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Google—Do Not Pass Go, Do Not Collect $200: Why the Tech Giant Is a “Bad” Monopoly
Hastings Law Journal Volume 71 Issue 3 Article 7 4-2020 Google—Do Not Pass Go, Do Not Collect $200: Why the Tech Giant Is a “Bad” Monopoly Alicia Ginsberg Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Alicia Ginsberg, Google—Do Not Pass Go, Do Not Collect $200: Why the Tech Giant Is a “Bad” Monopoly, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 783 (2020). Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol71/iss3/7 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Notes Google—Do Not Pass Go, Do Not Collect $200: Why the Tech Giant Is a “Bad” Monopoly † ALICIA GINSBERG Congress enacted the Sherman Act in 1890 to promote competition and creativity in the marketplace. The Sherman Act prohibits agreements that restrain trade and lays out rules regarding monopoly power. This Note explores three distinct theories under which Google, one of the most successful technology companies in the world, could be found to have violated the Sherman Act. Specifically, in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, Google “ties” its products together and forces mobile device manufacturers to sign exclusive dealing agreements preventing them from purchasing products from Google’s competitors. Further, Google’s systematic obstruction of competing Android operating systems is a form of anticompetitive conduct in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. -
Trump's Pick for Department of Justice Antitrust Division Chief
Trump’s Pick for Department of Justice Antitrust Division Chief Carl W. Hittinger and Tyson Y. Herrold, The Legal Intelligencer May 1, 2017 Last month we discussed Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch’s Gorsuch would not. Two aspects of Delrahim’s career will play confirmation hearings. Specifically, we noted the Senate a large role in his confirmation: his government experience, Judiciary Committee’s failure to nail Gorsuch down on key including a stint at the Department of Justice during the George antitrust issues, including issues he handled as an experienced W. Bush administration and his extensive lobbying work for antitrust lawyer and decided as a judge on the U.S. Court of some corporations that are currently engaged in litigation with Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which we also wrote about. At the Department of Justice. one point, Gorsuch invoked the so-called “Ginsberg Rule” and simply declined to answer Sen. Amy Klobuchar’s question regarding, not a pending or prior case, but the Department Delrahim’s Government Experience of Justice’s 2008 report on monopolization, responding, “Oh, senator, I—there’s no way you’re [going to] get me to.” Klobuchar In 1994, Delrahim joined the Office of the U.S. Trade quickly changed the subject. Despite the senators’ reluctance Representative as a deputy director for intellectual property to fulfill their “advise and consent” obligations under the rights, where he was responsible for negotiating foreign trade Constitution by pressing Gorsuch on contemporary antitrust deals involving intellectual property issues. After a short hiatus issues, the Judiciary Committee voted to send Gorsuch to the as an associate at Patton Boggs, Delrahim transitioned to full Senate on April 3. -
Refusal to License Intellectual Property Rights As an Abuse Of
Vol. 2 of 2 Refusal to License Intellectual Property Rights as an Abuse of Dominance under EU Competition Law: What is the Best Solution for Legal Certainty from a Rule of Law Perspective? By Marwa Marwan Shafiq Narmiq A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment for the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Central Lancashire October 2019 The law is stated as at 30th November 2018 and all the internet sources mentioned in the thesis were accessible as at end of November 2018. © Marwa Narmiq, 2018 1 LIST OF CASES WTO REPORT WTO Panel Report, Argentina: Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hide and the Import of Finished (Argentina-Hide and Leather)- Panel Report (February 2001) WT/DS155/R WTO AB Reports, EC: Export Subsidies on Sugar (28 April 2005) WT/DS265/266/283/AB/R WTO AB Reports, EC: Pipe Fittings (22 July 2003) WT/DS/219/AB/R WTO AB Reports, EC: Sardines (26 September 2002) WT/DS231/AB/R WTO Panel Report, Japan: Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper (Japan-Film)- Panel Report (April 1998) WT/DS44/R WTO AB Reports, Korea: Beef (11 December 2000) WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R WTO AB Reports Mexico: Corn Syrup (22 October 2001) WT/DS132/AB/RW WTO Panel Report, Mexico: Telecoms (2 April 2004) WT/DS204/R WTO AB Reports Thailand: H-Beams (12 March 2001) WT/DS122/AB/R 2 WTO AB Reports, United States: Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline-Report of the Appellate Body (29 April 1996) AB-19996-1 and WT/DS2/AB/R WTO AB Reports US: Cotton Yarn (8 October 2001) WT/DS192/AB/R WTO AB Reports, US: FSC (24 February 2000) WT/DS108/AB/R WTO AB Reports, US: Hot Rolled Steel (24 July 2001) WT/DS184/AB/R WTO AB Reports, US: Lamb (1 May 2001) WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R WTO AB Reports, U.S: Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 (2 January 2002) WT/DS176/AB/R EU CASES AstraZeneca AB (Case COMP/A.37.507/F3) [2005] OJ L332/24 Case T-342/99, Airtours v Commission [2002] 5 C.M.L.R 7 Case C-62/86 AKZO v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 Case C- 245/02 Anheuser-Busch v. -
The Donald Trump-Rupert Murdoch Relationship in the United States
The Donald Trump-Rupert Murdoch relationship in the United States When Donald Trump ran as a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination, Rupert Murdoch was reported to be initially opposed to him, so the Wall Street Journal and the New York Post were too.1 However, Roger Ailes and Murdoch fell out because Ailes wanted to give more positive coverage to Trump on Fox News.2 Soon afterwards, however, Fox News turned more negative towards Trump.3 As Trump emerged as the inevitable winner of the race for the nomination, Murdoch’s attitude towards Trump appeared to shift, as did his US news outlets.4 Once Trump became the nominee, he and Rupert Murdoch effectively concluded an alliance of mutual benefit: Murdoch’s news outlets would help get Trump elected, and then Trump would use his powers as president in ways that supported Rupert Murdoch’s interests. An early signal of this coming together was Trump’s public attacks on the AT&T-Time Warner merger, 21st Century Fox having tried but failed to acquire Time Warner previously in 2014. Over the last year and a half, Fox News has been the major TV news supporter of Donald Trump. Its coverage has displayed extreme bias in his favour, offering fawning coverage of his actions and downplaying or rubbishing news stories damaging to him, while also leading attacks against Donald Trump’s opponent in the 2016 presidential election, Hillary Clinton. Ofcom itself ruled that several Sean Hannity programmes in August 2016 were so biased in favour of Donald Trump and against Hillary Clinton that they breached UK impartiality rules.5 During this period, Rupert Murdoch has been CEO of Fox News, in which position he is also 1 See e.g. -
Delrahim Pick Signals Traditional Republican Antitrust Tack by Melissa Lipman
Portfolio Media. Inc. | 111 West 19th Street, 5th Floor | New York, NY 10011 | www.law360.com Phone: +1 646 783 7100 | Fax: +1 646 783 7161 | [email protected] Delrahim Pick Signals Traditional Republican Antitrust Tack By Melissa Lipman Law360, New York (March 27, 2017, 8:50 PM EDT) -- White House deputy counsel Makan Delrahim will bring decades of policy and lobbying experience to the U.S. Department of Justice as the president's pick to lead the Antitrust Division, a move experts say likely heralds a return to a traditional Republican enforcement approach. President Donald Trump named Delrahim, who has been overseeing nominations for the administration, as his pick for the assistant attorney general role on Monday. The long-time D.C. attorney brings a wide- ranging resume into the role, including a stint at the division under the last Bush administration, government experience with trade and intellectual property issues, and years serving as counsel to Republicans on the Senate Judiciary Committee. And colleagues who have worked with him on the Hill, in private practice and on the Antitrust Modernization Commission, described Delrahim as a thoughtful attorney who won't shy away from bringing cases when the evidence supports it. "He is just eminently well-qualified. He's really smart. He has a breadth of experience," said Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP's Jon Leibowitz, the former Federal Trade Commission chairman who has known Delrahim since the two served as counsel to opposite sides of the Senate's antitrust subcommittee in the late 1990s. "He understands the value of antitrust enforcement to real consumers and … when it's appropriate to bring a case." "There's no doubt he's a conservative, but I think he'd be willing to bring cases if the facts and the law require it," Leibowitz added. -
ABA Antitrust Spring Meeting
An Acuris Company 26-29 March 2019, Washington DC ABA Antitrust Spring Meeting parr-global.com PaRR ABA Antitrust Spring Contents 2 Meeting Contents Introduction 03 Europe, the Middle East and Africa 04 Americas 29 Asia-Pacific 71 parr-global.com PaRR ABA Antitrust Spring Introduction 3 Meeting Introduction Further information As regulators and lawyers gathered in Merger control policies were on the minds of Get in touch for a trial Washington last week for the American Asian enforcers with Singapore and Philippines Bar Association’s 67th Antitrust Law Spring representatives flagging planned changes Meeting, the lingering tensions surrounding to policies and thresholds, while Hong Kong Contact Sean Lanzner the US-China trade war were overshadowed and Malaysia spoke of the need to introduce by talk of convergence and outreach. PaRR’s merger control provisions. Cross navigation content global team worked the panels and fireside We hope you enjoy reading this compendium requires an internet connection. chats to bring our readers the essential news of conference coverage and – as ever – from this mainstay of the global antitrust welcome your feedback. agenda. This year’s event saw the US Department of Justice’s assistant attorney general, Roger P. The PaRR team Alford, announce that the agency’s cherished multilateral framework on procedures (MFP) is set to see buy-in from several competition authorities under the existing International Competition Network (ICN), with a second path planned for non-members. The director general of the Antimonopoly Bureau of China’s newly formed State Administration for Market Supervision, Wu Zhenguo, told PaRR on the sidelines of the conference that the country is mulling joining the MFP, and the EU’s competition head Margrethe Vestager, welcomed the move to streamline the proposal through the ICN. -
Google's Transformation from Gateway To
GOOGLE’S TRANSFORMATION FROM GATEWAY TO GATEKEEPER: HOW GOOGLE’S EXCLUSIONARY AND ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT RESTRICTS INNOVATION AND DECEIVES CONSUMERS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Approximately 240 million people in the United States regularly use the Internet, and last year their activity generated nearly $170 billion in commerce – making the Internet a linchpin of our economy, our society, and of everyday life. Maintaining a competitive environment in which investment and innovation can thrive on the Internet therefore should be a core public policy goal. Yet today, anticompetitive actions of the monopolist search engine, Google, put that goal at serious risk. Search engines are among the most critical actors on the Internet. With more than one trillion webpages on the Internet and more appearing every day, search is the principal means by which consumers find online businesses and online businesses find consumers amidst an otherwise crowded and confusing landscape. The Pew Internet & American Life Project reports that as of May 2011, 92% of adults online use search engines to find information on the Internet. In July 2011 alone, there were over 17.1 billion search queries conducted in the United States, up 3% from the prior month. Google controlled at least seven out of every ten of those searches. As antitrust authorities and courts here in the U.S. and abroad have repeatedly concluded, Google has market power in search, giving this single company unprecedented power over what users find, who is found, and what businesses must pay to be found on the Internet. Having gained a monopoly in Internet search and search advertising, Google also has come to control nearly 97% of the fast-growing mobile search market. -
Fairness-Aware Machine Learning an Extensive Overview
Fairness-Aware Machine Learning An Extensive Overview Jannik Dunkelau( ) and Michael Leuschel Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf Universitätsstraße 1 · 40225 Düsseldorf [email protected] [email protected] Abstract. We provide an overview of the state-of-the-art in fairness- aware machine learning and examine a wide variety of research articles in the area. We survey different fairness notions, algorithms for pre-, in-, and post-processing of the data and models, and provide an overview of available frameworks. Keywords: Fairness · Algorithmic Fairness · Machine Learning · Survey Version Date Modifications 00 05.07.2019 Create repository 01 17.10.2019 First version of survey Table of Contents 1 Introduction . .2 1.1 Legal Motivation . .3 1.2 Types and Causes of Discrimination . .4 1.3 Causes for Machine Bias . .6 2 Related Work . .7 3 Necessary Nomenclature . .9 3.1 Machine Learning Nomenclature . .9 3.2 Fairness Nomenclature . 11 4 Mathematical Notation . 12 5 Notions of Fairness . 13 5.1 Unawareness . 14 5.2 Group fairness . 14 5.3 Predictive Parity . 16 5.4 Calibration . 19 5.5 Individual Fairness . 20 5.6 Preference-Based Fairness . 21 5.7 Causality . 22 5.8 Note on the Selection of Fairness Metrics . 23 6 Pre-Processing: Discrimination-free Training Data . 24 2 J. Dunkelau et al. 6.1 Relabelling . 24 6.2 Resampling . 25 6.3 Fair Representations . 26 6.4 Further Algorithms . 27 7 In-Processing: Discrimination-aware Learners . 28 7.1 Adjusted Learning Algorithms . 28 7.2 Adapted Loss Function . 29 7.3 Adversarial Approaches . 31 7.4 Optimisation Subject to Fairness Constraints . -
Merger Control Review
Merger Control Review Eighth Edition Editor Ilene Knable Gotts lawreviews Merger Control Review Eighth Edition Editor Ilene Knable Gotts lawreviews the Merger control Review The Merger Control Review Reproduced with permission from Law Business Research Ltd. This article was first published in The Merger Control, - Edition 8 (published in August 2017 – editor Ilene Knable Gotts) For further information please email [email protected] PUBLISHER Gideon Roberton SENIOR BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MANAGER Nick Barette BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MANAGERS Thomas Lee, Joel Woods ACCOUNT MANAGERS Pere Aspinall, Sophie Emberson, Laura Lynas, Jack Bagnall MARKETING AND READERSHIP COORDINATOR Rebecca Mogridge RESEARCHER Arthur Hunter EDITORIAL COORDINATOR Gavin Jordan HEAD OF PRODUCTION Adam Myers PRODUCTION EDITOR Anna Andreoli SUBEDITOR Charlotte Stretch CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER Paul Howarth Published in the United Kingdom by Law Business Research Ltd, London 87 Lancaster Road, London, W11 1QQ, UK © 2017 Law Business Research Ltd www.TheLawReviews.co.uk No photocopying: copyright licences do not apply. The information provided in this publication is general and may not apply in a specific situation, nor does it necessarily represent the views of authors’ firms or their clients. Legal advice should always be sought before taking any legal action based on the information provided. The publishers accept no responsibility for any acts or omissions contained herein. Although the information provided is accurate as of July 2017, be advised that this -
FTC Fit to Its Purpose: Responding to Kovacic's Market Investigation
FTC FIT TO ITS PURPOSE: RESPONDING TO KOVACIC’S MARKET INVESTIGATION PROPOSAL BY CHRISTINE S. WILSON & PALLAVI GUNIGANTI1 1 Christine S. Wilson is a Commissioner of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission. Pallavi Guniganti is an Attorney Advisor to Commissioner Wilson. The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission or any other Commissioner. CPI Antitrust Chronicle OctoberOctober 20202020 1 Antitrust policy views the government as a referee, not as the manager or star player “ – Timothy Muris2 ” We focus more on law enforcement than on prescriptive regulation. “ – Edith Ramirez3 ” The idea that “antitrust is law enforcement, it’s not regulation,” 4 This does not mean that the antitrust agencies work solely on has become a bipartisan staple of remarks delivered by chairs of enforcement. The FTC in particular was created with significant the Federal Trade Commission and Assistant Attorneys General competition policy, advocacy and research powers. The agency for Antitrust at the Department of Justice. Then-chairwoman provides input to federal agencies and state and local author- Edith Ramirez noted that a statement of Section 5 enforcement ities regarding the competition impacts of various regulatory policy “prescribes no detailed code of regulations for the busi- and legislative initiatives; through both bilateral and multilater- ness community at large… no such prescriptive code would be al fora, engages in policy discussions regarding best practices for -
Search, Antitrust, and the Economics of the Control of User Data
Search, Antitrust, and the Economics of the Control of User Data Nathan Newmant This Article argues for reorienting many antitrust investigations-and more generally regulatory approaches-tofocus on how control of personal data by corporations can entrench monopoly power in an economy shaped increasingly by the power of "big data." What is largely missed in analyses defending Google from antitrust action is how Google's ever expanding control of user personal data and its critical value to online advertisers creates an insurmountable barrierto entry for new competition. Moreover, Google did not just inherit that business advantage through its innovation in search engine technology. Rather, Google has aggressively expanded its control of user data both by moving into new product sectors to collect additionaluser data and by invading users'privacy. Introduction: The Undermining of Competition in Online Markets...............402 A. How Google Uses Controlof User Information to Strengthen its Monopoly........... ................... ............. 405 B. The Antitrust Case Against Google ........................... 407 C. Remedies and the Argumentfor Aggressive and Earlier Regulatory Intervention.......................... 411 I. How Google Dominates the Search Advertising Market.. ............. 412 A. How the Search Advertising Market Works ......... ........ 413 B. Measuring Google's Dominance.....................414 C. Why Search Advertising is the Relevant Marketfor Antitrust Analysis ......................................... 416 D. Google's -
Department of Justice Antitrust Division 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530
August 7, 2018 The Honorable Makan Delrahim Assistant Attorney General United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530 RE: The Acquisition of Aetna, Inc. by CVS Health Corporation Dear Assistant Attorney General Delrahim: The American Medical Association (AMA) has long had the concern that market concentration is a leading cause of high costs in health care. We thank the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) for devoting resources to the health care sector. We are writing to provide our views regarding the proposed merger of CVS Health Corporation (CVS), the largest retail pharmacy chain and specialty pharmacy in the U.S. and one of the two largest pharmacy benefit managers (PBM), and Aetna, Inc. (Aetna), the third largest U.S. health insurer. The AMA has studied this merger, an analysis that started almost as soon as the merger was officially announced. The AMA has sought the views of prominent health economists, health policy and antitrust experts—some of whom testified in a California Department of Insurance hearing on this merger. After very carefully considering this merger over the past months, the AMA has come to the conclusion that this merger would likely substantially lessen competition in many health care markets, to the detriment of patients. Accordingly, based on the mutually confirming analyses and conclusions presented by the nationally recognized experts and other experts, as well as extensive research, the AMA is now convinced that the proposed CVS-Aetna merger should be blocked. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS This merger is popularly described as vertical when, in fact, horizontal concerns are also substantial.