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Prospective Advice and Consent Article Prospective Advice and Consent Jean Galbraitht I. INTRODU CTION ............................................................................................................. ................ 247 11. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROSPECTIVE ADVICE AND CONSENT .......................................... 251 A . T im in g ............................................................................................................................... 2 52 1. Two Textual Meanings of "Advice and Consent"...............................................253 2. From the Framers' Intent to Subsequent Advice and Consent.............................256 3. Prospective Advice and Consent in the Washington Administration..................260 B . S p ecificity ............................................................................ ............................................. 2 63 1. Text, Separation of Powers, and Ditch-Digging.................................................264 2. The Doctrine of Obligatory Ratification .............................................................. 265 3. Broad M andates in Practice..................................................................................268 4. Lim its on B readth ................................................................................................. 273 Ill. MULTI-TREATY PROSPECTIVE ADVICE AND CONSENT...............................................................274 A. Propsective Advice and Consent for Repetitive Bilateral Treaties..................................275 B. Prospective Advice and Consent Instead of Ex Ante Congressional-Executive A greem en ts ....................................................................................................................... 280 C . Preserving a V eto..............................................................................................................283 IV. SINGLE-TREATY PROSPECTIVE ADVICE AND CONSENT...............................................................286 A . Today's G raveyard ............................................................................................................ 286 B. Prospective Advice and Consent for Major Multilateral Treaties...................................292 1. Im proved N egotiating Pow er...............................................................................292 2. A ppeal to the Senate.............................................................................................294 3 . Feasib ility ............................................................................................................. 298 C . E xam p les...........................................................................................................................30 1 1. L aw of the Sea ...................................................................................................... 30 1 2. C lim ate C hange .................................................................................................... 303 3 . T rad e ..................................................................................................................... 3 0 5 V . C O N CLU SIO N ................................................................................................................................. 307 I. INTRODUCTION The Treaty Clause of the Constitution gives the President the "Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two t Sharswood Fellow, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I presented drafts of this paper at the Junior International Law Scholars conference at Yale Law School and at a faculty workshop at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. I thank the participants for their comments. I also thank Matt Adler, Elena Baylis, Stephanos Bibas, Bill Burke-White, Sarah Cameron, David Caron, Trey Childress, Meg deGuzman, Gabriela Femenia, Greg Hall, Duncan Hollis, Sophia Lee, Craig Martin, Milan Markovic, Theodor Meron, Ralf Michaels, Stephen Morse, Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Amy Wax, and David Zaring, and the editors of YJIL, especially Giselle Barcia and Sally Pei. All views and any errors are of course my own. 248 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 37: 247 thirds of the Senators present concur."' In theory, treatymaking traditionally proceeds in three steps: First, the President or his agents negotiate and sign the treaty; second, the Senate gives its advice and consent by a two-thirds vote; and third, the President ratifies the treaty. In practice, however, the Senate has earned its reputation as the "graveyard of treaties. ,,2 While minor treaties usually clear the Senate eventually, significant treaties-particularly multilateral ones-are often the subject of lengthy or endless delay. The Senate's present backlog goes back decades (the oldest treaty pending before it is from 1949) and includes major treaties like the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. 3 The specter of death in the Senate in turn limits U.S. bargaining power. If other nations believe that the United States will never become a party to a multilateral treaty under negotiation, then their incentives to listen to U.S. negotiators are greatly reduced. A former Legal Adviser to the State Department has recently described this as a "real problem in treaty negotiation," explaining that "our negotiating partners have no confidence that the executive branch will necessarily be able to get a potentially controversial treaty through the Senate. That does undermine the negotiating effectiveness of our State Department and other negotiators.A The Senate's failure to advise and consent to important treaties has received substantial attention from academics over the last twenty years, including contributions from Bruce Ackerman, David Golove, Laurence Tribe, John Yoo, Peter Spiro, Steve Charnovitz, and, most recently, Oona Hathaway. But these scholars have all focused on one particular issue, namely, the extent to which treaties can or should be approved as congressional-executive agreements by a majority of both houses and the President rather than through the Treaty Clause.5 Little has been written about whether the Treaty Clause itself could be applied in a more efficient or effective manner.6 By contrast, this 1. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2. 2. This phrase has a long history, see The Graveyard of Good Treaties, NATION, Mar. 15, 1900, at 199, and is often linked in particular to the failure of the Treaty of Versailles. See, for example, Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 178 (1996). 3. Treaties Pending in the Senate, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty /pending/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2012). 4. Interview by Toni Johnson with John B. Bellinger III, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Int'l and Nat'l Sec. Law, Council on Foreign Relations and Former Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State (July 9, 2010), available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/22614/us trouble-withstart-and-other_ treaties.html. 5. See generally Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?,108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995); Steve Charnovitz, Using Framework Statutes to Facilitate U.S. Treaty Making, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 696 (2004); David M. Golove, Against Free-Form Formalism, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1791 (1998); Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties'End: The Past,Present, and Future ofInternationalLawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236 (2008); Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 TEX. L. REV. 961 (2001); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995); John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionalityof Congressional-ExecutiveAgreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757 (2001). 6. For a rare exception, see Ronald A. Lehmann, Note, ReinterpretingAdvice and Consent: A 2012] Prospective Advice and Consent 249 Article argues that the Treaty Clause provides the President and the Senate with considerably more flexibility than the conventional wisdom suggests- flexibility that can strengthen the prospects for treatymaking under the Treaty Clause. Specifically, I argue that the Senate can, and in many circumstances should, give its advice and consent prior to treaties' final negotiation, an approach that I term prospective advice and consent. The Senate would give prospective advice and consent through the passage of a resolution that, by a two-thirds vote, authorizes the President to make a treaty or multiple treaties that conform to whatever conditions are set out in the resolution. Provided that the negotiated treaty or treaties then conform to these conditions, the President could ratify without further action by the Senate. This approach would reverse the longstanding and almost entirely unquestioned presumption that the Senate's advice and consent must follow the President's submission of a final treaty text, an approach that I call subsequent advice and consent.7 As I show, however, this presumption stems from historical practice rather than from a constitutional mandate. In the nineteenth century, this presumption made good sense: the United States entered into a sufficiently low number of international agreements that the Senate could reasonably take them up one by one; the most important agreements tended to be bilateral rather than multilateral, so renegotiation to accommodate
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