Catalonia: Towards Independence?

Andy Durgan

On Catalan National Day 11 September nationalist currents in Europe Catalan na- 2012, a claimed one and half million peo- tionalism emerged as a political movement in ple, around 20% of Catalonias population, the late nineteenth century, coinciding with demonstrated in Barcelona in favour of inde- the development of capitalism. pendence. Such annual demonstrations had Despite the events of 1714, Catalonia re- barely mobilised a few thousand or so peo- mained an important mercantile centre and ple for many years. For the first time since the development of a local textile industry saw the late seventies, the Constitutional settle- industrial capitalism develop before elsewhere ment of 1978 is on the verge of collapse. How in Spain. By the early twentieth century the this dramatic sea change has come about is as disparity between Catalan economic develop- much to do with the radicalisation of Cata- ment and the rest of the state was substan- lan nationalism as with the impact of the eco- tial. One result of this was the emergence nomic crisis. Nor was this the first time this of a militant mass workers’ movement. The movement has swung from right to left. other was the turn by sections of the bour- geoisie to nationalism. Parallel to this, a cul- tural and linguistic revival further reinforced national identity. Bourgeois nationalism, in the form of the Lliga Regionalista, limited itself to de- fending the regional rights that would allow Catalan industry to develop unhindered by Spanish “backwardness”. But the Catalan bourgeoisie, faced with an increasingly rebel- lious working class, would both in the early twenties and again in 1936 back its Span- ish counterparts to crush revolution. Under the military dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923-1930) the mantle of Catalan national- ism passed to an increasingly radicalised petty bourgeoisie. During the Second Republic (1931-1936) the separatist Catalan Republican Left (ERC) became the dominant force in Catalan politics Catalan Independence Protester with a mass base among the peasantry, white collar workers and the lower middle classes in urban areas. As part of what, in the last From Fascism to Democracy resort, would prove a forlorn attempt to es- tablish a modern liberal democracy, Catalo- Like all nationalist movements, Catalan na- nia was granted its first Statute of Autonomy tionalism looks to a distant past in which de- in 1932 with the ERC heading the new Gener- feat on 11 September 1714, when the fall of alitat government. Like other left republican Barcelona to the Spanish (and French troops) parties in the Spanish state at the time, the led to the end of Catalonia’s semi-independent ERC vacillated between the workers’ left and status, is a pivotal event in the liturgy of na- the right depending on local circumstances. tional identity. However, like other modern During the first year of the Civil War

14 (1936-1939) the national question was swept nomically. Opened up to foreign investment aside by social revolution. Control by the and tourism, the Spanish economy underwent workers’ movement of the economy and ini- a spectacular boom. Nowhere was this more tially, armed resistance to fascism, put the the case than in Catalonia where its indus- nationalists on the defensive. Middle class re- trial base expanded massively attracting hun- publicanism was eclipsed by Stalinism as the dreds of thousands immigrants, mainly from defender of order and the bourgeois state. In the south. Eventually this massive concen- Catalonia this role fell to the recently formed tration of a new working class would lead United Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSUC), to growing conflict in the workplaces. What the first ‘regional’ communist party to be were struggles primarily over conditions at recognised as an independent section of the work soon developed into political opposition Comintern. to fascism. By 1970, Spain had one of the Catalonia had never enjoyed so much in- highest strike rates per capita in the world in dependence as during the first months of the a country where democratic trade union or- war but this was thanks to the workers’ rev- ganisation and strikes were strictly illegal. olution and not the left nationalists, let alone Catalan nationalist organisations played a the Catalan Stalinists. One of the great relatively minor role in such mass resistance. ironies of history would be that with the fi- Although present in the growing civic and cul- nal defeat of the revolution in the summer of tural movements, they were clearly eclipsed 1937 the Catalan government, in the hands of by the workers’ movement at this stage. As the ERC and PSUC, found its authority un- elsewhere, with the notable exception of the dermined by the Spanish Republican govern- Basque Country, the Communists were the ment, which now took direct control of Cat- most influential force. While the historic or- alonia until its catastrophic fall to fascism in ganisation of the Catalan working class, the January 1939. CNT, had never recovered from the defeat More than at any previous time in the of 1939 the PSUC was able to convert it- country’s history the Franco regime (1939- self into the dominant force on the left. The 1977) tried to impose uniformity on Spain party’s credentials as a ‘Catalan’ party com- that would eliminate any national diversity. bined with its aura as the party of anti-fascism Catalan was prohibited in the public sphere had made it attractive to both the new gen- and local customs and culture undermined eration of working class militants and the or, at best, transformed into ‘Spanish re- sections of the Catalan middle classes radi- gional’ folkloric curiosities. Yet despite the calised by Francoism. ‘National’ demands in regime’s intentions, forty years of Francoist defence of the Catalan language and culture reactionary centralism had exactly the oppo- and demands for self-government had never site effect than it had set out to achieve. Na- disappeared and the PSUC’s emergent euro- tional and regional identities flourished, albeit communism made it even more suitable to ap- in the private sphere. Identifying with Catalo- pear the champions of democratic reform. nia, even speaking Catalan became an act of Many newly arrived workers sympathised defiance. Cultural events or football became with the plight of the Catalans and na- some of the most visible expressions of Cata- tional demands were present along with calls lan identity. Political activists that fell into for democratic rights, particularly the de- the hands of the police however, could expect mand for self-government and defence of the swift brutality if they dared to speak in the Catalan language. This was especially the “language of dogs” (as Franco once referred case with Spanish-speaking workers organised to it) in front of their oppressors. through the new unions, the Workers Com- During the sixties and early seventies Cat- missions, which were led mostly by the PSUC. alonia, like many other areas of the Spanish In contrast the radical independentist left was state, was transformed both socially and eco- a marginal influence, even compared to the

15 Marxist revolutionary left and the anarchists. were to be administrated locally but over- Within the context of these mass work- all policy decided in Madrid. This was also ers’ struggles, by the late seventies there were the case for the thorny question of educa- increasing initiatives promoting Catalan na- tion, albeit later allowing linguistic immer- tional identity. Nowhere was this clearer than sion whereby students would be taught pri- over the question of the language and in ed- marily in Catalan. The first Catalan elec- ucation. Movements of teachers, parents and tions in March 1980 demonstrated the grow- students (often led by the far left) resulted ing hegemony of the bourgeois nationalist in vibrant grassroots campaigns for seculari- Converg´enciai Uni´o(CiU), which now formed 2 sation and democracy in Catalan public edu- the first autonomous government since 1936. cation. Buildings were occupied by teachers For the next 23 years, the CiU would domi- and parents in working class areas and run on nate Catalan politics seeing its role as nego- a democratic basis, the teachers often receiv- tiating the best deal with the Spanish state ing no pay until the authorities were forced to for Catalonia. Independence was not on the recognise the schools. Notably such initiatives agenda. Thus, CiU MPs in the Spanish parlia- were actively supported in Spanish-speaking ment would offer their support to both Social- working class communities, a clear illustration ist Party (PSOE) and conservative (Popular that at this stage many workers saw the need Party) governments in return for concessions. for their children to learn Catalan as their All this would begin to unravel in the 2000s. first language. With the disintegration of the Consolidation of Catalan autonomy would regime after Franco’s death in November 1975 mark the end of the left-wing hegemony mobilisation for workers’ rights and democ- over the national question. With the estab- racy in general increased at all levels. On 11 lishment of basic democratic rights politics September 1977 over a million demonstrated shifted to the electoral arena. This led to a on the streets of Barcelona for a Statute of sharp decline in the influence of the Commu- Autonomy. Over the coming months a new nist Party, both in Catalonia and the rest of constitution would be negotiated in Madrid the state. This was not just due to the unex- between the main political parties, left and pected rise of the social democrats (PSOE), right, and the remnants of Francoism. It which had played hardly any role in the mass established the basis of a modern bourgeois opposition to Francoism, but also to the Com- democracy but also the untouchable nature munists’ role in accepting the new status quo of the ‘Unity of Spain’, which the army was from wage restraint through to the monarchy. entrusted to defend despite recognising the By dropping its defence of self-determination Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia as the PCE further weakened the credibility of “nationalities”. the PSUC. Demands for national rights would be In Catalonia, demobilisation combined channelled through a process of regional au- with the establishment of the Generalitat tonomy across Spain regardless of local cir- and the subsequent promotion of the Cata- cumstances. The Catalan Autonomy Statute lan language and culture weakened the con- was approved in a referendum in October nection between mass struggles for social and 19791 with jurisdiction over areas such as economic justice and the national question. culture, the environment, communications, Losing both influence and membership, the transport and the setting up of a Catalan PSUC suffered a damaging split in 1982.3 police force. Budgets for health and justice Relatively marginalised, the majority of the 1On a 60% turn out, the Yes vote was 88.15%, No 7.76%. 2CiU: 28% of the vote and 43 seats; PSC: 22%, 33 seats; PSUC 19%, 25 seats; ERC 9% and 14 seats. Radical left independentist lists received 39,000 votes, 2.38%, and a united far left slate 33,000 votes, 1.22%. 3The pro-Soviet PCC.

16 PSUC would later transform itself into an eco- has changed is that while in the 90s around socialist party, Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds 30% of the population had supported inde- (ICV), but with a far narrower base than the pendence, this had risen to 43% by June 2011 PSUC had had in the seventies. and to 59% by October 2013. With the failure of attempts to widen Cat- alonia’s autonomy and the impact of the cri- From Autonomy to Indepen- sis, both on Catalan business and in the form dence of mass protest against austerity, mainstream nationalism has embraced the demand for in- Rejection that Catalonia is a ‘nation’ in its dependence. Long before 2012 CiU was un- own right and thus little more than a ‘re- der pressure from its base and from the left. gion’ of Spain is still widespread in the rest Despite all its claims to be defenders of na- of the State. Such attitudes have, in turn, tional rights, collaboration with the rabidly reinforced both a sense of grievance and na- Spanish nationalist PP, both in Madrid and in tional identity in Catalonia itself. The right Barcelona, had undermined CiU’s credibility wing Popular Party in particular has encour- among sectors of its support. Already in 2003 aged the idea that the “rich” Catalans were it had been forced out of office and replaced taking advantage of their autonomous status by the Tripartit ‘left’ government based on the to deny funds to poorer parts of Spain. Elec- social democrat PSC, ERC and ICV-EUiA5, toral opportunism and its own centralist ide- which governed until 2010. ology have meant that the PSOE has failed to Under pressure from the left, the CiU combat what Catalan nationalists have iden- tried to regain lost ground by supporting an tified as ‘Catalanofobia’. Even the Commu- attempt to reform the Catalan Autonomy nist Party-led United Left (Izquierda Unida), Statute (originally introduced in 1979) backed although paying lip service to ‘self determi- by the parties of the Tripartit. After long nation’, has done little to combat such preju- negotiations, during which the Spanish gov- dices. In fact its leader Cayo Lara, after caus- ernment (PSOE) watered down much of the ing outrage among IU’s Catalan counterparts original content, the statute was approved in (EUiA) by stating that all of Spain should the Spanish parliament in April 2006. The vote on whether Catalonia should be inde- reformed Statute broadened the Generalitat’s pendent, subsequently accepted the right of areas of responsibility, increased its ability to Catalans to decide their future but insisted receive more finance and, in a highly symbolic that his party would oppose separation. move, recognised Catalonia as a “nation”.6 Over thirty years of the Generalitat pro- Even prior to its state wide electoral vic- moting Catalan and other symbols of patriotic tory in November 2011, the PP had launched pride has undoubtedly consolidated the sense a counter-offensive in the Senate and the Con- of national identity. Over the years opin- stitutional Court against the new Statute, ion polls have regularly shown over 50% of among other things removing preferential the population as feeling either ‘more Cata- treatment of Catalan in education, reducing lan than Spanish’ or ‘just Catalan’.4 What responsibilities in justice and eliminating the 4‘Only Catalans’ 27.1%; ‘more Catalan than Spanish’ 24.7%; ‘as Catalan as Spanish’ 37.3%; ‘more Spanish than Catalan’ 4.9%; ‘only Spanish’ 4.2%; La Vanguardia 14.10.12. There seems to be a correla- tion with Catalan identity and use of the Catalan language: in 2007 93.8% of Catalonia’s seven million inhabitants understand Catalan, 78.3% know how to speak it and 49.3% use it as their first language on a daily basis. 5Esquerra Unida i Alternativa (EUiA) is the Catalan equivalent of IU; since 2003 it has formed an electoral alliance with ICV. 6In the subsequent referendum, organised by the Generalitat, 73% voted in favour and 21% against, albeit with only 49% participation. The radical left called for a ‘No’ vote given the extremely limited nature of the text.

17 term ‘nation’ from the text. In response, in idea of some form of independence has become what till then was the biggest demonstration increasingly attractive to sectors of Catalan in defence of Catalan rights since Septem- business and, in turn, their political represen- ber 1977, a million people demonstrated in tatives. Barcelona in defence of the Statute in June The left of course cannot accept such ar- 2010. This was followed between September guments are a reason for separation. An in- 2011 and April 2012 by local ‘referendums’ dependent Catalonia would not somehow es- organised by the left nationalists in 555 Cata- cape from the ravages of the crisis and the lan municipalities; 900,000 people, the vast hardship this means for the majority of the majority of participants, voted in favour of population. But neither should the left ac- independence. cept, as unfortunately sections of the Span- With the economic crisis raging CiU re- ish left do, that any move towards more au- turned to government in November 2010 with tonomy, let alone independence, means that the aim of pushing through massive cuts in Catalonia is not showing ‘solidarity’ with the public spending while strengthening its hand ‘rest of Spain’. The supposed redistribution in relation to Madrid. Instead of the new of wealth from the richest Autonomous Com- “Fiscal Pact” that the CiU hoped to nego- munities to the poorest has not happened in tiate with Madrid, the PP, faced with the practice. Social inequality in the poorest re- stringent conditions accompanying the EU’s gions has in fact increased between 1991 and bailout package, set out to control the deficit 2001. and spending of the Autonomous Commu- Most of those business sectors backing nities (regional governments). As a result, CiU would be happy with the special eco- nine Communities including Catalonia, were nomic status the Basque Country enjoys8, but forced to be bailed out in turn by the Spanish the whole thrust of the PP’s economic poli- government to the tune of 12,600 million Eu- cies points in the opposite direction. Business ros (5,433 million going to Catalonia), thus sectors flirting with independence are clear reducing severely their room to manoeuvre. that they would want a framework where aus- In this context, sectors of the Catalan bour- terity continued and labour relations would geoisie, especially in the medium and smaller be to their advantage.9 Against this back- businesses, began to see independence from ground, CiU’s Congress in March 2012 came the “Spanish economic swamp” as a way to out in favour of a turn towards ‘sovereignty’ get out of the crisis, especially as Catalan ex- whereby Catalonia should have some form of ports were no longer dependent on the Span- “state structure”. This latter formulation is ish market as they had been in the past. By the crux of their position rather than inde- the 1990s a majority of Catalan exports were pendence as such: a “structure”, which would destined aboard, particularly to countries of protect Catalan business from the worst con- the EU.7 Parallel to this is the long stand- sequences of the crisis and allow control of fi- ing grievance that Catalonia provides more nances, hence alleviating some of the more ex- money to the Spanish state than it receives treme effects of austerity. Such a new “state” in financing and services. It is not difficult to would be “within Europe” that is, part of the see in this context how the CiU (and the ERC) EU. can blame Catalonia’s deficit, and thus its Meanwhile hundreds of cultural associa- austerity policies, on the unequal relationship tions, local collectives and prominent individ- with Spain. So once the possibility of more uals from all branches of Catalan nationalism autonomy and fiscal control was blocked, the established the Catalan National Assembly 7See Joel Sans, “Grietas en el Estado espa˜nol:crisis y cuesti´onnacional catalana” La Hiedra no5, January-April 2013. http://www.enlucha.org/site/?q=node/18312 8For historical reasons, the Basque Country has its own fiscal administration. 9 See Sans, “Grietas en el Estado...”

18 (ANC) with the aim of promoting indepen- On the face of it the demand for indepen- dence. It was the ANC that was behind the dence has reached an impasse. Given both the massive mobilisation of 11 September 2012. economic situation, the strength of the Span- CiU hoped it could use the demonstration suc- ish nationalist lobby and subsequent fear of cess as a springboard to strengthen its posi- losing votes, the PP rejects a negotiated set- tion in the Catalan parliament and called snap tlement. Examples of centralist intransigence elections in November 2012, with the promise are widespread. The recent education reform, of organising a referendum on independence apart from its sweeping privatisation and im- in 2014 to coincide with the three hundredth position of a conservative curriculum, specifi- anniversary of the defeat of 1714. But instead cally attacks teaching in Catalan. Meanwhile, of the expected absolute majority, CiU lost 12 the State Prosecutor’s Office has taken out seats and 90,000 votes (see table), forcing it charges against 187 Catalan municipalities to depend on support from the left nationalist that have declared themselves as ‘sovereign ERC to form a government. and free Catalan territories’. The Associa- tion of Spanish Army Officers has backed up this offensive by calling for military interven- Cul-de-Sac? tion to defend the unity of the homeland as ERC support for the CiU government states indeed the Constitution allows. a referendum will be held in 2014 but within Faced with a situation where there is no the current “legal framework”. Given the op- existing legal framework that allows the Gen- position of the Madrid government, as well as eralitat to call a binding referendum of this most of the Spanish parliament, this makes sort it is extremely unlikely that the Catalan the holding of such a vote highly unlikely. government will now launch a mass campaign This is a calculated ambiguity by the CiU so of civil disobedience, let alone a rebellion, to they can escape from the logic of separation achieve independence. Moreover, the Chris- and shows that, despite all the bluster, their tian Democrat faction of CiU are increasingly real aim is to still pressurise Madrid into some outspoken against separation.10 As seen, CiU form of a fiscal agreement. Faced with the ab- would be content with some form of “state sence of legality, CiU has begun to talk of a structure” which would allow more benefits “plebiscite” through elections whereby those for Catalan business. But there are not just favouring independence would stand a joint formal legal impediments. Any form of major list and upon winning at the polls would de- concession by Madrid would not only damage clare independence through the Catalan par- Spain economically but inevitably provoke a liament. process whereby other areas would at least de- Even this formula still begs the question mand more autonomy if not, as in the case of however, of what happens when Madrid re- the Basque Country, independence. jects such a declaration as ‘unconstitutional’ The problem for the nationalist right is and proceeds to take legal action against the that support for independence is not abating. Catalan government. Likewise the pact with On 11 September this year an estimated 1.4 ERC insists that Catalonia would develop its million people formed a human chain from the ‘own state structures’ inside the framework of French border to the south of Catalonia de- the EU. As the nationalists’ opponents have manding the right to decide on the country’s been quick to point out, the EU will not ac- future confirming, if need be, that the massive cept the separation of part of a member state mobilisation twelve months earlier was hardly that opposes such separation. The idea of an a passing phenomena. By failing to organise independent Catalonia outside the EU terri- the much heralded referendum in 2014 CiU fies the Catalan bourgeoisie. would open the doors to the historic defend- 10 CiU is a coalition between the nationalist Converg`enciaDemocr`aticaand the Christian democrat Uni´oDemocr`atica.

19 ers of independence, the left nationalist ERC, cal assemblies, the Proces aims to introduce which is already ahead in the polls. By back- widespread reform through ‘re-founding’ the ing the CiU’s austerity policies in exchange for political system of 1978. a guarantee of a referendum the ERC is also Support for the CUP and the Proces Con- under pressure from its left, principally from stituent shows that mass support for inde- the Candidatura d’Unitat Popular (CUP). pendence cannot be seen as just the result of Formed by various radical left indepen- the frustration with Spanish centralism, but dentist factions during the 80s, the CUP has overlaps with the fight against neo-liberalism. built itself up at a local level on the ba- Having responsibility for administering pub- sis of grassroots organisation with an anti- lic spending, the Generalitat has introduced capitalist programme. With over 100 local a wave of cuts that have had devastating ef- town councillors and hundreds of activists, fect on education, health and public services. its politics are an eclectic mix. Influences Opposition has come from public sector work- range from a Stalinised version of Marxism ers in the form of strikes, demonstrations and through to movementism. By deciding to occupations. More or less parallel to, and move beyond its localised and ‘municipalist’ increasingly interrelated with this, was the origins to contest the Catalan elections in emergence of the Indignados (the 15M move- 2012, winning 126,219 votes and 3 MPs, the ment) in May 2011.11 CUP has begun to transform itself into a se- While the independence movement, which rious alternative to both the nationalist and includes CiU voters12, and the resistance to non-nationalist reformist left. In standing as austerity, which includes people with little CUP-Left Alternative it deliberately courted sympathy for separation, are not symmetri- the non-independentist anti-capitalist left, in- cal the two clearly overlap. This can be seen cluding candidates from En lluita and other in various ways. Among those who declare revolutionary marxists in its lists. themselves in favour of independence, 71% de- Since being elected, the CUP’s MPs have scribe themselves as left wing. Support for agitated around an array of issues both inside independence is strongest among the Catalan and outside parliament, in particular against speaking working and lower middle classes. the austerity policies of the Catalan govern- Protests organised by the ANC have not only ment, the repressive role of the Catalan po- included slogans against the cuts but also, in lice and an unwavering defence of the right to the case of the human chain of 11 September self-determination. 2013, the encircling of hospitals and schools. Apart from the CUP, further opposition Also independence flags are a common enough to the moderate left nationalists has emerged sight on protests against cuts. Finally both from the newly founded Proces Constituent the CUP and the newly created Proces Con- (Constituent Process) promoted by a series stituent have received widespread support of well-known activists. Its manifesto has al- among activists of the 15M. Attempts by the ready attracted 45,000 signatories and reflects CiU to divert attention to its cutbacks by the core ideas of the Indignados: opposition blaming them on Madrid have, by and large, to austerity, restitution of cuts, nationalisa- failed. tion of banks under democratic control, rad- Any elections at present would probably ical democratic reform, taxation of the rich leave Catalonia ‘ungovernable’ as the left- and Catalan independence. By building a right unionist-separatist divisions make the broad socio-political movement based on lo- creation of a stable government unlikely, ac- 11 See Andy Durgan and Joel Sans, ‘ “No one represents us”: the 15 May movement in the Span- ish state.’ International Socialism Journal, 132, 2011, pp23-34. http://www.isj.org.uk/?id=757 http://muhalefet.org/haber-ispanyada-15-m-hareketi-0-7953.aspx 1252% of CiU voters believe Catalonia should be an independent state, and 70% would vote Yes in any referendum, Sans, “Grietas...”

20 cording to all the latest polls (see table). position in favour of independence. Some While the PSC, for a long time the sec- form of federal solution, favoured by social ond party in Catalonia, like the PSOE, is in democrats, much of IU and even parts of the freefall, the PP will lose out to the unionist- far left, is an abstraction when there is no such populist party Ciutadans. On the left, ICV- demand emerging in the rest of the State. Any EUiA is winning support but far less than vote will pose a stark choice, and a ‘no’ means the ERC and the CUP. It remains to be seen the continuance of the status quo. Of course whether the Proces Constituent can achieve defence of independence does not mean revo- its aim for an agreement between itself and lutionaries abandoning their distinct politics. the CUP and ICV-EUiA. Opposition by both That there is no common interest between the the Proces and CUP to ‘professional politi- nationalist bourgeoisie and the working class cians’ and the recent experience of the Tri- is clear, as the mass struggles against auster- partit government, where ICV-EUiA partici- ity in the last two years have shown. As the pated in an administration carrying out neo- CUP rightly argues there can be no indepen- liberal policies, make unity problematic. dence inside the EU or the Euro. National Although a defence of self determination independence on its own is no panacea but remains a central principle, revolutionary so- can only be posed as part of the wider fight cialists in Catalonia are forced to take a clear for social justice and democracy.

2006: No. 2010: No. 2012: % No. Poll: 27/10/13 % of vote of seats %of vote of seats of vote of seats Predicted seats CiU 32.2 48 38.5 62 30.7 50 31-32 Bourgeois Nationalists ERC 16.6 21 7 10 13.7 21 36-38 Left Nationalists PSE (PSOE) 27.4 37 18.3 28 14.4 20 14-16 Social Democrats PP 10.9 14 12.3 18 13 19 13-14 Spanish Conservatives Ciutadans 3.1 3 3.4 3 7.6 9 16-18 Unionists ICV-EUiA 9.7 12 7.4 10 9.9 13 14-16 Eco-socialist - United Left CUP - - - - 3.5 3 5-6 Radical Left Independenists

Table 1: Catalan election results 2006-2012

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