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(In-)Secure Messaging with the Silent Circle Instant Messaging Protocol

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(In-)Secure Messaging with the Silent Circle Instant Messaging Protocol (In-)Secure messaging with the Silent Circle instant messaging protocol Sebastian R. Verschoor Tanja Lange David R. Chariton School of Computer Science Department of Mathematics and Computer and Institute for Quantum Computing, Science, Technische Universiteit Eindhoven University of Waterloo [email protected] [email protected] ABSTRACT 1.1 History of SCimp Silent Text, the instant messaging application by the com- Silent Text uses XMPP for transportation and adds a pany Silent Circle, provides its users with end-to-end en- crypto layer to generate shared keys between communicating crypted communication on the Blackphone and other smart- parties. Messages are passed (and temporarily stored if nec- phones. The underlying protocol, SCimp, has received many essary) by Silent Circle's server. Instead of deploying OTR, extensions during the update to version 2, but has not been the Off-The-Record protocol [6] by Borisov, Goldberg and subjected to critical review from the cryptographic commu- Brewer, Silent Circle started from SecureSMS, introduced nity. In this paper, we analyze both the design and imple- in Belvin's masters' thesis [3], and adapted it to the XMPP mentation of SCimp by inspection of the documentation (to setting. The resulting protocol by Moscaritolo, Belvin, and the extent it exists) and code. Many of the security prop- Zimmermann from 2012 is called SCimp: \Silent Circle in- erties of SCimp version 1 are found to be secure, however stant messaging protocol". SCimp is described on Silent Cir- many of the extensions contain vulnerabilities and the im- cle's web page [24] and in a white paper [21]; some source plementation contains bugs that affect the overall security. code and explanations are available on GitHub. In 2014 These problems were fed back to the SCimp maintainers Silent Text 2.0 was rolled out [20] \to improve the security and some bugs were fixed in the code base. In Septem- and refine the user experience of our customers". This up- ber 2015, Silent Circle replaced SCimp with a new protocol date changes how parties provide keys, most importantly it based on the Signal Protocol. allows Alice to start a communication with an offline Bob, and added functionalities for group messaging and encrypted Keywords file storage. SCimp, Silent Circle, Instant Messaging Protocol 1.2 Advertised security properties 1. INTRODUCTION SCimp is designed to provide end-to-end encryption in such a way that no intermediary|such as the Silent Circle Blackphone by Silent Circle is an Android-based smart server|needs to be trusted in order for the communication phone running the Silent OS operating system, with cur- to be secure. SCimp supports erasure of old keys, so that rent versions (Blackphone 2) selling at a hefty 799 USD. a potential device compromise does not leak old messages The phone promises its users higher security and privacy: (which is also known as forward secrecy), by updating the \Blackphone puts privacy first". The Blackphone 1, costing encryption key for every message and rekeying every once more than 600 USD, was rolled out in summer 2014 and in a while. The protocol allows for deniability of all com- came with service subscriptions for encrypted phone (Silent munication, which means that nobody, including the users Phone) and chat (Silent Text). Silent Circle's \Products and Alice and Bob themselves, can provide any proof to con- Solutions" page [25] advertised Silent Text as vince a third party about what was said over SCimp or even Share unlimited encrypted texts on any Silent provide any proof that a conversation took place in the first OS, iOS or Android device. Use the burn feature place. The last important property of SCimp is that it pro- to set messages to automatically self-destruct af- vides future secrecy through key continuity: an attacker ter a set time period. Silent Text also offers that compromises key material shared between users, but secure file transfers of up to 100MB and voice misses the opportunity to set up a man-in-the-middle at- memo functionality. tack during rekeying, cannot decrypt future messages. This Silent Text was available for free on Apple's App store (since property is advertised as the \self-healing property". 2012) and on Google Play (since 2013) but users needed to buy a subscription for using the servers, with prices starting 1.3 Results at 9.95 USD per month. Given these prices one could expect SCimp version 2 was in use since May 2014 [20], but the some security analysis of the services, but only after an in- details have only been released in August 2015 [27], and then tense online discussion, started by Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn's only upon our request. Our paper shows that the update in- open letter to Phil Zimmermann and Jon Callas [31], did troduced new vulnerabilities, most remarkably that a man- Silent Circle post source code for Silent Text for iOS on in-the middle attacker Eve can arbitrarily delay authenti- GitHub [27] allowing inspection of their code base. We are cation between Alice and Bob and thus remain undetected. not aware of any public analysis of SCimp. Eve can also easily interrupt communications and force a new key exchange, which she then can man-in-the-middle. SCimp modes: PubKey mode and Symmetric mode. This interruption also destroys the advertised self-healing property of key continuity (version 1 and 2). 2.1 Key negotiation Due to the insufficient level of documentation (or close Alice and Bob are both registered by their XMPP ad- to none in the case of SCimp version 2), code review was dresses: A = \[email protected]/blackphone" and B = necessary, though tedious. The implementation of SCimp \[email protected]/android". Without loss of generality, provided on GitHub had several implementation errors, in- we assume that Alice initiates the key negotiation with Bob. cluding cryptographic errors. The SCimp version 2 imple- It is not specified how Alice and Bob learn each others mentation defines a state machine that leaves the protocol XMPP addresses. Alice needs to know the address (B0), to vulnerable to an undetectable man-in-the-middle attack. In which she wants to send a message. When Bob receives the addition, the way the state machine is often bypassed in first message, he can extract the sender address (A0) from the code leaves the implementation vulnerable to another the stanza. For the analysis, we assume that these addresses man-in-the-middle attack. are not authenticated, meaning that Alice does not know if B0 = B and Bob does not know if A0 = A. 1.4 Disclosure and updates The initial key negotiation is basically an ephemeral elliptic- Throughout this study we have communicated with Jon curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange (ECDHE) with a subse- Callas and Vinnie Moscaritolo from Silent Circle. In Septem- quent confirmation of knowledge of the derived shared se- ber 2015, Silent Circle announced [26] that they will stop cret. It consists of four messages: Silent Text on September 28 and change to a messaging ap- plication integrated with an updated Silent Phone app which 1. Alice commits to her public DH key in the Commit would be based on the Signal Protocol [13]. Jon Callas con- message. firmed that we may say that our analysis motivated their decision to switch. The switch takes care of most of our 2. Bob sends his public DH key in the DH1 message. concerns reported in Section3 and Section5, and possibly (but not necessarily) Section4. 3. Alice opens her commitment and confirms knowledge of the shared secret in the DH2 message. 2. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION 4. Bob confirms knowledge of the shared secret in the This section presents the SCimp protocol and explains the Confirm message. design rationale. We base our analysis on the Silent Circle documentation provided in [21] and [19]. A comparison with The key negotiation is depicted in Figure1, with some the code|showing several inconsistencies|is given in Sec- details omitted for brevity. tion5. The reason for the high level of detail in the protocol description is that the official documentation lacks the re- 2.1.1. Commit. Alice, as initiator, starts by computing quired details for proper cryptographic analysis. an ephemeral secret key for her DH key pair, which is a SCimp version 1 has two modes of which one, basic Diffie- random key ska. She computes the public key of her DH Hellman (DH) mode, provides encryption. Users do not have key pair pka = skaG, where G is a fixed base point on the 1 certified long-term keys. The protocol uses an ephemeral elliptic curve. Alice commits to point pka by computing DH key exchange (explained in Section 2.1) to establish a hash(pka), where hash is a hash function. shared key between two devices. After key negotiation, users If Alice and Bob have negotiated keys before, they share need to verify the identity of the other party by confirming a a cached secret (cs). They use this value in subsequent key short authentication string (SAS) out-of-band. Sessions are negotiations in order to authenticate to each other. When not time limited, so for enhanced security, the users period- they do not yet have a shared cs, they substitute cs with ically need to renegotiate their keys, which is explained in a random value and skip the corresponding validations and Section 2.2. SCimp uses the derived keys to perform authen- they authenticate later (see Section 2.1.5). ticated encryption to provide confidentiality and integrity of Alice proves knowledge of cs by sending hcsa: a Message the messages, as explained in Section 2.3. Authentication Code (MAC) using cs as the key.
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