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Journal of Review of Economic Studies Name: Maitreesh Ghatak Address: R530 Department of Economics, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, U.K. Telephone: (44) 207 852 3568 Email: [email protected] Education: Ph.D. (Econ.), 1996, Harvard University, Cambridge Mass.; B.Sc. (Econ.), Presidency College, University of Calcutta, First Class; M.A.(Econ.), 1991, Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi, First Class. Principal Current Position: Professor, Department of Economics, London School of Economics Selected Professional Activities: Director (2005 – ): Economic Organization and Public Policy Program (EOPP) in STICERD; Senior Fellow (2002 -): Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of Development (B.R.E.A.D.); Managing Editor (2003- 2006): Review of Economic Studies Research Interests: Development Economics, Public Organizations Selected Refereed Publications 1. "Group Lending, Local Information and Peer Selection". Journal of Development Economics , Vol.60, No.1, October 1999. 2. "The Economics of Lending with Joint Liability : Theory and Practice", (with Timothy W. Guinnane). Journal of Development Economics, Vol.60, No.1, October 1999 3. "Screening by the Company You Keep: Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect". Economic Journal, Vol.110, Issue 465, July 2000. 5. "Occupational Choice and Dynamic Incentives" (with Massimo Morelli and Tomas Sjostrom). Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 68, No. 4, October 2001, p. 781-810. 7. "Government versus Private Ownership of Public Goods", (with Tim Besley). Quarterly Journal of Economics , Vol. 116, No. 4, p.1343 – 1372, November 2001. 8. “Empowerment and Efficiency: Tenancy Reform in West Bengal", (with Abhijit V. Banerjee and Paul J. Gertler). Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 110, No. 2, April 2002, p. 239-280 9. "On the Inverse Relationship between Farm Size and Productivity" (with Juliano Assuncao). Economics Letters , Volume 80, No. 2, pp.189-194, August 2003. 10. "Eviction Threats and Investment Incentives" (with Abhijit V. Banerjee), Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 74, No.2, pp. 469-488, August 2004. 11. "Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents" (with Tim Besley). American Economic Review, Vol. 95, No. 3, pp. 616-636, June 2005. 12. "Subcontractors for Tractors: Asset Specificity and Contracting in a Manufacturer-Supplier Network" (with Asim Khwaja, and Tahir Andrabi). Journal of Development Economics . Volume 79, No. 2, pp. 273-492, April 2006. 13. "Entrepreneurial Talent, Occupational Choice, and Trickle Up Policies" (with Massimo Morelli and Tomas Sjostrom), Journal of Economic Theory, Symposium on Development Theory, Volume 137, No. 1, pp. 27-48, November 2007.4 14. “Wealth Inequality and Collective Action" (with Pranab Bardhan and Alexander Karaivanov), Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 91, No. 9, p. 1843–1874, September 2007. Selected Other Publications 1. “Recent Reforms in the Panchayat System in West Bengal: Toward Greater Participatory Governance?” (with Maitreya Ghatak). Economic and Political Weekly of India, Vol 37, No 1, January 5, 2002. 2. “Strategy for Economic Reform in West Bengal” (with Abhijit Banerjee, Pranab Bardhan, Kaushik Basu, Mrinal Datta-Chaudhuri, Ashok Guha, Mukul Majumdar, Dilip Mookherjee, and Debraj Ray), Economic and Political Weekly of India, Vol. 37, No. 41 October 12, 2002. 3. “Public Goods and Economic Development’’ (with T. Besley), in Understanding Poverty, (A. Banerjee, R. Benabou, D. Mookherjee, eds.), Oxford University Press, 2006. 4. “Land Reform”, entry in The Oxford Companion to Economics in India edited by Kaushik Basu, Oxford University Press, 2007. 5. “Land Reform and Agricultural Productivity in India: A Review of the Evidence” (with S. Roy), Oxford Review of Economic Policy , Vol. 23(2): India, p. 251-269, Summer 2007. 6. “Reforming Public Service Delivery” (with T. Besley), Journal of African Economics, Vol. 16 (1), p. 127-156, 2007. 7. “Property Rights” (with T. Besley) forthcoming, in D. Rodrik and M. Rosenzweig (ed.s) Handbook of Development Economics, North Holland. Working Papers 1. “Marry for What? Partner Selection in Modern India” (with Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, and Jeanne Lafortune) 2. “Creating Collateral: The de Soto Effect and the Political Economy of Legal Reform’’, (with Tim Besley). Selected Awards, Grants, and Prizes ESRC Large Grant RES-000-23-0717 “Competition and Incentives in Public Service Provision” (with T. Besley) 2004-06; Mellon Cultural Training and Research Grant for field survey in West Bengal, 1999; The Simon Kuznets Award, 1993, Harvard University. .
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