ABSTRACT

POLITICAL SCIENCE

Hill, Rickey B. A., 1975 Fisk University

THE CHARACTER OF BLACK POLITICS IN A SMALL SOUTHERN TOWN DOMINATED BY A MULTINATIONAL

CORPORATION: BOGALUSA, LOUISIANA

1965 - 1975

Adviser: Alex Willingham Thesis Date: May, 1977

This thesis presents a descriptive and critical

analysis of the character of black politics in Bogalusa,

Louisiana from 1965 to 1975 with emphasis on the Crown Zellerbach Corporation, which came to control the local paper mill in 1955 and to dominate local politics. During the period of the study we find, (1) the height of the Civil Rights Movement in Bogalusa, (2) black leadership coming forth from the ranks of Crown Zellerbach' labor force to give leadership to the Bogalusa Civic and

Voter's League and the Deacons for Defense and Justice, and (3) the specific struggle that occurred inside the Crown Zellerbach Corporation against the segregated line of progression and dual unionism. The concluding discussion consists of an assess¬ ment of development over the ten year period, and observations about the future of black politics in

Bogalusa. This study employs three methods to elicit information. The first method is the usual library study.

Literature on Southern and black politics, and multina¬ tional corporations is surveyed. The second method are open-ended interviews with key personalities in Bogalusa.

And thirdly, the author draws upon his individual assess¬ ment, having observed and participated in some of these developments over the last ten years. THE CHARACTER OF BLACK POLITICS IN A SMALL SOUTHERN TOWN DOMINATED BY A MULTINATIONAL

CORPORATION: BOGALUSA, LOUISIANA

1965 - 1975

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF ATLANTA UNIVERSITY

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR

THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

BY

RICKEY HILL

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

ATLANTA, GEORGIA MAY, 1977 R~ Ltt T ^ ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND DEDICATION

I am indebted to Professors Alex Willingham and William Boone for their contributions toward the completion of this thesis. This thesis is dedicated to the courageous struggles of black people in Bogalusa to transform the con¬ ditions of their lives, to my mother, Doris and to my

grandmother, Virginia, for they have been the strength in my life, and to my daughter, Nzinga Nia Kambon, in hope that she not only become a part of the current to break bourgeois

society, but that in her life time she is able to transcend the totality of the reified world. TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION 1 II. SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE 9 III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF BOGALUSA, LOUISIANA IN THE NEW SOUTH AND THE CROWN ZELLERBACH CORPORATION 42 IV. THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN BOGALUSA, LOUISIANA: BLACK POLITICS AND THE NEW- NEW SOUTH 62 From Acquiescence to Activism: The Rise of Militant Leadership and Organization 64 "Armed Defense": The Deacons for Defense and Justice 71 The Proving Ground of the South .... 74 The Struggle Against Inferior Education 85 School Desegregation and Student Activism 89 V. THE POLITICS OF PROGRESS OR ACCOMMODATION? 93 In Pursuit of the Electoral Arena ... 93 From the Parish Seat to the State Capital 98 The Big Company and Racism: The Struggle Against the Crown Zellerbach Corporation and Dual Unionism .... 100 Summary 108 VI. CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY EVALUATION ... 112 APPENDIX 123 BIBLIOGRAPHY 131

iii. CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

The study of the character of black politics as a significant phenomenon in the American South must consider political development in the region as a whole. Such a

study must also consider the race problem in the American South as fundamental to American and Southern institutions.

This consideration remains the key factor, whether one is concerned with black politics throughout the South or a particular geographical region, state or local in the

South. The fact also remains that, as the ideologies about Southern development have changed, so have both the views about "what to do with the Negro" and the actual status of the Negro in Southern life.

Statement of the Problem

The development of the American South can be summed up by at least three features: (1) as the bastion of modern slavery in the United States; (2) by its

-1- -2-

dependency on the industrial northeast ; and (3) the

ascendancy of black political authorities. The American South became distinguished for a form of politics that eliminated blacks from participation in any authoritative

decision-making. The Reconstruction period, however, did bring brief political power to the more privileged sector of the

black community in the South. It was during this period that black people had achieved emancipation from slavery,

O the right to bear arms and the right to vote. As tem¬ porary as it was, from 1865 to 1877, the Reconstruction

period, perhaps, was the only period where black people have ever exercized political authority in the United

States. With the Reconstruction over and the return of

"white supremacy" blacks were relegated to the subservient, menial position that they were held under during slavery.

■*■366 William H. Nichols, "The South As a Developing Area," 26 Journal of Politics, (February 1964): 24. 2 For specific discussion of the impact of Reconstruc¬ tion on black people in the South, at least three historical accounts are useful: James S. Allen, Reconstruction: The Battle for Democracy; 1865-1876, (New York : International Publishers, 1937); William Z. Foster, The Negro People in American History, (New York: International Publishers, 1954), 260-269 ; and W. E. B. DuBois, Black Reconstruction in America, (New York: Russell & Russell" 1962). -3-

Concretely, this situation was given added impetus by the 1896 Plessy vs. Ferguerson^ decision, in which the Supreme

Court declared "separate-but-equal" to be consistent with the American constitution. Ideologically, this situation remained a constant well into the twentieth century, and was manifested in all the devices that denied to blacks the ballot; i.e., the white primaries, the poll tax, and the literary test. The 1944 Smith vs. Allwright4 decision represents one salient point at which the position of blacks began to change.^ it was this decision that declared the white primaries unconstitutional. Prior to this decision not only had the race problem not been recognized as a Southern or an American problem, but scholarly research was also limited. Ten years after the Smith decision the Supreme Court went further to make a dent in the "solid South." The 1954 Brown vs. Board of Education^ decision reversed the "separate-but-equal" clause.

The Civil Rights Movement of the mid-fifties and the nineteen-sixties was the decisive turn that pointed to

^Plessy vs. Ferguerson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896). 4Smith vs. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944). ~*See Hugh D. Price, The Negro and Southern Politics, (New York: New York University Press, 1957). g Brown- vs. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, 347 U. S7~4ff3 7T954)'. -4-

black political activity as a new feature of Southern

politics. The prime aim of the Civil Rights Movement was to break down the segregated system in the South, i.e.,

to achieve the right to vote and to acquire access to public accommodations.^ Civil Rights activity occurred in many counties and was countered by some of the most bla¬ tant and brutal forms of racial oppression. Events in many of these counties represented salient episodes in

the Civil Rights Movements. The success of the Civil Rights movement is often attested by the removal of

segregation and the subsequent rise of black authorities. Places such as Lowndes County, Alabama, Madison County,

Mississippi; and Tensas Parish, Louisiana stand out.

However, on the other side of this development are those counties where there are no black political authorities and no meaningful input into the decision-making of the

polity. Bogalusa, Louisiana in Washington Parish is one such situation. This thesis undertakes a study of the character of the politics in this small southeastern

Louisiana town - which continued well into the 1970's without black political authorities.

^See Leon Friedman, The Civil Rights Reader; Basic Documents of the Civil Rights Movement, (New York: Walker and Company, 1967); Martin Luther King, Jr., Stride Toward Freedom, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958); and King, Where Do We Go From Here: Chaos or Community?, (New York: Bantam Books, 1968). -5-

Bogalusa was developed as a mill town settlement in 1906. It's settlement was characteristic of the New South strategy that began at the turn of the twentieth century. The name, Bogalusa comes from the Choctaw

Indian word, "Bogue Lusa," meaning dark or smoky waters; which was characteristic of the creek that ran through the town. The town was incorporated on July 4, 1914. It's entire growth has always been contingent on its industrial development. In 1906, the Great Southern Lumber Company was established as one of the largest lumber operations in the world. It was the Gaylord Container Corporation, however, that took control of Great Southern in 1936 and launched the town as one of the outstanding manufacturing places of pulp, paper, and boxes in the South. The pre¬ sent company, the Crown Zellerbach Corporation, merged with the Gaylord Corporation in November 1955; with the

Gaylord Corporation becoming one of the divisions of Crown Zellerbach. The advent of the Crown Zellerbach

Corporation brought to Bogalusa the first and only multi¬ national corporation. It is the purpose of this thesis to analyze the character of politics in this town dominated by a multi¬ national corporation. Prior to 1965 black political life was not considered a part of the larger Bogalusa community. -6-

For Bogalusa was one of those towns where Jim Crow laws and the Ku Klux Klan represented both the law and the order. A rigid segregation system denied blacks par¬ ticipation in the political process, i.e., blacks were still being denied the right to register and vote and access to public acconmodations. Other than teaching, preaching or working at Crown Zellerbach there were few "decent" jobs for blacks. However, even at Crown Zellerbach blacks were faced with a segregated line of progression, lower wages and the worst of jobs.** When the Civil Rights Movement began in 1965, it was a dual movement. First, against the caretakers of a segregated town, that systematically kept blacks from participating in the life of the town. And second, against the Crown Zellerbach Corporation, which helped to maintain that system of segregation. The rise of a militant politi¬ cal leadership in the Bogalusa Civic and Voters League and the Deacons for Defense and Justice was the impetus for the struggle against the city of Bogalusa and the Crown

Zellerbach Corporation. This study covers a ten year period, from 1965 to 1975. A descriptive analysis is made on the leadership, the issues, and the outcome of the activities during this

**See Herbert R. Northrup, The Negro in the Paper In- dustry, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969), pp. 97-98. -7- period. The specific study of the character of black politics within this ten year period is preceded by a his¬ torical analysis of Bogalusa within the New South era and the Crown Zellerbach Corporation. The study posits

that although the South in general may have changed -

especially in the ascendency of black persons to authorita¬ tive political positions - Bogalusa, Louisiana is still ideologically in the New South. Segregationists and white chauvinists dominate political life there, and the Crown Zellerbach Corporation has successfully maintained

its dominance over the town.

Outline This thesis is composed of six chapters. Chapter One is the introduction; consisting of the statement of the problem, the outline, and the methodology used in the

research. Chapter Two is a survey of the literature. Chapter Three is a description of the development of Bogalusa,

Louisiana from a small mill town settlement to the advent

of the multinational corporation, Crown Zellerbach. Chapter Four is a descriptive analysis of the Civil Rights

Movement in Bogalusa, Louisiana. Chapter Five is a descrip¬ tive analysis of the activity that characterizes the

changes in the status of blacks in Bogalusa within the past ten years. Chapter Six are conclusions and a summary -8- evaluation. An appendix and a bibliography are included at the end of the thesis.

Methodology

Information for this study was acquired through

several means. These included the usual library materials, covering books and journal articles on Southern and black politics and on multinational corporations and newspaper accounts of the Civil Rights Movement in Bogalusa. Un¬ published, first-hand documents belonging to various indi¬ viduals in Bogalusa also provided useful information. During the Summer of 1976, I spent one month in Bogalusa interviewing selected personalities through open-ended

interviews. Participant observation was also available as a source of information, because the author had parti¬

cipated in and observed some of the events as they developed

during this ten year period. CHAPTER II

SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE

Three types of literature are relevant to this thesis; (1) studies dealing with the South as a region, (2) studies dealing with black politics, and (3) studies concerning the purpose and function of multinational corporations. There have been few studies of the South that have attempted to come to terms with the relationship of development to the ascendency of black political authorities as a fundamental part of an overall development.

This thesis, then, undertakes a study of one small town that grew out of the racial and developmental strategies of the New South. It is intended to describe its efforts to evolve into the latest era of Southern politics.

I The literature that has been done on the American South has been extensive in subject matter and voluminous in quantity. One useful way to discuss it is in terms of its relationship to particular ideologies of Southern development. The South has been generally considered in three different historical periods distinguished according

-9- -10- to the dominant development strategy: the Old South, the

New South, and the New-New South (or the Post-new South-*-) .

These three periods represent a useful historical framework to investigate concrete relations in the American South.

The literature on the South will be discussed according to the above three historical periods, and will give particular emphasis to the changing position of the black community as conceived in each period. The emphasis on race relations results as C. Vann

Woodward points out, from the fact that this peculiarity was most often used to distinguish one order from another, not only as a way to discuss the relations between the races, 2 but more particularly the concrete status of the Negro.

The Old South The Old South as an institution was the slave South.

-*-The historian George B. Tindall used the term Post- New South to refer to the recent period in the American South, characterized by the disappearance of the one-party system, the one crop system in agricultural and industry, the death of Jim Crow, and the rise in levels of education. This period is also characterized by the ascendency of black per¬ sons to authoritative decision making positions. However, Tindall does not give explicit attention to this latter de¬ velopment. See his book, The Persistent Tradition in New South Politics, (Baton Rouge, Lousiana State University Press, 1975), pp. 2 and 72. 2 C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 5~. ^See Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, The Slave Economy of the Old South, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1968) and Clement Eaton, A History of the Old South: The Emergence of a Reluctant Nation^ (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, vmr. -li¬ lt may be dated through 1865. As an ideological phe¬ nomenon it remained well into the twentieth century being variously referred to as the "solid South," "agrarianism," the "Redeemers," "reunionism" and the like. Moreover, as an institution the Old South had a peculiar position in relation to the other regions in the United States. It had developed a distinctive economy, with which its whites identified, and which gave importance to tradition as the way to maintain its own peculiar way of life. According to Jesse T. Carpenter, the Old South viewed it¬ self as both a distinct section and a minority.^ In this case, a minority that had the right to perserve its cul¬ tural peculiarities, and to decide how it was to develop without the interference of the rest of the nation.

Although Carpenter’s observations covered the South over a period of eighty years from 1781 - 1861, this same view of Southern sectionalism was the dominant theme of other observers. Charles S. Sydnor in his book, The Development of Southern Sectionalism, 1819 - 1848^

^Jesse T. Carpenter, The South as A Conscious Mino¬ rity, 1781 - 1861, (Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith,

'’Charles S. Sydnor, The Development of Southern Sectionalism, 1819-1848, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1953). -12- made the same point as Carpenter, while confining his study to twenty-nine years. However, it was, perhaps, Avery 0. Craven who best captured the essence of the South as a minority and a distinct section. His view of a Southern "nationalism" embodied the essence of the antago¬ nism between the North and South which led to the outbreak of the Civil War. Craven confined his study to thirteen years, from 1848 - 1861.

The importance of these studies lie not in the periods considered, but the conceptualization of the South as a distinct entity. While agreeing with Carpenter and Sydnor on a South that was conscious of its minority status and sectionalism vis-a-vis the rest of the nation, it is

Craven's view that best sums up the eighty year period that Carpenter studied. Southern "nationalism" was the only way some elites could maintain their cultural identity and hold on to their possessions - which included black people- And as history recorded, like other "nations," the South was willing to secede from the Union to illustrate its

"self-determination" and its will to maintain its system. With the victory of the North, Lincoln's "Emancipation

£ Avery 0. Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism, 1841 - 1861, (Baton Rouge"! Louisiana State University Press, 1953) . -13-

Proclamation," and the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments Southern nationalism rapidly became a dying institution.

The Reconstruction was the decisive juncture in North-South relations. This period was characterized by the presence of black persons in authoritative politi¬ cal positions. The end of Reconstruction meant a return to the general form of race relations that characterized the Old South with black subordination. This was institu¬ tionalized in the rise of segregated institutions.

According to Claude H. Nolen, the results were the

"redemption" of the South and the disfranchisement of the

Negro; with the latter being legitimized through segregated institutions.

Nolen clarifies the matter in these terms :

disfranchisement was the key to the subordination of Southern Negroes. Without political influence they watched helplessly as their masters used the machinery of the state against them in every area of society, providing the conditions and discipline to maintain quasi-slavery, including the toleration of lynch mobs and other forms of occasional violence. With free use of the suffrage, Negroes would have helped govern the whole of society, as they had during Reconstruction, and could have effectively opposed those measures designed to hold them in an exploitable black caste. The so-called redemption of the South land its late born twin, disfranchise¬ ment, were but expressions of prejudices used, though many whites did not know it, as a means to perpetuate white domination over blacks.7

^Claude H. Nolen, The Negro's Image in the South, (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967) , pp. 9TT-91. -14-

Ralph McGill in his book, The South and the Southerner, made the same conclusions; confirming the redemption of

O the South as the establishment of a "caste system."0

Gunnar Myrdal made a similar point on the conduct of South¬ ern whites during elections. Myrdal observed that the do¬ minant white Southerners found it easier to establish intricate election laws and thereby manipulate the Q election machinery against the Negro.

The Old South, as an ideological phenomenon gained its greatest impetus toward the end of the nineteen twenties. Twelve Southern "gentlemen," most of whom were

from the Humanities Department at Vanderbilt University had taken their stand in defense of Southern tradition and against New South encroachment. They sought to define "a Southern way of life" against what they called

"the American or prevailing way."^ Their theme was

"Agrarian versus Industrial." ^ To them, agrarianism

^Ralph McGill, The South and the Southerner, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963), pp. ZÜ1-202.

Q ^Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma : The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy, (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1944), p. 450.

^Twelve Southerners, "I'll Take My Stand: The South and the Agrarian Tradition. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1930), p. DL 11 Ibid., p. ix. -15- was the essence of the Southern tradition and the testing

point of Southern loyalty. Their contention was that the whole way they live, act, thought and felt was rooted in

the agrarian way of life of the older South, not in the secular urbanism of the North. Their call was for "anti¬

industrial measures" which "might promise to stop the advances of industrialization, or even undo some of them."12 The Georgia historian Ulrich B. Phillips in his book, Life

and Labor in the Old South, made a similar attempt to prescribe the test of Southern loyalty.^ Phillips'

definition was confined to a preoccupation with race con¬ sciousness. Phillips' fundamental contention was that the South shall be and remain a white man's country. Both of these positions upholding the Old South tend to lend support to W. J. Cash's basic proposition

about the mind of the South. According to Cash, the mind of the South is continuously in the past ; which is deter¬ mined by the purely agricultural conditions of that past."^

12 lb id., pp. xix - xx. l^See Ulrich B. Phillips, Life and Labor in the Old South, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1929).

■^W. J. Cash, The Mind of the South, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 19417"! -16-

Its mind and body is so far removed from modernization that it has actually marched away from the present and future toward the past. In 1964, William H. Nichols summed up the problems of the Old South in its final efforts to maintain its institutional and ideological existence. Nichols points to four problems : (1) The South embraced an agrarian philosophy which positively opposed industrial-urban development as an inferior way of life. (2) The South took over from England the "aris¬ tocratic idea" of a society dominated by landholders, with a carefully stratified and rigid social structure in which first the Negro and later the typical white had his place. (3) The South's political structure was based on a narrow electorate which gave dispro¬ portionate weight to the economic interests of large planters.

(4) The South's dominant socio-political leader¬ ship gradually lost its sense of social responsibility, reflected particularly in its opposition to the advancement of public.. s education and industrial-urban development. 5

The New South - 1877-1960

In the place of the Old South, as an institution was created a New South that came after the abolition of slavery, and the ending of Reconstruction, and aspired for industrialization and intersectional reconciliation. According to Francis Butler Simkins, the New South recog-

^William H. Nichols, "The South as a Developing Area," Journal of Politics. (February, 1964): pp. 24-25. -17- nized the supremacy of the Union, emancipated Negro

*| £ labor and equality under the law. This gave impetus

to the ideas of business success and industrial advance¬ ment, and prompted the concept of universal education, with new ideas on religion and science. The New South ideology was not an ideology of race. One of its most prominent ideologues, Henry Grady made this point well in his treatise, The New South.^

While calling for industrialization and rapproachement with northeastern capital Grady wanted to maintain a place for the Negro. This latter position was enhanced by the phenomenon of segregation. As an institution, the New South began at the end of Reconstruction in 1877. Despite

the entrenchment of the "solid South" after 1877 the New South strategy became the competing ideology against the Old South reaction.

The Louisiana State University's ten-volume serial, History of the South has two outstanding and exhaustive studies on this period: Woodward's Origins of the New South, 1877 - 1913 and Tindall's The Emergence of the New South, 1913 - 1945. Woodward's study captured the essence

■LOFrancis Butler Simkins, The Everlasting South, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963), p. 40.

■^Henry W. Grady, The New South, (New York: Robert Bonner Sons, 1890). See also Grady's The New South and Other Addresses, (New York: Haskell House Publisher.Limited, 1969) and The New South: Writings and Speeches of Henry Grady, (Savannah, Georgia: The Beehive Press, 1971). *

■^Woodward, (1951) and Tindall, (1967). -18- of the necessity for New South development. He suggests that the basic objects of New South development were poverty and the lack of capital. According to Woodward, these were not merely sociological abstractions but power¬ ful needs of both the dominant class and the ordinary people of the region. Woodward suggests that, unlike any other ruling class in the United States the Southern ruling class at the end of Reconstruction found itself stripped of all economic foundation. Everyone had been stripped of grace and power; the old planter class and the leading financial, commercial and industrial families, therefore giving way to desperation and the need to recoup their losses. 19 By the time of the New South's "emergence" the

Progressive movement had taken new root. In one sense that made the advent of the New South significant in light of Woodward's observations about the desperation facing white Southerners. The Progressive movement which was prepared to accept some industrialization was still tied to the "agrarian arcadia" and "to an economy of small property, independent farmers, storekeepers, and at least relatively small-scale manufacturers." With the losses suffered by the prime Southern ruling class, Tindall states

■^Woodward, p. 29. ^^Tindall, p. 7. -19- that the progressive cause was shared by the middle-income

O 1 groups. These groups were concerned with taking over where the old planter class had failed; basically to own and develop productive property. With the help of small farmers, manufacturers and merchants they were able to function as both capitalist and labor. Therefore, they were able to propagate their Southern traditionalism while maintaining a general call for industrialization and economic advancement. The point to be made here, is that the "origins" and "emergence" of the New South developed just as much from Southern tradition and loyalty as they did from the constraints placed on that traditionalism and loyalty from Northern capital.

The New South ideology did not demand total en¬ franchisement of blacks. As Woodward points out elsewhere, the determination of the Negro's place took shape gradually under the influence of economic and political conflicts among the divided white people - conflicts that were eventually resolved at the expense of the Negro. 22 One such example was the obvious use of the Negro as a cheap labor source and needless to say, his relegation to the lower rungs of the economic ladder. While on the other

21Ibid., p. 5. 22 Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, pp. 6-7. -20- hand, the Negro would be subjected to segregation

statutes as constant reminders: of his inferior 23 position. In Louisiana "out and out" reigns of terror was instituted against blacks as the way in which

to develop white solidarity against the enfranchisement of blacks.^ Some of the literature on political develop¬ ment in that State did not consider blacks a part of the broad social categories. Robert W. Shuggs, in his book,

Origin of Class Struggle in Louisiana, excluded the Negro from the category of the masses because he viewed blacks

as belonging to a racial caste rather than a social class. J The New South ideology; beyond considering the Negro as a cheap and useful source of labor, failed to remove the

Negro from the type of social relations that so distinguished

the old South. In a word, Southern tradition remained just as entrenched. Simkins made the point as such: examination of many of the phases of the institu¬ tional life of the New South reveals a constantly recurring condition; despite the changes which the catastrophe of 1865 (Reconstruction) made inevitable

^See Robert L. Brandfon (ed.), The American South in the Twentieth Century, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company 1967). ^See Perry H. Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1971) and William Ivy Hair, Bourbouism and Agrarian Protest : Louisiana Politics, 1877 - 1900, (Baton Rouge : Louisiana State University Press, 1969). 25 Robert W. Shuggs, Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1939). -21-

the distinctive culture of the section was never destroyed. In politics, to cite the most obvious example, the South responded to the suggestion that the Negro be given the equalities mentioned in the declaration of Independence by reducing the race to political impotence. The opening since, 1937, of the Democratic primaries to the Negro by the Federal courts effected a change more technical than actual. While there was a con¬ siderable increase in colored voters, the new voters generally won the privilege of ratifying procedures already determined by white majorities. An un¬ changing caste system except in rare cases pre¬ vented the Negro from becoming a candidate for office or from effecting policies contrary to the will of whites.

The obvious conclusion, then, about the New South ideology, is that it did not seek to contend against the basic social classification that kept "the Negro in his place," while industrialization was taking hold in the South. It merely left the race problem unresolved.

The phenomenon of segregation appeared to be the vestige of institutional existence for the remaining Old

South groups. After losing to the North in the Civil War the remaining Old South groups took the position that the war had resolved the problem of the relation of the states to the federal government without destroying the rights of the states. The acceptance of this position by proponents of the New South ideology was, in the final analysis, the acceptance of segregation as the means by which the remaining

Old South groups participated in the New South strategy.

26 Simkins, p. 46. -22-

Segregation did two things: (1) it made possible agreement between proponents of the New South and the remaining Old South groups on industrialization and the institutions that would be developed by industrialization, and (2) it left the resolution of the race problem with these Old South groups. The literature on the various developmental strategies for industrialization has analyzed the tactical and strategic considerations which developed from the New South ideology. Scholars such as Howard W. Odum, Edgar T. Thompson, Marshall R. Colberg, William H. Nichols,

Calvin B. Hoover and B. C. Ratchford have all done ex¬ haustive studies on Southern development and research on development since the nineteen-thirties. 27 Journal articles by such people as Arthur Coleman, Albert Lepawsky, Gerald D. Nash and Dewey H. Grantham have contributed to the importance of understanding the New South as a prerequisite to understanding the dynamics of regional

^^See Howard W. Odum, Southern Regions of the United States, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1936) ; Edgar T. Thompson, Perspectives on the South: Agenda for Research, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1967); Marshall R. Colberg, Human Capital in Southern Development, 1939-1963, (Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina Press, 1965) ; William H. Nichols, Southern Tradition and Regional Progress, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960) and Calvin B. Hoover and B. C. Ratchford, Economic Resources and Policies of the South, (New York: Macmillan, 1951). -23-

O Q development.^

Albert Lepawsky provides an excellent tracking of government planning in his article, "Governmental

Planning in the South." Lepawsky points out two unique characteristics that would make government planning possible in the South; first, the homogeneous Southern economy, agrarianism; and the second, the availability of a strong "statehouse" tradition that permits the use of 29 its institutions for planning. Overall government planning in the South was the design of a "master plan," covering both public and private concerns; i.e., public works and improvements, social services, and commercial enterprise. Lepawsky begins with the comprehensive planning of the Tennessee Valley Authority in 1938-1939 as the prime example of sound government planning. The establishment of TVA constructed towns were the impetus for Southern metropolitan planning in such places as

Atlanta and Birmingham. The TVA establishments were also

the models in county and rural areas of the South. Lepawsky's

2 8 See Arthur Coleman, "The South's Chance at Industry," 25 Nation's Business (October 1937); Albert Lepawsky, "Governmental Planning in the South," 10 Joupial of Politics (August 1948): pp. 536-567; Gerald D. NasH^ "Research Oppor- tunities in the Economic History of the South After 1880," 32 Journal of Southern History (August 1966); pp. 308-324; and Dewey W. Grantham, "The Regional Imagination: Social Scientists and the American South," 34 Journal of Southern History (February 1968): pp. 3 - 32. 29 Albert Lepawsky, "Governmental Planning the South," 10 Journal of Politics (August 1948): p. 536. -24- overall point in his survey is the use of planning as the answer to the dilemmas of regionalism. And as the one way to reckon with the "Nation's No. 1 economic problem"-^ in general. According to some observers the New South strategy was not successful. While it raised the essential questions, it failed to make a decisive turn in the Southern predica¬ ment. William C. Havard states in The Changing Politics of the South, that "despite the promises of the advocates of the idea of the New South in the 1880's and thereafter the failure to diversify the prevailing form of agricul¬ tural capitalism and to develop supplemental industrial enterprises left the South in its peculiar agrarian context during most of the period of the development of the United

States toward its present urban-industrial configuration. 31

Havard also observes that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the South was only to recruit the more decimating kind of industries; such as the textile mills and lumber industries. Clarence H. Danhof provides a study of the entire New South strategy in Greenhut and Whitman's book, Essays

30 Report to the President on the Economic Conditions in the South, National Emergency Committee, (Washington, ET C. , ) p. 8F. 31 William C. Havard, (ed.), The Changing Politics of the South. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972), p. 9. -25-

OO In Southern Economic Development. Here Danhof surveys the body of literature which deals with Southern regional development. While describing the general categories of the debators on regional development, as journalists, sociologists, historians and economists; Danhof points out that no single position can be accepted as a Southern doctrine on the South's economic problems. Danhof's essay considers the forty years of thought on Southern development following nineteen-twenty. Such was the focal point, because according to Danhof after 1920, "the propo¬ sition that the Old South was a viable system in a modern world was no longer tenable." 33 And the development of new methods to achieve the New South was the order par¬ ticularly in light of a growing population, a rapidly depressing economy and technological change.

Danhof's basic accomplishment was a summation of the strategies offered for Southern development. He con¬ sidered those as "four basic approaches to a more satis¬ factory economic order.The four approaches embodied

32ciarence H. Danhof, "Four Decades of Thought On The South's Economic Problems," in Melvin L. Greenhut and W. Tate Whitman, (eds.), Essays in Southern Economic Develop- ment, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, IM). 33Ibid., p. 10.

34Ibid., p. 12. -26- the solutions that had been advocated by differing elements in the debate on Southern development since the end of Reconstruction: First, was the position of affirming traditional values, second, was the incremental improve¬ ment in the position of farmers, third, was the advocacy of out-migration by "disaffected Southerners," and fourth, was support for industrial development as the only solution to region's problem. The approach that emerged dominant was the latter. Very little impact from Southerners was prevalent, thus, like the debate, the industrial input reflected very little of the indigenous South: "Southern entrepreneurs emerged in a few industries and achieved some regional and even national dominance. The pursuit of industrialization, however, continued to be based O R on the importation of employers." One crucial point Danhof makes in his essay is his rejection of the "conspiracy thesis.This thesis was underlined by several notions : that the South was an exporter of raw materials, commodity rate discrimination, monopolization of the South by large Northern corporation, and absentee-ownership of the South's industries. Danhof

35Ibid., p. 23.

O £ Ibid., p. 44; See also Gerald D. Nash, "Research Opportunities in the Economic History of the South After 1880," 32 Journal of Southern History (August 1966); pp. 308-325"! -27- re jected these notions and the basic theory of a conspiracy against the South as having no substance; he argued that:

the colonial-imperialistic thesis of conspiracy must be considered an unfortunate episode - a re¬ surgence of a crude sectionalism - that diverted the attention of some of the South's ablest men from constructive approaches to the region's problems. It was attractive to some who held the liberal belief that a more newly perfect mobility of factors would solve the South's difficulties. It was also attractive to some who found in it an escape from the burdens they carried. The conspi¬ racy thesis shifted those burdens to others, and carried with it claims for compensation to be secured from the federal government.37

Danhof concludes, in the final analysis, that industriali¬ zation stimulated by the national economy provided the type of environment for a resolution of the South's economic problems.

Lepawsky's survey, unlike Danhof's defended the need for the development of a planning theory, as the prerequi¬ site for a planning government for the Southern region.

Lepawsky concluded that the South's problems were purely economic; while Danhof emphasized those problems as social and political, by viewing the overall solution of the

South's problems as a mediation of all three factors. Danhof put the problem this way:

"throughout, it has remained true that the economy of the South has evolved as the capabilities of its citizens to respond to their environment have been enhanced. That experience suggests that persistent adherence to the fundamental task of upgrading human capabilities is theotegion's best guarantee of continued growth.

^^Danhof, p. 50. 38 Ibid., p. 68. -28-

O Q Pat Watters emphasized in The South And the Nation^ the social and political considerations of planning and develop¬ ment in raising the ability of the regional economy to have

"liberalizing social influences" upon race relations, among other things, Watters' book is a rather general view of the South in the Sixties. His survey is both of the changing mentality and structure of the South; and its dis¬ tinctive economy, culture and dilemmas. The above has been a survey of literature on Southern development. The principal concern has been a survey of Southern developmental ideologies and strategies. The survey focused on the Old South is one way to understand the context out of which grew the ideological and institu¬ tional realities that have characterized the status of blacks.

The survey of New South conceptualizations enable us to come to terms with the relationship between industrial growth that the New Southerners proposed and the nature of the changes in race relations as a result of the New South strategy. Focus on this latter period was an attempt to assess the actual changes in the American South since

Reconstruction through the nineteen-sixties. From this sur¬ vey we conclude that in order for the New South strategy to have succeeded it had to come to terms with the larger

•30 Pat Watters, The South and the Nation, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969), p"! -29-

social and political considerations that actually retarded industrial growth.

II

We now come full circle to the literature directly

concerned with the impact of the race question on political

questions. The classic study of Southern politics was done by a political scientist and published in 1949. V. 0. Key's magnum opus, Southern Politics in State and Nation4^ became the model for studying the politics of the region. Key did not hesitate to get at the core of the South's problem. His premise was striking; "the South may not be the nation's number one political problem, as some Northerners assert, but politics is the South's number one problem."4''' At the time of Key's study, if anything remained in the ethos of

Southern tradition, it was Southern politics: in its grand outlines the politics of the South revolves around the position of the Negro. It is at times interpreted as a politics of free trade, as a politics of agrarian poverty, or as a politics of planter and plutocrat. Although such interpre¬ tations have a superficial validity, in the last analysis the major peculiarities of southern politics go back to the Negro. Whatever phase of the southern political process one seeks to under¬ stand, sooner or later the trail of inquiry leads to the Negro.

4^V. 0. Key, Jr., Southern Politics, in State and Nation, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Incorporated, 1949). 41Ibid., p. 3.

4^Ibid., p. 5. -30-

Key made this observation after finding that the core of southern political unity was in those counties and sections that constituted a substantial black population (the Black Belt South). Thus, in these areas the maintenance of con¬ trol by a white minority is found. While perhaps not reflecting total white supremacy, the politics of the Black

Belt South reflect the essence of the outcome of the main¬ tenance of the supremacy of whites over blacks. And while "the whites of the black belts give the South its dominant political tone, the character of the politics of individual states will vary roughly with the Negro pro¬ portion of the population."^3 Key observed that two great crises had left their imprint on Southern political development: the Civil War of the 1860's and the Populist revolt of the'90's.^

And they also lead Havard to add the Civil Rights Movement from the 1950's onward as the third major crisis in

Southern politics.^ These "crises," sum up, it seems, the essence of Key's argument that the race issue . . . is the number one problem on the Southern agenda. And it is this issue that has given impetus, according to Key to

Southern regionalism and sectionalism.

^Ibid. > p. 5 . ^Ibid. , p. 6 . AS Havard, (ed.), The Changing Politics of the South, p. 23. -31-

According to Key, Southern regionalism derives basically from the influence of the Negro. Other factors, to be sure, contribute to sectional character, but in the final analysis the peculiarities of southern white politics come from the impact of the black race. Zi.fi Of Southern section¬ alism Key came to the same conclusion that; "Southern sec¬ tionalism and the special character of southern political institutions have to be attributed in the main to the

Negro."47 So we must observe with Samuel DuBois Cook that, "the Negro has been strangely, the prime mover in the politics of Dixie. In the final analysis, then, we have in Key's book a thorough discussion of politics in the context of Southern racial practices. His analysis was the turning point for social and political scientists to consider the political status of a black community victimized by racial segregation and yet existing in an environment determined to foster industrial growth.

The advent of the 1954 Supreme Court decision led C. Vann Woodward to characterize the political adjustments

4^Key, p. 665. 47Ibid., p. 665.

Samuel DuBois Cook, "Political Movements and Organizations in the South," in Avery Leiserson, (ed.), The American South in the 1960's, (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 131. -32- of the Fifties and Sixties as the "second Reconstruction."^ Indeed, it was these two decades that have shaped a New-

New South, characterized by the removal of segregation in fact, the creation of a black constituency, and the ascendency of black persons to authoritative political positions. And it was within the New-New South, according to Simkins that "the Negro made a determined demand for social equality.

The literature on the New-New South has been con¬ cerned with both surveys on black political life and approaches to studying it. Literature on black politics in the American South has considered Key's Southern Politics as the primer. Although most of the literature has con-

^See c. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, p. 9 and The Burden of Southern History, (Baton Rouge : Louisiana State University Press, 1968) in which Woodward made a very interesting commentary that evoked Marx's notion of the tragedy turning to farce. ("The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in Selected Works, New York: Interna¬ tional Publishers, 1968, p. 98), Woodward states: during the present struggle for Negro rights (the sixties) which might be called the Second Reconstruc¬ tion - though one of quite a different sort, I have noticed among Negro intellectuals at times a tendency to look back upon the First Reconstruction as if it were in some ways a sort of Golden Age. In this nostalgic view that period takes the shape of the race's finest hour, a time of forthright and passionate action with no bowing to compromise of "deliberate speed." I think I understand their feeling, Reconstruction will always have a special and powerful meaning for the Negro. It is undoubtedly a period full of rich and tragic and meaningful history, a period that should be studiously searched for its meanings, a period that has many meanings yet to yield. But I seriously doubt that it will ever serve satisfactory as a Golden Age - for any¬ body. There is too much irony mixed with the tragedy."

^Simkins, The Everlasting South, p. 7. -33- sidered various aspects of black politics in the American

South, it has yet to move away from Key's basic paradigm.

With Key having defined the position of blacks in the

American South, it seemed that the basic task left was the development of a useful approach to studying the black political experience.

Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro in their study, Negroes and the New Southern Politics characterized the South and the Negro as the great deviant cases of

American life.-^ Their study was concerned with the voting patterns among blacks in the South during the early and mid-sixties. They argued that the acquisition and utili¬ zation of the vote by blacks were revolutionary. Their study also gave much concern to the development of leader¬ ship within the black community. After analyzing their sur¬ vey they found three general types of Negro leaders in the

South: "traditional leaders, who seek ameliorative action from whites within the system of segregation; moderates, whose goal is to improve the welfare of all Negroes through gradual desegregation; and militants, who are dedicated to psychic victories and the immediate destruction of racial 52 segregation.

'’■'"Donald R. Matthews and James W. Pro thro, Negroes and the New Southern Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Incorporated, 1966), p. 10. 52 Ibid., p. 195. -34-

Writing three years after the Matthew and Prothro study, Harry Holloway attempted to depart from Key. He

geared his work to two assumptions that had been posited

on the study of Southern politics: (1) that the South may be regarded as a traditional society that has been modernizing for several decades, and (2) that the Southern

Negro may be viewed as an ethnic group comparable to ethnic groups in the North.^ Following the second assumption,

Holloway suggested that black politics in the South was analogous to the ethnic politics of the Northern ghettoes

of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Holloway went further to conclude that the prototypes of a modem South, were the developing metropolis; places such as Atlanta and Memphis; where populations are growing, businesses and industries are flourishing and the like.

Holloway came to these conclusions by looking at the shifts

in black leadership. Suggesting, that where leadership was once confined to ministers, it has shifted to civic leaders

and professionals. Writing in Bailey's Negro Politics in America,^ Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. made a different point from

Holloway on black leadership, which concludes that black

J Harry Holloway, The Politics of the Southern Negro From Exclusion to Big City Organization, (New York: Random House, 1969), pp. 3-4. "^Harry A. Bailey, Jr., (ed.), Negro Politics in America (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, 1967). -35- leadership has not totally transferred from the hands of the traditional leaders. Ladd stated that: Negro political leadership in the South in the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first four decades of the present was not Negro selected leadership. The ability of these leaders to effect the patterning of political behavior within, their communities did not rest upon their control of institutional structures which in a major way effect social, political and economic life; nor did it rest upon a charismatic relationship with the Negro masses or upon the adoption of positions on race-related issues that articulated the deep sense of frustra? tions and hostility which southern Negroes felt. ^

Ladd also observes that the maintenance of a position of leadership depended on a favorable relationship with influential whites. One might also add to Ladd's statement above the two decades following the 1940's, because they more than any others characterized a black leadership which in many cases was susceptible to the influence of whites. Ladd proceeds further in his own book, Negro Political

Leadership in the South, to specify the type of black leadership that characterized the time period he was con¬ cerned with. According to Ladd this leadership had been variously described as "Uncle Tomism," as "Conservative" or "Accommodating" leadership. The "Uncle Tom" was a leader because the white community designated him a leader and supported his decisions and because the black community deferred to the authority of the white community. This,

-^Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. , "Negro Politics in the South: An Overview," in Harry A. Bailey, Jr., (ed.), Negro Politics in America, (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, 1967), pp. 237-247. -36-

then, was political leadership based on the support and sanctions of a dominant out group. ° Ladd also described

the various voting organizations for race leadership. He listed three of them: Voting organizations for breaking down massive barriers, Voting organizations for manipula¬

ting the vote in behalf of certain race goals, and voting organizations for formal party organs; such as Negro

Democrats and Republicans and welfare or protest organiza¬

tions . The New-New South is characterized by more than just a shift in the structure of Southern institutions.

According to Leslie W. Dunbar: it was with the beginning of the sit-in movement in Greensboro, North Carolina in 1960 that the "mind" of blacks became of conscious interest

to white Southerners, in the sense that the active awareness that had begun among blacks forced the Southern political options to include black values and desires.^ The survey of literature up to this point has

attempted to suggest that one way to analyze the problem of black politics in the American South is to look at the

JDEverett Carll Ladd, Jr., Negro Political Leadership in the South, (New York: Atheneum, 1969)', pp. 115-116. See also Myrdal, An American Dilemma, pp. 34-36.

"^Leslie w. Dunbar, "The Changing Mind of the South," 26 Journal of Politics (February, 1964): pp. 3 - 12. -37- changing strategies for regional development and the poli¬ tical status of blacks in the region. New South strategy was an effort to attract industries and that they were chiefly successful in bringing into the South certain kinds of industries, particularly textiles and lumbering. However, the advent of industrialization did not close the gap between regional development in the South and the rest of the country. The development of small northeastern industrial companies into giant, international combines heighten the expectations of New South development. It was expected that when these companies entered the region their rationalist approach would upset traditional race relations and other more reactionary Southern "traditions," such as anti-unionism. It is out of this context then, that this study has been selected, which allows one to look at the traditional expectations of New Southern developmental strategy, the evolution of industrial growth, and the purposeful activity of blacks.

Ill

We will now turn to a survey of the literature that has been done on multinational corporations. Of particular concern is a definition of multinational corporations, the functions of multinational corporations, and the dangers -38- and advantages of multinational corporations. There are several definitions of the multinational corporation. Some have defined it as a company whose foreign sales have reached a ratic of twenty-five percent or more in total sales. The United Nations' Department of

Economic and Social Affairs suggests that the term "multi¬ national" indicates that a corporation or enterprise is involved in more than one nation. Certain minimum quali¬ fying criteria such as assets, sales, production, employment or profits of foreign branches and affiliates determines

CO the activity of such corporations. George Modelski observes that multinational corporations are giant cor¬ porations. His definition is congruent with that of the

United Nations: He suggests that a multinational corporation: operates extractive and manufacturing facilities in several countries, either in a loose, decentra¬ lized manner, is on a tight, centralized way. It employs a considerable labor force, has extensive marketing arrangements in many countries; and deals with a myriad of customers to governments and other large organizations. Its two distinguishing features are absolute size and operation in a variety of net¬ work layers of the world (local, national, and global) in a way which blurs the differences between them _ and allows opportunities for extensive coordination. y

5®See United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Multinational Corporations in World Development, (Nfew York"! Praeger Publishers , 1974) , pp . 1-2. 59 George Modelski, "Multinational Business," in Modelski (ed.), Multinational Corporations and World Order (Beverly Hills : Sage Publications , 1972) , p. TT. -39-

Modelski observed two distinguishing features of a multi¬ national corporation which he suggests are the key to its central direction. According to Christopher Tugendhat, however large the corporation is or however many subsid¬ iaries it may have, all of its operations are coordinated from the center.^ The current literature on multinational corporations finds their behavior much different from the expectations of the New Southerners. It suggests an analysis of multi¬ national corporations as they perform globally and domesti¬ cally. The expectations that multinational corporations would disturb "traditions," i.e., race relations, becomes strained when these corporations are analyzed from these two features. Globally, multinational corporations have been found to operate as autonomous entities. They provide the capital means for abstracting natural resources. Their role is best observed in underdeveloped countries. While abstracting natural resources, multinational corporations have found ways to minimize taxes placed on them, and attract cheap labor. In addition, multinational corporations have maintained technologial dominance over underdeveloped coun¬ tries. These corporations have contributed to increases in

6^See Christopher Tugendhat, The Multinationals, (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 11. -40- the Gross National Product (GNP) of underdeveloped countries, but have done very little to ease underemploy¬ ment and poverty. Richard J. Barnett and Ronald E. Muller suggests that the basic problem is to be found in the multinational corporations' model of development. Barnett and Muller suggests that, while advancementand wealth are granted to the industrial elite, persistent poverty is main- tained against the many. Furthermore, the commodities that are produced in foreign countries are shipped to countries least in need; the rich and developed countries. In the final analysis, while multinational corporations operate to abstract natural resources and develop technical growth in underdeveloped countries, they do not promote efforts to remove social and economic constraints faced by those entities.

The literature suggests that the role of multination¬ al corporations are just as acute domestically as they are globally. Oftentimes, multinational corporations are responsible for the development of settlement towns. In such cases as these they control the entire political life of the community. They often are the largest employer and taxpayer. Generally, multinational corporations are

fil See Richard J. Barnett and Ronald E. Muller, Global Reach, The Power of the Multinational Corporations, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974), pp. 14 and 375 -41- interested in tranquil situations, such that the social and political character of domestic communities do not retard their performance. While they have been open to employing members of various ethnic and racial groups, they have generally maintained caution about upsetting tradi¬ tions .

Literature on multinational corporations suggests the need to analyze multinational corporations in the con¬ duct of their relations within a total environment. We have reviewed the role of multinational corporations both globally and domestically. The literature suggests similar performance in both situations. In the main, while pro¬ moting capital development, multinational corporations do not upset traditional social, economic and political patterns. Finally, this survey suggests that if we are to come to terms with the status of blacks in Bogalusa,

Louisiana, we must understand the relationship between that status and industrial development up to the advent of the town's only multinational corporation, the Crown Zellerbach Corporation. The entire survey has presented literature that has been done on development in the American South in general, black politics in particular and multinational corporations.

It has attempted to suggest a framework for studying black politics in the American South by analyzing the relation¬ ship of black political life and industrial development in the American South. CHAPTER III

THE DEVELOPMENT OF BOGALUSA, LOUISIANA IN THE NEW SOUTH AND CROWN ZELLERBACH CORPORATION

This chapter is a historical survey of the develop¬ ment of Bogalusa, Louisiana from a mill town settlement to the advent of the Crown Zellerbach Corporation.

Bogalusa was settled in 1906. Two extensive historical accounts have been done on its history. The bulk of the information in this chapter is abstracted from these two accounts. The first was done by one of the persons responsible for settling Bogalusa, Charles Waterhouse Goodyear. The second was done by Amy Quick. The

Goodyear account was compiled from memory and notes he kept on the settlement from the first day he set foot on the white sands of the "Bogue Lusa" creek. While the

Quick account was originally done for her Masters thesis

■'■Charles Waterhouse Goodyear, Bogalusa Story, (Buffalo, New York: William J. Keller, Incorporated, 1950).

^Amy Quick, "The History of Bogalusa,, The"Magic City of Louisiana," 20 Louisiana Historical Quarterly (January 1946): pp. 73 - 201.

-42- -43- at Louisiana State University. Other information was abstracted from newspaper articles and genealogical documents.

I

Charles Waterhouse Goodyear told his story as "the Goodyear story." In Goodyear's own words:

they came late, these men dreaming the urgent, restless dreams of accomplishment and of pyramiding wealth. They were long finding their new abundant virgin forest treasure, though its southernmost boundary was scarcely fifty miles from New Orleans. The southeastern Louisiana country where they found it had, in the beginning, been Choctaw country. The Choctaw Indians, hostile and shrewd, had guarded it long and well and when they left, they left it as they had found it - a forest wilderness of magnificent expense, its riches waiting to be tapped.^ The Goodyear brothers came to "Bogue Lusa" in the Fall of 1905. Charles was fifty-six and Frank Henry was fifty-two. They were the sons of Bradley Goodyear, a country doctor in Graton, New York.^ Charles Goodyear, who earned a law de¬ gree in Buffalo, New York, and at one time served as Assistant District Attorney and District Attorney of Erie County, New York; married Ella Conger, the daughter of a successful country banker."* Charles was the prime mover of

3 Goodyear, p. 1. 4 Thomas T. Taber, III, The Goodyears : An Empire in the Hemlocks, (Muncy, Pennsylvania: 1971), p. 50. ^Ibid., p. 502. -44- the Goodyear venture into the lumber industry. Besides holdings and capital investments in Buffalo and Reading,

New York; Charles and Frank also were tied very closely to the lumber industry in the State of Pennsylvania. The literature does not give any extensive information on Charles and Frank’s parents, nor do we find information on their financial holdings in Pennsylvania. Charles Good¬ year does not discuss these matters in his book.

For their lumber venture in Louisiana and Mississippi g the Goodyear brothers invested fifteen-million dollars.

Most of which had been accumulated from lumber and coal enterprises in Pennsylvania.^ And according to Charles Goodyear, another three million dollars of capital stock was provided by "Pennsylvania Capitalists;" the Hamlins and Crarys and by Charles I. James, "scion" of an aristocratic

O Maryland family.

The townsite for the Goodyear venture in the State of Louisiana was located in Washington Parish, which was created on March 6, 1819. Washington Parish is located in the southeastern section of Louisiana, laying east of

^Goodyear, p. 47.

^Ibid., p. 47.

8Ibid., p. 47. -45- the Mississippi River and north of Lake Ponchartrain. Washington Parish is a member of the commonly known

"Florida Parishes." On the north, the Parish is bound by the State of Mississippi; on the east by the Pearl River; on the west by Tangipahoa Parish and the south by St. Tammany Parish.^ The townsite that was selected was the "abundant virgin forest treasure" that Charles and Frank Goodyear came upon in the Fall of 1905. However, after the postal authorities preferred a one-word name, the designation

"Bogalusa" was used. The name was even registered with the Patent Office as a trademark and was used as the brand name of the lumber that was shipped from the site.

Five months after the townsite was selected the Great Southern Lumber Company was organized, along with completion of plans for the construction of a huge saw¬ mill. The Goodyear brothers also formed a Board of

Directors for their newly formed enterprises. Frank and Charles were selected president and vice-president, respectively. Charles I. James became second vice-president.

Q Quick, p. 73. For a historical account on Washing¬ ton Parish, see the Honorable Prentiss B. Carter, "The History of Washington Parish, Louisiana, as compiled from the Records and Traditions," 14 Louisiana Historical Quarterly, (January - October 1931). -46-

One, F. A. Lehs became secretary and treasurer. William

Sullivan became general manager of the lumber operations, and A. Conger Goodyear, Charles' son was appointed purchasing agent and was the first of the younger genera¬ tion of Goodyears to become identified with the family business interest."^ The Great Southern Lumber Company was organized as a Pennsylvania corporation, which at that time, had an authorized capital of twelve million 11 dollars.

The Goodyears hired one Harvey Murdock, a landscape architect of New York to draft plans for the city of

Bogalusa. Murdock had planned several real-estate develop¬ ments on Long Island and New York City. The idea of a lumber town being systematically planned was uncommon.

Such planning had only occurred in mining towns. According to Charles Goodyear, "it was never the intention of the builders of Bogalusa to create what would become a ghost town after sawmill operations came to an end with the ex- 12 haustion of the timber supply." In its final draft, the Murdock plan showed three residential areas; a business

■^Goodyear, p. 73. ■^Quick, p. 96. 1 9 Goodyear, p. 75. -47- section ; plots for public buildings and several parks, with the largest being Goodyear Park. To the south of Bogue

Lusa creek 850 homes were rented to company employees. About 150 acres were secure for the sawmill plant and log pond, to separate the residential section from the colored quarters. This was done in an attempt to avert racial conflicts as much as possible. "There had been lynchings of Negroes in the Parish, and probably 40 per- 13 cent of the city's population would be colored."

The settlement of Bogalusa was one of the classic examples of the New South strategy for development. Moreover, it was settled by men and women from the Northeast; many settlers came from the Buffalo, New York area and the State of Pennsylvania. This settlement of Northeasterners was a distinct contrast from the earlier settlers in Washington Parish. The early settlers to the Parish came from Kentucky, the Carolinas, Georgia, Virginia and Tennessee, and were of largely white Anglo Saxon Protestant stock. They were small farmers; owning four or five slaves.^ The organization of the Great Southern Lumber Company was the first of its kind in the deep South. Which not only made the South valuable for its natural resources, but needless to say, added to the capital assets that the Goodyears

13Ibid., p. 76.

-^Bogalusa - 1914 - 1964, Golden Jubilee, Commemora¬ ting the 50th Anniversary of the Incorporation of Bogalusa, (1964). -48- had in Pennsylvania and New York. The lumber company and sawmill (soon to be the world's largest) were indeed examples of what the New South strategy could do for

Southern development. Amy Quick summed up the settle¬ ment in Bogalusa quite well:

The founding of Bogalusa was to become a romance, not only of Louisiana industry, but of American enterprise. It showed to the world what unlimited capital backed by long experience could do in the way of city planning and city building. So well was the effort planned and timed that it was like winding up a mechanical toy and touching the spring! Here were built mills - and planer mills with all accessories, fireproof throughout, with concrete foundations and walls and roofs of iron; with machinery foundations planned to last until the final log was cut. Before a wheel was turned, Bogalusa was planned for forty years to come. And even then they said, Bogalusa will live on, the center of a thriving agricultural country and the home of varied indus¬ tries, which will be provided by the forethought of its founders .-*-5

Historically, much of the agricultural development has been done in other towns of the Parish. Towns such as Franklinton

(the Parish seat; twenty-one miles from Bogalusa, Enon,

Mt. Herman, Angie and Vanado, to name a few, are rich in crop production and dairy farming; while Bogalusa has been the center of industrial development.

The Great Southern Lumber Company was established in

1906 and produced lumber under the brand name "Bogalusa."

The Great Southern Lumber Company's primary subsidiary was the Great Northern Railroad. Besides providing the rail business for the town, it also operated the company stores

15 Quick, pp. 94-95. -49- between 1906 and 1914. The Great Southern also had other subsidiaries; the Southern Distillate and Fibre Company,

Colonial Creosoting Company, Bogalusa Turpentine Plant and the Pine Tree Inn. In 1916 a kraft paper mill, the Bogalusa Paper Company was established to turn the waste from the lumber company into paper. It too was a subsidiary of the Great Southern Lumber Company, and was the largest paper mill in the South at that time.

In 1928 a five thousand dollar plant of the Gaylord Container Company was begun in Bogalusa.^ And in May,

1937 the Gaylord Company and Bogalusa Paper Company merged. Though by 1938 the entire operation was in Gaylord's possession, including its subsidiary, the New Orleans

Great Northern Railroad; which later became the Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Railroad. This industrial development from 1914 to 1938 brought forth the "magic city," the creation of the Goodyear lumber interests. And as Amy Quick recorded, it was fittingly called "the New South's Young City of Destiny.

Bogalusa was incorporated on July 4, 1914 and its mayor was William Sullivan. Sullivan had served since 1906 as the manager of the lumber operations. He had become the most revered person in the town, and affectionately

16Ibid., p. 130. 17Ibid., p. 107. -50- became known as the "Father of Bogalusa." Sullivan was elected mayor by acclamation! Sullivan was responsible for the reforestration that enabled Bogalusa to grow from a mill town settlement to a municipality of 11,000 by

1914. The growth of the city was steady between 1906 and 1914. (See Appendix A). It established a commission form of government. Both industrially and population wise the town had grown, beyond expectation. Unlike other lumber settlements that had been developed by the Goodyears and William Sullivan in Pennsylvania and New York, they were determined to make this one grow. Black people came to Bogalusa as unskilled laborers.

Black people were a common commodity around lumber camps between the turn of the twentieth century and the first three decades. As workers they were to participate in a number of major union organizing efforts. This was particularly the case in Bogalusa. One well-known incident of union organizing was recorded by Goodyear. In the summer of 1919 sawyers and filers of Bogalusa joined the carpenters union and other workers joined a timber workers' local which was seventy-five percent black. This provoked mobilization of local white vigilantes. They ransacked the home of Sol Dacus, a black vice-president of the timber workers' local. Dacus fled into the Pearl

River swamps and has not been seen or heard from since. -51-

The vigilantes then attacked the union headquarters in which the president of the Bogalusa Central Trades 18 Assembly and three other unionists were killed. 19 Union organizing disappeared from Bogalusa until 1933. In its public brochures, promoting Bogalusa as a good town to settle in, the "colored section" was given little regard, if any. One of its brochures printed in the 1920's only had a sentence on "Bogalusa's colored section." - everything is done to keep our Negro citizens healthy, happy and productive." 20 Mention is not made of the fact that a Black man gave the sections of the town their names. Since the "colored section" was called just that, or the "colored quarters" there was no need to give it any other name. However, of the sections where whites lived, names were given. And since he was a grocery delivery man, he had no need to name the "colored section,"

18 See Goodyear, pp. 163-166; and Tindall, The Emergence of the New South, 1913 - 1945, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), p. 338. l-^See Herbert R. Norhtrup, The Negro in the Paper Industry, (Philadelphia: Univeristy of Pennsylvania Press, 19"6T(7 P- 96. 20 Department of Publicity, Great Southern Lumber Company, Bogalusa: The Cities of Families and Functions, (Bogalusa, LouisianaT"! -52- because he did not deliver groceries there. Amy Quick recorded how the names were derived:

the rather picturesque section names were given to Bogalusa by a Negro delivery man, one Henry Fisher. Henry was made head delivery boy at Bogalusa stores, and he complained that service was slowed down because it was hard for the boys to find out where the customers lived. He devised a system of stacking packages in piles and calling sections to the dragman after the fashion used in railroad stations. Dragmen soon learned that "Official Quarters" meant the handsome Sullivan Man¬ sion on South Border Drive. "Little Buffalo" or "Buffalotown" meant the residential district just south of the mill houses, which was occupied by company "higher ups" from Buffalo, New York; "Jew-town" referred to the Columbia street section where a few small stores were operated by Jewish merchants; Richardsontown had already been named; Adamstown and Denhamtown received their names from the families located there. Henry asked LeRoy Pierce to name his own section, to which Mr. Pierce gave the title Pleasant Hill (now dubbed simply "the Hill"). "Shacktown," called today, by the more euphomous designation, Lake- view, was Henry's masterpiece - said Henry, "Ain't nothin' but shacks out towards the river so we'll jes' call that place Shacktown."21

There is to be found no other recording in the historical tracks, indicating some type of contribution by blacks in

Bogalusa's early history. Their roles were consistent with the prescirption of the New South strategy: an unskilled labor force.

The race problem was indeed tied to the industrial situation in Bogalusa. The Goodyears and the Great Southern

Lumber Company provided the services, owned the utilities,

21 Quick, p. 108. -53- houses, the land, and virtually the town itself. Their control totally dominated the town. Indeed blacks were kept in their place, they only participated as unskilled laborers in the lumber industry. The advent of the Gaylord Corporation only brought a major shift in union relations. Gaylord welcomed the unions and unlike the Great Southern management it made no effort to fill the role as the direct community leader. Thus, it would take no position about resolving the race problem, which in the two previous decades lead to the murder and lynching of blacks. However, during Gaylord's existence in the town, blacks also participated as unskilled laborers. Gaylord's strategy for maintaining its dominance was a little different from the Great Southern Lumber Company. It turned the community leader¬ ship over to white unionists and the white middle class.

These groups ran the politics of the town and made it highly unionized. They represented both the discriminatory policies of the Gaylord Corporation and their interests as caretakers of a racially segregated southern town. Not only did blacks not enjoy the type of life as did whites, but Gaylord placed them in yard and common labor jobs. They also had to participate in separate unions. By 1955 not only had Gaylord failed to change the relations -54- between blacks and whites in Bogalusa, its operation had fallen prey to mismanagement and corruption. On November 30, 1955, it merged with the Crown Zellerbach Corporation of San Francisco, California. 22

The survey up to this point has been an attempt to describe the salient historical developments in Bogalusa,

Louisiana. The point that the author has tried to make is that the development of Bogalusa, Louisiana is indicative of the New South strategy. Northeastern capitalists settled the town to exploit its timber resource and thus maintained a hold on its development. Blacks were certainly considered "alien" and "menial," and only participated as unskilled laborers. The major industrial corporations up to the Crown Zellerbach Corporation maintained the same position on the race question in Bogalusa. We even noted the period in which total political control was placed in the hands of the white community to do as it wished particularly with Blacks. The remainder of this chapter will consider in more detail the Crown Zellerbach Corporation.

99 See Bogalusa Daily News,(November 30, 1955) - See also Herbert R. Northrup. The Negro In the Paper Industry, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969), p. 97. -55-

II

According to the 1975 edition of Moody's Handbook of Common Stocks, Crown Zellerbach is currently the second largest domestic paper manufacturer. It's main pulp and paper mills are in the Pacific Northeast, British Columbia, and Louisiana, in addition to 3.4 million acres of timber- land. Twenty-three percent of its total production is in container board, twenty-nine percent is in business and converting papers, seventeen percent is in newsprint, fif¬ teen percent is in other printing papers, while wood products accotants for eighteen percent of sales. The corporation headquarters is in San Francisco, California and it has 32,980 stockholders. The Crown Zellerbach Corporation was formed in 1870.

A German immigrant, one Anthony Zellerbach started a one- man system for distributing paper in San Francisco,

California. From this small beginning, Zellerbach with his son Isadore developed a $27 million paper enterprise by 1925. This enterprise had been organized under two names, A. Zellerbach and Sons and Zellerbach Paper Company. The former with business only in the State of California.

2^See Stanley Berkson, (ed.), Moody's Handbook of Common Stocks, Fall 1975 Edition, (New York: Moody's Investors Service, Incorporated, 1975). -56-

By the time the latter name was acquired, offices were opened in Portland, Oregon; Seattle, Washington; and

Salt Lake City, Utah. By the early nineteen-twenties, the Zellerbach Paper Company had become the major paper distributor in the West. "A holding company, called the

Zellerbach Corporation was created in 1924 to take over the subsidiaries, leaving the Zellerbach Paper Company to

0 / fulfill its primary function as a distributor."

The major turn in the history of the Zellerbach

Corporation was in 1928. The corporation merged with its nearest "competitor," the Crown Williamette Paper Company.

The Zellerbach Corporation was the principal instrument for the merger. Its name, therefore, was changed to

Crown Zellerbach. The shares of common stock were evenly divided between the former stockholders of Crown Williamette and the Zellerbach Corporation.^ With the merger, Crown

Zellerbach represented 56 percent of the Pacific Coast pulp and paper industry's manufacturing capacity, with assets totalling $96 million. Isadore Zellerbach became its president. One, Louis Bloch, who was general manager of the Crown Williamette operation, became chairman of the

Board of Directors. Isadore's sons J. D. and Harold were

^See R. 0. Hunt, Pulp, Paper and Pioneers: The Story of Crown Zellerbach Corporation, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, February, 1961), p. 18.

25 Ibid. , p. 20. -57- also officers in the new corporation. J. D. became executive vice president and president of the Zellerbach

Paper Company; a subsidiary of the newly merged corporation. The Zellerbach family remained at the head of the corpora¬ tion. Isadore turned the presidency over to J. D. in 1938; who remained at that post eighteen years, he retired and became chairman of the Board in 1956.

Further and decisive expansion of the Crown Zellerbach

Corporation took place from 1945 throughout the 1950's. Emphasis was placed on greater diversification of products. A contract was signed with Times Incorporated to produce and sell coated magazine papers. The corporation also ventured into British Columbia, to develop a mill and acquire the Canadian Western Lumber Company. This effort launched Crown Zellerbach into the manufacture and sale of lumber and plywood. In the mid 1950's it made a major move from the West Coast. A merger with the Gaylord Container Corporation of St. Louis, Missouri in 1955 put Crown Zellerbach into the container box field on a full time and integrated basis. Gaylord Container was incorporated as a division of Crown Zellerbach Corporation. The merger with Gaylord also gave Crown Zellerbach exclusive owner¬ ship and control over Gaylord's plant in Bogalusa.

Since 1955 Crown Zellerbach Corporation has become a multinational corporation, with foreign affiliates and -58- subsidiaries all over the world. Crown Zellerbach International, Incorporated is responsible for all the

Crown Zellerbach investments outside the United States.

The international division covers the following areas: the Crown Zellerbach Canada Limited in Vancouver, British Columbia; Van Gelder Papier in Amsterdam the Netherlands; Laja Crown South America Papeles Especiales in Chile; Crown Zellerbach Panama Incorporated in San- turce, Puerto Rico; Norsky Pacific Steamship Company,

Limited (a shipping service between the United States and foreign ports); Mitsui Zellerbach K. K. in Tokyo, Japan; Sigma, South America, in San Salvador, El Salvador; and Covertidora del Papel, South America in San Jose, Costa Rica.

The Crown Zellerbach Corporation has five major domestic subsidiaries and affiliated companies: the St. Francisiville Paper Company in St. Francisiville,

Louisiana; the Crown Simpson Corporation in Fairhaven,

California; the Waterway Terminals Company in Astoria and Portland, Oregon and Pasco, Washington; the Western

Transportation Company on the Columbia River; the Forest Terminals Corporation in Long Beach, California; and the

Cal-Pacific Manufacturing Company throughout the State of

California. The Crown Zellerbach Corporation has pulp and paper mills in the States of California, Ohio, Louisiana, -59-

Washington, and Oregon. And outside the United States in Canada, Chile and the Netherlands. The corporation has shipping container converting plants in the States of

California, Georgia, Ohio, Louisiana, Illinois, Texas,

South Carolina, Tennessee, Wisconsin, Delaware, Michigan, North Carolina, Florida and Missouri. And in British Columbia, and Canada. It has plastic plants in the .States of New Jersey and Missouri.

The Crown Zellerbach Corporation has packaging plants in Indiana, California, Delaware, Texas, Oregon and Missouri; in addition to the Netherlands and Canada.

For the exception of Louisiana, Crown's lumber mills are located in California, Oregon, Washington and British

Columbia. And in addition to Washington and British Columbia it operates a plywood plant in Louisiana. Crown Zellerbach has poles and piling plants in Mississippi,

Alabama, Louisiana and Oregon. Its managed forests are in British Columbia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Washington, and Oregon. Its chemical plants are in Louisiana, Oregon and Washington. The main research facilities of Crown Zellerbach are in Washington, California and Oregon. The corporation also has ink plants in Oregon and Missouri.

The Zellerbach Paper Company, which still operates as a distributor is located entirely on the West Coast, -60- including Hawaii. The Crown Zellerbach Corporation engages in four major kinds of activities: (1) pulp, paper and paper products; (2) containers and packages; (3) distribu¬ tion; and (4) wood products. It produces newsprint and coated and uncoated papers, directory papers, business and converting papers and multiwall paper. Its containers and packages are for bakery and frozen foods, and rigid plastic packaging such as margarine tubs and lids. Crown distributes paper, and office supplies for more than 2,600 manufactures on the West coast. And it produces lumber and plywood for construction and building materials. Crown Zellerbach also distributes and transmits poles and piling.

Along with the fact that Crown Zellerbach had $1,758,120,000 in net sales and $74,490,000 in net income in 1975 (See Appendix B) the above is the result of its multinational character and its dominance as the second largest paper company in the United States. Its position in Bogalusa, Louisiana is enhanced by the fact that it has three operations located there; a primary pulp and paper mill, a shipping container converting plant, and a chemical plant. The number of Crown's operations in Bogalusa is surpassed only by those in St. Louis, Missouri, four operations are located there. -61-

To the white community in Bogalusa the advent of the Crown Zellerbach Corporation was a new "lease on life." Immediately after taking control of the

Bogalusa plant, the Crown Zellerbach Corporation revita¬ lized the way of life that whites enjoyed. As stated above, it took a "hands off" position on the race problem. For its prime concern was its expansion as a national and multinational corporation. From 1955 to 1965 its policies of racial discrimination in its Bogalusa plant and its acceptance of racial segregation and injustice were the dominant themes. It is precisley the role that the Crown Zellerbach Corporation played from 1965 to 1975 that characterized its performance in Bogalusa, Louisiana, not just as some petty business enterprise, but as a multinational corpora¬ tion that functioned to shape the political life of the town. It is also the radical criticism that was registered by the black community, starting in 1965 that crystallized the character of the Crown Zellerbach Corporation.

This chapter has treated a historical survey of Bogalusa, Louisiana and the Crown Zellerbach Corporation.The following chapters will analyze the Civil Rights Movement in Bogalusa from 1965 to 1975. Included therein will be an analysis of Crown's relationship to the Civil Rights Movement. CHAPTER IV

THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN BOGALUSA,

LOUISIANA: BLACK POLITICS AND THE NEW-NEW SOUTH

Now we turn our attention to the relationship of

the Crown Zellerbach Corporation to the Civil Rights

Movement in Bogalusa, Louisiana. Of primary concern is an account of the activities that blacks engaged in to end

segregation in Bogalusa. Questions on leadership and or¬

ganization are raised as key factors in the development of the Movement. Attention is also given to the role

of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), (the only national Civil Rights organization that participated in the Bogalusa Movement). More detailed points are made

about the Crown Zellerbach Corporation and its role during this period. The general activities on the part of blacks, from

the mid-1950's to the mid 1960's have been characterized as the Civil Rights Movement.^ It ushered in a new be-

^For a characterization of the Civil Rights Movement, see Lester A. Sobel, Civil Rights, 1960-66, (New York: Facts on File, Incorporated, 1967); Steven D. Price, Civil Rights, 1967-68, (New York: Facts on File, Incorporated, 1973) ; Milton D. Morris, The Politics of Black America, (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1975), pp. 221-227; and Lucius J. Barker and Jesse J. McCorry, Jr. Black Americans and the Political System, (Cam¬ bridge: Winthrop Publishers, Incorporated, 1976), pp. 216-235.

-62- -63- ginning in the political life of blacks in the American

South. And more than any other set of activities, by any other people in the United States, the Civil Rights Movement illustrated the first radical execution of the basic elements of the American paradigm. Indeed the ideas of the Consti¬ tution and the Declaration of Independence shaped blacks ideological notions about integration, desegregation and their entire struggle for democratic rights in the United

States.^ We may date the beginning of the Civil Rights Move¬ ment in Bogalusa, Louisiana from 1965. The advent of the Civil Rights Movement in Bogalusa was a new beginning in the political life of blacks there. Prior to this period, life in the town was characterized by a clear dichotomy between blacks and whites. Blacks existed in a constant state of segregation from the primary function of the town's affairs. Constraints on black participation were the same in Bogalusa, Louisiana as elsewhere in the American South during this period. Blacks were not permitted to participate in any phase of city government. They were barred from employment in the retail industry. They were

2 See Sheldon Wolin, "Paradigms and Political Theories," in Preston King and B. C. Parekh, (eds.), Politics and Experi¬ ence, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968). -*See Martin Luther King, Jr. , Where Do We Go From Here : Chaos or Community? (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1967). ^ -64- no t allowed in the local white restaurants and similar establishments. Jim Crow signs regulated their use of the charity hospital and the public health clinic. The only meaningful jobs held by blacks were in the teaching and preaching professions. While at the Crown Zellerbach Corporation, racial discrimination was rampart, thus rele¬ gating blacks to the lowest paying jobs. In short, Jim

Crow laws and the Ku Klux Klan represented both the law and the order. Some changes, however, in the basic social relations in Bogalusa were to come in the Spring of 1965. The Movement that began in Bogalusa, was a dual movement. First, against the caretakers of a racially segregated town, which systematically prevented blacks from participation, and second, against the Crown Zellerbach Corporation.

From Acquiescence to Activism: The Rise of Militant Leadership and Organization In the Spring of 1964, staff workers from the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) entered Bogalusa to conduct a voter registration drive with the Bogalusa Civic and Voters League, which at the same time was an organization whose purpose was to promote voter registration in Bogalusa. Bogalusa was one of the many untested areas in the South. CORE, therefore sent a letter to the mayor, Jesse H. Cutrer, Jr., stating -65- it wanted to come in and integrate.^ The mayor and the city council called in the officers of the Voters

League and asked them to go and talk to CORE. However, according to Mrs. Gayle Jenkins, who was later to become secretary of the League, "they paid them to go and talk to CORE and ask them not to come in."’’ The refusal to let CORE in was supposedely attributable to the black leaders' desire to from a biracial commission to resolve g the problems faced by blacks. The series of events that are cited as the begin¬ ning of the Civil Rights Movement in Bogalusa began in

January, 1965. Before CORE was asked to come back into Bogalusa, a small group of white "liberals" and "moderates" made an attempt to avert the inevitable increase in the antagonisms between the black and white communities. These "liberals" and "moderates" included the editor/publish¬ er of the Daily News, Lou Majors; owner and manager of the local WBOX radio station, Ralph Blumberg; and the rector of the St. Matthew Episcopal Church; the Reverend Bruce

Shepherd. This group had invited former Arkansas Congressman

was unable to obtain a copy of CORE'S letter to mayor Jesse H. Cutrer, Jr. However, reference is made of the letter a year later in the Bogalusa Daily News, See March 15,1965 and March 23, 1965, and in personal interviews.

^Personal Interview, Mrs. Gayle Jenkins, June 18, 1976. g However the Commission was never formed. -66-

Brooks Hays, considered a liberal by Southern standards, to discuss the 1964 Civil Rights Act. After threats from the Ku Klux Klan, Hays' speech was cancelled. The Klan was able to demand respect from the white "liberal" and "moderate" community, because of its size in numbers. At the time it had, perhaps, the highest percentage of active Klansmen of any city in the South.^ With its headquarters across the street from City Hall, it had easy access to the mayor. Blumberg was subsequently forced to sell his radio station and leave town. While Majors and shepherd even¬ tually gave in to the segregationists demands. A year after

leaving Bogalusa, Blumberg told The New York Times "that

the Bogalusa Daily News, which fought the Klan for a while gave in and now publishes news in the slanted way desired by the Klan."® When the white "liberals" and "moderates" were forced to leave the racial issue alone, the mayor was willing to call CORE back into the city and give sanction to a day of testing for compliance with the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

^See The National Observer, July 26, 1965. See also Vera Rony, "Bogalusa: The Economics of Tragedy." 13 Dissent (May - June 1966): p. 237. g See The New York Times, January 6, 1966. -67-

In January 1965, Andrew Moses decided that the

time was right to ask CORE to come back into Bogalusa.

However, according to Mrs. Jenkins, the mayor had told

Moses to make the request. CORE did come in, under the

stipulation of a brief stay to help test the public

accommodations sections of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

Mrs. Jenkins described what transpired when CORE came

We went back to New Orleans and talked to Ronnie Moore (CORE's Field Director in Louisiana) and asked them to come in. They were going to come in on a Thursday. We then went back and met with the city council. They wanted them to come one day and then go back. But blacks felt that this was trickery; why would they integrate for one day? Everything was going to be peaceful; the kids were let out of school to go and integrate that day. They had their state troopers in and the television. They did go to the movies and all the lunch counters, everything was peaceful that day. The next day all hell broke loose. The Klan was beating kids. There was no integration. Everybody were going to jail; people's homes were being shot in; crosses were being burned in the streets. There was no integration; but something that the white man was using to trick us again.°

This violence and harassment frightened the League's officers

into calling for suspension of the tests and the departure

of CORE from Bogalusa. This led to dissension and splits

among the leadership. Moses quit, because he did not want

to be involved after the people decided to go back downtown

to integrate. Mrs.Jenkins describes the scenario that

9 Personal Interview, Mrs. Gayle Jenkins, June 18, 1976. -68-

that followed Moses' resignation: "then we elected

McClurie Sampson, he kept the office for two nights; then he quit. Then Willester Manning was elected president, he kept it one night. We went four or five months without a president. We didn't have a man in Bogalusa who would

stand up and take the job. I sent for A. Z. Young. He agreed to take the job."^

When A. Z. Young accepted the presidency of the

League, Robert Hicks remained vice-president and Mrs. Jenkins the secretary. Young and Hicks were both employees at the

Crown Zellerbach Corporation and leaders in their local

Pulp, Sulphite and Papermill workers Union. Both having

served as president of the union. At the time they took over the leadership of the League, Hicks was serving as president of the union, and Mrs. Jenkins was a $19.20 a week cook at the local Desporte Clinic. They formed a very close knit core of leaders, militant in their positions and straightforward about their decisions. Young's brother

R. T. became treasurer and Charles Sims became financial

secretary. (See Appendix C).

With this ascendency of militant leadership in the

League and the black community CORE was asked to remain

in Bogalusa. The Klan forced the "recently integrated restaurants" to reverse their policies,and^increased their

10 Ibid., June 18, 1976. -69- assault on CORE staffers and local blacks. This led to the establishment of a branch of the Deacons for Defense and

Justice in February, 1965. The Deacons had been formed in Jonesboro, Louisiana in the summer of 1964. Charles Sims became its president.

The significant factor about the Civil Rights

Movement in Bogalusa was its leadership. The change in leadership in the Bogalusa Civic and Voters League that occurred between the Spring of 1964 and the Spring of

1965 was an example of leadership developed inthe midst of a protracted struggle. The leadership of the League and the black community prior to 1965 was moderate and compromising, at best. Of the new leadership this was not the case. A. Z. Young and Hicks were laborers at Crown Zellerbach. At the time they were in their early forties and mid-thirties, respectively. They were shining examples of a young indigenous militant leadership. They were proven union organizers and leaders.

Hicks, , who had served as the League's vice-president before the major desertion, remained as vice-president under Young's presidency. Prior to Young taking over the presi¬ dency of the League, Hicks and Mrs. Jenkins were the only militant forces in the League. Hicks in some respects was a stalwart in the Movement. He was the one black person

-*--*-The Deacons will be discussed in detail later in this chapter. -70- to initially take white CORE members in his home; "I took whites into my home. No one else in the Bogalusa

Voters League would do that; take a white person in their home. I don't know whether I was not aware of the racial problem or the thing in the white man or what he had. 12 But when I brought them into my home I was locked in." If a catalyst of the entire Movement is to be identified, then Mrs. Gayle Jenkins is indeed it. During the 1960's she exhibited an independence and assertiveness. She was responsible, for the most part, for the cohesive¬ ness of the leadership. Mrs. Jenkins represented the type of strength that was unprecedented in many respects. She states :

I just wasn't afraid. Even Bob (speaking of Hicks); he said he would accept vice-president, but he would not take president. I think they were just afraid of the white structure here. Maybe I just didn't have sense enough to be afraid. I haven't been afraid and I never will be, I don't think . . .Everytime I would look at a white person and I'd get angry. A. Z. Young had all the requisites of effective leader¬ ship. With union organizing experience and a very articu¬ late and effective speaking ability, Young commanded the respect of the people of Bogalusa. He had always been recognized as aman who "went after what he wanted." Indeed like the others possessed a deep commitment and dedication

12 Personal Interview, Robert Hicks, June 16, 1976. •^Personal Interview, Mrs Gayle Jenkins, June 18, 1976. -71-

to black people. In some ways Young's confidence - some

might say even arrogance - were key qualities of his leader¬ ship. His ascendency to the leadership of the Movement

was characterized by his often quoted belief that Bogalusa would be the "proving ground of the South." He held to the idea that Bogalusa could be the first place in the South that would dramatize all that was good and just

about integration.

The Bogalusa Civic and Voters League became a different kind of organization. Prior to the change in

leadership, the League was an instrument at the disposal of the mayor of Bogalusa. Its only objective was voter

registration. However, when Young, Hicks and Mrs. Jenkins were chosen leaders of the League, its emphasis were far beyond voter registration. They engaged in "direct action" and led the battle against the Ku Klux Klan and the Crown

Zellerbach Corporation. The formation of the Deacons for Defense and Justice established for the League a

"military" arm that operated hand in hand with its political activities.

Armed Defense: The Deacons for Defense and Justice The Deacons for Defense and Justice and its presi¬

dent, Charles Sims were significant forces in the entire Movement. Sims was generally regarded as a "dedicated man who would take a back seat to no man." To him the Deacons -72- were concerned with the welfare of the entire black community, and were formed, because "the general public, mainly blacks didn't have adequate police protection. We had to organize a group to protect our people. In organizing we had to make up our minds that we would be only on the defense of them."^ Sims further states that:

The Deacons were not just a militant organization that believed in weapons, and what have you. We only used weapons, because we had to. We believed in helping to teach the community voter registration. We tried to get law enforcement to do their job. They wouldn't do their job, so we had to do the job for them. First, we didn't want anyone to know. This went on about a month. We then made up our minds that we didn't care who knew. It wasn't a secret what we were doing, we had a charter with the State of Louisiana.

The Bogalusa Daily News was bitterly opposed to the

Movement in general and Charles Sims and the Deacons in particular. Charles Sims it stated:

is always in the bitter middle of the racial strife which has become a way of life in Bogalusa. The 42 year old goateed Negro is president of the local chapter of the Deacons Committee for Defense and Justice. His arrest record at the Bogalusa police department has 21 entries dating back to 1957. He describes himself as an insurance agent but his main occupation these days is war leader of a mili¬ tant group of Negro men always willing to fight for their belief in the civil rights movement.I®

^^Personal Interview, Charles Sims, June 21, 1976.

15Ibid., June 21, 1976.

^Bogalusa Daily News, July 12, 1965. -73-

Sims had long since been recognized and respected for his militant nature. The white community knew and understood Sims effectiveness in the black community. His experience as a "tech-sergeant" in the Army made him equally qualified to head the Deacons in Bogalusa. Therefore, the whites in Bogalusa and throughout Louisiana attempted to remove Sims from the scene. The New York Times reported that the

Citizens Council of Louisiana announced a segregationist drive against common law marriage among Negroes. It was aimed specifically at the Civil Rights Movement in Bogalusa. A warrant was issued agains Sims, because the police said he had a common law wife. The report went further to state that thousands of Negro men and women would be put in prison for living together illegally. 1 7 Indeed the Deacons were an effective arm of the Civil

Rights Movement in Bogalusa. Not only did it defend the black community against terrorism, but it also guarded against Uncle Tomism within the black community. Much of the success of the Deacons had been due to Sims. By the summer of 1965 he had become a nationally recognized figure.

T O Twice during the summer he appeared on the Louis Lomax-1- show in Los Angeles,California. His appearances attracted a

■^See The New York Times, July 13, 1965. 18 Lomax is the author of The Negro Revolt, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962). -74-

lot of attention on the West Coast. Many people requested

that Sims help organize a Deacons in Los Angeles. According to Sims from these meetings came the Black Panther Party.

He impressed upon them that, "they didn't have to organize the Deacons in Los Angeles. They can organize any type

of organization that believed in the same philosophy that 19 the Deacons believed in." Huey Newton and Bobby Seale

did use the Deacons as a historical reference to organize 20 the Black Panther Party. Although, the Deacons were more publicized in Boga-

lusa and Jonesboro, they did exist elsewhere in Louisiana.

The Deacons were very active in Homer and Tallulah, also. There were also chapters in Mississippi and Alabama. There were an estimated 5,000 to 15,000 members throughout the South. 21 According to Sims, who presently refers to him¬

self as the National Chairman of the Deacons there were

some fifty-six chapters in the South and North.

The Proving Ground of the South By April 1965, the League had shown a political maturity that had never existed among black people in Bogalusa. On April 6, 1965 it presented Mayor Jesse H. Cutrer with a list of demands; which made clear the position

of the black community on their condition in Bogalusa:

19 Personal Interview, Charles Sims, June 21, 1976.

^See Bobby Seale, Seize the Time, (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 117. 21 Personal Interview, Charles Sims, June 21, 1976. -75-

the white leaders of Bogalusa and Washington Parish have on occasion expressed the view that "race relations," as they call it, have been happy and harmonious over the years. They seem publicly amazed and dismayed when assertions by Negroes make clear that whites only are susceptible to that myth.

Negroes are not interested in "race relations." We speak of freedom, justice, and equality. We are citizens, not "race relations;" and we assert our citizenship. We regard the following as minimal and reasonable requirements to our citizenship and ask you to help us attain them:

1 - Equal economic opportunity in public and private employment and in city licensing practices. 2 - Equal educational opportunities in integrated school facilities.

3 - Desegregation of all public accomodations and facilities. 4 - Extension to all the community of sewer, paved roads, bright street lighting, and adequate enforced housing codes. 5 - Inclusion of Negro leaders on a decision-making level on city and parish general and industrial planning boards. 6 - Removal from city ordinances of all unconstitu¬ tional discriminatory laws.

7 - Employment of Negro city policemen with all proper police power9to help insure the equal enforcement of law. z Outrer's 'only reply to the demands was that he would be-^glad to meet with one or more of the 'local citizens and members of the Bogalusa Civic and Voters 'League.

22 See the Bogalusa Daily News, April 9, 1965. -76-

On April 9th James Farmer, National Director of

CORE and Ronnie Moore, the organization's state field director led a march of about five hundred people to

City Hall. Mayor Cutrer, initially pledging to help solve the racial problems, insisted that half of the black negotiating team be drawn from those who opposed CORE'S

O O presence in Bogalusa.

Cutrer was determined in his insistence against the new militant leadership of the black community. He commissioned a subcommittee of the Bogalusa Community Affairs Committee

to conduct a survey to determine the Negro leadership of the city.^ Cutrer said that the Bogalusa Civic and Voters

League that was working with CORE, at that time, was not

representative of the Negro community. The survey was to determine the true leadership. It was to be conducted in the black community; asking blacks to name the persons o 5 they felt were the leaders of the black population. However, the black community did not participate in the

^See August Meier and Elliot Rudwick, CORE : A Study In the Civil Rights Movement, 1942-1968, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 348. Alsoaccording to Robert Hicks the mayor wanted blacks who resigned from the BCVL to be a part of the negotiating team. 24 The survey was conducted from various business estab¬ lishments when blacks went into these various places, i.e., banks, stores, they were asked to fill out questionnaires. "*See Bogalusa Daily News, April 21, 1965. -77- survey. Young and the other leaders had won the complete confidence and respect of the mass of the black community.

The level of the struggle had now moved toward intense programs of picket lines on the downtown merchants. This escalation also prompted the then Governor John McKeithen to send in over three hundred State Police. During this struggle the Crown Zellerbach Corporation had refrained from taking a position on the Bogalusa situa¬ tion. Instead, it had remained neutral. In effect, such neutrality was supportive of the white community. Wilfred Ussery, CORE'S National Vice-Chairman formed a "Bogalusa Committee for Concern" in San Francisco, to pressure Crown

Zellerbach's top national executives to take an active position in resolving the Bogalusa crisis. This committee had been established on February 12, 1965. It had asked

Crown Zellerbach to meet with the representatives of the

Voters League, to discuss the company's policies in Bogalusa and to hire black women in the Bogalusa plants as a show of good faith. The committee's larger concerns called for the Crown Zellerbach Corporation to prepare both nationally and at its Bogalusa plant a general policy statement reiterating its support of equal rights and pro-

^See CORE Southern Newsletter, Berkeley Campus CORE, July 14" 1965. See also August Meier and Elliot Rud- wick, CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights Movement, 1942- 1968, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 348. See also Rony "Bogalusa: The Economics of Tragedy," p. 243. -78- tection for all citizens under the Constitution and the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 (for a complete text of one set of demands, see Appendix D). The committee also was re¬ sponsible for raising funds for the Bogalusa Movement.

The Crown Zellerbach Corporation did issue a policy statement on the Bogalusa situation. The Chairman of its

Board of Directors, Reed 0. Hunt, issued a statement on April 22, 1965 at the company's Annual Share Owners meeting in San Francisco. The statement was titled "Equal Employ- ment Opportunity in Bogalusa, Louisiana." 27 Hunt's first suggestion in the statement was that Bogalusa was "not a company town." He stated, that "today you might describe

Bogalusa as a mill town, perhaps, but it is not a company town. We have worked hard to bring about this change." Hunt further stated that the impetus for any type of non- discriminatory policy was not of Crown's initiative. He stated, "as contract suppliers of paper to the Federal government, we were subject to Executive Order 10925. This order by the president required companies doing business under contract with the Federal government to develop pro¬ grams for providing equal employment opportunity to their people. It did not require overnight compliance." Finally, Hunt's statement on the company's basic position revealed the true character of a company bent on exploiting a situation

27 Reed 0. Hunt, Equal Employment Opportunity in Bogalusa, Louisiana," (San Francisco: April 22, 1965). -79- for its own advancement:

we will not dictate to this community, or any com¬ munity in which we operate. The Civil Rights issue is a community responsibility. The company has its part to play. We have our special responsibilities. Dictation is not one of them.

First and foremost is our responsibility for equal employment opportunity. This is a national policy. This is a company policy. It is a fair policy. We must live up to it.

But we recognize that we have wider responsibilities and obligations in Bogalusa. These take the form of support for community institutions, support of law and order, living up to the requirements of good corporate citizenship.

In the final conclusion, then, Crown Zellerbach took a position in favor of the established regulations in

Bogalusa.

The months of May and June of 1965 were marked by increased protest and demonstrations. Three areas of protest were developed. First, picket lines were set up downtown, to end discriminatory hiring and differential wage policies. The city tried to deny blacks freedom of assembly by passing a series of ordinances, making it illegal for more than two people to walk a picket line. The second area of protest grew out of the unconstitutional ordi¬ nances which were issued in June, 1965. This took the form of demands for the abolition of the ordinances and democratic control over the police. The city park was the third area of protest. The attempt to integrate the park,

28 Ibid., p. 8. -80- however, was met with violence. White mobs and policemen beat blacks who entered the park. All of this happened despite the mayor's promise that the park and other public facilities would be opened to blacks. While Bogalusa was the only town in Washington Parish actively engaged in the struggle for desegregation and equal rights, blacks in the entire Parish had benefited from the struggles in Bogalusa. Two black men had been

selected as the first black deputy sheriffs in Washington

Parish. Both were from Vanado, Louisiana; a small community town about seven miles north of Bogalusa. The two men were O'Neal Moore and Creed Rodgers, both in their thirties. The deputies patrolled throughout the black communities of the Parish. For the black community, they represented

symbols of security and hope. Their presence helped to keep down the night riding, which had increased with the

escalation of demonstrations.

However, on June 2, 1965, a fatal blow was to shadow that security and hope. On the night of June 2, 1965, while on patrol Moore and Rodgers were ambushed. Moore was instantly killed and Rodgers was critically wounded. Earnest R. McElveen, a 41 year old white employer at Crown Zellerbach was arrested in Tylertown, Mississippi shortly

after the ambush. Moore and Rodgers had been hired the year before as a campaign promise to black political leaders -81- of the Parish, by Sheriff Dorman Crowe. McElveen was a member of the United Conservatives, a right wing segre¬ gationist organization. The United Conservatives were a spinoff from the Klan in face of investigations by the House Committee on Un-American Activities. When arrested, four membership cards were found in McElveen's pockets. The cards identified him as a member of the Citizens Council, the national States Rights party, 29 the National Rifleman's Association, and as a special agent of the State Police; an honorary position he held since 1962. 30

29 The State Rights party was a right-wing, anti-semitic racist organization, headquartered in Birmingham, Alabama. on J McElveen was subsequently defended by Baton Rouge criminal lawyer, Ossie B. Brown. Brown maintained his client innocent. McElveen was acquitted of the charges. This is the same Ossie Brown who successfully defended one black Sergeant Mitchell of the Mai Lai charges. And the same Brown, who as District Attorney of East Baton Rouge Parish failed to find anyone guilty of the murders of two Southern University stu¬ dents in November 1972. The year 1966 was also to witness two shootings of black per¬ sons. The first was on March 11th. A black Army Captain, while using a public telephone at a gasoline station, was shot in the back. Donald Sims was home preparing for his first tour of duty in Vietnam. The man who shot him was Thomas Bennett, a 43 year old employee with the Crown Zellerbach Corporation. He was charged and later acquitted of attempted murder. A lynch-type murder was committed against another black man on July 31, 1966. Clarence Triggs, 24 years old,,was found dead near the Pearl River. He was murdered by two white men, Homer Richard Seale and John W. Copling, Jr. They too were acquitted of murder. The Crown Zellerbach Corporation did not even issue a statement expressing concern over the fact that two of its employees were responsible for two of the shootings. -82-

A law suit in the sum of $425,000 was filed by eleven black persons and one white CORE worker in the

Federal District Court. The suit charged the defendents with conspiring to deprive blacks of their equal pro¬ tection under the law, due process and general police brutality and harassment. The suit was filed against the mayor, the public safety commissioner, the police chief, the State Police superintendent, the Washington Parish sheriff, two city policemen and a Parish deputy. After hearing the case the Court enjoined the police department of Bogalusa and Washington Parish from using violence and threats to prevent blacks from exercising their civil rights. Federal District Judge, Herbert W. Christenberry ordered Arnold Spier, Bogalusa Commissioner of Public

Safety and Claxton Knight, Bogalusa Chief of Police to take all means to protect the Civil Rights demonstrators. The

Court also ordered Spiers and Knight to file with it written reports on the first of each month for one.- year, showing that they complied with its orders. 31-

Violence continued against blacks throughout the summer of 1965. The Voters League decided to conduct a seven day series of marches to dramatize their struggle to the nation. The marches began on July 7th. Each march was to have its own leader of some national statue. The likes of

31 See New Orleans Times .July 31, 1965. -83-

Dick Gregory, James Farmer, Martin Luther King, Jr., and two of his aides, Elton Cox and James Bevels were to lead a march at some point during the seven days. However, the marches did not occur as planned. 32 At the request of the mayor, the governor sent in more State Troopers and violence continued. At the end of the second march a white man was shot by a black man, alleged

to be a Deacon. The shooting occured when Henry Austin went

to the aid of one of the Civil Rights nurses, who was thrown

to the ground by a white man, while she aided a wounded girl. Governor McKeithen, after failing a few weeks earlier to get a cooling off period in Bogalusa sent his personal plane to fly Young and Hicks to his mansion, to persuade

them to accept another proposal for a cooling off period.

Young and Hicks agreed to take the proposal back to the rank and file, but the rank and file would not accept the proposal and pledged to continue the struggle. Having failed, McKeithen instituted a biracial commission to deal with the Bogalusa situation. However, the commission could do very little. By the summer of 1965, picketing and sit-ins were

the order of the day. The Justice Department agreed to send John Doar to Bogalusa. Doar was head of the Civil Rights Division and President Johnson's personal emissary.

■^See Southern Newsletter, Berkeley Campus CORE, July 14, 1965. -84- However, Doar and the FBI agents, who were also sent in were themselves targets of harassment from the white

segregationists. Doar's office in the local United States Postal Building was under constant picketing by whites. The Bogalusa Movement did have some minimal vic¬

tories to show for its activity. Two black men qualified

for and passed the Civil Service test to become the first black policemen in Bogalusa. The downtown restaurants and theaters were desegregated. A school desegregation suit was filed by CORE1s attorneys asking for preliminary

and permanent injunctions to prevent the Bogalusa School Board from operating a bi-racial school system and from making student and teacher assignment; from the disbursing of funds; and from constructing buildings and scheduling

extracurricular activities on a racial basis. The Court

thereby ordered limited educational integration. Although, the first six months of the Movement cost the city an additional ninety-six thousand dollars in

police expenses, 33 it was the merchants on Columbia Road, the main street of the town, that suffered the greatest

losses. The League had used the economic boycott effectively.

Individual stores lost anywhere from fifteen to eighty-five percent of anticipated business during the first eight months

of the Movement. Even though, the merchants suggested that

they could do something to resolve the racial conflict, they were afraid of the white segregationists. And if they would

^See Bogalusa Daily News, July 12, 1965. -85- have offered any solutions to problems, they felt the Klan would have bombed their stores.

The only concession that the first eight months of the Movement received from Crown Zellerbach was its acceptance

"in principle" of a proposal urged by the Federal Equal Opportunities Commission, to abolish its segregated line of progression in two of its departments. However, Crown

Zellerbach's role in this entire matter was more broader

than the aforementioned. Extensive discussion on the role of Crown will be taken up later in the next chapter.

The summer of 1965 also brought a new consolidation of the Movement within the black community. Efforts were made to raise the political consciousness of the black people in Bogalusa, about the national predicament of blacks, both historically and contemporaneously. The League, with the cooperation of CORE workers set up Freedom schools in various sections of the community. The schools were used to teach black history and provide voter education, and the like. This gave the impetus to a voter registration drive

that was able to register eighty percent of the qualified blacks during that summer.

The Struggle Against "Inferior" Education In the Fall of 1965, a new stage of struggle had developed, and a new dimension to the Bogalusa Civic and Voters League was consolidated. The schools in the black -86- community, had long since suffered from inadequate equip¬ ment and facilities. Black principals had hitherto done little, if anything, to request or demand better and adequate facilities to provide quality education to black youth. In 1965 there were three black elementary schools, from grades first through seventh; one black elementary school, from grades first through eight; and one black high school, from grades ninth through twelfth. The books and other materials usually were used and left over from the white schools, and there was always the problem of not enough to go around. One such example of the inequity of the distribution between the white and black schools was in the area of expenditures; for example, for the Bogalusa School Board spent $1,094,737.88 on the white schools and A yj $488,186.18 on the black schools. There was also an obvious disregard for black teachers acquiring new teaching methods and techniques. For 1965, $456.64 was spent on conferences and workshops for white teachers ; while no money was provided for black teachers for the same purpose. Black parents and students took the initiative to bring the matters to the attention of the black principals. However, the principals were negligent in their responsi¬ bility and refused to bring these matters to the attention of the School Board. The result was a full scale boycott of the black schools. This launched a new phase in the

From memorandum of Bogalusa Civic and Voters League, "Research on Bogalusa Schools, 1965. -87-

Bogalusa struggle, and sharpened the contradictions between the mass of the black community and its profes¬

sionals . The school situation also saw the development of a youth arm of the Bogalusa Civic and Voters League. The

Youth League was headed by Don Expose, the son of Mrs. Jenkins. Don was, perhaps, one of the most popular students around. The boycott of the schools began in October, 1965. A list of demands was presented to the School Board, from

the Youth League (See Appendix E). A full week of boycotts was initiated at each black school. The students also participated in a picket at the school's gates, along with

several marches to the School Board office; highlighted by the arrest of some 250 students at one time. Along with refusing to listen to the demands, the School Board also threatened the black parents with fines of $10 per

day or 10 days in jail or both. Overall bail for the arrested students reached the amount of twenty thousand

dollars. And if that was not enough to force the end of the boycott and marches, some officials of the League were arrested and charged with contributing to the delinquency of minors.

Violence was also inflicted upon the students, by the police. The demonstrations by the students and the

larger black community led to the increase in police -88-

brutality. After a rally that was held at the local

black union hall, many black persons were openly attacked in the heart of one section of the black community. Police

literally went down the street from door to door beating and kicking blacks. This occured on the main "night strip" in the black community. When it was over the night was properly characterized as a "night of terror." The black

community was caught completely off guard and many blacks were literally dragged from night clubs, while being beaten

on the head. In spite of the problems in the Bogalusa School System and the brutality inflicted upon black

students and the black community, the Crown Zellerbach

Corporation remained neutral and steadfast in its pledge to live up to "the requirements of good corporate citizen¬ ship," by not interfering in what it called the affairs of

the community. The remainder of the year of 1965 was characteri¬ zed by a relative calm in the school demonstrations. By

August 1966 Federal District Judge Frederick J. R. Heebee ordered the "freedom of choice" system of desegregating the Bogalusa School System. He also ordered all teachers hired without regard to race or color. In the Fall of 1967, the

School Board began to make some improvements at the black schools. The Board, for instance, put new recreational

equipment at most of the black schools. Finally, in the -89-

Summer of 1969, the Federal court ordered the total de¬

segregation of the Bogalusa School System. This court order was to be the decisive turn in ithe relationship between blacks and whites in Bogalusa.

School Desegregation and Student Activism When the Federal government ordered the total de¬

segregation of the public school system in the South in

1969, the racial polarization of the black and white com¬ munities in Bogalusa became more intense. For the black

students, particularly those at the high school level at the time, this meant that they would not finish out their high school years having experienced the type of cultural

affinity that had meant so much to others who had attended Central Memorial High (the black high school). On the other hand, these students had grown up experiencing

the bitterness of racial contradictions and an education that lacked the type of quality enjoyed by whites.

The suit which prompted the total desegregation of the Bogalusa school system was brought by Willie Elliot Jenkins, another of Mrs. Jenkins' sons.^ After several plans were submitted to the Federal District Court in

the summer of 1969, the Court accepted the plan of the School Board. This plan resulted in the demotion of all

of the black principals and all of the black teachers except

35 See Jenkins vs. City of Bogalusa School Board, E.D. La. , Civ. No. 15798, Sec. ËFT, 1969. -90-

one. There were no black head coaches over any of the athletic programs. The two high schools were merged into one; with two campuses: Bogalusa High School West at

the former Bogalusa High School, for grades eleven and twelve and Bogalusa High School East at the former Central Memorial High School,for grades nine and ten. The

three black elementary schools were closed down, with the elementary students being distributed throughout the

eight all-white elementary schools and the one junior high school, located in the white community. All the trends that have been common to newly

desegregated school situations were present in Bogalusa. Central Memorial High School, for example was given a complete rejuvenation for the advent of white students, in the Fall of 1969. Like the students of the 1965 Youth League, the black students of 1969 were determined

to remove all the constraints that would keep them in a

segregated position in the midst of Court ordered segrega¬ tion. The high point of the struggles of 1969 was over the high school homecoming activities. A black student had come in second in the balloting for the Homecoming Queen, but the white school officials did not want her as first maid. They therefore, usurped the process of selection and

chose an all white Homecoming Court. This prompted black

students to organize under the banner of "Students for -91-

Ultimate Liberation" (S.O.U.L.). Throughout the month of October 1969, boycotts of class and sit-ins in the principals's office were utilized to dramatize the discon¬ tent of the black students. Their efforts were totally supported by the black community.

The Bogalusa Civic and Voters League immediately joined the students in their efforts. Mr. Young was in¬ cluded as one of the defendents in the School Board's in-

O CL junction to stop the demonstrations of the black students.

Although the black community and the students lost all of the Court battles against the School Board, their activities made clear the injustice under the desegregated situation.

Black students made every effort to make the Court's decision work. However, they were prevented from partici¬ pation in all school activities except sports and music, of which they were dominant in terms of talent. Fights and the like continued throughout the year. In May 1970 of that school year, remnants of the 1965 police brutality was prevalent. Police attacked black junior high and high school students with tear gas and dogs. This mobilized

Two injunctions were brought against black students in October, 1969. See City of Bogalusa School Board vs A.Z. Young, Rickey Hill, et. al, and City of Bogalusa School Board vs. Rickey Hill, et. al. Both injunctions were filed in the Federal District Court, Eastern District, Louisiana. -92- the black community to rally. However, the conflict was brought to the Federal Court and settled. There were some isolated situations of violence against white mer¬ chants and whites who drove through the black community. In all, the black community made every effort to comply with the Court's desegregation order. And even in the midst of racial conflict the situation was brought to the Federal Judge. The years, 1970 through 1971 saw more of the same racial conflicts within the school system. More and more the black community, and particularly the Voters

League began to view desegregation with more caution, basically questioning its utility as the way to achieve quality education. CHAPTER V

THE POLITICS OF PROGRESS OR ACCOMODATION?

In Pursuit of the Electoral Arena

By 1967 attention was given to the electoral arena.

After the League failed to convince Governor McKeithen

to fill a Bogalusa School Board vacancy in March 1966, with Robert Hicks, Hicks ran for the Board in 1967. Since all the officers of the Board are at-large seats, the League did not delude itself about winning. Instead, Hicks' presence in the race for the School Board meant

that the black community was prepared to struggle on all fronts. Hicks won the two black precincts. A. Z. Young ran for Police Juror, at the same time, he too met the

same fate as Hicks. In 1970 and 1971 the black community made another big effort to break through the segregated electoral arena. A. Z. Young ran for mayor in 1970. Young's presence in the runoff would prove that things were changing in Bogalusa. However, his biggest opposition did not come directly from whites, but his black opponent. Young's campaign was run on the theme that, like the black community, many in the white community were from the "grass

-93- -94- roots," and therefore his campaign was a "grass roots" campaign. He did campaign in various sections of the white community. The other black in the mayoral race was one of the local morticians, one Earl R. Arnold, Jr.

It was generally felt, throughout the black community, that Arnold was paid to run for mayor, in order to block

Young's chances at the runoff.

Young overwhelmed Arnoldirr.both of the predominantly black precincts. Although, in the white precincts, where they both received votes, Arnold received more than

Young. Tabulation later revealed that Young's chances at the runoff would have been boosted if Arnold was not in the race.'*’ The runoff was between a local white embalmer,

Louis Rawls and a car dealer, C.P. Verger. Rawls won the election, David Johnson, Sr., who was the first General

Vice President of Local 189, the International United

Papermakers and Paperworkers, ran for Commissioner of

Streets and Parks. He too won overwhelmingly in the two black precincts, but did not get enough votes from the other precincts to make the runoff.

In 1971 three blacks also ran for the Bogalusa

School Board. They were Andrew Moses, McClurie Sampson

I Young received 741 votes to Arnold's 421. If Young would have received the votes of Arnold he could have possi¬ bly made the runoff. -95- and the Reverend Dr. Clifton Williams (Williams was a

former high school Chemistry and Physics teacher at Central Memorial High and was now the first black chemist

at Crown Zellerbach). Moses polled most of the votes, but

they all lost. The fact that any one black candidate polled the most votes in a given election did not mean that he was who the black community favored. At no time during any of the elections did the black community give a man¬

date to any one black person. Although, the League con¬ trolled the larger black community, there still remained

contradictions between the current leaders of the League and old line persons such as Moses. In this regard,

there had also been continued conflicts between the League and the local NAACP chapter during the Civil Rights years, but the school crisis brought them closer together on the problems of blacks in Bogalusa.

From 1970 to 1975 the League increasingly became less of an activist organization and more of a party organ; endorsing political candidates. They concluded that the

at-large system of elections would never allow a black to be elected. Therefore, much of their time was spent trying to establish relationships with those whites who would listen to the needs of blacks. Because blacks, having been enfranchised by the Civil Rights Movement had now become the deciding factor in the City and Parish elections.

Changes also took place in the League's leadership. -96-

A1though, the presidency, vice-presidency and secretary remained in the hands of Young, Hicks,and Jenkins, their socio-economic status began to change. Hicks had taken the supervisory position at Crown. And Mrs. Jenkins was pursuing nursing training. The biggest change came with Young which was not only socio-economic, but also political. In 1972 Young was offered the position of Special Assistant to the State Hospital Director, by the newly elected governor, Edwin Edwards. Young had worked hard for Edward's campaign not only in Bogalusa and Washington Parish, but across the State. His acceptance of the job left somewhat of a vacuum in the leadership of the black community. However, the League remained together and began to work on such matters as the re¬ apportionment of the districts in the city. In 1974, the Washington Parish branch of the NAACP, headed by one William Bailey, Jr.^ filed suit against the Bogalusa Commission Council, asking for a federal injunction against the total at-large system of elections, that

O prevented blacks from being elected to the Council. The Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana had prepared

o William Bailey, Jr. was the first black to register to vote in Washington Parish in July, 1950. See Bogalusa Daily News, July 28, 1950. Bailey, who lives in Bogalusa has served as NAACP president for 22 years.

See the Bogalusa Daily News, August 16, 1974. -97- a study on governmental reorganization in 1972, recommending reapportionment, but it was rejected by the mayor and the

Commission Council.^ A Charter Commission was created in March 1973 to develop a home rule charter and provide for a reapportionment plan. The commission has yet to complete its study. William Bailey, Jr. is the only black member on the commission. A similar suit, like the NAACP's was filed in

1975 against the City of Bogalusa's School Board. The suit was filed by "Concerned Citizens for Good Government," an unincorporated civic association with a membership made up predominantely of persons of the black race. Their suit called for an apportioning of the School Board on a one man, one vote basis. The case, however, is still pending.^ Three blacks ran for the School Board in 1975,

Andrew Moses tried again, along with one, James Cyrus and

Murkel Sibley. Cyrus and Sibley are supervisors at Crown Zellerbach. Of the three, Sibley polled more black votes;

t: with Moses getting more in the overall tabulation. However, they all lost. The suit therefore, was prompted by the results of this election.

^See the Public Affiars Research Council of Louisiana, Incorporated, Bogalusa City Government, Analysis and Recommen¬ dation For a More Effective Operation, (Baton Rouge: December 1972).

^See Concerned Citizens for Good Government vs. City of Bogalusa School Board, et al., Civ., March 1975. ^Moses received 3,033 votes, Cyrus received 2,127 votes, and Sibley received 1,947 votes. -98-

From the Parish Seat to the State Capitol

The high point of 1967 was the marches from Bogalusa to the parish seat in Franklinton, Louisiana and to the State Capitol in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The intent of the marches was to dramatize for the demands that the Bogalusa Civic and Voters League made on parish and state officials, during 1965 (See Appendix F). The march to

Franklinton was joined by CORE'S Associate Director, Lincoln Lynch. Lynch attempted to analyze the development of the Civil Rights Movement, when he spoke to the rally on the steps of the parish seat. He stated to people in front of the Washington Parish Courthouse that there was a new movement and that it was no longer the Civil Rights Movement anymore, but a Movement of revolution. Lynch obviously expressed CORE'S new position at that time on "Black Power." Lynch went further to explain what he meant:

some call it black power, others call it black revolution, but its all the same. If those rednecks in Bogalusa won't hire you don't picket their store anymore, run them out of your neighborhood. The days of black people clapping their hand and singing are over and many of you are going to be asked to kill for your freedom and you better be ready, to kill.' A. Z. Young made it clear to the people that from Franklin¬ ton they would move to the governor's office and if McKeithen would not listen he was going to President Johnson.

Less than a month later, in August 1967, marchers set out form Bogalusa to Baton Rouge. The trek is roughly

^See The Times-Picayune, July 25,1967. -99- 102 miles. And while the road was long it was to be

difficult also, for southeastern Louisiana was the heart of Klan country. The march travelled through four parishes;

St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, Livingston and East Baton Rouge.

A. Z.Young, who directed the march to Baton Rouge Slimmed up its purpose: I felt that the State was also involved in some of the discriminatory policies imposed on black people in this State. I also felt that the State should afford Blacks an equal opportunity, in terms of em¬ ployment. And also should play a role in trying to bring about a better relationship between blacks and whites. And to dispose of the discriminatory policies, not only in Bogalusa but throughout the state of Louisiana.8 The marchers from Bogalusa were joined by other blacks as they moved through the various parishes. The biggest con¬

frontation was in Satsuma, Louisiana; a "one shot" town on U. S. 190, five miles west of Livingston, Louisiana. Here whites lined both sides of the highway to attack the marchers as they passed. On August 16th, seventy-five whites "broke" through the police lines and attacked twenty blacks. The result was injuries to both whites and blacks.

One, Mr. Charlie Weary, perhaps the oldest of the marchers, suffered a broken jaw bone in the confrontation. When the marchers reached Baton Rouge, blacks from all over the State joined in the rally and demonstrations at the State Capitol. The likes of Zelma Wyche of Tallulah,

Q Louisiana and H. Rap Brown participated in the demonstration.

g Personal interview, A. Z. Young, June 17, 1976. ^Zelma Wyche is the black Chief of Police in Tallulah. -100-

However, there were no other activities outside the Capitol building. The marchers had dramatized their demands to

the governor, and had shown for the first time that black people in the State of Louisiana were not afraid to stand up to State authorities. The efforts to remove the racial constraints in the City of Bogalusa continued from 1967 throughout in the form of marches and meetings with city officials. The

decisive struggle had found victory more in the fact that a new dignity among black people had developed. Some of

the grievances had been resolved: two black men had been put on the police force; relative improvements had been made in the facilities in the black community; the feeling of knowing that blacks could patronize the white restaurants and the downstairs of the theaters was in progress, whether blacks went or not; and the Voters League became the recog¬ nized voice of the black community.

The MBig Company" and Racism: The Struggle Against the Crown Zellerbach Corporation and Dual Unionism

The struggle at the Crown Zellerbach Corporation had not ceased. It was a two pronged struggle; first against the discriminatory policies and practices of the company, and second against the dual unionism. The situation at

Crown Zellerbach was characterized by dual lines of pro¬ gression; one for blacks and one for whites, segregated -101- eating and shower facilities and the relegation of blacks to yard and common labor jobs. The labor unions were also segregated. The United Papermakers and Paperworkers had local 189 for white and local 189A for blacks. The International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite and Papermill Workers had local 362 for whites and local 624 for blacks. The union locals negotiated their contracts separately. In 1964, the black local 189A appealed to the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity to pressure Crown Zellerbach to open up all jobs to all persons. This resulted in the "merger of the extra-boards." The extra boards were used to fill temporary and permanent vacancies in the various line of progression. The members of the black extra-board were only eligible for vacancies on the black line of progression. The merger would supposedly make each employee on the extra-board eligible for temporary and permanent employment throughout the mill. In July 1965, when Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 became effective, the Equal Employment Opportu¬ nity Commission became involved in the Bogalusa case. The prime issues at the time were the merger of the lines of progression; the desegregation of the cafeteria, sanitary and eating facilities and locker rooms; which were required under Title VII. Title VII went into effect in regard to -102-

Crown Zellerbach on July 2, 1965, Section 703 (a) (2) made it unconstitutional for a employer :

to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Crown Zellerbach proposed for incumbent employees a "hori¬ zontal intermeshing of the present white and Negro pro¬ gression lines into one line of progression. This would have retained existing white and black designations.

Although, the promotion of blacks would have occured, the top five jobs would have been prohibited to blacks until all whites had advanced. The chairman of Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission; Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., entered the situation and produced an agreement between the company and the unions which provided for a merger of the lines, by intermeshing eleven of them and opening up every job classification and all employees without discrimination.

Although, the black local, initially accepted the agreement and later opposed it; the consent of the white local made the agreement binding, since it outnumbered the black local

1250 to 250. The black local opposed the agreement because they were still required to start at the bottom.

10 See Northrup, The Negro in the Paper Industry, (Phila¬ delphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969). 11 Ibid., p. 98. -103-

By 1966, Crown Zellerbach continued to award job promotions according to seniority; the man with the most years in the job slot below the vacancy had first call; the number of years worked in the mill meant nothing.

Blacks, therefore, had only seniority in bidding for jobs against each other and newer white employees. The deter¬ mining factor was the years spent in the former white line of progression. In mid 1966 the successor agency to the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) charged Crown Zellerbach with restrictions on black employment and promotions. It also maintained that Crown Zellerbach's facilities were still de facto segregated. This forced Crown to make a number of concessions. It abolished its testing programs, actively recruited blacks and promoted some. This met with disapproval from local 189, which in negotiating its 1967 contract did not settle on the seniority question. This then prompted the OFCC to disagree with the agreement between Crown and its white union, and it forced it to circulate a "consulting memorandum to all Federal agencies, requiring contracting officers to consult with it before granting contracts to Crown Zellerbach. A

l2Ibid., p. 99. 13 Ibid., p. 100. See also Crown Zellerbach Corporation vs Wirtz, p. 281, F.Supp. 377, (Dist. Court, D. CTj 1968). See also Monday vs. Crown Zellerbach Corporation, p. 271, F. Supp. 258 (Dis. Ct., La., 1967). -104- previous memorandum, that was withdrawn, caused

Crown loss of business."^

Crown Zellerbach's lack of aggressiveness on the matters of upgrading blacks resulted in two law suits being filed against it and local 189 on behalf of black employees by the Federal government in 1968.

The court decisions approved a stipulation providing for the merger of the union locals in which blacks would be guaranteed a vice-presidency and other repre¬ sentation. Other than the intervention of the federal government, on behalf of black employees of Crown

Zellerbach and court decisions in favor of black employees, there was no other fundamental action taken to protest the racial constraints faced by blacks at Crown Zellerbach.

While there were a number of isolated pickets at various times in 1965, there were no threats of a strike or call for a work stoppage to force Crown to resolve the problems of racial oppression and exploitation of black workers.

By 1968, the struggle against the Crown Zellerbach

Corporation and the white union locals was being waged entirely in the courts, with the intervention of the

Federal government on behalf of the black plaintiffs. In

January 1968, Crown Zellerbach agreed with the Office of

14 Northrup, p. 100. -105-

Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) to institute the new seniority system demanded of it by the OFCC. Under this system promotions, layoffs and demotions would be deter¬ mined by a workers' mill plus job seniority; that is the length of time spent in the mill, plus, seniority within the line of progression, opposed to a worker's occupation¬ al seniority. This system it was thought, would equalize the position of blacks with white. Therefore, local 189 of the United Papermakers and Paperworkers, along with the craft local at Crown; the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, threatened to strike. However, the United States Department of Justice enjoined the strike on the grounds that it violated Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act.-^ One month later this system had proved ineffective. It did not improve the ability of blacks to compete for better jobs. The government proposed, and the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana accepted in its decision, that remedy of the discriminatory situation be confined to the "affected class;" which were those blacks employed prior to January 1966, when all jobs were indisputably opened to blacks. This was upheld in the case of the United States vs. Local 189, United Paper- makers and Paperworkers, Crown Zellerbach Corporation, et. al.

1 C -'--'Herbert R. Northrup, The Negro In the Paper Industry: (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969) p. TUI -106- on March 26, 1968.^ The same decision was upheld by the District Court in the case that included two members of local 189A (the black local), David Johnson, Senior and Anthony Hill, as plaintiffs-intervenors.In its ruling on the appeal of the case by local 189 and Crown

Zellerbach, the United States Court of Appeals affirmed 1 ft the decision of the District Court, on July 28, 1969.

The District Court had already ordered the full merger of the unions in 1968.^

The Court's order was also stipulated for the other large union at Crown's Bogalusa plant; the Pulp and Sul¬ phite Workers. This union was located in the plant's converting division - a box plant, a grocery bag plant, and a multiwall bag plant. It too had separate locals.

As a result of the mergers, David Johnson, Sr,, who was president of the black local 189A of the United

Papermakers and Paperworkers, became first General Vice-

President of the merged unions. A. Z. Young, one time

16See 282 F39 (E. D. La.), 1968.

17301 F Supp. 906 (E. D. La., 1969). 18 See Local 189, United Papermaker and Paperworkers, et. al., vs. United States, United States Court of Appeals,

5tïï"cTrcuït, No. 25956,~July' 28” l9"69~ 19 Full texts of the cases can be found in Labor Cases Vols. 57LC9120, 60LC9274, and 60LC9289. See also Northrup, The Negro in the Paper Industry (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969). There are also several related cases which discusses employment tests for minorities discrimina¬ tory practices of corporations and unions. See Griggs vs Duke Power Co. 401 U. S. 424 (1971), Emporium Co,, vs Western, 42Ô U. S. 50(1975), Albermarle Paper Company vs. Moody 422 422 U.S.405 (1975) Mansion House Center vs.NLRB,473F. 2d471 (1971). -107- president of the black local, 624, the International

Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite and Papermill Workers, became 20 the first General Vice-President of the merged unions.

The removal of the discriminatory policies at the Crown

Zellerbach Corporation and the merger of the unions resulted in the opening up of a better occupational and employment situation for blacks. Notwithstanding the

Court's decisions, the victories of the black community over the Crown Zellerbach Corporation was more the result of the struggle that it had waged from 1965 to 1967.

There was another suit filed against Crown Zellerbach in 1968. Robert Hicks filed a suit to abolish the system of job seniority at Crown's box plant where he was employed, and established in its place a system of plant seniority with respect to promotions, selection of training and demotions. In this case also, the Court ruled against

Crown Zellerbach and the white local 362, the International

O I Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite and Papermill Workers. The result of the Court's decision forced Crown Zellerbach to open up supervisory positions to blacks. The first such position was offered to Hicks. He accepted the job, because his refusal would have in effect invalidated the law

20 Personal Interview, A. Z. Young, June 17, 1976. 21 See Robert Hicks vs. Crown Zellerbach, et. al., United States District Court, E. D. La., Civil Action No. 16638, Section B, April 8, 1968. -108-

suit. However, he was not deluded about what his promotion meant. According to Hicks, "the company used this as an effort to break up the leadership of the Bogalusa Civic and Voters League, by offering Hicks a job as supervisor. OO

The Hicks suit had alleged that there were no benefits given to persons who had been involved in the Civil Rights Movement. Therefore, in order to counteract this, Crown offered Hicks the job. However, Hicks also viewed this as a ploy to create division between he and Young: "they put me in the shipping department where Mr. Young worked,

to supervise Mr. Young, which was supposed to create con¬ fusion between Mr. Young and myself, but it did not work." Hicks' promotion led to the acquisition of two black personnel supervisors, a black chemist, and a black engineer between 1968 and 1969. In the final analysis, the

Crown Zellerbach Corporation's response to the grievances of the black union locals was the result of the pressure put on it by the federal government. If it was not for federal pressure the coporation would have succumbed to the demands of its white union locals, which it had done in previous

years.

Summary The Civil Rights Movement in Bogalusa, Louisiana from

22 Personal Interview, Robert Hicks, June 16, 1976. 23Ibid., June 16, 1976. -109-

1965 to 1975 was characteristic of the New-New South politics; it did not realize the rise of black political authorities; but it did realize a political leadership in the black community committed to a life and death struggle. Save it to say, the leadership has been the impetus for the struggles that have ensued over these ten years. The organization; the Bogalusa Civic and Voters

League, which had previously functioned as a voter registra¬ tion organization, seized its civic responsibility under the leadership of Young, Hicks and Jenkins. The Deacons for Defense and Justice proved the insight of their leader¬ ship. Here was a situation in the general Civil Rights

Movement, where nonviolence was the accepted theme but black people in Bogalusa, Louisiana organized themselves to meet antagonism with antagonism. Youth was also a crucial variable of the Bogalusa Movement. Therefore, the League organized a Youth League to effectively con¬ solidate black youth. The development of the Bogalusa Movement has various significant implications for present discussion of political organizing. Without obscuring certain particulars of the movement, one must pay close attention to several factors. Here was a Movement in the mid-sixties, where black people put together an effective organization with a political and "military" arm. Black women also palyed a dynamic role in the Movement. Mrs. Jenkins demonstrated an unyielding -110-

determination to struggle despite the reluctance of some black men. The differences in the black community were never disregarded, for the sake of unity. For instance, there were a number of boycotts on churches whose ministers would not support the Movement. It was through constant criticism of them that many were persuaded to join the struggle. Moreover, the movement developed from the indigenous will of the black people, CORE, for example, never led the movement in Bogalusa, it only gave assistance. By 1975 more blacks were holding occupations that blacks never held before in Bogalusa. Crown Zellerbach now had three black engineers, two yard superintendents,

r\ / a black personnel supervisor and assistant personnel supervisor, a black accountant supervisor, and a plant accountant, two black shipping supervisors, three black supervisors in its Southern Timber Division, and a black safety supervisor. Black women were also promoted to Crown's offices and on the assembly lines. The South Central Bell Telephone Company, the fourth largest taxpayer in the parish (See Appendix G) hired twenty blacks in 1975, most in the capacity of operators. The total number of black

^The black personnel supervisor at Crown Zellerbach is Bringier H. Barker, who in September 1974 became the first elected black public official from Washington Parish, when he was elected to the Parish School Board. Barker is from Franklinton, Louisiana; the parish seat. In 1975, Franklinton elected its first black city council member. -111-

employees by the City came to thirty-seven in 1975. Of

this number two are office clerks and four are policemen, with the one black veteran policeman holding the rank of sergeant. The remainder of blacks working for the

city are in maintenance. Also, by 1975 the number of black salespersons in the retail stores increased.

There are now two black principals, both on the elemen¬ tary level. However, there are still no blacks on the

administrative staff of the School Board. CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY EVALUATION The struggle of black people for political and social change in the United States within the past

twenty years, at least, has been characterized by two distinguishing features: as a struggle for democratic rights and as a struggle for development. Historically,

the former manifested itself as a struggle for desegre¬ gation, an end to racial discrimination and oppression,

and the enfranchisement of black people into the "American political process." The latter, particularly within the last five to seven years, has been an effort to organize and consolidate around various strategies for "self-

determination" and "Liberation." The struggle for

development was given impetus by the general themes of "black power" and "black nationalism," and is best illustra¬

ted by the call for five southern states, the theses that the city is the black man's land, the acquisition of capital, and to some extent the cultural affinity and identity with the African continent. Indeed regionalism has played a distinguishing role in both of these developments. From the mid-fifties to

-112- -113- to the late sixties the struggles of black people were characterized as struggles for desegregation and en¬ franchisement which were more profound in the southern rural areas, than in the northern urban areas. While such notions as "black power" and "black nationalism" in the above cited features, developed from the experience of black people in northern urban areas. This is not to sug¬ gest, however, that both forms of struggle do not have profound effects on each other. Indeed the struggle for democratic rights and development in some form or another characterize the general thrust of black people today; and it is just as profound in the rural South as in the urban North. The decisive analysis of the current intellectual period as that which posits the socio-economic apparatus is the key determinant of contradictions that black people experience in this country. Therefore; one would be remiss in his intellectual responsibility by omitting an analysis of the socio-economic factors which help shape the social and political dynamics of this society.

Particularly, since these dynamics are characterized by the domination and control of a few persons over the socio¬ economic apparatus, and the historical subordination of black people, in particular, within the entire society. -114-

Therefore, it seems to me, that studies of any dimension of the black experience must be posited within a exposition of the socio-economic factors which have helped shape that experience. It is with this general motion in mind, that this study was undertaken to present a descriptive and critical analysis of the character of black politics in a small southern town dominated by a multinational corporation. The study was confined to a ten year period, from 1965 to 1975, in order to describe the struggles of black people during the Civil Rights Movement and assess the outcome in terms of the changes of political life of blacks. Principal to this study was an analyisis of the multinational corporation and its impact on the town, par¬ ticularly within the last ten years.

In the final analysis, it is this author's conclusion that Bogalusa, Louisiana is very much in the New South. We find here no black political authorities. Cited in Chapter V is one black person on the Bogalusa Charter Commission. His tenure though, ends with the liquidation of the Commission.

Therefore his position is only significant in the long run, if the change in the commission form of government grants the black community electoral control over the two predominantly black precincts. (See Appendix H). The commission form of government and the at-large electoral systems have prevented the election of black persons to politically authoritative positions. While the presence of black persons in -115- such positions would mean decisive change for the black community, overall progress depends on changes in at least two broad areas: industry and leadership.

Historically, all indicators point to Bogalusa as a "company town." In chapter three we described the Great Southern Lumber Company, the Gaylord Container Corporation and the Crown Zellerbach Corporation. While social discriminations may have lessened during the tenure of each company, their roles were generally consistent.

This is particularly true of the race question where there was no change until the Federal government inter¬ vened against the Crown Zellerbach Corporation on behalf of black workers. The general opposition of each company, particularly Crown, to prevent any other major industry to come to

Bogalusa has retarded economic and industrial growth.

While Crown Zellerbach is the largest employer and taxpayer in Bogalusa and Washington Parish, it cannot provide jobs for all of the people of Bogalusa or the surrounding towns.

Its employment stipulations have, hitherto, been confined to relatives of persons working for it. While Crown

Zellerbach has upgraded some blacks to supervisory positions, it has remained neutral, at best on the question of black participation in the political decision-making process of the town. Contrary to the expectation that the advent of -116- multinational corporations in the American South would upset Southern "traditions," i.e. race relations, we find that this expectation has not been fulfilled in

Bogalusa.

The question of leadership concerns both the black and white communities. Since 1970 the governmental leadership of the town has been in the hands of segrega¬ tionists. The mayor, Louis Rawls has failed to establish or maintain a working relationship with either the black community or the "liberal" and "moderate" white community.

Rawls is far from a dynamic leader. He has shown a lack of understanding of a South that now has Blacks partici¬ pating in city and county government. Moreover, the "li¬ beral" white community recognizes this lack of dynamic leadership that would bring Bogalusans together, but it is afraid to say so. This overall problem goes beyond the attitudinal positions of whites in Bogalusa, rather it points to the lack of foresightedness about future possibilities for the town. Indeed, if whites have yet to council on matters of future development, since they control the existing apparatus, it is very little that the black community can bring to this discussion.

On the other hand, the leadership question in the black community is crucial to its consolidation, and to the options that it poses for change. It is important, -117-

since there are no black political authorities repre¬

senting the black community in city government, that the black community demand tighter control of its leader¬ ship. This is very crucial, because in every political election that blacks have entered since 1967, the "old line opportunists" have prevented blacks from making the runoffs. Moreover, the representatives of the black community in such positions should be chosen from

the ranks of those who have been consistent since the 1960's. The problem, thoughis a lack of aggressive, young leadership. Indeed, one that is nurtured by the struggles of the 1960's and tutored by the experiences of a Young, Hicks and Jenkins, would provide the black

community with a strong and dedicated leadership and one that can challenge the existing political arrangements with insightfulness.

Murkel Sibley, who came to Bogalusa, after graduating from Southern University in 1970, to work at Crown

Zellerbach as a Grocery Bag Accountant, is emerging as part of the future leadership of the black community. As stated in Chapter V Sibley ran for the City School Board in 1975. In March 1974, he had been promoted to Accounting

Supervisor, the head accountant at Crown Zellerbach. In an interview with Sibley he summed up his views on the -118- politics in the black community. Sibley stated that "we have entirely too many groups here; too many leaders and not enough followers. We have too many old people who do not want to step aside and give up the little prestige and political power.However, Sibley also echoes the faith that the "old line" leadership has in the Courts and the traditional mechanisms of change:

we are here just as a people, who are being suppressed. We don't make any political decisions, we do not determine our destiny to any extent, we raise a lot of "sand." Our battles are going to be won in the Courts, and we know they are going to be won in the Courts, until we can get enough blacks registered. Until we can get enough blacks educated as to really what's going on.2 Although Sibley's perception is basically traditional, his presence in the town is a hope for both blacks in the

community and at the Crown Zellerbach Corporation. Progress is spoken of in terms of the jobs that some blacks have received, jobs that were once held by whites. However, substantive changes have not come about in the relationships between blacks and whites in this

small southern town. There is still very deep contempt on the part of whites toward blacks, and in a general sense the city lacks dynamic leadership.^ White "liberals" are

Personal Interview, Murkel Sibley, June 17, 1976. 2Ibid., June 17, 1976 3 Mayor Louis Rawls, who, for example, became mayor in 1970 ran for re-election and won in 1974 on the asinine slogans, "Accomplishments with God and the People's Help" and "Plat¬ form to Continue with the Lord's Work." -119- also very much excluded from the basic political functioning of the town; the segregationists still control the apparatus there.^ The economic situation has become dim, not only for blacks, but also whites. Despite the merged labor unions, black workers do not even participate. Within the black community, Young and others feel that the only hope is its own consolidation, particularly economically. There has been talk of economic pools and the like, but no concrete efforts have been made in this regard. It is this author's evaluation, then, that while the increase in better jobs for some blacks signifiy some progress, the situation remains the same ten years later. Whites have been determined to keep the political arena closed to blacks, as one indicator of this. The Crown Zellerbach Corporation's continued limitation of the number of jobs given to blacks, is another indicator. The School System continues to terminate black teachers while black students find little value in further education and the like, after graduating from high school. Popular culture, in the form of "black exploitation" films and drugs have added to the lack of incentive and motivation among black youth. Even institutions, like the black YMCA , no longer provides a place of identity for the black commu¬ nity. Seemingly, then the black community has been

^On April 16, 1976, Mayor Rawls cut the ribbon opening the Sixth District headquarters of the Ku Klux Klan in Bogalusa. -120- accommodated to the situation by a small increase in the socio-economic level of some blacks, while the basic constraints on the entire black community remains very much the same. This study concludes that the Civil Rights Move¬ ment, while registering the black community's discontent with the existing social and political arrangements in Bogalusa, did not produce decisive changes in the condi¬ tions in their lives. Several factors are indicative of this point: (1) the electoral arena remain such that blacks cannot be elected to political office, (2) the school system, while desegregated, has retarded the incentive of black youth, (3) the leadership in the black community had not been consolidated around a united stra¬ tegy for confronting the political arrangements of the town, and (4) the Crown Zellerbach Corporation, as the largest employer and taxpayer, has failed in its responsibility to encourage fundamental change in the traditional race relations and stimulate greater social development in Bogalusa. If real change is possible in Bogalusa, then, the black community must reassert itself to bring that change about. Protest in the.tradition of thel960's has not occurred there since 1970. The leadership of the black -121-

community has been quiescence, and has returned to its traditional role of endorsing candidates for office,

registering people to vote; and the utilization of the courts as the solution of the problems. As one who has observed for the past ten years and participated in some of the historical activity analyzed

above, this author concludes that the only possible meaning¬

ful and fundamental change in the political life and life chances of black people in Bogalusa can only occur with a reassertion of a radical criticism against the pre¬ vailing political authorities and arrangements of the

town. It is only until the black community reconstruct its agenda of political struggle that real progress can be measured. Indeed while it is true that political

consciousness of the black community was raised by the movement of the Sixties, it remains a constant that the

life chances of blacks are as low ten years later as they were in 1965. This thesis has attempted to present a case of New South development that is still tragically

retarded by Old South ideologies in the midst of a New-New South, characterized by the ascendency of black political authorities in particular and the participation of black people in its political arrangements.

Finally, this study concludes with several larger

implications: (1) hitherto, analysis of black politics in -122- the American South have been done on Southern urban areas, i. e., Atlanta, New Orleans, Memphis and others. This study presents an analysis of black politics in a non-metropolitan Southern town, (2) most studies have fo¬ cused exclusively on black political participation in the form of voting, holding public office and the like. This study presents an analysis of participation in the form of protest, i. e., demonstrations, armed defense, (3) we find in this study several variables which contradict most modernization theses (which suggest that black political leadership in the American South has remained under the control of traditional black elites, i.e., ministers, educators, and morticians). In this study we find a younger, progressive and militant leadership, and (4) finally, this study suggests that an analysis of black political development vis-a-vis industrial develop¬ ment is a useful framework to the study of black politics in the American South. APPENDICES APPENDIX A BOGALUSA POPULATION STATISTICS

The following table shows the phenomenal growth of Boga- lusa from 1906 to 1914; the year of its incorporation.

1906 Started to build town

1907 1500 1908 2000

1909 3000 1910 5000

1911 7500 1912 9500

1913 10,000

1914 11,000 Source: U. S. Bureau of Census

Population growth in Bogalusa has been moderate in recent history.

1930 14,029 1940 14,604

1950 17,798 1960 21,423 1970 18,412

Source: U. S. Bureau of Census, Characteristics of the Population in Louisiana, 1970.

Present Population by Race Total White Black 18,412 12,229 6,183

Source: U. S. Bureau of Census, 1970

-123- APPENDIX B

THE CROWN ZELLERBACH CORPORATION - FINANCIAL STATUS - 1975

Net Sales $1,758,120,000

Net Income 74,490,000 Per Share of Common Stock 3.01 Dividends Declared per share of Common Stock. 1.80

Shares of Common Stock 24,644,415 Number of Common Shareowners 31,258

Source: Crown Zellerbach, Resource, Vol. 5, No. 1 Spring 1975.

-124- APPENDIX C

The Officers of the Bogalusa Civic and Voters League - 1965 to Present

President : A. Z. Young Occupation: 1965 -Laborer at Crown Zellerbach

Present-Director of the De- parment of Human Re¬ lations, State of Louisiana Vice President: Robert Hicks Occupation: 1965 - Laborer at Crown Zellerbach

Present- Shipping Supervisor at Crown Zellerbach

Secretary: Mrs. Gayle Jenkins Occupation: 1965 -Hospital Cook at Desporte Clinic, Bogalusa

Present-Practical Nurse, Bogalusa Community Medical Center Treasurer: Robert T. Young Occupation: 1965 -Laborer at Crown Zellerbach Present-Self-employed -Taxi¬ cab driver

Financial Secretary: Charles Sims Occupation: 1965 -Insurance Agent

Present-Self-employed -Taxi- cab driver

-125- APPENDIX D

-126- COMMITTEE FOR CONCERN- RE; BOGALUSA, LOUISIANA

DEFINITE PROPOSALS TO BE DISCUSSED WITH THE EXECUTIVES’ OF CROUN-ZELLERSACH

(Please NOTE1. ; These recommendations will NOT be sent to the Crown-Zel 1er bach Corporation in advance of the requested meeting, They are for YOUR information ONLY.)

1. That the Crown-Zellarbach Corporation prepare - both nationally and at its Bogalusa plant - a general policy statement re-iterating Its support of equal rights and protection for all citizens under the Constitution of the United States and the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the immediate end of discrimination in public accommodations; the right of ail citizens to exercise their franchise to regincar and to vote unhindered; desegregation of the public schools, and its £uJ1 support of totally non—discriminatory practices in all areas of employment.

Further, that Crown-Zk;iiarbacli s trongly decIcre its op?og ; t ion to the ICu Kin:; Klan and simi.1er organisations and/or any a : tien that would attempt to dissuade, harm, intimidate or prevent any individual from the fret erarei.se of their rights and/or their right to free assemblage and speech.

In addition, that the. Ctown-Zellerbach management in Bogs lus a make this policy knur-re to all of their employees by including such a s tacement ; % in Cut noxl ampleyre • ngi upon, ta e r employee* to similarly support and protect the rights of a lid U3 .

2. That Crovrt-Zslierhach request of Bogalusa public officials - in particular, Mayor Jesse Cutrer - the immediate appointment of a truly Inter-Racial Council ; on. which the top executive of Bogalusa Crown-Zellarbach would serve.

3,. That Crown-Zeller bach request the Federal Bureau of Investigation (F,B,Ï.) to open and/or re-open their investigations into the. series of whippings, cross burnings and other intimidating activity; the Brooks Hays incident, and the recent occurrences during the past two weeks ... and insist that the FBI identify and prosecute those involved.

4, That Crcwn-Zellerbach enter into an agreement whereby they will dismiss any and all employees who are involved in such activity as described above and/or are found to be members of the Ku Kivu: Klan or similar organizations; and that such a policy be made known to Crown-Zellerbach employees.

5. That Crovrn-Zellerbach communicate with the appropriate Federal authorities for actio;* when and where necessary and for a total commitment from such agencies to protect the rights of all American citizens in Bogalusa. Specifically recommended are; The Office of the President of the United States; Vice President Hubert fi. Humphrey, who is directly charged with the basic responsibility of all governmental agencies involved in the area of civil rights; Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach, John Dore and others in the Justice Department, and the Community Relations Service. Since Mr. Brooks Hays was not allowed to appear in Bogalusa due to intimidation by the Klan and the lack of continuing backing by civic leaders including Crown-Zellerbach, the executives of the Bogalusa opera¬ tion should take it upon themselves to sponsor a series of orientation meetings in conjunction with the Federal Community Relations Service.

ô. That communication be made with the Governor of Louisiana, John J. KcKeithen, requesting the full resourses of his office be available and used to correct the situation in Bogalusa and other places in Louisiana.

7. That Bogalusa Crown-Zellerbach officials also directly communicate with the )onr..‘. Police Department and with the Sheriffs Office, insisting that they perform their duty and obligation for the protection of all people and that both use the full force of their powers to suppress and halt the lawlessness ar.d brutality of the Klan and others,

8» That ZelLerhrch !?.HV.P. nr. official ooli'y that they arcl/or their reçut:.7n3 will ~d' thg" n uwithhold support from any candidate for puni in office - in rojyc1.ua a or anywhere xn the •'•cate o! Louisiana - who . ar-c ;io~r.. co.vh. Z"c on supports in ar.y ac itrvit .t«s of the I : w. end/or .similar or ind'J .

9. Thai 1 ,o rn Ze Herb-tick bai i r-g mine ifs ou. y,.-}.i.-y puni Lely known in Bogalusa ai], parte of Louisiana and Kit locally •* request that local oific-.ftl.-5 issue a policy statement to ail press media and by this and other means of ccam>uKï cai.icr.., rail for an. cep: try ■ n'.cb rv.laK and for the control of, arl r.ppnsl <-

10. That Crow. Zellerbacb nu.tur -* r.*^the Bogai:*.s* *h-.I ephor.e Company and other public utilities v.oj«jaus;ic«..*doa at v. vith the Fcc-ra. Jccvifracedons Commission to assure that such cnmavDO-atlon rs net disruyked as periods of dis¬ tress and/or violence againsttivil rights participants or others.

Also that a special request be directed to the FBI to investigate the curious circumstances by which an "out of order-' report was given on all phonos in. the area for a period of more than one hour during the "siege" period, Wednesday night, February 3, 1SÔ5. (See Addendum below)

ADDENDUM - BACKGROUND ON BOGALUSA

A. On the night of February 3 when Yates and Miller were holed-up in the Cafe, a very frightening thing developed. The phone service on the whole area of the ghetto was disrupted for more then one hour. Tie could not reach Yates and Miller in the Cafe, nor other persons in the area. The phones rangconstantly busy -- and upon checking, the Bogalusa operators would simply report the phones as being "OUT OF ORDER". A smart and persistent Boston operator finally broke the barrier when it occurred to her rather strange that so many phones were "out of order" at such a crucial time. This type of thing is ominous, since phones for our operations are literal "Life lines". *

o-

B. Shots were fired by the pursuers during the chase leading to the beating and during the flight of Yates and Hiller into the Cafe.

COMMITTEE FOR CONCERN- RE: EOGALUSA, LOUISIANA

Committee Chairman - Wilfred T. Ussery, 2nd National Vice Chairman, CORE - FI 6-4465

Committee Co-ordinator* Kiss Shirley Ann Mesher - JO 7-3430

Assistant Co-ordinator- Mrs. Ruth Gottstein - SE 1-6932 Assistant Co-ordinator- Miss Patricia Murphy - JO 7-3430

*And Public Relations - Press Co-ordinator. APPENDIX E

-127- October 13, 1563

So s ochool Board mi other Officials rrosu The Youth and iareata of loculus*

i the youth of 3ogaluaa are protesting for eqtml education, o intend to protect until our demands for equal education are feta, tie following is a partial list of our demands*

tuai all smdesuta immediately be supplied, with all books And supplies necessary for cur studiea* That our seieabo laboratories be brought up to date with equipment and supplies* Hit the equipment of all physical education, departments be brought up to date with that of the -whit® schools. That at least one doctor or nurse be assigned to each i*XC»* O ow a 1? &. Peat at least one other foreign language be offered at the .Central Yesjorial High bchool besides Preach* Oi that the shop teachers refrain from sending students out • to now -the superl ntendant*s lawn and work,, on .his house and that a worthwhile program be adopted and sufficient equipment . be Ins-called... That we have store and better qualified teachers*-. • That all needed repairs* and remailing of tho school premises be acted upon immediately». Specifically, that central heating be provided, in all schools* -. «/ * Thai: disciplinary action be hausen against .the. person or persons responsible. for locking the school doors on Wednesday,. J%M:j - S October 13, 1365* '■.tvi'* .-\ mKj 10 That disciplinary action be tajæn against teachers when jgV. > ' complaints are filed* APPENDIX F

-128- Bogaluaa Votera League

¥3 danand of Mayor Cutrer and of tha other city officials:

1» Fair and adequate poMce protection far the Negro citizens ôf Bogalucs in their daily activities, as well as protection for demonstrators.

2» The end of unfair and. illegal ordinances, such as the segregation of publia facilities, tha segregation, of public accomodations, the restrictions upon peaci- able assembly— for example, the ordinance limiting pickets to two ner establish^.

3* Adéquat» lighting, adequate sewage facilities, adequately paved streaca, and other public services for the Negro citizens and taxpayers of Bogalusa, Further «he enfaroessent of pausing -‘standards throughout the city,

4» Equal opportunity for Negroes to gain access to smolnysaait by public auihorii Specifically, we cl strand tha hiring of Negroes to the police fores and to the firs dan&rts«nt*,.

5*. That'tha city licensing daparfcàesd: and.dimerizdnaticri .r.gaArvri--Negara*» arid. „ license qualified Negroes as pi,umbers and electricians,

6 , That there be established, fair*- and consistent procedures 1er the processing and adjudication of complaints by Negroes against police and other city officials 7* That 'Title H of" the-Civil Eights Ant of .1964 (regarding public acccmcdations be- fully and effectively-enforced iharaighout the city,

3* That'.all of the public schools of Bogaluaa, be desegregated, and that the .-teaching., staff "of the public, schools, be integrated without discrimination against Negro teachers» :.v lr* \ ; ' - 9> That-Negroes, who compris» over on»—third of the city's peculation, be included, cm all city and parish policy-Bsaking and advisory boards.

10» That- there be established immediately 3 bi-rsciai ccjnrdttee, v/ith full and carol at a representation of tha Negro coxmunity including the officials of tha Eogalûsa Voters League, to meet, and to deal with the long-range problems of this., city, 11, That Cape, Haynes ITascaab and Patrolman Bernard Nil,llama, as well as other policemen, who beat and otherwise miatreat Negroes, fca immediately dismissed, and that officers who oo> treat Negroes in the futurs be similarly treated. l!d demand of tha businessmen of Bogalusa:

1„ Equal oppcrtunity in the emnloyaant of Negroes at all Bogalusa stereo,

2, The inclusion of Negroes In all job categories, with equal opportunity for prenotion and advancement.

We demand of the officials of Washington Parish:

1» Fair and adequate police protection for ths Negro citizens of Vîashidgbcn Parish in their daily lives, aa well a3 the protection of dénionstratora,

2, Equal ssraloyasent opportunities for Negress on the Pariah Sharif *3 force— specifically and initially we dscand the hiring of a Negro to replace the murdered O’Neal Moore, and tha guaranteeing of full reinstatement and seniority for the injured Creed Rogers.

3» A full and complete investigation of the murder of O’Neal Moore, and the full and swift prosecution of his murderers.

4. 'Ena dismissal of'Vertrsea Mams and Officer Lyons for the beating and mis¬ treatment of Negroes, .and similar treatment for any other officer who acts in a - ; similar- manner. r.

We demand of Governor MeKeithen and of the other officials of the state of Louisiana:

1» Fair and adequate police protection for the Negro citizens of Louisiana in their daily activities, aa well as protection for demonstrators,

2. Equal employment opportunities for Negroes in state employ; specifically and initially the hiring of Negroes for the state police farce.

3. The end of uneanstitutisnai laws, such aa the prohibition upon teachers against participating in Civil Rights demonstrations»

4., The removal of all racial signa from all state buildings,

5, Ths desegregation of all state facilities and schools*

6, The desegregation of all public accomodations in the state,

7, A full and correlate investigation of the murder of O’Neal Mocre, and the full and jswift prosecution of his murderers.

8, The desegregation of Charity Hospital, Bogalusa. Also an end to the refusal of Charity Hospital to adequately treat Negro patients—for example, their failure to act swiftly and effectively to treat the demonstrator injured on Saturday, July 19, 1965; their failure to treat adequately the demonstrators injured at the city park, as well as their general failure to give prompt, effective, and courteous treatment to Negro patients. APPENDIX G

TEN LARGEST TAXPAYERS IN WASHINGTON PARISH

1. Crown Zellerbach Corporation $17,243,090 2. Southern Natural Gas Company 3,263,270

3. Louisiana Power and Light Company 3,016,320 4. South Central Bell Telephone Company . . . . 2,198,800

5. Florida Gas Transmission Company 1,851,710 6. Washington - St. Tammany Co-op Incorporated. 467,900

7. United Gas, Incorporated 406,420 8. Illinois General Gulf Railroad Company . . . 406,050

9. United Gas Pipeline Company 201,650 10. Dixie Pipeline Company 164,350

Source: Capital Region Planning Commission Baton Rouge, 1973.

-129- APPENDIX H

-130- TABLE 1

Population by Race of Proposed Election Districts, City of Bogalusa: 5 District Plan

ELECTION DISTRICTS POPULATION (1970) (and component Other Reported enumeration districts) Total White Negro Indian Specified “Other”

District 1: ED 25 856 844 6 0 2 4 26 1,278 1,273 2 2 1 0 27 809 788 21 0 0 0 28 983 983 0 0 0 0 29(part) 100(est.) 91(est.) 8(est.) 0 l(est.) 0

Total 4?026(est.) 3,979(est.) 37(est.) 2 4(est.) 4 Percent over (under) Ideal3 9.3

District 2: ED 21 80 80 0 0 0 0 22 1,343 1,111 232 0 0 0 23 860 11 847 1 1 0 24 1,557 98 1,459 0 0 0 29(part) 78(est.) 71(est.) 6(est.) 0 l(est-) 0 Total 3,918(est.) l,371(est.) 2,544(est.) 1 2(est.) 0 Percent over (under) Ideal3 6.4

District 3: ED 30 596 421 175 0 0 0 31 405 128 276 1 0 0 32 1,102 25 1,077 0 0 0 33 1,112 39 1,073 0 0 0 34 319 11 308 0 0 0 42(part) 80(est.) 0(est.) 80(est.) 0 0 0 Total 3,614(est.) 624(esfc.) 2,989(est.) 1 0 0 Percent over (under) Ideala (1.8)

District 4: ED 29(part) 300{est.) 274(est.) 24(est.) 0 2(est.) 0 35 255 255 0 0 0 0 40 1,284 1,281 2 0 0 1 41 633 566 63 0 0 4 42(part) l,061(est.) 618(est.) 442(est.) 0 0 l(est.) Total 3,533(est.) 2,994(est.) 531(est.) 0 2(est.) 6(est.) Percent over (under) Ideala (4.0) TABLE 2

Estimated Voter Registration by Race of Proposed Election Districts, City of Bogaiusa: 5 District Plan

REGISTERED VOTERS5 ELECTION DISTRICT'S (Julv 1973) (and component precincts)a Total White Black District 1: Precinct 4 1,117 1,117 0 5 1,354 1,337 17 Total 2,471 2,454 17

District 2: Precinct 1 (part) l,230(est.) 353(est.) 877(est.) 8A (part) 452(est.) 452(est.) 0 Total l,682(est.) 805(est.) 877(est.)

District 3: Precinct 1 (part) 100(est.) 100(est.) 0 2 (part) l,503(sst.) 401 (est.) l,107(est.) 3A (part) lOOfest.) lOOfest.) 0 Total l,708(est.) 601(est.) l,107(est.)

District 4: Precinct 1 (part) 254(est.) 254{est.) 0 2 (part) 148(est.) 0 148{est.) 3 1,675 1,555 120_ Total 2,077{esfc.) l,809(est.) 2S8(est.)

District 5: Precinct 6 633 839 0 7 1.657 1,656 _1 Total 2,236 2,295 1

City Totals 10,234 7,364 2,270

aAIl precincts are in Ward 4 of Washington Parish. 5Voter registration by race by precinct supplied by Curtis M. Thomas, Washington Parish Registrar of Voters.

Prepared by: Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, Inc. 2

ELECTION DISTRICTS POPULATION (1970) (and component Other Reported enumeration districts) Total White Negro Indian Specified “Other”

District 5: ED 29(part) 100 (est.) 91(est.) 8(est.) 0 l(est.) 36 545 544 0 1 0 37 632 632 0 0 0 38 1,059 1,059 0 0 0

39 985 985 0 0 0 o Total 3,321(est.) 3,311(est.) 8(est.) 1 l(est.) 0

Percent Over (under) Ideala (9.8)

aIdeaI District Population

Prepared by: Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, Inc. MAP OF BOGALUSA, LA PROPOSED CITY COUNCIL »•*»««• •» >>u>>»Tt » ►I U l l IV AM VOCATION TOC» NitAk I <* % T I T 1/ T t ELECTION DISTRICTS

2 1 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Pellegrine, Roland and Charles H. Coates, "Absentee- Owned Corporations and Community Power Structure," 23 American Journal of Sociology. (February 1958): 413-419. Potter, David M. "The Emergence of the New South: An Essay Review." 34 Journal of Southern History. (August 1968): 420^424! Quick, Amy. "The History of Bogalusa, The Magic City of Louisiana." 29 Louisiana Historical Quarterly. (January 1946): 73-201.

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Newspapers

The Bogalusa Daily News. The New Orleans Times -^Picayune.

The New York Times.

Unpublished Materials

Boone, William and Alex Willingham "Political Studies and the American South: Expanding Opportunities In a Changing Field," submitted to the Spencer Foundation Faculty Grant Committee, Atlanta: Atlanta University, October, 1976.