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Downturn LGD: a More Conservative Approach for Economic Decline Periods

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Downturn LGD: a More Conservative Approach for Economic Decline Periods 42 Downturn LGD: A More Conservative Approach for Economic Decline Periods Mauro Ribeiro de Oliveira Júnior Armando Chinelatto Neto Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2416500 43 Abstract The purpose of this paper is to identify a relevant sta- tistical correlation between rate of default (RD) and loss given default (LGD) in a major Brazilian financial institution’s Retail Home Equity exposure rated using the IRB approach, so that we may find a causal relationship between the two risk para- meters. Therefore, according to Central Bank of Brazil require- ments, a methodology is applied to add conservatism to the es- timation of the Loss Given Default (LGD) parameter at times of economic decline, reflected as increased rates of default. Keywords: A-IRB, Loss Given Default, Rate of Default. 1. Introduction Financial institutions that wish to aches, and allows larger banks to use the use IRB (Internal Ratings Based) approa- advanced approach based on the internal ches pursuant to the recommendations of rating of exposures according to their cre- the Basel Committee on Banking Supervi- dit risk, that is, the Advanced IRB approa- sion as provided in the document titled "In- ch, to which the literature refers as A-IRB. ternational Convergence of Capital Measu- Central Bank of Brazil Circular Let- rement and Capital Standards: a Revised ter No. 3.581, dated March 8, 2012, addres- Framework", or simply Basel II, must cal- ses the standards governing the use of in- culate the following risk parameters: Pro- ternal credit risk systems. In practice, Cir- bability of Default (PD), Loss Given De- cular Letter No. 3.581 tropicalized the con- fault (LGD), Exposure at Default (EAD) and cepts of Basel II. Effective Maturity (M). According to Carvalho and San- Central Bank of Brazil Communi- tos (2009) the A-IRB approach requires the qué No. 18.365 (2009) established the pre- most sophisticated models and is therefore liminary guidelines for using these appro- more complex than the other approaches Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2416500 44 that Basel II discusses. compromise obligors’ capacity to honor Under A-IRB, Central Bank autho- their debts. rized institutions will be able to used their Therefore, during economic down- own estimates for Probability of Default turns, a portfolio’s loss rates may be gre- (PD), Loss Given Default (LGD), Exposu- ater than during normal periods, and the re at Default (EAD) and Effective Maturity portfolio’s downturn LGD must reflect this (M), subject, at all times, to minimum cri- volatility. teria set forth by the supervising authority. Circular Letter No. 3.581 addres- LGD corresponds to the percen- sed this point explicitly, as it provides that tage loss relative to total exposure at the LGD estimates must be more conservative time of default, and must be determined in the presence of a relevant positive cor- for every contract in the portfolio that is in relation between the frequency of default default status. and the magnitude of LGD. According to article 75 of Circu- Given the above, calculating a do- lar Letter no. 3.581 and to paragraph 468 wnturn LGD is justified because, in al- of Basel II, banks using the A-IRB method most every case, the LGD obtained from must estimate LGD parameters so that they the historic average of recovery rates may cover a full economic cycle and are equal not be independent from rates of default, to or greater than the long-term weighted requiring an added penalty for LGD esti- average of observed LGD percentages. mates for the duration of economic down- According to Communiqué No. turn periods. 18.365 and Circular Letter No. 3.581, whe- In light of the foregoing, this re the losses show cyclicality characteris- paper’s research problem is to propose tics, the LGD parameter must reflect perio- a downturn LGD for a Retail Home Equi- ds of adverse economic conditions, a prac- ty portfolio that can reflect added conser- tice that is referred to in the literature as vatism at times when default rates are on “downturn LGD”. the rise. Indeed, at times of economic do- Section 2 analyzes an overview of wnturn, obligors in arrears may have incre- the available literature on rates of recovery ased difficulty honoring their obligations, and rates of default. Section 3 shows the leading to higher loss rates for banks’ por- application of the methodology developed tfolios. In this case, the mean historic LGD, in the literature to calculation of a down- which may include a previous period of turn LGD. Finally, Section 4 presents the “economic normalcy”, will not provide an paper’s conclusions. accurate indicator of the future losses fa- ced as an adverse period arises, and will, in fact, underestimate the portfolio’s real 2.Literature Review loss potential. The academic studies reviewed It is during recessive periods that show that economic adversity and periods both retail and wholesale loan portfolios of high default imply greater expected los- face their greatest rates of default: as the ses. It is therefore a mistake to regard LGD economic scenario deteriorates, it may as independent from rates of default (RD) 45 and use only the long-term average LGD to The document describes the pro- estimate the portfolio’s future LGD. cess to be followed to evaluate the poten- The conservatism supervisors re- tial effects of worsening economic condi- quire in connection with LGD estimates, tions on recovery rates. According to the according to Altman and Ssabato (2005), is guidelines, the first step is to identify a his- due to the fact that Pillar 1 capital require- toric period that can be characterized as a ments under Basel II are highly sensitive to period of economic downturn. the magnitude of LGD, particularly as con- One understanding that can be de- cerns retail asset classes. Therefore, requi- rived from the document is that, if the reco- ring the calculation of a more conservati- very rates observed during the periods of ve – downturn – LGD is intended to make highest defaulting are lower than the ave- sure that capital requirements accurately rage long-term rates of recovery, there is a reflect the capital needed to face unexpec- potential for increased losses in periods of ted losses arising from credit portfolio ex- rising default. Therefore, failing to adopt a posures over long periods of time. conservative LGD estimate for this period Most of the academic studies on may underestimate the capital needed to the dependence between the behavior of cover unexpected losses. LGD and variables indicating economic We thus conclude that the appro- downturns analyze data for debt issued by priate approach to identify a period of eco- large businesses. For example, Altman et nomic decline must be based on tracking al. (2005) examine the rates of recovery of the historic observed rates of default and, corporate obligations in 1982-2002 to con- as a result, periods in which historic obser- clude that macroeconomic variables do ved rates of default are high will be then answer for a small part of the variation in associated to a specific period of econo- rates of recovery. mic downturn for each credit portfolio. Arguments for evidence of de- Our review of the literature reve- pendence between the recovery of de- aled a single article that uses data for re- faulting exposures and variables associa- tail assets: Sabato (2009). According to ted with recessive economic conditions the author, it was the first study that pro- can be found in Frey (2009), where the au- posed to analyze the ties between rates of thor shows that, during recessions, the re- recovery and an economic downturn for covery of defaulted obligations is around this asset class. 30% lower than during periods of econo- In the paper’s results, the author mic growth. His study, however, also exa- showed a high and positive Pearson corre- mines American corporate bonds, where lation coefficient of .77 between LGD and a high correlation between default and re- default rates. The correlation was obtained covery can be found. using data from a portfolio of products ca- Basel Committee 2005 document tegorized, as per Basel II, as Other Retail “Guidance on Paragraph 468 of the Fra- Exposures - ORE. mework Document” helps banks interpret On the other hand, in the same paragraph 468 of Basel II as concerns the study, the author demonstrated the ab- demand for downturn LGD. sence of significant correlation between 46 variables in retail portfolios of products ca- dependence between the rates of default tegorized as Qualified Revolving Exposu- and LGD will imply increased conserva- res (-.84) and in Exposures to Small and tism in A-IRB models may vary significan- Medium Enterprises (-.12), suggesting that tly from one financial institution to another, these two asset classes do not require cal- given that the methodologies take internal culation of a downturn LGD. databases into consideration for the pur- Identification of a statistical con- poses risk-parameter calculation. nection between two variables may not es- Therefore, the purpose of this stu- tablish a casual tie between them. In this dy – that is, to calculate downturn LGD ba- paper, we use a method supported by the sed on historic data for the Home Equity literature and known as the Granger Cau- Retail sub-class, is to make sure that LGD sality Test, which allows finding a cau- includes future predictions of loss rates re- sal link (or temporal precedence) between lative to the risks that increased defaulting any two variables, in the sense that varia- may create. ble X Grange-causes variable Y if the ob- served X in the present or past helps pre- dict the future values of Y for a given hori- 3.
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