Reforming Pensions in Chile*
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REFORMING PENSIONS IN CHILE* Nicholas Barr Nicholas Barr and Peter Diamond (2016), ‘Reforming London School of Economics, United Kingdom pensions in Chile’, Polityka Społeczna, No. 1, 2016, pp. 4-9, Peter Diamond** https://www.ipiss.com.pl/?lang=en London School of Economics, United Kingdom Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States of America INTRODUCTION sion (Chile Presidential Advisory Council, 2006) and the Bravo Commission (Chile Presidential Advisory Commission on the In 1981, under military government, Chile moved away from Pension System, 2015a, 2015b). Commissions can have diver- a badly-designed set of diverse defined-benefit plans (Soto se roles. Sometimes they are set up with a narrow remit and an 2007), and put in place a mandatory fully-funded defined-con- eye on early legislation, sometimes to increase understanding of tribution plan in the formal sector, with a guaranteed minimum the issues and perhaps also to provide public education, with an for workers with at least 20 years of contributions. eye on eventual legislation. Most of the Marcel Commission’s Moving to such a plan was widely touted by the Chilean recommendations were included in a pension reform in 2008. authorities, by some analysts, and by the World Bank (e.g. With 58 specific proposals and three competing and controver- World Bank, 1994). And many countries started partially down sial Global Proposals, the full impact of the Bravo Commission this road, both in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe is likely to take longer. (Box 1). Box 2. Retreat from individual accounts Box 1. Pension reform: The demonstration effect of Chile A move towards funding has significant transition costs: The arrangements in Chile were highly influential in Latin if worker’s contributions are diverted to individual accounts, America and elsewhere. they cannot be used to finance current pensions, hence past Beginning in the 1990s, Peru (1993), Argentina (1994), promises have to be met from elsewhere in the government Colombia (1994), Uruguay (1996), Bolivia (1997), Mexico budget. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe that introdu- (1997), El Salvador (1998), Ecuador (2001), Costa Rica (2001), ced individual accounts in the years after the mid-1990s fa- the Dominican Republic (2003–05), and Panama (2005–07) ced the problem acutely after the 2008 economic crisis and, introduced structural reforms. These reforms had distinct as a result, many countries retreated. aspects and characteristics, but they all shared a common Reform was of two sorts. Some countries, including objective: to make their social protection systems viable Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania, retained in- […], or in other words to ensure that they are funded in the dividual accounts but changed the balance of contributions medium and long term. (Rofman et al. 2015, p. 16). so that less went to individual accounts and more to finance In Central and Eastern Europe, funded individual acco- Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) benefits. In some countries those unts were introduced in Hungary (1998), Poland (1999), changes were intended to be temporary, in others perma- Latvia (2001), Bulgaria (2002), Estonia (2002), Lithuania nent. Other countries, notably Hungary, abandoned individual (2004), Slovakia (2005) and Romania (2008). Funded indi- accounts altogether and transferred both the flow of contri- vidual accounts were also introduced in China (1998) and butions and the stock of assets to the PAYG system. Argen- Hong Kong (2000). tina took the same path, again largely for fiscal reasons. For accounts of the retreat, see Bielawska et al. (2016) and Si- The reality, however, did not turn out as well as projected, in monovits (2011). Chile or elsewhere. With similar strategies, it should not be surprising that systems faced similar problems. Incomplete Section 2 outlines the 1981 system and its problems. Se- coverage remains a persistent problem, given the scale of in- ction 3 discusses strategic reform in 2008, and Section 4 the formal activity in Latin America; the fiscal costs of transition background to and proposals of the Bravo Commission. Section were a problem in some countries; and administrative costs 5 concludes. were and continue to be a problem. With hindsight, Chile made the approach look easier than it really was, with considerable THE 1981 SYSTEM1 retreat in some countries (see Box 2 on Central and Eastern Europe). The root of the post-1981 system is mandatory saving in This paper argues that the experience of Chile demonstrates a privately-managed defined-contribution account. Each worker (a) limitations of individual accounts that were both predictable was required to place 10% of covered earnings into an account, and predicted and (b) a mostly rational evolutionary approach to plus a contribution for disability insurance plus a commission to addressing those problems. In making changes, Chile has made the firm that administers the individual account, collects contri- use of Presidential Commissions, notably the Marcel Commis- butions, manages the pension fund and purchases disability in- surance. Initially, there was no employer contribution, but since 2008 employers have paid the contribution for disability. Legal * We are grateful to Alberto Arenas and David Bravo for help on factual retirement age was (and remains) 65 for men, 60 for women,2 matters. The opinions are ours alone, as are any remaining errors. ** Professor of Public Economics, London School of Economics and with later earnings not subject to the contribution mandate. Be- Political Science; Institute Professor Emeritus, Massachusetts Insti- nefits can be taken as an inflation-indexed annuity from an insu- tute of Technology. Barr was a member of and Diamond an advisor to rance company. An alternative is phased withdrawals, with the Chile Presidential Advisory Commission on the Pension System constraints on the rate of withdrawal to reduce the risk of outli- (the Bravo Commission) in 2014–2015. ving savings. Annuities and withdrawals were (and are) subject 4 Social Policy No 1 ENG/2016 to mandatory coverage for survivors. The 1981 system included Since the benefit is non-contributory, in principle anyone is a minimum pension guarantee for people with at least 20 years eligible, including formal- and informal-sector workers, urban of pension coverage. and rural, employed, self-employed and outside the labor force. To handle the individual accounts, Chile organized a highly- Thus the basic pension assists workers with low or sporadic regulated market in which specialized fund management firms incomes. By implication, it also recognizes caring responsibili- (called administradoras de fondos de pensiones, or AFPs) ties: someone who cares for young children or elderly depen- compete to manage funds. Firms were initially restricted to dents will make fewer contributions to their individual account; a single investment fund with tight rules on permitted assets; people with small accumulations are entitled to the full basic over time the number of funds a firm could offer was expanded pension. Thus, as Figure 1 shows, the basic pension particular- to five, each with a different risk profile, and the range of per- ly benefits women. mitted assets widened. Entry into the business was (and rema- ins) open to any firm meeting sufficient capital and managerial THE AUCTION MECHANISM FOR ACCUMULATION. A sys- criteria and having an exclusive activity as part of the pension tem where firms compete for individual workers is inevitably system. expensive. The 2008 reforms introduced competitive tendering As commission charges were higher than anticipated, the in which AFPs bid for all new entrants to the labour force over regulations repeatedly experimented with changes to encourage a two-year period, who have to stay with the winning bidder for more competition to try to lower charges. at least 18 months. The AFP had to offer the same low commis- A telling brief summary of the problems of the system came sion to its existing members and to any new members. After 18 at a seminar in Santiago in 2004, referring to the Seven deadly months, the AFP could increase its commission for all mem- sins of Chile pensions: low coverage, low pensions, high admi- bers, preserving uniformity. nistrative costs, high fiscal cost, lack of gender equality, little competition, and political tests for Boards of Directors of AFPs.3 THE AUCTION MECHANISM FOR BENEFITS. The market for In other words, reality was far from an idealized model of the annuities was very expensive. The 2008 reforms endorsed the capital market. Online Pension Consultation and Bidding System (SCOMP) intro- duced in 2004. In order to retire or switch options, consultation THE 2008 REFORMS4 with this system is mandatory and includes insurance compa- nies bidding for individual retirees. The web site provides mem- Until 2008, with pensions based mainly on individual sa- bers with information on the bids made by insurance companies vings, the system did not provide adequate benefits for people and the estimated programmed withdrawals if switching AFPs. with low lifetime earnings or incomplete contribution histories. Thus the 2008 strategy is based on two core elements: This is to be expected with any system in which pension bene- • A partially funded element – the Solidarity Pension Sys- fits are proportional to contributions. Thus Chile did not have tem – provides poverty relief for people with little or no other a pension system, but only part of a system. Widespread infor- retirement income, and offers some insurance against poor la- mality made this problem important throughout Latin America bor market outcomes by topping up benefits for those with low (Rofman et al., 2015, pp. 1–2). To address that lacuna and covered earnings histories. some of the other problems identified above, President Michelle • A saving element – the AFP system – mainly provides Bachelet established the Marcel Commission at the start of her consumption smoothing for those with complete or near-com- first term. plete contribution records, plus some smoothing for those with Two elements of the resulting reforms stand out: the intro- incomplete coverage.