Überwachung Und Kontrolle
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PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL Claimant
IN THE INVESTIGATORY POWERS TRIBUNAL BETWEEN: PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL Claimant -and- (1) SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS (2) GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION HEADQUARTERS Defendants AMENDED STATEMENT OF GROUNDS INTRODUCTION 1. Privacy International is a leading UK charity working on the right to privacy at an international level. It focuses, in particular, on challenging unlawful acts of surveillance. 2. The Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is the minister responsible for oversight of the Government Communication Headquarters (“GCHQ”), the UK’s signals intelligence agency. 3. These proceedings concern the infection by GCHQ of individuals’ computers and mobile devices on a widespread scale to gain access either to the functions of those devices – for instance activating a camera or microphone without the user’s consent – or to obtain stored data. Recently-disclosed documents suggest GCHQ has developed technology to infect individual devices, and in conjunction with the United States National Security Agency (“NSA”), has the capability to deploy that technology to potentially millions of computers by using malicious software (“malware”). GCHQ has also developed malware, known as “WARRIOR PRIDE”, specifically for infecting mobile phones. 4. The use of such techniques is potentially far more intrusive than any other current surveillance technique, including the interception of communications. At a basic level, the profile information supplied by a user in registering a device for various purposes may include details of his location, age, gender, marital status, income, 1 ethnicity, sexual orientation, education, and family. More fundamentally, access to stored content (such as documents, photos, videos, web history, or address books), not to mention the logging of keystrokes or the covert and unauthorised photography or recording of the user and those around him, will produce further such information, as will the ability to track the precise location of a user of a mobile device. -
(1) SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN and COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS (2) GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION HEADQUARTERS Respondents
IN THE INVESTIGATORY POWERS TRIBUNAL Case No. IPT 14/85/CH BETWEEN: PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL Claimant and (1) SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS (2) GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION HEADQUARTERS Respondents IN THE INVESTIGATORY POWERS TRIBUNAL Case No. IPT 14/120- 126/CH BETWEEN: GREENNET LIMITED RISEUP NETWORKS, INC MANGO EMAIL SERVICE KOREAN PROGRESSIVE NETWORK (“JINBONET”) GREENHOST MEDIA JUMPSTART, INC CHAOS COMPUTER CLUB Claimants -and- (1) SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS (2) GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION HEADQUARTERS Respondents WITNESS STATEMENT OF ERIC KING I, ERIC KING, Deputy Director of Privacy International of 62 Britton Street, London EC1M 5UY, SAY AS FOLLOWS: 1. I am the Deputy Director of Privacy International. I am authorised to make this statement on behalf of Privacy International. 2. I have worked on issues related to communications surveillance at Privacy International since 2011. My areas of interest and expertise are signals 1 intelligence, surveillance technologies and communications surveillance practices. I regularly speak at academic conferences, with government policy makers, and to international media. 3. The contents of this statement are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief, and are the product of discussion and consultation with other experts. Where I rely on other sources, I have endeavoured to identify the source. 4. In this statement I will address, in turn, the following matters: a. Computer Network Exploitation: Introduction b. The Five Eyes c. What malware can do against an individual device i. Activating sensors ii. Obtaining stored data from devices iii. CNE as a alternative to intercept iv. Other CNE capabilities d. What malware can do against a server or network i. -
2014 05 12 Privacy International Hacking
IN THE INVESTIGATORY POWERS TRIBUNAL BETWEEN: PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL Claimant -and- (1) SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS (2) GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION HEADQUARTERS Defendants STATEMENT OF GROUNDS INTRODUCTION 1. Privacy International is a leading UK charity working on the right to privacy at an international level. It focuses, in particular, on challenging unlawful acts of surveillance. 2. The Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is the minister responsible for oversight of the Government Communication Headquarters (“GCHQ”), the UK’s signals intelligence agency. 3. These proceedings concern the infection by GCHQ of individuals’ computers and mobile devices on a widespread scale to gain access either to the functions of those devices – for instance activating a camera or microphone without the user’s consent – or to obtain stored data. Recently-disclosed documents suggest GCHQ has developed technology to infect individual devices, and in conjunction with the United States National Security Agency (“NSA”), has the capability to deploy that technology to potentially millions of computers by using malicious software (“malware”). GCHQ has also developed malware, known as “WARRIOR PRIDE”, specifically for infecting mobile phones. 4. The use of such techniques is potentially far more intrusive than any other current surveillance technique, including the interception of communications. At a basic level, the profile information supplied by a user in registering a device for various purposes may include details of his location, age, gender, marital status, income, ethnicity, sexual orientation, education, and family. More fundamentally, access to 1 stored content (such as documents, photos, videos, web history, or address books), not to mention the logging of keystrokes or the covert and unauthorised photography or recording of the user and those around him, will produce further such information, as will the ability to track the precise location of a user of a mobile device. -
Vs. Gauner- Und Geheimsprachen: Ein Ethisch-Kognitiver Verbesserungsweg Von Effektivität Der Fachkommunikation
Niniejsza publikacja jest dostępną na licencji Creative Commons. Uznanie autorstwa-Użycie niekomercyjne-Bez utworów zależnych 3.0 Polska. Pewne prawa zastrzeżone na rzecz autora. Zezwala się na wykorzystanie publikacji zgodnie z licencją – pod warunkiem zachowania niniejszej informacji licencyjnej oraz wskazania autora jako właściciela praw do tekstu. Treść licencji jest dostępna na stronie: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/pl/ Lingwistyka Stosowana 18: 3/2016, 51–66 Annikki KOSKENSALO Universität Turku Funktions- und Charakteristika-Vergleich von Fach- vs. Gauner- und Geheimsprachen: Ein ethisch-kognitiver Verbesserungsweg von Effektivität der Fachkommunikation Abstract: A Comparison of Functions and Characteristics of Specialist Languages vs. Thieves’ Cants & Secret Languages: An Ethic-Cognitive Attempt to Improve Effectiveness of Specialist Communication This paper discusses functions and characteristics of thieves’ cants and secret languages, and compares them with functions and characteristics of specialist languages. Selected examples showcase similarities and differences between both types of languages. Taking them into account, the paper proves that it is necessary to consider solutions developed by users of thieves’ cants and secret languages in order to im- prove the effectiveness of specialist communication conducted with the help of specialist languages. Einleitung und Problemstellung Folgende Situation: In einem Krankenhaus besprechen zwei Ärzte am Beginn ihrer Visite beim Bett eines Patienten dessen Fall. Sie tun dies in ihrer Fachsprache1 bzw. ihrem Fachjargon2&Fach-Chinesisch3 und benutzen zudem Abkürzungen4. Der Patient versteht nicht, worüber da geredet wird und ist dementsprechend ungehalten, weil es 1 Kritisch dazu: Fachsprachen sind normal auf den Bereich begrenzt, für den sie geschaffen wurden, wie hier primär für den Gebrauch von Kommunikationsträgern wie im höchsten Abs- traktionsgrad unter Wissenschaftlern desselben Faches (L. -
US Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Activities in Japan 1945 – 2015: a Visual Guide
The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability US signals intelligence (SIGINT) activities in Japan 1945 – 2015: A Visual Guide Desmond Ball and Richard Tanter Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability Special Report 23 December 2015 Summary The US maintained signals intelligence (SIGINT) activities at about 100 sites in Japan during the Cold War, probably than in any other country. In Japan today, about 1,000 US personnel are engaged in SIGINT, Information Operations, Internet surveillance and Network Warfare activities, mainly at Yokusuka, Misawa, Yokota Air Base in Tokyo, Camp Hansen and Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, and the US Embassy in Tokyo. The US SIGINT activities in Japan have directly supported US nuclear war planning, Korean War and Vietnam operations, and since September 2011, the ‘Global War on Terror’. The technological developments over these seven decades have been stupendous. The end of the Cold War coincided with the beginning of the World Wide Web and the Internet age. Surveillance of the Internet and computer network systems became the highest priority. Intelligence became conflated with operations, with a proliferation of Information Operations (IO) and Cyber- warfare units. There has been no Japanese involvement in the US SIGINT activities, and no direct cooperation between US and Japanese SIGINT stations, apart from limited cooperation with respect to particular crises, and with the partial exception of Camelus at Camp Hansen since 2007. Japan is a Third Party to the UKUSA Agreements under which the US and Japan exchange certain designated intercept materials, including HF/VHF DF bearings, but excluding higher level cryptologic material. Authors Desmond Ball is Emeritus Professor at the Australian National University (ANU). -
Überwachung Und Kontrolle. Einleitung in Den Schwerpunkt 2015
Repositorium für die Medienwissenschaft Dietmar Kammerer; Thomas Waitz Überwachung und Kontrolle. Einleitung in den Schwerpunkt 2015 https://doi.org/10.25969/mediarep/1531 Veröffentlichungsversion / published version Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Kammerer, Dietmar; Waitz, Thomas: Überwachung und Kontrolle. Einleitung in den Schwerpunkt. In: Zeitschrift für Medienwissenschaft. Heft 13: Überwachung und Kontrolle, Jg. 7 (2015), Nr. 2, S. 10– 20. DOI: https://doi.org/10.25969/mediarep/1531. Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine This document is made available under a Deposit License (No Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares, non-transferable, individual, and limited right for using this persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses document. This document is solely intended for your personal, Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für non-commercial use. All copies of this documents must retain den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt. all copyright information and other information regarding legal Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument document in public, to perform, distribute, or otherwise use the nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie document in public. dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke By using this particular document, you accept the conditions of vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder use stated above. anderweitig nutzen. Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die Nutzungsbedingungen an.