A Study of the Impact of the Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS) on the Hong Kong Housing Markets
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Lingnan University Digital Commons @ Lingnan University Theses & Dissertations Department of Economics 11-7-2001 A study of the impact of the tenants purchase scheme (TPS) on the Hong Kong housing markets Fai Yip YEUNG Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/econ_etd Part of the Economics Commons Recommended Citation Yeung, F. Y. (2001). A study of the impact of the tenants purchase scheme (TPS) on the Hong Kong housing markets (Master's thesis, Lingnan University, Hong Kong). Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/ 10.14793/econ_etd.20 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Economics at Digital Commons @ Lingnan University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Lingnan University. Terms of Use The copyright of this thesis is owned by its author. Any reproduction, adaptation, distribution or dissemination of this thesis without express authorization is strictly prohibited. All rights reserved. A STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF THE TENANTS PURCHASE SCHEME (TPS) ON THE HONG KONG HOUSING MARKETS by YEUNG Fai Yip A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Philosophy Lingnan University October 2001 ABSTRACT A Study of the Impact of the Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS) on the Hong Kong Housing Markets by YEUNG Fai Yip Master of Philosophy The Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS), the public housing privatization programme, which commenced in the first quarter of 1998 in Hong Kong, has received much attention from urban economists. However, few empirical studies have been carried out to examine its impact on the housing market and the entire economy. This study uses time-series regression analysis to distinguish the effect of the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) from that of the TPS on the transaction volume and the real transaction value in the second-hand HOS market (focusing on the HOS free market), the secondary property market, and the overall property market. In addition, a “Time-Shift Multi-Dimensional Housing Ladder Model” is used to estimate the effect of TPS on the HOS market using cross-sectional analysis. The empirical findings for the time-series analysis show that the TPS has affected the HOS free market much more seriously than the AFC. The effect then extends to the secondary property market and finally the overall property market. The cross-sectional analysis suggests that the HOS market will have led to a loss of more than 82,000 potential buyers over a period of 10 years as a result of the introduction of TPS. It also discovers that resource is inefficiently allocated by the large-scale survey. This dissertation also provides an analysis of the pitfalls of present TPS and discusses three alternative public housing privatization schemes. (The HKCER Model, the Wong Model and the Ho Model) It seems that the “Conditional Bidding” proposed in the Ho Model is the most appropriate policy for the change of present TPS because his model suits the criteria of economic efficiency, policy efficiency and equity best. I declare that this thesis《A Study of the Impact of the Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS) on the Hong Kong Housing Markets》is the product of my own research and has not been published elsewhere. __________________________ Yeung Fai Yip October, 2001 Yeung Fai Yip 2001 All rights reserved. No part of this thesis may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the author. CHAPTER ONE 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background and Significance It is generally believed that Hong Kong’s unprecedented economic downturn in 1998 was wholly caused by the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC)1. However, both the historical review and the comparisons of economic recovery among other Asian countries after the AFC suggest that there may be other explanations for Hong Kong gone through such a serious economic disaster. In fact, Hong Kong had experienced the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution of 1966 - 682 ; the two major oil crises during the seventies ; the plunge of the Heng Seng Index from over 1700 to less than 200 of 1973 - 75 ; the unprecedented interest rate hikes with prime rate momentarily up to 20% of 1981 - 82 ; the banking crises of 1965 - 66 and 1982 - 863 and the Tiananmen incident of 1989. Actually, among these gigantic setbacks, Hong Kong’s growth engine never failed and it was only in 1998 that Hong Kong experienced negative economic growth since 1961. Moreover, the rebound was extremely weak in 1999 when compared with the rebounds that followed earlier recessions. The rebounds were 11.3% in 1969, 16.2% in 1976 and 1 Hong Kong recorded negative economic growth (-5.3%) in 1998. 2 The Cultural Revolution started on the Mainland but spread rapidly to Hong Kong. People were killed in street riots, bombs were set off and property prices slumped. 3 With multiple bank failures from 1982 to 1986, it aroused widespread panic and serious currency depreciation. As a result, the linked exchange rate system was set up in 1983. 1 10.8% in 1986. The rebound, however, was only 3.1% in 1999. Since there was a negative (-5.3%) economic growth in 1998, the small rebound (3.1%) in 1999 meant that the aggregate output after 1999 was still below that in 1997. On the other hand, the economies among other Asian countries were less adversely affected by the AFC. Ho (2000) pointed out that given Hong Kong’s tight links with China and the United States, both of which registered strong growth in 1998, and Singapore’s tight links with the ASEAN countries, Hong Kong should have fared better than Singapore. Nevertheless, the results were just opposite that Hong Kong registered a negative 5.3% growth while Singapore registered a positive 1.3% growth in 1998. He argued that Hong Kong should have been in much better shape than the debt-ridden South Korea. But by the second half of 1999, South Korea’s GDP had rebounded to well over the pre-crisis level. After declining by 5.8% in 1998, the rebound was 10% in 1999. The difference was so large when compared with Hong Kong’s 3.1% rebound at the same time. He further analyzed that Hong Kong’s trade figures started to improve markedly in 1999 and by the first quarter of 2000, Hong Kong appeared to be well on its way to recovery, with a 14% year-on-year growth. Although the strength of the external sector was great, it scarcely benefited domestic consumption through late 1999. Actually, most of Hong Kong citizens continued to feel the crunch of the recession. 2 There is no doubt that Hong Kong’s economic growth is closely related to the change of property market historically. In the past, the persistent rapid economic growth was quite attributed to the active and prosperous property market. According to Census and Statistics Department and Centaline Property Agency Ltd, the economic growth rate since 1993 is positively related to the changes of Overall Private Domestic Property Price Index. Ho (2000) pointed out that the transmission mechanism for the AFC to burst the property price bubble was lacking. He mentioned that : “First, foreign participation in the housing has never been significant. There is no evidence that a big withdrawal of foreign capital from the housing market produced a collapse. Second, although inter-bank interest rates went up in the wake of the currency troubles in South East Asia, mortgage rates had been relatively stable. Hong Kong had seen bigger mortgage rate hikes before, but had never encountered such serious depression in the housing market. Third, it is not true to say that confidence collapsed overnight. Actually, many people, including veteran analysis, were expecting a moderate recovery in property prices. That expected recovery simply never came.” (p.3) He further added that the economy lost 12% of its GDP in the first quarter of 1998. Furthermore, there was indeed one interest rate dropping and the currency turmoil had shown signs of stabilizing at that time. To put all these analyses together, it is questionable to judge that the AFC was the sole factor for the property market collapse and the deep recession since 1998. The Chief Executive (CE), Mr. Tung Chee Hwa, in his first Policy Address of October 1997 explicitly called for increasing the home ownership ratio from 50% to 70% in ten years. He tried to achieve it through an ambitious public housing 3 privatization program, the Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS)4. (For full context, please see Appendix I & II) The Director of Housing, Mr. Tony Miller, in a speech made in late 1997, argued that : “The TPS would foster a sense of belonging and would give owners a greater sense of security. Besides, it would provide purchasers with a first step on the housing ladder, and would enhance opportunities for upward mobility. As a result, it would help the flow of housing market. Furthermore, it promoted the release of scarce public housing resources for those in need.” (See Appendix Q2) In contrast, Ho (2000) argued that the economic decline was the direct and immediate result of misguided housing policy, particularly its motivation to increase ownership in the property market. His hypothesis is summarized as follows : “By selling public housing cheaply to tenants and allowing resale of these units in the open market, the attractiveness of Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) was reduced dramatically. Price declines of HOS housing spread to housing of a more superior quality because the latter depends on HOS owners trading up.