Conclusion: the Architecture of Policy Transfer in the Anglosphere---A Networked Present and Future

Conclusion: The Architecture of Policy Transfer in the Anglosphere---A Networked Present and Future

This book has set out to explore the rapidly changing patterns of international policy transfer and to gain insight into how the Anglosphere nations in particular have forged a distinct architecture of mutual learning and collaboration. The opening pages framed the challenge for us, as scholars and citizens, as one essentially rooted in the public interest moti- vation of the (liberal democratic) state: How are decisions made, on which issues, by whom, how and with what effect? Elusive as the concept of the public interest might be, it remains central to those from a liberal democratic tradition that the public have visibility of the decisions made and actions undertaken by their governments and public servants, without which accountability is cut off at the knees. And so the analysis in the preceding pages has sought to illuminate a modest part of contemporary policy decision-making: the age-old question of from where policy-makers draw their best, or worst, ideas.

Beyond Policy Transfer

In its early iterations, the policy transfer framework was used as a heuristic to answer these questions. To understand the processes by which policies are transmitted between jurisdictions and across the international terrain, its early protagonists showed how policy transfers operate as multi-level phenomena, driven by agents, occurring at and between several levels,

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive 217 license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 T. Legrand, The Architecture of Policy Transfer, Studies in the Political Economy of Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55821-5 218 CONCLUSION: THE ARCHITECTURE OF POLICY … including local, regional, national, transnational and international (Evans and Davies 1999). These showed how, normatively, the benefits were manifold: policy transfer can be used as a beneficial technique of public administration: overseas experience can be used to engineer rapid policy change, to forestall the unintended consequences of untested policies, or enhance inter-state cooperation. The lessons drawn can be negative as well as positive; the policies drawn might be a direct copy, an emulation, hybrid or ‘inspiration’; learning might occur at any stage of the (domestic) policy process; and be initiated by elected officials, policy officials, policy entrepreneurs, international organisations and NGOs, interest groups or any other suitably empowered actor (Dolowitzand Marsh 2000; Ladi 2005). On the global stage, scholars showed that a policy transfer perspective was integral to depicting the pressure that the IMF can bring to bear on states by attaching policy conditions to financial aid (Pal and Ireland 2009); to identify the combination of coercion, norms and mimetics used by the EU to achieve ‘technocratic legitimacy’ of its policy ambitions (Radaelli 2000); and to identify transnational policy communities which generate ‘common patterns of understanding’ (Stone 2001). These approaches leave little doubt of the powerful influence of non-domestic policy ideas on states, international organisations and supranational organisations. Yet lacking to date has been a deeper insight into the selectivity of policy ideas; why some states tend to look consistently to particular countries for policy lessons. Both the policy transfer and transgovernmentalism literatures have made a fundamental contribution to our conceptual understanding of the policy interplay of state and non-state actors, though it has been my contention that both literatures have yet to adequately explain why certain configurations of transnational policy relationships emerge. Reconciling both frameworks, as presented here, can generate stronger insights into global governance policy processes and, specifically, into the proliferation of transgovernmental networks. Engaging with this puzzle, we have explored one of the oldest, most active, and perhaps most resilient, of transgovernmental alliances active in the global governance space: the ‘Anglosphere’ countries of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the USA. As we have seen, at the heart of this alliance is a manifest historical, cultural and political affinity, which plays out in a complex raft of social, economic and policy relationships amongst and between the Anglosphere states. The previous three chapters have been empirically CONCLUSION: THE ARCHITECTURE OF POLICY … 219 focused on the case study at hand—the evolution of New Public Manage- ment and its stimulation of policy networking behaviours, and Third Way ideas in shaping labour market policy across the Anglosphere. This is set out in some detail with a concern for highlighting the linkages between the structures at play and the agents who operate therein.

Operationalising the Architecture of the Anglosphere framework

In Chapter 3, I outline the conceptual framework of transgovernmental policy network formation and how they are sustained. This framework operates as three theoretical levels to depict how transgovernmental relationships emerge within a structural environment:

• Level 1. Structural: Political-Cultural Propinquity • Level 2. Emergent: Institutional-Ideological Networks • Level 3. Agential Articulation.

Level 1. Structural: Political-Cultural Propinquity As outlined conceptually in Chapter 4 and articulated empirically in Chapter 7, the Anglosphere states have coalesced as a partnership of ‘like- minded’ entities with commensurate values, beliefs and political aims. The strength of this afﬁnity articulates as a political-cultural propinquity, in which policy ofﬁcials (and the publics) of those states identify and assign a priori legitimacy to one another, which manifests in (in this case) preferred transnational collaboration relationships. This is an associ- ation that has emerged from long-standing historical alliance and become cemented by both overlapping global policy challenges and commensurate institutional structures most recently (but not exclusively) expressed in New Public Management reforms and latterly as Third Way ideology.

Level 2. Emergent: Institutional-Ideological Networks As outlined conceptually in Chapter 3, and empirically in Chapters 6 and 7, policy networks emerge in an environment structured by pre-existing preferences and institutional relationships that make some policy ideas 220 CONCLUSION: THE ARCHITECTURE OF POLICY … more palatable (ideologically) and compatible (institutionally and politi- cally) than others. These are situated within the environment of cultural propinquity—the Anglosphere—and as suggested above, two proper- ties of this context are emergent. The ﬁrst is the ideological effect of New Public Management and Third Way politics. The growing disag- gregation of the state in conjunction with the upsurge in the spread of policy networks precipitated the conditions in which policy transfer and collaboration could occur through transgovernmental networks.

Level 3. Agential Articulation Institutions operate as structural constraints or inﬂuences on both the preferences of agents and the available opportunities for policy transfer. As Chapter 6 has suggested, agents work within institutions that already have established channels of preferential learning and collaboration, as per epistemic communities that fall into similar ‘geographical, cultural, linguistic and/or political environments’, whether as network or bilateral relationships. Emphasised here have been transgovernmental networks in which agents have forged closer and tighter bonds with their counterparts in their praxis as collaborating policy ofﬁcials while articulating the same beliefs about their shared Anglosphere history, traditions, outlook, aims and interests.

The Architecture of the Anglosphere

This analysis adds to a growing body of work on transgovernmentalism and the Anglosphere. As we have seen, the new-style Anglosphere architectures of policy-making to have emerged in this millennium display considerable conceptual conformity to policy transfer and transgovernmental frameworks. Anglosphere countries have constructed a transgovernmental policy architecture encapsulating a range of national institutions to, first, promote the exchange of policy ideas, information and evidence to address domestic challenges and, second, establish collaborative approaches to meeting transnational challenges. The shared culture, values and norms of these states have, as argued in the preceding pages, been critical to the coalescence of Anglosphere policy networks , which conform to distinct network features. The networks themselves are noteworthy too. Foremostly, it is clear that ‘small group size’ and homogenous preferences are a dominant CONCLUSION: THE ARCHITECTURE OF POLICY … 221 feature of the networks: over two-thirds of the networks identified in Chapter 7 are occupied by the five core Anglosphere states. We might further speculate that the constitution of the networks corresponds with the claim that Anglosphere networks operate to the exclusion of ‘spoiler’ states and generate dominant policy blocs. Certainly, interview evidence from the Belmont Conference reported in Chapter 7 suggests an ‘Anglo- sphere bloc’ influence on the OECD (though naturally the claim requires substantiation). In addition, the exclusivity and the strategic importance of the networks are underlined by the participation of elite officials: officials from the highest echelons of a department/agency participate in the networks, often at the ministerial level, with evidence of functional dele- gation to sub-networks. Related to the exclusivity, these networks operate under informal confidentiality where possible: the agenda, proceed- ings and outcomes are not easily publicly accessible, which aligns with the prevailing view of transgovernmental networks in the international relations literature (Slaughter 2004). Next, within the Anglosphere policy networks, the levels of policy transfer are both valued and varied. The breadth of engagement described above and in the detailed case studies below is suggested as a heuristic of in Fig. 1, which places each Anglosphere networks along a continuum of engagement and sets out the extent to which Anglosphere network has coordinated and shared policies and functions. As suggested by the policy transfer framework, Anglosphere policy officials in, for example, the Windsor Conference and the International Heads of Child Support Agency Meeting, engage in a rich exchange of policy ideas, experience and data, and cooperation agreements on common transnational issues (cf. Dolowitz and Marsh; Legrand 2012a). Additionally, the Four Coun- tries Conference of electoral agencies meets annually to exchange ideas and experiences on domestic policy and not undertake any collaborative actions. Moreover, the Vancouver Group of intellectual property agencies goes even further and has fully integrated their agency functions, processes and protocols to form, effectively, one amalgamated Anglosphere agency.

Towards Cultural Coalescence in Transgovernmental Policy Networks The coalescence of Anglosphere officials reveals the importance placed on cultural propinquity, as revealed across participants in the networks. The five statistical agencies of the Anglosphere engage with one another 222 CONCLUSION: THE ARCHITECTURE OF POLICY … integration) (Functional High engagement engagement High (military and (military E.g. Technical Technical E.g. Amalgamation of governance functions functions governance Cooperation Program Cooperation Program intelligence agencies) agencies) intelligence exchange Automatic data data Automatic E.g. TheE.g. Migration Five; the Border Five data data agencies) (social policy policy (social Manual exchange of exchange Manual E.g. The Six Nations The Six E.g. Conference market agencies) market agencies) of Understanding of Understanding E.g. The WindsorE.g. Continuum of network engagement Continuum (employment/labour (employment/labour Agreeing Memoranda Agreeing Memoranda benchmarks benchmarks Meeting (child (child Meeting common policy policy common support agencies) agencies) support Agreeing to institute E.g. Heads of Agency agencies) agencies) Exchange of policy Exchange E.g. Four Countries Countries Four E.g. conference (electoral conference (electoral ideas and experiences experiences and ideas Continuum of Anglosphere transgovernmental network engagement (Policy transfer) (Policy Low engagement Low engagement Anglosphere Anglosphere transgovernmental network Fig. 1 CONCLUSION: THE ARCHITECTURE OF POLICY … 223 because of what the ABS describes as ‘cultural, language and historical commonalities’,1 and a participating official of the Belmont Conference stated: ‘We have similar political regimes. And I think that’s very, very important’. This coalescence of transgovernmental networks suggests a novel mechanism of network coalescence on the landscape of global policy and offers an opportunity to develop a proposition of transgovernmental network membership that, as claimed earlier, remains unexplored in both the policy transfer and transgovernmental literatures, despite comporting with the conceptual frameworks of both. This offers some useful future directions for scholars of policy transfer and transgovernmentalism. Following Wendt (see Chapter 4), we can posit a proposition of Anglosphere network coalescence that frames cultural identity as endogenous and prior to TGN membership and policy transfer relationships. The formation of Anglosphere networks represents a prior consensus on the nature of domestic and transnational policy issues as well as an implied determination to prefer forms of knowledge and partnership stemming from network peers. This perspective comple- ments the prevailing functionalist perspectives of transgovernmentalism and policy transfer by suggesting that, for Anglosphere states, the exoge- nous imperatives of policy problems are framed a priori by and through transgovernmental networks coalesced by endogenous shared cultural frames. For the moment, this proposition is tempered, as noted above, by the boundary conditions of the study: the veracity of the cultural propinquity proposition is reliant on future confirming (or confounding) additional comparative, historical or even ethnographic research. Framed in this way, the proposition that endogenous cultural factors promote network coalescence strengthens the arm of policy transfer and transgovernmental theorists looking to understand why specific configurations of policy networks emerge above the state. This perspective provokes questions for transgovernmental theorists around the existence of other similar transgovernmental configurations globally. The lens of culturally-coalesced transgovernmentalism might equally be applied to long-standing relationships across, for example, Franco-phone, Latin America and Nordic countries. Certainly, the Nordic Council was established in the 1950s to facilitate coordinated policy responses to transnational challenges affecting Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, and exhibits the prima facie facets of cultural coalescence suggested here as integral to Anglosphere policy networks. Examination of this, and other similar transnational cultural configurations, is likely to 224 CONCLUSION: THE ARCHITECTURE OF POLICY … furnish stronger conceptual insights into the structure and form of transgovernmental policy networking. The latter question, why the five ‘core’ states dominate these networks to the exclusion of other Anglophone states, provides an opportunity to refine the cultural propinquity proposition. There is a range of Anglophone jurisdictions including, for example, Ireland, South Africa, the Caribbean, India and Pakistan, which conform to many of the same background historical, cultural and political characteristics. Why does the membership of Anglosphere transgovernmental networks identified here not extend to these countries? One possibility is that the post-war military and intelligence collaboration between these states embedded a long-standing mutual trust that permits the Anglo- sphere to enjoy collective military and intelligence global dominance; or what former NSA analyst Edward Snowden has called a ‘supranational intelligence agency’. The intelligence-sharing and collaboration in resolving transnational issues, such as immigration-related offences, radi- calisation and cyber-crime, for example, are manifest in agendas of the Quintet of Attorneys General and the Five Countries Conference.

Transgovernmental Policy Networks in Global Perspective

Understanding and tracking how government institutions learn from and network with one another at an international level is a crucial endeavour for public policy scholars. Doing so achieves three things. First, such knowledge can generate better insight into enhancing policy processes—indeed, the pay-off of such research for our policy servants are, at one level, quite clear: systematic policy learning and collaboration provoke some signiﬁcant ‘goods’ such as enhancing domestic policy capacity, improving the use of evidence and delivering joined-up solutions to common problems. For example, the case study considered herein spans considerable engagement across almost every portfolio of Anglo- sphere governments, indicating that models of the policy process in each of these countries are incomplete without considering the transgovernmental dimension, especially at the elite level. Second, such research also contributes to the public interest question raised above. The networks discussed in this book raise some profound accountability concerns. With few exceptions, the networks are populated by the most senior echelons of public services, yet the substance of the meetings is almost never made available to the public. And so we might wonder whether the obscurity CONCLUSION: THE ARCHITECTURE OF POLICY … 225 cloaking the networks militates against transparency and accountability for democratic decision-making. This is hardly an original point, but it does reinforce earlier scholars’ views on the subject:

The image of national regulators coming together of their own volition and regularizing their interactions either as a network or a networked organiza- tion raises the specter of agencies on the loose, unrestrained by democratic accountability. (Slaughter 2004, p. 48)

Third, studying these networks also affords an opportunity to overcome some domestic and international theoretical silos and refine our available concepts. Though the public administration discipline displays an overwhelming emphasis on state-based explanations of policy outcomes, the domestic/international distinction is nothing more than an analytical artifice, or a ‘convenience of the mind’ as Cox puts it (1981, p. 126). Developing interdisciplinary frameworks can promote the valuable enter- prise of political science to burrow beneath the often opaque facade of government policy-making to reveal the latent structures, processes, prior- ities, agents, institutions, imperatives and encumbrances that, together or separately, constitute the state: ‘If our existing map of our institutions and how they work is faulty, we mislead citizens and undermine representative democracy’ (Rhodes et al. 2003, p. 160). This book’s concern has been to enhance our conceptual tools as means of refining our theoretical perspectives on the state. Normatively, this gives ballast to my overarching view that the opacity of the policy processes of global governance means that there is a clear public interest imperative to link domestic ideas of public administration to these emerging above-the-state policy processes. Doing so meets Bob Jessop’s injunction to ‘look beyond the state to examine its embedding within a wider political system, its relationship to other institutional orders and functional systems, and to the lifeworld (or civil society)’ (2004, p. 49). If political science is to maintain a strong theoretical grasp of those fundamental questions of political science—Who governs? How do they govern? For whose benefit do they govern?—it is imperative that we constantly refine and rethink our conceptual tools to pursue the ever- changing modalities of public policy decision-making. The rise of Anglo- sphere transgovernmental policy networks represents a new dimension of global policy-making that, thus far, has managed to evade the attention of political scientists. Here, I have attempted to remedy this omission 226 CONCLUSION: THE ARCHITECTURE OF POLICY … and contribute a conceptualisation of the Anglosphere’s transgovernmentalism by, empirically, mapping out the range of active Anglosphere policy networks and, conceptually, drawing out the role of cultural propinquity in coalescing these networks. As I have argued, reconciling both the policy transfer and transgovernmental frameworks can help overcome the domestic and international artifice. In so doing, I hope to have equipped both frameworks with a stronger insight into culturally-shaped patterns of policy transmission and provided an alternative to the dominant functionalist propositions of why transgovernmentalism networks emerge. While some theorists posit that the ‘new’ transnational regulatory system has emerged as bottom- up response to perceived shortfalls in state action (Abbott and Snidal 2009b, p. 510) in which states and international organisations operate as the orchestrators of international regulation developed in collaboration with private actors (2009a, b). Proposed here, by contrast, is a state-based concept of transgovernmentalism that both excludes private actors and sidesteps international organisations, representing a reassertion of domestic autonomy in the global space. Locating these forms of policy-making is critical to our understanding of the processes of contemporary global governance, of which Stone states: ‘Not only do these collective processes of policy transfer or diffusion create new cycles and circuits of interpretation, it also contributes to new architectures of transnational governance’ (Stone 2012, p. 9). The existence and activities of autonomous public officials developing policy away from public scrutiny in new global governance spaces raise larger questions of legitimacy and accountability that, for Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, ‘the more ambiguous (and in some cases secretive) nature of many transgovernmental agreements may reduce domestic pressure by obscuring distributive effects’ (2007, p. 10). It thus remains imperative for public administration scholarship to pay close attention to these emerging global policy spaces. By meeting Jessop’s (2004) injunction to extend domestic policy analysis upwards into the transnational space, we can not only illuminate nascent beyond-the-state decision-making actors, venues and pathways, but also capture more precisely the consequences for domestic public policy outcomes and, in so doing, strengthen the arm of representative democracy. CONCLUSION: THE ARCHITECTURE OF POLICY … 227

Note

1. Taken from http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/[email protected]/productsbyCa talogue/CA17DB8313B95A0BCA257061003172F1?OpenDocument, accessed 10 July 2014.

References

Abbott, K. W., & Snidal, D. (2009a). The governance triangle: Regulatory standards institutions and the shadow of the state. In The politics of global regulation (pp. 44–48). Princeton: Princeton University Press. Abbott, K. W., & Snidal, D. (2009b). Strengthening international regulation through transmittal new governance: Overcoming the orchestration deﬁcit. Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 42, 501. Bevir, M., & Rhodes, R. (2003). Interpreting british governance. London: Routledge. Cox, R. W. (1981). Social forces, states and world orders: Beyond international relations theory. Millennium, 10(2), 126–155. Dolowitz, D. P., & Marsh, D. (2000). Learning from abroad: The role of policy transfer in contemporary policy-making. Governance-An International Journal of Policy and Administration, 13(1), 5–24. https://doi.org/10.1111/0952- 1895.00121. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. (2007). Varieties of cooperation: Government networks in international security. Evans, M., & Davies, J. (1999). Understanding policy transfer: A multilevel, multi-disciplinary perspective. Public Administration, 77 (2), 361–385. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9299.00158. Jessop, B. (2004). Multilevel governance and multilevel metagovernance. Changes in the EU as integral moments in the transformation and reori- entation of contemporary statehood. Multi-Level Governance, 2, 49–74. Ladi, S. (2005). Globalisation, policy transfer and policy research institutes. Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar. Legrand, T. (2012). The merry mandarins of Windsor: Policy transfer and transgovernmental networks in the Anglosphere. Policy Studies, 33(6), 523–540. https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2012.722290. Pal, L. A., & Ireland, D. (2009). The public sector reform movement: Mapping the global policy network. International Journal of Public Administration, 32(8), 621–657. https://doi.org/10.1080/01900690903000187. Radaelli, C. M. (2000). Policy transfer in the European Union: Institutional isomorphism as a source of legitimacy. Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions, 13(1), 25–43. https://doi.org/10. 1111/0952-1895.00122. 228 CONCLUSION: THE ARCHITECTURE OF POLICY …

Slaughter, A. M. (2004). Disaggregated sovereignty: Towards the public accountability of global government networks. Government and Opposition, 39(2), 159–190. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00119.x. Stone, D. (2001). Learning lessons, policy transfer and the international diffusion of policy ideas. Retrieved from http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/2056. Stone, D. (2012). Transfer and translation of policy. Policy Studies, 33(6), 483– 499. https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2012.695933. Wendt, A. (1994). Collective identity formation and the international state. American Political Science Review, 88(2), 384–397. https://doi.org/10. 2307/2944711. Index

A Bhaskar, Roy, 58, 73, 74, 76–78 Anderson, Benedict, 112 Blair, Tony, 134, 135, 155, 161, 164, Anglosphere 165, 169 and the Commonwealth, xvii, 116 British Empire. See Colonialism characteristics of, xxv, 124, 206, 224 colonial origins, xvii, 115, 117, C 123, 124, 207 Clinton, Bill, 55, 134, 138–142, 146, Five Eyes, x, 107 155, 161, 164–169, 187, 189, network emergence, xv, xxiv, xxv, 190 124, 129, 193, 194, 197, 202, Coercive, 49, 50 207, 209, 211, 220, 221, 223, Colonialism, xvi, 115, 117 226 administrative legacy of, British, xvi, transgovernmental networks, xxiii, 115 193, 218, 220, 221, 223, 224 Commonwealth. See Anglosphere ASEAN, 113 Communitarianism, xiv, 135, 136 Community of Portuguese Language B Countries - Comunidade dos Base Erosion and Proﬁt Shifting Países de Língua Portuguesa, 114 (BEPS) initiative, 33 Conditionality, 50 Belmont Conference, 186, 188, 194, Constructivism, 71, 109 197–200, 202–204, 206, 208, Convergence, 29, 31 221, 223 Copying, 48

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive 229 license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 T. Legrand, The Architecture of Policy Transfer, Studies in the Political Economy of Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55821-5 230 INDEX

Critical realism G agency and, 58, 78 Giddens, Anthony, 84, 94, 134, 135, emergence in, 58, 76 146 theory, xxv, 72–74 Global ﬁnancial crisis, 8, 10, 202 Globalisation and interdependency, 6, 8–10, 30, 33, 39, 55 D and internationalisation, 33, 54, 84, Davies, J., 25, 41, 61, 83 85 Digital era governance, xi, xiii, xiv and transnational challenges, 6, 7, DiMaggio, P.J., 31, 62 9, 84, 85 Dolowitz, David, xiv, xix, xxi, 14–16, 25–27, 29, 46–51, 57, 61, 62, 82, 83, 86, 87, 162, 169, 212, H 218, 221 Haas, Peter, 52, 89–94, 96 Dunleavy, Patrick, xi, xiii Hay, C., 62 Historical institutionalism, 93 Howard, John, 151, 153, 154 E Elite Networking, 31 Emulation, 48 I Epistemic communities, 29, 42, 52, IMF, 15, 47, 48, 54, 185, 218 63, 85, 87–96, 220 European Union (EU), 9, 30, 47, 85, 95, 113, 114, 218 J Evans, Mark, xiv, xv, xix, xx, 14, 15, James, O., 41, 83 25, 27, 29, 41, 46, 51–56, 60, JET Program, 161, 182–184 61, 63, 83–90, 94–96, 100, 139, 142, 162, 186, 212, 218 Evidence-based policy-making, xiv, K xxiv, 137, 147, 161, 163, 165 Keohane, Robert O., xxiii, 5, 6, 12, 59, 97, 117, 123

F L Five Country Conference, 210 Labour market policy, xv, xxiv, 1, Border Five, 210 131, 151, 162, 194, 198, 199, Migration Five, 210 204, 208, 213, 219 Five Country Ministerial (FCM), Lesson-drawing, xix, 13, 15, 24, 28, 210–212, 215 29, 33, 41, 42, 45–49, 51, 52, Five Eyes. See Anglosphere 82, 108, 172 Furlong, P., 51 Lodge, M., 41, 83 INDEX 231

M Penetration, 31, 62 Marsh, David, xiv, xix, xxi, 14–16, Personal Responsibility and Work 25–27, 29, 30, 46–52, 57, 62, Opportunities Reconciliation Act 83, 86, 87, 121, 162, 212, 218, (PRWORA), 130, 140–144, 147, 221 155, 166–169, 176, 184, 186, Meadows, Thomas Taylor, xv, xvi 187, 190 Multi-Level Approach, xx, 52, 86, 87, Peter Hall. See Policy paradigms 89 Policy assemblage, 24, 28, 29, 56–58, Mutual Obligation, xxiv, 131, 133, 62, 63, 76, 80, 107 147, 151–155, 198 Policy Communities, 31 Work for the Dole and, 153, 154 Policy convergence, xix, 24, 28–34, 36–38, 40, 44, 46, 85 N Policy diffusion, xix, 24, 28, 29, National security, 209 36–39, 199 counter-terrorism, x Policy learning, ix, xii–xvii, xix, 14–17, international threats to, xi, 123 28, 29, 33, 36, 38, 41–43, NATO, 111 45, 46, 52, 80, 82, 124, 155, New Deal, The, xxiv, 13, 130, 135, 161, 170, 171, 193, 194, 200, 136, 141, 145–150, 155, 161, 204–208, 212, 213, 224 164, 169–171, 173–176, 184, Policy-making 187 digital dimensions of, 225 New Democrats, 55, 164 evaluation, 26, 137 New Institutionalism, 25 evidence, xiv, xxiv, 137, 147, 161, New Labour, 55, 135, 136, 144–149, 163, 165, 180 164, 165, 167, 169, 171, 173, ideology, xv. See also Digital era 175, 176, 187 governance New Public Management, xiv, xx, 55, Policy networks, xxiii, 16, 27, 45, 52, 56, 82, 118–121, 124, 137, 155, 53, 55, 56, 59, 60, 63, 80, 82, 219, 220 87–89, 95–99, 101, 122, 124, Northcote-Trevelyan Report, xvi 176, 185, 193, 194, 197, 203, Nye, Joseph, xxiii, 5, 6, 12, 59, 97, 204, 206, 209, 211, 219–221, 117, 123 223, 225 Anglosphere, xv, 101, 124, 193, 194, 197, 209–211, 219–221, O 223, 226 OECD, 7, 15, 18, 33, 39, 47, 54, Policy paradigms, 43–46, 52 133, 152, 164, 195, 199–202, Kuhn and, 43 221 Policy transfer, 25, 48 peer-review mechanism, 38, 39 criticisms of, 83, 93 deﬁnition of, xix, xxi, xxv, 87, 212 P Dolowitz and Marsh Model, xix, Pandemic, ix, xi, xxiii, 8, 9, 23 29, 47–49, 51, 52, 83, 87, 212 232 INDEX

examples of, 85, 86, 95, 163, 221 165, 168, 169, 172, 178, 183, government advocacy of, 96 184, 219, 220 networks, 27, 53, 55, 56, 60, 82, Transgovernmentalism, 28, 29, 58, 86–89, 94, 96, 102, 161, 186, 59, 61, 63, 96, 97, 100, 193, 190, 202, 209 211, 218, 220, 223, 226. See also normative, 17, 26, 62, 218 Anglosphere, policy networks voluntary and coercive, 27, 47–49, 52, 62, 83, 84, 87 Powell, W.W., 31, 62 U Public interest, the, xii, xxi, xxiii, 1, United Nations, x 3–5, 10, 11, 18, 25, 217, 224, 225 V Visegrad group, 114 Voluntary, 49, 50 Q Quintet of Attorneys-General, 209, 210, 224 W Welfare-to-work, xv, xxiii, xxiv, 124, 129, 130, 132–134, 138, R 146, 147, 149, 150, 153, 155, Rationality, 49, 50 161–165, 169, 173, 175, 176, Rights and responsibilities, xxiv, 130, 187 135, 136, 138, 146, 147, 151, and Australian policy, xv, xxiv, 130, 154, 155, 169 155, 161, 162, 165, 176 Rose, Richard. See Lesson-drawing and UK policy, xv, xxiv, 130, 147, 150, 155, 161, 162, 164, 165, 169, 173, 176 S and US policy, xv, xxiv, 130, 138, Slaughter, Anne-Marie, 12, 59, 60, 150, 155, 161, 162, 164, 165, 96–99, 101, 122, 221, 225 169, 173, 175, 176, 187 Stone, Diane, xii, xiv, xv, xx, xxiii, 15, punitive effects of, xxiv, 131–133, 23–26, 52, 61, 71, 72, 96, 212, 153 218, 226 Wendt, Alexander, xix, 81, 84, Structure and agency, xiii, xxii, 53, 109–111, 123, 223 63, 80, 84, 87, 94, 101, 111 and collective identity formation, structuration and, 84, 94 81, 109 Westminster system, xv, xvii, 115, 195 Windsor conference, the, xxiv, 193, T 194, 202–204, 208–210, 221 Third Way, the, xiv, xv, xxiii, xxiv, Working Nation, xxiv, 131, 152, 153 121, 124, 129–131, 134–138, World Trade Organisations (WTO), 144, 146, 147, 155, 161, 164, 31, 54