SIDS Climate Change Negotiators’ Guidance Manual Table of Contents
List of Abbreviations 2
Introduction 6
Module 1: The Science Behind Climate Change 8
Module 2: The Convention: The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) And Negotiations Under The Convention 18
Module 3: The Politics 34
Module 4: The Process: Institutional Structure Of The United Nations Framework Convention On Climate Change 44
Module 5: Civil Society And Media Engagement 56
Module 6: Objectives of the Alliance of Small Island States 68
Appendix 80
© United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) This publication or parts of it may be reproduced for educational or non-profit purposes without special permission from the United Nations Development Programme, provided acknowledgement of the source is made.
Citation: UNDP (2015) Capacity Building for SIDS Climate Change Negotiators Guidance Manual. United Nations Development Programme, Barbados and the OECS.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the United Nations, or its Member States, or the Australian Government
Author: Hugh Sealy
Editing: Nina Kojevnikov, Justine Huffman, Danielle Evanson and Donna Gittens
Design and Layout: Marisa Sunset Sealy of Strawberry Samurai
This publication has been possible with the support of the Australian Government under the “Capacity Building of SIDS Climate Change Negotiators” initiative Abbreviations And Acronyms
AAU Assigned Amount Unit GCF Green Climate Fund
ADP Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action GDP Gross Domestic Product
AF Adaptation Fund GEF Global Environment Facility
AILAC Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Carribean GWP Global warming potential
ALBA Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de GHGs Greenhouse gases Nuestra América) ICA International consultations and analysis AOSIS Alliance of Small Island States IEA International Energy Agency BASIC Brazil, South Africa, India, China IGO Intergovernmental organisation BAP Bali Action Plan INDC Intended nationally determined contributions CAN Climate Action Network IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change CBDR-RC Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities JI Joint implementation CCCCC Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre JISC Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee CDKN Climate Development Knowledge Network L&D Loss and damage CDM Clean Development Mechanism LDCs Least developed countries CER Certified emission reduction LDCF Least Developed Countries Fund CMP Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol LMDCs Like-minded developing countries COP Conference of the Parties MOI Means of implementation CRP Conference room paper MRV Measurement, Reporting and Verification CTCN Climate Technology Centre and Network NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization DNA Designated National Authority NAMA Nationally appropriate mitigation action EIG Environmental Integrity Group NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration EU European Union NDC Nationally determined contribution FIELD Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development NIE National implementing entity FVA Framework for various approaches
2 3 Abbreviations And Acronyms
NGO Non-governmental organisation SMART Specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-bound
NMM New market mechanism SPREP Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme
NWP Nairobi Work Programme on Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change SREX Special Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation ODA Official development assistance TEC Technology Executive Committee OECD Organisation for Economic Development TEM Technical expert meeting OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries TNA Technology needs assessment QELRO Quantified emission limitation and reduction objective UNDP United Nations Development Programme RC Respective capabilities UNEP United Nations Environment Programme SBI Subsidiary Body for Implementation UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change SBSTA Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization SCCF Special Climate Change Fund WEMA Workplan for Enhancing Mitigation Ambition SIDS Small Island Developing States WMO World Meteorological Organization SLR Sea level rise WWF World Wildlife Fund
4 5 Introduction Working Together In Harmony
“Climate change is destroying our path to that consensus and convincing the general public that sustainability. Ours is a world of looming challenges real danger faces humankind in the future have been and increasingly limited resources. Sustainable difficult goals to attain. development offers the best chance to adjust our course”. - Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the Nowhere is the impact of warming been more United Nations1 evident (and more alarming) than amongst Small Island Developing States (SIDS), which are especially The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate vulnerable to the repercussions of the rise in sea levels, Change (UNFCCC) defines “climate change” as being ocean acidification and the increased frequency and attributed directly or indirectly to human activity intensity of extreme weather events. These countries that alters the composition of the global atmosphere are some of the lowest emitters of greenhouse and that is in addition to natural climate variability gases, but are already being impacted by climate observed over comparable time periods2. change and will be amongst the first to be negatively impacted by further climatic changes. It is therefore The latest report3 from the Intergovernmental Panel important that the politicians, negotiators, and the on Climate Change (IPCC) states the following: general population of these islands be equipped with the knowledge, skills, and techniques to communicate “Human influence on the climate system is clear, and what is already happening in their midst. The capacity recent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases of SIDS representatives to make their case in global are the highest in history. Recent climate changes fora must be increased, so that they can disseminate have had widespread impacts on human and natural accurate information and appeal for shifts in thinking systems.” to take place in as effective, powerful, and convincing manner as possible. For SIDS, time is not on their side. “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the observed changes It is in light of the above that this informational and are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The guidance manual has been written. Its goal is not atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts only to equip its readers (primarily SIDS negotiators) of snow and ice have diminished, and sea level has with facts about climate change, but to enhance their risen.” ability to seek assistance to facilitate the achievement Working Together of climate resilience and adaptation and sustainable Tony Blair, a former British Prime Minister, has policies, and to enable them to intervene on the world in Harmony stated that “Global warming is too serious for the stage and negotiate effectively on behalf of their world any longer to ignore its danger or split into constituencies. opposing factions on it”4. Unfortunately, achieving
1Remarks to the General Assembly on his Five-Year Action Agenda: “The Future We Want” 25 January, 2012 2http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/mains1.html 3Climate Change 2014. Synthesis Report. Summary for Policy Makers. http://www.ipcc.ch/index.htm 4Conference Speech, 27 September, 2005
6 7 SIDS Climate Change Negotiators’ Guidance Manual
Module 1
The Science Behind Climate Change
8 9 Module 1 The Science Behind Climate Change
1.0 Introduction forcing measured in watts per square meter (w/m2), C A more equable, that is constant, climate (at least for other GHGs—for example methane— nitrous oxide,
is the CO2 concentration in parts per million by volume Sweden) is what Arrhenius hoped for. Unfortunately, and fluorinated gases also contribute to warming.
The Earth’s atmosphere and oceans are warming. (ppmv), C0 is the baseline CO2 concentration in parts his physical science was right about the cause of When scientists conduct their analyses, each gas Our planet is currently on a greenhouse gas (GHG) per million by volume (ppmv), and α is a constant. climate change, but his predictions of the impacts of is assigned a numerical value of its global warming emissions pathway that will result in an average the warming were misleading. potential (GWP), a figure based upon its lifetime in the atmospheric warming of greater than 3ºC (over pre- The IPCC, using a value of 6.3, in 2007 predicted a atmosphere and its ability to absorb energy. Carbon 2 industrial times) by 2100 . Such a development will 2 to 4.5 ºC rise in temperature if CO2 concentrations 1.2 Sources And Causes Of Emissions dioxide is assigned a baseline GWP of 1, and all other be catastrophic for many regions, but in particular doubled. These calculations were not very much GHGs are ranked in relation to that base. The following for small islands, many of which will cease to exist as different from the original calculations by Arrhenius. Arrhenius was correct in his assertions that carbon table (Table 1) briefly summarises the GWPs (on a viable human settlements. dioxide was causing the most significant radiative 100-year basis) and the major sources of the basket ANTHROPOGENIC CLIMATE CHANGE WAS forcing and that the combustion of coal was a major of gases regulated under the Kyoto Protocol (See In 2014, global emissions reached ~10 GtC (gigatonnes PREDICTED OVER 100 YEARS AGO. THE SCIENCE IS source of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. However, Module 2 for further details on the Kyoto Protocol). of carbon). Cumulative emissions (since 1750) have NOT NEW. now reached ~590 GtC. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that, if we are Arrhenius hoped that the warming of the atmosphere to have a better than two-thirds chance of keeping would be beneficial to mankind. In the following quote warming below 2ºC, the cumulative emissions budget from his 1896 publication, not only does the chemist of 1000 GtC cannot be exceeded. name the prime culprit—coal—but he also introduces, perhaps unwittingly, the concept of equity into If current trends continue, the budget will be exceeded the politics that now surround climate change (see by 2045.3 Module 3):
1.1 History Of The Science Of Climate Change “We often hear lamentations that the coal stored up in the earthis wasted by the present generation without The first greenhouse or “hot house” theory was any thought of the future... We may find a kind of developed by the French physicist and mathematician, consolation in the consideration that here, as in every Jean-Baptise Joseph Fourier (1768-1830), who in 1800 other case, there is good mixed with the evil. By the speculated that the earth’s atmosphere acts much influence of the increasing percentage of carbonic like the panes of glass in a hot house or greenhouse, acid in the atmosphere, we may hope to enjoy ages trapping heat that is then radiated back from the with more equable and better climates, especially as surface. regards the colder regions of the earth, ages when the earth will bring forth much more abundant crops In 1896, Svante Arrhenius, a Swedish chemist (winner than at present, for the benefit of rapidly propagating of the Nobel Prize for Chemistry in 1903) published mankind.5”
an equation that predicted that the average global 2 IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working atmospheric temperature would rise by about 5 Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental to 6 degrees Celsius (ºC) if carbon dioxide (CO ) Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer 2 (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, 151 pp. 4 concentrations doubled. The following equation is 3 http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/research/news/2014/global-carbon-budget referred to as the Arrhenius Greenhouse Law: 4 Arrhenius, Svante. On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air. Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science. London, Edinburgh, and Dublin. Series 5, 1 ΔF = α ln(C/C0) vol. 41, April 1896, pp. 237-275. Further information on the GWP of various gases can be obtained at the following link: which is interpreted as follows: ΔF is the radiative 5 Arrhenius, p. 63. http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/ch2s2-10-2.html.
10 11 Module 1 The Science Behind Climate Change
It should be noted that water vapour also has a The rate at which climate forcing (change POSITIVE FEEDBACK COMBINED WITH TIPPING The Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), “Climate Change greenhouse effect, but has not been assigned a in energy/heat) in the atmosphere/ocean/ POINTS MAY LEAD TO A SCENARIO OF RUNAWAY 2014, Synthesis Report” (http://ipcc.ch/report/ar5/ specific GWP by the International Panel on Climate cryosphere system rose between 1850-2005 CLIMATE CHANGE THAT MAY BE IRREVERSIBLE. syr/) was published in 2014, and represents the latest Change (IPCC). However, the IPCC asserts that water (about 0.01 Watt/m2/year) is more than an order available science. This report integrates the findings vapour plays an important role in a positive feedback of magnitude faster than during the last glacial 1.4 Modern Science of the working groups and the special reports into loop that can accelerate climate change. Feedback termination 17,000 – 10,000 years ago one document and should be used as a reference In June 1988, the World Meteorological Organization loops are discussed in the next section. (about 0.00045 Watt/m2/year). document by anyone interested in investigating the (WMO) held a global conference entitled “The Changing science behind climate change. Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security”. The 1.3 Feedback Loops And Tipping Points Source: http://theconversation.com/ipcc- participants at that conference recommended that climate-trends-blueprints-for-tipping-points-in- 1.5 Climate Change 2014: the Synthesis an international convention on climate change be Positive feedback loops amplify or enhance changes, earths-climate-18706 Report and move a system away from a state of equilibrium, adopted by 1992. In Rio, at the Earth Summit in 1992, thus making it more unstable. Negative feedback the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate The latest IPCC report confirms the following: loops lessen changes, a phenomenon that contributes However, the rate of climate forcing that terminated Change (UNFCCC) was established. The Convention • Climate change is already occurring, with to a system’s state of equilibrium. the last ice age was significantly less than what is is discussed in detail in Module 2. widespread effects. currently occurring. • Sea levels are rising (~3 mm/year), and the rate of Three examples related to climate change in regard to In December 1988, the WMO, along with the United SLR is increasing. positive feedbacks occurring in nature are: The following potential tipping points have been Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) established • Snow and ice are diminishing (Greenland and • Water vapour: As the ocean surfaces and the identified by concerned scientists6: the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Arctic Ice Sheets) and the rate of ice loss is atmosphere warms, evaporation increases and • Boreal forest dieback; (IPCC). The primary objective of the IPCC is “to increasing. the capacity of the atmosphere to retain water • Amazon rainforest dieback; provide the world with a clear scientific view on • The oceans and the atmosphere are warming vapour increases. Water vapour is a GHG and • Loss of Arctic and Antarctic sea ice (polar ice the current state of knowledge in climate change (0.85ºC since 1880) and the rate of warming is will contribute to further warming, thus causing packs) and melting of Greenland and Antarctic and its potential environmental and socio-economic increasing. further releases of water vapour. ice sheets; impacts”.9 The work of thousands of scientists is • The oceans are acidifying (there has been a 26% • Albedo effect: Dark colours absorb more heat • Disruption to Indian and West African monsoons; reviewed by three IPCC working groups and summary increase in acidity since the industrial age). (energy) than light colours. As the light Arctic • Formation of Atlantic deep water near the Arctic reports are published. ice diminishes, more dark ocean is revealed, ocean, which is a component process of the precipitating the absorption of more and causing thermohaline circulation; and more ice to melt. • Loss of permafrost, leading to potential Arctic • Permafrost thaw: Because of the Albedo effect, methane release and to an effect that is related to as the snow melts, the darker surface below the the “clathrate gun hypothesis”.7 level of methane emissions from the exposed land surface increases and is revealed. It should also be noted that warming is not occurring uniformally across the globe. Whilst global average 6 Lenton, T. M.; Held, H.; Kriegler, E.; Hall, J. W.; Lucht, W.; Rahmstorf, S.; and Schellnhuber, H. J. (2008). Inaugural article: “Tipping elements in the Earth’s climate system”. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 105 (6): 1786. doi:10.1073/pnas.0705414105. A tipping point may be defined as an abrupt shift temperatures (over land and oceans) have increased
from one state of equilibrium to another. The Earth by 0.85ºC during the period 1880 to 2012, regions in 7 “The clathrate gun hypothesis is the popular name given to the hypothesis that increases in sea temperatures (and/or falls in sea level) can trigger the has previous experience of these tipping points in the higher latitudes have warmed more. For example, the sudden release of methane from methane clathrate compounds buried in seabeds and permafrost which, because the methane itself is a powerful greenhouse gas, leads to further temperature rise and further methane clathrate destabilization – in effect initiating a runaway process as irreversible, once started, as the form of ice ages. Finnish Meteiorelogical Institute has stated that, since firing of a gun.”(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clathrate_gun_hypothesis). 1847, “the average temperature in Finland has risen by 8 more than two degrees.8 http://news.yahoo.com/temperature-rising-faster-finland-anywhere-else-223524053.html
9 http://ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml
12 13 Module 1 The Science Behind Climate Change
Figure 1: SPM.2: Total annual anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (gigatonne to sea level rise” (AR5, 2014). Along with sea level can promote ambitious global action. rises, there will be, inter alia: of CO2-equivalent per year, GtCO2-eq/yr) for the period 1970 to 2010 by gases. • Changes in hydrological and evapo-transpiration Point 8 speaks to the transformational impact of patterns, which will affect agriculture and the transitioning to a low-carbon economy. This is a supply of fresh water. Lower precipitation rates key economic characteristic of SIDS that should are predicted for the Caribbean region (see the receive maximum attention and which should be table below); the focus of communication efforts. Support for the • Changes in the abundance of the fish supply and mitigation of climate change in SIDS is not considered the migration patterns of fish and other species; a global priority, due to the fact that small island • Increased intensity in storm events, coupled with states are traditionally low emitters. However, the higher sea surface temperatures; and transformational impact of a low-carbon development • Hotter days and nights. strategy and the ability of SIDS to act as microcosms of larger societies are often neglected. The Climate and Development Knowledge Network (CDKN) has published “The IPCC Fifth Assessment SIDS have the highest costs of electricity in the world, Report: What’s in it for Small Island Developing and the importation of fossil fuels to meet energy States?” This report summarises the latest science and demands has affected sustainable development. SIDS its relevance to SIDS and is recommended reading for DOCK10 (promoting sustainable development) has negotiators from the Alliance of Small Island States been formed to assist small island states to transition (AOSIS). There are nine key messages for SIDS to to a low-carbon developmental pathway. consider, specifically that: 1. The climate is already changing and SIDS are In 201011, the UNDP conducted a study to estimate already feeling the impacts of these developments. the economic impact of SLR, associated with An analysis of Figure 2 (taken from the IPCC Synthesis • Unique natural systems would be threatened. 2. Further climate change is inevitable in the coming climate change, on the economies of the SIDS in the Report) shows the increase in the emissions of the • Extreme weather events would begin to occur. decades. Caribbean. With a 1m SLR, it was estimated that 49% major GHGs from 1970 to 2010. Using the latest GWP • The impacts of climate change would be globally 3. Climate change is affecting SIDS’ growth and of the major tourism resorts would be damaged or data from AR5, it has been calculated that the total distributed. development. destroyed. The cost of seawall defenses for projected emissions in 2010 were estimated at 52 GtCO eq/yr. • There would be a global aggregate of impacts. 2 4. Climate change poses an existential threat to SLR this century could be as high as USD 4.4 billion • The possibility of a large-scale singular event was some SIDS. for the Caribbean region. Hence, the costs of adapting Current atmospheric concentrations of carbon a distinct possibility. 5. Adaptation can reduce the impacts of climate to just one aspect of climate change—sea level rise— dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide are change, but there are limits and risks involved. may be beyond the capacity of the local governments unprecedented over at least the last 800,000 years. 1.6 Impact Of Climate Change On Small Island Developing States (SIDS) 6. The economic cost of adaptation to climate of most small island states. It should also be noted change is high in small island states (relative to that sea level rise will not occur in isolation. There AR5 (2014) draws specific attention to the impacts the size of their economies). will be increased storm surges from extreme weather of climate change on food production, with projected For SIDS, adaptation to climate change is a priority 7. SIDS stand to benefit from further integration of events and natural coastal defenses (coral reefs) will loss of fisheries and decreased crop yields. Other and critical to their very survival. Whilst mitigation by climate adaptation, mitigation, and development be further degraded by ocean acidification. predicted global socio-economic impacts include: all emitters is an imperative, there are some aspects approaches. • Dislocation of people; of climate change, like rising sea levels, that are now 8. Transformation to a low-carbon economy implies • Increases in violent conflict; and inevitable: “Coastal systems and low-lying areas will new patterns of investment. • Decreases in public health. increasingly experience submergence, flooding and 9. International cooperation is vital to avert The scientists highlighted five “Reasons for Concern”: erosion throughout the 21st century and beyond, due dangerous climate change and SIDS governments
14 15 Module 1 The Science Behind Climate Change
The special vulnerability of SIDS to climate change has limits: been recognised under the UNFCCC (see Module 2). • Hard adaptation limit: No adaptive actions are However, other nations, particularly those in Central possible to avoid intolerable risks. America have sought to minimise the special status • Soft adaptation limit: Options are currently of SIDS by arguing that they are just as vulnerable. It not available to avoid intolerable risks through is recommended that AOSIS negotiators defend the adaptive action. special vulnerability of SIDS. The science appears to admit that there are limits and For AOSIS, loss and damage are separate and barriers to adaptation and that there are knowledge, distinct to adaptation. For AOSIS, there is a limit to awareness and technology, physical, biological, adaptation. AOSIS argues that some impacts, from economic, financial, human resource, governance either slow onset events like sea level rise or acute and institutional constraints to adaptation. However, extreme events like a tropical cyclone are beyond the the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) introduces the Climate change, coupled with natural capacity of countries to adapt to. concept of “transformational adaptation” taking over when “incremental transformation” has reached its hazards and societal vulnerability, can The IPCC’S Special Report on Extreme Events limit. impose a limit on sustainable development (SREX)12 acknowledges that climate change, coupled with natural hazards and societal vulnerability, can impose a limit on sustainable development. The SREX concludes that adaptation options should not only be incremental in their response, but should be “transformative” and “should alter the fundamental attributes of a system”.
Chapter 16 of the Working Group II report (IPCC WGII, AR5 Chapter 16) describes two types of adaptation 12 http://www.ipcc-wg2.gov/SREX/
16 17 SIDS Climate Change Negotiators’ Guidance Manual
Module 2
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Negotiations under the Convention
18 19 Module 2 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Negotiations under the Convention
2.0 History Of The UNFCCC Such a level should be achieved within a time frame straightforward and even quite sensible, they have principle is not elaborated upon in the Convention, it sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to been very difficult to operationalise in practice. has been the focus of much academic work in recent Climate change was identified as an issue of climate change, to ensure that food production is not Some of them still remain extremely contentious years. international concern as far back as 1979 at the First threatened and to enable economic development to issuestoday, and clearly demonstrate why addressing World Climate Conference, which was attended proceed in a sustainable manner.17 climate change at the international level has been Special Circumstances Of Developing Countries, primarily by the scientific community.13 However, it so difficult. Much of the current debate is essentially Especially Those Most Vulnerable was only after the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate The use of the word “prevent” is noteworthy, and about how these principles should be interpreted. This principle recognises that developing countries, Change (IPCC) released their First Assessment is an unambiguous term indeed. What is it that the especially those that are particularly vulnerable to Report in 1990 that governments began negotiating Convention is seeking to “prevent”?—dangerous This principle is generally interpreted to mean that the impacts of climate change, are grappling with a the global treaty in earnest.14 anthropogenic interference with the climate system. all countries have an obligation to address climate multitude of sustainable development challenges and change, but the scale of the action to be undertaken therefore should not bear a disproportionate burden The UNFCCC was completed in just 15 months and But what is meant by the term “dangerous” and by any given country depends on their contribution to under the Convention.23 It provides the basis for the was ready for launch at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio dangerous for whom? The Convention provides the problem (which might include current or historical provision of certain types of financial and technical de Janeiro, where 154 states became signatories15. little guidance on these issues. Some particularly emissions) and their domestic ability to take action support to help developing countries meet their vulnerable countries might argue that they are (which might take into account wealth, access to obligations under the Convention. 2.1 Principles And Provisions Of already experiencing “dangerous” climate impacts, advanced technologies, and institutional capacity).20 The Convention but the lack of a clear legal definition for this term Right To Promote Sustainable Development leaves them little legal recourse under the UNFCCC. The preamble of the Convention even recognises the This principle recognises that addressing climate The Convention, as its name implies, “frames” the greater historical share of emissions and greater per change should not be at the expense of sustainable manner in which international negotiations to address Perhaps the most precise explanation of Article 2 can capita emissions of developed countries. This principle development, but rather that action should be climate change take place, in that it defines various be found in its long-term goal “to hold the increase was operationalised in Article 4 of the Convention integrated into development programmes in ways important principles that are operative, along with in global average temperature below 2°C above pre- through the setting out of additional obligations for that are appropriate to domestic circumstances.24 a number of obligations for different groups of industrial levels,”18 which was agreed at sixteenth developed countries;21 these were further spelled out countries. The Convention contains 26 articles in total, Conference of Parties (COP 16) in Cancun, Mexico, in the Kyoto Protocol (see below). It remains one A paragraph in the Convention preamble goes even along with a preamble and two annexes. This section in 2010, though this goal has also been notoriously of the most contentious issues in the negotiations further, in that the text gives recognition to the fact will focus primarily on Articles 2, 3, and 4 and is best difficult to operationalise. Article 2 remains among as countries seek to adopt a new agreement that is that the share of emissions originating in developing read in conjunction with the text of UNFCCC.16 the provisions most frequently cited by negotiators, responsive to modern challenges and circumstances. countries will grow to meet social and development but its utility as a benchmark for measuring progress needs.25 When studying the articles of any treaty, it is important has been limited by its ambiguity. Equity to pay close attention not only to what is said, but Often cited along with Common but Differentiated Prohibition Of Disguised Restrictions On Trade also what is left unsaid. For example, the ultimate Principles under Article 3 of the Convention Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR- This principle addressed a prominent concern of objective of the Convention is contained in Article 2, RC),22 the principle of equity is generally thought to some countries their exports might be penalised in which reads in its entirety as follows: Common but differentiated responsibilities and encompass general notions of fairness. While the certain markets to protect domestic industries under respective capabilities (CBDR-RC): The ultimate objective of this Convention and any Article 3 sets out a number of important “principles” 17 21 related legal instruments that the Conference of of the Convention.19 While these principles may seem UNFCCC, Article 2, 1992. Available online at: http://unfccc.int/key_ UNFCCC, Article 4, 1992. Available online at: http://unfccc.int/key_ documents/the_convention/items/2853.php documents/the_convention/items/2853.php the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance 18 Decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 4, 2010. 22 UNFCCC, Article 3.1, 1992. Available online at: http://unfccc.int/key_ 13 Module II: Introduction to Climate Change Diplomacy, UNITAR/UNDP, 19 NFCCC, Article 3, 1992. Available online at: http://unfccc.int/key_ documents/the_convention/items/2853.php with the relevant provisions of the Convention, pg.16, 2014. 14 documents/the_convention/items/2853.php 23 UNFCCC, Article 3.2, 1992. Available online at: http://unfccc.int/key_ stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the Manual Del Negociador de Cambio Climatico Iberoamericano, UNDP, pg. 30, 2014. 20 Principle 7 of the 1992 Rio Declaration, which was adopted the same year documents/the_convention/items/2853.php atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 15 Module II: Introduction to Climate Change Diplomacy, UNITAR/UNDP, as the Convention, contains a somewhat more detailed expression of CBDR- pg.18, 2014. RC. anthropogenic interference with the climate system. 16 http://unfccc.int/key_documents/the_convention/items/2853.php
20 21 Module 2 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Negotiations under the Convention
the guise of climate action.26 While this principle has Article 4 includes commitments by various countries demonstrate that developed countries are taking can implement their Convention obligations not been elaborated upon, despite the attempts of to provide certain types of information, as well as the lead (Article 4.2(a)); (Article 4.5); and some countries to do so, it is a clear recognition of general commitments to take action, cooperate with • Periodically communicate detailed information on • Support the development and enhancement the fact that climate action is inextricably linked with each other, and provide certain types of support. policies and measures to reduce GHG emissions of endogenous capacities and technologies of issues such as trade and economic competitiveness. It does not contain quantified commitments for and enhance sinks, as well as on resulting developing counties (Article 4.5). countries, either individually or in aggregate, to limit projected emissions by sources and removals by Precautionary Principle or reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by a sinks (Article 4.2(b)); Developing Countries (Non-Annex I Parties) This principle is well established in certain areas of specified amount. Those would not arrive until the • Aim to return individually or jointly GHG emissions (Article 4.7) international environmental law, although it has been adoption of the Kyoto Protocol five years later in 1997. to their 1990 levels by 2000 (Article 4.2(b); and Developing countries, which are not listed in Annex less important in the climate change context. In short, • Identify and periodically review policies and I of the Convention, are granted a great degree of the lack of scientific certainty should not be used as All Parties practices that encourage activities leading to flexibility in meeting their Convention obligations. In an excuse to postpone action, in that countries should All Parties have the following commitments under greater GHG emissions (Article 4.2(e)). fact, the Convention states that the extent to which err on the side of caution.27 Article 4, that is to: they implement their commitments will depend on • Develop and publish national inventories of GHG Annex I Parties Transitioning To A Market Economy the implementation by developed countries of their Commitments under Article 4 of the emissions by different sources and removals by Annex I Parties transitioning to a market economy, commitments related to financial resources and Convention: sinks (Article 4.1(a)); which refers to countries of the former Soviet Union as transfer of technology. Developing countries that • Implement and publish information about well as many in Eastern Europe, are granted flexibility are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of Article 4 contains the commitments that countries national and regional programmes to reduce GHG in meeting the Article 4 commitments of Annex I climate change (Article 4.4) The preamble of the have agreed to under the Convention. All countries emissions (Article 4.1(b)); Parties. (Article 4.6) Convention recognises that this group includes small have commitments, though some have more than • Promote and develop technologies, practices, and island countries; countries with low-lying coastal, arid, others. In addition, some groups of countries are processes that reduce GHG emissions (Article Annex II Parties and semi-arid areas or areas liable to floods, drought granted flexibility in meeting their commitments or 4.1(c)); Some of the highest-income Annex I countries are also and desertification; and developing countries with are entitled to certain types of support. The division • Promote the sustainable management and listed in Annex II and have the following additional fragile mountainous ecosystems. These countries are of countries into various groups represents one of conservation of sinks and reservoirs of GHG gases, commitments, to: entitled to assistance from Annex II Parties in meeting the clearest manifestations of the principle of CBDR- including forests and marine ecosystems (Article • Provide new and additional financial resources to the costs of adaptation. RC. It is also the source many disagreements in the 4.1(d)); meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing negotiations of the 2015 agreement. While most of the • Prepare for adaptation to climate change impacts, countries in complying with their reporting Least Developed Countries (Article 4.9) current debate has focused on the binary distinction including through the elaboration of plans for obligations under the Convention (Article 4.3); The least developed countries are recognised as between developed countries (Annex I) and coastal zone management, water resources, and • Provide through the financial mechanism of the deserving special consideration based on their developing countries (non-Annex I), the Convention agriculture (Article 4.1(e)); Convention the financial resources, including for specific needs and special situations with regard to carves out differing responsibilities for at least eight • Promote and cooperate in scientific, technology transfer, needed by the developing funding and technology. different groups of countries.28 technological, technical, socio-economic, and countries Parties to meet the agreed full other research(Article 4.1(g)); and incremental costs of implementing measures Countries With Economies That Are Vulnerable • Communicate this information to the Conference covered by Article 4.1 (commitments of all Parties) To The Adverse Effects Of The Implementation Of 24 UNFCCC, Article 3.4, 1992. Available online at: http://unfccc.int/key_ of Parties (Article 4.1(j)); (Article 4.3); Measures To Respond To Climate Change (Article documents/the_convention/items/2853.php 25 UNFCCC, preamble paragraph 3, 1992. Available online at: http://unfccc. • Assist developing countries that are particularly 4.10) int/key_documents/the_convention/items/2853.php Annex I Parties vulnerable to climate change in meeting costs of This group of countries, which explicitly includes 26 UNFCCC, Article 3.5, 1992. Available online at: http://unfccc.int/key_ Developed countries listed in Annex I of the Convention adaptation (Article 4.4); countries with economies heavily reliant on the documents/the_convention/items/2853.php 27 UNFCCC, Article 3.3, 1992. Available online at: http://unfccc.int/key_ have the following commitments under Article 4, to: • Promote, facilitate, and finance the transfer of, or production, processing, export, or consumption of documents/the_convention/items/2853.php • Adopt national policies and take corresponding access to, environmentally sound technologies fossil fuels, are recognised as requiring consideration 28 UNFCCC, Article 4.8, 1992. Available online at: http://unfccc.int/key_ documents/the_convention/items/2853.php measures on the mitigation of climate change to and know-how for developing countries so they with regard to the impacts they will experience when
22 23 Module 2 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Negotiations under the Convention
other countries implement their obligations under the guidance on many issues, but this is to be expected Convention. for a short and hastily negotiated document seeking to address one of the most complex problems ever The Convention Also Mentions The Following Groups faced by humanity. Perhaps it is better to think of Of Countries As Requiring Consideration (Article the Convention as a foundation on which more 4.8): detailed instruments can be built in the future. As • Small island countries; will be discussed in other sections of these training • Countries with low-lying coastal areas countries materials, the UNFCCC over the past two decades has with arid and semi-arid areas, forested areas and addressed issues that go well beyond the reduction areas liable to forest decay; of GHG emissions, the roots of which can often be • Countries with areas prone to natural disasters; traced back to the original principles and provisions • Countries with areas liable to drought and of the Convention. It is another question altogether desertification countries with areas of high urban as to whether the outcomes of these subsequent atmospheric pollution; negotiations are consistent with the spirit of the • Countries with areas with fragile ecosystems, Convention. For example, countries particularly including mountainous ecosystems; vulnerable to climate change impacts are entitled to • Countries whose economies are highly dependent assistance from Annex II Parties in meeting the costs on income generated from the production, of adaptation. Has this provision been fulfilled? Are processing and export, and/or on consumption of the means to operationalise this provision still being fossil fuels; and negotiated? Like many issues, different negotiators • Landlocked and transit countries. would likely have different views on the matter.
The treatment of these groups of countries has 2.2 The Kyoto Protocol, Marrakesh Accords, evolved over time with the adoption of new legal And Doha Amendments instruments. For example, small island developing states (SIDS) have secured dedicated seats on several As discussed above, the Convention provided a committees and governing boards based on their framework for further action, but lacked individual special recognition under the Convention. country commitments that could be quantified Countries particularly vulnerable to and enforced. The only expressions of combined Like the principles of the Convention, the commitments responsibility under the Convention were the climate change impacts are entitled are often quite expansive, yet frustratingly vague. objective under Article 2, which was very open to to assistance from Annex II Parties in What does it mean to “promote” the development interpretation, and the “aim” of developed countries of technologies and what would their “agreed full to return their GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2000 meeting the costs of adaptation incremental costs” be? Annex II countries have under Article 4.2(b). committed to assist particularly vulnerable developing countries with their adaptation to climate change, but When Parties next met at COP 1 in 1995, they adopted the scale and type of assistance is not specified. the Berlin Mandate, which launched a new process to negotiate a protocol or another legal instrument The “bold ambiguity” of the Convention leaves a to establish quantified GHG reduction or limitation large number of areas open to interpretation (and obligations for developed countries. The Berlin negotiation). The UNFCC lacks clear and concrete Mandate explicitly ruled out any new commitments
24 25 Module 2 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Negotiations under the Convention
29 for developing countries. intention was to facilitate emission reductions and 1.5 gigatonnes of CO2 reductions and facilitated the Protocol were adopted at COP 7 in Marrakesh in 2001 investment in Annex I countries transitioning to a investment of over USD 200 billion in developing and are called the “Marrakesh Accords”.31 The outcome of this process was the Kyoto Protocol, market economy (whose economies had recently countries. The CDM has saved Annex 1 countries which was adopted in 1997 and under which all collapsed and had abundant opportunities for low- approximately USD 3.6 billion in compliance costs, The Kyoto Protocol entered into force on 16 February Annex I countries took on legally binding GHG cost emission reductions), while at the same time reflecting the significant differences in mitigation 2005. The United States had a very strong hand in reduction or limitation commitments for the period making it cheaper for the wealthier and more efficient costs (costs per tonne of carbon dioxide reduced) shaping it, and was one of the earliest proponents of of 2008 to 2012, also known as the first commitment Annex I countries to achieve their commitments. Since between developed and developing countries. This is emissions trading; while the United States did sign period. In order to assist countries in achieving their both the investing country and the receiving country perhaps why there is continued interest in having a the Protocol in 1998, it never ratified it. In fact, even commitments, the Kyoto Protocol also introduced are Annex I countries with GHG reduction or limitation new market mechanism (NMM) replace the CDM in before signing, the United States Senate had passed three “flexibility mechanisms”—emissions trading, commitments (and therefore fall under the global a future agreement and for a framework for various the non-binding Byrd-Hagel Resolution, which stated Joint Implementation (JI), and the Clean Development cap), the total amount of emissions allowed during approaches (FVA) to be agreed that would allow that the United States would not join any climate Mechanism (CDM). The text box below provides brief the first commitment period would not change. fungibility of the various units being created in a change agreement that did not require developing descriptions of the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto number of domestic markets. countries to reduce their emissions. Protocol. Clean Development Mechanism (Article 12) The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is However, since the beginning of 2013, the CDM has Creating a global cap-and-trade system under Flexibility Mechanisms Of The Kyoto Protocol: conceptually very similar to JI, with two very important been dying. Due to the global recession that started the Kyoto Protocol had a dramatic impact on the exceptions. First, it allowed Annex I countries to invest in 2008, the decision by the European Union to institutional development of the UNFCCC, which Flexibility Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol in non-Annex I countries to secure emission reductions restrict the purchase of certified emission reductions immediately became much more technical. The Emissions Trading (Article 17) and apply those reductions towards meeting their (CERs)30 from the CDM post 2012, the withdrawal of UNFCCC Secretariat found itself in charge of Under the Kyoto Protocol, each Annex I country commitments. Second, since the reductions would be several Annex 1 countries from the Kyoto Protocol, maintaining a very extensive complex trading system adopted a “quantified emission limitation and reduction taking place in a country that was not subject to a and a general lack of mitigation ambition on the part and increased its technical capacity accordingly. objective” (QELRO), a five-year emission budget, for GHG reduction or limitation commitment during the of developed countries, the per unit price of CERs has Negotiations over the rules of this system continue the first commitment period of 2008 to 2012. For first commitment period, it would have the effect plummeted from a high of USD 15 to less than USD to this day.
each tonne of CO2 or CO2-equivalent that the country of raising the global cap. Therefore, it became very 0.40. expected to emit, they were issued a corresponding important to verify that emission reductions achieved In 2005, as the start of the first commitment period Assigned Amount Unit (AAU), essentially a permit through any CDM project were in fact additional to The carbon market has collapsed. The future role of an approached, Kyoto Protocol Parties commenced to emit. Those countries that emitted less GHG than what would have happened under a business-as- international carbon offset mechanism like the CDM is negotiations on what would subsequently take place. their budget were allowed to sell their excess AAUs. usual scenario. This required the development of now unclear and will require a clear signal in the new This process concluded in 2012 with the adoption of Those that emitted more than their budget would different methodologies to demonstrate the increase global agreement, which is scheduled to be signed the Doha Amendment, the most important provision be required to purchaseadditional AAUs. The total of the reductions from different types of projects. in Paris in December 2015, and which will essentially of which was agreement on a second commitment number of AAUs issued was capped during the first The increase of several initial CDM projects has been replace the Kyoto Protocol. period from 2013 to 2020.32 The amendment will commitment period, and the expectation was that questioned. The rules governing the CDM have been The Kyoto Protocol required the development of enter into force when three-fourths of the Parties to cap would be tightened in subsequent commitment significantly strengthened over time. a detailed set of accounting rules to ensure that a the Kyoto Protocol (144 of 192 Parties) have ratified 33 periods. As AAUs became more scarce over time, reduction of one tonne of CO2 from a coal plant is it. As of 31 December 2014, 23 Parties have done so. their price would rise and the incentive to move A full analysis of the Kyoto Protocol and its flexible equal to a one-tonne reduction from an automobile. In It is important note that some Annex I countries from carbon-intensive sources of energy to clean mechanisms is beyond the scope of these training other words, it required that GHG emission allowances (Japan, New Zealand, and Russia,) have indicated that alternatives would grow. Joint Implementation materials. The Kyoto Protocol has had its fair share be fungible. Most of the rules governing the Kyoto they will not take on legally binding commitments (Article 6) Joint Implementation (JI) allows an Annex of critics and its staunch defenders. A global cap- I country to invest in emission reductions in another and-trade system was created and, most importantly, 29 Decision 1/CP.1, 1995.
Annex I country and apply those reductions towards a price was put on carbon. By the end of 2014, the 30 One CER is equivalent to one tonne of CO2. meeting the investing country’s commitments. The CDM had registered over 7,500 projects, achieved 31 Decision 11/CP.7, 2001.
26 27 Module 2 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Negotiations under the Convention
during the second commitment period. Canada Protocol. It would also include provisions addressing part to the diplomatic efforts of the incoming COP technology development and transfer, transparency of withdrew completely from the Kyoto Protocol in needs and new mitigation obligations for developing President (from Mexico), Parties were able to reach a action and support, and capacity building. It was also 2011. A common justification articulated by all of countries. The Umbrella Group34 envisioned a single comprehensive set of decisions at COP 16 that largely agreed that the new agreement would be “applicable these countries for their decisions has been the lack outcome that would bring all countries under a single defined the regime we have today. Under the Cancun to all Parties,” though what this means in practice in of commitments for some of their biggest economic regime. In contrast, many of the larger developing Agreements, all developed countries agreed to take on the context of the principle of CBDR-RC remains the competitors, particularly China, India, and the United countries supported the continuation of the Kyoto 2020 mitigation targets, while developing countries focus of intense debate. This process would become States. Protocol and advocated that other matters be resolved would adopt nationally appropriate mitigation known as Workstream 1 of the ADP. not in the form of a protocol, but rather through the actions (NAMAs), which could include economy-wide 2.3 From Bali (2007) To Durban (2011) adoption of decisions. or sectoral targets to be met in accordance with a Concerned that delaying the implementation of a schedule of policies and measures. They would be new agreement until 2020 would lock in insufficient The Thirteenth Session of the Conference of the The deadline set for concluding a new agreement taken in the context of a long-term goal “to hold the ambition for the rest of the decade and all but Parties (COP 13) in Bali was a major milestone in the under the Bali Action Plan was set for COP 15 increase in global average temperature below 2°C guarantee a temperature rise in excess of 2°C, AOSIS evolution of the UNFCCC. In the lead up to the Bali (in 2009),35 leaving two years for negotiations. above pre-industrial levels”; however subsequent insisted that a space be created for continued work Conference, it was becoming increasingly difficult to International attention grew to levels never before scientific assessments projected that the pledges on pre-2020 mitigation ambition. They succeeded ignore the lack of commitments on the part of some experienced at the UNFCCC, and civil society, joined would lead to much greater warming.37 in launching the Work Plan on Enhancing Mitigation countries. In addition, GHG emissions in developing by many vulnerable countries, called on world leaders Ambition, which would proceed under Workstream 2 countries were growing rapidly and needed to be to “seal the deal” in Copenhagen. Around 120 Heads The Cancun Agreements established a number of of the ADP. addressed. Finally, there was wide recognition that of State and Government ultimately attended the new institutions, such as the Green Climate Fund, more needed to be done on priorities identified under meeting, which was the largest such gathering outside the Adaptation Committee, the Standing Committee Progress since Durban on the 2015 agreement has the Convention other than mitigation. The outcome the General Assembly in New York. on Finance, the Technology Executive Committee, been modest. At COP 19 in Warsaw in 2013, it was was the Bali Road Map, which introduced a “two- and the Climate Technology Centre and Network. decided that Parties would come forwarded with track” negotiation process. One track would focus Despite high expectations, the negotiated text was They also included a number of new provisions for intended nationally determined contributions on new commitments under the Kyoto Protocol (see not ready for adoption. The Danish President of the measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) (INDCs) in the first quarter of 2015.39 It is noteworthy above). The other track would follow the mandate Conference of the Parties convened a small group of mitigation actions, including biennial update reports, that the use of the term “contribution” was a last- of the Bali Action Plan (BAP), which was based on a short political declaration, which would become international consultations and analysis (ICA), and minute compromise, deliberately chosen because it five pillars—a shared vision, mitigation, adaptation, known as the Copenhagen Accord. Many countries international assessment and review (IAR). did not have an established meaning in the UNFCCC finance, and technology transfer and development. felt the process used to negotiate the accord was process (unlike the term “commitment”, which was Capacity building would later be added to the mix of neither inclusive nor transparent. In the end, it was 2.4 From Durban (2011) To Paris (2015) preferred by some countries), and therefore did issues discussed and take on the status of a de facto merely taken note of in a decision.36 not prejudge their legal nature. Some developing sixth pillar. While the Kyoto Protocol negotiations continued to countries insisted that the differentiation in the legal The Copenhagen Accord is important for two reasons. heat up at COP 17, the conference’s most significant nature of obligations taken by Annex I and non-Annex Some groups of countries, the Alliance of Small Island First, it essentially became the basis of the decisions outcome, the so-called Durban Platform for Enhanced I countries be maintained. States (AOSIS) being among the most prominent, adopted a year later in Cancun, Mexico. Second, Action, would bring negotiations under the Bali advocated for a new protocol which would work in the process used to negotiate the Accord greatly Action Plan to a close. It would also begin a process tandem with the Kyoto Protocol. The new protocol undermined trust in the process for many negotiators. under the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Lima Outcomes would, in these countries’ view, include commitments Negotiations recommenced in 2010. Much of the first Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) to negotiate “a from the United States that were comparable to session was spent by participants trying to decide new protocol, legal instrument, or agreed outcome The nature of INDCs was further defined at the recently those taken by other Annex I Parties under the Kyoto which negotiating text would be used. Due in no small with legal force” to be adopted in 2015, which would concluded COP 20 in Lima in 2014. The decision listed come into effect and be implemented from 2020 the type of information that might accompany the 32 Decision 1/CMP.8, 2012. 34 The “Umbrella Group” was formed after the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol onwards.38 Parties agreed that the 2015 agreement mitigation component of Parties’ INDCs to facilitate 33 The latest ratification information can be found online at http://unfccc.int/ and was a loose coalition of non-EU developed countries. kyoto_protocol/doha_amendment/items/7362.php 35 Decision 1/CP.13, paragraph 2, 2007. would address mitigation, adaptation, finance, clarity and transparency. It also opened the possibility
28 29 Module 2 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Negotiations under the Convention
that Parties might consider listing their adaptation priority for AOSIS in 2015. 2.6 Proposed Elements Of The Paris 2015 emissions of CO2 and other long-lived greenhouse undertakings as part of their INDCs. In addition, • Despite the objections of the developed Agreement gases by the end of the century; an Annex was attached to the decision containing countries, the principle of CBDR + RC has been elements for a draft negotiating text.40 Significantly, it re-emphasised. As agreed in Lima, the Paris Agreement is to treat the Option (b): Ensuring that global greenhouse gas could not be agreed whether or not elements in this • Developed countries are urged to enhance their following six elements “in a balanced manner”: emissions peak by 2020 at the latest, are reduced by text could formally become a draft negotiating text. financial support to developing countries. However, at least 50 per cent by 2050 and continue to decline As a result, this matter will likely be the subject of a no quantitative targets have been agreed. 1. Mitigation (including the role of markets); thereafter; procedural debate at the first negotiating session in • The decision allows the complex negotiations on 2. Adaptation; 2015. the “elements of the draft negotiating text” to 3. Finance; Option (c): Ensuring significant global greenhouse continue into 2015 without progress being lost in 4. Technology development and transfer; gas emission reductions over the next few decades The “Lima Call for Climate Action”41 consists of a regard to the narrowing of options in 2014. 5. Capacity building; and in order to achieve a global goal for substantially preamble, 23 operational paragraphs of the text of the • The decision clarifies what the INDCs should 6. Transparency of action and support. reducing global emissions by 2050; consistent with decision, and an Annex that contains “the elements of contain and sets a timetable for their submission. the agreed global goal for substantially reducing a draft negotiating text”. AOSIS agreed to accept the AOSIS is disappointed that the timetable will not AOSIS will continue to press for loss and damage to be global emissions by 2050; consistent with the agreed text for the following reasons: allow for an effective review of the aggregate listed as a seventh element. The proposed elements global goal, and based on the best available scientific effect of the INDCs prior to the Paris Conference. of the text, with many options that reflect the various knowledge and equitable access to sustainable • The Lima decision keeps the door open on the legal • The decision provides an essential mandate to positions of the Parties, are contained in an Annex to development. form of the Paris Agreement: whether it will be “a continue the work plan to enhance mitigation the Lima Decision. protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed ambitions before 2020. This was an absolute In the above text, the use of the word “evolving” should outcome with legal force under the Convention priority for AOSIS, given that the science clearly It will be important for AOSIS to develop nuanced be noted, in that some Parties wish to introduce the applicable to all Parties.” That battle will continue indicates that GHG emissions must be reduced negotiating positions on a number of these options use of this word before the principle of CBDR and the in 2015. AOSIS wants a legally binding protocol for quickly; it is not possible to delay taking action (see Module 6). For example, after the preamble, the differences in specificity in the sub-options have been all parties. until the new agreement comes into effect. draft begins with an objective. However, even the presented. • The decision confirms that the Paris Agreement objective has options, with Option 1 containing three “shall address in a balanced manner, inter alia, Lima delivered what was required. A lot of work sub-options; it reads as follows:42 Under mitigation, options provided in the draft text mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology remains to be completed before AOSIS will be satisfied include:43 development and transfer, and capacity building, that Paris will deliver a legally binding international All Parties to take action and cooperate to further and transparency of action and support.” A agreement that will provide a reasonable chance of implement the Convention in order to reach its ultimate 13.1 Option 1: All Parties, in accordance with Article 4 balanced approach is critical for a number of survival for all small islands. objective as stated in its Article 2, on the basis of equity and their common but differentiated responsibilities developing countries that are concerned that too and in accordance with their historical responsibilities and respective capabilities and on the basis of equity, little attention is being paid to adaptation and MOI. 2.5 Timeline For Negotiation and common but differentiated responsibilities/ to enhance mitigation ambition and cooperate with a AOSIS remains concerned that an international evolving common but differentiated responsibilities view to achieving the long-term emission reductions, mechanism to address loss and damage incurred Time is short if the deadline set in the Durban Mandate and respective capabilities, by achieving an emission in the context of Article 2 of the Convention, consistent by vulnerable countries from the sudden impacts is to be met. A negotiating text must be completed by pathway consistent with limiting the global average with limiting the global average temperature increase and slow onset events of climate change has not May 2015 to meet the Convention requirement that temperature increase to below 2°C or 1.5°C above to below 2 °C or 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels yet been recognised as a separate and distinct any protocol be made available to Parties at least six pre-industrial levels, which entails: and in the context of equitable access to sustainable element of the Paris Agreement. This will be a months before it is adopted. development;
36 Decision 1/CP.15, 2009. 3.1 Option (a): Ensuring significant global greenhouse 37 The Emissions Gap Report, UNEP, 2010. gas emission reductions over the next few decades or Option 2: All Parties to make efforts and cooperate 38 41 Decision 1/CP.20, 2014. Decision 1/CP.17, 2011. a 40–70 per cent reduction in global greenhouse gas on enhancing mitigation ambition to ensure that 39 Decision 1/CP.19, 2013. http://unfccc.int/meetings/lima_dec_2014/session/8532/php/view/ 40 Decision 1/CP.20, 2014. documents.php emissions below 2010 levels by 2050 and near-zero the aggregate level of mitigation commitments/
30 31 Module 2 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Negotiations under the Convention
contributions increases over time, so as to achieve the long-term emission reductions, in the context of Article 2 of the Convention, consistent with limiting the global average temperature increase to below 2 °C or 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels;
Option 3: Parties to make efforts and cooperate to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, in accordance with the shared vision resulting from the Bali Action Plan, including holding the increase in global average temperature below 2 °C or 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels in the context of sustainable development, with developed country Parties taking the lead by undertaking ambitious emission reductions and providing finance, technology and capacity building support to developing country Parties.
Again, the differences between the options presented above should be noted. Option 1 grounds mitigation under Article 4 of the Convention, and highlights equity, CBDR, and equitable access to sustainable development. Option 2 makes no mention of CBDR. However, Option 3 reintroduces the qualitative objective of preventing “dangerous” climate change. Every section of the draft elements text contains similar options. It is beyond the remit of this manual Parties to make efforts and cooperate to to advise on which specific options AOSIS should support. However, in Module 3 the rationale or politics stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations behind the positions taken by Parties is explored and in the atmosphere at a level that would in Module 6, AOSIS’ position on key issues is discussed. prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system
42 Decision 1/CP.20, 2014. 43 Decision 1/CP.20, 2014.
32 33 SIDS Climate Change Negotiators’ Guidance Manual
Module 3
The Politics
34 35 Module 3 The Politics
3.0 Introduction of most developing countries; and that developing fuels and in which the demand for energy (in the the climate change crisis. What the world needs is a countries have the right to develop and have the developing countries) is expected to continue to regulated transition towards a low-carbon economy. The world desperately needs a new robust need for an equitable distribution of the remaining increase at 1–2% per year for the foreseeable future be Some countries may have to be compensated. international agreement to curb greenhouse gas carbon budget. The means of implementation (MOI) de-carbonised? It should be noted that there are still (GHG) emissions and to help countries adjust to some (finance, technology development and transfer, and over 620 million people in sub-Saharan Africa who 3.1 Negotiating Groups of the impacts of climate change. The following is an capacity building) must be provided by the developed do not have access to modern energy services. Some admittedly oversimplified summary of the geopolitics countries to the developing countries to help them consider the ongoing climate change negotiations Climate change negotiations are conducted by and macroeconomics surrounding the current adapt to climate change and to transition to low- as a proxy war on fossil fuels. There is no doubt that negotiating groups, an approach that makes the negotiations between 195 countries (via consensus) carbon development pathways. The required MOI is how global energy demands are met in the future negotiations more efficient as it allows for the to achieve this global agreement. This new agreement currently estimated to cost at least USD 100 billion per will determine the extent of climate change. The role formulation and articulation of common positions on is to be finalised at the Twenty-First Session of the year. The developing countries have argued that this of special interest groups, in particular, those with the basis of groups of, and not individual, member Conference of the Parties (COP 21) in Paris, France, finance should be new and additional to the Official a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, is states46. in 2015 and will come into effect in 2020. Not since Development Assistance (ODA) promised under the discussed in Module 5. 2009 in Copenhagen has there been so much political Monterrey Consensus44 (0.7% of GDP). Developing Country Groups attention focused on a climate change conference. It should be noted that, in 2013, global subsidies for However, Copenhagen was perceived as a failure by The Political Problem: What is an equitable way to fossil fuels totaled USD 550 billion, more than four G77 and China the developing countries and marked a turning point distribute the remaining carbon budget? The metrics times the subsidy provided for renewable energy The Group of 77 developing nations (G77) and China in the bifurcated approach (developed vs. developing) are difficult to agree. Should emissions be determined (USD 120 billion)45. The concern of countries like India is the main developing country coalition in the United used to implement the Convention’s principle of and the remaining carbon budget be distributed over the impacts of the removal of fossil fuel subsidies Nations system and was recently reaffirmed as “the common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) on a per capita or a per country basis? Within the will have to be understood and overcome. Practical means for the countries of the South to articulate and respective capabilities (RC). Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), countries economic alternatives to fossil fuel subsidies should and promote their collective economic interests like Barbados, Singapore, and Trinidad and Tobago continue to be one of the foci of the technical expert and enhance their joint negotiating capacity on The majority of developed countries argue a number have argued against any metric that uses a per capita process under the ADP Workstream 2. all major international economic issues within the of points that they considered critical to discussions, basis. Should more weight be placed on the historical United Nations system, and promote South-South principally that: emissions of developed countries in contrast to The International Energy Agency (IEA) has warned cooperation for development”.47 • the world has changed since the UNFCCC was the current emissions of developing countries? Is a that two-thirds of the world’s proven reserves of coal, established in 1992; historical tonne worse than a current tonne? Should oil and natural gas cannot be combusted (without The Group of 77 (G77) was formed on 15 June 1964 • developing countries are now responsible for a metric that distributes responsibility for mitigation carbon capture and storage) if there is to a be a through the signing of the “Joint Declaration of almost 60% of global GHG emissions; and action be based upon economy-wide or sectoral reasonable chance of keeping warming below 2ºC. the Seventy-Seven Developing Countries at the • emissions are increasing faster in the developing carbon intensity figures (that is, the amount of carbon The value of these potential stranded assets has been Conclusion of the United Nations Conference on world than in the developed world. emitted per unit of GDP)? How should livestock estimated at USD 6–20 trillion, often referred to as Trade and Development” (UNCTAD), held in Geneva, emissions be weighted? The objections of countries the “Carbon Bubble”. It is noted that in 2012, the top Switzerland.48 Developed countries argue that all countries like Argentina to any restrictions on emissions from 200 energy companies invested ~USD 674 billion in should take on mitigation targets consisting of livestock should be noted. What credits should be exploration for new fossil fuel reserves. nationally determined contributions (NDCs) that are given to reducing emissions from deforestation and internationally monitored and verified. land degradation (REDD+) activities? Attention The ongoing battle for market share being waged 44 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monterrey_Consensus should be drawn here to the lobbying of such entities by Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 45 International Energy Agency (IEA 2014) World Energy Outlook 2014, Executive Summary. The majority of the developing countries argue that the as the Coalition of Rain Forest Nations. (OPEC) has caused the price of oil to drop to USD50- 46 (See Appendixes 1 and 2 of this module, which lists all of the countries in developed countries remain historically responsible 60/bbl in early 2015 and will have a short-term impact the different groups and samples, and indicate how these may be reflected The Economic Problem: How can a global economy on the fuel choices that the market makes, perhaps in a diagram). for climate change; that sustainable development 47 http://www.g77.org/doc/A-68-948(E).pdf and the eradication of poverty remain the priorities that is still more than 90% dependent upon fossil confirming that market conditions alone will not solve 48 http://www.g77.org/doc/A-68-948(E).pdf
36 37 Module 3 The Politics
Although the G77 has increased to 134 countries, to sea level rise. AOSIS is the primary negotiating AOSIS submissions and statements can be found on and an Economic Vulnerability Index (population the original name remains.49 Palau and Tuvalu are group for most AOSIS members at the UNFCCC, and the AOSIS website.51 size, remoteness, instability of exports of goods and the only AOSIS UN member states that are also not is made up of 39 member states and five observer services, etc.).52 Botswana, Cabo Verde, the Maldives, members of the G77.50 states. AOSIS speaks for roughly 20% of UN member AOSIS has negotiated dedicated seats for small island and Samoa are no longer considered part of the LDC states and has a strong voice at the climate change developing states (SIDS) on various UNFCCC Boards group in that they no longer meet the membership During climate change negotiations, developing negotiations. AOSIS includes states from the African and Committees. The Chair of AOSIS is responsible for criteria.53 countries articulate common positions through the Group, ALBA, LDCs, LMDCs and the Coalition of putting forward Group candidates for these positions. G77 and China. AOSIS, the African Group, the Least Rainforest Nations. The LDCs are strong supporters of adaptation and Developed Countries (LDCs), Like-Minded Developing The African Group the means of implementation (MOI). They have Countries (LMDCs), the Independent Alliance of Latin AOSIS members share a number of characteristics that The African Group advocates for the interests of the advocated, alongside AOSIS, but sometimes with a America and the Caribbean (AILAC), the Bolivarian drive the Group’s common positions at the climate 54 African States at climate change negotiations. It is different strategic approach, that loss and damage be Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), change negotiations. Some of these characteristics the only regional group that negotiates as a bloc at the treated as a separate element in the 2015 agreement. BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China), and the include: UNFCCC. The African Group includes members from The LDCs are chaired by a member state and the Chair Coalition for Rainforest Nations all negotiate through • susceptibility to sea level rise and natural hazards the LDCs, LMDCs, BASIC, AOSIS and the Coalition rotates every few years. The Chair speaks on behalf the G77 and China. The positions of the Group of 77 such as typhoons, droughts, tsunamis, and for Rainforest Nations. The African Group frequently of the Group at formal UNFCCC meetings. The LDCs are typically not as evolved as those of its various volcanic eruptions; associates itself with the statements made by AOSIS have significant overlap with the member states of the sub-groups, given that the G77 and China is the • the importance of tourism to the economy; and the LDCs. African Group and AOSIS, and they often associate largest and most diverse of the negotiating groups • limited fresh water and other natural resources; themselves with the statements of these Groups. and works on unanimous consensus, an approach • remoteness; and The African Group tends to stress the importance of which allows for any member to prevent the Group • small aggregate emissions. adaptation and the provision of MOI under a balanced Like-Minded Developing Country (LMDC) Group from adopting a position. The diversity of national and equitable approach. The collapse (post 2013) of The Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) Group positions in the Group serves to moderate and limit An important fact at the heart of the positions that the price of carbon under the CDM has disappointed held its first meeting in Beijing, China, in October 2012 common positions. AOSIS adopts is that some member states face an countries in this region, in that they had recently built with Bolivia, China, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Malaysia, existential threat from climate change. Generally, capacity enabling them to access the CDM. Nicaragua, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, The Chair of the G77 and China changes annually, AOSIS has pushed for strong mitigation efforts by all Thailand, and Venezuela represented.54 and usually speaks first at meetings to articulate the Parties, with developed countries taking the lead and The African Group is chaired by a member state and common views of developing countries. Opening developing countries taking action independently the Chair rotates every few years. The Chair speaks At this first meeting, it was noted that the LMDC is statements and other interventions of the G77 and and with support from developed countries. AOSIS on behalf of the Group at formal UNFCCC meetings. a platform for like-minded developing countries to China consist of text that is negotiated, often through frequently associates itself with the statements made exchange views and coordinate positions in regard to lengthy deliberations by the Group. by Africa and the LDCs. The Group of Least-Developed Countries (LDCs) climate negotiations. Different countries will associate The Group of Least-Developed Countries (LDCs) is a with the LMDC statements on different issues. The Within the G77 and China, various member states and AOSIS is chaired by a member state and the Chair group of 48 countries defined by the UN as being the group was formed in part to strengthen the voice of individuals serve as coordinating entities on various rotates every few years. The Chair speaks on behalf of least developed. The UN General Assembly officially developing countries that did not belong to any other issues. In these cases, a member State other than the the Group at formal UNFCCC meetings. Statements established the LDC category in 1971 in an effort to negotiating groups. The group’s formation may also Chair of the Group may speak on its behalf. and positions are negotiated within the Group during attract international support for members of the be interpreted as a reaction to the perceived state AOSIS plenaries and preparatory meetings. AOSIS Group. of the negotiations—the attempted erosion by the AOSIS operates on the basis of unanimous consent, which developed countries of the principle of CBDR +RC The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) was formed occasionally limits the ability of the Group to develop Membership in the LDCs is defined using a low-
in 1990 during the Second World Climate Conference more evolved and elaborate positions. AOSIS also income criterion (per capita gross national income of 51 http://aosis.org/ (in Geneva) to represent the interests of low-lying and makes common group submissions to UNFCCC lower than approximately USD 1000), a Human Assets 52 http://unohrlls.org/about-ldcs/criteria-for-ldcs/ 53 http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc/ldc_graduated. small island countries that are particularly vulnerable bodies. These are typically negotiated via email. Index (health indicators, education, literacy rate, etc.) shtml
38 39 Module 3 The Politics
and the bifurcated approach enshrined in the Kyoto for developing country mitigation and adaptation ALBA (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de reduce its GHG emissions by 40% below 1990 levels Protocol. actions.56 However, the recent activity of China and Nuestra América/Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples by 2030. Many parties believe that the EU has both India in the LMDC begs the question as to whether of Our America) the technical capacity and political will to make even The LMDC group does not have a formal Chair and Brazil and South Africa share all the same views ALBA (the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of larger cuts, if it saw its major trading partners (the different members may speak for the group on various and proposed negotiating strategies with the more Our America) is a negotiating group that consists OECD and China) taking similar action. issues. populous Asian members of BASIC. South Africa now of countries from Latin America and the Caribbean. appears to be more active in the African Group, and The membership includes Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Umbrella Group This group is firmly focused on ensuring that Brazil quite often makes interventions in its national Nicaragua, and Venezuela. The Umbrella Group is a loose coalition of non-EU Convention obligations are fulfilled and its principles capacity. developed countries that was formed following the are upheld. Two of the guiding principles of the group It may be argued that a socialist ideology pervades adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. Although there is no are that the eradication of poverty and sustainable Independent Alliance of Latin American and the negotiating perspective of ALBA. It should be formal list, the group is usually made up of Australia, development efforts of developing countries should Caribbean states (AILAC) noted that Venezuela hosted a “Social COP” just prior Canada, Japan, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Norway, the not be curtailed, and developed countries must The Independent Alliance of Latin American and to COP 20 in Lima, Peru. The group tends to support Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States.60 fulfill their Convention obligations to take the lead Caribbean states (AILAC) is made up of Chile, the rights of indigenous peoples and the concept The Umbrella Group countries stress that major in reducing emissions and providing support to Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama, and Peru of “Mother Earth”; this group is wary of the use of emitters from developing countries should have developing countries to support their adaptation and and was formed during COP 18 in Doha, Qatar in market-based approaches in regard to mitigation. similar responsibilities to developed country Parties, mitigation efforts. 2012.57 and that the “firewall” between developed needs to be ALBA calls on developed countries to bear removed given the economic advancements of major Best negotiating practice requires the parties to seek AILAC members are middle-income countries that responsibility for historic emissions and to commit to economy developing countries since the Convention to comprehend the positions of all the major players are calling for developing countries to take ambitious steep emission cuts.58 was agreed in 1992. and to foster mutual respect and understanding. The domestic mitigation commitments in an effort to LMDC has become a key negotiating bloc in relation bridge the North-South divide. AILAC, in contrast Developed Country Groups The majority of the members of the Umbrella Group to this kind of approach. Its membership is diverse and with the LMDCs, considers the Convention to be have either pulled out of the Kyoto Protocol or fluid, and currently contains two of AOSIS’ members a living instrument that should be interpreted in European Union expressed very little interest in ratifying the Doha – Cuba and Dominica. To some extent, China’s and a dynamic way, so that the principles of common The 28 countries of the European Union (EU) form Amendments and in making ambitious pledges under India’s active presence in the LMDC has reduced but differentiated responsibilities and respective the largest negotiating bloc of developed countries. the second commitment period. Norway may be the significance of BASIC as a negotiating bloc (see capabilities do not serve as an excuse for a lack of The EU puts forward a coordinated position at the considered the most “moderate” in this group. It is below). action from developing countries. AILAC and AOSIS UNFCCC, usually speaking through the member state noted that, along with the EU, this group is a major often agree on the urgency to negotiate on substance that holds the EU’s Presidency, which rotates every six source of historical emissions and a major contributor The BASIC Group rather than process, and on the need for all countries months.59 The EU itself is a Party to the Convention, to current emissions. Amongst this group are the BASIC is a coalition of four large emerging-economy to mitigate climate change, within the context of but it does not have a separate vote from its members. “rich” nations of Australia, Canada, Japan, and the developing countries—Brazil, South Africa, India and CBDR + RC. AILAC tends to place more emphasis The EU considers itself to be an environmental United States, all of whom are expected to provide China—which agreed to work as a negotiating bloc at on countries doing as much as possible within their leader among developed countries. However, its the MOI to developing countries. COP 15 in Copenhagen in 2009.55 The BASIC countries respective capabilities, which is not dissimilar to the membership contains countries like Poland, which is represent about 40% of the world’s population view of the United States of America. heavily dependent upon coal as an energy source. The Umbrella Group may be considered a developed and an increasing share of global greenhouse Recently, the EU has felt itself exposed within the country counter-balance to the positions of the gas emissions. The BASIC countries put a heavy Organisation for Economic Development (OECD), LMDCs.
emphasis on upholding the principles and provisions 54 http://www.twn.my/title2/climate/info.service/2012/climate20121005.htm and does not want to lose its competitive advantage of the Convention, particularly equity; common but 55 http://www.sei-international. to other OECD countries, which may not be as 56 differentiated responsibilities; respective capabilities; http://envfor.nic.in/sites/default/files/press-releases/Joint-statement-18th- ambitious as their mitigation pledges would seem to BASIC-New-Delhi.pdf and the provision of support by developed countries 57 http://ailac.org/en/sobre/ indicate. The EU announced in late 2014 that it would
40 41 Module 3 The Politics
Environmental Integrity Group The Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) is a made up of Liechtenstein, Mexico, Monaco, the Republic of Korea, and Switzerland. The group purports to put forward positions that promote the environmental integrity climate change regime. The EIG is made up of countries that are not members of any of the other coordinated groups that sought to amplify their voice at the climate change negotiations.61 In Lima, Mexico voiced its support for loss and damage to be considered as a separate element in the Paris Agreement. This is a significant departure from previous positions held by the EIG, and one that AOSIS should exploit.
In Lima, Mexico voiced its support for loss and damage to be considered as a separate element in the Paris Agreement
58 http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2012/12/12-latin-america- climate-roberts 59 http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/negotiating_groups/ items/2714.php 60 http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/negotiating_groups/ items/2714.php 61 UNITAR, p 98.
42 43 SIDS Climate Change Negotiators’ Guidance Manual
Module 4
The Process: Institutional structure of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
44 45 Module 4 The Process: Institutional structure of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
4.0 Institutional structure of the United Nations The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological outcome with legal force under the Convention Framework Convention on Climate Change Advice (SBSTA) applicable to all Parties.”80 The ADP is further (UNFCCC)70 Article 9 of the UNFCCC establishes the Subsidiary mandated to complete its work “no later than 2015 in Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) order to adopt this protocol, another legal instrument as one of the two permanent subsidiary bodies of the or an agreed outcome with legal force [at COP21] and Figure 2: UNFCCC CHART OF Conference of the Parties (COP) UNFCCC.71 SBSTA serves the Conference of the Parties for it to come into effect and be implemented from (COPs) and Conference of the Parties Serving as the 2020”.81 The ADP is divided into two workstreams: Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) Workstream 1 relates to the new agreement to by providing information and advice on scientific and be adopted in 2015 and Workstream 2 relates to technical matters.72 SBSTA serves as the link between enhancing pre-2020 mitigation ambition. the scientific information provided by experts and “the policy-oriented needs of the COP”.73 SBSTA works on In 2013 at COP19 in Warsaw, Parties called for further issues such as those related to impacts, vulnerability, development of a negotiating text for the new and adaptation to climate change, and improving agreement, including elaboration on the elements that guidelines for preparing and reviewing greenhouse it might contain.82 The Warsaw decision also invites gas emission (GHG) inventories.74 Parties to prepare intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) and to communicate these The Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) INDCs well in advance of COP 21.83 Article 10 of the Convention establishes the Subsidiary Under Workstream 2 in Warsaw, Parties called for Body for Implementation (SBI) as the second a technical process to examine opportunities for permanent subsidiary body of the UNFCCC.75 SBI actions with high mitigation potential. Throughout serves the COP and CMP “through the assessment 2014, this process involved technical expert meetings and review of the effective implementation of the (TEMs)—which examined specific policies, practices, Convention and its Kyoto Protocol.”76 SBI covers areas and technologies—as well as regular updates to of work such as nationally appropriate mitigation the technical paper on actions with high mitigation actions (NAMAs) and issues related to measurement, potential.84 The TEMs in 2014 have covered renewable reporting and verification (MRV).77 In addition, SBI energy, energy efficiency, agriculture and land use, advises the COP on administrative and budgetary urban development, short-lived climate pollutants, matters.78 and carbon capture and storage. Transport has not
SBSTA and SBI work jointly on some issues, including 70 http://unfccc.int/files/inc/graphics/image/png/unfccc_bodies_large.png 71 UNITAR, Module II, p. 83. capacity building, the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms, 72 Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) http:// the 2013 to 2015 review, and discussions surrounding unfccc.int/bodies/body/6399.php the Technology Mechanism.79 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 UNITAR, Module II, p. 83. The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform 76 Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), http://unfccc.int/bodies/ for Enhanced Action (ADP) body/6406.php 77 Ibid. The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform 78 Ibid. for Enhanced Action (ADP) was established in 2011 79 Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), http:// by decision 1/CP.17. The ADP is mandated to “develop unfccc.int/bodies/body/6399.php 80 Decision 1/CP.17. a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed 81 Decision 1/CP.17.
46 47 Module 4 The Process: Institutional structure of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
yet been covered, except for a brief reference under of that Protocol.89 All Parties to the Kyoto Protocol five United Nations regional groups, two members The Adaptation Fund allows Parties to access funds urban planning. are represented at the CMP, while States that are each from Annex I and non-Annex I Parties, and one directly through national implementing entities not Parties to the Kyoto Protocol participate as member from SIDS.94 (NIEs).102 This direct access is intended to better target AOSIS has made numerous suggestions as to how observers.90 Article 13 of the Kyoto Protocol describes local priorities and to increase the speed of delivery the TEMs can be improved, some of these have the functions of the CMP, which include to “periodically Ten members serve on the facilitative branch, which of the funds. However, NIEs must go through an been captured in the Lima decision. However, it will examine the obligations of the Parties under this “aims to provide advice and assistance to Parties in accreditation process, and only three AOSIS members be incumbent upon AOSIS, as the “Champion of Protocol” and to “promote and facilitate the exchange order to promote compliance”.95 The remaining 10 (Belize, the Cook Islands, and Jamaica) have initiated Workstream 2”, to continue to play a leading role in of information on measures adopted by the Parties to members serve on the enforcement branch, which this process. ensuring that Parties have a strong influence over address climate change and its effects”.91 “has the responsibility to determine consequences the evolution of the TEMs. One important issue, that for Parties not meeting their commitments”.96 All The Adaptation Fund is currently the only source needs to be settled in 2015, is the institutional home 4.1 Additional Bodies 20 members together make up the plenary of the of financing for adaptation under the UNFCCC and for the Workplan on Enhancing Mitigation Ambition Compliance Committee.97 The plenary reports to the Kyoto Protocol that does not entirely depend on (WEMA) after the ADP expires. Bureau CMP on activities on the Compliance Committee and voluntary contributions from developed countries.103 The Bureau is an eleven-member body elected may submit proposals on rules of procedure, as well Once operationalised, the Green Climate Fund (GCF) Conference of the Parties (COP) annually by the COP.92 Bureau members are nominated as administrative and budgetary matters.98 will be an additional source for adaptation financing. The Parties to the UNFCCC meet annually as the by the five United Nations regional groups, which Conference of the Parties (COP).85 The COP is the nominate two representatives each, and one seat Adaptation Fund Board Nairobi Work Programme supreme decision-making body of the UNFCCC and is reserved for a SIDS representative. The Bureau Parties established the Adaptation Fund in 2001 under The Nairobi Work Programme on Impacts, Vulnerability reviews the implementation of the Convention.86 The comprises the COP/CMP President, seven Vice- the Kyoto Protocol.99 The Adaptation Fund finances and Adaptation to Climate Change (NWP) is a COP takes decisions to promote the implementation Presidents, the Chairs of the two subsidiary bodies, concrete adaptation projects and programmes in SBSTA work programme with two objectives—to of the Convention, including on institutional and and a Rapporteur. The members of the Bureau serve developing country Parties that are particularly improve understanding and assessment of impacts, administrative arrangements.87 Article 7.2 of the one-year terms and may be re-elected for a second vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. vulnerability, and adaptation and to assist Parties in Convention describes the responsibilities of the year. While the function of the Bureau is not defined The Fund is partially financed by a 2% share of proceeds making informed decisions on practical adaptation COP, including to “assess...the implementation of the in the Convention or by the draft rules of procedure, from certified emission reductions (CERs) from Clean actions and measures.104 The NWP is divided into Convention by the Parties” and to “establish such the Bureau has served to advise the President and Development Mechanism (CDM) projects. However, nine areas of work in regard to which meetings and subsidiary bodies as are deemed necessary”.88 The handle procedural and organisational issues. The given the current low value of CERs, the Adaptation workshops are held.105 These nine areas of work are: COP held in December 2014 in Lima was the twentieth Bureau may also examine the credentials of Party Fund has had insufficient resources and has resorted 1. Methods and tools; session of the COP, or COP 20. representatives and review requests for accreditation to fundraising through voluntary contributions from 2. Data and observations; by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and developed country Parties. Germany, currently the 3. Climate modeling, scenarios, and downscaling; The Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting intergovernmental organisations (IGOs). biggest contributor to the Adaptation Fund, donated 4. Climate related risks and extreme events; of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) EUR 50 million in 2014.100 With this contribution, the 5. Socio-economic information; The COP Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to Compliance Committee Fund has approximately USD 147 million available to 6. Adaptation planning and practices; the Kyoto Protocol is known as the CMP, reviews the As part of the Kyoto Protocol compliance mechanism, fund projects.101 7. Research; implementation of the Protocol, and takes decisions the Compliance Committee is designed to “strengthen to promote the effective implementation the Protocol’s environmental integrity, support the carbon market’s credibility, and ensure transparency of 89 Bodies, http://unfccc.int/bodies/items/6241.php 96 Ibid. 90 97 82 Decision 1/CP.19; Capacity Building for SIDS document page 42. accounting by Parties”.93 The Compliance Committee, Ibid. UNITAR, Module 2, p. 83. 91 98 83 Ibid. Kyoto Protocol, Article 13. Ibid. established by decision 27/CMP.1, comprises 20 92 99 84 Capacity building for SIDS document, pp. 42-43. UNITAR, Module 2, pp. 82-83. Capacity building for SIDS document, pp. 51-52. 93 100 85 UNITAR, Module II, pp. 18-19. members and 20 alternates, all serving in their An Introduction to the Kyoto Protocol Compliance Mechanism, http://unfccc. The Adaptation Fund at COP20, https://adaptation-fund.org/node/4080 101 86 Bodies, http://unfccc.int/bodies/items/6241.php int/kyoto_protocol/compliance/items/3024.php Ibid. individual capacities. The members are elected by 94 102 87 Ibid. UNITAR, Module 2, p. 83. Capacity building for SIDS document, p. 52. 95 103 88 UNFCCC Article 7.2. the CMP and consist of one member from each of the Ibid. Ibid.
48 49 Module 4 The Process: Institutional structure of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
8. Technologies for adaptation; and ambitious and timely contributions from developed Joint Implementation (JI) Technology Mechanism is comprised of the Climate 9. Economic diversification. countries to prepare for the initial mobilisation of The second flexible mechanism of the Kyoto Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) and the resources by COP 20 (2014 in Lima, Peru). In the Protocol is joint implementation (JI), which allows Technology Executive Committee (TEC). The objective of the NWP is somewhat restricted, given lead up to and during COP 20, developed countries Annex B parties to earn emission-reduction units that it is limited to disseminating and highlighting pledged a total of over USD 10 billion to the GCF.111 The (ERUs) by implementing mitigation projects in other The CTCN facilitates a network of national, regional, information on adaptation and does not extend to the GCF hopes to begin considering funding proposals in Annex B countries.115 This mechanism is intended to sectoral, and international technology networks implementation of projects on the ground.106 This has June 2015. provide additional flexibility and cost-effectiveness and organisations. The CTCN consists of the led to a call from some parties to include adaptation to countries fulfilling their emission reduction or Climate Technology Centre, located in Copenhagen, under Workstream 2 of the ADP. Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) limitation commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. As Denmark, and a global network of expert institutions The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allows with CDM projects, JI projects must provide emission that respond to climate technology requests from At COP 17, Parties requested that SBSTA reconsider countries with quantified emission limitation or reductions additional to what would otherwise have developing country Parties.119 It is noted that very the work areas of the NWP in order to make reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol occurred.116 few SIDS institutions (e.g. the Carribean Community recommendations to COP 19 in Warsaw.107 At COP 19, to earn certified emission reduction (CER) credits Climate Change Centre (CCCCC) and South Pacific Parties agreed to continue the work programme and through the implementation of mitigation projects This mechanism contains two sets of procedures Regional Environment Programme (SPREP)) have to further enhance the NWP through measures, such in developing countries.112 Countries with emission- for verifying that ERUs are additional.117 Under Track joined this network to date. as developing linkages to other relevant workstreams reduction or emission-limitation commitments under 1, the host party must meet stringent eligibility and developing “knowledge products” to improve the Kyoto Protocol can use CER credits towards requirements. Once these requirements are met, The UN Environment Programme (UNEP) manages the understanding of impacts, vulnerability, and meeting those commitments. The CDM is the first the party may verify a project as being additional. the CTCN in collaboration with the UN Industrial adaptation.108 global mechanism to provide standardised emission Under Track 2, host parties that do not meet all of the Development Organization (UNIDO). The CTCN offsets. In order to qualify for CER credits, emission eligibility requirements must go through a verification Advisory Board, established at COP 18, meets twice Green Climate Fund109 reductions from CDM projects must be additional to process under the Joint Implementation Supervisory a year and consists of 16 representatives, with equal The Green Climate Fund (GCF) was established at COP what would otherwise have occurred.113 Developed Committee (JISC). representation from Annex I and Non-Annex I Parties. 16 (2010 in Cancun, Mexico) as the operating entity of and developing countries must establish a designated The CTCN is accountable to and under the guidance the financial mechanism of the Convention. The GCF is national authority (DNA) to authorise participation in There has been significant criticism of the of the COP through the Advisory Board.120 mandated to support projects, programmes, policies, CDM projects.114 environmental integrity of Track 2, and AOSIS supports and other activities in developing country Parties.110 the elimination of this track. There is a current debate The CTCN provides free technical assistance to The GCF Board governs the GCF, and the Board has The CDM has established four Regional Collaboration (see Brazilian submissions) on the merits of merging developing countries upon request by countries’ full responsibility for funding decisions. The COP is to Centres (in Lome, Togo; Kampala, Uganda; Bogota, a reformed CDM with Track 1 of the JI, which may National Designated Entities (NDEs). The five main provide guidance to the Board on matters including Colombia; and St. George’s, Grenada) to promote the obviate the need for a new market mechanism. types of support provided by the CTCN are: eligibility criteria, programme priorities, and policies. CDM in under-represented regions. It may be prudent • Technical assessments; At COP 17 (2011, in Durban, South Africa), the COP for AOSIS to support the expansion of the mandate Cancun Technology Mechanism • Technical support for policy and planning approved the governing instrument for the GCF, and, of these RCCs to provide assistance on all mitigation- The Cancun Technology Mechanism was established documents; at COP 18 (2012 in Doha, Qatar), Parties requested related issues including preparation of NAMAs, INDCS, at COP 16 in order to facilitate enhanced action on • Training; the Board to carry out a series of tasks—including and national communications. technology development and transfer to support • Tools and methodologies; and securing funding and selecting the trustee—and to action on mitigation and adaptation.118 The Cancun • Implementation plans.121 report on progress at COP 19. 110 Decision 1/CP.16. 115 Joint Implementation, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/joint_ 104 Capacity building document page 54; Decision 2/CP.11. 111 Press Release: Total Pledges nearing USD 10.2 billion, http://news.gcfund.org/ implementation/items/1674.php At COP 19 (2013 in Warsaw, Poland), the Board 105 Capacity building document, p.54. wp-content/uploads/2014/12/release_GCF_2014_12_10_austria_pledge.pdf 116 Kyoto Protocol, Article 6. presented its report, and the COP requested that the 106 Capacity Building for SIDS document, p. 55. 112 Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/ 117 Joint Implementation, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/joint_ 107 Decision 6/CP.17. GCF balance the allocation of its resources between mechanisms/clean_development_mechanism/items/2718.php implementation/items/1674.php 108 Decision 17/CP.19. 113 Kyoto Protocol, Article 6. 118 1/CP.16. mitigation and adaptation. The Parties also requested 109 Capacity Building for SIDS document, pp. 2-3. 114 Designated National Authorities, http://cdm.unfccc.int/DNA/index.html 119 Capacity Building for SIDS document, pp. 24-25.
50 51 Module 4 The Process: Institutional structure of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
The CTCN also seeks to facilitate collaboration via a implementation of the results of TNAs; promoting network of experts from academia, the private sector, enabling environments and recommended actions and research institutions. to address barriers to technology development and transfer; collaborating on specific areas of work with Technology Executive Committee (TEC)122 stakeholders and institutions under and outside of the The Technology Executive Committee (TEC), Convention; and promoting medium and long-term established at COP 16, is mandated to carry out six strategies and activities on technology development functions, including the following: and transfer to accelerate actions on mitigation and • Provide an overview of technological needs and adaptation. The CTCN and the TEC are required to analysis of policy and technical issues related to jointly report to the COP on their activities and the the development and transfer of technologies for performance of their functions. mitigation and adaptation; • Consider and recommend actions to promote 4.2 Negotiating Phases Defined technology development and transfer, in order to accelerate action on mitigation and adaptation; Plenary and “A formal meeting of the entire COP, CMP or one of • Recommend guidance on policies and programme the subsidiary bodies. Formal decisions or conclusions priorities related to technology development and may only be taken during plenary sessions”.126 transfer with special consideration given to the least developed country Parties.123 Friends of the Chair “Delegates called upon by the Chair (who takes The TEC has 20 expert members, with nine members into account the need for political balance among from Annex I Parties; three members from Africa; three various interests) to assist in carrying out specific members from Asia and the Pacific; three members tasks.”127 A Friends of the Chair meeting may be from Latin America and the Caribbean; one member open-ended, which usually leads to a large number from small island developing states (SIDS); and one of Parties attending, or it may be closed, with only member from least developed countries (LDCs).124 a small number of countries or groups of countries represented. A Contact Group is an open-ended The TEC must agree on and regularly review its workplan.125 The workplan is not required to be Contact Group meeting that may be established approved by the COP or subsidiary bodies. The TEC’s The contact group is: by the COP workplan for 2014 and 2015 is structured around “An open-ended meeting that may be established five strategic objectives—promoting coherence by the COP, a subsidiary body or a Committee of and synergy with the Technology Mechanism; the Whole wherein Parties may negotiate before recommending actions to strengthen the technology forwarding agreed text to a plenary for formal needs assessment (TNA) process and enhance adoption. Observers generally may attend contact group sessions”.128
120 Decision 14/CP.18. 125 Ibid. 121 Technical Assistance, http://ctcn-public.mijnlieff.nl/technical-assistance 126 UNFCCC Glossary, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/glossary/ 122 Capacity Building for SIDS document, pp. 23-25. items/3666.php 123 Decision 1/CP.16. 127 Ibid. 124 Capacity building for SIDS document page 24. 128 Ibid.
52 53 Module 4 The Process: Institutional structure of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
Informal Contact Group 4.3 Document Types Draft Negotiation Text A negotiating tactic, used by some, is to recall The informal contact group is: A draft negotiation text is one on which Parties favourable decisions in the preamble of text currently “A group of delegates instructed by the President or Party submissions and Conference room papers discuss with a view to finalising a decision. The origin under negotiation or to use “approved text or a Chair to meet in private to discuss a specific matter (CRPs) of this negotiating text is usually a point of contention language” from a previous decision in a current in an effort to consolidate different views, reach a Party submissions are normally issued as miscellaneous over process. For example, in Warsaw, Poland, Parties decision. This is an attempt to reinforce a particular compromise, and produce an agreed proposal, often documents and are not translated.131 Parties may decided on a timeline for the development of the 2015 position. COP decisions, unless specifically stated, in the form of a written text”.129 Observers are not make submissions containing information and views, agreement. Parties agreed that an initial draft text be have no end date. However, later decisions often refine usually present during these informal sessions. which may be made in response to specific calls for developed by December 2014 and that a formal draft or add detail to earlier decisions. A later decision submissions included in the outcome of a session.132 text be submitted by May 2015.136 However, Parties could may even undo or change previous decisions on the Informal-Informal Negotiations (“Informal- The secretariat’s new submission portal can be not agree initially on the process. What text would be same matter. Decisions live on, without any apparent Informals”) accessed at: http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/ used as the basis for negotiation? Some Parties wanted hierarchy. This is why there is intense debate over each “Informal-Informals” are smaller group settings SitePages/sessions.aspx. the process to be “Party-driven” with a “compilation word in a draft negotiating text before it becomes a “used to troubleshoot a specific problematic issue or text”, which is comprised of the submissions made formal decision. advance negotiations on contentious issues”.130 These Conference room papers (CRPs) are “in-session by Parties, as the starting point. Others thought that may also be referred to as drafting groups or spin- documents containing new proposals or outcome of process would be too cumbersome and preferred a Under Article 15 of the Convention, Parties may off groups. Informal informals “may be open-ended or in-session work and are intended for use only during streamlined text (perhaps with options) prepared by propose amendments to the Convention. Proposed limited only to those delegates invited to participate.” the session.”133 the Co-Chairs after several Contact Group meetings amendments must be communicated at least six and bilaterals to explore Party positions and to find months prior to the COP session that is to consider that High-Level Ministerial Sessions Technical papers points of convergence. amendment for adoption. While Article 15 encourages High-Level Ministerial Sessions are often held in the Technical papers have been produced within the Parties to reach consensus on such amendments, it second week of the meeting of the COP/CMP. These UNFCCC on a wide range of topics including The plenary ended in Lima with a draft ADP decision does provide that, if consensus cannot be reached, sessions may focus on a specific issue, such as climate adaptation strategies, emission reduction targets, text being presented by the COP President (after an amendment can be adopted by a three-fourths finance. In the past, guiding questions have been climate impacts, and hydrofluorocarbons. Under ADP lengthy closed bilaterals) and Parties given one hour majority vote. Following adoption, Parties must provided to facilitate preparations for the sessions. Workstream 2, the technical paper on options to to “huddle” to consider the text. This “take it or leave deposit instruments of acceptance. High-level sessions have also been held in conjunction enhance mitigation ambition is regularly updated to it” last-ditch attempt to find universal consensus with the mid-year meeting of the subsidiary bodies. incorporate information from submissions and from has, unfortunately, become a regular feature of Prior to high-level sessions, AOSIS attempts to brief recent technical expert meetings (TEMs).134 recent COPs. AOSIS should strive to ensure that it its attending Ministers either electronically or through is always adequately represented and has a strong a physical meeting. A lack of continuity in attendance The Chair’s text and non-papers communication link with the President of the COP, and of appropriate briefing material hampers the A non-paper is an in-session document issued whenever the negotiations go behind closed doors. effectiveness of AOSIS participation at these sessions. informally to facilitate negotiations. It does not It is recommended that a concise but comprehensive have an official document symbol, but may have an Decisions written brief is prepared for AOSIS ministers and that identifying number or carry the name of its author.135 A decision is a document formally adopted by the continuity be provided at these sessions by means COP or CMP. Decisions are translated into all six UN of the accreditation of the appropriate regional languages (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, institutions (e.g. CCCCC) to attend. Along with the 131 Introductory Guide to Documents, http://unfccc.int/documentation/ and Spanish) and are labeled by the decision number, introductory_guide_to_documents/items/2644.php national Ministers, these regional bodies would be able 132 Submissions from Parties, http://unfccc.int/documentation/submissions_ followed by the session of the COP or CMP adopting to articulate AOSIS positions that are strengthened by from_parties/items/5900.php the decision. For example, 1/COP.20 would be the first 133 a regional approach—for example, access to finance. Introductory Guide to Documents, http://unfccc.int/documentation/ decision adopted by COP 20. introductory_guide_to_documents/items/2644.php 129 Ibid. 134 FCCC/TP/2014/13. 130 Guide for Presiding Officers, p. 17 http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/ 135 EU document, p. 108. publications/guide_presiding_officers.pdf 136 FCCC/ADP/2013/3.
54 55 SIDS Climate Change Negotiators’ Guidance Manual
Module 5
Civil Society And Media Engagement
56 57 Module 5 Civil Society And Media Engagement
5.0 Introduction elsewhere in society: to observe, contribute, and ground” implementation. armed with lawyers, who use their expertise to affect bring accountability to decision-making processes change through existing legal apparatuses.143 Representatives of civil society (or non-governmental that impact the public good. In fact, Principle 10 of Of course, there are a multitude of players involved There can be considerable overlap amongst the organisations (NGOs)) and news organisations have the Rio+20 outcome document (“The Future We in the climate campaigning space, and they bring a advocacy approaches taken by these groups—be attended meetings of the United Nations Framework Want”) states that “Environmental issues are best multiplicity of agendas and political orientations to it in the areas of science, policy, human rights, or Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) since the handled with participation of all concerned citizens, the negotiations. A subsequent section will look more international law. Groups like 350.org have blended body’s inception at the 1992 “Rio Earth Summit”137. at the relevant level”.139 closely at the ideological divide that more and more many of these approaches into an online-based However, in the same way that thinking about such characterises climate-related NGOs, but they can campaigning movement. For example, in 2014, that issues as climate change and sustainable development To be sure, few crises have more far-reaching be said to broadly represent four main issue areas: organisation was largely responsible for turning out has evolved over the years, so have the ways groups consequences for the environment and for social environmental, humanitarian, science-policy, and an estimated 400,000 demonstrators for the People’s involved with these topics and in policy-making well-being than that of climate change: Extinction, legal. Climate March, which coincided with UN Secretary- varied their responses, their communications styles, ocean acidification, habitat loss, desertification, crop General Ban Ki-moon’s climate summit on the margins and methods of engagement. Their level of influence failures, droughts, famine, and sea level rise are just Most groups touch on each of these categories in of the body’s annual general assembly144. in regard to these issues has tended to fluctuate a few of its most detrimental impacts on the natural their work, and there are obvious interconnections as well. Still, the roles these groups play at climate and human environments. between them, but Greenpeace, for instance, takes One indication of the number of climate change change talks have remained much the same, but the quite a different approach to campaigning than interest groups involved at the UNFCCC is the large proliferation of social media outlets run by NGOs and It is not surprising, then, that a proliferation of interest Oxfam, which focuses on the nexus between climate membership of the Climate Action Network (CAN), other interested parties has had a significant impact groups focused on these issues, and many others, change and global poverty.141 which sends a representative speaking on behalf of both on public opinion and on the level of influence participate in meetings in relation to the UNFCCC over 900 NGOs from more than 100 countries. This wielded by these groups. and its related bodies. In fact, scholars have argued More science and policy-oriented organisations, such organisation is often visible at the talks, particularly that the talks cannot merely be understood as the as the World Resources Institute and World Wildlife with its daily presentation of the “Fossil of the Day” In fact, leading up to the ground-breaking Rio Summit, sole domain of national governments, but rather Fund (WWF), rely on academic research in science award, which is given to the parties seen as being the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) worked as a “myriad (of) actors representing a diversity of and governance to inform their participation in most obstructionist at the negotiations. Many NGOs closely with Center for International Environmental interests”. In other words, the climate talks have been climate change discussions; increasingly, they work make themselves available as a technical resource to Law (CIEL) in support of efforts to ensure that climate elevated to international prominence, “not because with government and business leaders to influence understaffed party delegations at the talks, including change featured prominently on the meeting’s of the official agreements reached, but because they policies from within existing power structures.142 Still, AOSIS and the least developed countries (LDCs) (see agenda; AOISIS has continued relationships with many help set global agendas, facilitate ‘joined-up’ thinking other NGOs, such as the Foundation for International the graph below). other environmental groups since then.138 Given that and provide global leadership for national and local Environmental Law and Development (FIELD), are some member states face an existential threat from governments”.140 sea level rise, reporters have long been interested in talking with the group’s representatives in order to But their engagement has been met with resistance feature the dramatic impact that climate change has from some Parties, which insist that the UNFCCC on these islands. should remain the sole domain of national governments—a perspective that became evident A Short History Of Civil Society And Media during the debate over the participation of cities and At The Climate Change Talks local governments in Workstream 2 of the Ad Hoc 137 http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2014/sbi/eng/03.pdf 141 www.greenpeace.org; www.oxfam.org Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced 138 http://www.ciel.org/about-us/2010-frederick-anderson-climate change- 142 www.wri.org; www.e3g.org award-recipient-alliance-of-small island-states-aosis/ 143 www.ciel.org; www.field.org.uk 5.1 Civil Society Action (ADP). In general, AOSIS supports the broad 139 http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default. 144 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/nyregion/new-york-city-climate participation of stakeholders, particularly those from asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163 change-march.html 140 NGO Diplomacy: The Influence of Nongovernmental Organizations in 145 http://unfccc.int/files/parties_and_observers/ngo/application/pdf/ The intended role of civil society at the climate change the private sector, financial institutions, and local International Environmental Negotiations, Felix Dodds and Michelle Betsill, cumulative_admissions_of_oob negotiations generally mirrors that played by NGOs government that are involved in actual “on-the- 2007, p. 2. server_organizations_cop_1-19.pdf
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Figure 3: Cumulative Admissions Of Observer Organizations145 regional groupings or organizations”.148 5.3 Climate Reporting And The Evolution Of Public Opinion But back in the 1980s and 1990s, neither Hansen,
1800 104 nor the aforementioned island leaders, nor the When news outlets or more generally “the media” are 99 environmental groups that increasingly began to 1600 93 discussed in the context of the UNFCCC, it is often NGO IGO 86 advocate for action, assumed the advocacy posture assumed that journalists—be they print, television, 1400 83 that defines the movement today. Experts and activists or bloggers—perform a similar role to what they
1200 alike tended to think that, when presented with the do outside the process: that is, they cover the topic facts about climate change, decision-makers would without bias and demonstrate a genuine commitment 1000 70
62 respond appropriately, and do what was necessary to to facts and the truth. 1676 60 1621 149 800 59 1542 prevent the crisis from spinning out of control. 54 1409 52 1319 Whether reporters can ever truly be neutral on a 600 51 49 50 44 974 To this day, AOSIS and many other country groupings subject remains an open question, but it is true that, 38 868 400 36 761 790 invoke “science” when arguing for the need for 662 back at that first meeting in Rio, before climate 33 614 554 501 520 23 479 urgent climate action. The plea was enshrined in the change became such a highly charged debate, news 200 21 359 395 294 176 210 “1.5 To Stay Alive” rallying cry heard in Copenhagen coverage of the issue did not always reflect the 0 CO P 1C OP 2C OP 3C OP 4C OP 5C OP 6C OP 6.5C OP 7C OP 8C OP 9C OP 10 CO P 11/ CO P 12/ CO P 13/ CO P 14/ CO P 15/ CO P 16/ CO P 17/ CO P CO P and, to be sure, science shows that a temperature CM P 1 CM P 2 CM P 3 CM P 4 CM P 5 CM P 6 CM P 7 18/CM P 19/CM P reality of what was taking place. Furthermore, the 8 9 increase beyond that all-important threshold would controversy that now typifies the debate was largely be devastating to many communities. absent. Significantly, the headline from the New York 5.2 Climate Action: From Common Sense To who began to work with the Center for International Times at the conclusion of the 1990 summit hailed: Controversy Environmental Law (CIEL) to develop a strategy However, convincing the general public of the science “With Climate Treaty Signed, All Say They’ll Do Even for addressing the issue at the international level. about climate change and even appealing to people’s More”.151 This headline was typical of the reporting at The physics and chemistry of climate change have Attention was drawn to this fact by some of AOSIS’s sympathies by illustrating what is at stake for small that time, and demonstrated the prevailing optimism. been understood since the 1950s, but after a series early founders—John W. Ashe, Robert Van Lierop, islands is turning out to be more complicated than of papers persuasively demonstrated that the earth and Anilla Cherian—in their 1999 paper entitled “The originally thought and, according to recent social It’s hard to imagine such an optimistic prognostication was warming steadily as a result of human activities role of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) science research, may even be counterproductive, with today, but like politics, news reflects the historical (particular the burning of fossil fuels) were published in the negotiation of the United Nations Framework many polls finding that information about proliferating context in which it takes place. The economic situation by NASA scientist James Hansen in the 1980s, experts Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)”, who crises often lead people to react with despair, rather was very different in the 1990s and the world was not and policy-makers started to pay closer attention.146 wrote: than to become engaged.150 In response, AOSIS has the same place that it is today. The ascendancy of started to deploy messaging that demonstrates the emerging powers (and the breakneck speed which In 1990, further research findings highlighted in a “With such overwhelming scientific evidence and proactive steps small islands are taking to address some achieved economic growth, largely powered by report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate observations at their disposal, the small island or climate change and to position themselves as leaders fossil fuels) meant that the global community had yet Change (IPCC) projected that a “Half a million people low-lying coastal developing countries of the major in tackling the problem, and not just its victims. to fully set the contours of what nations were willing living in archipelagos and coral atoll nations that lie oceans of the world formed an ad hoc coalition of to agree to when it came to climate action. countries known as the Alliance of Small Island States almost entirely within three metres of sea level, such 146 http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/06/29/the-catastrophist as the Maldives, the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, Kiribati, (AOSIS). This Alliance, whose members are primarily 147 “The role of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) in the negotiation Tokelau and other archipelagos and island nations in member states of the United Nations, represents of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC by John W. Ashe“, Robert Van Lierop, Anilla Cherian,” Natural Resources Forum the Pacific, Indian Ocean and the Caribbean, could countries, which are particularly vulnerable to the 23 ( I 999), p. 209-220 149 http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/06/29/the-catastrophist lose much of their beaches and arable lands, which adverse consequences of climate change and sea 148 “The role of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) in the negotiation 150 http://journalistsresource.org/studies/environment/climate change/shifting- of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC by would cause severe economic and social disruption”.147 level rise, which share similar or comparable levels of public-opinion-empirical-assessment-influencing-concern-u-s John W. Ashe“,Robert Van Lierop, Anilla Cherian,” Natural Resources Forum 23 151 http://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/13/world/the-earth-summit-with-climate- These dire implications were not lost on island leaders, economic development, and are members of island ( I 999) pp. 209-220 treaty-signed-all-say-they-ll-do-even-more.html
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As sociologists Riley E. Dunlap and Aaron M. McCright below their 1990 levels. It was soon realised that many illustrate in the Oxford Handbook of Climate Change countries would not be able to meet their emissions and Society152, a concerted effort by what they call targets and even if they did, it would make very little the “climate change denial machine” had yet to factor difference since developing countries were greatly into public opinion. But, “as the threat of international increasing their emissions and would exceed those of policy-making increased, from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol industrial countries by 2020. to the 2009 COP in Copenhagen, the growing army of opponents to carbon reduction policies … steeped up Unrealistic and misdirected objectives: Member their attacks.”153 states that abandoned the Protocol argued that too much emphasis was placed on carbon dioxide and Subsequently, political and economic factors began not enough on other greenhouse gases. to dampen the initial enthusiasm that greeted the signing of the Kyoto Protocol. Four of the largest Controversy over exempting developing countries: It economic powers and most important signatories was argued that a fundamental flaw of the Protocol later abandoned their commitment to the Protocol. was the exclusion of developing countries from There were a number of reasons why they and other binding reductions in emissions, since they were member states began retreating from their initial importing and using huge amounts of fossil fuels to undertakings:154 grow their economies, and thus would continue to contribute to climate change, despite reductions by Questions about the science of climate change: industrialised countries. Given that large areas of uncertainty remain in regard to predictions about climate change, it was argued Severe economic consequences: Given that that, if the science was uncertain, then member states adherence to the Protocol would greatly increase the could not be expected to make firm commitments cost of energy, some member states argued that such on the basis of what was asserted to be questionable a development would greatly harm their economies, data and unreliable computer models predicting the put jobs at risk, and harm countries’ competitiveness. future (one thinks of the controversy surrounding the It is not an exaggeration to state that a media so-called “hockey stick” model, which was discredited campaign to discredit the theory of climate change The Protocol required that industrial in the eyes of many155). The Protocol also does not accompanied the changing economic and political differentiate between human and non-human sources environment. As Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway countries had to reduce their emissions for greenhouse gases, another point of contention. asserted in a 2010 publication,156 a concerted effort to to below their 1990 levels. Unreachable targets: The Protocol required that muddy the waters and sway public opinion in terms of industrial countries had to reduce their emissions to climate change was launched. Their book, Merchants
152 Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society, Edited by John S. Dryzek, Richard Norgaard, and David Schlosberg, 2011. 153 https://books.google.com/books?id=JihhbdpO-yoC&pg=PA144&lpg=PA144&dq=%22Organized+Climatechange+Denial%22+mccright+du nlap+oxford&source=bl&ots=mTaCbrS_9e&sig=6AvQabli6J_t68Csb7CCGiWffT8&hl=en&ei=OK6ITqn9HYPk0QGKo53EDw&sa=X&oi=book_ result&ct=result#v=onepage&q=%22Organized%20Climate change%20Denial%22%20mccright%20dunlap%20oxford&f=false 154 http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2001/05/president-bush-right-to-abandon-kyoto-protocol 155 The hockey stick model was used to demonstrate that the rise in global temperatures was unprecedented. 156 Oreskes, Naomi and Conway, Erik M. Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming. Bloomsbury Press, 2010. 157 www.merchantsof.doubt.com
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of Doubt, emphasises how journalists and Internet 5.4 Adopting An Effective Communication However, certain industrialised nations became mentioned above have large staffs and budgets bloggers often uncritically repeated the mistruths Strategy increasingly resistant to having to “pay”, as they saw already dedicated to promoting climate action and and distortions.157 it, for their previous actions (at the expense of their countering the rhetoric of climate sceptics. Thus, As many thinkers and advocates in terms of the present situation). when designing a media campaign, one should begin However, an examination of the success of the climate have stated, what does not work in terms of with strategic thinking to identify how they can climate-denial campaign demonstrates how effective the “climate message” is isolating and/or “bashing” The geopolitical landscape had changed dramatically best contribute to a useful discussion of the issues engagement with the media should be organised one or other of the member states of the UNFCCC since 1992, with China, India, Brazil, South Africa, and concerned. in order to advocate for climate action and counter or others; such campaigns are negative and tend Russia experiencing a substantial rise in fossil fuel misinformation that exists. In addition, trends in the to harden attitudes and stiffen resistence. Positive consumption and, in the case of China, consistent It is crucial that SIDS negotiators craft and implement recent past exemplify the importance of the effective messages communicate the results of recent research double-digit economic growth. In fact, in 2008, China and effective media campaign, and that they exploit use of social media. to the general public and to political leaders; this is surpassed the United States as the world’s largest every media resource available to them. Steps for an done in an effort to change attitudes and behaviours emitter. In this context, major historic emitters, effective campaign include: First, one should be aware that, fundamentally, media and to alter perceptions about what is occurring particularly the United States and European nations, • Determining the objectives to be reached (they efforts by international organisations interested in globally. were increasingly less sympathetic to the argument should be made “SMART”: specific, measurable, enhancing an awareness of the dangers of climate for CBDR, which had been a fundamental principle in attainable, relevant, and time-bound). change is about changing people’s beliefs and, by One important message that must be emphasised the original Convention. In fact, a dominant message • Breaking down the objectives into incremental extension, the policies implemented by the officials is that of an enhanced awareness of shared global in today’s discourse is that the world has change steps. they elect into office. The fossil fuel industry lobbied responsibility and the positive impact that such a shift dramatically since the early 1990s and it is no longer • Establishing a performance-evaluation mechanism against the Kyoto Protocol and against reductions in in thinking could achieve. Key member states (who reasonable for developing countries to get a pass on that will measure success and provide feedback. emissions; advocates of the Protocol should lobby just were big emitters of greenhouse gases), after initially taking climate action. • Identifying groups/organisations (NGOs, IGOs, as effectively if they wish to change public opinion. signing the Protocol, became increasingly skeptical etc.) that will support the achievement of the about the argument for “Common but Differentiated However, for many years, the belief has survived that objectives. Second, it should also be borne in mind that language Responsibility (CBDR)”, which in international law is we are one global civil society, which—in a historic • Targeting the appropriate audiences. is a powerful tool in the environmental cause, and, one of the cornerstones of sustainable development mission—will save the world in light of the universal again, climate change deniers skillfully crafted their (it was explicitly formulated during the 1992 Rio Earth failure of state policies. This position is experiencing a In fact, AOSIS recently went through this exercise messages to achieve the maximum effect. Negotiators Summit160). This principle stems from the concept that renaissance, particularly following the disappointing and determined it would be worth testing a media from AOSIS and representatives from SIDS should there are common concerns and a common heritage United Nations climate summit in Copenhagen in campaign specifically focused on empowering its also learn to create messages that communicate their that all humankind shares, thus necessitating that all 2009. At the same time, the international climate negotiators by enabling them to appear high-profile concerns to the general public in the most effective states tact in a responsible manner in terms of other negotiation process highlights how large the conflicts news outlets (read by decision-makers and other manner possible. states—principally, in this case, in terms of sharing of interest among civil society climate actors have delegates), rather than engaging in efforts to shift the burden of environmental protection.161 This now become in terms of geography, positions, and public opinion on climate change on a mass scale. The For example, publications on the website “Talking principle “anchors on past harm done, or culpability” ideologies. results can be measured, not only by media hits, but Climate”158 publish a number of guides about how to and encourages equality and the ability of nations to also by getting direct feedback from other delegates communicate effectively with the public about climate meet to “tackle common environmental, economic Moving Forward: How To Use Media And Civil Society at the negotiations. The effort has proven relevant to change and how environmental advocacy groups can and social issues”.162 To Support SIDS the talks on numerous occasions when a particular frame their messages; writers on that site state that: The above background on the media, civil society, position or view needs to be broadcast quickly and 156 “But effective communication [about climate change] Oreskes, Naomi and Conway, Erik M. Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful and their relationship to climate change discourse the results are achievable at a single conference or of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global is about more than just picking the right words—the Warming. Bloomsbury Press, 2010. is useful for understanding the policy debate. But it over the course of a year or two, rather than over a way messages are framed, the values they speak 157 www.merchantsof.doubt.com is important to remember that many of the NGOs period of decades. 158 to and the narratives that bring the climate change http://talkingclimate.org/guides/communicating-climate change/ 159 http://talkingclimate.org/ 161 http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/151320/ 159 message alive are incredibly powerful”. 160 http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/151320/ 162 http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/151320/
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The tactic has shown two additional benefits: on-one interviews have proven much more effective • It offers maximum impact without taxing time- in answering journalists’ questions about the dynamic Organisation: Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) strapped delegates. nature of the negotiations. Facebook, with its massive • Appearing in highly credible news outlets raises reach, could be used in a variety of different ways, but Objective: Call attention to Typhoon Haiyan as the profile of the group and, it can be argued, it is important to remember that the medium often evidence of emerging climate impact. increases its bargaining power. is the message and reflect on when it is an effective platform for diplomats to be discussing foreign policy. Audience: International policy-makers, developed In fact, Ambassador Ronny Jumeau, AOSIS’s Twitter, on the other hand, is a powerful way to send a world political class. spokesperson, has emerged as one of the most message to all the reporters following you in a matter prominent voices in the climate change debate, with of seconds. Challenge: Putting AOSIS spokespeople forward scores of appearances and articles about him in the and leveraging relationships with international news New York Times, the Washington Post, Reuters, the Case Studies in Successful Media Work organisations. Associated Press, Bloomberg, and the BBC. Example 1: United Nations Security Council climate change and security debate. Strategy: Super-Typhoon Haiyan struck the It is important for climate change advocates to Philippines after narrowly missing several AOSIS understand what is being written about this issue in Objective: President’s statement recognising climate member states in the Pacific. The ensuing devastation the news. Most issues have an existing narrative, or change as a threat to international peace and security. called attention to the increasing threat of more story that is being told, and effective advocacy and powerful storms due to climate change and created negotiating entities adopt steps to control or at least Audience: UN ambassadors and international policy- a breaking news opportunity to use the tragedy as an influence the narrative. The underlying assumptions makers teaching moment. A press statement from the lead of any climate change story should be examined and negotiator was issued, while a spokesperson met with negotiators should pinpoint other popular narratives Organisation: Pacific Small Island Developing States the New York Times’ Moscow Bureau chief, who flew that can support the positions of small island states. to Warsaw to cover the story. The result was some of For instance, at the 2013 UNFCCC negotiations Challenge: Skepticism to UNSC action; asymmetrical the most in-depth reporting on a contentious issue at in Warsaw, Poland, Typhoon Haiyan struck the power imbalance at the United Nations. the talks known as “loss and damage”. Philippines with deadly consequences that played out graphically on television. The timing of the event Strategy: Given the intended audience and the and the growing narrative created an opportunity for PSIDS relative lack of power, a strategy designed to a discussion on Loss and Damage in a human context, communicate effectively to international stakeholders and Yeb Sano of the Philippines became an emotional and leaders was pursued. A telephone call to the spokesman for the cause in one of the most enduring New York Times established that the conditions were stories to come out at the same time that a UNFCCC optimal for submitting a story to the newspaper. The conference was taking place. story was framed as an environmental cautionary tale to make it widely relevant to all countries and was In addition, negotiators should identify the tactics that accompanied by outreach to the Times’ news desk, help achieve their objectives. Different campaigns Bloomberg, the Guardian, as well as blogs at the call for different tools, and not only are the tactics Center for American Progress and other think tanks. chosen important, but the way they are wielded are Additionally, a follow up piece was placed in the Links: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/19/opinion/19stephen.html?_r=0 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/21/world/21nations.html of equal relevance. A press release is a good way to Huffington Post. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-20/nauru-s-plea-for-un-action-on-climate-threat-goes-unheeded-1-.html http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/12/world/ broadcast a message to lots of reporters writing on Example 2: United Nations Climate Conference: asia/typhoon-in-philippines-casts-long-shadow-over-un-talks-on-climate-treaty.html http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/17/world/growing-clamor-about-inequities- deadline at the beginning and end of a COP, but one- Warsaw 2013 of-climate-crisis.html?pagewanted=all
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Module 6
Objectives of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)
68 69 Module 6 Objectives of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)
6.0 Introduction 6.1 Draft Elements Of The Paris Agreement However, a key question needs to be posed: How does information on adaptation et al will be too imprecise AOSIS ensure that its key objectives are met within and confusing to guide global decisions and will The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) has often As discussed in Module 2, elements of the Paris the proposed framework of the 2015 agreement? basically be there as a sop to countries that insisted been called the “conscience of the Climate Change Agreement are still to be decided and, along with that it should be included in the iNDC process. In this Convention.” Small islands are generally recognised the submission of the intended nationally determined 6.2 Mitigation And The NDCS context, the role of CARICOM and other progressive to be particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate contributions (INDCs), will be the focus of negotiations countries has to continue to be firmly fixed on the change, whilst contributing very little to the cause, under the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban AOSIS has always favoured a “top down” approach need to explicitly get aggressive emissions reductions either historically or currently. AOSIS is expected, by Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP in 2015). There are to the global mitigation effort, together with strong out of the Paris Agreement, and to adequately provide its own membership and by others, to be assertive in numerous options provided in each of the chapters international oversight of national targets. For for adaptation and MOI through the relevant chapters its call for: dealing with the proposed six elements in the draft AOSIS, these national targets should be binding in the new agreement.”164 • The maximum mitigation efforts possible from all text annexed to the Lima decision. legal obligations for all Parties (within the context of countries, as urgently as possible (pre- and post- the new agreement being a legal protocol) and the So, how does AOSIS get aggressive emission 2020), with the objective of keeping the rise in The current text has been described by one senior aggregate of the individual national numbers should reductions out of the Paris Agreement, now that the warming below 1.5ºC; with full transparency and AOSIS negotiator as follows: be easily determinable and should reflect an emissions proposed vehicle has become more muddled? accountability of actions, including market-based The elements text was drafted in a manner intended trajectory that gives a reasonable chance (>50%) of approaches; to capture the range of views expressed by Parties, keeping warming below 1.5ºC. This temperature goal Perhaps, AOSIS can: • The timely provision by developed countries of to capture the entire spectrum of possibilities, so that is a pre-requisite for the survival of all SIDS. • Continue to lobby at all levels for ambitious adequate, easily accessible, new and additional the elements text itself can or will evolve to satisfy the national mitigation targets in the submitted INDCs. finance and other means of implementation to 6 month rule - with any language that arguably falls Climate change is the ultimate negative externality. • Take the lead in the timely submission of its own developing countries; within the boundaries of the element text fair game No individual country or group of countries will take members’ INDCs using the format recommended • A balanced approach to adaptation when dealing for the 2015 agreement. As a result, the elements text unilateral action (i.e. aggressively reduce its emissions in paragraph 14 of the Lima decision and encourage with the elements of the agreement; doesn’t present language that’s suitable for adoption at the rate and by the amount deemed necessary others to do so. • Consideration of loss and damage as a separate or even clear options or options that are mutually by science) that will place it at a comparative • Use what remains of the ex-ante assessment element, and not as a component of adaptation; exclusive.”163 disadvantage. There is a need for robust, internationally procedure for the INDCs as effectively as possible. • Special consideration of small island developing The Lima decision allows for this annexed text to be binding action by all countries. “Self-differentiation” • Encourage its entire membership to ratify the states (SIDS) when decisions are being made in taken forward into the negotiations in 2015. It will be will not provide the requisite assurances. Doha Amendments to the Kyoto Protocol and regard to mitigation responsibilities, measurement, up to the Parties and the new Co-Chairs of the ADP lobby others to do the same. reporting and verification (MRV) of actions, access to determine its status. However, the Lima decision Instead, the world has agreed upon a “bottom-up” • Continue to support and improve Workstream 2 to finance and other means of implementation clearly does state that the new agreement will address approach through the vehicle of Intended Nationally of the ADP. (MOI); and the following six elements in a balanced manner: Determined Contributions (INDC). Aspects of the • Refuse to accept an agreement in Paris that does • Special recognition of the transformative capacity • Mitigation; Lima decision on the scope of the INDCs (can include not meet minimum mitigation criteria. of transitioning to a low-carbon economy for SIDS. • Adaptation; adaptation, see paragraph 12); the voluntary nature • Finance; of their content (“may include,” in paragraph 14); the In terms of the last bullet point above, it is The above may be considered as the key objectives • Technology development and transfer; loss of the ability to conduct an effective ex ante recommended that AOSIS develop these minimum for AOSIS in any future climate change agreement. • Capacity building; and assessment with the publication of the synthesis report mitigation criteria and the political will to defend “red This module discusses possible approaches to achieve • Transparency of action and support. not until Nov 1st, 2015 (Para 16b) were all disappointing lines” in Paris. these objectives. to AOSIS. One of AOSIS’ lead negotiators has stated: The role of the iNDC has not evolved in Lima. It has become more muddled and impotent, in that it will no longer be able to achieve the explicit commitment
163 Mace, MJ. 2015, Pers. Comm. to emissions reductions that it was intended to. The 164 Charles, L, 2015. Pers. Comm.
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One AOSIS member has made a recent submission in address this issue in the upcoming negotiations. implementation of post-2020 commitments, and 6. Meaningful political engagement: The Republic of regard to the mitigation element. The Republic of the provides the clearest possible understanding of the Marshall Islands argues that reviews and technical Marshall Islands made a submission in October 2014,165 3. Decarbonisation goals: The RMI submission Parties’ aggregate emissions…”. The ability to MRV papers by themselves do not yield transformational which envisaged the “creation of an upward spiral of also calls for Parties to “bring forward longer term post-2020 commitments is seen by the RMI as a outcomes. This member state sees the need for ambition” by adherence to the following concepts decarbonisation goals” (e.g. for 2050), which should fundamental requirement of the Paris Agreement. To engagement with ministers and decision-makers and proposals in the Lima decision on INDCs: also be captured in the new protocol. The new protocol achieve consensus within AOSIS, it may be necessary through bilateral and multilateral discussions that take should capitalise on current national potential, should to nuance a position where the measurement, place in conjunction with high-level political events. 1. No backsliding would be permitted: Developed express aspirational ambition, and should describe the reporting and verification (MRV) requirements are There appears to be no objection within AOSIS to this countries must continue to bring forward and challenges of reaching their goal. The RMI envisages, differentiated for least-developed countries (LDCs) position. implement quantified and absolute economy-wide in addition to the INDCs, that Parties will indicate and small island developing states (SIDS) (see emission reduction commitments over a commitment longer-term, aspirational, decarbonisation goals on Brazilian Concentric Circles below). period. For developing countries, proposed a more informal platform. There appears to be no commitments must be at least as robust as those they objection within AOSIS to this position. have committed to previously, with an understanding 166 that those with most responsibility and capacity will 4. Ex-ante (2015) assessment of INDCs: “Doing Figure 4: Brazil’s Concentric Circles Chart do more than necessary, for example by moving from as much as you can”. The Republic of the Marshal business-as-usual targets to intensity targets and then Islands’ submission expressed the hope that the absolute targets, or expanding coverage, over time. Lima decision would provide a time table for the The “no backsliding principle” was captured by submission of the INDCS in 2015 that would allow paragraph 10 of the Lima Decision. for political engagement on their adequacy prior to the Paris COP. However, this decision calls for the 2. Cycle of commitments: “Sitting down at the table submission of a Synthesis Report from the Secretariat together, every five years”: The Republic of the by 1 November 2015, leaving very little time for this Marshall Islands’ submission calls for all INDCs to ex ante assessment phase. It should be noted that have the same commitment periods and end dates within AOSIS) there was no consensus on the need to allow for better comparison and aggregation of for and scope of the ex-ante assessment, given that efforts. It calls for a five-year commitment period such member states were concerned over potential which, in its opinion, allows countries to improve their international scrutiny of their own INDCs. There ambition in response to the developments in science appears to be a need for more internal dialogue within and technology, and avoids the risk of “locking in” AOSIS to achieve consensus on this issue. low ambition over a lengthy commitment period. Paragraph 14 of the Lima decision leaves it up to the 5. MRV of post-2020 commitments and interactive Parties to determine the length of the implementation demonstration to address full national potential: period of their INDCs. Some AOSIS members appear “Showing you are doing as much as you can.” The RMI to support a longer (10-year) commitment period. has called for the 2015 Paris Protocol to “include a AOSIS does not have a consensus position on the specific and facilitative process that builds upon the length of the commitment period and may wish to current biennial MRV framework to review Parties’
165 RMI, 2014. Republic of the Marshall Islands. Submission to the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) - Ambition 166 Brazil, 2014. Brazil ADP Elements. http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/SitePages/sessions. in the ADP and the 2015 Agreement. October 2014. aspx?showOnlyCurrentCalls=1&populateData=1&expectedsubmissionfrom=Parties&focalBodies=ADP
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Brazil has proposed a differentiated approach to of AOSIS, it is assumed that the actions and policy 6.3 Adaptation And Loss And Damage: The in the Paris Agreement when it comes to adaptation. the mitigation component of the INDCs (see the decisions recommended in the textbox below have Special Vulnerability Of SIDS This emphasis by AOSIS on the special vulnerability self-explanatory figure above). In its November the support of the AOSIS members and will act as of SIDS has caused friction within the G77 and China 2014 submission, Brazil stated that it expected that one of the guides to the mitigation goals sought by Nauru, on behalf of AOSIS, made its latest submissions group, with others also claiming special vulnerability countries would make use of the following options this alliance. on adaptation on 30 November 2014 and on loss and status. It is recommended, that despite this friction, when they were defining their INDCs: damage on 4 November 2014. The key messages from AOSIS continues to claim this special status for SIDS. • A quantified, economy-wide, absolute emission • We can and must act boldly now to reduce these submissions may be summarised as follows: limitation or reduction target in relation to a greenhouse gas emissions to keep the politically WHEN ADAPTATION ACTIONS ARE NOT ENOUGH, baseline year; agreed 1.5-2ºC goal within reach, avoid increased SIDS are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of WHAT’S LEFT IS PERMANENT LOSS AND DAMAGE. • A quantified, economy-wide, emission limitation costs of mitigation, adaptation, and technological climate change and adaptation to these adverse or reduction target relative to a projection of its lock-in, provide universal access to modern energy, effects is of high priority for the group. The AOSIS submission on loss and damage (L&D) emissions; and realise multiple health and development co- calls for it to be included as a separate element of • A quantified, economy-wide, emission limitation benefits. SIDS are experiencing unavoidable loss and damage the Paris Agreement. This was a crucial issue in Lima, or reduction target relative to units of gross • The scale of the challenge is beyond anything we from the effects of climate change. For SIDS, with language in the original draft text that subsumed domestic product (GDP) in relation to a previous have yet considered. Success is essential for current adaptation is thus a matter of survival, and not merely loss and damage under adaptation. AOSIS took the year; and future generations but is only achievable if we a matter of climate-resilient sustainable development. strategic decision that it would rather see no specific • A quantified, economy-wide, emission limitation tackle the technological, institutional, financial, The compounded adverse impacts of climate change reference to L&D in the Lima decision, thus leaving and reduction target per capita; and and political inertia now. Despite the rise in profile contribute to existing challenges that are unique to the door open for future negotiations. At the very • Non-economy-wide actions. of climate change as a critical issue, emissions SIDS. end of the Lima COP, as a condition of acceptance since 2000 have been increasing at a rate almost of the decision, Tuvalu (on behalf of the LDCs) made The Brazilian proposal deserves close scrutiny, given three times faster than they did in the last decade To date, global financial resources, which have been a statement expressing its determination that L&D that it is likely to get some traction within the G77 of the nineties. Our current pathway will not available and accessible to SIDS for adaptation have receive distinct treatment in the new agreement. and China group, and perhaps some of the developed achieve the deep decarbonization we need. Time been grossly insufficient to meet ever-increasing and countries as well. It should be noted that Brazil is is running out. dire needs. To ensure the permanency of the L&D mechanism, contemplating four possible types of economy-wide • There is major cost-effective potential to rapidly AOSIS is calling for the Warsaw International targets (absolute, business-as-usual BAU) deviation, increase efficiency in the transportation, building, The adaptation submission, which is essential reading Mechanism on Loss and Damage to be anchored in per unit of GDP, and per capita). Some members of industrial, agricultural, waste management, and for any assigned AOSIS negotiator, provides AOSIS’ the 2015 agreement. AOSIS is also calling for new AOSIS are likely to object to any per capita metric. It water sectors with existing commercially available views on the following areas under negotiation: and additional finance for L&D that is separate and can be expected that LDCs and perhaps SIDS would technologies and use of best practice, given 1. The nature of commitments under the Convention; distinct from the finance provided for mitigation anticipate would reside in the outermost circle and appropriate policy support. 2. The particular vulnerability of small island and adaptation. This demand is perhaps the most would take on sectoral (non-economy-wide) actions. • There is significant scope for the early deployment developing states and low lying coastal states; pressing reason why some developed country Parties at scale of renewable energy technologies (e.g., 3. The need to enhance implementation actions on are insistent that L&D be treated as a continuum of In September 2014, there was a publication, wind and solar), if supported with policies (e.g., the ground; adaptation and are adamant that L&D be considered commissioned by the Republic of Nauru, as the Chair affordable capital, feed-in tariffs, elimination of 4. Institutional arrangements, including mechanisms part of the Cancun Adaptation Framework (CP.16/1). of the AOSIS, entitled “Tackling the Challenge of fossil-fuel subsidies, and de-risking investments) and modalities; Climate Change: A Near-Term Actionable Mitigation and increased public and private sector financing. 5. The means of implementation; and In 2015, AOSIS will have to weigh the risk of not having Agenda”. Authored by over 30 scientists and lead • An effective price on carbon to reflect the health 6. Aspirational global goals on adaptation. any specific reference to L&D in the new agreement negotiators, it calls for urgent mitigation action. The and environmental costs of emissions for current against the benefit of having L&D referenced as a following text box has been reproduced from the and future generations would send the right price Of particular strategic importance to AOSIS is the separate and distinct element. The strategy to date executive summary of that publication. Given that signal to drive investment recognition of the special, if not unique, vulnerability has been to go all out to achieve what is necessary, the publication was commissioned by the then Chair of SIDS and the need for specific provisions for SIDS and to reject any language that specifically makes
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provisions for L&D, but only within the context of Reducing carbon emissions is not considered as a If AOSIS truly considers finance to be a fundamental Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) “to adaptation. It may be prudent for AOSIS to conduct priority for SIDS. On a global scale, the emission building block of the Paris Agreement, it may be identify and to explore options for a range of actions further intensive bilateral discussion with other Parties trajectories of SIDS are inconsequential. However, prudent to determine what the minimum quantitative that can close the ambition gap with a view to ensuring (e.g. LDCs) to achieve more “buy-in” to the AOSIS due to the high economic costs of the importation of or qualitative criteria for the finance element are. the highest possible mitigation efforts by all Parties.” approach. fossil fuels to meet growing primary energy demand, AOSIS considers national financial policies and AOSIS members recognise the importance of the transformational capacity of transitioning to a low measures to be critical in the battle against climate strengthening adaptation actions in the pre-2020 6.4 Provision Of MOI: Economic carbon development path is enormous for many SIDS. change. period. However, the mandate from Durban focuses Transformation Through Green Energy on pre-2020 mitigation actions, which are critical INVESTMENT IN SIDS MAKES SENSE Developed countries must therefore include to providing the best chance to achieve the AOSIS The adequate provision by the developed countries commitments on financial policies and measures goal of limiting warming to 1.5 degrees above pre- of the means of implementation including new and SIDS should continue to lobby for special, simplified that will reduce investments in carbon intensive industrial levels. Since Durban, there have been additional finance (over and above that provided access, with low transaction costs, to finance, technologies and processes and to increase financial various initiatives under the UNFCCC to achieve this under official development assistance (ODA)) has technology transfer and development and capacity flows towards green technologies and investments goal. been a consistent call from AOSIS. Indeed, this has building for both mitigation and adaptation. and adaptation. We also believe that all Parties should been a consistent request by all of the members of commit and incentivize all future public and private 6.6 Ratification of Doha Amendments to the the G77 and China group. Support is required by For AOSIS, finance should be “a fundamental building climate finance flows towards resilient and low- Kyoto Protocol developing countries, in particular SIDS, to help them block of the 2015 agreement” with “quantitative emission development to facilitate the achievement prepare and then implement national adaptation commitments from the developed countries” of the objectives of the new agreement.1 In Doha, Qatar, in 2012, Parties adopted an amendment plans (NAPs) and nationally appropriate mitigation forming the core of the finance chapter. The USD to the Kyoto Protocol to agree to a second commitment actions (NAMAs). 100 billion/year offered by the developed countries Transparency is considered a key element of any period under the protocol, which runs from 1 January in Copenhagen in 2009 is seen by AOSIS as the floor finance chapter in the new agreement. AOSIS is 2013 until 31 December 2020. This extended the A critical success for AOSIS has been the decision for post-2020 obligations. AOSIS further argues in lobbying for an MRV system for finance that is robust, Kyoto Protocol until a new protocol, another legal by member states to allocate Green Climate Funds its submission that the amount of finance required as coherent, and contributes to “upward results cycles.” instrument, or an agreed outcome with legal force (GCF funds) to adaptation (50%) and to mitigation part of the MOI should be constantly reviewed. AOSIS is looking for a future financial system that would go into effect in 2020. The amendment (50%). It has also been decided that 50% of the GCF provides ex ante predictability and a clear ex post includes emissions-reduction commitments from adaptation funds will be allocated to SIDS and LDCs. It It has been noted that the funds pledged to the GCF picture of global financial flows. Parties; however, Japan, New Zealand,and Russia did will be incumbent upon SIDS to show the “absorption to date are equal to approximately USD 10 billion over not agree to take on new emissions reduction targets capacity” for these funds. a four-year period (2015 to 2018); this is equivalent AOSIS believes that the Least Developed Countries in the second commitment, while Canada withdrew to approximately USD 2.5 billion per year. It is further Fund (LDCF) and the Special Climate Change Fund from the Kyoto Protocol entirely. SIDS should seek to ensure that they receive an noted that all of the USD 10 billion is not “new and (SCCF) should be reformed along the same lines as adequate share of the funds allocated for mitigation as additional”, nor is it all grant funding. recommended in the Evaluation Report of the GEF The Doha amendment to the Kyoto Protocol requires well. It is noted that accessing the Clean Development and that the Adaptation Fund should be considered ratification by at least three-fourths of the Parties to Mechanism (CDM) has become much less attractive to This huge difference between the finance demanded for inclusion under the Financial Mechanism of the it for it to come into force. As of December 2014, only SIDS since the collapse in the price of carbon and the by the developing countries (including AOSIS) and Convention. 23 out of the required 144 instruments of acceptance decision of the EU to restrict the purchase of certified the amount pledged by the developed countries begs required for the entry into force of the Doha emission reductions (CERs) to those from LDCs. SIDS the question as to whether there are any red lines on 6.5 Workstream 2: Pre-2020 Mitigation amendment had been deposited.167 AOSIS members have put very little political pressure on the EU for finance for AOSIS. Ambition taking this decision. Perhaps, this is a reflection of the low priority given to market mechanisms by AOSIS IS AN INADEQUATE AGREEMENT IN PARIS BETTER At the insistence of AOSIS and others, Parties at COP members in general. THAN NO AGREEMENT? 17 in Durban (2011) agreed to establish Workstream 167 https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_ 2 (WS2) under the Ad Hoc Working Group on the no=XXVII7c&chapter=27&lang=en
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that have accepted the Doha amendment include: sustainable development, and sustainable cannot compromise. It will be important for the There is a lot of work for AOSIS negotiators to do if Barbados, Comoros, Guyana, Mauritius, Micronesia livelihoods, energy security, public health, AOSIS negotiators to identify red lines that cannot be they are to achieve their objectives. The reward for (Federated States of), Nauru, Singapore, Solomon economic competitiveness, and biodiversity, crossed, if any, and to obtain the political mandate success will be the gratitude of future generations. Islands, and Tuvalu. among others; to defend these positions, at all costs.Time is not on • Costs, including the scale and type of financial AOSIS’ side. The emissions gap is increasing, and the 6.7 Improving Kyoto Protocol Commitments resources needed for implementation; costs of closing this gap are increasing. The urgency of And Increasing Comparable Targets • Other barriers to implementation, including the situation may force AOSIS negotiators to consider technology and capacity; and accepting a less-than-perfect agreement for the sake The Doha amendment to the Kyoto Protocol required • Strategies that can be used to successfully of expediency. that Parties that had undertaken responsibilities under overcome these barriers to implementation the second commitment period revisit their obligations and mobilise the resources necessary for The current mitigation ambition (pre- and post- in 2014. The rationale behind this revisiting was to implementation, including through international 2020) of both the developed countries and the large have Parties “ratchet up” their pre-2020 mitigation cooperation inside and outside the UNFCCC. emerging emitters is too low. The Lima decision has pledges. This was considered an important means by diluted the ability for a meaningful ex ante assessment which the pre-2020 mitigation commitments could This technical process is non-prescriptive and seeks of the submitted INDCs to take place. The recent be increased and trust could be built up for the 2015 to find ways for Parties to share experiences and to drop in the price of oil, as OPEC countries fight to agreement negotiations. Additionally, it was expected find ways to implement mitigation actions that are maintain market share in competition with non- that Parties who had not given assurances in regard aligned with national development priorities. traditional sources of fossil fuels (shale oil and gas, to the second commitment period under the Kyoto At COP 20 in Lima (in 2014 it was agreed to extend tar sands), will slow the required decarbonisation of Protocol would also raise their comparable pledges. the technical expert process until 2020). It was economies. The collapse of the price of CERs under However, none of the Protocol or non-Protocol Parties also agreed to publish a summary of the technical the CDM continues to send the wrong price signal with comparable pledges increased their pledges information for policymakers and to encourage the and has removed a major potential source of funding in 2014. AOSIS, along with the rest of the G77 and Secretary and the President of the Conference of for mitigation projects in SIDS and has affected the China group, continues to call for increased pre-2020 the Parties to convene an annual high-level event replenishment of the Adaptation Fund. The initial ambition on the part of the developed countries. on enhancing implementation of climate action. An mobilisation of funds for the GCF has been welcomed institutional home for the technical process will be by AOSIS but, at the current level of 78 79 Appendix UNFCCC COUNTRY GROUPS AOSIS62 G77 and China63 Dominican Republic Micronesia (Federated States of) Tanzania (United Republic of) Guinea Antigua and Barbuda Afghanistan Ecuador Mongolia Thailand Guinea-Bissau Bahamas Algeria Egypt Morocco Timor-Leste Kenya Barbados Angola El Salvador Mozambique Togo Tonga Lesotho Belize Antigua and Barbuda Equatorial Guinea Myanmar Trinidad and Tobago Liberia Cabo Verde Argentina Eritrea Namibia Tunisia Libya Comoros Bahamas Ethiopia Nauru Turkmenistan Madagascar Cook Islands Bahrain Fiji Nepal Uganda Malawi Cuba Bangladesh Gabon Nicaragua United Arab Emirates Mali Dominica Barbados Gambia Niger Uruguay Mauritania Dominican Republic Belize Ghana Nigeria Vanuatu Mauritius Fiji Benin Grenada Oman Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) Morocco Federated States of Micronesia Bhutan Guatemala Pakistan Viet Nam Mozambique Grenada Bolivia Guinea Panama Yemen Namibia Guinea-Bissau Bosnia and Herzegovina Guinea-Bissau Papua New Guinea Zambia Niger Guyana (Plurinational State of) Guyana Paraguay Zimbabwe Nigeria Haiti Botswana Hait Peru Rwanda Jamaica Brazil Honduras Philippines African Group64 São Tomé and Príncipe Kiribati Brunei India Qatar Algeria Senegal Maldives Darussalam Indonesia Rwanda Angola Seychelles Marshall Islands Burkina Iran (Islamic Republic of) Saint Kitts and Nevis Benin Sierra Leone Mauritius Faso Iraq Saint Lucia Botswana Somalia Nauru Burundi Jamaica Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Burkina Faso South Africa Niue Cambodia Jordan Samoa Burundi South Sudan Palau Cameroon Kenya São Tomé and Principe Cabo Verde Sudan Papua New Guinea Cabo Verde Kiribati Saudi Arabia Cameroon Swaziland Samoa Central African Republic Kuwait Senegal Central African Republic Tanzania (United Republic of) Singapore Chad Lao (People’s Democratic Seychelles Chad Togo Seychelles Chile Republic of) Sierra Leone Comoros Tunisia São Tomé and Príncipe China Lebanon Singapore Congo (Democratic Republic of) Uganda Solomon Islands Colombia Lesotho Solomon Islands Congo (Republic of) Zambia St. Kitts and Nevis Comoros Liberia Somalia Côte d’Ivoire Zimbabwe Saint Lucia Congo (Democratic Republic of) Libya South Africa Democratic Republic of the Congo St. Vincent and the Grenadines Congo (Republic of) Madagascar South Sudan Djibouti LDCs65 Suriname Costa Rica Malawi Sri Lanka Egypt Afghanistan Timor-Leste Côte d’Ivoire Malaysia State of Palestine Equatorial Guinea Angola Tonga Cuba Maldives Sudan Eritrea Bangladesh Trinidad and Tobago Korea (Democratic People’s Mali Suriname Ethiopia Benin Tuvalu Republic of) Marshall Islands Swaziland Gabon Bhutan Vanuatu Djibouti Mauritania Syrian Arab Republic Gambia Burkina Faso Dominica Mauritius Tajikistan Ghana Burundi 80 81 Appendix I UNFCCC GROUPS Cambodia EIG Central African Republic LMDCs66 EU69 Mexico Chad Algeria Austria Republic of Korea Comoros Argentina Belgium Switzerland Democratic Republic of the Congo Bolivia Bulgaria Monaco Djibouti Cuba Croatia Liechtenstein Equatorial Guinea China Cyprus Eritrea Dominica Czech Republic Coalition for Rainforest Nations Ethiopia Ecuador Denmark Bangladesh Gambia Egypt Estonia Belize Guinea El Salvador Finland Cameroon Guinea-Bissau India France Cote d’Ivoire Haiti Iran Germany Congo (Democratic Republic of) Kiribati (People’s Democratic Iraq Greece Congo (Republic of) Republic of) Kuwait Hungary Dominica Lao (Democratic Republic of) Nicaragua Ireland Dominican Republic Lesotho Qatar Italy Fiji Liberia Saudi Arabia Latvia Gabon Madagascar Sri Lanka Lithuania Guyana Malawi Venezuela Luxembourg Honduras Mali Malta Kenya Mauritania BASIC The Netherlands Papua Mozambique Brazil Poland New Guinea Myanmar South Africa Portugal Togo Nepal India Romania Uganda Niger China Slovakia Rwanda Slovenia São Tomé and Príncipe AILAC67 Spain Senegal Chile Sweden Sierra Leone Colombia United Kingdom Solomon Islands Costa Rica Somalia Guatemala UMBRELLA South Sudan Panama Australia Sudan Peru Canada Tanzania (United Republic of) Japan 62 http://aosis.org/about/members/ Timor-Leste ALBA68 Kazakhstan 63 http://www.g77.org/doc/members.html 64 http://www.un.org/depts/DGACM/RegionalGroups.shtml Togo Bolivia New Zealand 65 http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc/ldc_list.pdf Tuvalu Cuba Norway 66 http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp2-5_submission_by_malaysia Uganda Ecuador Russian Federation _on_behalf_of_the_lmdc_cover_note.pdf 67 http://ailac.org/en/# Yemen Nicaragua Ukraine 68 http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp2-3_alba_20131112.pdf Zambia Venezuela USA 69 http://europa.eu/about- eu/countries/member-countries/ 82 83 Appendix I UNFCCC GROUPS UNFCCC CHART OF COUNTRY GROUPS 84 85