent an identity. Non-governmental Watson, Ivan. “Historic Elections in Tu- ber 2013. agenda of their own, performed organizations focusing on political nisia Lauded,” CNN, 25 October 2011. Habashi, Latifa. Personal interview, 20 Sep- poorly. Reacting to Ennahda’s development should encourage Lynch, Marc. “Tunisia’s New al-Nahda,” tember 2013. Ben Achour, “2011-2013: Révolution, Reli- strategy rather than to its ideology parties to adopt a practical Foreign Policy, 29 June 2011. Ibid. gion, Sécularisation.” in the upcoming parliamentary approach to campaigning Ben Achour, Yadh. “2011-2013: Révo- Ben Abdessalem, Selim. Personal interview, 2 elections (scheduled before the and governance in order to lution, Religion, Sécularisation” (Seminar October 2013. end of 2014) would allow the foster a multiparty arena that given for “La Tunisie à la croisée des Muasher, Marwan. “Year Four of the Arab Awakening,” Carnegie Endowment for Interna- opposition to capitalize on the privileges popular demand over chemins: Quelle trajectoire pour quelle transition?,” Université Paris 8, Seine- tional Peace, 12 December 2013. party’s new fragility. ideological infighting. The United Saint-Denis, France, 12 December 2013). Ennahda’s struggle to maintain States—seen as relatively neutral Midlarsky, Manus I. “Democracy and a cohesive identity while adhering compared to European powers—is Islam: Implications for Civilizational to internal and external pressures particularly well positioned to Conflict and the Democratic Peace,” International Studies Quarterly 42, No. 3, results from a balancing act that encourage partisan negotiation September 1998, 485–511. other Islamist parties in the region in Tunisia. Because tensions and Ibid., 487. will likely face while participating crises are likely to resurge as the Cavaillès, Thibaut. “Tunisie: le double in democratic consolidation. The country’s democracy solidifies, langage de Ghannouchi,” Le Figaro, 12 October 2012. popular uprisings since 2011 the United States should use its Brésillon, Thierry. “Tunisie: la charia empowered Islamist movements diplomatic clout to encourage inscrite dans la future Constitution?,” Le but also forced them to transform, constructive dialogue between Nouvel Observateur, 2 March 2012. adapting their oppositional divergent political parties, Business News. “Sahbi Atig: Ceux qui veulent séparer la religion de la politique rhetoric to political strategy. reiterating pluralism’s importance touchent à la base de l’Islam,” 28 February Marwan Muasher, vice president in Tunisia’s transition moving 2012. for studies at the Carnegie forward. ◆ Mandraud, Isabelle. “Ennahda renonce à Endowment for International inscrire la charia dans la Constitution,” Le Monde, 27 March 2012.

58 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 59 From Modest Beginnings: and that, locally, has catered to or destined to, the region. A the region’s unique demographics. small number of other services The Growth of Civil Aviation Complainants would do well offered by these carriers targeted to understand this strategy key oil-producing countries and in the Middle East By John Strickland and, rather than fighting these served mainly business traffic and developments, find ways to pursue expatriate workers from Europe mutual benefit by collaborating and North America. The other ABSTRACT commercially with local carriers main traffic flows included affluent and by concluding Open Skies local populations traveling beyond agreements with local states. the region as well as religious The Persian Gulf states have positioned the Middle East as a pivotal player in The focus of this article is on traffic, largely to and from Saudi global aviation. Long-haul carriers, such as Emirates, Qatar Airways, and Etihad the airline carriers of the Gulf Arabia. Airways, are exploiting the region’s unique geographic location and airport states, given their dominant role The traditional business model hubs to capture air traffic flows between emerging markets around the world. in the region’s aviation sector. I in the region had been for states Meanwhile, low-cost carriers, like Air Arabia and Fly Dubai, are capitalizing begin by describing the landscape to fund flag carriers, with airlines on the Gulf countries’ demographic diversity to promote travel within the of civil aviation in the region, seen as little more than symbols region. Critics of the Gulf carriers, including foreign airlines and governments, explaining the reasons why specific of state prestige. There was no cite alleged state subsidies for fuel and favorable terms for aircraft acquisition airlines have become globally accountability for commercial as unfair advantages that undermine global competition. The success of these important and shedding light results or service standards. But carriers, however, is a reflection of their strong business principles and of the on their possible development by the early 1990s, the structure sector’s geopolitical significance. Rather than complaining, critics would do well trajectories in the years ahead. of the aviation market changed to pursue commercial collaboration with the Gulf carriers and conclude Open Next, I discuss the factors dramatically. The arrival of the Skies agreements with the Gulf states. underpinning the Gulf carriers’ Boeing 747-400, a longer-range success—strong business principles model of the well-established built upon quality management— Boeing 747, allowed airlines to and their geopolitical implications. operate nonstop flights between Introduction region’s carriers enjoy unfair ad- I conclude by highlighting Europe and Asia, eliminating the The Middle East has become a vantages, including state subsidies potential risks that may affect the need for a technical stop in the pivotal player in global aviation. for fuel and favorable terms for sector’s continued growth. Middle East. This development aircraft acquisition, that adversely This development, fuelled by led European and Asian carriers to accelerated growth in the region’s affect the financial performance A Modest Beginning reduce their services to the region, civil aviation sector, is taking place of carriers in other parts of the In the 1980s, the Middle East’s creating the impetus for a number at both the intra- and inter-region- world. aviation sector had a limited of Middle Eastern states and local al levels and spans a number of The rise of the region’s aviation presence in the global landscape airlines to protect these air links by different airline business models sector, however, is neither an of the industry. European and undertaking fleet investment and shaping the growth of local carri- overnight sensation nor the result Asian carriers treated a number growth. ers. Such changes have significant of unfair advantages. Rather, it is of destinations in the Middle In Dubai, Emirates had been geopolitical implications. From the product of a business strategy East, such as Bahrain, Dubai, established in 1985 and was North America to Europe to that, globally, has capitalized and Muscat, as technical stops to initially the flag carrier of the Africa, airlines and governments on the region’s almost ideal refuel long-haul services between United Arab Emirates (UAE). It across the world have voiced geographic location as a hub— Europe and Asia. These carriers carried just 86,000 passengers concerns about the expansion of linking key emerging markets in also picked up limited volumes in its first year of operation.1 the Middle East’s aviation sector. Asia, Africa, and Latin America— of local traffic originating from, However, as carriers beyond They allege that a number of the

60 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 61 the region reduced their flights, work in professional positions and Meanwhile, Etihad Airways, efficient, competitive transport to Emirates began adding new have extensive travel requirements, which flew just 340,000 passengers customers in burgeoning markets. aircraft and destinations, growing both globally and within the in 2004, carried almost 12 million In the future, the region is likely throughout the 1990s. From region, for business and leisure. passengers in 2013.5 Together, to retain its competitive status as the outset, the airline’s owners This provides a strong source of these three airlines today carry in carriers invest in next generation made clear that it would have to traffic for local airlines. There is excess of 69 million passengers aircraft to further improve fuel operate on a commercial basis. also a large population of migrant annually. economy and reduce risk when Meanwhile, Qatar Airways, which workers, primarily from South and Three factors have fuelled this opening routes in new markets. had been established in 1994, was Southeast Asia, who generate high expansion. The first is concerned Some critics question the Gulf relaunched in 1997 under new volumes of traffic to and from with market dynamics. In the carriers’ large fleet sizes and CEO Akbar Al Baker, who still their home countries. Some states, global economy, the most rapid massive aircraft orders. Emirates holds the post today. Under his including the UAE, are also home growth is taking place in Asia, has in excess of 200 aircraft in leadership, it began to grow and, to substantial communities from Africa, Latin America, and the its fleet with over 300 additional like Emirates, also operated on a other Middle Eastern countries— Middle East. The demand for aircraft on order.6 Etihad Airways clear commercial basis. These two including Iran, Iraq, and Egypt— air travel linking these global has 89 aircraft in its fleet and airlines were later joined by Etihad that represent another source of regions is also growing rapidly, around 220 on order, while Qatar Airways, Abu Dhabi’s flag carrier, traffic. and long-haul carriers in the Gulf Airways has around 130 aircraft which was launched in 2003. Growth in the tourism sector have a clear geographic advantage in its fleet with over 280 on These three carriers have has also aided the local aviation in exploiting this potential. For order.7 These figures may appear contributed much to the region’s market. For example, as part markets, such as China-to-Africa ambitious, but they need to be put burgeoning aviation sector, of its strategy to diversify its or Asia-to-Latin America, it makes in context. These orders stretch operating long-haul flights economy, Dubai has led the region no geographic or commercial out years into the future, and some between key markets across the in developing a strong tourism sense to travel via Europe or represent replacement, rather globe. In addition to these, there industry. This sector, supported North America. Conversely, the than incremental, aircraft. Flight are the low-cost carriers, led by by a diverse tourism proposition Gulf carriers offer logical flight times from the Gulf are so long— Air Arabia and Fly Dubai, that and extensive hotel infrastructure, routes, while their purpose-built seventeen to eighteen hours to the provide services within the region provides yet another source of hubs provide numerous itinerary western United States or Latin as well as to markets within a traffic for the Gulf ’s airlines. permutations between these America—that to maintain even one-to-five hour flight radius of markets, maximizing revenue from once-daily frequency requires a the region. Both business models The Long-Haul Market these emerging economies. minimum of two to three aircraft. are shaping today’s aviation Since the turn of the century, the A second factor is the types and Higher frequencies require landscape. growth of long-haul air traffic has technical capabilities of aircraft more aircraft. Considering the The Gulf ’s unique accelerated, much of it a function in the Gulf carriers’ fleets. All growth potential of the markets demographics also support a of the expansion of Emirates, three hub operators have invested served, the ultra-long distances buoyant airline sector, as a number Qatar Airways, and Etihad in state-of-the-art aircraft—in of the flights operated, and the of local countries have sizable Airways. During fiscal year (FY) particular, the ultra-long-range high-occupancy level of flights expatriate populations. In the 2003-2004, 10 million passengers Boeing 777 twin jet and the when new capacity is added, UAE, for example, local Emiratis flew on Emirates, a figure that large-capacity Airbus A380. From there is good reason to believe constitute only 16 percent of the rose to 39 million passengers by Gulf airports, these aircraft can this expansion is commercially country’s total population.2 There FY 2012-2013.3 Qatar Airways serve any market in the world on warranted. is a large community of affluent flew 3 million passengers in FY a nonstop or one-stop basis. They A third factor is the availability expatriates, particularly from 2003-2004 but, by FY 2012-2013, offer high-capacity and low-unit of adequate and expanding Europe and North America, who had 18 million passengers.4 costs for their operators and airport capacity that can be used

62 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 63 twenty-four hours a day. This one to five hours in duration. of young people who could not a clear commercial rationale, capacity is critical to the Gulf hub Air Arabia, founded in the UAE previously afford to fly, as well as underpinned by macroeconomic carriers’ model, which depends emirate of Sharjah, is the leading the region’s vast foreign worker and demographic trends, to these on having efficient operations to LCC, having recently reached population that wishes to visit airlines’ operations. Emirates, plan a large number of flights its tenth year of operation. The home in countries like India. The by its own acknowledgement, and optimize the itinerary options company is publicly traded and availability of low-cost flights received start-up investment available to clients to achieve high profitable and has adopted a has also stimulated new inbound funding but has since stood on its occupancy levels. By contrast, multi-country model with aircraft tourism, with markets—such as own. It has delivered sustained North American and European based in Egypt and Morocco, in Russia—opening up. profitability, supported by its airlines tend to be limited by night addition to Sharjah. Later this The LCC market will continue increasingly transparent financial curfews at their home airports. year, it will open an additional to flourish given the region’s disclosures. Qatar Airways and Airport traffic statistics base in the emirate of Ras Al diverse customer base and these Etihad Airways do not yet have demonstrate the effectiveness of Khaimah. Fly Dubai, meanwhile, airlines’ abilities to take advantage this level of transparency, but these hubs’ operations. Dubai has taken a different approach. of new sources of demand. As there is little doubt that they International Airport handled Established in 2009 by the such, both Air Arabia and Fly intend to move in this direction. just under 4 million passengers in government of Dubai, the airline Dubai have additional aircraft Their owners, while certainly 1985, but as Emirates developed provides flights exclusively from on order. Other country markets governments, still hold them this hub, this figure rose to 18 Dubai to a diverse range of also offer latent potential: Saudi accountable for delivering million in 2003 and 66 million in destinations largely distinct from 2013.8 Meanwhile, Abu Dhabi those served by Emirates. It has International Airport handled 4 delivered significant profits within million passengers in 2003 but, four years of its founding. “Since the turn of the century, the growth of long-haul air by 2013, had over 16 million.9 To Although each airline has a traffic has accelerated, much of it a function of the expan- keep pace with fleet expansion and different business approach, both sion of Emirates, Qatar Airways, and Etihad Airways.” market potential, however, further are commercially defensible. investment in airport expansion is Some intraregional markets served essential. Dubai recently opened by LCCs have been buffeted by a second airport, Qatar is moving political unrest, but the model has its Doha hub to a new airport, proved resilient, demonstrating Arabia, for example, has a profitability, and indeed, both have and Abu Dhabi is opening an that as soon as stability is restored, developing LCC sector. However, recently reported profits, though additional terminal. Investment confidence recovers and traffic further growth in the LCC market not at sufficient levels. is also taking place in other parts returns. will largely depend on whether Contrary to critics’ claims, the of the region—for example, the As in other parts of the world, local states reduce protectionist success of the Gulf carriers can provision of new airport capacity regional customers have taken to barriers that currently inhibit air be attributed to strong business in Oman. the low-cost model, which includes service development. principles, including the vision, a simpler service ethos, more ability, and continuity of their Low-Cost Carriers affordable pricing, and the use of Here to Stay management. Emirates has built The success of Gulf aviation the Internet as a sales channel. The region’s air transport sector its business over almost thirty is not only the result of the This short-haul business model is the subject of criticism from years. Sir Tim Clark, Emirates’ long-haul carriers. The emergence has democratized air travel in foreign airlines and governments president and an Englishman of low-cost carriers (LCCs) has the Gulf and the wider Middle that question the Gulf airlines’ with vast industry experience, generated new travel within and East. It is tapping into the region’s business models. However, the has been with the airline since to the region on flights typically vast local population, particularly evidence shows that there is its founding and initially headed

64 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 65 its planning team. He was encapsulate the drive of the Etihad Airways has taken a growth in passenger traffic for instrumental in leading Emirates’ airline: “Qatar Airways does not third path by establishing what Middle East carriers, the strongest move to tap into existing markets, fly airplanes to carry fresh air to it terms “equity alliances.” It has growth shown by any region such as Europe-to-Asia and Eu- any destination.” He adds, “We purchased minority stakes in a in the world. IATA credits this rope-to-Australasia, and to spot don’t go anywhere to please any number of airlines and engages in figure to the “continued strength the potential of new markets, government. We go where there management contracts with some of regional economies and solid like Asia-to-Africa. He has also are economic opportunities, when of its partners. growth in . . . travel, particularly to greatly influenced the direction there are business opportunities There are strengths and developing markets like Africa.”12 of Boeing and Airbus’ aircraft for the airline.”10 His leadership weaknesses to each of these IATA also projects that the UAE design specifications from which has succeeded in steering the approaches that will become more will be among the world’s top Emirates and other global airlines company from a small local airline clear over time. But what we are ten markets for air travel by have benefited. Clark has provided into a major global player. witnessing is a willingness on the 2016, accommodating 87 million continuity in leadership to the Strong business principles also part of the three Gulf carriers to passengers. By comparison, the airline and has instilled a high explain the success of the LCCs. seek collaboration with partners U.S. market accommodates 223 degree of entrepreneurialism into Their capable management has beyond the region. Although million passengers and the UK its management personnel—what brought a discipline that compares the Gulf carriers provide tough market 200 million.13 he describes as the “Emirates favorably with best-in-class LCCs competition for many airlines in Other projections underscore DNA.” This is a key qualitative globally, combining efficient other parts of the world, some in the sustainability of this trend. factor in Emirates’ success. low-cost operation with high the industry recognize the value According to Boeing forecasts, productivity. of working with, rather than between 2013 and 2032, airline Although all three long-haul complaining about, them. Willie traffic in the Middle East will Gulf airlines continue to focus on Walsh, CEO of International grow by over 6 percent, higher “The success of the Gulf hub operations, there is evidence Airlines Group (IAG), the parent than the global average of 5 aviation sector is based that their business strategies group of British Airways, has percent and well ahead of mature are becoming more divergent. indicated his strong support for the markets, such as North America on linking rapidly growing Emirates has formed a deep commercially rational approach of and Europe. During the same global markets and capital- commercial partnership with the Gulf carriers.11 This represents period, Boeing foresees demand izing on favorable demo- Australia’s Qantas. There is no a new phase of maturity in the for 2,610 additional aircraft in cross-shareholding between the region’s aviation development and the region, roughly 7 percent graphic and economic con- airlines, but regulations permit one that I see as positive for the of total global demand. More ditions within the region.” the two airlines to have close future. importantly, the region’s demand commercial cooperation, including for new long-haul, wide-body joint optimization of schedules. Sustainable Growth? aircraft represents 23 percent of Qatar Airways recently joined the The success of the Gulf aviation global demand, reflecting the Qatar Airways has also oneworld alliance—one of three sector is based on linking significance of the region’s hubs.14 benefited from the sharp such alliances in the world—that rapidly growing global markets In the geopolitical context, aircraft commercial focus of its CEO will allow it to cooperate more and capitalizing on favorable orders by these airlines support Akbar Al Baker, who has been closely with alliance partners, demographic and economic thousands of high-quality jobs at the airline’s helm since notably British Airways. Initially, conditions within the region. This beyond the region, particularly in 1997. He sees himself, first and the level of collaboration will success is confirmed by data from the aerospace industries of Europe foremost, as a businessman and is not be as deep, due to regulatory the International Air Transport and North America. recognized as a tough negotiator limitations, as that of Emirates Association (IATA), which These opportunities aside, with suppliers. His own words and Qantas, but this could change. reported in 2013, 12 percent there remain risks to future

66 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 67 growth. Serious military conflict 1 Clark, Tim. E-mail correspondence with John and political unrest, for example, Strickland, March 2014. would be extremely damaging 2 Malit, Froilan T., Jr., and Ali Al Youha. “Labor Migration in the United Arab Emirates: to the sector. Fallout from the Challenges and Responses,” Migration Informa- 1991 Persian Gulf War and the tion Source, 18 September 2013. 2003 Iraq War illustrate the 3 The Emirates Group. “It Takes a World: negative consequences of these Annual Report 2012-2013,” 2013, 152. 4 Qatar Airways. “The Qatar Airways Story: shocks to the industry. At the Charting the Rise of One of the Fastest Grow- operational level, insufficient air ing Airlines in the World,” March 2014. traffic control capacity and the 5 Etihad Airways. E-mail correspondence inefficient use of airspace due with John Strickland, February 2014; Etihad Airways. “Fast Facts and Figures: Q4/2013,” to military considerations are 2013, 2. serious impediments to air traffic 6 Emirates Group. “Tim Clark on 2013 and expansion in the region. Averting Going into 2014,” Open Sky 18, February 2014, this problem requires Gulf states 2 and 12. 7 Etihad Airways. “Annual Report 2013,” 2013, to invest resources and muster 28; Qatar Airways, “The Qatar Airways Story.” the political will to avoid a future 8 Dubai International Airport. E-mail cor- logjam. respondence with John Strickland, February In spite of these risks, aviation 2014; Dubai International Airport. “Fact Sheets, Reports, & Statistics,” 13 April 2014. in the Middle East is reaching a 9 Abu Dhabi International Airport. E-mail new level of maturity. The sector correspondence with John Strickland, February is led by well-managed airlines 2014. that are best-in-class by global 10 Al Baker, Akbar. Interview with John Strick- land, 2012 Arabian Travel Market Dubai, standards. It also has the benefit Dubai, UAE, May 2012. of its unique geographic location 11 Attwood, Ed. “No Issue with Gulf Carriers relative to shifting macroeconomic Says IAG Boss,” Arabian Business, 10 April 2013. trends. In the years ahead, by 12 International Air Transport Association (IATA). “Air Passenger Market Analysis, De- making shrewd use of aircraft cember 2013,” 6 February 2014. and airport resources, the Gulf 13 IATA. “Projected Top 10 International Pas- aviation sector is likely to increase senger and Freight Markets in 2016.” its importance both within the 14 Boeing. “Current Market Outlook 2013- 2032,” June 2013, 3. region and around the world. ◆

John Strickland is director of JLS Con- sulting, a London-based air transport consultancy. He has over thirty years of experience in the industry and offers regular commentary and analysis on de- velopments in the Middle East aviation market.

68 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy Breaking the Peace Negotiations Stalemate: An Interview with Interviewed by Nada Zohdy, managing Dr. Hanan Ashrawi editor of JMEPP, on 15 January 2014

JMEPP: My first question violations by the Israelis on the has to do with the most ground, including settlements, recent talks brokered by U.S. the transformation of Jerusalem, Secretary of State John Kerry. annexation of territory, and so on. You said at last night’s event This meant that while ostensibly at the JFK Forum that the you’re talking about a two-state negotiations have become solution, you’re allowing the the objective in themselves more powerful side to destroy the and not a means to a final two-state solution by destroying solution. Could you expound the possibility of having a viable on this, and if this is going to Palestinian state and by creating a be the case in the future, why larger Israel. continue to negotiate? We kept saying that if the means are flawed, you fix them ASHRAWI: Absolutely. If if you have an instrument or a negotiations become an exercise in tool like the negotiations. And futility, a sort of repetitive pattern this instrument is flawed; you that is generating a negative either fix it, or you replace it with dynamic, then certainly they something else. Unfortunately, become counterproductive, and there has been a persistence in they negate their very objective. doing the same thing over and This is what has happened so far over again—adopting Israeli in the sense that the emphasis has priorities, allowing the process been on the process rather than to run its course in a way that on the substance and objective. provided Israel with more of an Negotiations have incorporated ability to act with impunity and the asymmetry of power that privilege, and destroying the allowed the powerful side—the Palestinian chances of having occupier—to exploit its power freedom, dignity, and sovereignty. against the occupied. It robbed We were hoping that this new the weaker party of any access to initiative by John Kerry would global or international instruments draw the proper conclusions from of self-empowerment, including the process that began in 1991. international law. We hoped the new round would It also did not curb any try to maintain some integrity

2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 69 and viability by addressing prejudicial unilateral moves on we will start seeking only equal larger-than-life figures. Some of the real issues rather than the the ground and attempting to rights within an apartheid system them are in the political arena, process itself—by curbing Israeli prevent Palestinian statehood of Israel” means that we will have some are in the intellectual arena, violations, by basing the process and sovereignty. The annexation postponed any type of solution for and Edward Said certainly made on agreed terms of reference and of land and resources and the generations. It means that again his name outside of Palestine. He international law, and therefore expansion of settlements continue. Israel would feel perfectly free to made his name as a global player, safeguarding its own viability and We are being told that you have pursue its own expansion. I don’t and then he brought to bear this integrity. to embrace a one-state solution think that there is the political will type of presence in the literary by some people, knowing that it on the part of the United States world. Through his writings, he will mean the perpetuation of the or the international community at brought real expression of quality JMEPP: If negotiations occupation. large to curb Israeli violations and into the struggle for Palestine. continue to be of no use, why We have seen how Israel to hold it accountable. So, it wasn’t that he came not fold the PA and demand managed to create a system of full citizenship in return? legal, effective, on-the-ground administrative and functional Saying ‘we will stop seeking freedom and sovereignty and ASHRAWI: Well, there are lots discrimination against the of creative ideas coming out indigenous Palestinians who stayed so on, and we will start seeking only equal rights within an now—the one-state or one-land, in historical Palestine in Israel. apartheid system of Israel’ means that we will have post- one homeland and two states, They are citizens of Israel, and poned any type of solution for generations. or the overlapping sovereignty yet they are being treated with issue, or all sorts of other issues such blatant discrimination and like the binational state, the one racism. You have Palestinians secular, democratic state, which who are now being transformed JMEPP: I wanted to ask you to prominence through his we discussed in 1969. It seems into the demographic threat to about the state of Palestinian struggle for Palestine and then to me that the one-state solution Israel because we happen to be intellectual life. You were gained international intellectual is becoming a de facto reality non-Jews. close with the late Edward recognition. He managed to rather than a political program I know Israel is perfectly Said who was a champion for engage the world in terms of because there is no consensus on capable of maintaining a system the Palestinian cause and a intellectual pursuits, and in terms the one-state solution anywhere, of apartheid, discrimination, and renowned academic. Today, of his political statements, in terms whether in Palestine or in Israel total exclusion of Palestinians there’s no shortage of activists of his national commitment— or in Europe or elsewhere. This from any consideration of the law and intellectuals well known he engaged the world on his is because in a sense Zionism has or human rights. They continue in the West and in Palestine own terms. It was an amazing placed the imperative of division pressing ahead with Greater such as Rashid Khalidi and combination, and I don’t think and separation on the table. Israel. Right now we have come Joseph Massad, but no one that such phenomena can be International resolutions have to the UN, and we have had our seems to rise to the level of repeated frequently. made it possible, and we made recognition as a state and are Edward Said or taken up his I think we may have lots of the historical compromise of working to have our boundaries, mantle. So I was wondering distinguished people. Mahmoud accepting Israel on 78 percent of our borders, our capital, and if there is someone who could Darwish for me is an amazing historical Palestine. Unfortunately, our right to self-determination inherit what Edward Said left creative poet as well. He even that is being destroyed. recognized. It’s going to mean a behind? encapsulated and embodied So, the one-state solution is sort of 180-degree shift. Saying the Palestinian experience and taking the shape of Greater Israel, “we will stop seeking freedom ASHRAWI: Every country, every national identity. He wrote in freeing Israel’s hand to create and sovereignty and so on, and culture, every state has its own Arabic but became recognized

70 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 71 internationally. So, his progress combination of intellectual rigor is the opposite of Edward’s—he and political commitment— started with the struggle, expressed the sort of joint language that it creatively, and then it was Edward legitimized—but they translated and the world took still haven’t reached the status to notice. We have others as well. be noticed globally. Palestinians There are quite a few impressive in exile are not constrained by figures. You mentioned Rashid living under occupation. They have greater freedom to explore their possibilities internationally and then to bring Palestine to While ostensibly you’re bear on this freedom to engage intellectually outside. ◆ talking about a two-state solution, you’re allowing Dr. Hanan Ashrawi is a renowned leg- islator, human rights activist and schol- the more powerful side ar, and is the first woman to be elected to to destroy the two-state the Executive Committee of the Palestine solution by destroying the Liberation Organization, the highest ex- ecutive body in Palestine. She is an elect- possibility of having a via- ed member of the Palestinian Legislative ble Palestinian state and by Council and the founder and secretary creating a larger Israel. general of the MIFTAH movement, the Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy. Dr. Ashrawi has been representing Palestine as an official spokesperson in peace nego- Khalidi, you mentioned Massad, tiations with Israel since the late 1980s. and there are also the Makdisi She received her PhD in Comparative brothers who are nephews of Literature from the University of Virginia Edward. and then founded and chaired the Depart- In Palestine you have an ment of English at Birzeit University, ongoing and lively debate within following which she became Dean of the civil society. It hasn’t crystallized Faculty of Arts at Birzeit. enough, and we haven’t had an output of such quality as to make inroads into the consciousness of global intellectual arenas. I think you will see that there are some wonderful poets at home. And they are writing in Arabic. There are quite a few people who are coming to grips in a very creative

72 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy Changing Dynamics in the Gulf: An Interview with Dr. Adnan Interviewed by Sarath Ganji, managing Shihab-Eldin editor of JMEPP, on 8 March 2014

JMEPP: Often we hear the Let me dwell quickly on the American perspective when first one. It is clear, from our it comes to changes in the perspective, that the fact that the global energy market and United States will become an how that will affect American increasingly important producer engagement with the Middle of oil is not necessarily bad. In East and, in particular, fact, it’s welcome in the sense that oil-exporting countries. I’d we need all potential producers like to reverse that point. How to produce oil and sell it or use do you see these countries’ it because the resources of the geopolitical relationships Middle East will remain the changing in light of America’s cheapest that are available in production of unconventional terms of cost of production. So oil and gas? there is no concern from that point of view in the long-term, whether SHIHAB-ELDIN: There are two it is the United States or anyone aspects to the Gulf Cooperation else. But the concern would be Council (GCC) perspective that if the United States dramatically are important in this regard. altered its relationship [with the One has to do with whether the GCC countries], which has been changes in the United States will the cornerstone of security in the imply a disengagement from Gulf. the Gulf and the oil-producing That would be something that countries in general. So that is is not desirable, and that is where one important perspective, and it the second dimension comes has important consequences and in. The United States currently challenges and concerns. The appears to be adopting a policy of second has to do with the United not being the super-policeman of States being an important player the world, but [rather] a leader of in the security of the world—not a global alliance to act when there just in the Middle East—and how is a need, based on consensus. that would affect the Gulf. And But consensus may not always these are related, but there are also work. We have examples. In different dimensions. 1990, there was a grand alliance

2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 73 established by the United States whether it is the United States, in a region where a labor force Qatar or the Emirates in terms to liberate Kuwait, but there was whether it is Europe, whether it is was not available. Even if you of oil production. What is the no consensus. There were some Russia, or somewhere else. Oil is had enough financial resources net effect? We still require large countries that were not a part of fungible; it moves around quickly. coming in, if you don’t have the labor forces from outside Kuwait that. And with the United States manpower—and reasonably because economic growth is large, today, we see that happening priced manpower—it would and so the bottom line is that even in Ukraine. What will be the JMEPP: I’d like to know not have been possible. From after thirty years, we don’t have a response of the United States more about the domestic this perspective, I don’t think it sufficient labor force. What you’re to Ukraine? Will they require a implications of these energy will change with the changing going to see is a shift in what type consensus, or will they go with trends for the GCC countries in geopolitics of energy or the of labor force you will need, either a majority, or will they exercise particular. How do you think changes in the energy landscape. to the very highly-skilled, which leadership and just enforce that these changes in the GCC’s oil What are the changes in the we don’t have, or to the service leadership to try to resolve this and gas industries—or in the energy landscape? We’re seeing sector, which not many people thing? This is really what is larger global energy market— a revolution in renewables. engage in. In between, you’re happening. will affect their immigration We’re seeing unconventional going to see more Qataris, more oil and gas increasing, and Saudis, more Kuwaitis engaged, we’re seeing energy efficiency and less dependence on labor “The knowledge economy is not going to be an economy improvement taking place. These forces from outside of the country that depends on the government. It has to be dependent are the three important changes for those sectors: engineers, on the private sector.” in the energy landscape. The teachers, accountants, investment only thing that could cause a managers. But in those very problem for the Middle East is highly-skilled [jobs] in oil and gas The United States will continue policies—namely, workforce if the unconventional oil supply or in any industry, or in the service to be interested in the supplies nationalization (i.e., combined with energy efficiency sector, you’re going to continue coming from the Gulf. That’s Qatarization, Emiratization) and renewables were to reduce to see that dominated by labor our view. Why? Because oil is versus the importation of large dramatically the need for oil coming mainly from the Indian fungible. Even if the United States numbers of foreign workers exports from the Middle East. subcontinent, Egypt, Syria, maybe ends up not importing much oil from abroad? That would mean there would be the Philippines, and Indonesia. from the Gulf, and currently it’s a reduction in oil revenues. In that not importing much—I think SHIHAB-ELDIN: It’s been case, it would not be possible to it’s importing one to two million well-observed that economic continue a development that relies JMEPP: As Kuwait progresses barrels mostly from Saudi Arabia growth in the Gulf countries, on outside labor. toward its goal of producing and it’s coming down quickly. which is fueled by oil export Now, taking the second a knowledge-based The fact that oil is fungible revenues, has been dependent to part of the question—about economy, what has the means that if there is a threat to a large extent on having skilled nationalization policies—I think Kuwait Foundation for the supply security from the Gulf and semi-skilled labor available it’s clear that you have to develop Advancement of Science (KFAS) to China, that will impact the to move into the region, whether your human resources. It’s natural. done to develop and retain the United States in two ways: first, it’s engineers or administrators And what we have seen in the intellectual capital needed to U.S. economic growth depends or clerks or [those] in the service Middle East—take a country like drive this effort? on Chinese economic growth; sectors. So the well-being and Kuwait, which has been following and second, any shortage in the the development over the last this policy now for fifty years, SHIHAB-ELDIN: KFAS is a supply of oil to China will have to twenty or thirty years would not because Kuwait has thirty or unique foundation. I say unique be compensated somewhere else, have been possible were we living fourty years of an advantage on because not many people know

74 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 75 that it is an alliance between the on the government. It has to be private sector and the government. dependent on the private sector. It is funded by the private sector, The government role is to enable but the foundation is chaired by it, and our role, being an alliance the head of state, His Highness between the government and the the Emir of Kuwait. So that private sector, is to enable it with a puts a responsibility on KFAS to view that the graduates are better ensure that it carries out strategic equipped and qualified for work in programs and that it develops the the private sector. ◆ skilled manpower that is needed by the private sector, because Dr. Adnan Shihab-Eldin, for- currently most of the employment merly acting secretary general is in the government sector. So and director of research at we focus in our programs on OPEC, is currently director developing youth to take on general of the Kuwait Foun- science and engineering careers dation for the Advancement of and to help to develop those who Sciences, a board member to pursue those careers. And that’s Al-Dorra Petroleum Services why we have programs at Harvard Company, and a member of and MIT and the London School the board of trustees of the of Economics. The idea is to use American University of Kuwait these programs at world-class and the Gulf Research Center institutions whereby some of our Foundation (Geneva). young graduates can come [to these universities], develop their skills in an exchange program or on a training program. Or some of our more advanced scholars come join researchers at Harvard, at MIT, at LSE, to tackle, on the one hand, research on important issues for the country, but to do it in a collaborative way with some of the top researchers at the top universities. So, in our small way we are contributing to developing [our] human resources, especially those that are needed by the private sector for the future knowledge economy, because the knowledge economy is not going to be an economy that depends

76 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy Contextualizing the Arab Awakenings: An Interview with Interviewed by Nada Zohdy, managing Srjda Popovic editor of JMEPP, on 15 January 2014

JMEPP: What do you think are Egypt and Iran. There are a lot of the greatest misconceptions people born after the Mubaraks around the Arab awakenings? and Khomeinis of this world ever came to power. For these people, POPOVIC: I think there are the revolutionary narratives built several misconceptions generally around these leaders never made about the situation in the Middle any sense. Arab youth are far East prior to the Arab Spring. more aware with what’s happening The first is what I like to call the in the world and more eager to “burger or French fry dilemma.” change their country than what It’s the idea that the region is foreign spectators might say. somehow stuck in a refrigerator— The second misconception is frozen in time—and that the assuming that masses of people only two political options you filled the streets in these countries can have in the Middle East are spontaneously. So many observers a strict religious theocracy (in the were taken aback by the mass style of Iran or Saudi Arabia), protests in Iran in 2009, Tunisia in

These revolutions didn’t come out of thin air.

with religious people on top using 2010, and Egypt in 2011 because different coercive pillars to control so many people assumed the the population, or a military type refrigerator paradigm. But these of enforced secular dictatorship, revolutions didn’t come out of thin like what we saw in Egypt, air. Tunisia, and Syria. We met many of these young My first big revelation activists prior to these events, came when I considered the and you could see they had great demographic issue. You have very intelligence and planning skills. young societies in countries like They were exploring Gandhi,

2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 77 adopting the clenched fist symbol democracy takes time. Even was going down then used the looking at their leaders and expect from Serbia, translating comics of looking at U.S. history, you know popular discontent and Tamarod them to deliver. If they don’t Martin Luther King Jr., and more. that over a decade passed between movement to set the stage for deliver, they punish them in the They were planning and the Declaration of Independence them to step back in. Now, they polls. After thirty years of rigged thinking about how Mubarak’s and the U.S. Constitution. Why are prosecuting the Muslim elections, it is very encouraging removal could be a broad-based wouldn’t you give at least the9 Brotherhood very harshly, gravely that Egyptians are taking this new rallying point. They understood same amount of time as a window violating human rights, and even power of elections so seriously. that three major social pillars— of opportunity for people in the starting to prosecute the secular The democratic potential of the military, the international Arab world, not just in Egypt? activists they are supposedly on the society is there; once people community, and the business We know from research the same side with. learn they can keep politicians sector—would all be very sensitive by Maria Stephan and Erica A very encouraging process is accountable, this can’t be reversed. to Mubarak’s attempt to install his Chenoweth that the average the process of people awakening. The third trend is something own son to power. When you talk nonviolence struggle takes two Once people decide they want to I don’t know if it’s good or bad to people who have this type of and a half years. I’m coming from be free and exercise nonviolent news. For me, bringing groups like thoughtful strategy, even without a country that had a successful struggle, people become the the Muslim Brotherhood to the training, then you understand nonviolent movement in 2000 shareholders of their future political stage is a necessary part the huge potential. So we weren’t and peaceful transition after; because these movements bring of democracy building the Arab surprised when the uprisings but before that, we had eight or common people, as opposed to world. I think these groups should broke out. And, of course, timing nine years of trying. Rather than elites, into the struggle. Once be in the political arena, should is everything, so when Tunisia dismiss any of these cases as a people risk their energy and time be subject to elections, and should erupted, this was the spark that success or failure, the only thing I and achieve something collectively be subject to public scrutiny if catalyzed others. can do is compare where I come (and not just in struggles for they don’t deliver. These groups from. People were fast to tell us in democracy, but any nonviolent represent huge parts of the 1991 that we can’t do anything to struggle), they change their population, and as we’ve learned, challenge Milosevic; in 1992, that understanding of the world and large parts of the population must JMEPP: Specifically focusing we lost; and, in 1997, when the their role in it, and they become always be political represented. If on Egypt, your organization opposition split, that we lost our shareholders of this change. they are not represented, this is a CANVAS helped train the April last hope. For so many outsiders, When you look at the trajectory recipe for a crisis in any society. 6 Movement years before the we were labeled the hopeless Egyptian revolution. Since black hole in the Balkans ruled Morsi was taken out of power by the butcher. So I would avoid Once people risk their energy and time and achieve last summer, there has been being that outsider when it comes an unprecedented level of to Egypt, and I strongly advise something collectively (and not just in struggles for polarization, and some have everyone to avoid that. Nonviolent democracy, but any nonviolent struggle), they change their been quick to call Egypt’s struggle takes time. understanding of the world and their role in it, and they democratic experiment a In my view, there are three failure. What is your reaction parallel processes happening in become shareholders of this change. to this, and what do you think Egypt. One is very encouraging. the role of nonviolent activists One is very discouraging. And one like April 6 is now? is hard for me to judge. of Egyptian electoral results over JMEPP: Do you think one Let’s start with the bad news. this short window of time in the of the mistakes some Arab POPOVIC: I’m not an academic, The military cleverly shifted last few years, this shows another activists made was not but I know that building sides when they knew Mubarak encouraging trend: people are sufficiently planning how they

78 Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2013-2014 ◆ Volume III 79 would play in the political groups (the military and the game once the transitions took Muslim Brotherhood) would POPOVIC: Every time we work Srdja Popovic was a founder of the Ser- place? inevitably seize power in this with people we learn. We avoid bian nonviolent resistance group Otpor! unstable situation. But that doesn’t advising people specifically what that led the successful campaign to unseat POPOVIC: I think it’s a necessarily mean Egypt is a to do because we know you can’t Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic in combination of three things. failure. copy and paste strategies. But we October 2000. Popovic later served a First, consider the objective People power is a marathon, try to give them tools about how term as a member of the Serbian Nation- environment. In Serbia, we had a not a sprint. No matter how fast to evaluate tactics, how to develop al Assembly from 2000-2003. In 2003, transitional government in place you can finish one level of the strategy, how to negotiate, and Popovic and other ex-Otpor! activists very fast, and we had a plan for game, there is yet another level how to select target audiences. started the Centre for Applied Nonviolent the transition. But we also had to accomplish, and another. Through this process, we learned Action and Strategies, CANVAS (www. well-established political parties. This is one thing we understood so much about how rich, clever, canvasopedia.org), a nonprofit education- These were the bricks needed to in Serbia, and perhaps not all enthusiastic, and powerful this al institution that has worked with people build new structures. activists understood this in the world of Arab youth is. They from over fifty different countries spread- Arab world. But you can always have tremendous energy, courage, ing knowledge on nonviolent strategies and start the game over from the commitment, and creativity. And tactics. In 2012, Popovic was nominated beginning. their commitment to teachers for the Nobel Peace Prize. JMEPP: And, of course, these The third thing is the challenge is very unlike Serbs—who will parties existed before Otpor!. of building alternative power. throw chalk at their teachers. When you look at a transition, you Arab people will respect their POPOVIC: Yes, they were need to accomplish several things. teachers. Besides all the contextual around before Otpor!, and there Once you build momentum, you information I tried to learn, was existing civil society as well. need to maintain it—somehow if I learned one thing from my To have the same outcome in transform this broad political Arab friends, it is how to respect a place like Egypt, where you movement into a set of civil the people who have taught me don’t have really well-established society organizations, political in life. ◆ political parties, you need to build parties, pressure groups, watchdog them. You know, building a car groups, a constitution assembly, and driving a car at the same etc. But you need to have a plan time is really difficult. It’s really for this. I keep hearing from unfair to compare Egypt with the people who work within the field Serbian situation on this point. that Arab youth activists somehow The second issue is that of tend to be very happy being where you set your victory bar outside the institutions. They see (or your “goose egg”). The point that their role is being on the street here is that setting your vision while someone else is in power. of tomorrow and limiting your strategy to dismantling Mubarak and expecting that once you leave the streets everything will JMEPP: What do you change overnight is shortsighted. personally find most inspiring This is instead of understanding about the Arab activists you’ve that the two most organized worked with?

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