Government ownership and venture performance: Evidence from China* Jerry Cao† Singapore Management University & Asia Private Equity Institute Mark Humphery-Jenner‡ UNSW Australia Jo-Ann Suchard§ UNSW Australia * This paper benefited from comments received at the Australasian Finance and Banking Conference (2013), and from seminar presentations at Singapore Management University and UNSW Australia. We also thank Vish Ramaswami, Hyacinthe Some and Melvyn Teo. † Singapore Management University. Email:
[email protected] ‡ UNSW Business School, UNSW Australia. Email:
[email protected] § UNSW Business School, UNSW Australia. Email:
[email protected] Government ownership and venture performance: Evidence from China Abstract We study the government's role in VC market in China. The impact of government depends on whether the fund is wholly or partially government-owned at central or provincial level. Partially government-owned VCs improve venture success, e.g., the likelihood of exit via an IPO and the likelihood of exit in mainland China. Investment from provincial government-owned VCs is associated greater exit-success, with such advantage diminishing with more funds. Government- owned funds exhibit worse performance at the fund-level. Our findings suggest that government VCs may benefit through political connections may help VCs, but that excessive government control leads to inefficiencies. Keywords: Government Ownership, Venture Capital, Private Equity, China, IPO JEL Classification: G24, G34, G38 1 1 Introduction In emerging economies, the government has significant influence over markets owing to political control and discretionary regulations. Government has widespread presence in the economic entities through direct ownership or via indirect vehicles. For example, Shleifer (1998) shows that government direct ownership is associated with inefficiency and value destruction in state owned enterprises (SOEs).