The Renewed Right to the City in Latin America Slum Upgrading and Placemaking

UNIVERSIDAD PONTIFICIA COMILLAS FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS HUMANAS Y SOCIALES

Degree in International Relations

Final Degree Project

Author: Natalia Meléndez Fuentes

Coordinator: Dr. Heike Clara Pintor Pirzkall

Madrid, April 2018

Table of Contents

1. Purpose and Motivation 1 2. Introduction 1 3. State of Affairs 2 4. Objectives and Research Questions 8 5. Methodology 9 6. Theoretical Framework 11 6.1. On the Formal and the Informal 11 6.2. Renewing the Right to the City: 16 The Art of Placemaking in Latin America 7. Regional Background: Birth and life of the Latin American Slum 18 8. Analysis and Discussion 22 8.1. Regularization framework and coverage of basic needs: 23 Pró-Favela Program (Brazil) 8.2. Community participation and organization: 25 Villa El Salvador (Peru) 8.3. Access to credit, transparency and good governance: 28 PRODEL (Nicaragua) 8.4. Cost-recovery and budget control mechanisms: 30 Self-Management Program (Mexico) 8.5. Political will and social capital: 31 Rosario Habitat Program (Argentina) 8.6. Sustainability and monitoring: 33 Neighborhood Improvement Program (Bolivia) 8.7. Strong intermediary structure: 36 Popular Habitat Program (Costa Rica) 8.8. Integral and multidisciplinary approach: 37 PUI Nororiental Initiative (Colombia) 8.9. Bridging the gap between a development project & social progress: 40 PROUME (Guatemala) 8.10. Equity, esteem and inclusion: 41 Library Parks, Schools and Metrocable System (Colombia) 9. Conclusion and proposals 44

10. Bibliography 49 10.1. Primary Sources 49 10.2. Bibliographic References 49

11. Abbreviations and Acronyms 60 12. Glossary of terms 61 13. Annexes 64 13.1. Annex 1: Manfred Max-Neef’s Fundamental Human Needs 64 13.2. Annex 2: Population Data 68 13.3. Annex 3: By-Country Sheets: Recent National Slum and Housing 70 Policies in Latin American countries 13.4. Annex 4: Names of Slum Upgrading Programs Studied Prior to 85 Selecting the Representative Case Studies 13.5. Annex 5: Meléndez’s Pyramid of Slum Upgrading 88 13.6. Annex 6. Case Studies Sheets: Slum upgrading programs whose 89 elements constitute Melendez’s Pyramid for Slum Upgrading 13.7. Annex 7: Names of Informal Settlements All Over Latin America 141 13.8. Annex 8: Interview to Slum-Upgrading Expert 142

3 1. Purpose and Motivation

The decision to embark on a research project on the present topic, was mainly motivated by two factors. First, having peers in the field of architecture introduced us to deep discussions, which inspired further reflection and learning upon the subject. These peers, to whom we are deeply grateful, have taught us how to look at global problems through socio-spatial lenses; an approach that enriches thought and is more integral at its core. The utmost importance of architecture and urbanism in developmental sciences was recognized by the illustration of the transcendence of these two fields in our daily lives, as they affect virtually all human dimensions, decisions, and actions. Through this final degree project, we modestly aim to present such relevance to our readers. Second, the past five years of university studies have nurtured many areas of knowledge within the field of International Relations. Brainwork led us to interrelate them and conceive a bigger picture on the present global state of affairs. Such acquired more-critical eye inspired a special concern for slums, given the increasingly alarming situation of informality in world cities. This negative picture hints a lack of sufficient research on finding more effective solutions to the slum question. Therefore, we have wished to harness this project as a stepping stone to conduct research on the topic. For we aspire to pursue a career in the field of Development Cooperation and deem cities and urban challenges as key issues in development agendas.

2. Introduction The present project reviews the condition of urban informality in Latin America and recommends a methodology to better address the slum question. This document is organized into six sections. First, the ‘State of Affairs’ compiles information on the present scenario of slums: a general overview of their challenges and how they are addressed. Second, the section of ‘Objectives and Research Questions’ establishes the lines that led our research activity and what we intended to accomplish through it. Third, in the “Methodology” we define the tools used and the process followed to achieve our objectives and answer our questions. Fourth, regarding the ‘Theoretical Framework’, this section engages in a discussion on concepts and literature review on urban informality, complemented with our own body of theory on slum upgrading. Fifth, we present the specificities of Latin America in dealing with slums and slum upgrading in the ‘Regional Background’. Sixth, our ‘Discussion and Analysis’ illustrates the practical effectiveness of what was theoretically displayed. At this stage, we examine the main findings of our research and critical reflection. Special focus is put into the essential human needs that slum upgrading should satisfy and into expounding our recommended methodology to achieve that. To this latter purpose, we have selected the ten Latin American slum upgrading programs that we consider to best illustrate this satisfaction of needs. Finally, the ‘Conclusion’ culminates the study by presenting the general lessons of our research, which in itself constitutes a proposal for future practices on the field.

3. State of Affairs There are a billion squatters in the world today, that is one in eight people. This figure is projected to increase to 1.5 billion by 2030 if the demographic, urban planning, and economic distribution dynamics do not change significantly (UN-Habitat, 2016: 2). Numbers continuously swelling, the slum problem remains a critical factor for the persistence of poverty in the world, reducing the efficiency of economic growth and stunting the human potential of many. Slums are a clear manifestation of many global deficiencies (e.g., unequal distribution or malfunctioning housing sectors). Their prevalence is not of poverty’s exclusivity, but can also be found in developed urban landscapes. On the face of this alarming situation, tackling the slum problem has been an integral part of the global development agenda for almost forty years.

To begin with, a ‘slum household’ is a group of individuals living in an urban area, deprived of one or more of the following: lack of access to improved water source, lack of access to improved sanitation facilities, lack of sufficient living area, lack of housing durability and lack of security of tenure (UN-Habitat, 2006: 1). This definition was included in Goal 71 of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which are eight international development objectives adopted by all UN members in the year 2000. The MDGs are a global compromise to reduce poverty and deprivation through collaborative action. Such joint action is the result of three influential happenings: the WB’s World Development Reports (1990-ongoing); the UNDP’s Human Development Reports (1990-ongoing); and the resume of UN Summits and Conferences (1990-ongoing). These events brought poverty back to the global agenda and devised strategies to eradicate it (Hulme, 2009: 9).

In 2015, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) replaced the MDGs, setting a renewed global agenda of seventeen social and economic development objectives to advance further in the fight against poverty. The challenge of slums was also reflected in the SDG Declaration, this time in Goals 11 and 162. The continuous presence of the slum question in the development agenda, indicates the importance globally assigned to the eradication of urban poverty. Nonetheless, it is necessary to note the inadequacies in the statistical base for measuring and monitoring progress on MDG and SDG targets. The bar for progress is set low, which allows ‘improved’ services to be recorded as ‘adequate’ or ‘significant’. The reasoning behind this is mainly economic: as settlements meet the low criteria to qualify as ‘adequate’ they stop requiring further urgent investment (Satterthwaite, 2016: 112; Satterthwaite, 2013). This large understatement of deficiencies is deceiving in establishing how much progress has been actually made and which is the real and current situation.

1 MDG 7: “To have achieved by 2020 a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers” (UN General Assembly, 2000). 2 SDG 11: “By 2030, ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services and upgrade slums”; SDG 16: “To promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels” (UN General Assembly, 2015).

The presence of slums mainly finds its causes in rapid urbanization, elitist city planning, massive rural-urban migration, lack of land affordability, weak governmental institutions, discriminatory legal frameworks, and highly protected financial systems (Ferguson & Navarrete, 2003: 202; Esteves, 2012: 159; Rakodi, 1993: 207-215). Although the weak welfare state in most countries vastly exacerbates and contributes to the problem, the market logic equally resonates in the formation and persistence of urban informality (TECHO, 2015: 135). The industrialization stage of the last two centuries led cities to absorb a myriad of workers with no planning for their inclusion. Unable to afford properly serviced areas, the majority of the working class established spontaneous settlements on the peripheries in a quest to address their ‘right to the city’ and to housing. The lack of services in these areas is mainly due to the authorities’ inability to keep pace with rapid urban growth (Irazábal, 2009: 34).

Their informal living, adjacent to economic opportunities, allows slum dwellers to make four contributions to national economies. These four aspects enable a kind of economic growth that makes formal cities richer and slum residents more vulnerable, their poverty perpetuated (Fernandes & Figueiredo, 2016: 185). First, they invest in housing and land improvement. Second, they are part of the job market, usually at very profitable rates for employers. In addition to these ‘formal’ jobs, they usually also work within the settlement. Third, there are many small businesses in slum areas, which is extremely important in monetary terms: it allows people within the settlement to buy and sell to and from each other at a great rate. And fourth, there is the social capital deriving from and invested in the creation of a community. This fourth aspect is not exclusively economic but acts as an economic engine: it makes investment in home and neighborhood upgrading possible, as well as the financing of the many small enterprises (Environment & Urbanization, 1989: 174-177). The profitability of these contributions for national economies explain the widespread neglect of slums, despite international commitments on the issue. In this vein, one should also consider the many political implications––and inconveniences––in considering ‘adequate housing’ as a right (Leckie, 1989: 93).

As if these political and economic implications were not enough of a hindrance, the future of dwellers is further compromised by the behavior of the capitalist market system, where the production of city space has become a business in itself. This feature rules out the possibility of overcoming the urban and environmental deficits inherited from previous eras, thus increasing the pressure on unsustainable urban dynamics (Withaker Ferreira, 2016: 69-72). Because access to cheap serviced land is a major problem all across the globe and due to informal settlements’ proximity to economic opportunities, slums are the best compromise between dweller’s needs and their inability to afford better serviced plots (Gilbert, 2014: 258).

What makes informal settlements an appalling urban phenomenon to be addressed forthwith are the strong levels of poverty, deprivation and socio-spatial exclusion to which their residents are

subjected (UN-Habitat, 2016: 4). Lack of basic infrastructure and services poses risks of injury, illness and premature death among settlers (Ferguson & Navarrete, 2003: 201). Squatter settlements can be an important focal point for serious waterborne diseases and high crime rates. These communities are also extremely vulnerable to natural disasters given their usual location in risk areas (WB, 2012: 15). Adding to the urgency, slums present dire consequences for the environment. For instance, the contamination and depletion of natural resources; the deforestation of nearby areas; or the severe erosion resulting from the steep slopes where they are often settled upon (Okeyinka, 2014: 7).

Consequently, the global aspiration to achieve sustainable development is unattainable until the slum question is solved. This link between sustainable development and adequate housing has been endorsed with the recognition, at the highest international level, of housing as a human right (Fernández-Maldonado, 2010: 1). After years of experience, the international community has recognized slum upgrading as the best strategy to address the slum question and thus fulfill the human right to housing. Slum upgrading is the practice of alleviating poverty in slum areas by providing basic services and infrastructure, as well as securing land tenure to its residents. On the basis of equity, this process includes incorporating the slums into the larger city by providing dwellers with the social, economic, legal, institutional and community services available to the rest of the citizenry (Materu & Sietchiping, 2001: 3). Significant progress and methodological improvements are still needed, but the creation of regional and international discussion networks opens up new prospects for the implementation of suitable national and local urban policies.

At the global level, UN-Habitat and its several programs are indubitably the central focus of debate in the field of slum upgrading. This UN Agency had its beginnings at the first Habitat Conference (Vancouver, 1976) but it was not until 2002 that the initiative became a formal UN body. Nowadays, headquartered in Nairobi, Kenya, UN-Habitat is tasked with the coordination of human settlements and urbanization issues within the UN framework. This agency is a crucial actor in the field, for it produces international standards; influences the definition of state policies; and configures practices to be undertaken by development agencies or NGOs (Fernandes & Figueiredo, 2016: 179). In 1990, these efforts were further supported by the launching of the aforementioned Human Development Reports. Its proponents, economists Amartya Sen and Mahbub ul Haq, introduced a new perspective on development: people are to be at the center of this process with the economic apparatus merely supporting the provision of quality of life and the restoration of individual rights (Dowbor, 2016: 34).

There have been two further Habitat Conferences: the 1996 Habitat II (Istanbul, Turkey), and the 2016 Habitat III (Quito, Ecuador). The latter was especially relevant for its issuance of the New Urban Agenda (NUA), oriented towards more inclusive and sustainable cities. The NUA has been a success insofar as it serves as a platform for sharing orientations, perspectives and conflicts of interest

regarding cities. Another of its advances was its involvement of states and many other stakeholders in solving the slum question. The NUA is set to motivate peer reviews among countries, involvement of local actors, and inclusive decisions on sustainable development (Dellas, 2016). Yet, the wording is very much contradictory and imprecise, making countless readings and orientations possible (Fernandes & Figueiredo, 2016: 182). Another shortcoming is its lack of direct accountability of big corporations, which are hegemonic players in producing cities and territories (Ibid.: 185). All its faults notwithstanding, the NUA has set in motion the internationalization of a new urban paradigm through the revision of the urban geopolitical scenarios (Balbim, 2016: 17).

For the purpose of institutionalizing the upgrading of slums, the WB and UN-Habitat have collectively launched a partnership and two programs. In 1999, the two entities established the multi- donor partnership Cities Alliance to address urban poverty, foster slum upgrading strategies, and promote the participation of local stakeholders (WB, 2012: 12). In this latter sense, the partnership is especially unprecedented: it places local governments at the heart of the upgrading. Then, the ‘Cities Without Slums’ (CWS) Action Plan was set in motion in the same year, endorsed by 150 heads of state. The CWS Action Plan acknowledges that slum upgrading programs need to be complemented with strategies that address the root causes of poverty, thus preventing further slum formation. Later, the funding shortfall3 for slum upgrading, motivated the establishment of the Slum Upgrading Facility (SUF) program in 2004. The SUF packages the financial, technical and political elements of development projects with the purpose of mobilizing capital for slum upgrading; that is, it makes these slum upgrading projects more attractive for private institutions to finance4 (UN-Habitat, 2006b: 3-6). So far, the approaches and credit enhancement provided by the SUF have attracted major commercial banks to participate in slum upgrading, though still insufficient5 (UN-Habitat, 2011: 48).

Complementary to these initiatives, the different World Social Forums (WSF), have played a very influential role in improving living conditions in slums. Since 2001, these forums have congregated in the form of transversal participatory meetings that connect the local echelons up to the global level in different social areas. By this way, the first WSF (Porto Alegre, 2001) introduced the practice of ‘participatory budgeting’. Through this scheme local communities can participate in the allocation of municipal budgets, its success resulting in many other world cities6 adopting the practice. The second WSF (Porto Alegre, 2002) released the milestone World Charter for the Right to the City. The ultimate goal of this document is to create competent legal monitoring mechanisms and instruments that ensure

3 To this day, funding to address the slum question is rather directed to new housing schemes, as these create more jobs and give more benefits to constructing companies and other influential stakeholders. As a result, resettlement strategies are more widespread than slum upgrading, but the most common approach towards slums is of neglect (Bolay, 2011: 11; Irazábal, 2009: 1-13). An additional aspect that explains why slum upgrading suffers from a funding shortfall is the profitability of informality, as explained in previous lines through its four contributions to the national economies. 4 See SUF 2009: 68-71 for detailed information on the workings of SUF. 5 UN-Habitat issued the last report on SUF activities in 2011 (UN-Habitat, 2011: 48-53). According to it, up to that date, the SUF had helped mobilize $440,000 from seven different commercial banks in three countries (Ghana, Sri Lanka and Indonesia) with different socio-economic conditions. That amount benefiting 1,600 people since 2004. 6 Among others, a number of towns and cities in Portugal, France, Italy, Uruguay, Germany, Spain, Canada and India (most notably, the village of Hiware Bazar).

the enforcement of recognized human, social, and citizenship rights. Acknowledging that human rights declarations are not sufficient, the Charter intends to foster an explicit legalization of international human rights instruments at the local level (Allegretti et al., 2016: 216-231).

In this line of work, the last decades have witnessed valuable slum upgrading initiatives by various international coalitions. Namely, the UN-Habitat sponsored its Participatory Slum Upgrading Program (PSUP), implemented by 35 ACP countries since 2008. This program furthers the adoption of a programmatic city-wide approach in order to integrate slums into formal planning systems, leading to significant key achievements7 (UN-Habitat, 2016: 20). Another important undertaking is the India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum, a trilateral initiative furthering South-South cooperation. This forum added human settlements to its portfolio in 2007, which enabled solid exchanges of know-how and joint research in the field of slum upgrading (Klink, 2016: 199-200). The most coordinated region for these purposes, however, is Latin America. Also in 2007, Ibero-American Heads of State decided to enshrine the ‘right to the city’ by ensuring access to land, adequate housing, and social services through governmental policies. Since then, the region has been pooling technical expertise and pioneered a people-oriented approach to slum improvement (Zárate, 2016: 294).

Nonetheless, the notion of regional and international planning for slum upgrading creates a dilemma: how to build an effective global/regional agenda on planning that recognizes the specificities of each local context, but, at the same time, enables countries to learn from each other, from academics, technical experts, NGOs, and local communities? Solutions to slum upgrading must be locally devised with the full engagement of the beneficiary communities. That explains why the most successful slum upgrading strategies are found at the local level (Magalhães, 2016: 112). International and regional schemes are necessary, for they set guidelines and provide most of the funding, but they are far from enough. Broad initiatives cannot be expected to have as efficient results as tailored approaches do: the broader the scope in planning, the less a program takes note of the particularities of the site. Losing touch with local idiosyncrasies nullifies communities’ voices and social capital. This is why many slum upgrading programs struggle to reap the benefits to be expected from so much expertise and investment brought together. Best practices cannot be replicated fully; they were categorized as ‘best’ because they looked at local specificities in detail and built according to what was already there.

In this context, states and municipalities host the most powerful approaches to slum upgrading. Echoing the 2002 WSF, Brazil, Ecuador and Colombia introduced the ‘right to the city’ within their national legislations8. In the Brazilian case, eleven years of discussion, debates and political bargaining

7 To name a few, more than 800,000 slum dwellers being provided with land tenure in 9 countries (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, DR. Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger and Senegal), 32 city-wide slum upgrading strategies are currently in the process of integrating slums into formal cities, and a gender focal point in all its endeavors to ensure gender responsiveness (UN-Habitat, 2016: 21). 8 Positively impacting slum upgrading strategies, the ‘right to the city’ was introduced in the aforementioned countries in the following forms: Brazil’s Law No.10.257/2001– –aka. City Statute––, Ecuador’s Constitution (2008) and the Ecuadorian Law on Territorial Occupation and Land Management and Use (Saule Júnior, 2016: 316). Colombia pioneered in the legalization of the ‘right to the city’ and slum dweller’s rights prior to the WSF with its Law No. 388/1997 in 1997 (Fernandes, 2007: 204).).

led to the adoption of the landmark City Statute. This instrument establishes the necessary urban and legal instruments to advance the ‘right to the city’ and to upgrade the lives of informal settlers nationwide (Fernandes, 2007: 212-4). The Colombian ideas, also worth the mention, include the policy of ‘social urbanism’, which conceives a city model that integrates different topics (politics, social, culture, territory and urban planning) in the reorientation of municipal policies towards human welfare (Vilar & Cartes, 2016: 60). Other countries carrying out innovative practices include Egypt, Mexico, Morocco, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia and Turkey. These countries, where slum sprawl exist to an enormous scale, are addressing their urban issues by dint of pro-poor policies, substantial funding, and integrated approaches. For instance, Thailand is exemplary for its sharp reduction of slum growth rates by linking rural and urban socio-economic development. This avoids future poverty-provoked rural- urban migration (UN-Habitat, 2006: 44; Norford, 2016). In the case of Turkey, the Gecekondu9 Law protects informal housing built overnight: if settlers are not caught during construction from dusk to dawn, they cannot be evicted without due process of law. Moreover, any Turkish slum area with more than 2,000 residents owns the right to be recognized as a legal sub-municipality, which makes settlers suddenly entitled to access politics, tax collection, or municipal services (Neuwirth, 2004: 8).

Notwithstanding all the initiatives, efforts, and advances to recognize the rights of slum dwellers; slums continue to be the main form of home provision worldwide, and slum formation has not been reduced to any appreciable extent (Magalhães, 2016: 104). Many states in the world, like India or China, still perform slum clearance as a regular policy (UN-Habitat, 2006: 162). This course of action ignores all the potential these areas have in generating income, employment and social capital. Slum upgrading has been proven as the best option for addressing slums (Calderón Arcilla, 2008: 27). This is supported by the direct correlation between the way cities treat their inhabitants and the prosperity of nations. Slum upgrading and conscious urbanization reduce overall poverty levels, provide new opportunities, higher incomes and increased quality of life (UN-Habitat, 2010: 82-89). Yet, even knowing this, numerous states do not include slum upgrading in their national political agendas, instead enforcing eradication or laissez-faire policies. Of the meager slum upgrading in place, the majority still fails to address social exclusion, vulnerability and the root causes of poverty (Magalhães, 2016: 112). As yet, higher priority is given to physical and apparently more urgent aspects of slums than to the structural elements perpetuating the problem. In addition, many slum improvement projects flounder due to insufficient funding, lack of long-term sustainability, cost overruns, inadequate maintenance, and hurdles in land tenure regularization (Bolay, 2011: 11). In many other instances programs fail to reach the lowest-income quintiles (Magalhães, 2016: 104).

9 In Turkish, “built overnight”.

It is our belief that the future of cities and the environment lies to a great extent, in successful slum upgrading. The democratization of (all the areas of) cities and of every-day spaces is essential for the existence of democracy and progress in other dimensions and levels (Dowbor 2016: 28). The world is timidly beginning to see integrated, multiscale, multi-sectoral, human-oriented strategies that do not only address slum areas but the greater city (Irazábal 2009: 117). Yet, a big challenge remains: how to conciliate economic activities and production manners with fair and democratic cities and settlements? From what the best slum upgrading experiences show, the answer seems to be found in the implementation of actions that relate urban equity to poverty eradication; articulate sustainability and inclusivity; and aim for ecological and resilient cities (Fernandes & Figueiredo 2016: 184).

4. Objectives and Research Questions Based on what has been established in previous sections, the main aim of this final degree project is to critically comprehend the context of slum upgrading in Latin America, and evaluate the principles, methods, and outcomes that should be driving this process. Diverse conditions and circumstances affect cities and the slum areas within them. Thereby, attempting to create an internationally––or even regionally and nationally––transferable models appears futile. However, there are some indispensable elements for slum upgrading, which usually go largely ignored. This project thus aims to identify which are those imperative elements for producing truly successful slum upgrading programs. Bearing in mind this aim, our main research question is:

1- Based on the fundamental human needs10 all people have (Annex 1), which are the indispensable elements to be recommended for slum upgrading programs in Latin America?

For providing the answer to this question, a set of secondary research questions will be examined:

2- Which are those essential anthropological needs? And, how can these needs be properly and jointly fulfilled in the context of the Latin American slum? 3- What kind of initiatives are best to end the stigmatization of urban poverty? 4- What are the most advantageous methods to foster sustainable development by means of slum upgrading? How can slum upgrading and social inclusion be sustainable (in all its strands) in a self-sufficient manner? 5- How can more social inclusion within cities be allied to the ways economic growth is operated?

These questions are subsequently approached in four sections. The first two sections (‘Theoretical Framework’ and ‘Regional Background’) present the reader with the body of theory and information that will support the later analysis stages and answering of questions. We encourage to read the

10 By fundamental human needs, we have decided to follow Chilean economist Manfred Max-Neef’s taxonomy of human needs for deeming it very complete and encompassing. He identifies the following human needs: subsistence, protection, affection, understanding, participation, recreation, creation, identity and freedom, which can be satisfied through the existential categories of ‘being’, ‘having’, ‘doing’, and ‘interacting’. (See Annex 1 for more detailed information on the workings of this taxonomy).

‘Regional Background’) together with Annex 3 in order to gain a richer––and country-specific––idea of the Latin American context regarding housing and slums. As the scope of this project limits the number of pages in the body of work, we deemed it necessary to include considerable information in the annexes. The topic of choice is very complex and interdisciplinary, and we did not wish to withhold the reader from getting the most comprehensive picture we could provide. Thus, question 1 is answered throughout the project, while question 2 is conjointly assessed in Annex 1 and the third section (‘Discussion and Analysis’). For its part, question 3 is also solved throughout this third section. It is very important to combine the reading of the ten subsections of the ‘Discussion and Analysis’ with Annex 611, which describes the cases studies in detail. In an attempt to answer the questions above, these ten subsections address a specific set of characteristics (question 3) with the aim of providing input for solving all questions. However, subsection 8.6 specifically targets question 4, while subsections 8.3, 8.4, 8.9, and 8.10 give answer to question 5. Last, a fourth chapter (‘Conclusions and Proposals’) concludes the project by showing the general lessons of the research, an evaluation of the answers to the research questions, and, based on the results and insight acquired, a short analysis of the future of slum upgrading in Latin America.

5. Methodology The main methodology used in this project was case study research and literature review, in which the unit of analysis was the area limited by slum upgrading in Latin America. To be able to achieve our objectives and answer the research questions, we examined in detail forty Latin American slum upgrading programs (Annex 4). These were implemented practices that were either completed or still ongoing. The forty case studies were selected based on the academic research by experts on slum upgrading and urban planning, and on literature review. We attempted to be as most geographically- inclusive as possible in the selection of the programs, so as to be representative of the whole Latin American region. However, seven countries12 out of twenty13 either lacked literature on the topic or the programs implemented were not sufficiently adequate to contribute insight to this study.

To complement case study reviews, data collection was attempted through triangulating methods: literature review on slum upgrading, interviews, and observation of quantitative and qualitative data. Most interview proposals––through e-mail––to experts remained unanswered probably due to different reasons beyond their control. However, it is important to mention that many academics on the field did share their valuable research upon request (e.g., Research Gate or Academia), when it was restricted to public access. As it may be inferred, this project consisted mostly in desk study whereby

11 Annex 6 presents crucial data on each of the programs (e.g., sustainability, strengths, weaknesses, or lessons learnt). The reason why the weaknesses are not pointed out in the body of this project (and only on Annex 6) is because, for the most part, they were not generated by the elements which are under analysis. This project does not aim to analyze the projects in itself, but the relevant elements that constitute our Pyramid. 12 Belize, El Salvador, Guyana, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, and Suriname are not represented in our case study review (forty projects). 13 This study limits its scope to sovereign Latin American countries, and therefore French Guiana was not included.

an extensive literature review took place. Such process took approximately six months. We are aware that field work and interviews with actors of slum upgrading projects would have contributed priceless information, however we were limited by geographic and time constrains. Nevertheless, further research on the topic will include these dimensions if possible.

The sections ‘State of Affairs’ (above) and ‘Regional Background’ were elaborated mainly through literature review and academic research. Quantitative data was used when necessary to provide a picture of the levels and impacts of past urban behaviors. For the ‘Theoretical Framework’ we used urbanism and slum upgrading theory. This presented an initial challenge given the technical vocabulary and complexity of the topics. Nonetheless, hours of reading and research gradually filled that gap. It should be emphasized that for these three sections, which required in-depth comprehension of mechanisms and underlying forces, international institutions’ information, mostly proved superficial and biased when provided in the form of annual or evaluation reports. This was not the case of their rapporteurs’ releases, whose authorship character enabled to conduct more solid analyses.

Completed with critical meditation and analysis, the review of literature and forty case studies inspired creative ideas to bring to the field of slum upgrading. For instance, how were we going to analyze which elements were most essential for Latin American slum upgrading without being acquainted with the housing and slum state of affairs in each of the region’s countries? To fill that gap, we compiled information on each country’s situation regarding slums and urbanization (Annex 2) and policies towards housing deficits and slums (Annex 3). The latter was especially useful since no source was found that provided solid individualized information on each national approach to the slum question. Most sources merely provided information for the whole of Latin America, incurring in a dangerous generalization. This process took almost four months of extensive research: many sources were not reliable, provided conflicting information and/or were outdated. On the other hand, governmental information on national policies was not sufficiently critical. After months of research and reading, we were able to compile legitimate and objective reports either by academics, urbanists or rapporteurs for each Latin American country’s slum question. With this relevant insight, we acquired a more thorough situational image of the problem.

Subsequently, the combination of this insight and the literature and case study review enabled the identification of the elements that were indispensable for slum upgrading practices. To better illustrate them, the Meléndez’s Pyramid on Slum Upgrading was conceived (Annex 5). Inspired in the Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, the Pyramid consists of ten blocs, each representing a group of indispensable elements. In order to back each of the blocs with supporting evidence, ten slum upgrading programs were singled out of the forty examined for their epitomizing of the elements previously recognized as indispensable. To provide the reader with information on each program, we also prepared case study

sheets addressing critical information on each of them (Annex 6). Having conducted all this background research, we developed the section ‘Discussion and Analysis’ through the lessons provided by the ten programs, thus, symbolically piling stone on stone of the Pyramid. Our ‘Conclusions and Proposals’ were based up on the findings of the research and the results of critical reflection on the future prospects for slum upgrading.

Finally, it is important to justify the change in the order of sections as proposed in the Final Degree Project Guide. We understood that for a higher cohesion of our project, we needed to arrange the section “Theoretical Framework” after sections “Objectives and Research Questions” and “Methodology” instead of before. Since we introduce theoretical aspects of our own, we wanted to consecutively connect these with the “Discussion and Analysis”, as to create a lineal sense of story. Through this way, we continue our project with its body of theory. On a final note, we would like to recommend our readers to first of all go through the Glossary (section 12) in order to guarantee a better comprehension of all concepts.

6. Theoretical Framework: Here below, this project engages in a discussion on concepts and literature review about urban informality, slum upgrading, and future prospects. The first subsection (6.1) presents a general overview of the ills of present urbanity and advocates for the rethinking of informality in order to improve settler’s lives. The second subsection (6.2) describes in detail how this rethinking is to be applied to slum upgrading by complementing it with placemaking. This theoretical framework will guide the conceptual construction of the aforementioned pyramid.

6.1. On The Formal and The Informal Urban reality is the culminating outcome of humanity. The urban accumulates human time without parallel; hence, spatial configurations and territories are open books to the past, present and future of their inhabitants. Current urban forms have a dual literature: formal and informal. Praised as the greatest achievement of humanity, the formal city amalgamates infrastructure, culture, history, networks and innovation. Far from perfect, this formal city is sold in a global market where the citizenry fades into the consumer ideal (Balbim, 2016: 148). In contrast, segregated by and product of the formal, there is the informal city. Informality emerges because of the inadequacies of the formal: its inability or unwillingness to fulfill the public interest (Vekstein, 2010: 229-230). In need for each other, the formal subjugates the informal to marginal spaces within and around it.

This formal-informal trap precludes a holistic social interaction city-wide: empathy and social capital cannot be generated given the stereotyping of both formality and informality (Álvarez Rivadulla, 2014: 11). The story told by the dual cities of today is one of physical and material development, but not of human development. Such narrative seems oxymoronic when, in the 1990s

and for the first time in history, urban population surpassed that of rural areas (Segre, 2010: 163). Nevertheless, cities have for long––but not always––grown in the formal-informal dichotomy, and in so doing, their development has never been complete. Present urban forms are living entities, the neglect and undervaluing of their informal parts forestalling full human progress.

The slum question is the ultimate example of urban informality. The preservation of slums as we know them, imposes an impasse on urban––ergo, human––development. The right to housing has only been recognized since 1948, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNGA, 1948). Since then, other international and national documents14 have aspired to protect the most vulnerable social echelons at the urban level (Leckie, 1989: 91). But the traditional city management model has not changed, despite these and other efforts to include the poorest (Bonduki, 2016: 81). This is so because, to a far greater extent than other social products (as education, health care or security), housing is a market product. Housing is composed by the interweaving of state activities, the market’s, and social needs, and as such it is the welfare sector with most market interests vested (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 21).

The immediate reaction vis-à-vis the informal is of neglect. The slum question has only recently become a problem for the authorities. For long, urban informality was an economic engine the formal city tolerated, one that was part of an economic growth that made informal settlers even more vulnerable (Fernandes & Figueiredo, 2016: 185). It became a problem in the 1800s, the era of urban beautification. Haussman turned Paris into the imperial city par excellance, and other cities the world over transformed to replicate Paris. Informal, irregular settlements had no place in such beautiful, artificial projects. Slums were cleared, ignoring that they were an outcome of the system and the forces driving that system remained unchanged (Arimah, 2010: 30).

Experience shows that slum clearance is not a solution to the proliferation of slums: after clearance, the informal re-emerges somewhere else. Slum eradication focuses on the symptoms, rather than on the causes of informal settling (Ibid.: 30), and it usually takes place as a result of powerful economic interests for developing profitable formal structures in the area. Another orientation of dealing with urban informality also inclined to obey economic effectiveness is resettlement. Past and present housing policies have entailed the massive production of low-cost housing units for the later relocation of informal settlers (Fernandes & Figueiredo, 2016: 185). This practice entails the dismembering of communities and their social capital, deeply relegating informal settlers to what is more convenient for other, more powerful, humans. However, the strategy of resettlement has further implications. Slum residents depend on employment in the vicinity of their dwellings, where they have also already established social networks with more affluent neighbors that help them cope with their

14 E.g., the 1976 Vancouver Declaration on Human Settlements, the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 2005 World Charter for the Right to the City, or the 2007 Santiago Declaration of the Ibero-American States.

poverty (Morgan, 2007: 9). Moreover, except rare examples of successful resettlement programs–– like that of squatters from Brasilia to Samambaia––, the plots and houses provided in the new locations tend to be extremely insufficient, lacking adequate infrastructure and services, and distant from workplaces and city centers (Arimah, 2010: 3). Nonetheless, in some particular instances resettlement is imperative due to the risk locations of the squatting. For example, when slums are highly vulnerable to landslides or dangerous flooding, the families must be relocated. When that is the case, there is a need to implement adaptation programs and mitigation of psycho-social impacts (TECHO, 2015: 137).

Urban informality did not become an object of analysis as a field of action until the dominant critiques of modernism in the 1960s and early 1970s, with the works of John Turner, Charles Abrams, William Manguin, and of different members of Team X (Segre, 2010: 167). These authors mainly attacked previous treatment of the urban, and advocated for doing away with eradication and resettlement practices when dealing with the slum question. Hence, the underlying idea is that, to overcome urban faults, urbanity and the informal need to be rethought. In order to rethink the informal, one must focus first on identifying its root causes. To that end, a UNU-WIDER extensive quantitative analysis carried out from data on a million informal settlers from all continents, pointed out that the incidence of slums was directly related to macroeconomic aspects and, therefore, decreased with income. Also, this analysis informed that informal settlements are highly dependent on migration flows (rural to urban, country to country), and on the legal and economic frameworks conditioning access to land and housing (Arimah, 2010: 5-9).

For her part, urban expert Janice Perlman studied poverty and slums in Rio de Janeiro. Four decades spent in favelas enabled her to provide empirical evidence of poverty being a result of discriminatory structures that denied the poor the means and capabilities to realize themselves (Perlman, 1976: 91-102). Urban researchers Moser and Satterthwaite reinforced this position (Moser & Satterthwaite, 1985: 7-12). In his very influential book, Development as Freedom, Amartya Sen built on these concepts by articulating that poverty should be seen as the deprivation of basic capabilities rather than merely as lowness of income (Sen, 1999: 87). Sen established that thorough development needs of five types of freedoms: political freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective securities (Ibid.: 10). Thereby, according to Sen’s conclusions, slum residents are confronted with all the five types of unfreedoms; their development fully hindered. Rethinking informality means to focus on the ends that slum dwellers have reason to pursue, and, correspondingly, on providing them with the capabilities/freedoms to attain their aspirations (Ibid.: 90).

Informality rethought, the slum question is taken seriously. As mentioned, these times have an urban character where cities accommodate the majority of the world’s population and where

informality is ever-increasing. To this day, there is an astounding lack of attention to science and research in architecture and urbanism among policymakers. By taking the slum question seriously, cleavages between theory and practice, policymakers and (all) stakeholders, north and south, are bridged. When all elements transforming urban informality act in unison and when they provide capabilities to the urban poor, “architecture returns to its ancestral social meaning of responding and expressing everyday needs through the vital rescuing of lost human dignity” (Segre, 2010: 175).

The leading figure in the theorization of the rethinking of informality was French sociologist, Henri Lefebvre. In his books, Le droit à la ville (1968), Espace et politique (1973), and Du Contrat de citoyenneté (1990), he elaborates on a seminal urban development and philosophical concept: the ‘right to the city’ (Fernandes, 2007: 205). Lefebvre, establishes that the city historically constructed is no longer lived nor understood practically, for there is another way unfulfilled in our cities. Contrary to present practices, such way requires for urban society to be an oeuvre and not a product. He calls for a new humanism––that of urban society––to be attained by means of a new life in the city. Until generalized segregation disappears, his ‘right to the city’ cannot be achieved, as this concept gathers the interests of all those who inhabit (Lefrebvre, 1996: 148-158). Thus, citizens can no longer be labeled by their family names or places of residence. Rather, they should be defined by their belonging to different social networks in family, profession and habitat (Fernandes, 2007: 205). To build the ‘right to the city’, Lefebvre provides a crucial formula for social citizenship: a new Rousseauian contract between state and citizens to reduce the gap between them and between different peoples within a city, placing the state as an enabler of links between communities; a provider of encompassing rights; and a setter of obligations towards a pluralistic society (Ibid.: 208). Then, the central idea to Lefebvre’s postulates is that the right to the city ensues “the capacity to change ourselves by changing the city” (Harvey, 1973: 315). All citizens––formal and informal––would thus be able to fully enjoy urban life: benefit from all its services and advantages (the right to habitation), and take direct part in city management (the right to participation) (Fernandes, 2007: 208). His works press for the urban to raise to its real nature, which is first and foremost human (Lefebvre, 1996: 208).

It is important to note the difference between the ‘right to the city’ and ‘rights in the city’. The Lefebvreian claim does not grant specific rights, but enables for common ownership of the city by its dwellers and visitors, conferring them all with equal opportunities to enjoy the city, as well as with responsibilities to sustain and improve the urban. This paradigm will be interpreted differently in the various polities and cultures of the world, but the fundamental philosophy will remain the same: all city inhabitants have the right to access each and every possibility of city life (Brown & Kristiansen, 2009: 36). Given the escalating urbanization of current societies, Lefebvre’s principles appear as urgent as ever to be fulfilled. To this day, the ‘right to the city’ converges all internationally agreed

urban human rights in the 2030 Agenda15, and inspired, back in 1978, the creation of UN-Habitat. Hence, the ‘right to the city’ provides a tangible, alternative structure for rethinking the cities and the informal. As it is not possible to separate the concern for the people from urbanism matters, democracy and development will only be achieved by reshaping the sciences of the urban (Brillembourg & Klumpner, 2010: 133).

Rethinking informality and satisfying the ‘right to the city’ aim for true democracy to be realized. If that is the case, further deliberation is required: what is then the role that both urbanism and architecture must play in/for society? The answer is found in a less-known book of acclaimed architect Frank Lloyd Wright, An Organic Architecture: The Architecture of Democracy. There, he establishes that architecture “ought in one sense or another to be like nature, responsive to nature or at one with nature” (Wright, 1939: 12) and that, “it must be true to time, place, development, environment and purpose (Ibid.: 17). In this sense, the sciences of urbanity––architecture and urbanism––need to be performative. When citizens are placed at the epicenter of city planning and management, these fields acquire the power to become agents of statements that stimulate a series of social practices. Always going along with nature, these sciences assist in delineating the contours of a community. And by reshaping their role in society, they can negotiate the inclusion of informality into the city and, therefore, improve the lives of those living in the informal (Brillembourg & Klumpner, 2010: 130).

Slum upgrading stands thus as the ultimate practice condensing the promotion of the ‘right to the city’, the democratic and developmental power of both architecture and urbanism, and Amartya Sen’s capacity-building approach. Since informality is a reality of contemporary cities, and eradication and resettlement strategies have proven detrimental, the smart way forward is slum upgrading. Complete development cannot avoid any parts of a whole. If massive numbers of––urban and rural––peoples are not given the opportunities to grow to their full potential, then a big share of the global human capital is impeded from contributing to human development (Sugiri, 2009: 26). In an urban context, therefore, slum upgrading should be the foremost policy to be implemented.

According to urban theory, slum improvement must solve the immediate physical needs of the poor and empower communities, without disregarding the worthy existing physical and social community assets. It also helps incrementally in the improvement of the greater city, because, as a living entity, when an area is changed, the whole city is directly impacted (Irazábal, 2009: 23). Moreover, slum upgrading makes highly visible, immediate, and large differences in the quality of life of urban informal settlers. For instance, unhygienic conditions leading to water-borne diseases are dealt with (Cities Alliance, 1999: 3). Satisfaction with one’s life is also incremented, as are safety and

15 The 2030 Agenda encompasses the principles previously endorsed by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the Objectives for Sustainable Development (SDGs), the commitments of the Habitat Agenda and the New Urban Agenda (UN-Habitat).

perceptions of security (Brakarz & Jaitman, 2013: 16). In addition to the foregoing, improvement of city infrastructure attracts more investment, which in turn boosts economic growth. What is more, slum upgrading contributes to a healthy development, as it supports a self-sufficient improvement, once basic needs are met. The more self-sufficient settlers of upgraded slums can satisfy their needs in a more complete and harmonious fashion: prosperity becomes more sustainable, community-building is fostered, and participation and creativity are enhanced (Max-Neef et al., 2010: 38).

Yet, slum upgrading experts, Jeff Ruster and Ivo Imparato, aptly point out that upgrading strategies should go beyond physical improvements to create more integrated emphatic societies: through a broad transformation of relationships within communities, between informal communities and the formal citizenry, and between communities and authorities. Hence, slum upgrading must meticulously heed the particular urban, social, political, cultural and economic contexts (Ruster & Imparato, 2003: 87). Since the declaration of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), many slum upgrading programs have been launched. Yet they failed to transcend physical improvements or, in importing international upgrading models, did not consider the particularities of the site (Irazábal, 2009: 108). International best practices on slum upgrading, which do follow Ruster & Imparato’s ideas, illustrate that rethinking informality and previous models are effective instruments for positive change. In a global context, Latin America is a good testimony of it. A fascinating case-study for slum upgrading, the region hosts most international best practices in the field. This new wave of more inclusive slum upgrading is still confined in the region because of the many economic interests vested in perpetuating urban informality, the lack of direct communication between governments and urban experts, and the preference for shorter interventions with more immediate results. Hence, in spite of the larger part of projects still falling short of addressing socio-spatial equity concerns (Ibid.: 24), relevant measures are being taken towards fulfilling Lefebvre’s ‘right to the city’ in Latin America.

6.2. Renewing the Right to the City: The Art of Placemaking in Latin America This project, in developing its own body of theory, urges for a renewal of the Lefebvrian right. The concept should be reinvigorated to specifically and only target the slum question, due to the urgency thereof and, so far, the many inadequate responses to it. Social, economic and physical problems in slum areas and within their larger city-context should be grasped and integrated into city planning. The ‘renewed right to the city’, becomes an imperative: it cannot be attained if part of the population are not conferred equitable opportunities, and it ought to be attained. State and citizenry alike, should stop lenient tendencies towards the presence of unsanitary slum areas; and cease stigmatization, stereotyping, and undervaluation of the informal. Such ‘renewed right to the city’, strives for much more far-reaching slum upgrading practices than those in place; it entails “a forthright call for justice in all aspects of city life” (Marcuse et al., 2009, as cited in Irazábal, 2009: 24). Hence,

the renewed concept urges slum upgrading to turn into a truly comprehensive transformation, by bringing all the brilliance of Lefebvre’s postulates to the forefront of slum upgrading.

According to the French sociologist, city development has over the years cleaved into two antagonistic forms of space: abstract and social. The former, ‘abstract space’, is a tool of domination which destroys the conditions that generated it (Lefebvre, 1974: 49). The latter, ‘social space’, is inherently connected to the people who produce it (Ibid.: 68). Echoing Lefebvre’s social space, architects Lynda H. Schneekloth and Robert G. Shibley, defined the concept of ‘placemaking’ as, “the way in which all of us as human beings transform the places in which we find ourselves into places in which we live” (Schneekloth & Shibley, 1995: 1). When applied to the context of squatter settlements, the concept of ‘placemaking’ unveils a whole new dimension for slum upgrading; one that gives access to the emotional and the psychological of these sites.

Other than the cleavage between abstract and social spaces, city development has also resulted in the dehumanization of informal settlements. The placemaking approach allows to materialize the life of these settlements in the collective imagination of outsiders. When the Lefebvrian right and placemaking are fully applied to slum upgrading, settlements stop being bypassed/no-go, stigmatized city areas to become places of meaning. As slums acquire human meaning, they are begun to be understood as spatial consequences of complex social processes. In turn, this sensitizes the approach to slum upgrading: now it does not only upgrade, it also acknowledges and enhances the good there found. Borrowing from the human geography aphorism, “as people construct places, places construct people” (Holloway & Hubbard, 2001: 7), slum upgrading should be conceived and planned “to form a new possibility by means of interaction between the symbolic, the imaginary and the real” (Jáuregui, 2010: 223). In this manner, slum upgrading turns into an enabler for virtuous reciprocity: spaces are improved and enhanced to better residents’ lives, and, likewise, fostered coexistence upgrades spaces by adding valuable meanings. As a result, slum upgrading transcends the urban to address all anthropological needs; it becomes a practice that incorporates a set of indispensable elements to satisfy the basic needs that all humans require (Annex 1).

As previously pointed out, the Latin American countries have been setting new and relevant benchmarks in the slum upgrading field (Irazábal, 2009: 117). By applying the theoretical concepts previously analyzed and by carefully examining best practices of slum upgrading in the region, we have identified a series of necessary elements that must be taken into account in slum upgrading practices. This set of elements has been represented as a pyramid of upgrading needs––Meléndez’s Pyramid16––(Annex 5), inspired by the Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. As shown, by covering Max- Neef’s fundamental human needs, slum upgrading eventually leads to placemaking. These

16 Having all equal importance for their own purposes, the distribution only denotes logic order in implementation not hierarchy.

indispensable elements17 allow for the ‘right to the city’ to be renewed and for placemaking to be satisfied. For putting theory into practice, ten case-studies of slum upgrading in Latin America will be further on analyzed to explain the weight of each element and how it can be best achieved.

7. Regional Background: Birth and life of the Latin American Slum The Latin American region is the world’s most urbanized, with almost 80% of its population living in cities and high levels of informality and slums (Magalhães, 2016: 2) (See Annex 2 for data on population figures). This mainly results from the rapid urbanization of the region during the 20th century, outcome of the increased manufacturing industries that greatly diminished economic reliance on agriculture. The industrialization era heightened rural-urban migration flows, and weak authorities were unable to provide sufficient land, housing services and infrastructure to new residents. Invasion of the periphery was convenient to both invaders and industrial interests: it provided dwelling close to economic opportunities to the former, and adjacent cheap labor to the latter. Hence, forced by market forces and necessity, the newcomers built their self-help homes on the fringes of the Latin American cities (Irazábal, 2009: 7-8).

However, the phenomenon of informality in the region dates back to colonial times. Spaniards and Portuguese were the early propellers of urbanization in Latin America. Building on the formal- informal dichotomy, the 440 cities they founded had no space nor desire for indigenous populations, who were pushed to the perimeters of cities. Black slaves who managed to escape from their owners also settled on the periphery. Land invasion has ever since been a response to unfair distribution of resources in the region (Hernández & Kellet, 2010: 3-4). Later on, European migration (1800s-1900s) aggravated the urbanization problem. Big waves of European population moving into Latin American cities––mostly to Argentina and Brazil––led to rapid construction with no strategic planning involved. When cities are not properly designed, its poorest inhabitants are those who bear the brunt. Almost always, when time is pressing, a less effective use of resources is made, quickly earmarking funds for projects that simply translate into broader economic benefits. Establishing their own localized communities and specializing in a particular economic activity, Europeans soon became key socio- political figures, the kind that could afford to pay for qualitative urbanization. As this situation became more visible, the segregation of this region’s urbanity heightened (Sánchez Alonso, 2007: 213-421).

The slum problem in the region has been dealt with in various ways. In the first half of the 20th century, urbanization was understood in evolutionary terms. In order to drive progress, cities needed to be healthy, and thus slums were cleared. Then, this criterion was updated with the functionalist

17 The indispensable elements of the Meléndez’s Pyramid will be individually addressed in Section 8. They are the following: regularization framework and coverage of basic needs; community participation and organization; access to credit, transparency and good governance; recovery cost mechanisms and budget control; political will and social capital; sustainability and monitoring; strong intermediary structure; integral and multi-disciplinary approach; bridging of the gap between a development project and social progress; and equity, esteem and inclusion.

CIAM18 model. These measures proved valid for democracies and dictatorships alike, and advanced strict functional segregation and planning of cities to solve urban problems (Almandoz, 2006: 95). By the second half of the century, however, the model had given rise to grave social problems in terms of housing and employment. In the context of the Cold War and later the Cuban crisis, the region transferred North American urban ideas, and approached squatter settlements as possible hotbeds of insurgency threatening national security (Klaufus, 2015: 1-4). Believing in the trickle-down effect of diversified urban economies, Latin American countries, supported by US agencies, launched national programs to tackle slums. Further eradication of informal settlements and construction of large housing projects followed suit, ignoring the housing deficits of the poorest (Fernández-Maldonado, 2010: 2). At this time, slums had spread to become symptomatic for larger social problems affecting society as a whole, and though cleared, they sprouted again in nearby locations. Social problems were blamed on migrants and squatters; anti-urban gated communities deepened segregation and internal colonialism; and the roots of the slum problem were neglected. Cities––and slums––continued to grow in a hyper- urbanizing fashion (Klaufus, 2015: 1-4).

The regional trauma caused by the model of import substitution industrialization (ISI), the 1973 oil and debt crisis, and internal guerrilla wars precipitated the 1980s neoliberalism guided by the IMF and the WB. In urban terms, neoliberalism translated as postmodern trends (i.e., rehabilitate, revitalize, restore, beautify), which focused on the value of historic centers and heritage preservation, causing gentrification and further displacement of the poor to the periphery. Socially discriminatory urbanism led to increasing socio-spatial polarization of Latin American cities. In addition, neoliberal city policies were parallel to the institutionalization of urban fear and violence. This initiated a downward spiral of insecurity and protective measures, which stigmatized informal settlements and poor areas as no-go sites (Ibid.: 5-7). In lockstep, however, pressure from social movements and John Turner’s ‘self-help’ approach gradually started to take hold of urbanism: slum clearance was to be avoided, and low income groups to be assisted in housing development. The WB played an important role in supporting this strategy (Fernández-Maldonado, 2010: 2).

However, this entity’s role was rather market-oriented and neglectful of the root causes of slums. Among the reforms imposed on the region by the Washington-based institutions, the 1990s witnessed the implementation of measures to improve housing markets, namely the regularization of property titles and the development of housing finance systems. At this time, national housing agencies emerged. They worked in consonance with private banks for mortgage lending and with private construction firms or developers for housing schemes construction––usually of a very inadequate quality, very badly serviced, and incurring in high maintenance costs (Ibid.: 2). The limited success of

18 Congrès International d’Architecture Moderne, 1928-59.

this type of assistance and the alarming rates of urbanization and informal settlements blatantly required an alternative. As part of poverty alleviation strategies, international development agencies19 entered the scene and broadly upgraded infrastructure and basic services in slums across the region.

By 2000, there was an internationally favorable climate in the development cooperation field, the 2000 Millennium Development Goals signed. Such enabling environment also reached urban development, and thus slum upgrading programs became lightly more multi-dimensional and comprehensive. Slum upgrading had finally came to the forefront of housing policy recommendations, and municipalities started to take the lead in implementation. Yet the focus of these initiatives remained on alleviating quantity rather than quality (Magalhães 2016: 108). In the last 17 years, Latin American housing policies (which tend not to include slum upgrading practices), all things considered, have not addressed the underlying socio-political elements behind urban informality20 (Annex 3). This is reflected in the fact that, as of 2014, 23.5% of the region’s population lived in slums (UN Data 2014). In view of this, the region is now slowly incorporating a more integrated and comprehensive approach to slum upgrading, with some landmark examples from previous times (Ibid.: 104).

Numerous people in Latin America have carried out extensive practical and theoretical work in the topic of slum upgrading, which has been scantly recognized at the international level. In recent years, their valuable work has made possible major alterations in Latin American slum upgrading (Hernández & Kellet, 2010: 13). Still small-scale notwithstanding, these changes are very relevant. The most significant of these has been the shift from upgrading as process that was technical, expert and official data driven, and detached from slum dwellers’ opinions to one that is more concerned with combining housing solutions, social development, and the creation of inclusive cities (Calderón Arcilla, 2008: 65). A big contribution to ameliorating slum upgrading has been decentralization. By means of it, local governments have acquired planning, fiscal and administrative leverage. Being closer to the informal settlement in question, and now better equipped, municipalities have turned into key players in the upgrading field. Latin America has thus emerged as a leader in the creation of a socially responsible slum upgrading, with Brazil and Colombia leading the way (Magalhães, 2016: 107).

Nonetheless, a plethora of challenges and questions still remain, and older planning styles persist in most cities. Nearly all countries in the region have not carried out a comprehensive reform plan to ameliorate their national housing systems integrally (Calderón Arcilla, 2008: 64-65). This ensues a trap of toxic oblivion: states believe to be taking measures to get better, but, instead, their efforts are running into the sand inasmuch as they remain superficial and sectoral. Because of this, know-how extrapolated to urban development is socially shallow as well. For instance, there is a shortage of

19 Mainly, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Inter-American Development Bank, the United States Agency for International Aid (USAID), and the World Bank (Magalhães, 2016: 108). 20 Nevertheless, see Annex 4 for information on each country: housing policies greatly vary across the region.

funding, technical assistance, coherent national planning, and administrative capacity-building. Obsolete provisions of legal urban orders frustrate urban reform and promote predatory land and speculation practices (Fernandes, 2007: 203). The region also lacks proper information systems to support the interventions at every stage.

For its part, targeting of the lowest-income quintiles still remains a challenge (Magalhães, 2016: 108). The launch of slum upgrading programs is usually marked by the existence of a prior relationship between the government and the slum community––often mediated by clientelism. As a result, slum upgrading tends to reach those who are more convenient to be assisted and not necessarily whomever is in most need (Álvarez Rivadulla, 2014: 6). Product of speculative land markets, clientelism-based political systems, elitist urban planning practices and exclusionary legal regimes, and informal peri- urbanity are today the main socio-economic ways to produce urban space in Latin America (Fernandes, 2007: 203). The housing deficit in the region is above 30%; that is, 32% in terms of qualitative housing deficit and 37% as for quantitative housing deficit (Magalhães, 2016: 4) (See Glossary). However, a quantitative housing deficit does not imply homelessness. Most people in the region do have homes21, even if they are not provided by the formal market, are overcrowded and/or poorly-serviced.

Turning to the positive new wave of slum upgrading in the region, it goes back to the 1980s Brazilian and Colombian pathways in reforming legal systems for urban development22. Since then, slum upgrading has been influenced by the rhetoric of the ‘right to the city’ to some extent, with participatory budgeting and good governance really making urban progress (Ibid.: 5). In a few cases, the traditional model of planning has gradually evolved into a more collaborative and local planning strategy, including the communities’ opinions and desires (Irazábal, 2009: 23). Programs have been designed to redistribute wealth and make the land market more accessible (Magalhães, 2016: 5). Switching the focus from quantity to quality, some recent programs have introduced social support to promote capacity building and integration. Emphasis has been placed on improving public spaces–– especially green areas––as a means of tackling the ‘ghetto image’ of slums and of increasing squatters’ bond with their cities (Segre, 2010: 164). The aesthetic element of this new wave also finds explanation in attracting investment on the city, thus bolstering national economies (González Couret, 2015: 132).

All the improvements notwithstanding, this new wave in slum upgrading is still very limited in scope. The best, most consistent practices are concentrated in a few cities23, with the rest of remarkable practices erratically scattered across the region. However, most of these programs are also territorially confined at a local level and, focused on upgrading a specific neighborhood, they rarely generate

21 Only 0.6% of Latin Americans are homeless (Magalhães, 2016: 114). 22 As mentioned in a previous section, Colombia and Brazil materialized the ‘right to the city’ in legal terms with the approval of Law no. 388/1997 (Colombia), and Law No.10.257/2001 (Brazil) ––aka. City Statute–– (Fernandes, 2007: 204). 23 Medellin, Bogotá, Rio de Janeiro, and Rosario (Saborido, 2006: 9-13; Magalhães, 2016: 1-11; Ruster & Imparato, 2003: 47-95).

significant synergies at the city level (Magalhães, 2016: 108). To reverse that, governments need to support these programs at the national level through legal orders and measures that prevent future informality (e.g., diversifying local economies to generate jobs). The underlying explanation for this is that a policy of neglect towards slums still prevails by reason of the interests vested––by influential stakeholders––in perpetuating present socio-economic dynamics. Latin America also requires further environmental commitment in slum upgrading, as green policies are not integrated in planning, nor exists an attempt to raise environmental awareness (Ezquiaga Arquitectura, 2015: 9). Thereby, this new wave needs to devise a strategic approach to slum upgrading that enhances connectivity, mobility, urban integration, social cohesion and access to affordable land (Magalhães, 2016: 9). As long as settler’s fundamental basic needs are not satisfied, urban development will not be whole.

As aforementioned, this project has conducted extensive research on the topic in order to identify how the fundamental human needs can be best satisfied through slum upgrading and placemaking. To that end the referred pyramid of urban needs was conceived (Annex 5). The elements that constitute the pyramid have been identified in slum upgrading projects appertaining to this new slum upgrading wave in Latin America. The following section will attempt to exemplify each of the elements by the experience attained in a particular program, in an effort to convey the indispensability of that element in question. This research stands thus as a modest endeavor to infuse the relevance of acknowledging all of Max-Neef’s fundamental basic needs in slum upgrading practices.

8. Analysis and Discussion The present study proposes a set of indispensable elements that slum upgrading must include in order to fulfill the fundamental human needs (Max-Neef et al. 2010: 26). This is not an attempt to provide a one-size-fits-all solution. On the contrary, we recognize the importance of a bottom-up approach, which permits meeting and prioritizing the specific needs of informal settlers. The future slum upgrading paradigm should aim for satisfying all human needs by means of a gradual, integrated and multi-disciplinary rehabilitation of precarious slum areas. The intervention shall consist of strong economic and sociocultural development strategies, with a special emphasis on social capital, equity, esteem, and inclusion. The paradigm must also advocate for close cooperation among the different stakeholders, specially allowing for the participation of the community at all stages. Upgrading programs should be further supported by regularization tools, political will, good governance and sufficient credit. The presence of a strong intermediary structure is envisaged to facilitate full transparency, as well as to streamline recovery-cost, budget-control and monitoring systems. All these elements together enable to bridge the gap between a development project and social progress, which is a guarantee of sustainability. The formulation of the Meléndez’s Pyramid is therefore an association

of the potential, the ideal, and the rational regarding slum upgrading. Its ten blocs, each embodied by a slum upgrading program in Latin America, are detailed hereunder.

8.1. Regularization framework and coverage of basic needs: Pró-Favela Program (Brazil) In 1983, Belo Horizonte, Brazil became the first municipality in the world to adopt a legal instrument for the regularization of informal settlements (Pró-Favela Law). This had been the result of well-organized social movements and lobbying at the end of the military regime. The PRÓ-FAVELA Program for the Regularization of Favelas is an ongoing upgrading scheme that was implemented in 1983 to operate the provisions of the Pró-Favela Law. This program fosters the urban and legal regularization of favelas through their inclusion in the city. Such action positively reverberates in the community in the form of basic services and infrastructure, access to politics, and the legalization of land tenure (Annex 6) (Fernandes & Pereira, 2010: 171-199).

The Pró-Favela Program is revolutionary for two reasons. First, it pioneered in recognizing the relevance of regularization, acknowledging its beneficial outgrowths. And second, it delivered an ideal methodology to enforce it. Up until 1974, the military regime had followed a line of slum clearance. Community organizations sprung across the country, Belo Horizonte’s being especially well- organized. Gradually, they were able to influence a shift in urban policy, slum upgrading gradually introduced. In 1983, upgrading was institutionalized by the Pró-Favela Law and Program, whose main purpose was to regularize favelas. Most squatters live without any form of secure tenure, permanently threatened by eviction (WB, 2012: 9). Thus, for slum upgrading to be sustainable, regularization is essential. In order to properly plan the upgrading of slums; legal, regulatory and procedural bottlenecks imposing unrealistic requirements for land use must be eliminated (Ruster & Imparato, 2003: 227).

Since the 1960s, many slum upgrading programs in Latin America have focused on the legalization of land tenure, but the Pró-Favela example, by passing it into law, sets a worthy precedent. The benefits of regularization are manifold. For instance, regularized slum areas yield access to basic services (Durand-Lasserve, 2006). Tenure security also enables a greater sense of belonging and willingness to invest resources, effort and time in developing the community (Irazábal, 2009: 108). Another benefit is that, in principle, it could contribute to the financial base of cities by improving tax recovery (Arimah, 2010: 5). Moreover, regularization can contribute to peace and stability in cities. It could also hasten the integration of urban informal activities into the formal economy, especially when regularization co-occurs with real rights (i.e., freehold or leasehold) (Durand-Lasserve, 2006). A study conducted in Argentina on the topic (Galiani & Schargrodsky, 2010 as cited in Álvarez Rivadulla, 2014) showed that regularization increases the quality of life of settlers and reduces poverty because with a regularized land tenure status, families invest more in home improvement and education.

However, when regularizing informal settlements, it is important to include and listen to the community throughout the process. For example, several people could claim the property of the same plot, in which case regularization would only deepen unrest. It is also commonplace that property rights are allocated to the male breadwinner, thus intensifying male superiority and female insecurity within the family (Álvarez Rivadulla, 2014: 8-10). It can also be the case that regularization plunges settlers into unpayable mortgages used for land purchase (Bartesaghi Koc, 2014: 3). Thus, regularization must be precluded by meticulous community-based needs assessments and by a careful examination of possible side-effects. It is important to note as well that the regularization process is not always well-received by the community. Comfortable with certain aspects of their informality, some do not want to pay property taxes or to comply with building codes (Irazábal, 2009: 108).

In order to properly regularize slums, the Pró-favela Program introduced the concept, ‘zones of special social interest’ (ZEIS24). This tool sets the framework for certain areas to be assisted and included into the formal city. Given their physical characteristics, it was impossible to adhere these areas to existing, formal codes, impeding their upgrading and perpetuating their precariousness. Hence, the ZEIS allow for the temporary suspension and relaxation of relevant laws to ease the upgrading and land regularization processes (Morgan, 2007: 11). Thus, when an area is recognized as ZEIS, the authorities are obliged to regularize and, by extension, to assist it (Anderson & Moura, 2016).

As previously mentioned, regularization goes hand in hand with the provision of basic services. Together, these two elements cover for many of the settler’s anthropological needs, mainly physical, economic, and, thus, political. Urban experts have showed that the faster the provision of services and infrastructure, the more developed and integrated the settlement will be within the city (Sakat et al., 2011 as cited in Bartesaghi Koc, 2014). Basic urban services and infrastructure include potable water access, sanitation, sewage systems, electricity and street lighting, storm drainage, garbage collection, and street and road pavement. Upgrading must also encompass community services such as playgrounds, schools, markets, daycare centers, and clinics (Arimah, 2010: 1-4). In order to ensure sustainability, all these actions must be tailored to the location and community. The Pró-Favela Program conducted this process through the use of Geographic Information Systems (GIS). These systems engage in spatial and socio-economic data collection. Ideally, when applied to slum upgrading projects, communities participate in data collection adding their own perceptions (Chopra et al., 2016: 1-3). Some of the variables are: proxies for sanitation, crowding, income and access to water, proportion of households without a bathroom, or average income of heads of household per month (Hacker et al., 2013: 10). Very valuable to the amelioration of basic services provision, GIS inform policy making, creating an overall vision of the real situation and problems.

24 ZEIS from the Portuguese-language acronym: ‘Zonas Especiais de Interesse Social’.

It is commonplace in the region for the houses to be built on hazardous locations, such as floodplains, steep slopes, or in proximity of waste disposal sites. Strategies to improve slums should take these characteristics into account and plan accordingly to minimize any possible risk. However, resettlement should only be ordered when unavoidable because it incurs in tremendous social capital loss, creates social disruptions, and increases expenditure (Ibid.: 22). Furthermore, since 1960, natural disasters have killed around 180,000 people in Latin America, and disrupted the lives of many more. Hence, effective mitigation measures must be integrated in slum upgrading strategies. GIS technologies can be of tremendous value for this objective. In spite of the cost-effectiveness of mitigation measures, more than 90% of the budget for natural hazard management in the region is spent on disaster relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction. This leaves less than 10% for pre-disaster prevention (Irazábal, 2009: 21).

Through the Pró-Favela Law and Program to guide the improvement of favelas, Belo Horizonte successfully included the ‘right to the city’ into its planning process. The impact of the program (e.g., by reaching 120,000 residents in 5 slum areas) proves the utmost importance that slum upgrading must attach to regularization and basic services provision (Ruster & Imparato, 2003: 179). However, the Pró-Favela Program gives evidence of the institutional and political obstacles to slum upgrading, given the powerful vested interests in the housing market. The program shows that having institutional support and the proper tools to affect change does not suffice. Despite the Pró-Favela’s efforts, 13% of Belo Horizonte’s population (307,038 people) still live in irregular slum areas (Carvalho, 2013: 3). When squatting levels are of such magnitudes, upgrading programs need to become more ‘market compatible’––i.e., more acceptable to economic forces––, and to strengthen its legal base so as to meet political and bureaucratic challenges. Given these circumstances, regularization and basic services provision constitute an indispensable, solid understructure to the upgrading of slums.

8.2. Community participation and organization: Villa El Salvador (Peru) Villa El Salvador (henceforth VES), located in Southern Lima, is one of the biggest squatter settlements in Peru and an extraordinary example of community empowerment. It was founded in 1971 as a government-led housing scheme to accommodate 4,000 squatter families living in central Lima. Land was allocated in the desert (26 km away from the city center) with no services or infrastructure whatsoever. Nevertheless, the Integral Development Plan (1984-ongoing)––a partnership between the government and the local community-based organizations (henceforth CBOs)––has allowed the slum area to enjoy basic services, infrastructure, housing, and formal inclusion into the city of Lima. The VES Plan epitomizes the power and relevance of community participation and organization in slum upgrading programs. Some 40 years later, and after a long constant process of self-upgrading, VES is now home to 350,000 people who do not suffer from lack of basic services and infrastructure, or of

shortness of political voice (Read Annex 6) (Bartesaghi Koc, 2014: 1-7; Azcueta, 2003: 20-42).

The notion of incorporating communities into urban planning was influenced by sociologists Patrick Geddes and Lewis Mumford, and applied to the field of informal settlements by the educator Paulo Freire and the psychosociologist Kurt Lewin (Fisher, 2001: 10-21). Through community participation and organization, settlers influence resource allocation, planning, design, implementation, monitoring and maintenance policies. That is, dwellers are present at all upgrading stages, with more or less intensity depending on their needs, interests and skills. As it is the case in the VES Plan, these elements must be complemented by a self-help model, in which the funding entity acts as a provider and a technical advisor, with most of the upgrading being performed by the community itself (Calderón Arcilla, 2008: 33). This action offered the opportunity to change the dynamics between the community and the authorities: paternalism was overcome and interaction on a more equal foot was fostered (Ruster & Imparato, 2003: 9). Also, devoid of the influence of momentary political climates, VES’ bottom-up approach ensured sustainable and positive city changes. Thus, it is relevant for slum upgrading strategies to involve communities: dwellers stop seeing themselves as victims to become active protagonists in their own development (Morgan, 2011: 10).

The example of VES illustrates that when the allocation of public resources is based on decisions made at the grassroots level––also known as ‘participatory budgeting’––, people partake to good purpose, as they are going to see their real needs materialized (Dowbor, 2016: 31). This automatically generates political appropriation. Communication and information channels established, politics and polis are reconciled (Balbim, 2016: 22). A participatory planning approach enables authorities, promoting agencies, and communities to cooperate and jointly find solutions, instead of working in a detached, segregated fashion (Bartesaghi Koc, 2014: 7). Through these channels, communities can more effectively voice their demands. In the case of VES, there is a strong and highly-organized CBO (the Self-Managed Urban Community of Villa El Salvador, or CUAVES25) that knows the workings of political and governmental mechanisms. In this manner, this CBO can directly communicate with the authorities, exerting significant pressure (Ruster & Imparato, 2003: 431-433). The result of this acquired political voice is that people are capacitated to make the necessary demands to improve their quality of life (e.g., funds and technical advice for building infrastructure) (Stein, 2001: 33).

In consequence, a bottom-up approach increases the accuracy and cost-efficiency of the upgrading actions. As a general rule, informal areas pose a great challenge to urban planners and decision-makers, due to their intricate social implications and their proven impact on the economy, spatial growth and evolution of cities (Bartesaghi Koc, 2014: 1). Applying participatory planning to slum upgrading renders the identification of needs easier, and public resources spending is optimized. Community

25 The official name is in Spanish: La Comunidad Urbana Autogestionaria de Villa El Salvador, CUAVES.

participation has been shown to also reduce costs, mainly due to the settlers’ contributions in kind, labor and materials, which in turn revitalizes the local economy. Given the participation of the community in the different stages of the project, new habits of control emerge. In VES, diverse communal activities (e.g., communal work, a street paving scheme, or feeding centers) were carried out, and regular audits were established to ensure total transparency and accountability (Ruster & Imparato, 2003: 447). One of these communal activities in VES is the cooperative ownership of land, an ancient Peruvian tradition dating back to the Incas (Bartesaghi Koc, 2014: 5). A very positive aspect of local participation is that it cannot be divorced from the respect of local culture and traditions, which in turn contributes to the sustainability, integration, and self-esteem of the community.

Several factors should be taken into account in order to best apply a participatory scheme to slum upgrading. For the community to participate successfully, it needs a decentralized political environment. In fact, Latin America has been witnessing a wave of decentralization that could vastly benefit slum upgrading. The wonders of decentralization are rooted in the notion of subsidiarity. Given capacity and geographical constraints, local governments can implement more tailored solutions than national authorities are able to. Decentralization is relevant to slum upgrading insofar as communities become integrated and their neighborhoods are upgraded in a more sustainable and cohesive manner (Ruster & Imparato, 2003: 8). Alongside the support of the local authorities, slum areas also require highly organized CBOs. This is the case of VES, which has been organized by CUAVES since 1971. Given the complexity present in VES––which is common to all slums––, outsiders need the community to inform the process. The solid VES’ CBO has so far been able to produce impressive results: no more does the settlement suffer from a lack of basic services, Lima’s metro system has reached the area, and literacy and electrification rates are well above the Peruvian average (King & Abbot, 2016).

However, when it comes to who should take part in community participation the answer is not as obvious as ‘everyone’. Inviting all community members to take part is unmanageable, so methods for fair, rotating representation must be designed from the onset. In order to create an effective representative system, learning about the community is paramount. Using GIS technologies may simplify the process (Calderón Arcilla, 2008: 36). In the case of VES, the presence of CUAVES preceded all slum upgrading actions. It was the upgrading plan which was designed according to the particularities of that CBO and its community. In line with this, working through existing CBOs is essential. These actors have key contacts, networks and influence in the community that should not be undermined by the imposition of external organizers (Stein, 2001: 34). As it happens in VES, all initiatives are implemented through CUAVES to make the most of participation. Then, the CBO carries out the task of boosting community participation at large: it analyzes which who will perform which task best, and so it assigns (TECHO, 2015: 136). Moreover, one should remark the importance

of preparing in-coming professionals in working with CBOs in a manner that favors development from below––i.e., to turn them into self-sustaining communities (Bartesaghi Koc, 2014: 5).

However, the organization capacity of VES does not exist in the majority of informal settlements, but it must be encouraged in order to create in the people a sense of ownership towards their habitat (Calderón Arcilla, 2008: 33). The Integral Development Plan for VES demonstrates that community participation alone does not suffice; it needs the support of a slum upgrading program to give structure to the transformation. What was achieved through the combination of a slum upgrading program and community participation in VES sets a precedent on how to go beyond the physical to create more integrated, emphatic societies. The upgrading of a community is difficultly achieved if the people concerned do not inform, take part, nor approve of the process.

8.3. Access to credit, transparency and good governance: PRODEL (Nicaragua) During the 1990s, the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) conceived a new generation of slum upgrading initiatives to reach the lowest-income quintiles. Most often, Latin America’s poorest cannot meet the eligibility economic criteria to qualify for slum-upgrading assistance. With the purpose of reversing this trend for the urban poor, Sida designed and supported initiatives for the region, among which stands out the Local Development Program26 (PRODEL) in Nicaragua. This program was implemented in 1994 with a reach of six Nicaraguan cities. Due to its success, it is now a foundation, which extended its scope to reach thirteen municipalities. So far it has benefited more than 78,000 families. The PRODEL is based on the principle of self-help: it does not carry out any work, but provides assistance and support to settlers and authorities alike (Stein, 2001: 11-14). Through an innovative financial scheme, the PRODEL eventuated in sustainable access to credit, good governance and transparency. Its achievements give evidence of the magnitude that these three elements can make upon slum upgrading programs (Read Annex 6) (Sida, 2005: 1-12).

The program offers three types of loans (basic infrastructure, home upgrading and micro- enterprise). This loan structure generates a revolving fund of the initial $7 million invested by Sida: families receive a loan, use it to cover their needs, and then repay it by instalments to PRODEL (Becerra et al., 2005: 12-15). Through this system and its benefits, the PRODEL solves the debate ‘loans vs. subsidies’, so widely pondered when addressing poverty. The program opts for loans as they are more sustainable. As opposed to subsidies, loans do not replace the household’s possibilities of saving and indebtedness, nor do they impose a life beyond people’s own means (Gonzales Arrieta, 1999: 160). In order to reach the often-overlooked lowest-income groups, the PRODEL establishes a selection criteria consonant with the socio-economic realities of such groups. In doing this, it acknowledges that the state and funding institutions do not have an obligation––or the capacity––to

26 The official name is in Spanish: Programa de Infraestructura con Fondos no Reembolsables, Programa de Desarrollo Local, PRODEL.

provide housing to all. Instead, what these actors are obliged to is guaranteeing that all families have access to market opportunities on a more equal footing (Ibid.: 159-160). Such rethinking of what funding should encompass ensues increased governability and transparency.

Even to this day, Latin America at large is affected by a clear governability deficit. This includes weak institutions, deficient mechanisms for citizen participation, clientelism, patronage, and corruption, to name a few (Irazábal, 2009: 27). In the context of post-revolutionary Nicaragua this was even more widespread: two decades of war and political polarization had left a country in an unstable and critical condition (Stein, 2011: 12). That is why the PRODEL had to pay special attention to governability through institutional development, technical assistance, and national reconciliation. In the context of slum upgrading, good governance is fundamental to attain effectiveness and efficiency. There is no better way to think of good governance than through outcomes. Due to a rigorous financial framework (i.e., strict loan system with a low rate of arrears) and the strong Sida supervision throughout the upgrading, the PRODEL achieved a scale of upgraded infrastructure nearly twice as much than originally planned. Furthermore, a common slum upgrading methodology was established for all majors and political parties, which ensured that slum upgrading continued unhindered by changes in political leadership. Institutions were strengthened through funding and capacity-training. In addition to implementing anti-corruption and decentralization strategies, it also promoted that power and responsibilities be shared with the beneficiary communities (Ibid.: 12-28).

The combination of a self-help loan system and of increased good governance yields enhanced transparency in slum upgrading mechanisms. Transparency is relevant because it ensures cost- effectiveness and heals the relationship between communities and authorities by building on trust. As it is the case of the PRODEL, loan application procedures must be transparent and fully understood by beneficiaries-to-be. Criteria for selection should objective, and based on measurable, impersonal factors (Gonzales Arrieta, 1999: 161). The self-help, participatory approach applied throughout all upgrading stages enables communities to control and audit municipalities. For example, CBOs participate in the evaluation of the project, monitor the investment of funds, and take part in budget preparation. With municipalities better reporting to communities, national reconciliation and community cohesion are fostered. Furthering comprehension, transparency allows, on one side, for communities to really grasp the role of local authorities, their real limitations and financial resources; and, on the other, for authorities to listen, work with, and support slum residents (Stein, 1999: 22-31).

All things considered, the PRODEL transformed many slums in Nicaragua by providing a solid bureaucratic buttress. As exemplified by the Nicaraguan model, in order to trigger effective results, a slum upgrading program must ensure access to credit, propitiate good governance, and aim at transparency in all actions and at all levels (Stein, 1999: 32). Together with security of tenure, basic

services, and community participation, these elements constitute the base of the pyramid: they make up the foundation for unleashing the vast potential of the urban poor.

8.4. Cost recovery and budget control mechanisms: Self-Management Program (Mexico) The upgrading of slums in Tijuana pioneered an approach that delegates on communities for the management, execution and partial financing of projects. The Self-Management Slum Upgrading Program was implemented in 1990 at the municipal level of Tijuana. Its mandate encompasses slum and home upgrading, land regularization, basic services and infrastructure provision. The program, still ongoing, has become a key element of Tijuana’s poverty reduction strategy and improved the quality of life of many––even though most achievements are only physical. It encouraged the city’s squatter communities to actively and autonomously manage the upgrading project cycle. This generated very sustainable dynamics. Not only did thus Tijuanan slum dwellers become protagonists of their own development, but they also became well-versed in budget administration and in the real constraints of project-financing (Read Annex 6) (Ruster & Imparato, 2003: 397-400).

Budget control and cost recovery are essential elements to ensure the sustainability of the achieved upgrading. By applying measures to keep the project within budget, one ensures that the project does not stall for a ‘sudden’ lack of funding, and that cost recovery is more easily attained (Van Dijk et al., 2014: 209). Meanwhile, cost recovery overcomes paternalistic tendencies in slum upgrading, as well as it guarantees that informal settlements develop sustainably (Ruster & Imparato, 2003: 9). In this sense, Tijuana’s Self-Management Program operates at a very high level of cost-recovery: communities (through self-management committees) are informed and included at all stages of the upgrading program. Being informed entails that they are in the know of real costs and available funds at all times. For its part, being included––besides involving them in decision-making––requires communities to make a financial effort. In the case of Tijuana, for the Municipality to partially subsidize the project, slum residents need to contribute at least 30% of the project’s total value. This ensures mainly four outcomes: First, costly solutions are avoided, and therefore the project is kept within budget. Second, the Government only subsidizes those works that communities really need/want. Third, communities develop an early appreciation of each project, which in turn enhances their readiness to maintain them in the long-term. And fourth, dwellers learn that development cannot be obtained for free but as a result of their own efforts, which are then correspondingly rewarded (Anguiano & Ordoñez, 1994: 69-74). Moreover, Tijuanan slum dwellers further ensure cost-recovery of the program by conducting most upgrading works themselves (Ruster & Imparato, 2003: 70).

The principle of cost recovery lies in the idea that a real cash flow is generated and that the investments for upgraded services/infrastructure can be paid back through returns (Van Dijk et al., 2014: 209). However, making the communities commit to full cost-recovery would be quixotic: slum

dwellers operate in the informal sector in order to avoid such costs. This is why cost recovery mechanisms should be smart. Squatter communities need to learn the benefits of entering into formality and the advantages of contributing a share of total costs. One of the merits of slum improvement is that its completion, if done right, ensures cost recovery: comprehensively upgraded squatter areas will bring heightened economic profits both to the community itself and to the city (and country) at large. Tijuana’s upgrading model shows that, when integrated and informed, slum dwellers are willing to pay for services, and that their inclusion in project financing turns slum upgrading more affordable and sustainable (Calderón Arcilla, 2008: 28). The fact that 77,000 lives have been improved through this program demonstrates the effectiveness and weight of cost recovery and budget control mechanisms in slum upgrading (Ruster & Imparato, 2003: 397).

8.5. Political will and social capital: Rosario Habitat Program (Argentina) The Rosario Habitat Program is particularly special due to its strong focus on the social dimension of upgrading; in particular, it is driven by political will and generates social capital among slum communities. Rosario is Argentina’s third biggest city and, as such, it has received much of the immigration flows that cannot afford a porteño life. Before the program started in 2002, Rosario had the highest incidence of slums (13%) in the country and poverty was there extreme. Still operating to this day, the Rosario Habitat Program has developed a comprehensive and integrational model that has qualitatively and consistently bettered the lives of 5,251 people. However, its scope has been limited, reaching only 1/10 of Rosario’s slum dwellers27. The Habitat Program’s success lies notwithstanding in its combination of physical and social slum upgrading initiatives and in the interaction and complementarity among these (Annex 6) (Saborido, 2006: 57-68; Garzia et al., 2014: 1-18).

The Rosario Habitat Program gives evidence of the considerable bearing that political will has in slum upgrading. All the elements analyzed in foregoing and ensuing sections would stall in the absence of political will or in case of political unwillingness. When political will is neutral, progress can be attained but only slowly and ineffectively (Ruster & Imparato, 2003: 227). Yet, a strong political will favoring the upgrading of the city’s slums, the process becomes smooth and bears exotic fruits. In Rosario, the local government has been making constant efforts to update and upgrade its slum assessment policies. Indeed, one of its innovative lines that local authorities show readiness to make self-critical assessments. For example, on a regular basis, they analyze available municipal instruments to address urban and housing policies, work on transparency levels, and have the communities audit their performance (both financial and results-based) (Saborido, 2006: 67). As shown in the Rosario upgrading program, local authorities are the political entities with most potential to fully comprehend

27 This sparks off the ‘quantity vs. quality’ debate, which is fundamental to be considered when conceiving slum upgrading programs. In the present era, when so much importance is attached to sustainability, we argue––based on our research––that quantity should always be aimed for, need it be at the expenses of quantity.

the realities of an area and the needs of its inhabitants. Therefore, although political will should emerge at all political levels, special emphasis should be put on local activity (TECHO, 2015: 136).

Among all the benefits yielded by strong political will, the Rosario Habitat Program epitomizes the meaningfulness of social capital. The connection between the two concepts is that both are based on trust. The concept of ‘social capital’ condenses civic virtue, social cohesion, solidarity, collective action, capacity development, and community building. It is inherent in social relationships, based in trust and cooperation, and can certainly be fostered by connectivity, security, identity and diversity (Vilar & Cartes, 2016: 58). Applied to slum upgrading, social capital constitutes an anchor for sustainable development. Urban development theory provides the rationale explaining why slum upgrading and social capital work so well together. Experts on this field have acknowledged that the design and form of cities and buildings influence the way people interact and bond with each other; i.e., urbanism can promote community building and, therefore, give rise to social capital (Moobela et al., 2009: 257). The way urban design can facilitate and allow the growth of social capital is, for instance, by retaining people longer at public places, engaging them in continuous social interaction (Vilar & Cartes, 2016: 59). Based on solid political will, the Rosario Habitat Program generates social capital through strengthened institutions, community participation at all stages, the creation of employment opportunities, education, and cultural activities. The combination of these initiatives triggers an approach to slum upgrading whose achievements are much more interweaved; ergo, more resilient, strong and autonomous. But, above all, Rosario has been efficient in generating social capital because it does not conceive the people and their involvement as a means but as the end itself.

One of the most palpable benefits of promoting social capital is that, it has been proven that in places where social capital is high its inhabitants tend to invest more time and efforts on the community on the perception that others will reciprocate. The pool of resources resulting from these actions represents a powerful instrument in slum upgrading. For example, it improves people’s health and happiness, boosts economic development, sets safe neighborhoods, and betters the communities’ relationships with the authorities (Moobela et al., 2009: 256-257). In this sense, Latin America has a comparative advantage: the region is profoundly oriented towards the family and the community, yet remaining an individualistic society. There, social ties and networks very often replace deficits in services and opportunities of different nature (Saracostti, 2007: 519). Thereby, by institutionalizing the promotion of social capital in slum upgrading practices, slum dwellers will acquire more confidence on the promoting institutions as well as on their own capacities.

The experience of the Rosario Habitat Program identifies a deep interrelation between the social, urban and economic dimensions of slum upgrading, whose stimulation it deems key. This model recognizes that generating social capital and political will, through civil society participation and the

strengthening of their capacities, is an effective approach for attaining substantial development. Political will is a guarantor of sustainable and integral development; while social capital ensures that achievements become autonomous and stable.

8.6. Sustainability and monitoring: Neighborhood Improvement Program (Bolivia) The slum situation in Bolivia is one of the most critical in the region, with 58% of Bolivian families living in informal housing (Habitat for Humanity, 2017). Up until the 1990s, the country’s approach to the slum question had been both inadequate and neglectful. From then onwards, however, the central government implemented decentralization measures and more integrated strategies, which yielded better results in slum upgrading28. Within this new trend, in 1998, the IDB and the Bolivian Government conjointly designed a new approach to upgrading: the PROVIVIENDA, a national program to improve Bolivia’s housing policy. It was composed of four subprograms29, of which the Neighborhood Improvement Subprogram (SMB30) undertook slum upgrading works. Ending in 2008, the SMB exemplifies achieved sustainability. Contributing to this, the program bore in mind the traditional and cultural diversity of the country at all times (Annex 6) (Rivas, 2007: 4-5).

In recent years, slum upgrading programs in Latin America have made considerable progress as more integrated approaches are adopted. However, sustainability is still the main challenge. The region undertakes multiple initiatives for the improvement of slums, and it is commonplace that, when observed some years into completion, results are found to be in decay (Mitlin, 2002: 176). Thereby, the region at large needs to place more efforts in attaining sustainable slum upgrading. Otherwise, all work becomes futile. As it is the case of Bolivia’s SMB, a program is sustainable when it generates permanent improvements and triggers a long-term development process (Ruster & Imparato, 2003: 42). Planning in sustainability requires addressing five dimensions31. First, the conservation of physical benefits. Second, the training and motivation of the community to spark lasting social development. Third, the economic growth of the area, aiming for self-sufficiency. Fourth, the optimization of the program’s funds. And fifth, the coalescence of all initiatives and works with the environment.

In terms of physical sustainability, the SMB teaches valuable lessons. For one thing, only once the community had convened and agreed on priorities did the works start. This ensured that the program only conducted initiatives needed by and adapted to the people. To illustrate, a significant share of the funds was invested in building community centers, which goes in line with Bolivia’s community tradition. Also important for the sustainability of physical achievements, dwellers were taught how to maintain results. Involved in the construction stage, the community automatically

28 E.g., Law 1551, known as People’s Participation Law (See Annex 4 for more information). 29 The Demand Subsidies Subprogram, the Subsidy Program for Endemic Areas of Chagas Disease, the Natural Disasters Subsidies Subprogram, and the Neighborhood Improvement Subprogram (FOPEVI 2009: 34). 30 Abbreviation for the original name of the program: Subprograma de Mejoramiento de Barrios. 31 Dimensions identified by the author from Satterthwaite, 2016: 99-118 and Ruster & Imparato, 2003: 42-43.

developed maintenance skills. In line with this, slum upgrading must always aim for initiatives that the people will be able to preserve in the longer term: expensive or complex enterprises are therefore to be avoided (Rivas, 2007: 18-26). Although only achieved in some of the 26 cities intervened by the SMB32––due to insufficient funding––, upgrading programs must become part of local development plans in order to have a legal framework ensuring continuity (Calderón Arcilla, 2008: 28).

The strong component of the SMB, however, was social development. In conceiving the communities as social catalysts, training and motivating them for social progress, social sustainability was attained. This was realized by fostering community participation and by teaching the community about the effects and responsibilities entailed in them participating. Initiatives on sexual education and gender equality helped to combat stereotypes thwarting social development. Also, by building community centers and paving sidewalks, interaction among residents was enhanced and social capital promoted. This resulted in a solid network of social support (e.g., childcare, collective works, health centers, etc.) that fostered the continuity of the upgrading (Rivas, 2007: 21-22). Nevertheless, the key for attaining social sustainability was the combination of social development with the adequate technical support. Experts prepared communities in planning, execution, financing, monitoring and maintenance of slum upgrading, as well as in social and economic development (Constance, 2005). The program completed, all these strategies had created momentum for the communities to autonomously explore further ways to improve (Winchester, 2005: 17).

Regarding economic sustainability, it is imperative for slum upgrading to sustain the capacity of residents to draw on the market, both individually and collectively (Mitlin, 2002: 177). Program funds should not be merely spent; they should be invested. The SMB had several components illustrating this course of action. In particular, the Bolivian program encouraged handicrafts production as well as training on different areas (e.g., plumbing, gardening, electricity and construction). Interviews conducted by the national coordinator of the SMB, Sara Rivas, indicate that many people could later access the labor market or earn extra income due to these acquired skills (Rivas, 2007: 27-53). In addition, the training that people received also strengthened their ability to voice their needs to the authorities. In conjunction with social sustainability, these economically sustainable actions also fostered local commerce initiatives and even tourism (Ibid.: 21-22).

For its part, a financially sustainable program is one that creates within itself the conditions to secure and optimize the available funds––without requiring extra capital. Achievements need to be affordable both to communities and to the local government/development agency providing funds (Mitlin, 2002: 175). The SMB attained this through a transparent public tendering system for selecting

32 Only the wealthiest municipalities, as La Paz, were able to integrate the program as a line of action of its municipal development plan.

the beneficiary municipalities. Since joining in the program was voluntary, the municipalities that decided to take part were thorough observants of the requirement of contributing 30-40% of the program’s value. Complementing this, the training the community received was also critical for financial sustainability. First, because the labor they contributed considerably reduced costs. And second, because such training taught them to require the upgrading of elements that were of utmost necessity, which, in turn, were maintained more readily (Brakarz, 2002: 118; Winchester, 2005: 17).

A pioneering aspect of the SMB was its disposition to protect the environment. Given the climatologic conditions in some Bolivian cities, the number of trees and green areas is there very limited. In addition, urbanization very often deprives city areas of vegetation. Thus, the SMB conducted a study to see which trees thrived best in each of the national climates, and carried out reforestation and tree planting initiatives. These actions also addressed risks of erosion and landslide in informal settlements. Such projects increased the environmental sustainability of the cities at large, and improved the quality of life in and the aesthetics of the areas intervened (Rivas, 2007: 14). At present, communities feel proud about their neighborhoods and more esteemed by their governments. Workshops on hygiene, citizenship and environmental protection were also conducted (Ibid.: 27-53).

In slum upgrading terms, environmental sustainability refers to the ability of an ecosystem to remain undamaged after the improvement cycle is completed (Mitlin, 2002: 174). Latin America, as most developing regions, faces this task from a position comparative disadvantage. Rapid urbanization has led to lacking infrastructure, informal settlements in vulnerable areas, resource depletion, pollution, inadequate management of air and solid waste, deficient mobility policies, and human habits that aggravate these challenges (Ezquiaga Arquitectura, 2015: 10). Such inefficient subsystems hinder the capacity of the entire region to become sustainable, a situation that will only become more harmful (Arcidiacono et al., 2017: 357). It is thereby imperative that Latin America conceives far-reaching slum upgrading programs that strive for environmental sustainability. This will turn urban planners and communities into a sort of ‘doctors of the city’ (Mostafavi & Doherty, 2016: 10).

Having discussed the five dimensions of sustainable slum upgrading, it is essential that programs also involve mechanisms for their maintenance and monitoring. Again, the SMB sets a good example on how to do so. In the Bolivian case, maintenance was planned between both the community and planner designers before implementation began. This enabled both parties to prepare for future responsibilities and learn the best way to maintain elements they had seen throughout construction. Also during its planning stage, the SMB designed its future methods for monitoring. This anticipation allowed to better record information, which improved monitoring results and the extracting of lessons during and after slum upgrading (Brakarz, 2002: 115-121).

All things considered, sustainability is the finest indicator of slum upgrading success. The

accomplishments of the SMB show that sustainability––in all its dimensions––has enormous impact on the larger city’s competitiveness and development, as more investment is attracted, more productive jobs are created, and more cohesion is generated among citizens. Monitoring and maintenance strategies are the medium to ensure lasting achievements. This model, set by the SMB, was legitimized by the further development that took place in Bolivian cities after the program’s completion33.

8.7. Strong intermediary structure: Popular Habitat Program (Costa Rica) During the 1980s, Costa Rica suffered a serious economic crisis that exacerbated the country’s soaring housing deficit and elevated the number of informal settlements. Up until that period, the slum problem had been only addressed through subsidized resettlement. The result was that when squatters were moved into subsidized housing areas, new families reoccupied the slums almost straightaway. In addition, national housing subsidies never reached the poorest. Funds were almost often hijacked by middle and lower-middle classes while lowest-income groups were left excluded. Thus, in 1987, Costa Rican authorities acted to reverse these vicious patterns with the setting-up of the Foundation for the Promotion of Housing (FUPROVI). Given the dire economic situation, the country received a development aid package ($14 million) from Sida––to be managed by FUPROVI. With these funds, the Government and foundation set in motion the Popular Habitat Program to address the slum question. This program pioneered the use of an intermediary structure in slum upgrading: FUPROVI acted as a mediator between the government and the people, enhancing transparency and efficiency, and yielding stupenduous results (Annex 6) (Ruster & Imparato, 2003: 65-69; Sida, 1997: 216-231).

Plan formulation and implementation is usually very politicized in Latin America (i.e., clientelism, populism and patronage). The cities in the region are however making progress in good governance. In parallel, many slum upgrading programs are including a component of institutional strengthening (Irazábal, 2009: 27). By setting up an intermediary structure for slum upgrading actions, unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles are avoided and the results magnified. In most slum upgrading scenarios, there is a wide range of stakeholders: residents, public authorities, public and private companies, landowners, donors, and NGOs. All of these require a non-partisan entity that brings them all together, sets strategic partnerships among them, and allows each to give their best; all while protecting the interests of the whole and of each party (Ruster & Imparato, 2003: 8).

In the case of the Popular Habitat Program, the FUPROVI constituted an independent structure that eased communications between all stakeholders. After thirty years, the program is still in place. So far, it has increased the flexibility and efficiency, strengthened community organization and participation, built the communities’ capacities, and helped improve the lives of 80,000 Costa Ricans. Although intermediary structures can take many shapes, the way the FUPROVI works is by enabling

33 For instance, the renown Barrios de Verdad Program (‘Truthful Neighborhoods Program’) that gave place to more visual and aesthetic slum upgrading.

slum dwellers to access the national subsidy system. First, FUPROVI loans the families money from the Swedish aid package. Then, once the families have obtained the national housing subsidy from the government, they pay FUPROVI back. In this manner, squatters are integrated into the national financial system, and FUPROVI keeps a rotating, revolving fund, which allows it to continuously help more families (Ruster & Imparato, 2003: 381-385; FUPROVI, 2017). The Popular Habitat Program also makes special allocations to institutional development, technical support and capacity building, in order to guarantee sustainability and future self-sufficiency (Biblioteca C+FS, 2000).

The FUPROVI model illustrates that having an independent institutional setup exclusively dedicated to coordinate and manage slum upgrading programs bears more fruitful results. Intermediaries permit to create a technical body of know-how tailored to the country or area where it operates. Involved from the start, an intermediary structure can develop an ordained information- gathering system, which serves for monitoring present endeavors as well as for extracting lessons for improved performance. Such systematized agent is to be composed of technical experts that enhance all stages of slum upgrading, without incurring in extra costs: their salaries come out of the revolving fund (Ruster & Imparato, 2003: 65-69). Additionally, the Costa Rican experience shows that intermediary structures are critical when community participation and organization are weak or insufficient, as they possess the necessary expertise to trigger community action (Irazábal, 2009: 98).

The FUPROVI model gave place to institutional innovation, transparency and efficiency. The continuity generated by its revolving fund yielded autonomy from partisan politics. This was all the more beneficial for the communities, who could enjoy constant assistance in improving their homes and developing their communities. Moreover, the well-functioning foundation has produced clear standardized procedures and refined managerial and information systems (Sida, 1997: 218). In its thirty-year trajectory, both the FUPROVI and Popular Habitat Program have enriched Costa Rica’s results in slum upgrading, demonstrating the relevance of strong intermediary structures.

8.8. Integral and multidisciplinary approach: PUI Nororiental Initiative (Colombia) The slum question in Colombia is one of the most alarming in the region. Its long history of internal armed conflict generated one of the highest global rates of internally displaced people34 (Magalhães, 2016: 63). This situation critically affected the urbanization process of the country. Also, the drug cartel’s demand for rural land during the 1980s gave place to additional rural-urban migration. The overall effect of such circumstances has been burgeoning numbers of informal settlements across the country. Against this background, several Colombian cities started to make progress in addressing the situation, among which Medellin stands out for its revolutionary development capacity. The present Medellin highly differs from the dangerous, narcoterrorism-affected, poverty-stricken city of the 1990s

34 Between 1985 and 2009, conflict between the government and the guerrillas displaced 4.9 million people.

(Ibid.: 67). This transformation was due both to the PRIMED35 (1993-2004) and to the more recent Integrated Urban Program (PUI) (2004-2011). The PUI could only take place after the springboard of the PRIMED, which addressed basic needs, infrastructure deficits, slum upgrading, land tenure regularization, and the relocation of families occupying areas of high geographic risk. This set a solid base for the PUI to enter the scene. This program is based on the premise that integral, interconnected, emblematic programs within informal settlements, connected with social undertakings, will have a tremendous impact on the lives of the poor (Ibid.: 77-82; Osorio Gaviria, 2015: 1-20).

The full PUI intervened in each of the city’s slum pockets by applying this integral, multidisciplinary approach. It formulated programs that were tailored to the potential and challenges of each particular slum area. The PUI Nororiental Initiative––our focus of study––was the pilot project of the PUI model. The nororiental zone––linked to the Medellin cartel and paramilitary groups––was selected because of its alarmingly low HDI levels and high homicide rates (Calderón Arcilla, 2008: 8). The whole program epitomizes an integral and multidisciplinary intervention: it consists of strategically interconnected projects that coalesce in transforming the many dimensions of slums. Composed of physical, social, institutional, cultural, and psychological interventions, the PUI is based on the concept of ‘social urbanism’ (Annex 6) (Magalhães, 2016: 77).

Due to its comprehensive character, initiatives as the PUI are the best first steps into the notion of ‘placemaking’. Comprehension of the particularities of the place and acknowledgment of the multi- dimensionality of resident’s needs unveils a whole new realm for slum upgrading. For the slum problem is not solely made of physical components, but also of social, institutional, cultural, and psychological elements. The expectations created by the life in the slum determine the behavior of its residents. As slums are not urbanistically conceived for community living––and “places construct people” (Holloway & Hubbard, 2001: 7)––, the hopes and behaviors of dwellers are merely a by- product of the places they live in. This contributes negatively to the vicious cycle in which they are trapped. As economists Max-Neef, Elizalde and Hopenhayn would say, the life in the slum is a clear example of a self-fulfilling prophecy (Max-Neef et al., 2010: 19). Therefore, the only way to tackle such conundrum is by means of an integral and multidisciplinary approach.

In order to enable the combination of slum upgrading and placemaking do its magic, a program must, first and foremost, avoid overregulating the organic life that blossomed in the absence of public support (Risom & Madriz, 2018). The process of intervening a slum area must identify strengths and weaknesses, and work along the place’s potential. To that end, planners need a proper understanding of the characteristics of slums and their inhabitants (Chopra et al., 2016: 4). This is best accomplished by integrating and respecting the community at all stages; not by merely consulting decisions with

35 The Integral Program of Improvement of Subnormal Districts [official name: Programa Integral de Mejoramiento de Barrios Informales].

them but by planning everything with them. The PUI attained this scenario through the so-called ‘problem identification’, ‘prioritization’ and ‘imagination’ workshops, which actively involved community members throughout the program cycle (Magalhães, 2016: 81). The PUI Nororiental Initiative illustrates how to work along an informal settlement’s potential. Since formal cities already cover all anthropological needs and face no hurdle, the program planned for the integration of the slums into the adjacent formal grid (e.g., through improved public transport networks, cultural initiatives and increased institutional presence). This brought more equal opportunities to all citizens (Calderón Arcilla, 2008: 56). Hence, informal mechanisms were not substituted by formal structures, but rather were complemented by them. Such approach facilitates a multidisciplinary scheme, enabling all interventions to be buttressed by broader formal structures (e.g., public and private companies) (Ibid.: 30). Additionally, all of the PUI’s components––i.e., physical, social, institutional, cultural, and psychological––forged more integrated social networks that in turn fostered community building, development and sustainability (Ibid.: 56).

A major innovation of the PUI was its breaking of the exclusion cycle that ensnares underprivileged neighborhoods. By means of an integral and multidisciplinary approach it tackled all deficits at once, attaining robust achievements that bolstered one another. To illustrate, the physical interventions of the program significantly increased the quality of life in Medellin’s nororiental zone. Projects such as home upgrading, health clinics construction or piping systems positively affected the physical health of slum dwellers. For its part, social, cultural and psychological interventions like local economic development, music or dance promotion, and more colorful and qualitative infrastructure had a valuable impact on the mental health of community members. Literacy rates, education and culture were heightened by pedagogic workshops and the construction of libraries (Section 8.10) (Calderón Arcilla, 2008: 105-108). The multidisciplinary nature of the program permitted to enhance community participation. Solid participation originated more positive relationships between the community and the authorities, rendering a more humanized process. Moreover, safety and security improved as communities integrally developed in owning their own progress. In fact, PUI’s new facilities are characterized by cleanliness and absence of vandalism. Last, such comprehensive transformation attracted private and international investment in the area (Magalhães, 2016: 82).

As has been noted, slum upgrading should be integral and encompass various disciplines. The PUI Nororiental Initiative illustrates that only through investment in all dimensions can slum upgrading overcome all shortcomings and tackle the root causes of poverty. Another important accomplishment of an integral, multidisciplinary approach is that it plants the seeds for placemaking to sprout.

8.9. Bridging the gap between a development project & social progress: PROUME (Guatemala) The upgrading of El Mezquital, Guatemala constitutes a success story in itself. It occurred in the framework of the Guatemalan Civil War (1960-1996). Carried out by the PROUME36 (1993-1997), upgrading works started in a penurious panorama. There were virtually no basic services or infrastructure in this area of Guatemala City. However, the high levels of community organization caught the eye of a WB mission. For this reason, El Mezquital became the recipient of a $14-million aid development package from the WB, to which UNICEF also contributed (Ruster & Imparato, 2003: 83-85; Cabanas et al., 87-106). What makes this program special was its bridging of the gap between a development project and social progress. Twenty years after the completion of the program, the community has internalized a pro-development attitude. To this day, they continue their own development despite the many hurdles they have found in the road37 (Annex 6) (Drummond, 2005: 28).

A development project that does not turn into social progress ignores the human dimension of it all, and, as a result, does not result in placemaking. Drawing inspiration from Ruster & Imparato’s “bridging of the gap between a development project and a social process” (Ruster & Imparato, 2003: 95), we consider that reaching social progress involves a full penetration of the program into the community. That is to say, that the program interacts at all stages and from all its components with the people and with their complex agglomeration of culture, internal dynamics, demands, vested interests, expectations, and perspectives about the upgrading. Therefore, essential in this bridging are the community participation and community building elements.

The attention given to building this bridge is grounded on the idea that slum dwellers are often their own main opponents. According to the concept of ‘placemaking’, the areas people live in shape their identities. Hence, the notion of bridging the gap entails a strong psychological component. As did the PROUME, slum upgrading programs must encourage slum residents about their inherent value and transformation potential (Drummond Lewis, 2005: 27). In order to properly achieve this, the PROUME identified the social architecture of the community and worked along residents by filling in the gaps. In addition, the program diligently removed obstacles for future social progress. This aspect is very important in bridging the gap, since habits and stereotypes can hamper the autonomy acquired through physical development. In this line, the PROUME attached great importance to fighting male chauvinistic stereotypes and developing of family ties. It also endeavored to make progress in sexual education, as the country suffers from big rates of HIV/AIDS. Moreover, the program gave a central

36 Program for the Urbanization of El Mezquital [official name: Programa de Urbanización de El Mezquital]. 37 With the turn of the millennium, El Mezquital witnessed the increase of violence by the presence of Mara 18 and Mara Salvatrucha cadres. This was very detrimental to the development of the community. Some residents blamed the PROUME’s focus on community organization for the convening of youth who then joined the Maras. Against this background of increased violence, the community, demonstrating their solid organizational base, established group patrols, organized workshops to teach young people about their value to the community, and set artistic and cultural activities for them to participate in. Violence has since then decreased significantly (Batres et al., 2006: 27-114).

role to women empowerment: it promoted female leadership, provided legal assistance to combat gender-based violence, and constructed a center for women’s needs (Bartres et al., 2006: 27-114).

All things considered, the PROUME was successful in creating the appropriate conditions for social and autonomous progress. The bridging of the gap cannot be separated from placemaking. The gap bridged, communities change their attitudes about the future and acquire the skills to fulfill their aspirations. All the elements analyzed in previous sections are essential to achieve this. Nonetheless, for placemaking and slum upgrading to reach their full potential an additional aspect is needed–– equity, esteem and inclusion––which will be discussed in the following section.

8.10. Equity, esteem and inclusion: Library Parks, Schools and Metrocable System (Colombia) The tip of Meléndez’s Pyramid is ‘Equity, Esteem and Inclusion’. These last elements were thoroughly inspired by Medellin’s amalgam of Library Parks, educational institutions and Metrocable38 system (2001-ongoing). The three projects are part of a strategy within the broader framework of the PUI, which conceives urbanism as an instrument for social inclusion (Section 8.8). Within this context, the three projects carried out qualitative and appealing works that linked the upgraded-slums with the broader city. The benefits of such initiatives were precisely the enhancing of equity, esteem and inclusion among Medellin’s slum residents (Esteves, 2012: 157-166). Medellin’s Secretary of Civic Culture and Social Development, Jorge Melguizo, delineated the rationale of these projects in two sentences: “the public sphere as a guarantee, as a possibility of inclusion and equity”, and “the best spaces, the best possibilities for those who had nothing39.” (Melguizo, 2011) (Annex 6).

As of 2018, the three projects together have given place to 9 Library Parks, 10 educational institutions, and 3 Metrocable lines (with 2 more lines under construction). As the images in Annex 6 show, the Library Parks and educational institutions are located in the poorest areas of the metropolis, while the Metrocable system links these zones and their new facilities to the city center, and vice versa. Such network creates a sense of belonging among the poorest quintiles: it gives them more equitable opportunities, fights social stigma, and enhances social cohesion throughout the city (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2015: 59-61). Slum upgrading that fails to provide public spaces, opportunities for culture and education, and adequate public transportation, can yield breeding grounds for health and social problems (Magalhães, 2016: 7). When the bridging of the gap and the benefits of placemaking are ignored, development cannot be sustainable. Solving the slum question necessitates the transformation of the political culture, which will hardly be attained if interventions are only focused on infrastructure and on the poorest urban areas. As does the Medellin strategy, slum upgrading must target culture, education and public transport citywide, to realize society's mutual comprehension (Ibid.: 37).

38 Name of the cable car system of Medellin. 39 Translation by the authors, original at Melguizo, 2011.

Distressingly, most slum upgrading practices and housing policies in Latin America have not yet internalized the relevance of qualitative culture, education and public transportation. Thus, they fail to consider a vital socio-spatial dimension. Instead, a quantitative vision predominates in the region’s urban planning, resulting in a deepening segregation and denigration of the urban poor (Ibid.: 7). To reverse this condition, slum upgrading programs must include elements that foster equity, esteem and inclusion. Hence, we propose that culture, education, and adequate public transport systems as excellent means to accomplish such endeavor.

Public spaces are the ideal ground for the ‘right to the city’ to fully realize itself. They are sites of coexistence and sharing; channels for expressing culture and “exercising citizenship” (Berney, 2010: 554). Medellin’s 9 Library Parks have produced new axles of growth within the city’s poorest areas (Esteves, 2012: 163). They conform a sociocultural development strategy: public spaces generate interaction on a more equal footing, unlocking prejudice and social stigma. The spontaneous meetings that occurr at these places also contribute to commercial dynamism and business strategies linked to local tourism. These sites––very esthetic in character––have become touristic attractions, welcoming ‘formal’ citizens and foreigners. This, in turn, has broken the cycle of fear and insecurity prevalent in these areas, both inwardly and outwardly. Insecurity and violence were combated through coexistence, which is precisely what public spaces promote (Melguizo, 2011). Thus, the Library Parks have conferred a new image to previously stigmatized communities by dignifying them (Esteves, 2012: 165). Moreover, the sense of pride generated by such places fosters social capital generation (Vilar & Cartes, 2016: 64). In terms of urbanism, open streets and public spaces enable to integrate slums into the formal city (Garau, 2015: 44). In the specific context of the slums, public spaces provide generous benefits. For instance, the poorest citizens of Medellin do not have spacious homes, access to clubs or recreation spaces other than what their neighborhoods may offer. As attested by residents of Commune 13, Library Parks have reduced children’s exposure to broken homes, violent family environments, or constant television recreation. Now they can spend more time in the open and in more pedagogic atmospheres, as are libraries (Berney, 2010: 543). Ultimately, public spaces make urban life easier and transcend into the emotional of people to generate feelings of equity, esteem and inclusion.

Slum upgrading programs in Latin America should not ignore the importance of public space in their planning. Especially when the region is characterized by an ancient tradition of public space. For example, dating back to pre-Columbian times, plazas are essential parts of urban life and symbolize civic authority (Irazábal, 2009: 38). Latin Americans see public space as key points of encounter necessary for democracy (Berney, 2010: 540). Nevertheless, most slum upgrading actions replace important elements, such as public space, by more pressing elements. Notwithstanding its non-urgent character, public space is still indispensable and it must be gradually introduced along another

upgrading works (Garau, 2015: 49). According to the notion of placemaking, public space is essential in slum areas because it has the ability to transform residents and turn these areas into places of meaning (Schneekloth & Shibley, 1995: 1). Needless to say, investment in public space contributes to the city’s overall environmental sustainability. Furthermore, a survey provided evidence that public space increases citizen’s care of nature, as green areas raise their environmental awareness (Berney, 2010: 552).

Nonetheless, the Library Parks of Medellin have a manifest dual nature. Besides being public spaces, they also possess educational and cultural powers. In combination with PUI’s educational institutions, the Library Parks invest in social inclusion. The Municipality of Medellin placed education and culture at the center of its slum upgrading and urban regeneration, for it considered both elements as the propelling forces of social transformation. As for the Library Parks, they transformed Medellin into an educational city, as they foster education, recreation, culture and art (Esteves, 2012: 163). With a special focus on music and dance, there are plenty of everyday educational and cultural activities at the Library Parks. As PUI architect Gustavo Restrepo put it, these spaces are educational opportunities, “for everything that is under the sun educates40” (Restrepo, 2013).

For their part, the 10 educational institutions benefited 7,916 students, contributing to the broader aim of achieving public education for all of Medellin’s children and adolescents (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2006). Teaching in education and culture from an early age is proven to empower communities more effectively and to be vital for social capital (Vilar & Cartes, 2016: 62). In fact, since Medellin has given priority to education and culture (2004), statistics show that the city has experienced a considerable increase in HDI41 levels (Herrera Marín, 2013: 103-109). One of the most staggering results has been the manner in which the communities have welcomed this approach. For example, in 2007 the neighborhood of Aranjuez42 dedicated 65% of its participative budget funds to both culture and education (Cátedra Medellín Barcelona, 2012: 183). This shows that, when given the opportunity, people are interested in developing cultural and educational activities, as they see them as an effective way to break away from poverty and scarcity (Ibid.: 179-185).

Nonetheless, education and cultural provision must not merely exist but also be accessible. In most cases, slums and poor neighborhoods are located either far from the city center or on the steep hillsides of the city, as it is the case of Medellin. The PUI’s introduction of qualitative public transportation in the city’s poorest areas was a quest to dignify people’s time. Before the arrival of the Metrocable, residents of these areas took an average of 1.5-2 hours to reach the city center. Before

40 Translation by the authors, original at Restrepo 2013. 41 HDI is measured by a composite of the Life Expectancy index (i.e., life expectancy at birth), Education index (i.e., expected years of schooling + mean years of schooling), and GNI index (i.e., GNI per capita) (UNDP, 2016). As of 2004, it was 0.402, while, by 2013, it had risen up to 0.8405. 42 Located in the nororiental zone of Medellin, Aranjuez is one of the most populated neighborhoods (170,334 people). It is a working class neighborhood of middle-low and low social classes. The participative budgeting has generated a powerful cultural movement among the youth, mainly in support of Hip Hop dancing and music. Their activities have become so popular as to be fostered by Aranjuez’s CBOs and Medellin City Council (Cátedra Medellín Barcelona, 2012: 183).

2004, public transportation was faulty, of low frequency and even dangerous. Taxi services (as police services did) avoided these neighborhoods. The remaining option was descending and ascending the hillsides by foot. As a result, economic and labor opportunities, social interaction with other city areas, and access to culture and education were limited to the neighborhood of residence (Heinrichs & Bernet, 2014: 55-67). Thus, these aerial cable cars (Metrocable) do not only link educational and cultural sites located in the poorest neighborhoods; they also connect the residents of these areas with the larger city and with all the opportunities that so entails. The outcome is a more equitable city.

The cable car system is an excellent solution for attaining real development in slum areas due to its multiple benefits. Other Latin American cities as La Paz or Caracas have also connected informal settlements to the formal city through cable cars. First and foremost, this mode of public transport is a low-emissions one, requiring less electrical power. Their aerial position means that they can be easily integrated into the transportation cityscape, without competing with traffic. They entail no-wait service and are accessible to passengers with impaired mobility (McConville, 2010). Additionally, these mechanisms are relatively cheap and can even be free in the long term due to trip fares. For instance, the Municipality of Medellin predicts full cost-recovery in 10-15 years into its inauguration. More than that, Medellin’s Metrocable system has become a tourist attraction, which in turn has increased commerce opportunities in informal settlements and heihgtened their residents’ feelings of inclusion and esteem vis-à-vis the city (Heinrichs & Bernet, 2014: 66).

In spite of their recognized benefits, public spaces, education, culture and public transportation are however almost always disregarded by slum upgrading practices. This neglect of emotional components––as are equity, esteem and inclusion––results in an incomplete addressing of the slum problem. The previous section described the bridging of the gap for attaining social progress, and referred to the need to add psychological elements to slum upgrading. This section completes an integral approach to slum upgrading by stressing the indispensability of conceiving slum upgrading schemes that also reach the emotional. Demonstrated by Medellin’s Library Parks, educational institutions, and cablecar system, the combination of slum upgrading and placemaking has the power to target physical, economic, social, political, cultural, psychological and emotional human dimensions. Aiming for less would not solve any problem but only make a temporary fix.

9. Conclusion and Proposals On the whole, slum upgrading and placemaking are the answer to many of the urban and human challenges confronting Latin America’s present society. With bourgeoning rates of urbanization and 23.5% of its population living in informal settlements (UN Data, 2014), the region requires an integral transformation of its urban dynamics. The widespread presence of slums signals the malfunctioning of the present system, for it is indisputable that life in the slum violates human dignity. Also, slums

pointlessly limit human potential in reaching beyond the present and vicious state of affairs. “Social warming is as dangerous as climate warming” (Restrepo, 2013), and, because of that, revising current faulty upgrading practices seems imperative. Striving for a permanent fix to the slum question entails addressing its root causes and fulfilling present deficits. In doing this, Latin America should aim for a policy that not only upgrades but that includes placemaking in its true sense. Slum upgrading practices must target physical, economic, social, political, cultural, psychological and emotional human dimensions (Max-Neef et al., 2010: 36). Taking all these aspects into account, the Melendez’s Pyramid on Slum Upgrading advances a set of indispensable elements for Latin American programs to always include. The Pyramid draws from the premise that, until squatters’ basic human needs are satisfied, human development will not be whole nor durable. Finally based on what has been discussed, it can be established the answer to the main research question of this study.

To this end, we have expounded on the indispensable elements to be recommended for slum upgrading programs in Latin America, elucidating their importance. The matching of each pyramid bloc with a real slum upgrading program gives testimony of each element’s actual impact and of the feasibility of its realization. Thereby, Brazil’s Pró-Favela Program confirms the necessity of providing basic needs and a regularization framework to slum dwellers. In their absence, informality prevails, perpetuating a second-class citizen status. At present, the impact of the Pró-Favela regularization scheme on Belo Horizonte is indisputable: more than 120,000 dwellers acquired legal rights over the land they inhabited, and about 30,000 witnessed an increase in the coverage of their basic needs. Carrying on with the dignifying task, community participation and organization enable slum residents to acquire a sense of ownership over their habitats. So is corroborated by the citizens of Peru’s Villa El Salvador. After 40 years, the community participation of the 350,000 citizens of VES has reached beyond the physical, attaining a more empathetic and integrated society.

Without losing touch with reality, slum upgrading must operate within formality yet be built on a basis of equity. That is why slum dwellers, who seldom enjoy opportunities, must be treated with partiality. In slum upgrading, the backing that will help them most is: access to credit, good governance, transparency, cost-recovery and budget control. Nicaragua’s PRODEL and Mexico’s Self-Management Program prove how these elements can act as a stepping stone to qualitatively improve settlers’ lives. On one side, PRODEL has ameliorated the lives of 78,000 people through a rigorous loan system. PRODEL secures slum upgrading by providing a model of a strong and pro-poor bureaucracy: it gives settlers access to credit and betters the transparency and good governance of all operations. On the other side, the Tijuanan paradigm of recovery cost and budget control fights against the stereotype of slum dwellers as helpless actors. If PRODEL had provided a bureaucratic structure,

the Self-Management Program set an organized financial scheme that enabled dwellers to share costs and own a more self-sufficient progress.

In order to give more substance to slum development, political will and social capital are vital. In Argentina’s Rosario Habitat Program, these two elements played an essential role for attaining, on one side, a more comprehensive and robust development and, on the other, increased autonomy for its protagonists. The Habitat Program has so far assisted 5,251 people in high-quality social and economic development, yielding strong social networks, community participation, positive future prospects, and the sustainability of all achievements. For its part, Bolivia’s Neighborhood Improvement Program showed that sustainability can only be ensured when all human needs are satisfied. Otherwise, progress in one dimension ends up eroded by deficits in another. Important in this sense is the special focus that has to be put on environmental sustainability. Climate change and threatened ecosystems magnify the urgency of solving the slum question. The SMB reached 125,088 families, making sure that each action could be self-sufficiently maintained by the community. Fighting stereotypes that hindered sustainability and development, it also undertook education in hygiene, citizenship, and environmental protection.

So as to ensure that corruption and partisan politics do not interfere with slum upgrading, a strong intermediary structure must be constituted. In Costa Rica, the FUPROVI ensures transparency, efficiency, and continued development. Improving the life of 80,000 Costa Ricans would not have been possible without such intermediary structure, which acts as a sort of protective agent of the upgrading process. Moreover, urban development of slums should be integral and multidisciplinary, as so are human needs. Only through targeting them all can slum upgrading overcome all shortcomings and attain real sustainability. As shown by Colombia’s PUI Nororiental Initiative, targeting all dimensions fully clears the ground for the benefits of placemaking. This model has enabled that 230,000 residents could fully develop their identities and capacities, and create enriching meanings linked to their places of living.

Also essential for placemaking is the impact of bridging the gap between a development project and social progress. In Guatemala, the PROUME set in motion a truthful journey of inclusive and integrated growth within the community of El Mezquital. Thus, it illustrated that slum upgrading must also integrate a psychological component, for mental health and strength are the backbone of solid progress. The tip of the pyramid is the combination of equity, esteem and inclusion. Colombia’s three- pronged strategy––Library Parks, educational institutions, and a cable car system––shows the difference that it makes when a program incorporates emotional needs. Almost always disregarded, emotional aspects confer a human and intimate character to slum upgrading. These projects have turned into axles of reference for citizens and tourists. Senses of belonging and inclusion among slum

dwellers have increased. Services offered at these institutions and facilities have changed many daily routines for the better, introducing cultural and educational offers, as well as easiness in transportation. Settlers’ self-esteem boosted, social capital, social cohesion, harmony, positive psychological and emotional effects are generated. The significance of this being the accomplishment of a kind of development that is wholly consistent with itself.

Regarding our secondary research questions, these were also addressed in answering our main question of research. The conclusion we can draw from our findings can be reduced to a simple fact: in order to solve the Latin American slum question, informal settlements must be acknowledged as a problem, whose solution requires previous full comprehension. Present approaches must be reshaped to include missing or marginalized voices. However, the way to bring this change about must be conscious of the humanity and potential of settlers. We regard the fundamental human needs identified by Max-Neef et al. as a powerful foundation on which to build an effective slum upgrading ideal. What sets this model of needs apart is its recognition of emotional and psychological elements. Ultimately, Max-Neef’s set humanizes slum upgrading and urban development. Echoing Sen’s postulates, capacity-building and the promotion of self-sufficiency are the best ways to destigmatize poverty and to attain sustainable results.

The most valuable contribution of our Pyramid is its proposal for a change of urban rhetoric. Cities, as history, have been erected by winners, leaving so many in exclusion. The future of slum upgrading must thus encompass a system that places slum residents at the core––in all possible senses and satisfying the whole range of human needs. This is the only way to give birth to inclusive cities: when all intersecting factors that affect how we relate to space (i.e., race, ethnicity, social status, socioeconomic background, and gender) become aligned. Nonetheless, the biggest hindrance to this change of rhetoric is the lack of resource redistribution. By means of our Pyramid, we have tried to elucidate that cities’ potential is nowadays insufficiently tapped. Therefore, the tension between the formal and the informal city––which are inseparable according to economic logic––must be put to good use through an integral slum upgrading. However, carrying this out runs into the problem of vested powerful interests: implementing such initiatives has thus remained elusive, not realizing how much is to gain from a change of approach. Taking all these factors into account, the diagnosis is that Latin America won’t see a solid development nor a change in its slum figures until there is acknowledgement and political will.

Latin America’s slum upgrading has been caught in a vicious cycle: most programs consist of merely physical, social or economic interventions. This generates little and unsustainable results, progress in one dimension undermined by the neglect of all others. As a result, donors become insecure and fatigued, which has led to funding wrought. Not seeing consistent and ongoing results, investment

in slum upgrading has considerably decreased (UN-Habitat, 2016: 13, 106). By the same token, communities have lost hope on development, after decades of receiving no sustainable solutions. Future Latin American cities need strong housing policies and political will to redesign existing space, and thus become more equitable. And slum upgrading practices need to take into account the indispensable elements analyzed in this project. However, the region’s cities face a bleak future unless political and economic forces become forthcoming. No matter how much slum upgrading adapts to the workings of the market, housing is and will remain a profitable market product.

Then, the best deal to aim for is a renewal of the social contract. This can be perfectly achieved by means of slum upgrading, whose benefits reach deeply beyond slum limits. Here is where placemaking acquires real importance––because, “as people construct places, places construct people” (Holloway & Hubbard, 2001: 7). Squatter settlements are one of the most visual outcomes of the wrongs of present economic, political and social systems. Since informal housing is the result of multidimensional marginalization, undertaking slum upgrading will restore many of the ills of present systems. For the home is the locus for all development: the way architecture and urbanism work–– both at the home, neighborhood, and city levels––influences people’s lives to the deepest intimate degree. Thus, our most relevant recommendation is for Latin American cities to renew the ‘right to the city’, for the informal to be rethought, and for practices of integral slum upgrading and placemaking– –as described in the present project––to be carried out throughout the region’s peri-urbanity.

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11. Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACP countries: African, Caribbean and Pacific countries ALBA: Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America CBOs: community-based organizations CWS Action Plan: ‘Cities Without Slums’ Action Plan GDP: Gross Domestic Product GIS: Geographic Information System HDI: Human Development Index IBSA Dialogue Forum: India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue Forum IDB: Inter-American Development Bank IMF: International Monetary Fund NGOs: Non-Governmental Organizations PB: Participatory Budgeting Sida: Swedish International Development Agency SUF: Slum Upgrading Facility UN-Habitat: United Nations Human Settlements Programme UN: United Nations UNDP: United Nations Development Programme UNU-WIDER: UN University – World Institute for Development Economics Research WB: World Bank WSF: World Social Forum ZEIS: Zones of Special Social Interest

12. Glossary of terms

Brown agenda: urban development term that refers to the challenges to be met at the urban level relating to unsanitary living conditions, hazardous pollutant in the air and water, and the accumulations of solid waste. These issues have immediate environmental impacts and tend to burden lower-income social groups (Pugh, 2000: 73).

City Statute (Estatuto da Cidade): Federal Law 10. 257/2001 in Brazil related to urban development and slum upgrading, which establishes a series of norms regulating the use of urban property for the communal good, as well as regularizing favelas. The City Statute devolved numerous housing and land responsibilities to the municipal level and stimulated the unfolding of a municipal institutional capacity (Magalhães, 2016: 116).

Green agenda: urban development term that refers to the strategies to tackle the challenges posed by urban-based production, consumption, and waste generation, and how these contribute to ecosystem disruption, resource depletion and global climate change (Pugh, 2000: 73).

Home improvement: national and local programs, particularly in Colombia, which provide grants to eligible beneficiaries to improve their housing conditions. Some focus on human safety (structural reinforcement); others focus on health (sanitations, kitchens and bathrooms) (Magalhães, 2016: 116).

Integrated upgrading: slum upgrading context in which any action undertaken in a particular settlement follows the participatory area development plan for that settlement, which considers all the needed layout changes, relocation and resettlement needs, and requirements in infrastructure. In this fashion, every action contributes to the achievement of a well-defined goal and avoids piecemeal upgrading (Ruster & Imparato, 2003: 168-169).

Legalization: legal acknowledgement of an informal settlement, acting as a prerequisite for the later regularization and intervention through upgrading programs. This action ends with the informal status of slum dwellers and enlarges their rights by including into the umbrella of the legal national system. (Ruster & Imparato 2003: 248).

Participatory budgeting (PB): “is a different way to manage public money, and to engage people in government. It is a democratic process in which community members directly decide how to spend part of a public budget. It enables taxpayers to work with government to make the budget decisions that affect their lives (Participatory Budgeting Project 2018).

Qualitative housing deficit: an indicator of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean referring to the number of existing housing units that lack basic services and present insecure physical and/or tenure conditions (Magalhães, 2016: 118).

Quantitative housing deficit: an indicator of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean referring to the number of housing units required to meet the housing needs of existing households, compared to the number of existing housing units (Magalhães, 2016: 118).

Self-help model: also known as, ‘supporter model’ or ‘bottom-up model’. It is a slum upgrading scheme that empowers residents to be involved throughout the upgrading process, mostly during the

design and construction stages. They are all along supported by technical and economic support from non-governmental, public and private entities. It allows for enhanced sustainability of achieved results (Bartesaghi Koc 2014: 8).

Serviced land: subdivided site on which development works have been carried out (earthworks, roads, water supply systems, sewers, electricity, rainwater systems, etc.) to render it habitable (Prud-Home, Mercier & Associates 2014).

Slum/ informal settlement/ squatter settlement: In this thesis, the terms ‘slum’, ‘informal settlement’ and ‘squatter settlement’ are synonymous. They encompass any urban area or neighborhood with one or more of the following characteristics: irregularity of land occupation, lack of tenure/titling, deficient or precarious infrastructure and public services, risks from natural disasters, high density, precarious building conditions, social problems, and poverty. The term ‘slum’ is not intended in its pejorative connotations: it has been recognized by UN-Habitat as a collective category to identify the broad range of substandard housing encompassed by Magalhães’ definition. (UN- Habitat 2006: 1).

Social capital: the set of features inherent in social relationships that are based in trust and cooperation. Its introduction is credited to author Lyda J. Hanifan in 1916. According to this educator, social capital encompasses “those tangible assets that count for most in the daily lives of people: namely goodwill, fellowship, sympathy, and social intercourse among the individuals and families who make up a social unit. Meanwhile, the OECD has its own definition: “social capital constitutes networks together with shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate cooperation within or among groups. These networks and understanding engender trust and so enable people to work together”. (Moobela et al. 2009: 256; Keeley 2007: 104).

South-South cooperation: the exchange of resources, technology, experiences, and knowledge between developing countries (which are mostly in the Southern hemisphere). This process of exchange enables the countries involved (two or more) to pursue their individual and/or shared national capacity development objectives. Very common channels of South-South cooperation are regional and interregional collective actions, including partnerships involving governments, regional organizations, civil society, academia and the private sector. It is important to note that this model of development cooperation does not substitute but complement the more traditional North-South cooperation (UNDP 2016).

Zones of Special Social Interest (zonas de especial interesse social, or ZEIS): Brazil’s social housing instrument––under umbrella of the City Statute––enabling the delimitation of certain municipal areas. The ZEIS are also employed to establish and illustrate special norms regarding land use, occupation, parceling and building rules in areas already occupied by informal settlements. ZEIS must be defined in the Municipal Master Plan or in other related municipal laws (Magalhães, 2016: 118).

Bibliography for this section:

Keeley, B. (2007). Human Capital: How What You Know Shapes Your Life. Paris, France: OECD.

Magalhães, F. (Ed.) (2016). Slum Upgrading and Housing in Latin America (Report No. IDB-CP-45). Washington D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank.

Moobela, C., Price, A. D. F., Mathur, V. N., & Paranagamage, P. (2009). Investigating the Physical Determinants of Social Capital and their Implications for Sustainable Urban Development. The International Journal of Environmental, Cultural, Economic & Social Sustainability, 5(2) p.255- 270. Retrieved from https://www.academia.edu/832574/Investigating_the_Physical_Determinants_of_Social_Capit al_and_Their_Implications_for_Sustainable_Urban_Development

Participatory Budgeting Project (2018). What is participatory budgeting? Retrieved from https://www.participatorybudgeting.org/what-is-pb/ Prud’Homme, Mercier & Associates (2014). Glossary: Serviced land (terrain viabilisé). Retrieved from http://www.pmea.ca/en/1002-serviced-land-terrain-viabilise.html Pugh, C. (ed.) (2000). Sustainable cities in developing countries: theory and practice at the millennium. London, Earthscan. 73-87.

Ruster, J., & Imparato, I. (2003). Slum Upgrading and Participation: Lessons from Latin America. Washington D.C.: Directions in Development, World Bank. Retrieved from http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/277391468765324276/pdf/multi0page.pdf UN-Habitat. (2006). State of the World’s Cities 2006/7. The Millennium Development Goals and Urban Sustainability: 30 Years of Shaping the Habitat Agenda. Nairobi, Kenya: UN-Habitat Publications. Retrieved from http://mirror.unhabitat.org/pmss/listItemDetails.aspx?publicationID=2101 UNDP (2016). Frequently Asked Questions: South-South and Triangular Cooperation. Retrieved from http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Poverty%20Reduction/Development%20Coop eration%20and%20Finance/SSC_FAQ%20v1.pdf

13. Annexes 13.1. Annex 1: Manfred Max-Neef’s Fundamental Human Needs

Source: (Max-Neef et al., 2010: 24-30).

Manfred Max-Neef is a Chilean economist (1983 Alternative Nobel Prize) who has worked for many years in the area of development in the Third World. He criticizes conventional development models, arguing that they have led to increasing poverty, massive debt and ecological disaster for many developing and underdeveloped countries. In this line of criticism, Max-Neef advocates for an integral transformation, which he develops in one of the sources used throughout this project, Human Scale Development: An Option for the Future (1987)43. The authors of this book are Max-Neef, and his colleagues at the Center for Development Alternatives (Chile), Antonio Elizalde and Martín Hopenhayn. For the authors, ‘Human Scale Development’ is “focused and based on the satisfaction of fundamental human needs, on the generation of growing levels of self-reliance, and on the construction of organic articulations of people with nature and technology, of global processes with local activity, of the personal with the social, of planning with autonomy, and of civil society with the state.” (Max- Neef et al., 2010: 12).

In order to achieve this Human Scale Development, they propose a taxonomy of the fundamental human needs. The main contribution this taxonomy makes to the understanding of needs is the distinction made between needs and satisfiers. In that sense, the authors consider human needs to be limited and classifiable, and distinguish them from the notion of ‘desires’, which are endless and insatiable. For Max-Neef and his colleagues, human needs remain unchanged through all human cultures and across historical time periods. What varies between cultures and over time is the way people satisfy their needs.

Therefore, the taxonomy classifies the fundamental needs as: ‘subsistence’, ‘protection’, ‘affection’, ‘understanding’, ‘participation’, ‘recreation’ (i.e., leisure, meditation or idleness), ‘creation’, ‘identity’ and ‘freedom’. These needs, the authors understand, can be satisfied through the existential categories of: ‘being’, ‘having’, ‘doing’ and ‘interacting’. The result of such combinations is a 36 cell matrix that proposes examples of satisfiers of those needs (next page):

43 The edition cited throughout this project is the 2010 Edition of this book.

Taxonomy of Fundamental Human Needs (Max-Neef et al. 2010: 26). The table was elaborated by the authors of this project.

A second aspect to the taxonomy is that satisfiers can be of different nature: violators or destroyers, pseudosatisfiers, inhibiting satisfiers, singular satisfiers, or synergic satisfiers. Each of these categories can be explain as follows:

- Violators or destroyers: they are paradoxical satisfiers. Their application intends to satisfy a particular need, but, instead, their side effects inhibit the possibility of both satisfying that need and other needs. They are mainly related to the need of ‘protection’, which, when combined with fear, can result in desperate measures. Examples of these type are: arms race, large bureaucracies, censorship or high levels of national security.

- Pseudosatisfiers: they are phony satisfiers. They are not as aggressive as the violators or destroyers, as they generate an initial false sense of satisfaction. Nevertheless, they can also inhibit or destroy the possibility of satisfying the need they intended to. These are satisfiers that

are usually introduced as possible options to satisfy needs through propaganda, advertisement or media. Some examples are: heavy natural resource extraction, chauvinism, stereotypes, prostitution, social status symbols, obsessive productivism, fashions or alms.

- Inhibiting satisfiers: they are those that, because of how they fulfill a particular need, destroy the possibility of satisfying other needs. This type is usually embedded in culture, very often ritualized or camouflaged as part of people’s identities. Inhibiting satisfiers include, among others: paternalism, overprotective parents, authoritarian education, boundless permissiveness or commercial television.

- Singular satisfiers: they aim for the fulfillment of a single need, without hampering the satisfaction of further needs. They are characteristic of development, cooperation or assistance projects, and are usually designed from an institution. Examples of these are: provision of food and drinking water, social housing programs, medicine, insurance systems, professional military, voting, nationality tenure or presents. (This category would encompass most current slum upgrading programs).

- Synergic satisfiers: they are those that, because of how they fulfill a particular need, simultaneously stimulate and contribute to the satisfaction of further needs. Having a counter- hegemonic nature, they reverse dominant destructive tendencies, such as competence or coercion. Synergic satisfiers encompass, among others: self-management production, breastfeeding, popular education, democratic CBOs, direct democracy, didactic games, self- help programs, preventative medicine, meditation or cultural television. (This category would encompass slum upgrading programs that address the elements of the pyramid).

Thereby, this model helps to explain many of the problems of the current economic and development systems, which are dependent on mechanistic process that, for the most part, neglect the human dimension. As the authors describe, their taxonomy provides insight into the key underlying problems and root causes that are hindering further development. If followed, the result––as the title hints––is a more human scale development.

We have decided to follow this taxonomy for considering it encompassing and complete in terms of dimensions (i.e., physical/physiological, economic, political, social, cultural, psychological and emotional). Also, its encompassing value is also inferred in the way all human needs are portrayed as a system ––that is, they are interconnected and interdependent. Even though it was Maslow’s pyramid which inspired our pyramid of slum upgrading elements, we already established that the pyramidal arrangement of the elements we recommend does not imply hierarchy but logic in achievement. In the same way as we do, the proponents of this taxonomy reject any hierarchy of needs (other than the basic

need for subsistence or survival). Instead, the fundamental needs these Chilean economists propose are based on simultaneity, complementarity and interrelation. Our proposed pyramid aims at turning slum upgrading into a synergic satisfier that tackles as many needs as possible.

Bibliography for this section: Max-Neef, M., Elizalde, A., & Hopenhayn, M. (2010). Desarrollo a escala humana. Opciones para el futuro. Madrid: Biblioteca CF+S. Retrieved from http://habitat.aq.upm.es/deh/adeh.pdf

13.2. Annex 2: Population Data

Table 1. Total and Urban Population of Latin American countries

Total Urban Population Population REGION 2016 1950 2000 2015 2050 639,048,639 Latin 63,164,000 372,730,000 472,465,000 635,191,000 America COUNTRY 43,850,000 Argentina 11,206,000 32,896,000 38,677,000 48,339,000 366,954 Belize 38,000 114,000 153,000 301,000 10,890,000 Bolivia 919,000 5,253,000 7,553,000 13,193,000 207,700,000 Brazil 19,517,000 141,684,000 174,508,000 210,238,000 17,910,000 Chile 3,553,000 13,302,000 16,047,000 19,403,000 48,650,000 Colombia 3,924,000 28,756,000 37,858,000 53,083,000 4,857,000 Costa Rica 324,000 2,320,000 3,842,000 5,482,000 16,390,000 Ecuador 976,000 7,557,000 10,343,000 17,184,000 6,345,000 El Salvador 803,000 3,510,000 4,288,000 5,425,000 16,580,000 Guatemala 789,000 5,056,000 8,383,000 21,157,000 773,303 Guyana 114,000 214,000 231,000 314,000 9,113,000 Honduras 261,000 2,835,000 4,610,000 9,497,000 127,500,000 Mexico 12,069,000 77,617,000 99,245,000 134,828,000 6,150,000 Nicaragua 456,000 2,792,000 3,678,000 6,006,000 4,034,000 Panama 307,000 1,900,000 2,656,000 4,462,000 6,725,000 Paraguay 509,000 2,960,000 4,196,000 7,471,000 31,770,000 Peru 3,129,000 18,991,000 24,495,000 35,405,000 558,368 Suriname 101,000 310,000 362,000 445,000 3,444,000 Uruguay 1,744,000 3,056,000 3,269,000 3,549,000 31,570,000 Venezuela 2,410,000 21,474,000 27,848,000 38,964,000 Source: UN Department of Economics and Social Affairs, Population Division 2014.

Table 2. Percent of Urban Population Living in Slums in Latin American Countries (‘slum’ as defined by MDG 7).

Region 2014 Latin America 23.5% (113 million people) Country Argentina 16.7% Belize 10.8% Bolivia 43.5% Brazil 22.3% Chile 9.0% (2005) Colombia 13.1% Costa Rica 5.5% (estimated) Ecuador 36.0% (estimated) El Salvador 28.9% (2005) Guatemala 34.5% Guyana 33.1% Honduras 27.5% Mexico 11.1% Nicaragua 45.5% (2007) Panama 25.8% (estimated) Paraguay 17.6% (2005) Peru 34.2% Suriname 7.30% Uruguay 4% Venezuela 32.0% (estimated) Source: UN Data 2014.

Bibliography for this section:

UN Data (2014). Proportion of urban population living in slums. Retrieved from http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=urban+slum&d=SDGs&f=series%3AEN_LND_SLUM United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2014). World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision, File 3: Urban Population at Mid-Year by Major Area, Region and Country, 1950-2050 (Prepared for the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs). New York, NY: United Nations. Retrieved from https://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/

13.3. Annex 3. By-Country Sheets: Recent National Slum and Housing Policies in Latin American countries

Argentina Argentina is characterized by both qualitative and quantitative housing deficits. Nevertheless, slum problems in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay are significantly inferior than those affecting the rest of the region. The present conditions of marginalization and exclusion make visible the gap between social housing needs and responses, showing the inadequacy of the responses even after the national effort doubled (both in terms of funds invested and in housing units produced). The country still lags behind in terms of addressing the slum problem beyond the physical elements, giving both inadequate quantitative and qualitative solutions. Also, a deficient monitoring of the construction and the continuation of the projects is carried out, which hampers all progress. However, the turn of the century––with the implementation of the new strategy, Política Federal de la Vivienda (PFV) [Federal Housing Policy] in 2003––shows that a promising methodology is entering the Argentinian slum upgrading scene (e.g., focus on job stimulation and cooperative communal upgrading), contributing a human rights approach. Argentina has yet to implement a multisectoral, multidimensional, integrated, and social-oriented approach to the slum problem. This would enable the country to overcome pure growth by transforming it into development. (Rodulfo & Boselli, 2015: 30-40; Rodulfo & Boselli, 2014: 218-241)

Belize First and foremost, it must be noted that the Constitution of Belize, promulgated in 1981, does not recognize the right of Belizeans to a decent home. That established, the Government of Belize, by means of diverse mechanisms, has long been actively engaged in housing (e.g., allocation of serviced land, construction and allocation of homes, management of rental housing, mortgage loans, and the provision of grants for home improvement). Nevertheless, the lack of housing policies enshrined into law give place to urban developments without an entrenched set of rules and practices: local politicians can initiate and carry into effect land subdivision and housing projects on their own. Also, the processes of land and housing allocation lack transparency to a considerable degree. The 1957 Housing and Town Planning Act empowers the Central Authorities to engage in traditional slum clearance, but this mechanism is not put into use very frequently. The major part of the squatters in Belize are immigrant households, and the few squatter settlements in Belize (less than 0.5 percent of the households) are transformed over time into political subdivisions. This allows the local government to lease the land to squatters, or to purchase the land from its private owner and then lease it to squatters, with an eventual option to offer them to buy the plot. At present, there is no specific infrastructure upgrading program in place, and regardless of the number of informal settlements being small, serious infrastructure improvements are needed (e.g., piped water supply, storm drainage, drainage systems, and strategies for the mitigation of damage from hurricanes and storm surges). Thus, integrated slum upgrading policies, as the ones advocated for in the present thesis, seem far-fetched (Angel, 2010: 59-79).

Bolivia The slum situation in Bolivia is critical: 58% of Bolivian families live in informal settlements (Habitat for Humanity, 2017). Centralized up to 1994, the institutional situation of Bolivia was dramatically reversed with Law 1551, known as the People’s Participation Law. This measure put into effect mandatory budget transfers of 20 percent from the central government’s budget to the municipalities’. It also established participatory budgeting at the local level. Thereby, neighborhood associations (urban) and village committees (rural) started to decide on priority setting for the allocation of funds. The remarkable aspect of this policy is its profound respect for traditions: these associations have a long history in Bolivia, with some village committees (sindicatos rurales) dating back to the Incan ayllus. Such encompassing of traditions and culture in national regulations allows Bolivian policy to take full advantage of social capital and community relationships for its own development. Law 1551, also mandates control of resource allocation and expenditure by community representatives. Nonetheless, twenty-three years after the passing of Law 1551, the slum problem in Bolivia continues to be grave: change is slowly happening, but, extraordinarily and positively, it is the people who directly control the process (and they themselves make mistakes from time to time, e.g., requesting apparent upgrades as road pavements when more pressing needs were sewage systems). Another important action undertaken to better the lives of slum dwellers is to facilitate the shift from the informal employment sector to the formal sector. This has allowed many Bolivians to improve their incomes. (Brakarz & Jaitman, 2013: 47-51; Ruster & Imparato, 2003: 289-328).

Brazil Brazil exemplifies one of the most common trajectories of urban development policies of the 1970s and 1980s in the LAC region (it being its pioneer). During most of the twentieth century, policies favored mass low-cost suburban housing developments and the clearance of slums was the norm. This led to the creation of large isolated communities that lacked social services and were connected by inadequate transportation systems. With the collapse of the National Housing Bank, responsible for previous policies, the ‘twin-track approach’ was institutionalized in the 2000s. This approach entails a new regulatory framework, increasing channels for citizen participation and more efficient financial engineering. It combines the upgrading of living conditions in favelas and the provision of new housing, with highly controlled costs and lower subsidies. The success in alleviating housing deficit notwithstanding, Brazil still faces critical challenges: difficulties in regulation and public licensing; urban sprawl resulting from the lack of affordable land; low housing quality and design due to budget constraints; and the failure to address the problem beyond the physical intervention stage. After decades of lessons learned, Brazil stands as one of the very few countries to have implemented a national slum upgrading program, with the Right to the City Statute made law in 2001. (Bolaffi, 1992: 99-111; Brown & Kristiansen, 2009: 20; Magalhães, 2016: 31-54).

Chile Chile’s free-market economic model, influenced an impressive market-led housing policy with staggering results, with only 1 percent of households now living in slums. This has been made possible through a policy shift from government-led programs to a market-based model; combining demand subsidies and incentives for the private sector to offer affordable housing and direct- government investment to improve conditions in informal settlements. However, this model has fostered urban sprawl and segregation, as well as the creation of new pockets of poverty and exclusion, relegating the poor to the periphery. Chile, has thus been able to provide universal housing at the expense of quality housing. Its market-based housing policy has fallen short in addressing the multifaceted aspects of urban poverty, as it has not combined housing with transportation, and in- community inclusion. The approach has been of slum eradication and relocation rather than slum upgrading, signaling how only providing a roof is not an admissible measure. Such housing trend has been slowly reversed since 2000, with the inclusion of more horizontal and integrated policies that encourage effective community-institutional dialogue. (Castillo, 2010: 10-14; Magalhães, 2016: 13-27).

Colombia Throughout the years, Colombia has developed innovative and promising policies at the local level, yet it has shown an inability to transform them into national strategies. With the decentralization of the administrative and political system, municipalities emerged as key urban players, thus opening up a path for new arrangements between real estate and public cooperation. These positive experiences, however, are virtually limited to two cities––Bogota and Medellin––, which has shown the relevance of converging national and local strategies. Nonetheless, taken in isolation, these two cities exemplify the success of integrated slum upgrading approaches versus other schemes tackling the slum problem. In fact, Medellin is responsible for the implementation of the PUI initiative (Integrated Urban Project). Such initiative proved so successful that it quickly evolved into the PUI approach, which has been fully institutionalized at the local level. In addition, the PUI approach has become an international reference for its best practices in slum upgrading and participatory planning. Bogota’s MetroVivienda Project, on its side, suggests an experimental model for slum prevention that, in spite of the many critical aspects it yet needs to address, shows many valuable lessons on which to develop urban planning forward. Above all, the Colombian achievement lies in its enhancement of a bottom-up learning process. Nonetheless, the country’s prolonged history of internal armed conflict has generated the displacement of 4.9 million. The overall result of this situation is a housing quantitative deficit of 1.03 million and a housing qualitative deficit of 1.2 million. Given this image, much more work needs to be done in this area, despite the recent achievements. (Echeverry Restrepo & Orsini, 2011: 130-150; Esteves, 3012: 157-166; Magalhães, 2016: 61-97).

Costa Rica Costa Rica has been successful in incrementing the number of home owners, with 71% of the households describing themselves as owners of the homes they lived in. This increase can be traced back to the 1984 housing policy, which is characterized by its granting of housing subsidies. In spite of the relative success of the national housing policy, there has been little positive impact on slums, for the Costa Rican policy is not one of upgrading but of subsidized relocation. The result is that

when squatter dwellers are moved to government-subsidized housing areas, new families reoccupy the squatter area almost straightaway. A pressing issue for Costa Rican authorities to address is that of the squatter communities located in areas subject to floods or landslides. Costa Rican housing policy is characterized by limited state intervention, with the State taking on normative, planning and financing roles, while private enterprises promote, design and execute the projects. A great success for the country was the institutionalization of a strong intermediary structure between the two, as the FUPROVI’s Habitat Popular Urbano Program elucidates. The municipal governments’ role is limited to the granting of building permits once the projects have been approved by the so-required institutions. At present, the subsidies offered need not ever be repaid and can be used either for: a) covering the cost of land, urban infrastructure and the housing unit; b) purchasing urbanized lots; c) the construction of a house on an already-owned lot; or d) remodeling and other improvements. This flexibility, however, has also entailed downsides such as the impact of what people came to interpret as “free house” bonuses. The subsidy program also fails to address the vast majority of poor families living in urban areas, for there are prerequisites of a minimum income and a clear title to an urban lot in order to receive a subsidy. Slum improvement policies in Costa Rica face the enormous handicap that most informal settlements are located in risk areas. Inappropriate regulatory frameworks contribute to making slum improvement strategies unaffordable for low-income families. However, a big advance has taken place recently. The Government has issued an official decree which frees slum areas from the normal restrictions that almost often hinder upgrading aspirations and efforts. This new decree allows for project-specific regulations and for a more adequate execution of slum upgrading programs. (Morgan, 2007: 1-19; Ruster & Imparato, 2003: 365-397).

Ecuador Host to the Conference UN Habitat III in 2016, Ecuador has not yet been able to consolidate a solid national urban policy. Ecuadorian social housing actions are usually financed as it is commonplace across the region: by combining the savings of the beneficiary, a subsidy bond, and a bank loan–– known as the ABC system (Ahorro+Bono+Crédito). However, this system broadly fails to tackle beyond the provision of big housing projects, with important deficits on the access to social services. Such system thus stands as particularly inadequate when housing improvement appears as the principal problem––since the qualitative deficit is much larger than the quantitative deficit––, as it is the case in Ecuador. The Ministry of Urban Development and Housing of Ecuador (MIDUVI) has been working to shift this trend, achieving substantial results with the creation of the Undersecretary Office to establish an appropriate national urban legislation framework and the creation of a National Urban Agenda. As of 2016, there had been 945 informal settlements identified in Ecuador, 60% of which is concentrated in Guayaquil. There is a blatant need to extend infrastructure and basic services to the poorest segments of the population. Given the geographical landscape of the country, many times slum clearance stands as the only option. To date and when possible, housing policies in Ecuador combine relocation and upgrading (Angel, 2000b: 1-32; Arias Ramos et al., 2015: 19-23; Gilbert, 2001:12; Morales, 2016).

El Salvador Since the past century, El Salvador has attained remarkable achievements in housing needs, considering the huge backdrop faced by the country: 12 years of armed conflict (1980-1992) that killed 75,000 people and displaced one million; an earthquake (1986) that left almost 9,000 families without shelter in San Salvador alone; and Hurricane Mitch (1999), which left 59,000 residents without a home. Legal, low-cost subdivisions were supplied at very large scales. However, these housing compounds were perceived by the rest of city inhabitants as alarmingly dangerous. Since November 2015, El Salvador is one of the few Latin American countries with a national housing and habitat policy. Much of this initiative is owed to the recognized benefits that slum upgrading has proved to have for increasing city safety. The Salvadorian National Housing and Habitat Policy (NHHP) has achieved considerable results in improving safety and quality-of-life of squatters. The elaboration of this measure took more than two years and it is constituted of public institutions, private sector partners, civil society organizations and international agencies. It emphasizes the reduction of both quantitative and qualitative housing deficits, acknowledging the relevance of the latter for building social cohesion. However, the national policy fails to be comprehensive and does not delegate decision-making powers to municipalities, which slows the process. Additionally, it lacks quality control of slum upgrading projects and quality housing, and its material standards are rather low. (Brakarz & Jaitman, 2013: 24-25; Fortin-Magaña, 2003: 38-39; UN-Habitat, 2015).

Guatemala Guatemala City is the largest metropolis of Central America, and it has 314 informal settlements within its limits alone. Within this distressing context, the Guatemalan Government, by means of financial assistance from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), is positioned as an enabler of housing action. The Housing and Human Settlements Law of 1996 established an institutional framework to monitor the transfer of invaded public lands to squatters. The financing of these projects combines mortgage finance by the banking sector, up-front subsidies and loans at market rates. However, its actions tackling slums have been insufficient. The Guatemalan strategy lacks coordination among its actor institutions and an efficient data compilation system. This deficit prevents the country from implementing an integrated solution. Given the geographic location of Guatemala, slum upgrading has often not been enough, and environmental risk mitigation in informal settlements must also be implemented. But, when most municipalities have acknowledged that at least 70% of existing settlements are on lands which do not pose an inordinate risk of landslides and can be legalized, most funds continue to be diverted away from upgrading into new housing solutions. It is notably commonplace in Guatemalan slums, as in many other countries in the region, the formation of neighborhood committees that establish quotas to build up funds, and thus improve the settlements. In Guatemala, they are mostly unstructured and weak, their actions very modest, usually only targeting occasional repairs, and contributing very little to community and social capital building. So far, actions undertaken in Guatemala to address the slum problem have not been robust. So long as there is no variation in the socio-economic model followed by the country, the number of squatter settlements will continue to grow. (Angel, 2013, 1-43; TECHO-Guatemala, 2015: 132-137; Valladares Cerezo, 2003: 1-23).

Guyana Most of Guyana’s population is rural, with only 26.4% being urban. Across the country, there are over 216 squatter areas, of which 154 have been brought under a regularization program of up-front subsidies to increment land and housing ownership. Guyana has also established incentives to encourage financial institutions to move down market in the provision of mortgages. With the assistance of the IDB, Guyana has made considerable process, mainly in public land divestiture. By the end of 2015, nearly 19,000 house lots had been serviced in infrastructure and housing demand. In the case of new housing schemes, most of them lack adequate infrastructure, as land divestiture ran ahead of the availability of financing for such services. The Government launched a program in 2011 to improve the quality of these schemes. The Ministry of Communities of Guyana, on its part, has set up a Squatter Enforcement Unit to prevent further squatting. In the 1990s, Guyana faced a big handicap for meeting the affordable land demand and thus achieve land regularization goals. Back then, 90% of Guyanese land was jointly owned by the Guyana Sugar Company (Guysuco) and the Government, Georgetown hemmed in by sugar estate lands. Eventually, land from Guysuco was transferred to the Central Planning and Housing Authority (CH&PA) of Guayana, either as a gift or a deed, which allowed to lower the price of rent and tenure land titles. An additional governmental housing policy is infrastructure development countrywide. This policy fosters community involvement in the planning and implementation stages. Communities were encouraged to form community development committees to work together for the good of the community. In addition, the CH&PA delivered an environmental and homeownership training program instructing household in building septic tanks or pit latrines, home building, and community consolidation. For their part, housing construction projects are highly environmentally aware, aiming at minimal environmental footprint, and include solutions to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters. (Barandiaran, 2015; McHardy & Donovan, 2016: 51-65).

Honduras Honduras shows high degrees of population growth and of urbanization. Facing that, 62% of Hondurans live with less than a dollar a day and 27.5% lives in slums. The country displays a housing deficit of 57%, of which 30% is quantitative and 70% is qualitative. In addition, Honduras is extremely vulnerable to severe tropical storms and natural disasters, aspects that are not sufficiently integrated in housing efforts. Worrying levels of violence all across the country further hinder with national development. The Government of Honduras lacks a national housing policy––as many other countries in the region––, and resources are allocated poorly. In order to change the crude scenario, participative and context-specific approaches and land-tenure regularization schemes are needed. The Foundation for Development of Urban and Rural Social Housing (FUNDEVI), which enjoys German assistance, has hugely improved the situation. It was designed in 2000 to cover the absence of existing politic-strategic guidelines. FUNDEVI provides finance to low-income families for the construction and improvement of houses, legalization of land, and infrastructure. It has been an effective means of ensuring transparency and of channeling grant funds provided by cooperating countries. However, the lack of legal framework governing the housing sector perpetuates the state of uncoordination and widespread inefficiency. Most informal settlements are located in the two biggest cities, Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula. The conditions of Tegucigalpa’s slums are alarming, with many lacking water, sanitation and electricity systems, and being extremely exposed to landslides. The NGO TECHO has recently been

implementing projects to provide the squatter communities in Tegucigalpa with solar panels. Also, the World Bank has been assisting with its Barrio Ciudad Project since 2008. This initiative is operated through public and private loans, to provide basic infrastructure and services, and improve access to credit and capacity building. Its most innovative component is that all settlement improvement initiatives––mostly implemented by residents––are targeted to contribute to crime and violence reduction through community building. (e.g., by means of: the elaboration of “insecurity” maps to inform project design; walk-throughs of insecure areas at night; improved relations with and involvement of the local police; tree planting days; community clean-up days; mobilization of youth; or decentralization and involvement and municipal-level actors). (Azevedo Rocha, 2014; COFINSA, 2006: 3-22; Cohan, 2011; Madrid Rivas, 2008: 1-9; World Bank, 2008: 1-12).

Mexico The 1917 Mexican Constitution was pioneer in recognizing the right to decent housing. From then on, until the 1980s, it took significant steps in advancing housing for all. In the 1980s, with the Tlatelolco massacre, the earthquake and the consecutive economic crises, the Government remarkably reduced its concern for housing. For the last 40 years, private development has fully entered the country. As a result of unaffordable housing, squatter settlements sprouted all over in a fashion that has broadly contributed to social segregation. In fact, Mexico City’s irregular settlements constitute roughly half of the urbanized area, housing 60% of the city’s population. National housing policy is de facto oriented to a limited sector of the population (middle-class families) for the benefit of major developers. Nevertheless, the year 2013 saw the creation of a cross- cutting reform agenda in which cities and housing play a key role. Yet, the challenges the country faces are many: as of 2017, more than 60% of what is built in Mexico was informal (which does not always entail squatting). Additionally, Mexico stands as one of the countries with more abandoned houses (almost 5 million) due to insecurity reasons in the concerned area. Since 2008, the Government has mainly focused on the regularization of land tenure for low-income families and on the construction of massive social housing schemes. Until 2009, the latter were mostly developed without considering climatic effects and soil quality. The Mexican Government has often neglected slum upgrading. However, with the recent decentralization tendencies, municipalities have seen their roles in urban upgrading increased to a certain extent. Thus, slum upgrading has become a more visible trend in the country, with notable examples such as the Community Upgrading Programs of Tijuana. These pioneered an approach that coupled participatory budgeting with community management. Nonetheless, slum upgrading remains a modest trend. (Audrefroy, 2013: 1-11; Herbert et al., 2012: 1-37; Marcial Pérez, 2017; OECD, 2015: 31-55; Ruster and Imparato, 2003: 69-71).

Nicaragua Nicaragua ranks as the second poorest in the continent, both in terms of GDP and HDI. The country does not have the support of national urban or territorial planning and municipalities are very weak with low funding at their disposal. The Government has been unable––due to institutional and political factors––to consolidate a mechanism to tackle housing on an ongoing and consistent manner. There is no stable national budget allocation to social housing, but, since 2001, new financing

windows have been developed (savings, subsidies and loans). Since the change of government of 2007, Nicaragua has had further financial assistance for housing from the ALBA countries. The year 2002 saw the creation of the Red de Vivienda (“Housing Network”), made of thirteen organizations specialized in social housing and informal settlements. The very effective network is dedicated to the management and production of decent habitats, mostly focusing of cost-reduction. Nicaragua has not been an exception to the proliferation of informal settlements, most of them located in risk areas. The 10-year civil war (1981-1989); drastic changes in governing ideology; radical stabilization measures; the 1992 tsunami; or Mitch hurricane in 1998, further contributed to the already critical urbanization problems. The Government has traditionally avoided confrontation, eventually regularizing and legalizing the slum areas. In very few cases are squatters relocated to areas suitable for urbanization. Funding and technical assistance from entities such as the PNUD, IDB, or the Netherlands Government, have allowed the country to move closer to a more integrated approach to the slum problem. The country combines the upgrading policies with the prevention of further formation of slums, with mixed results. (Habitat for Humanity 2008: 1-15; Pérez Casas 2016: 89-97; Pérez Casas & Magrinyà Torner 2017: 1-3).

Panama The Panamanian Centro Bancario Internacional (CBI) has been essential to promote the finance of housing within the country, which has been conducted through mortgage loans. Special programs however, such as the Ley de Intereses Preferenciales, have eased the access to credit for low-income households, thus increasing the mortgage market. The Government is still paternalistic insofar as it builds and finances public housing, instead of taking on an enabling role. Only one of the three Inter- American Development Bank-supported programs (Parvis) provides a kit of building materials. The preferential interest rates for housing loans involves the private sector directly in the production of low-income housing, which has resulted in levels of new housing affordability unequaled in regional terms. There are circa 260 squatter settlements, mostly within the Panama City metropolis. There is no evidence of an active informal housing construction sector. There are established legal procedures for the regularization of squatter settlements and a program for land tenure in place under the Ministry of Housing (MIVI). Nevertheless, the MIVI does not invest in slum upgrading, nor there is a formal upgrading program. What the MIVI does is coordinate the provision of infrastructure services by other public agencies, but it fails at involving municipalities, community organizations and NGOs in the upgrading process. The Ministry only has a program for providing serviced lots, however this support is unclear and inconsistent. (Alemán 2004: 52-57; Angel 2000: 1-37).

Paraguay There are 405 informal settlements identified across the country. Most of the squatting takes place in the coastal and river areas of Paraguay, making its residents vulnerable to flooding and marine pollution––which results from industrial and chemical accidents, among others. Since the 1960s, Paraguay has openly recognized its duties on housing and attempted to carry them out through several instruments, such as the Instituto Paraguayo de Vivienda y Urbanismo (IPVU) [“Paraguayan Institute for Housing and Urbanism”]. Its main approach towards housing deficits for

low-income families has been the construction of social housing schemes, applying a unidimensional view to the slum problem and housing deficits. There is a diversity of programs in place, but the institutional vulnerability, skilled human resources deficit, and lack of funding have sabotaged most efforts. In this context, the positive elements found within the Paraguayan slums by the NGO TECHO were surprising. In its mapping of informal settlements of the country, the NGO observed solid organization networks in different slum areas across the country. There are democratically-elect community leaders; different spaces for community participation; and collective activities to answer to infrastructure, health or social services problems. Self-help and self-upgrading is therefore a widespread practice. (ABC Paraguay, 2005; Flores, 2012: 145-167; SNT, 2017; TECHO, 2015: 78).

Peru Peru is among the countries with the greatest housing challenges in the region due to its high poverty rates, higher than the mean for Latin America. Housing policies to allegedly target the poorest segments of society were often oriented towards new social housing schemes and subsidies, and decades of laissez-faire housing policies have contributed to the proliferation of slums. Influenced by Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto, Peru has also focused on the regularization and legalization of land tenure. According to the economist, granting land tenure to the poor boosts economic development of low-income countries. His rationale is that, people would then have easier access to credit, and as a result would invest in the improvement of their homes. This would in turn alleviate poverty rates. However, such argument has been proven not to be always true (Álvarez Rivadulla 2014: 9). Following De Soto’s postulates, Peru has implemented programs of mass-regularization of land. However, regularization only focuses on housing units, without paying attention to socio-spatial conditions of the area surrounding the units (or to most of the elements signaled in our Pyramid for that matter). Examples like the informal settlement of Santa María (San Juan de Lurigancho, Lima) exemplify the national tendency, land tenure granted: the settlement is 21 years old, most families were granted land tenure 18 years ago, and the area has not developed whatsoever. Also, many times, the Government regularized informal settlements that were not sustainable, neither urbanistically nor environmentally. The Peruvian experience with regularization and legalization show that this practice, on its own, is not a very sustainable one. In the country, the main problem is housing improvement, as the qualitative deficit is much larger than the quantitative deficit. The Peruvian authorities have mainly neglected quality housing provision. Slum upgrading and comprehensive approaches to the slum problem are not very frequent. Also, new social housing schemes do not really meet the quality standards required. Thus, Peruvian cities continue to grow at a double process: informally and formally, vertically and horizontally. (Fernández-Maldonado, 2010: 1-13; Fernandes, 2011: 30-34; Gilbert, 2001:12; Sáez Giráldez et al., 2009: 1-14)

Suriname According to the Surinamese Constitution, everyone is entitled to land. However, there is not enough serviced land to distribute to everyone, with approximately 43.1% of the population living in multidimensional poverty. A weak economic structure, predominantly informal, makes it difficult to gain access to affordable housing. The Government is reluctant to invest in improving planning and

land management. This results in distorted land markets: there is never sufficient land to distribute or where to undertake housing construction in because most serviced lots’ owners are overseas or are speculators. Moreover, lot sizes then to be too big to be easily affordable, this constituting a major deterrent to affordable housing. Nevertheless, with the support of the IDB, Suriname has achieved considerable results to improve its housing problems: as at 2015, 2,087 homes had been built, expanded, or renovated. In addition, Suriname has introduced a program of up-front subsidies to stimulate investment for home rehabilitation and new house construction. NGOs and CBOs provide assistance to underserved households in low-income neighborhoods by improving or building houses. They also lobby to make shelter policies and subsidies more efficient, equitable, and transparent. Squatter settlements are not commonplace in Suriname, and the few present mainly take place on government-owned land. In fact, Suriname is the country with the lowest rate of population living in slums (7.30%). For some time now, the Government of Suriname has been working on the development of a satellite city to its capital, to be located 14 km from Paramaribo. It is intended to be a social housing project for low- and middle-income homes of approximately 4,000 homes. On a different note, the effects of climate change, in particular sea level rise, are highly alarming for a country where 69% of the population live in areas located less than 10 meters above sea level. This situation must be better addressed by national housing authorities. (McHardy & Donovan, 2016: 83-94).

Uruguay Uruguay enjoys a national housing policy since 1990. The Uruguayan Ministry of Housing, Regional Planning and Environment (MVOTMA) is in charge of defining and implementing Uruguayan housing policies and programs. It defines quinquennial housing plans that account for housing needs, housing construction, as well as for ensuring that low-income families have access to appropriate housing. There are four types of programs at the national level: a) provision of rental guarantees for low-income households; b) provision of small loans for construction materials for legal owners of land or property; c) provision of micro-loans for renovation and expansion; and d) granting of access to ownership of a housing solution. In terms of informal settlements, about 4% of the population live in informal settlements, while 5.3% of Montevideo’s households are squatter units. To tackle this situation, the Uruguayan Government launched the Program for the Integration of Irregular Settlements (PIAI) with support from the IDB back in 1999. This specific program is aimed at the integration and regularization of squatter settlements, and it is executed in coordination with the MVOTMA. The PIAI aims for: a) the improvement of infrastructure and community facilities in and around informal settlements; and b) the regularization of legal use of land (not legal ownership) and resettlement plans. However, the criteria for selecting settlements to be assisted by this program leaves many out of reach: only two thirds of households living in irregular conditions meet the requirements to be reached by public policies. Greater coordination among social and housing policies is therefore needed. In addition, the fact that the PIAI does not include the regularization of legal ownership results from the debate of “granting use vs. ownership of land”–– taking into account the consequences each road leads to––. A notable consequence of choosing “use” over “ownership” is provoking the inheritance of informality generation after generation. In 2010, the Uruguayan Government declared a “state of housing emergency”, launching the program Juntos (“Together”), which pools public and private funding to ameliorate housing conditions for the

poor. As part of this focus priority, the five-year allocation to housing almost doubled. Uruguayan efforts have attempted to tackle social aspects of poverty in the slums, but further work is needed in order to create a more integrated and cohesive approach. (Álvarez Rivadulla, 2014: 1-13; El País Uruguay, 2017; Garabato & Ramada-Sarasola, 2011: 1-15).

Venezuela Venezuela is one of the most urbanized countries in Latin America, with 87% of its population being urban (GUTLAB, 2012). The wave of rural-urban migration during the twentieth century corresponded with an expansion of squatter settlements, mostly in Caracas. As a matter of fact, half of the capital’s population lives in slums, although the space they occupy only represents a quarter of the metropolis (Silva, 2016). Venezuelan slums are characterized by a lack of basic infrastructure and services, and, moreover, units are commonly built in natural risk zones without legal tenure to the occupied land. Interestingly, Venezuela used to be characterized for having the world’s tallest slum (Centro Financiero Confinanzas––aka. “Tower of David” ––with 45 stories and home to more than 3,000 residents). Yet its residents were evicted and relocated in May 2015. This example shows the unsustainability of the slum situation in Venezuela––among many of the country’s current ills–– , which has broader consequences at the national level: social malaise, minimized productivity, and worsened quality of life, among others. The Government has long been implementing policy and program initiatives, often co-financed by the World Bank, but the scope of these is rather limited. Traditionally, governmental policies have been of relocation and provision of new social housing schemes. However, as it is custom, informal settlements always sprout around the new housing structures. This is explained by the ongoing quantitative housing deficit in Venezuela. The Government has thus focused on building housing blocs filling voids within the city, so that public transportation systems are within reach for the new or relocated inhabitants. From 2000 onwards, however, there has been a clear deceleration tendency of informal settlement formation. In terms of slum upgrading measures, governmental actions are tremendously insufficient. Some municipalities, such as Sucre, are taking the lead in the creation of public spaces and other community ameliorations, but, overall, actions undertaken only represent a small percentage of what is required. (Collado Solís, 2015: 1-8; GUTTLAB, 2012; Silva, 2016; Taylor, 2014).

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13.4. Annex 4: Names of Slum Upgrading Programs Studied Prior to Selecting the Representative Case Studies44

1. Argentina, Buenos Aires: Integral Improvement Program in Barrio San Jorge [official name: Programa de Mejoramiento Integral del Barrio San Jorge] (1987-1997).

2. Argentina, Buenos Aires: Participatory Slum Upgrading in Villa 31 [official name: Programa de Mejoras para Villa 31, Buenos Aires, Argentina] (2002-ongoing).

3. *Argentina, Rosario: Rosario Habitat Program [official name: Programa Rosario Hábitat dentro del Plan Estratégico de Rosario (PER)] (2002-ongoing).

4. Bolivia: Bolivian Law 1151, known as People’s Participation Law [official name: Ley 1551, sobre la Participación Popular de Bolivia] (1994-ongoing).

5. *Bolivia, 26 municipalities: Neighborhood Improvement Suprogram (SMB) [official name: Subprograma de Mejoramiento de Barrios (SMB) dentro del marco de PROVIVIENDA] (1998-2008).

6. Brazil: My House, My Life Program, PMCMV [official name: Program Minha Casa, Minha Vida, PMCMV] (2009-ongoing).

7. *Brazil, Belo Horizonte: PRÓ-FAVELA Program for the regularization of favelas [official name: Programa Municipal de Regularização de Favelas - PRÓ-FAVELA] (1983-ongoing).

8. Brazil, Porto Alegre: Participatory Budgeting Law [official name: Lei do Orçamento Participativo] (1989-ongoing).

9. Brazil, Rio de Janeiro: Favela Bairro [official name: Programa de Urbanização de Assentamentos Populares do Rio de Janeiro (PROAP)] (1995-scheduled for 2020).

10. Brazil, Rio de Janeiro: Morar Carioca “Verde” (Green) Program [official name: Projeto Morar Carioca Verde] (2009-scheduled for 2020).

11. Brazil, Rio de Janeiro: Multirão Program [official name: Projeto Multirão] (1981-1989).

12. Brazil, Recife: Plan for the Regularization and Urbanization of Special Zones of Social Interest, PREZEIS [official name: Plano de Regularização das Zonas Especiais de Interesse Social, PREZEIS] (1987-ongoing).

13. Brazil, São Paulo: Guarapiranga Program [official name: Programa Gurapiranga] (1993- 2000).

14. Brazil, São Paulo, Cubatão: The Serra do Mar Project [oficial name: Programa Recuperação Socioambiental da Serra do Mar e Mosaicos da Mata Atlântica] (2007-2010).

15. Chile: Chile Barrio Program [official name: Programa Chile-Barrio] (1997-2002).

16. Chile: Neighborhood Recovery Program “I Love My Neighborhood” [official name: Programa de Recuperación de Barrios “Quiero Mi Barrio”] (2006-2010).

44 Representative case studies are signaled with a ‘*’.

17. Chile; Santiago, Curicó, Vila del Mar, San Antonio, Valparaíso, and Talca: The Progressive Housing Program [official name: Programa de Vivienda Progresiva en Chile] (1991-2002)

18. Chile; Atacama, Valparaíso, Los Ríos, Aysén, Magallanes, and the Santiago Metropolitan Area: [official name: Fondo Solidario de Vivienda (FSV) del Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo de Chile (MINVU)] (2001-ongoing).

19. Colombia, Bogota: City Agency Metrovivienda for low/moderate income land development [official name: MetroVivienda, empresa de capital público] (1999-ongoing).

20. Colombia, Santiago de Cali: Self-Construction of Public Service Infrastructure Works with Delivery Materials, AOISPEM Program [official name: Autoconstrucción de Obras de Infraestructura de Servicios Públicos con Entrega de Materiales, AOISPEM] (1990-1997).

21. Colombia, Medellin: Integral Improvement Plan for Moravia (PPMIM) [official name: Plan Parcial de Mejoramiento Integral de Moravia, PPMIM] (2004-2014).

22. *Colombia, Medellin: Northeast Integral Urban Project (IUP) [official name: Proyecto Urbano Integral (PUI) Zona Nororiental] (2004-2011).

23. Colombia, Medellin: Medellin Integrated Informal Settlement Upgrading Program, PRIMED Program [official name: Programa Integral de Mejoramiento de Barrios Subnormales en Medellín, PRIMED] (1993-2004).

24. Costa Rica, Heredia, Guararí: Intervention Plan for slum upgrading and better cohabitation in the informal settlement of Guararí [official name: Plan de Intervención para la mejora de barrios y la convivencia en el asentamiento de Guararí] (2007-2012).

25. *Costa Rica, San Jose: Popular Habitat Program of FUPROVI [official name: Programa Habitat Popular Urbano, FUPROVI] (1988-ongoing).

26. Ecuador, Cuenca: “Neighborhood to a Better Life” Program [official name: Programa Barrio para Mejor Vivir] (2005-ongoing).

27. Ecuador, Guayaquil: Integral Urban Intervention at the Northwestern Expansion Area of Guayaquil, Ecuador [official name: Intervención Urbana Integral en la Zona de Expansión del Noroeste de la ciudad de Guayaquil, Ecuador] (2010-ongoing).

28. *Guatemala, Guatemala City: The El Mezquital Project [official name: Proyecto El Mezquital] (1993-1997).

29. Mexico, Tijuana: Social Community Works, Tijuana [official name: Programas de Obra Social Comunitaria, Tijuana, México] (1993-ongoing).

30. Mexico: Integral Neighborhood Upgrading Program for the Neighborhood Romero Rubio [official name: Programa de Mejoramiento Barrial Integral Romero Rubio] (1998-1999).

31. Mexico, Ciudad Juárez: Community Upgrading Programs [official name: Programas de Intervención Comunitaria] (1995-1998).

32. *Mexico, Tijuana: Self-Management Community Upgrading Program of Tijuana [official name: Programa “Autogestión” de Tijuana, en cooperación con el Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (PRONASOL)] (1990-ongoing).

33. *Nicaragua, several municipalities: Local Development Program (PRODEL) [official name: Programa de Desarrollo Local, PRODEL] (1994-1998/ 1998-2001).

34. *Peru, Lima: Integral Development Plan of Villa El Salvador [official name: Programa de Desarrollo Integral de Villa El Salvador, Lima, Perú] (1984-1995).

35. Peru: Organization for the formalization of Informal Ownership, COFOPRI [official name: Organismo de Formalización de la Propiedad Informal, COFOPRI] (1996-ongoing).

36. Salvador, San Salvador: Rehabilitation Project of the Community of Las Palmas, San Salvador [official name: Proyecto de Rehabilitación de la Comunidad Las Palmas] (1995- 2002).

37. Uruguay: TECHO Program for Uruguay [official name: Programa Un Techo Para Mi País (UTPMP)] (2003-ongoing).

38. Uruguay: Informal Settlements Integration Project, PIAI [official name: Proyecto Integración Asentamientos Irregulares, PIAI] (1999-ongoing).

39. Venezuela: Venezuelan Communal Councils and Law of Communal Councils [official name: Ley Orgánica de los Consejos Comunales] (2006-ongoing).

40. Venezuela, Caracas: Sectorial Plan for the Upgrading of the Catuche Social Consortium [official name: Plan Sectorial para la mejora integrada del Consorcio Social de Catuche] (1993-1998).

13.5. Annex 5: Meléndez’s Pyramid of Slum Upgrading

13.6. Annex 6. Case Studies Sheets: Slum upgrading programs whose elements constitute the Meléndez’s Pyramid for Slum Upgrading

Name of the project Pró-Favela Program for the Regularization of Favelas

[official name: Programa Municipal de Regularização de Favelas - Pró-Favela] Location Belo Horizonte, Brazil Implementation 1983 Duration 1983-ongoing Example of Regularization framework and coverage of basic needs Brief description Up until 1974, the government of Brazil had been following a repressive line in dealing with the slum problem: it eradicated those informal settlement areas it saw fit. With the weakening of the military regime after 1974, community organizations sprung within the favelas with the aim of obtaining land tenure legalization, slum upgrading and basic services. The community movements of Belo Horizonte were particularly well organized, and greatly contributed to the passing of the Belo Horizonte Pró-Favela law (Lei Municipal nº3.532/83) in 1983––the first legal instrument in Brazil for the regularization of informal settlements. The Pró-Favela Program was set up in support of the Pró-Favela Law. It allows for the integration of the favelas within the formal city fabric–– through the creation of ‘zones of special social interest’ (ZEIS)––, thus increasing the squatters’ access to public and social services. It also targets slum upgrading. Type of action - Land tenure regularization. - Slum upgrading (infrastructure upgrading, basic services, solid waste disposal, etc.). - Initiatives for poverty reduction and promotion of socioeconomic and cultural development of the communities. Scope Municipal Promoting agency At first, the Municipality of Belo Horizonte. Later, German Governmental Development Aid Agency (GIZ), the Italian Association of Volunteers for International Cooperation NGO (AVSI), and the Urbanizing Company of Belo Horizonte (URBEL) [established as a tool to implement the PROFAVELA Law]. More recently, the Inter-American Development Bank. Cost $30 million Innovative features - Coining of a new expression, planejamento participativo (‘participatory planning’), which describes a method of intervention in low-income areas that includes inhabitants in the decision-making and that incorporates their labor into the construction stages. - The law changed the zoning status of 120 slum areas, creating the concept of ‘zones of special social interest’ (ZEIS), which integrates them into the city’s legal and urban area. - Recognized favela residents their rights to the land they occupied by: a) the suspension and relaxation, on a temporary basis, of relevant laws; and b) the buy of the lots from the original owners, giving the land tenure titles to the settlers. - Application of a GIS-supported comprehensive upgrading methodology (GIS: geographic information systems). - URBEL’s training of the community on use of computer mapping and planning tools. This encouraged later self-sufficiency and autonomy. - Special attention to the rights and needs of women. Pró-Favela gives preference to women in the issuance of property title deeds and removes previous obstacles to the issuance of title deeds to females. Participation - Participatory planning and budgeting. - Community labor during construction stages.

Resettlement N/A. Sustainability Moderate: the program was well-conceived in terms of tools and capacity- building, and it has been included in the planning process of the Municipality. However, institutional and political limitations hinder the Municipality’s regularization capacity and reduce its effectivity. Additionally, the program was democratic and participative, but did not conceive the city’s market component; this ensured the opposition of economic forces. The program needs to develop ways to become more ‘market sustainable’ and its legal measures need to be further strengthened so as to meet political and bureaucratic challenges. Strengths - Issuance of title deeds to 120,000 dwellers in 22 settlements, upgrading of five slum areas with a population of 30,000. - Developed a pilot project for solid waste disposal that reached 25% of Belo Horizonte’s favelas. - Both the Law and Program eliminated the unrealistic standards that had kept favelas illegal (e.g., the size of the plots and width of the streets were required to be bigger, the slope of the streets needed to be flatter, etc.). - Establishment of URBEL to tackle technical problems in slum and settlement upgrading. Capacity-building was a feature of URBEL from the start. - Periodic joint evaluation seminars by URBEL. - A significant share of the funding package came from Belo Horizonte’s participatory budgeting scheme. - Concepts of ‘integrated upgrading’, ‘GIS methodology’, and ‘participatory planning’ pioneered by the program were formally adopted by the city’s master plan of urban development. Weaknesses - Lack of a strategy for subsidy targeting. - Lack of a cost recovery strategy. - Budgetary constraints have prevented the program from fully attaining its inception objectives. - Bureaucratic, political and judicial obstacles hindering the land tenure regularization process. - Not all inhabitants are able to invest the same and to comply even with relaxed laws, which delays the granting of title deeds and, in turn, of improved housing. - Deficient account of market forces over land, which did not make the “giving of land to the poor” a measure compatible with the economic system. Lessons learnt - Key role of NGOs to play in slum upgrading programs as intermediary institutions: they can act as a link between successive (and sometimes opposing) municipal administrations; they can exert pressure to complete an initiative under way. In addition, there are some instances in which NGOs are the only institution keeping record of the historical and documentary memory of the intervention process. In the Pró-Favela context, ASVI played that role, guaranteeing the continuation of the program in Belo Horizonte. - How pro-poor legislation can really make a difference: the Pró-Favela Law and Program have facilitated security of land tenure and status-regularization for tens of thousands of favelados. Illustrative figure 1: The figure shows two maps. In the first (left), one can observe the limits of the nine participative budgeting regions in Belo Horizonte. In the second map (right), information is showed regarding the categories of zone division––achieved by means of GIS technologies and dasymetric mapping––with the different values for residential construction (Law 9.959/10). The categories are the following: Environmental Preservation Zones (Zona de Preservação Ambiental, ZPA); Protection Zones (Zona de Proteção, ZP); Zones of Limited Densification (Zona de Adensamento Restrito, ZAR); Zones of Preferential Densification (Zona de Adensamento Preferencial, ZAP); Central Zones (Zona Central, ZC); Densificated Zone (Zona Adensada, ZA); Zones of Special Social Interest (Zona de Especial Interesse Social, ZEIS); and Big Equipment Zones (Zona de Grandes Equipamentos, ZE). The latter category stands for those areas of the city uniquely devoted to urban non-residential structures.

Illustrative figure 2: the two following maps show the census sectors of Belo Horizonte before and after the city’s zone division. This process helped to carry out a more accurate census of the population and a better assessment of the territorial situation. Having divided the city in zones, an accurate calculation of the number of households a zone can resists––specially ZEIS––is possible.

Image credits 1. [Zone division of Belo Horizonte]. Reprinted from Revista Brasileira de Estudos de População, by Glauco Umbelino and Clodoveu Davis Jr., 2015 from http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0102- 30982015000300511#f2 Copyright 2015 by Glauco Umbelino and Clodoveu Davis Jr. 2. [Census sectors of Belo Horizonte]. Reprinted from Revista Brasileira de Estudos de População, by Glauco Umbelino and Clodoveu Davis Jr., 2015 from http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0102- 30982015000300511#f2 Copyright 2015 by Glauco Umbelino and Clodoveu Davis Jr. Sources Fernandes & Pereira, 2010: 171-199; Huchzermeyer, 2004: 60; Ruster & Imparato, 2003: 177-79, 265; UN-HABITAT, 2004: 7; Vasconcelos de Freitas, 2015: 41-48.

Name of the project Integral Development Plan of Villa El Salvador

[official name: Programa de Desarrollo Integral para Villa El Salvador, Perú] Location Lima, Peru Implementation 1984 Duration 1984-ongoing Example of Community participation and organization Brief description Villa El Salvador (henceforth VES) is one of the biggest squatter settlements in Peru. Despite its condition of slum area, nowadays it has become one of the most important districts in the country in terms of its contribution to the national GDP. This was enabled by the Integral Development Plan there implemented. VES was founded in 1971 as a state-assisted housing scheme to accommodate 4,000 squatter families living in central Lima. The government chose a flat area of desert in Southern Lima (26 km from the city center), laid out a city plan in a neat grid pattern, and allocated plots without basic services or infrastructure to squatters. This became a barriada asistada (“assisted shantytown”). The Velasco administration adopted a collaborative stance vis-à-vis the grassroots organizations and provided basic services. However, not all subsequent administrations have followed the same line, subjecting the community to the particular interests of the political party in power. The community has also deeply suffered Shining Path’s terror. In such context was born the Integral Development Plan, a partnership between the government and the local CBOs. To this day, the Plan has provided VES with basic services, infrastructure, housing, and formal inclusion into the city of Lima. The program’s sustainability and community development have been ensured by strong CBOs and a robust sense of community. Development professionals consider VES a case of a successful participatory process taking place in an area with poor natural resources. Type of action - Infrastructure improvement (with special attention to schools). - Basic services provision (e.g., electricity, drinking water, public transport, road pavement, and sewage systems). - Home improvement (by 2015 most housing was multi-story and made of permanent materials). - Regularization of land tenure titles. - Lima’s first metro line to reach VES. Scope Municipal Promoting agency The District Municipality of Villa El Salvador; the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima; the Catholic Church; and local NGO DESCO (Center for Development Studies and Promotion). International entities, such as the German Government, contributed in specific infrastructure projects. Cost $330 million (estimated value of the district’s real estate) Innovative features - Combination of a self-community management approach and an inclusive city policy from an early stage (state support through a policy of enablement and direct communication). - The trajectory of VES has been that of building a city, rather than just housing. This was achieved by means of an integrated approach. - Direct dialogue between the community and the authorities. - Incorporation of tradition and culture into the development process (tailored approach). Participation - VES had since its inception been independently organized by a neighborhood committee (junta vecinal), La Comunidad Urbana Autogestionaria de Villa El Salvador, CUAVES (“The Self-Managed Urban Community of Villa El Salvador”). - Participative budgeting since the 1980s.

- Over the years, the development plan is revised through thematic working groups, general meetings, and citizen consultations. This generates intense community interest and participation. Community leaders changed periodically. - Active community participation from the start that allowed the community to acquire knowledge on political mechanisms and government. This enabled it to lobby municipal administrations with relative success. - Sheer number of grassroots management initiatives, such as: communal work, cooperative ownership of land (which emulates ancient Incan traditions), improvement of the tax collection system, feeding centers, and a street paving scheme. Resettlement The Integral Development Plan for VES started out as a resettlement strategy. After resettlement, the area became a slum that has progressively developed into a city. Sustainability High: - Education in sustainability, citizenship, and political mechanism to enable autonomy. - The neighborhood has continued to grow and improve steadily over the decades given its high levels of community engagement. Creation of economic opportunities has contributed to financial sustainability. - Strong attachment to the place has been a catalyst for the community to look after the environment. Strengths - VES never had an irregular slum layout; instead it had a well-defined grid pattern, wide streets, decent plot sizes, and spaces reserved for public use. This was conducive to facilitated basic services provision, quality development, and densification. - The VES’s industrial park has become one of the most important of the kind in the country. It was part of the initiatives for the local economic development of the neighborhood, attaining great success. It all started as a group of small workshops. It is important to mention the big contribution these workshops made to the community through their construction of community infrastructure and facilities. Soon enough, what was already an industrial park had been consolidated and integrated into the formal economic markets of the city. The park also improved the income per capita in neighborhood, as well as employment, mobility and infrastructure demands. - All along, strong CBOs compensated for weak Peruvian institutions. Their capacitation in political mechanisms enabled the community to engage in direct dialogue with authorities and thus exert more pressure on the fulfillment of their rights. - VES is now home to 350,000 people and literacy and electrification rates are well above the Peruvian average. - Community management of funds is subject to regular audits that ensure its total transparency. - The settlement does not suffer anymore from the lack of basic services, disconnection from public transport networks, or shortage of public spaces that do usually affect slum areas. Weaknesses - Still to this day, 100% of VES residents fit into the country’s lowest bracket. - Projects are developed with scarce funds and little technical support. - Lacks formal monitoring and evaluation stages. - The formal private sector is largely absent, which makes VES dependent on funds from a weak public sector and, to a much lesser extent, international agencies. - There is a recent worrying trend: occupation for housing purposes of lands destined for environmental reserves and public use. Lessons learnt - Even though participation is one of the most powerful tools in slum upgrading, it does not often produce meaningful results without the support structure that a well-defined program provides.

- The Municipality of Lima has over the years replicated the VES model in other places, and, now, over 60% of its squatter settlers live in barriadas asistadas, with varying degrees of success. Nevertheless, it is important to note that few cities have access to such large areas of cheap and undeveloped land to provide to squatters, and not all slum communities have the profound levels of organization/unity found in VES. - Relevance of the commitment and willingness of residents, authorities and professionals to cooperate and find affordable solutions together, and not in a detached way. - Technical support should be trained on the use of grass-roots organizations and community participation to produce capacity-building and strategies that are propitious to bottom-up development. Technical support is essential to turn poor neighborhoods or slums into self-help communities. Illustrative image 1: Villa El Salvador in 1971-1972. Back then, houses were made of straw in a hut-like fashion, and basic services were non-existent.

Illustrative image 2: Today, after more than thirty years of the execution of the Plan, Villa El Salvador offers a dignified space to its inhabitants.

Illustrative image 2: community members building infrastructure in Villa El Salvador, 1996.

Illustrative image 3: Children at Catholic School Fe y Alegría, Villa El Salvador, 2001.

Image credits 1. [Villa El Salvador in 1971-2]. Reprinted from Asociación Amigos de la Villa website, by Amigos de la Villa, 1971 from http://www.amigosdevilla.it/paseando/02.htm Copyright 1971 by Asociación Amigos de la Villa. 2. [Villa El Salvador today] Reprinted from Peru-com website, by Peru.com, 2014 from https://peru.com/actualidad/mi-ciudad/elecciones-2014-estos-son- candidatos-villa-salvador-noticia-282624 Copyright 2014 by Peru.com. 2. [Community works in Villa El Salvador]. Reprinted from Slide Share website, by Institución Educativa Fe y Alegría, 2009 from https://es.slideshare.net/elarcalle/historia-de-fe-y-alegria-17 Copyright 2009 by Institución Educativa Fe y Alegría. 3. [School children in Villa El Salvador]. Reprinted from Slide Share website, by Institución Educativa Fe y Alegría, 2009 from https://es.slideshare.net/elarcalle/historia-de-fe-y-alegria-17 Copyright 2009 by Institución Educativa Fe y Alegría. Sources Azcueta, 1998: 1-8; Azcueta, 2003: 20-42; Bartesaghi Koc, 2014: 1-9; Biblioteca CF+S, 2000; Echegaray & Marulanda, 2001: 25-55; King & Abbot, 2016; Ruster & Imparato, 2003: 431-470.

Name of the project Local Development Program (PRODEL) of Nicaragua

[official name: Programa de Infraestructura con Fondos no Reembolsables, Programa de Desarrollo Local, PRODEL] Location Several Nicaraguan cities (Since 1994: Ocotal, Estelí, Somoto, León, Chinandega, Chichigalpa. Since 1998: Matagalpa and Jinotega. Since 2002: Masaya, Rivas, Masatepe, Managua, and Chontales). Implementation 1994 Duration Two phases: 1994-1998/ 1998-2001. In 2003, PRODEL became an NGO and has continued the PRODEL Program to this day. Example of Access to credit, transparency, and good governance Brief description PRODEL was part of a new generation of initiatives (together with FUPROVI and the Chilean Progressive Housing Program) seeking to reach the lowest-income groups in urban areas with improved housing and living conditions in a sustainable way. Unlike other programs, PRODEL does not carry out the work itself but instead provides technical assistance and financial support to households, CBOs, and municipal authorities. PRODEL’s loans to households and local enterprises are implemented by the national Popular Credit Bank (Banco Popular). Until 2003–– when PRODEL became a foundation and undertook the execution of the Program– –, it was INIFOM (Nicaraguan Institute for Municipal Promotion) the actor charged with carrying out the PRODEL Program. The Program is made of four components: basic infrastructure provision loans, home upgrading loans, micro-enterprise loans, and assistance in institutional development and technical upgrading. The technical work is done by a technical unit set up by municipal authorities. More than 78,000 families have seen their lives improved by dint of this program. Type of action - Slum and housing upgrading (both rural and urban) through micro-credit loans. - Repair and provision of basic infrastructure in squatter settlements (street paving, introduction of potable water and electricity, and sewage and storm drainage systems). - Construction of sport areas, playgrounds, schools and nurseries. - Technical advice for self-help housing, home improvement, and loan financing (assessing credit needs and allocating the loaned money to needs). - Loans to local enterprises to stimulate the local economy. - Community building. Scope Municipal (thirteen Nicaraguan cities) Promoting agency Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA); Municipalities of Nicaragua; and, later on, the Nicaraguan Foundation PRODEL and the Inter-American Development Bank. Cost $7 million Innovative features - Changed the stereotyping of low-income households and their CBOs as mere beneficiaries of projects by reinforcing the idea that they are groups with knowledge, resources, planning, organizing and managing skills. - To this day, PRODEL has developed a rigorous framework for the management of financial indicators that have ensured increased governability, efficiency and transparency of the transactions and operations. - In the case of slum infrastructure provisions, credit is granted on condition that the communities contribute more than 35% of the project’s value through labor, machinery, funds or other contributions in kind. - Strengthens municipal governance by providing funding, capacity-training, and by promoting the direct involvement of local leaders in local development actions. - PRODEL applies a broader political reconciliation, decentralization, and democratization approach. - There is specific technical assistance to women-headed households.

Participation The combination of all its participatory strategies so far, has originated the PRODEL Community Participation Model. This is based on the premise that families who take part in decision-making, administration and execution of infrastructure, and housing improvement increase their commitment to co-finance and maintain the results. Among those strategies are: - Equipping the community with the tools necessary to deal with organizational aspects (e.g., community labor and overseeing of funds). - CBOs and community leaders are trained to negotiate with public and private sectors to identify solutions to their problems. - The community takes part in slum upgrading tasks. Resettlement N/A. Sustainability High: - PRODEL model was designed to continue––and even to increase the volume of––its activities after SIDA funding ceased (e.g., by strengthening local institutions; pooling of resources from municipal and beneficiary communities; and setting up an autonomous structure that ensures continuity despite the changes in government). - Levels of cost recovery to date show that funds have become financially sustainable. - High commitment on the part of the communities contribute to the sustainability of the achievements. - However, there is no account of the PRODEL taking into account pro- environmental actions. Strengths - Acts as economic catalyst of the communities by promoting micro-enterprises and increasing the value of the homes. - Scale of the infrastructure upgrading was nearly twice that originally planned. This result was closely linked to high levels of community participation and training. - Its community participation model has established new habits of control within municipal governments, better reporting to the communities. - The Program follows a comprehensive approach that targets problems beyond physical deficits. - Evaluations of PRODEL’s criteria for selecting neighborhoods confirm that it ensures that the most impoverished urban areas are reached. - Its loan structure results in a revolving fund, which ensures cost recovery and sustainability. This encourages independence from further external aid. - PRODEL’s work through the INIFOM (whose Directive Committee is composed of the mayors of Nicaragua’s main cities) has resulted in mayors from different political parties accepting a common methodology for working with the poor under clear and transparent participative actions. Weaknesses - Weak municipal support given politically polarized nationwide environment at the onset of the program. This situation has improved to some degree. - Little prior experience with mutual-help and community directed solutions. - This kind of projects takes time to develop before funding can be allocated, requires a lot of technical help, involves long negotiations, and needs modest levels of funding. Thus, they present difficulties for international agencies to provide funds to, as these are often under pressure to keep down staff costs, rapidly spend funds, and provide large loans. - Housing and micro-enterprised credits have not been managed with profitability criteria. - The monitoring system of PRODEL’s achievements is inadequate. Lessons learnt - Relevance of developing clear, explicit, written agreements setting the conditions and obligations of each stakeholder. - Housing/Improvement subsidies should be avoided when funding trough loans is possible.

- It should be ensured that women can take part as easily as men in slum upgrading/housing programs. This means that programs should acknowledge men’s and women’s different needs and capacities for contributing to self-help and community labor. In addition, programs should also facilitate access for single parent households by establishing nurseries or day care facilities. - In comparison to other loan programs in Nicaragua, the rate of arrears for PRODEL loans is low. This a result of strict levels of supervision and requirements. On another note, such reliable revolving fund has also safeguarded its long-term sustainability. - The fact that PRODEL includes slum infrastructure upgrading rather than only housing loans guarantees that the poorest groups with too low an income to afford a housing loan can still benefit. Illustrative image: Community participation in the works introducing drinking water, a sewage system, a storm drainage system, and road paving in the city of León. The community was assisted by a technical group all along. This method enables the community to truly owns its development.

Image credits [PRODEL in León]. Reprinted from PRODEL website, by PRODEL, 2003 from http://www.prodel.org.ni/es/proyecto/6/ Copyright 2003 by PRODEL. Sources (Stein, 2001: 11-36) (Stein 1999: 1-44) (Sida, 1997: 222-232) (PRODEL, 2012) (Becerra et al., 2005: 17-96) (Sida, 2005: 1-12).

Name of the project Self-Management Community Upgrading Program of Tijuana

[official name: Programa “Autogestión” de Tijuana, en cooperación con el Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (PRONASOL)] Location Tijuana, Mexico Implementation 1990 Duration 1990-ongoing Example of Cost recovery mechanisms and budget control Brief description The upgrading of slums in Tijuana was broadly influenced by Mexico’s ongoing process of democratization and decentralization. Tijuana is a particular Mexican city: neighboring California, US, it hosts 700 formal maquiladora factories (assembly plants) and at least 200 informal more, which together employ at least 200,000 people. Unemployment is very low due to its proximity to the United States. Migrants and maquiladora workers are usually those who inhabit the informal settlements of Tijuana. It is important to note that these informal settlements do not resemble the chaotic face of Brazil’s or Venezuela’s. Rather, they are scarcely- serviced informal land subdivisions. Given all its conditions, Tijuana is one of the main destinations for internal migration in Mexico. However, international migration, the increasing presence of large transnational companies, and drug trafficking also affect the city. In Tijuana, rapid growth and big migration flows have meant rapid expansion of informal settlements. This condition combined with Tijuana’s irregular topography, the great number of inhabited risk areas, and the fact that almost 50% of the land is dedicated to low- density housing, creates a situation in which land is very expensive and informality very difficult to address. In 1990, Mayor Carlos Montejo developed the Self-Management Slum Upgrading Program to improve the infrastructure of slum areas. By 1991, 194 Self- Management Committees (Comités de Autogestión) had been created. The principle of this program was to have the authorities support self-help slum upgrading. Gradually, the National Solidarity Program, PRONASOL (Programa Nacional de Solidaridad) also started to carry out programs in the area. The problem with this was that the PRONASOL was a federal initiative (Institutional Revolutionary Party, PRI), and the Municipality, and by extension the Self-Management Slum Upgrading Program, were governed by the National Action Party (PAN). The history of animosity between these two parties conditioned the upgrading of Tijuana’s slums, with the PAN complaining about the self-serving and partisan upgrading carried out by PRI’s PRONASOL. In 1996, when the PRONASOL was entirely decentralized to the municipalities, this program and the Self-Management Program started to find ways to set the stage for joint work. Even though municipal slum upgrading efforts have diminished to this day, its achievements since 1990 are very visible, improving the quality of life of many ––even though most achievements are only physical. An innovative feature of this program is that the Self-Management Committees receive the funds directly from the promoting agencies and from the communities themselves (the latter contribute at least 30% of the project’s value, sometimes reaching the 50%). Type of action - Home and slum upgrading. - Infrastructure and basic services provision and reparation (electricity, street paving, sidewalks, access ramps and pothole repair). - Community infrastructure (sport courts and fields, schools, health clinics, and community centers). - Property regularization and a new cadaster system. - Special focus on building storm drainage systems (in 1993, torrential rains and the lack of stormwater drainage had caused the death of 30 informal settlers). Scope Municipal

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Promoting agency The Municipality of Tijuana, the State Government of Baja California, and the Federal Government through the PRONASOL, the State Commission for Public Services of Tijuana (CESPT), the Federal Commission on Electricity, and the State Commission for the Regularization of Land Tenure. Cost $40 million (of which, $17 million contributed by local communities themselves) Innovative features - It pioneered a participatory approach that couples participatory budgeting with community management of small local upgrading projects, with the community making an upfront cash contribution of around 30% of the project’s value. The remaining 70% is paid by the government directly to the community in the form of termly subsidies. The Government does not give the ensuing check until communities have spent the previous amount: this ensures transparency and cost consciousness. - The Municipality transferred funds directly to the committees. This improved the resident’s self-esteem, as well as their relationship with the local authorities. - In order for the municipalities to transfer the subsidies to the committees, the committees need to first have raised at least 30% of the project’s total value from community members. This guarantees mainly four outcomes: a) the Municipality only subsidizes projects that the community really wants/needs; b) communities will select cost-effective projects, thus keeping the project within budget; c) communities develop an early appreciation of each of the projects, which in turn enhances their readiness to maintain them; and d) communities learn that development cannot be free but a result of their efforts, which then are correspondingly rewarded. - Committees are charged with raising the communities’ contribution. - Committees were encouraged to form exclusively for the execution of works in order to avoid the clientelism that has traditionally marred Mexican CBOs. - Among Tijuana’s numerous slum upgrading initiatives within the Self- Management Framework, the Manos a la Obra Program (Let’s Roll up Our Sleeves) stands out. This program focused on allowing poor communities to set their priorities, manage their resources, and assume partial costs of the infrastructure works. - For communities to execute infrastructure works, the Municipality sets groups of technical experts that train the committees (who in turn train the communities) to take charge of contracting, financial management, and execution. Those upgrading works that are outside the people’s capacities are tasked to a contractor, which is selected and supervised by the community. Participation - Participatory budgeting had been initially conducted through large community gatherings, but, as the program developed, delegations and sub-delegations became the preferred representation channels. - Direct mechanisms of participation between the communities and authorities have ushered in a new generation of active community leaders. - The Self-Management Committees spurred the rotation of community leaders and gave place to more community organizations. - One of the results of the program so far has been COPLADEM, a participatory planning structure at the municipal level. It organizes regular consultation with Tijuana’s various interest groups. - Before authorizing the execution of any work and receiving any municipal/state/federal funds, the committees have to gather more than 30% of the agreed community contribution. - However, participation needs to be fostered to its full extent as most residents limit themselves to just pay their share of the community contribution. Resettlement N/A. Sustainability Moderate/High: - Sustainability was in a way ensured by strict technical standards and project supervision routines. This also heightened the quality of the resulting projects.

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- With diminished resources, the upgrading program has continued to this day and become a key element of Tijuana’s poverty reduction strategy. - The fact that the PAN has continued to run Tijuana enables the continuation of the program. However, changes in the municipal administration every three years (even though the party in power does not change) do affect the program’s development. - Sustainability is somewhat undermined by the fact that the programs do not really address social, physchological, and emotional aspects. - Sustainability is also jeopardized to some extent by the lack of information on the program for present and future maintenance or monitoring. Strengths - The program has successfully achieved a significant amount of community improvements, mainly carried out by community members. - Slum upgrading was accompanied with methodological and institutional development. - The cost of the work is low. - The emphasis put on non-partisan resident-involvement in the works. - Relaxation and flexibility of standards for land tenure regularization: 77,000 titles were issued. - Budget control is enhanced by having the communities manage all funds (both the communities’ contributions and the authorities’). - Communities operate at a very high level of cost-recovery: they are informed, aware, and included in the discussion of upgrading alternatives and of the cost of each. This, combined with having them contribute an upfront share of the cost of every project, prevents the program from selecting costly solutions or ending up stalled due to budget constraints. - The relationship between the communities and the local government is now more transparent and fruitful. Weaknesses - Tijuana’s upgrading programs were greatly affected by the difficult relationship between the PRI federal government and the PAN local government, a condition that lasts to this day. - Half of the works conducted were paving projects. This is mainly due to: a) street paving has a symbolic value for the people, and communities, when tasked with decision-making, tend to first prefer more visible projects that improve the immediate aesthetics of the locations they inhabit; and b) unpaved roads create problems of access during rainy season and dust during dry season, rendering the access to settlements difficult. - The program is more focused on technical matters than on social ones. - Slowness in responding to community needs due to administrative handicaps. - Level of municipal investment varied greatly from year to year due to political and electoral cycles. - Lack of participatory information-gathering means that future government planning won’t have access to socioeconomic information on the area. Lessons learnt - The program has challenged common assumptions about the ability of poor urban communities to participate in development programs. However, since community participation is far from complete, the program’s long-term sustainability is hindered. - Given the traditional activism of Tijuana’s CBOs in the social sector fields (e.g., health, education, and assistance to vulnerable groups) and their absence from the fields of housing and urban development, aiming at fusing the two would be very beneficial for the communities. - It will be very positive for Tijuana, due to its tradition of industrial city, to involve the private sector and maquiladoras in the upgrading of the city’s informal settlements. - The program shows how important it is to integrate the community in the planning, executing and financing of the upgrading works. This empowers them, increases their self-esteem, as well as it ensures cost-recovery and budget control.

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Descriptive image Not found Sources Anguiano & Ordoñez Barba, 1994: 69-74; Campbell & Katz, 2004: 69-97; Fuentes Fierro, 1997: 61-70; Negrete Mata & Hernández Vicencio, 2001: 223-224; Ruster & Imparato, 2003: 397-430.

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Name of the project Rosario Habitat Program

[official name: Programa Rosario Hábitat dentro del Plan Estratégico de Rosario (PER)] Location Rosario, Argentina Implementation 2002 Duration 2002-ongoing Example of Political will and social capital Brief description The city of Rosario is Argentina’s third biggest and an important industrial axis in the Río de la Plata basin. At the turn of the millennium, 13% (120,000 people) of Rosario’s population lived in informal settlements. In relative terms, this figure made Rosario to have the highest incidence of slums in the country. Rosario, together with Córdoba, was a better option for those who searched better opportunities in urban areas without wishing to meet the living costs involved in such an expensive capital as Buenos Aires. Thus, many people arrived to Rosario from the different Argentinian provinces and, unable to access the formal land market, they settled for informal living at the villas miseria (informal settlements) of the city. Initially, slum dwellers were rural migrants, but with the increased unemployment and inflation resulting from desindustrialization, Rosarian slums were also inhabited by “new poor people” (nuevos pobres). The situation was alarming: most slum homes were built on ravines with risks of soil erosion and landslides, others were on the bank of highly contaminated streams or risk of flooding, and some were located upon dump sites. The biggest majority of them lacked the most basic services. Against this critical background, the Municipality of Rosario became the recipient of a share of an IDB loan made to Argentina in 2001. With the funds ($43 million), the Municipality invested an additional amount of $28 million to set in motion an integral upgrading program that combined physical and social initiatives. Up until 2002, the Municipality had only carried out partial improvement projects in the city’s squatter communities. The Rosario Habitat Program is particularly special due to its strong focus on incentivizing political will and generating social capital in slum communities. At present, the program has assisted 11 informal settlements with 980 beneficiary families (that is, 5,251 people). The Rosario Habitat Program experience is now a nationally appraised slum upgrading best practice. It has been deeply studied and discussed at academic as well as technical levels, and other municipalities have got inspiration from it to assess their own slum problems. Type of action - Slum and home upgrading. - Social housing construction. - Basic services and infrastructure (water, gas, electricity and sewage systems; road paving; 2 health clinics, 2 schools, 2 sport courts, and 3 public squares). - Regularization of land titles. - Social services. - Social protection measures for the most vulnerable groups (children and adolescents at risk, undernourishment prevention, women, elderly people, etc.). - Creation of employment opportunities and support of micro-enterprise creation to foster the economic development of the area (by of 2017, 1,858 young persons and micro-entrepreneurs had benefitted from vocational training). - Cultural activities to enhance community cohabitation (special focus on gender equality). - Institutional development.

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Scope Municipal Promoting agency The Government of Argentina, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the Municipality of Rosario. Cost $71,7 million Innovative features - The Habitat Program contributes to the improvement of the city at large: it betters urbanization, traffic, security, and environmental protection. In doing this, it includes slums in the formal fabric of the city. - The city of Rosario puts a great emphasis on the development of social capital. This is conducted through strengthened institutions and a solid political will. Social capital is mostly built through education and employment-creation initiatives, which enable the beneficiaries to overcome situations of social inequality and their lack of access to public services. - Some social initiatives were inspired by the lack of a certain need; however, many of them worked with the existing CBOs and financed those initiatives the community itself deemed necessary. - Self-critical assessment on the part of the local authorities to analyze the municipal instruments available to address urban and housing policies, as well as to assess transparency. - The program included specific initiatives to evaluate the root causes of poverty and informality for the particular context of Rosario. - It is worth noting the cooperation agreement engaged with the National University of Rosario and the Technical National University through the Pensar el Hábitat Program (‘Think the Habitat’). This initiative pooled valuable technical and academic knowledge from faculty, researchers, students, and technical experts. Participation The whole program is based on intense community participation. A municipal executing unit organizes this community participation vis-à-vis the different local government entities. Participation is not only conceived as a means to implement the program but as an end itself. By means of encouraging the community to participate, the program undertakes to promote decentralization, effectivity and transparency, as well as social capital and sustainable development. Some of the participative strategies were: - The community is previously trained on participatory planning through CBOs; then they participate in the program’s execution stage (through labor, monitoring, or auditing of the upgrading works). The works completed, the community is educated on the best ways to maintain the improved/acquired services or infrastructure. - Consensus-building activities in order to ensure future conflict resolution and joint planning. - Participatory budgeting. - From the onset, about 50% of the families met regularly with the CBOs to set the common lines of work and future steps in order to reach their objectives. - Many residents participated in sessions of garbage collection, gender equality workshops, leisure activities, and social integration seminars. Resettlement 28.4% of the beneficiary families (1,400 people) had to be resettled due to the high levels of risk entailed in the location of their homes. Sustainability High: - The program designed monitoring, evaluation, and maintenance mechanisms from an early stage. This has allowed that today, 16 years later, initial achievements are found in perfect conditions and development can be built upon that cohesive progress. - Cost recovery measures were put in place. Throughout the program, settlers contributed through labor, and then, in installments they paid part of the project’s cost back to the local authorities. This ensured the

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financial sustainability of the program and the possibility to continue assisting other slum communities independently from external agencies. Additionally, the communities’ contribution is assembled into different funds (one per community), whose administration is handed to the CBO in question. As a result, they have discretionary power over how to further improve their own neighborhoods. - High levels of transparency throughout the program’s execution ensure its sustainability and the community’s satisfaction with the results. - Pro-environment actions were undertaken, especially with regard to raising awareness. From a more technical point of view, erosion control measures, reforestation, construction of public parks and squares, and garbage collection systems were also part of the Habitat Program. Strengths - Needs are addressed in an integrated and integral manner. For instance, the ‘Growing’ Project (Proyecto Crecer) targets children from 2 to 5 years-old living in informal settlements. This project included several interlinked measures (nutritional security program, pedagogic and psychomotor stimulation, and recreational activities). - Previous partial projects had enabled the municipal government to gain experience and knowledge on the communities. Given this previous experiences, the local government had learnt about the importance of setting an independent coordinating unit to mediate between the authorities and the communities. This has allowed enhanced effectiveness and dynamism. - In 2003, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) recognized the Municipality of Rosario as an example of good governance and local development. Combined with political will in assisting informal settlements, this set of attributes guaranteed the success of the program. - Besides the IDB loan and the Municipal Government investment, the program has attracted funds from government-owned lands. Also, other actors such as construction firms, professional associations, universities and NGOs have become involved in the program’s development. - Constant efforts on the part of the local government to update and upgrade its urban intervention policies. This strong political will has been very decisive in the attainment of all the integrated results of the program. Weaknesses - The reach of the program so far––though very solid in what has been achieved––has not even reached 1/10 of Rosario’s slum dwellers. This sparks off the ‘quantity vs. quality’ debate. - Regarding community participation, it has been identified the predominance of an executing role among residents. It is important to reverse this tendency in order to generate more proactive, managerial, and independent attitudes. Lessons learnt - The focus on the social dimension demonstrates the difference that social capital can make. It generates a more integral community development; existing social networks are strengthened; community participation is fostered; and sustainability thus ensured. - The importance of including the communities in planning and auditing in order to generate credibility and thus anticipate problems that arise from an underlying lack of trust in the authorities. - The greatly positive effects of transforming informal settlements and of correspondingly incorporating them into the formal city fabric are perceived in the medium- and long-term. - The Rosario Habitat Program shows that sustainability depends both on the advance of each of its components as well as in the interaction and complementarity among them.

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- This program shows the importance of flexibility. The program’s goal was to improve the quality of life, and thus it created tailored approaches to the various needs of different communities.

Illustrative image: This was the appearance of the informal community of Oroño, Rosario, in 2017, before and after works introduced road pavement, garbage collection, water system, sewage and storm drainage system, electricity, home and slum upgrading, and reforestation. The road shown in the picture leads directly to the city center, connecting the informal settlement to the formal city fabric.

Illustrative Images 2 and 3: Staggering upgrading results in 1807 and 1878 Streets, in the informal settlement of La Lagunita (2002-2017).

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Illustrative Image 4: The images show an aspect of the social dimension of the program: youth vocational training programs. In particular, the images depict the welding workshop and two trained butchers at their workplace. These initiatives strongly foster community development through social capital generation. By investing in strong and self-valued minds, the program reaches further and deeper. This training programs have considerably increased the opportunities for young people in the communities to get a job. Before, their condition of slum dwellers virtually precluded them from being hired. Now, 35% of those who have taken part in the vocational training has a job.

Image credits 1. [Rosario Habitat Program in Oroño, Rosario]. Reprinted from Consejo Económico y Social de Rosario website, by Municipalidad de Rosario, 2017 from http://ceysrosario.org/documento/programa-rosario-habitat/ Copyright 2017 by Municipalidad de Rosario. 2. [1807 and 1878 Streets, La Lagunita, Rosario in 2002]. Reprinted from Consejo Económico y Social de Rosario website, by Municipalidad de Rosario, 2017 from http://ceysrosario.org/documento/programa-rosario- habitat/ Copyright 2017 by Municipalidad de Rosario. 3. [1807 and 1878 Streets, La Lagunita, Rosario in 2017]. Reprinted from Consejo Económico y Social de Rosario website, by Municipalidad de Rosario, 2017 from http://ceysrosario.org/documento/programa-rosario- habitat/ Copyright 2017 by Municipalidad de Rosario.

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4. [Youth Vocational Training Programs of Rosario Habitat Program]. Reprinted from Consejo Económico y Social de Rosario website, by Municipalidad de Rosario, 2017 from http://ceysrosario.org/documento/programa-rosario-habitat/ Copyright 2017 by Municipalidad de Rosario. Sources Arqueros Mejica et al., 2008: 1-21; Biblioteca CF+S, 2004; Garzia et al., 2004: 1-18; Ministerio del Interior, Obras Públicas y Vivienda de Argentina, 2017; Municipalidad de Rosario, 2017: 1-53; Rosenstein, 2005: 59-73; Saborido, 2006: 57-76.

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Name of the project Neighborhood Improvement Subprogram (SMB)

[official name: Subprograma de Mejoramiento de Barrios (SMB) dentro del marco de PROVIVIENDA] Location 26 municipalities of Bolivia: Department of Beni: Guayamerín, Riberalta, Santa Ana and Trinidad; Department of Cochabamba: Cochabamba and Quillacollo; Department of Chuquisaca: Monteagudo and Sucre; Department of La Paz: La Paz and El Alto; Department of Oruro: Oruro; Department of Pando: Cobija; Department of Potosí: Llalagua and Potosí; Department of Santa Cruz: Ascensión de Guarayos, Roboré, La Guardia, Mineros, Montero, Portachuelo, Warnes and Yapacaní; Department of Tarija: Bermejo, Tarija, Villamontes and Yacuiba. Implementation 1998 Duration 1998-2008 Example of Sustainability and monitoring Brief description Due to its high rates of urban growth from the 1970s onwards, Bolivia has long faced a big slum and homelessness problem. Up until 1998, the Government addressed this in very inadequate manners. Namely, it financed the creation of big unserviced housing schemes or overestimated people’s ability to repay loans or to maintain housing solutions. All of these initiatives resulted insufficient to tackle the rapidly growing rates of precarious suburban development. In 1998, the Bolivian Government together with the IDB set to effectively address the slum problem. The result was the PROVIVIENDA, a national program to improve Bolivia’s housing policy. The Neighborhood Improvement Subprogram (Subprograma de Mejoramiento de Barrios, SMB) is part of this broader framework, but it specifically tackles slum upgrading. Regarding the SMB, the IDB undertook the financing of 40% of the program’s value, while the Government of Bolivia and its municipalities assumed the rest of the costs. The SMB has the objective of improving the housing of low-income families living in Bolivian cities with more than 8,000 inhabitants. There are 45 cities in Bolivia that meet such requirement, but the program could only reach 26 of them. In total, the program addressed 104 slum neighbors, which benefited approximately 125,088 families. The SMB had a solid pedagogic component to ensure its long-term sustainability. For example, community participation and community financing and execution of the program were encouraged, instructed, and required. The program also aimed to improve the national housing and financial markets and to facilitate the access of the poorest groups to credit systems. The SMB applies an integral approach: takes into account the physical and the social in order to develop the areas. Type of action - Slum upgrading (drinking water provision, sewage systems, road pavement and improvement, storm drainage systems, electricity, and public lightning system). - Land regularization, and technical and legal assistance throughout the process. - Environmental initiatives (tree planting and reforestation). - Health modules (for example, some of the slum dwellers are part of cultures that defecate in the open, in nearby wastelands, which gives place to unsanitary conditions that can affect the health of communities. Given this situation, many houses lacked private restrooms. The program made one of its central axis the provision of the like). - Construction or improvement of community centers (this was a very special component that demonstrated the Program’s comprehension of the country’s different cultures and traditions. Bolivian cultures are traditionally community- oriented).

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- Community development to ensure long-term sustainability of physical as well as social projects. - In response to the 1998 earthquake in Aiquile, Mizque, and Totora, a further component was added: reconstruction of the houses and infrastructure damaged by the earthquake. Scope Municipal (acting in 26 Bolivian cities) Promoting agency Inter-American Development Bank and the Government of Bolivia. Cost $51,10 million Innovative features - The SMB had a strong focus on environmental protection. To that end it carried out reforestation and tree planting activities; educated the communities in environmental protection; and instructed them on how some of their habits could be detrimental for the environment. - The SMB, drawing from Bolivian tradition, put a great emphasis on community development, seeing it as key in attaining long-term sustainability of achievements. Among the initiatives, there were projects to foster gender equality in the family and in community organizations. Community development also entailed raising awareness in the implications of community participation: effects, obligations, and responsibilities. - The SMB had a component of promoting artisan arts and crafts. It organized workshops for communal teaching and learning. At present, many people have admitted that these acquired skills enabled them to earn extra income. - Within the social dimension, sex talks were included. This raised awareness about dos and do not’s. Participation High: - Bolivia is a country that traditionally attaches great importance to the community. This was reflected in the consecution of the program: collective work initiatives were set up right away, which conducted most of the works. Technical work was provided by the Municipality in question with the purpose of filling in the gaps. - No works could start without the community having convened and decided on priorities. - Residents were grouped into committees by street and bloc in order to encourage community participation. However, this program did not include the community at all stages of the program cycle. Instead, it replaced community participation at some stages by community development, which incentivized the communities to continue exploring for ways to improve after the program is completed. - Dwellers were trained on leadership (some), maintenance, monitoring, self-help construction, fiscal auditing of public spending, and execution (some, through committees). - Children and adolescent leadership was promoted. Regarding environmental awareness, this was key: the younger groups seemed to be the ones more prone to changing bad habits and encouraged their parents to change. Resettlement N/A. Sustainability High: - By strengthening communal networks and organization, enhancing their skills in management, mobilization, and participation, the SMB attained the sustainability of its results. - Residents were trained on different areas such as plumbing, gardening, electricity, or construction. This allowed to save costs to a large extent. After the program’s completion many of them state that these acquired skills enabled them to access the labor market. - The communities were educated in hygiene and environment protection. - Given the climatologic conditions in some Bolivian cities, the number of trees and green areas is there very limited. The SMB conducted a study to see which trees thrived best in each of the national climates and carried out reforestation and tree planting initiatives. These actions also addressed risks in erosion and

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landslide of informal settlements. Such projects increased the environmental sustainability of the city at large, as well as it improved the aesthetics of and the quality of life in the areas intervened. - Achievements of the SMB paved the way for a more visual upgrading conducted by the renown Barrios de Verdad Program. As the PRIMED Program would pave the way for the PUI in Medellin (see Case-Study Sheet nº8 for PUI Program). This feature illustrates the success of the SMB in building a strong base for further sustainable development. Strengths - Construction companies were incentivized to hire local people for the works. - At first, the integrated approach, combining physical and social dimensions, was confusing to external companies (construction and consultancy). However, during the execution of the upgrading, innovative methods for joint work in both dimensions were conceived. This ensured that the multidisciplinary approach was followed, which has greatly contributed to the sustainability of the program’s results at large. - The SMB was successful in its strategy to mobilize local resources through the design of a public tendering system: this increased municipal contributions from 30 to 40% of the costs in the final process. This support always included contributions in kind (in the form of work) from the communities. - The program’s method for selecting the beneficiary municipalities (public tendering) was designed to avoid clientelism and political pressure. - By introducing lighting to these settlements, usually far away from city centers, security was considerably increased. - Road paving was an essential element in guaranteeing community building: in the aftermath of the program, communities interact outside. - The tree planting and reforestation component has entailed that communities feel proud about their neighborhoods and take care of green areas together. This has propitiated neighbors to work further on the image of their communities and thus encouraged local commerce or even tourism. - Land regularization motivated home improvement as a general rule. - The teams of engineers of the program had the challenge of the high risk locations of most informal settlements. For instance, in La Paz, most of the squatter settlements are located on hillsides with slopes ranging from 35% to more than 60% degrees. Other slums are built on top of sedimentary deposits of gravel, clay, and sand; which multiplies the possibilities of landslides. However, from the beginning, the program ruled out the possibility of resettlement and worked carefully and thoroughly with what was already there. This geographical challenge, a factor of most of the Bolivian squatting, slowed the process and limited its reach; but the technical experts approached it in a way that ensured the consistency and sustainability of what was upgraded. Weaknesses - The program applied the same criteria for selecting beneficiary cities in all cases, when Bolivia is a highly diverse country. This aspect should be revised and adapted to equitable standards. - Lack of information on the terrains and their ownership on the part of the municipalities hampered and slowed the initiation of the program. - Limited funds did not enable the continuation of the program in the longer-term. Only the wealthiest municipalities, as La Paz, were able to integrate the program as a line of action of its municipal development plan. - The administration of the funds was adjudicated to a state entity, whose monitoring and evaluations were based merely on economic indicators. This ignored the social dimension in its entirety, even though it was a specific part of the program. Lessons learnt The social, geographic, and institutional variations from city to city gives place to difficulties in extracting lessons. Nonetheless, some valuable lessons can be drawn: - In order to ensure transparency, the SMB hired three different companies for intervening the areas (the constructing company, the supervision company, and the consulting agency on community development and land regularization). This

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gave place to uncoordinated efforts, with the social initiatives taking place before the physical works had even begun. Luckily, this situation was reversed and the program acquired the integration and cohesion that defines its results today. Later stages only hired two different companies: one for construction and another for supervision, community development, and land regularization. - Future programs that draw inspiration from the SMB need to be very careful if imitating their approach to community development. If the approach is not tailored to the community in question, it can generate a feeling of exclusion among its members and, in turn, greater urban segregation. Illustrative image Not found. Sources Brakarz, 2002: 115-122; Constance, 2005; IDB, 2011: 1-50; Rivas, 2007: 3-53; Villagra Romay, 2006: 10-102; Winchester, 2005: 17.

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Name of the project Popular Habitat Program, FUPROVI

[official name: Programa Habitat Popular Urbano, FUPROVI] Location Costa Rica (nationwide) Implementation 1988 Duration 1988-ongoing Example of Strong intermediary structure Brief description It is commonplace among national housing policies in Latin America that the subsidies fail to target the lowest income groups: funds tend to be hijacked by middle and lower-middle classes while the poorest groups are left excluded. In Costa Rica, the Foundation for the Promotion of Housing (FUPROVI) was set up in 1987 to fight such aftermath. This initiative also matched the recent intense housing movement within civil society: multiple grassroots associations demanding the right to housing had emerged among the lowest-income groups. In aiming for more equality in housing terms, FUPROVI was singled out by the Government to manage a development aid package from the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida). Thus, the Popular Habitat Program was set in motion to tackle each bottleneck of public housing subsidy programs. Through FUPROVI, families applying for national housing subsidies obtain assistance––in legal, administrative, financial, social, and construction terms––, throughout the slum upgrading process. The FUPROVI system works as follows. First, the institution provides assistance, supervision, and conducts the planning of projects. FUPROVI charges between 16 and 23% of a project’s cost for its services, which contributes to its financial sustainability. Second, the communities themselves are charged with the management of funds, procurement of materials and technical services, warehousing and stock administration, construction, and the setting up of support services (e.g., soup kitchens and daycare). The program is also well adapted to the country’s particularities: in its quest for suitably located land, it takes into account the Costa Rican tradition of detached houses and strong cultural resistance to densification. Type of action - Planning and engineering. - Land tenure regularization and legal assistance. - Assisted mutual-help construction. - Social development (i.e., capacity building that contributed to economic sustainability). - Slum upgrading. Scope National Promoting agency The Swedish International Development Agency (Sida), the Costa Rican NGO FUPROVI, the Government of Costa Rica, and the National Housing Mortgage Bank (BANVI). Cost $14 million Innovative features - Setting up of a strong intermediary and independent structure, whose main benefits are: increased flexibility and efficiency, strengthening of community organization, training and capacity-building of staff and community, and a decentralized, independent management model. - For the lowest-income brackets to receive housing subsidies, FUPROVI set up a requirement of 30 hours of labor a week for an average of 18 to 24 months; this ensures that only people who really need it apply for the subsidies. When families commit to these requirement, they have to sign a formal contract with the institution. - The Popular Habitat Program promotes the participation of females as a key element in community and family development.

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- For those families that do not qualify for the national subsidy given their extreme poverty, the program has developed new models in order to reach them. - Most funding supports housing projects, but special allocations are also made for institutional development, studies, training, support for income generation, and environmental improvement projects. This makes the Popular Habitat Program one of the earliest comprehensive approaches to the slum problem. Participation - The community is tasked with the management of funds, procurement of materials and specialized services, warehousing and stock administration, setting up of support services (mainly soup kitchens and daycare), and carrying out the construction. - There is not much community participation in the planning stages, as this is conducted by FUPROVI itself. Resettlement N/A. Housing subsidies were distributed irrespective of their final purpose (new housing or home upgrading). However, this did not entail resettlement policies; the families or housing associations were at all times in the position to decide what to do with the subsidy. Sustainability High: - The sustainability of the development is ensured by the fact that the implementation itself is mainly carried out by the community (mutual-help upgrading), with FUPROVI only conducting planning, supervisory, and assistant roles. - The FUPROVI model incurs in capacity building. This enables further development initiatives once FUPROVI’s services cease. The skills acquired during the program cycle enable the communities to have a more complete toolkit for the improvement of their habitats. - FUPROVI has aimed at full recovery cost by seeking to preserve as much as possible of its seed capital of $14 million, which has been kept in a rotating fund. First, FUPROVI loans the families money (from the Swedish aid package). Then, the families use it for housing purposes (be it upgrading or new housing acquisition). Last, the families pay FUPROVI back once they obtain the national housing subsidy, for which FUPROVI helps them apply. In this manner, households are integrated into the national financial system and FUPROVI’s revolving fund is replenished, allowing it to help other families. - The program cycle completed, communities are able to undertake further development initiatives on its own, such as street paving or bus routes. - It incorporates elements to ensure environmental sustainability: reforestation, sewage water treatment, garbage collection systems, and alternative construction systems. Strengths - Long-term cost recovery mechanisms, such as its mutual self-help construction, community management methodologies, and revolving-fund loan system. This ensures independence from further donor grants from the start. - Change of mentality (more positive mindsets) of communities in respect of their community and neighborhood development. - Strengthening of community organization to the point of ensuring further development to be independently undertaken by the community, the program over. - Strong focus on housing as well as in social infrastructure and community building. - The program promotes new and favoring national legislation on self-help housing. - By 2016, 80,000 Costa Ricans had been beneficiaries of the program and thus improved their quality of life.

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Weaknesses - Its dependence from the national housing subsidy scheme entailed that, in recent years, with the strong reduction of the scale of the Costa Rican housing subsidy program, the Popular Habitat Program had to reduce its annual output dramatically (from 4,000 units a year to 1,500). - A relative low number of the beneficiary families were among the very poorest. This is not surprising given that lowest-income families have priorities linked to daily survival rather than housing. - Extensive focus on housing is detrimental to other valuable assets communities offer (e.g., public spaces for community building and social development; and social initiatives and workshops for enhanced socioeconomic sustainability). - The subsidy component (vs. a loan system) gave place to a situation in which many felt inherently entitled to a free house; a promise that no government can really fulfill. The free subsidies (bonos gratuítos) created the perception among settlers that they were entitled to “free housing”. The population came to expect that the program should cover all costs of housing. - The program’s feature of requiring weekly hours of labor places single- parent households at an unfair disadvantage. - In some instances, weak community leadership hindered the process. - Scarce participation of local governments. Lessons learnt - Importance of setting an independent intermediary structure to assist without ulterior motives. Its autonomy ensures continuous advancements, despite the changes in government, and guarantees an enhanced transparency of finances. Additionally, its autonomy from partisan politics stimulates greater interest from the private sector. - The benefits of self-help construction: it does not only contribute to the supply of manpower, but also to community and social building. - With the proper assistance and capacity-building, communities can and should manage the implementation of their development. - Constant cost-checking is imperative for the sustainability of the project. New models have to be permanently developed for keeping the budget on check. - Relevance of establishing clear, explicit, written agreements that specify the conditions and obligations of each partner. - There is a need to develop housing/upgrading programs specifically addressed to the lowest-income groups. Descriptive image Not found. Sources: Biblioteca CF+S, 1996; Biblioteca CF+S, 2000; Morgan, 2007: 1-19; Ruster & Imparato, 2003: 365-397; Sida, 1997: 216-231.

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Name of the project PUI Nororiental Initiative of Medellin

[official name: Proyecto Urbano Integral (PUI) de la Zona Nororiental] Location Medellin, Colombia Implementation 2004 Duration 2004-2011 Example of Integral and multi-disciplinary approach Brief description Through an integrated approach, the PUI has targeted urban development by means of infrastructure, social, institutional, and cultural approaches. The PUI model could only take place due to the springboard of the PRIMED Program (1993-2004), which addressed basic needs, infrastructure deficits, slum upgrading, and relocation of families occupying geographical risk areas. Along the way, it also supported community development and participation in Medellin. The PUI model is based on the premise that emblematic urban programs within the informal fabric, connected with social programs, will have a powerful impact on the poor’s quality of life. The full PUI has intervened in each of the city’s slum pockets applying this integral and multi-disciplinary approach. For each of these areas, the PUI formulated tailored projects, according to the particular potential and challenges of each informal settlement. Regarding the PUI Nororiental Initiative, this was the pilot project of the PUI model. The nororiental zone––linked to the Medellin cartel and paramilitary groups––was selected because of its alarmingly low HDI levels and high homicide rates. The whole program epitomizes an integral and multidisciplinary intervention. It consists of strategically interconnected projects, which are in turn combined with broader social sectors that coalesce in transforming the many dimensions of the area. The results have improved the lives of 230,000 people. Its integral and multidisciplinary components entailed45: a) Physical interventions: home improvement, risk mitigation, environmental protection initiatives, road rehabilitation and pavement, public and open spaces, parks and landscaping, sidewalks and pedestrian networks connecting to mass transit, a cable car system reaching slum areas, safe cable car stations, and social and community facilities. The majority of these interventions either hired local workers or involved collective work on the part of the community. b) Social interventions: strategies for community building, participatory planning processes, leadership promotion, fostering of CBOs, local economic development initiatives, and social assistance projects. c) Institutional interventions: increased institutional presence to increase security of sensitive areas, management and implementation taskforces for inter-sectoral coordination, new managerial schemes, and monitoring systems. d) Cultural interventions: library parks, city-wide integration initiatives, green areas, schools, educational workshops and activities, special focus on music and dance projects, and other artistic activities. e) Psychological interventions: educational workshops and activities, animation stage after project’s completion to promote people’s feeling of ownership over the new facilities, connection with the formal city through improved public transport systems, more colorful and qualitative infrastructure, and developing of local music and dance projects among the youth. A valuable element of this program was how it prepared the community to take full advantage of the upgrading achievements and to take an active part in the

45 The following categorization was created by the authors and it cannot be found in the official planning of the PUI.

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maintenance of the enhanced environments. Starting at the formulation stage, the community was trained on how to perform best during later stages and, most importantly, how to own their upgraded neighborhood. The PUI model caused Medellin to be internationally renowned for its development capacity. Type of action - Slum upgrading (neighborhood infrastructure, road systems and rehabilitation, public spaces [library parks, green areas], health clinics, schools, piping system). - land tenure legalization. - targeting of areas of geological risk, and risk mitigation tasks. - opening of networks connecting to mass transit. - strategies for community-building and promotion of leadership and community organizations (e.g., culture, sports and leisure activities for the youth, betterment of primary and secondary-level schooling, and education in citizenship and human rights) (250 projects). - educational, cultural and psychological projects. - local economic development initiatives. Scope Neighborhood level Promoting agency Municipality of Medellin and Medellin’s Enterprise of Urban Development, EDU (Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano), for the most part. In a smaller measure: the French Development Agency (AFD), UN-HABITAT, UN Development Program (UNDP), the Agency of International Cooperation of Medellín (ACI) and the Spanish Development Cooperation Agency (AECI, today AECID). Cost $400 million (20% for the physical component and 80% for the social programs) (this figure does not include the cost of the Metrocable lines [See Case Study Sheet Nº10]). Innovative features - Conceptualizes the term ‘integral urban project’ (PUI) with the aim of designing a transferable urban development model. As a result of its effectiveness, the PUI model becomes internationally renowned. - Introduces the term ‘social urbanism’, which stands for the promotion of integral human development––and not only economic growth––for the people and with the people’s participation, integrating various topics such as political, social, and urban planning. - Infrastructure developments are complemented with social programs. - It is a transformative intervention city-wide; one of its core interventions (the cable car system/Metrocable) connects slum areas to the metro system and the city center, and vice versa. - Includes an Animation Phase, once construction is over. In order for the new infrastructures to become social landmarks for the community, the PUI organizes a significant event establishing the social program or vocation for the building and thus the people can develop a sense of ownership and belonging towards it. - Encouragement of shared power and responsibility over city spaces. - Revolutionary approach: interventions were conceived as contributions to an integrated social network, that in turn could trigger community building and empowerment - Fostering of a positive relationship between institutions and communities. - The EDU was a key actor as it promoted inter-institutional coordination, which proved fundamental in the project’s development. Participation - Participatory budgeting, planning and design (Talleres Imaginarios [‘Imagination Workshops’]). - Community taking part at the implementation stage; community-level committees were formed to assist different stakeholders (technicians, social workers, and communicators). - Community participation increased levels of compromise and empowerment.

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Resettlement In a small degree: only when families had their houses located in high risk areas and resettlement was unavoidable. Sustainability High: - New administrative schemes, inter-sectoral coordination, and monitoring systems. - Prepared local community members to take full advantage of improved neighborhoods and to play an active role in their sustainability and physical transformation. - The project included provisions for enhanced environmental sustainability (e.g., campaigns for environmental awareness, sustainability, risk prevention, and reforestation). - Monitoring and evaluation systems were set in motion. Strengths - Integrated––rather than sectoral––planning and execution (horizontal institutional arrangement). - A decentralized and independent structure (The PUI Team) was established to manage the program. This enhanced coordination and implementation. - The PUI model reinvented the city at large, achieving a radical transformation of a previously highly dangerous city. - Stimulation of community ownership of the new infrastructure and services. - Participatory planning and involvement of the community during all the stages in order to bring back the trust towards municipal institutions. - The new projects (e.g., like public spaces) were located strategically to potentiate the surrounding area and to develop social capital. - Strengthening of administrative coordination. - Integration of over 250 social assistance projects. - Local political will supporting formulation, execution and continuity of the project. - Reapplication of the model in other areas of the city (PUI Centro-occidental, PUI Centro-oriental, PUI Noroccidental, and PUI Iguaná). Weaknesses - The project fell short in ameliorating the situation of inequality, lack of opportunities, insecurity and violence in the neighborhood. Some improvements were achieved in this areas, but the expected results were not attained. - It has not succeeded in mitigating the risk of the location of some housing. - It can be questioned if it is really worth the great amount of investment put on the construction and facilities, and if it would be more reasonable to use the resources in other programs. However, we believe that the benefits of the PUI, which tackle all the human dimensions identified by Max-Neef et al., are due to the high quality of its projects and initiatives. - The resettlement of displaced families due to the construction of PUI projects, such as the España Library Park, was not sufficiently engaged. - Some expensive projects, such as the library parks, have presented challenges for maintenance and had to be closed to the public for rehabilitation. Lessons learnt - The PUI confirms that slum upgrading bears fruit, both to the squatter settlement dwellers and to the city as a whole. It also shows that urban development projects need to be comprehensive. - For slum upgrading to attain solid results, it needs continuation despite political changes. The PUI program enjoyed this situation, as mayors were committed to the importance of upgrading and, administration after administration, efforts were not stopped or disregarded. Additionally, these integral, multi-disciplinary programs need extensive funds, for they tackle many areas and do so in coordination. The PUI program could succeed due to international donors and the Municipality of Medellin’s commitment to make upgrading a primary target for public expenditure.

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- Just as the PUI could not happen without the solid achievements of PRIMED, the PUI Nororiental Initiative (and others) cannot be considered as an initial answer. The PUI model is a useful instrument in the long way of completely bettering the city and its society, and it must come after structural elements are in place (e.g., regularization, basic services, good governance, etc.). - Facilitating tax collection and the continuous revision of the cadaster were essential for the implementation of such a broad and expensive project. Illustrative Image 1: Outdoor escalator [the climb is about 1,260 feet or 28 stories high] in Comuna 13 (Nororiental zone). The picture also shows the result of the project Medellín se pinta de vida (‘Medellín is painted with life’), which echoes social improvement.

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Illustrative Image 2: Transformation of Paseo Urbano Calle 107, Andalucía (nororiental zone). This street was strategic to PUI as it hosts the entrance to the Acevedo Metrocable station and acts as “the entrance hall” to the neighborhood.

Image credits 1. [Outdoor escalator and color houses of Comuna 13]. Reprinted from Lafarge Holcim Foundation website, by Lafarge Holcim, 2014 from https://www.lafargeholcim-foundation.org/media/news/projects/medellins- transformation-a-leading-example-at-world-urban-forum Copyright 2014 by Lafarge Holcim Foundation. 2. [Transformation of Paseo Urbano Calle 107, Andalucía]. Reprinted from Arch Daily website, by Harvard Graduate School of Design, 2013 from https://www.archdaily.com/423245/winners-announced-for-2013-veronica- rudge-green-prize-in-urban-design Copyright 2013 by Harvard GSD. Sources Calderón Arcilla, 2008: 73-83; Echeverri Restrepo & Orsini, 2011: 13-24; Hernández, 2009; ICLEI, 2014: 1-8; Malgalhaes, 2016: 77-82; Osorio Gaviria, 2015: 1-20; Vilar & Cartes, 2016: 60.

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Name of the project Program for the Urbanization of El Mezquital, PROUME

[official name: Programa de Urbanización de El Mezquital] Location Guatemala City Implementation 1993 (approved in 1988 but was interrupted until 1992 due to civil strife; the World Bank suspended all disbursements to the country from 1989 to 1992). Duration 1993-1997 Example of Bridging the gap between a development project and social progress Brief description El Mezquital is a success story that began in very adverse circumstances. It was a World Bank-funded upgrading program starting out in a very poor and war-torn community with no basic services whatsoever. However, the high levels of community organization caught the eye of a World Bank mission. This was how El Mezquital became the recipient of a development aid package from the World Bank, to which UNICEF also contributed financially. All upgrading works were conducted through a cooperative, the COIVEES (Cooperativa Integrada de la Vivienda, Esfuerzo y Esperanza/ ‘Integrated Cooperative of Housing, Esfuerzo and Esperanza’). The work of this entity––which is still in place––was subject to constant monitoring, which ensured transparency, good results, and sustainability. The program improved the lives of 37,600 people, targeting the five slum areas of Nuevo Mezquital. Twenty years after its completion, the community organization has been able to bridge a mere development project with community progress. After the physical and social architecture of the program was completed in 1997, the community has taken measures to sustain such achievements and to continue to develop and improve the community. Today, El Mezquital enjoys adequate basic services, a strong community-based structure, and active community planning for a better future. It is important to highlight the inadequacies that persist to this day: lack of employment opportunities, overcrowded living conditions for some segments, problems of violence, drug addiction and street children. Type of action - Slum upgrading (street and footpath networks, storm drainage, street paving, electricity, water supplies, drinking water, sewage networks and sewage treatment plants, wastewater collection and treatment, home improvement, new community facilities, green areas, and environmentally protected areas). - Basic infrastructure according to community needs (and integrated center for family development [Centro de Desarrollo Integral de la Familia, CEDIF], a fire station, a primary school, a basic education institute, and four multi- purpose halls). - Land tenure regularization. - Creation of a main transport road through the settlement that would better connect the area with the formal city. - Home upgrading (500 units) and new housing construction (450 units). - Community organization support. - Legal advice project. - Mental health project. - Specific targeting of overcrowded housing conditions. - Community development initiatives (cooperatives or a center for women’s needs). Scope Neighborhood Promoting agency Partnership between a World Bank mission (resources and supervision), UNICEF (technical assistance and day-to-day coordination), and the Municipality of Guatemala City. Cost $14 million

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Innovative features - UNICEF worked to increase the management capacity of the community through external counseling. The community organization was consolidated in the form of an already existing cooperative: the COIVEES. - Physical and social initiatives were complemented by the Integral Health Program. This targeted micro-zones (each comprising 50 families) to confront the serious health problems affecting the community. - Attention to the social architecture of the community, which included the creation of an integrated center for women’s needs (Foundation of Courage and Prosperity, FUNDAESPRO), a fire station, a primary school, a basic education institute, and four multi-purpose halls. - Establishment of a revolving fund to increase cost recovery and thus encourage independence from further external aid. - Unlike other upgrading projects, El Mezquital’s included the introduction of both wastewater collection and wastewater treatment systems. Participation High: - Intense community participation and mobilization at all stages, mostly in planning and execution. PROUME was in fact the outcome of a multidisciplinary participatory strategy: funds were managed by the community and external entities (i.e., NGOs and UNICEF) mainly assisted the people at all stages without a dominant role over them. - The program provided support and motivation for communities to organize, teaching the people about their potential. - The Cooperative (COIVEES) was in charge of receiving and managing the funds and administrating loans to residents for home upgrading or construction. This turned them into direct and valid interlocutors vis-à-vis the World Bank. - The COIVEES also gathered all relevant information for auditing and monitoring of projects; this had a tremendous impact on transparency and sustainability. - Foundation of a center for women’s needs that attempted to fight stereotypes and male chauvinistic attitudes. Resettlement - For 350 families who lived in areas impeding development (either due to planning layout or to geographical high risk). - There was a temporary relocation of many families during the conduction of the works. Sustainability High: - Community organization and training on management achieved long-term sustainability results. - The revolving fund has ensured the financial sustainability of results. - Even after project completion, CBOs are carrying out self-financed improvements, monitoring achieved developments, and even assisting other communities in their upgrading. - Since the end of the PROUME, the community has implemented multiple projects for further development (a health improvement project, training on HIV/AIDS prevention, legal training for dealing with gender-based violence, and a waste collection project). - Environmental management was an element to the project, which further enhances its sustainability. - Also, the program entailed the designation of environmentally protected areas of those territories that were of special environmental value and had been neglected by neighboring residents. Strengths - COIVEES was created before the implementation of the program: it represented all five informal settlements in El Mezquital. This ensured more autonomy on the part of the community from the program’s workings and its sustainability once the program ended its activities. - The program also included two intermediary structures (the National Reconstruction Committee and the Office of Human Settlements and

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Housing [DAHVI]). Their main responsibility was to channel the government funds (which included international donor’s funds) to the community. - Provision of the necessary support and incentives for the community to organize, whose benefits still last to this day and contribute to the project’s overall sustainability. - The high degrees of organization at the community level have made possible the bridging of the gap between a development project and social progress. - Major impact of the zealous work and community support of highly qualified and experienced personnel from UNICEF and some Guatemalan NGOs. - Good coordination among all the NGOs involved in the upgrading works. - Unsanitary living conditions and home overcrowding were successfully targeted. - The PRODEL coincided with the main objectives of the national peace process. - The program takes into account the ethnical diversity of the area (Quiché, Mame, and mixed race), and potentiates it. - Major focus on women empowerment have yielded strong results in capacity- building and female autonomy. However, macho stereotypes prevail. - The economic situation of dwellers has improved thanks to the work of the CBOs, the support of the external organizations, and, in part, the national government. - Emphasis on cost recovery from the start. The program established various mechanisms from the beginning, such as the metering of service consumption. Weaknesses - Weaknesses of the Guatemalan institutions and deficient political will: incapacity to respond to the needs of the community, under-estimation of community capacity and attempts at political manipulation. The difficulties of it notwithstanding, the program should have contained an element of institutional strengthening. - The program has not been able to fully tackle domestic violence and drug and substance abuse within El Mezquital area. Also, violence still prevails. In 2017, El Mezquital was the scenario of armed attacks between Mara 18 and Mara Salvatrucha. There are some residents who blame the formation of maras on PROUME’s community organization, as it convened the neighborhood’s youth, from where Mara leaders arose. - The PROUME also left several works unfinished, so a certain amount of dissatisfaction exists within the community. - Community participation highly depended on the benefits yielded being visible, immediate, and received on an individual basis. - Corruption has eroded the COIVEES. - Lack of employment opportunities (though a significant number could access the market after the springboard of local economic development initiatives). - Problems of street children. - Despite the efforts of FUNDAESPRO in addressing women’s needs, the submissive role and stereotyping of women still prevails to a high degree. - Insufficient green spaces and recreation facilities. - As not everyone in the community had access to the loans, there is still precarious housing in the area. Lessons learnt - The importance of flexibility, local demand, and the ability to establish partnerships in which the comparative advantage of each stakeholder is fully leveraged. - One of the main strengths of the project was its stimulation of community- based organization, which by the end of the program had grown to four times the original number. - Slum upgrading programs must identify the obstacles that hinder and will hamper social progress: stereotypes, male chauvinistic attitudes, and sexual

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taboos that are detrimental to the communities. Above all, the female element must adopt a protagonist role: one cannot aim for development while undermining half of the site’s population. - The PROUME set a precedent in recognizing CBOs as able interlocutors with international organizations such as the World Bank. - This program is an excellent illustrator of the importance of bridging the gap between a development project and social progress. The program set in motion a truthful journey of inclusive and integrated growth within the community of El Mezquital. Descriptive image Not found. Sources Basurto, 1996: 23-24; Batres et al., 2006: 17-114; Cabanas et al., 2000: 87-106; Drummond Lewis, 2005: 20-28; Ruster & Imparato, 2003: 83-85; Urban Upgrading Site, 2001.

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Name of the project Integrational Projects of Library Recreational Parks, Educational Institutions & Metrocable system, within the PUI Framework for 2004-2007 of the Municipality of Medellin

[official name: Programas Estratégicos de los Parques Biblioteca y Equipamientos Educativos y el Sistema de Metrocable dentro del marco del Proyecto Urbano Integrado 2004-2007 de la Alcaldía de Medellín] Location Medellin, Colombia Implementation Metrocable System: 2001 Library Parks: 2005 Educational institutions: 2004 Duration of works Metrocable System: 2001-2017 (first line inaugurated in 2004) Library Parks: 2005-2013 Educational Institutions: 2004-2008 Example of Equity, esteem and inclusion Brief description Integrational strategies by the Municipality of Medellin, the three projects are a small fraction of Medellin’s far-reaching PUI model. PUI conceives urbanism as an instrument for social inclusion, and these projects aimed at connecting the center and the periphery by creating spaces that could be shared by the bulk of the citizenship. The Library Parks and educational institutions are located in the poorest areas of Medellin. They are qualitative and aesthetic infrastructures that appeal to the subconscious of slum dwellers by boosting their self-esteem. These projects also constitute a means for attaining the social cohesion of the city, as they promote social interaction on a more equal footing. Also, they make available equitable opportunities to those who had the least. The nine Library Parks also embody the investment in education and culture as tools for social inclusion. Additionally, they also represent Medellin’s stake in the green areas and environmental protection. For their part, the projects regarding educational institutions is twofold. On one side, ten new educational institutions were built. As the Library Parks, they specifically targeted the poorest areas of the city, bringing enhanced education and opportunities to children and adolescents living there. Thanks to these ten new institutions, 7,916 additional students could access tuition-free education. On the other side, 132 existing schools were transformed to provide better education and facilities to Medellin public-school students. Regarding the Metrocable system, it links these new facilities (and, by extension, the areas and neighborhoods in which they are built) with the city center, and vice versa, with the hope of creating a sense of belonging to the city among those who are alienated the most. Type of action - Social urbanism. - Construction of 9 Library Parks (all Library Parks include lecture rooms for both children and adults, playrooms, Internet workstations, Entrepreneurial Area Centers [Cedezo]46, auditoriums, exhibition halls, Salas Mi Barrio47 [‘My Neighborhood’ Rooms] and cafeterias). - Construction of 10 new schools (and transformation of 132 existing schools). - Social and cultural investment. - Community building. - Aerial tramway system (Metrocable) given the steep topographical conditions. - opening of networks connecting to mass transit. - Integration strategy.

46 The Area Entrepreneurial Centers [Centros de Desarrollo Empresarial Zonal, Cedezo] are spaces that support local entrepreneurship within the different communes and that strengthen existing entrepreneurial activity. These spaces are targeted at everybody, offering workshops on education, entrepreneurship, work opportunities, and administrative management. 47 The Salas Mi Barrio are free-access spaces that compile information on the specific commune in which they are located. This information is usually contributed by the community itself or third parties (e.g., media or organizations). Its goal is to strengthen community ties, to boost cultural identities, underscore local knowledge and traditions, and to promote community and citizen participation.

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Scope Municipal Promoting agency Mainly: Municipal Government, the Spanish Development Cooperation Agency (AECI, today AECID), the French Development Agency (AFD), EPM Communications Group, (Empresas Públicas de Medellín, ‘Public Companies of Medellin’, ISAGEN (Colombian Energy Company) and the European Regional Development Fund. Cost Metrocable system. Total cost (temporary): $221.03 million. For now, as line M and line P is still underway. It is a public sector project, financed by the Municipality of Medellin and by Metro de Medellin Company. In the case of lines H and M, a loan from the ADF [$85 million] has been used to finance a share of the costs. • Line K - Trajectory: Acevedo-Andalucía-Popular-Santo Domingo (connects commune 1, 2 and 5). Acevedo is also a metro station, so it connects the Metrocable system with the Metro system. - Inauguration year: 2004. - Cost: $26 million (COP) • Line J - Trajectory: San Javier-Juan XXIII-Vallejuelos-La Aurora (connects commune 7 and 13 and Corregimiento San Cristóbal). - Inauguration year: 2008. - Cost: $47.5 million. • Line L - Trajectory: Santo Domingo Savio-Arví (connects commune 1 and Corregimiento Santa Elena). - Inauguration year: 2010. - Cost: $17.33 million. • Line H - Trajectory: Oriente-Las Torres-Villa Sierra (connects communes 8, 9 and 10). - Inauguration year: 2016. - Donor: French Development Agency (AFD) [loan did not cover full cost]. - Cost: $28.9 million. • Line M - Trajectory: Miraflores-El Pinal-Trece de Noviembre (connects communes 8 and 9). - Inauguration year: December 2018 (projected). - Donor: French Development Agency (AFD) [loan did not cover full cost]. - Cost: Obstacles in construction work do not enable to provide a projected cost. • Line P - Trajectory: Acevedo-Sena de Pedregal-Parque Biblioteca Gabriel García Márquez–El Progreso Nº2 (will connect communes 5 and 6). - Inauguration year: 2019 (projected). - Cost: $101.3 million (projected) (includes cost of resettlement of 391 families. Resettlement).

Library Parks. Total cost: $47.95 million. • Presbítero José Luís Arroyave Library Park - Location: San Javier (commune 12). - Inauguration year: 2006. - Cost: $5.4 million. - Donors: ISAGEN and ORBITEL. - Architect: Javier Vera Londoño. • León de Greiff Library Park - Location: La Ladera (commune 8). - Inauguration year: 2007.

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- Cost: $4.48 million. - Donors: ISAGEN, UNE. - Architect: Giancarlo Mazzanti Arquitectos. • Tomás Carrasquilla Library Park - Location: La Quintana (commune 7). - Inauguration year: 2007. - Cost: $4.1 million. - Donors: ISAGEN, EMP Comunicaciones. - Architect: Ricardo La Rotta Caballero. • España Library Park - Location: Santo Domingo Savio (commune 1). - Inauguration year: 2007. - Cost: $5.3 million. - Donors: AECID, Movistar, Telefónica Agence Spain, ISAGEN. - Architect: Giancarlo Mazzanti Arquitectos. • Belén Library Park - Location: Belén (commune 16). - Inauguration year: 2007. - Cost: $5.02 million. - Donors: EPM Comunicaciones, ISAGEN. - Architect: Hiroshi Naito and students (Tokyo University). • Fernando Botero Library Park - Location: San Cristóbal (one of Medellin’s 5 corregimientos [Medellin’s rural subdivision]. San Cristobal is 11km away from Medellin). - Inauguration year: 2011. - Cost: $5.78 million. - Donors: Not found. - Architect: G Ateliers Architecture (Orlando García). • José Horacio Betancur Library Park - Location: San Antonio del Prado (one of Medellin’s 5 corregimientos. San Antonio del Prado is 21 km away from Medellin). - Inauguration year: 2011. - Cost: $7.48 million. - Donors: Not found. - Architect: Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano (EDU). • Manuel Mejía Vallejo Library Park - Location: Guayabal (commune 15). - Inauguration year: 2012. - Cost: $4.79 million. - Donors: Not found. - Architect: Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano (EDU). • Gabriel García Márquez Library Park - Location: Doce de Octubre (commune 6). - Inauguration year: 2013. - Cost: $5.6 million. - Donors: Not found. - Architects: Verónica Ortiz, Carlos Puerta and Diego López.

Educational Institutions. Total cost: $35,7 million. • IE48. Antonio Derka – Santo Domingo Savio - Location: Santo Domingo Savio (commune 1). - Inauguration year: 2008. - Cost: $3.93 million. - Architect: Carlos Pardo (Obra Negra Arquitectos).

48 Institución Educativa (Educational Institution).

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• IE. Francisco Miranda - Location: (commune 4). - Inauguration year: 2007. - Cost: $2.33 million. - Architect: Laureano Forero. • IE. Plaza de Ferias – Antonio José Bernal - Location: (commune 5). - Inauguration year: 2008. - Cost: $4.92 million. - Architect: Carlos J. Calle. • IE. Llanadas – Joaquín Vallejo Arbeláez - Location: (commune 8). - Inauguration year: 2008. - Cost: $4.27 million. - Architect: Óscar Mesa. • IE. Héctor Abad Gómez - Location: (commune 10). - Inauguration year: 2008. - Cost: $1.6 million (low cost is due to the fact that it was built over a pre- existing structure). - Architect: Rafael A. Gracia. • IE. Benedikta Zur Nieden – San Javier - Location: (commune 13). - Inauguration year: 2008. - Cost: $3.81 million. - Architect: Horacio Navarro. • IE. La Independencia – Jaider Ramírez - Location: (commune 13). - Inauguration year: 2008. - Cost: $4.75 million. - Architect: Felipe Uribe de Bedout. - IE. Las Mercedes – Horacio Muñoz Suescún - Location: (commune 16). - Inauguration year: 2008. - Cost: $4.2 million. - Architect: Juan Manuel Peláez. • IE. Altavista – Débora Arango Pérez - Location: Corregimiento Altalavista. - Inauguration year: 2008. - Cost: $3.22 million. - Architect: Juan Fernando Forero. • IE. Ángela Restrepo – San Antonio de Prado - Location: Corregimiento San Antonio del Prado. - Inauguration year: 2008. - Cost: $2.77 million. - Architect: Gabriel Arango. Innovative features - High quality investment in the poorest/most dangerous areas of the city. - Innovative bottom-up approach that included communities from the beginning and at really high and deep rates. - Best-quality facilities for the poorest communities to increase their sense of belonging, inclusion, and self-esteem. - Promoted newly built/upgraded areas for the rest of the citizenry to visit and thus fight previous stigmatization. - It goes beyond physical improvements to transform and affect relationships within communities: between slum dwellers and the city, between slum dwellers and other citizens, and among slum dwellers themselves. Far more

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than only subsidizing physical improvements of squatter settlements, PUI actions allowed slum dwellers to feel as recognized and integrated citizens. - Renown international architects designed the library parks contributing spectacular infrastructure to the pride of the communities. Urban design becomes the main approach to the regeneration of the city. Aesthetic infrastructure was built to increase settlers’ self-esteem and sense of esteem among settlers. Participation - For the Library Parks, people gave input about the content, books, schedule, architecture style, and governance systems. However, getting the people to participate took considerable efforts. At the first meetings held, people only participated to complain about previous municipal administrations with no pedagogic intentions. Also, the Municipality and the CBOs had to struggle through the lack of credibility they inspired on the people. This attitude has by and large been reversed. - Once the CBOs were formed, people contributed and corroborated the analysis done by the physical component and GIS technologies. This was done through the Talleres de Imaginarios Urbanos (“Urban Imaginaries Workshops”). - All projects were first discussed with the community that was going to enjoy them. With the input given by the community, the designing entities worked on a first sketch that was later presented to the CBOs to confirm that the ideas of the community had been taken into account. The CBOs gave feedback, and so on. This process was conducted through the Talleres de Imaginarios de Proyecto (“Project Imaginaries Workshops”). - 126 CBOs were involved in decision-making. - Participative budgeting for the allocation to Library programs and activities. - Members of the community were hired for construction works (approximately 92% of all PUI’s labor force came from the local area). - The three projects, within the broader PUI framework, are all along monitored by the group of CBOs, Veeduría al Plan de Desarrollo de Medellín (“Citizen Oversight of Medellin’s Development Plan”). This results in a shared responsibility over the projects and their achievements. - At present, the Library Parks organize weekly cultural, educational, recreational and sports activities. This enhances community cohesion, which in turn favors community participation. Resettlement Yes. Resettlement was carried out when dwellings were located at high-risk locations or when it was unavoidable for the conducting of the works. Resettlement was designed so that families did not have to change neighborhoods or areas within the neighborhood. Sustainability High: - The Metrocable systems works with clean, electric energies. - The Library Parks increased the volume of green areas in the city and contribute, through workshops, to raise community awareness on the environment. - The Library Parks and educational institutions, through their promotion of culture, contribute to a more educated and cultured citizenry, which is an asset for sustainability purposes. - Pride raised among community members about their upgraded neighborhoods ensures them taking good care of the facilities. Nevertheless, structural failures have been found in some of the Library Parks, resulting in their temporary closing for reforming. - The three projects were conceived to be constructed in parallel to the improvement and upgrading of the dwellings and in the areas which were recovered. Strengths - Reduced the fare to be paid for transportation (before the Metrocable, settlers had to commute to the city center, which was also possible by means of transferring. This entailed that they had to pay for at least two fares. Now with

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Metrocable in place, they only need to pay for one ticket. Medellin’s residents currently save $20 dollars a month). - The 9 Library Parks scattered across the city combine education, culture, and encounter. In addition, their construction gave work to more than 2,300 locals. - Tourism has increased; city economy has grown; the number of small entrepreneurs has increased; and employment has been created. - Ensured high degree of sustainability: the Animation Phase promoted the sense of ownership among community members and also gave place to agreements between the community and the public administration on which were the responsibilities of each party towards the new facilities. - Some of the activities in the implementation stage were delegated completely to the community. This allowed to cut costs, generate more income for the community, and ensure, among settlers, a sense of ownership and belonging over their habitat’s progress. - Reduction of violence and increase in their perception of security. - Education institutions have increased access to schooling for many and improved the quality of the education of all Medellin’s public student body. - The city recognized the informal settlements as a formal part to it, thus reducing stigmatization. - By means of the two projects, clientelism tendencies were successfully attenuated. Weaknesses - There is much to be done; the current cable car system does not cover all of the people’s transportation needs. - The Library Parks were expensive projects, whose maintenance could result in a burden for the Municipality (each Library Park costs c. $600,000 a year). - There have been identified structural failures in some of the Library Parks, which have provoked their temporary closing. - Workshops for each stage of the process should be continuous. The fact that they are individually organized for each stage and then dissolved incurs in a loss of effort and in-depth knowledge of issues cannot be acquired. - Workshops do not involve representatives from institutions different than the Municipality and the CBOs. As a result, there cannot be proposals beyond the agenda already set by PUI. - People from other areas of the city (or from outside the city or country) visiting the Metrocable stations or the Library Parks do not tend to go outside those areas, where they feel more protected. Therefore, interaction with squatters and their environments is limited. Lessons learnt - The combination of the Library Parks, educational institutions, and the Metrocable system contributed to increasing the self-esteem of the poorest- income families. This reverberated in the city at large with positive perspectives of the city, increased security, higher literacy and reading rates, economic growth, community development, and boosted culture demand. - The Library Parks have turned into axles of reference for the city area in which they are located. Senses of belonging and inclusion among slum dwellers have increased. Services offered at these institutions have changed many daily routines for the better, introducing cultural and educational offers, as well as green spaces. In this sense, the access to greenery and to beautiful buildings has improved settler’s self-esteem, generating social capital, social cohesion, harmony, and positive psychological effects. - The educational approach of the Library Parks has been translated into drivers of culture and alternatives for youth violence. - Medellin’s Library Parks and the educational institutions teach about the importance of investing in culture and education and about the transformative power of these elements.

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- The lessons showed by the Library Parks have inspired a route of South-South cooperation among Latin American cities, including Lima, Quito, Cuenca and Buenos Aires. - It is important to rethink the science of budget allocation for development projects. The 4-year budget plan model does not fit well with success stories; Medellin is a success story because it had the PRIMED, and now the PUIs. However, budget allocation has adversely affected the process. Illustrative images 1, 2, 3 and 4: Maps of the Library Parks (Parque Biblioteca) [Image 1], educational institutions [Image 2] and Metrocable system [Image 3] [Image 4].

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(Metocable lines work as follows: Line H, in pink, connects Library Park La Ladera and the neighborhood to the center; Line M (under construction), in mauve, will further connects this area to the center; Line J, in yellow, connects two Library Parks [La Quintana and San Javier] and the areas between themseves; Line K, in light green, connects Library Park Santo Domingo Savio and the area to the center; and Line L, in brown, further connects the Santo Domingo district to the center). Works on Line P started on February 2018. Its estimated inauguration date is the third quarter of 2019.

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Illustrative Image 5: España Library Park, Santo Domingo Savio District, Medellín.

Illustrative Image 6: Children’s corner at Fernando Botero Library Park, San Cristobal, Medellin. Note the ceiling windows that allow to see the sky.

Recommended Users and culture officials on the impact of the Library Parks: videos https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3NaYtuspmqQ Architect Gustavo Restrepo on the rationale underlying ‘social urbanism’ and Medellin’s urban transformation of slum areas. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xxc45mainCI Image credits 1. [Library Parks of Medellin in map]. Reprinted from Observatorio Inmobiliario Catastral de Medellín, OIME website, by OIME, 2012 from

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http://catastrooime.blogspot.com.es/2012/09/parques-biblioteca-ciudad-de- medellin.html Copyright 2012 by Observatorio Inmobiliario Catastral de Medellín, OIME. 2. [Educational Institutions City Map, Medellin]. Reprinted from Alcaldía de Medellín Proyectos Estratégicos, by Alcaldía de Medellín, last updated in 2007 from https://www.medellin.gov.co/ Copyright 2017 by Municipality of Medellín. 3. [Metro + Metrocable system in City Map, Medellin]. Reprinted from Metro de Medellín website, by Municipality of Medellín, last updated in 2017 from https://www.metrodemedellin.gov.co/viajeconnosotros/mapas Copyright 2017 by Alcaldía de Medellín. 4. [Metrocable system Map, Medellin]. Reprinted from El Tiempo website, by Metro & Infografía ETCE, last updated in 2017 from https://www.metrodemedellin.gov.co/viajeconnosotros/mapas Copyright 2017 by Metro & Infografía ETCE. 5. [Photography of España Library Park, amplified aerial view]. Reprinted from Panamerican World website, 2014 from https://www.panamericanworld.com/es/articulo/medellin-milagro-de-ciudad- inteligente Copyright 2014 by Panamerican World. 6. [Photography of Children’s corner at Fernando Botero Library Park]. Reprinted from Estudio Quagliata Architectura website, 2012 from http://arquitectura.estudioquagliata.com/tag/colombia/page/6 Copyright 2012 Estudio Quagliata Architectura. Sources: Alcaldía de Medellín, 2009: 1-59; Alcaldía de Medellín, 2015: 59-61; Borraez Álvarez, 2014: 50-58; Calderón Arcilla, 2008: 73; Echeverri Restrepo & Orsini, 2011: 13-24; Esteves, 2012: 157-166; ICLEI, 2014: 1-8; Junta de Andalucía, 2012: 1; Next City, 2015; Peláez Serna & Muñoz Montoya, 2012: 10; Peña Gallego, 2011; Red de Bibliotecas, 2012; Ruster & Imparato, 2003: 85-87.

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Echegaray, G. C., & Marulanda, L. (2001). Desarrollo Local con Gestión Participativa: Presupuesto Participativo Villa El Salvador, Perú (IHS SINPA Paper Nº 09/2001). Rotterdam, The Netherlands: Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies. p. 25-55. Echeverri Restrepo, A. & Orsini, F. M. (2011). Informalidad y urbanismo social en Medellin. In M. Hermelin Arbaux, A. Echeverry Restrepo, and J. Giraldo Ramírez (eds.), Medellín Medio Ambiente, Urbanismo, Sociedad. Medellin, Colombia: Universidad EAFIT. p.13-24. Retrieved from https://upcommons.upc.edu/bitstream/handle/2099/11900/111103_RS3_AEcheverri_%20P%2 011-24.pdf Esteves, M. H. (2012). Shaping New Urban Environments in Latin America: The Case of Medellin, Colombia. Humanities and Social Sciences Review, 01(02). p.157-166. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Maria_Esteves2/publication/273461887_SHAPING_NE W_URBAN_ENVIRONMENTS_IN_LATIN_AMERICA_THE_CASE_OF_MEDELLIN_C OLOMBIA/links/5504189e0cf24cee39fde6e1.pdf Fernandez, E. & Pereira, H. D. (2010). Legalização das favelas: Qual é o problema de Belo Horizonte?. Planejamento e Políticas Públicas, 34. p.171-199. Retrieved from http://www.ipea.gov.br/ppp/index.php/PPP/article/viewFile/171/184 Fuentes Fierro, A. (1997). Posibilidades y límites para el cambio: PAN. Mexico City, Mexico: Plaza y Valdés. p.61-70. Garzia, M. I., Salomón, A., Sanz, A. P., Ferraris, C., & Queralt, G. (2004). Programa Rosario Hábitat; aprendizajes alcanzados. Paper presented at II Congreso Nacional de Políticas Sociales. Mendoza, Argentina. Retrieved from http://municipios.unq.edu.ar/modules/mislibros/archivos/garzia.PDF Hernández, C. (2009) Proyecto Urbano Integral en la zona nororiental de Medellín: Un modelo de transformación de ciudad. Paper presented at 2nd International Congress of Human Development. Madrid, Spain. Retrieved from http://www.reduniversitaria.es/ficheros/CesarHernandezCorrea.pdf Huchzermeyer, M. (2004). Unlawful Occupation: Informal Settlements and Urban Policy in South Africa and Brazil. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press. p.60. ICLEI. (2014). Urban NEXUS Case Study: Medellín, Colombia. The Integral Urban Development Project: fighting crime with urban interventions (Report by Local Governments for Sustainability, ICLEI). Bonn, Germany: ICLEI. p.1-8. Retrieved from http://www2.giz.de/wbf/4tDx9kw63gma/08_UrbanNEXUS_CaseStudy_Medellin.pdf IDB. (2011). Country Program Evaluation: Bolivia 2008-2010 (Report No. RE-391 prepared for the Office of Evaluation and Oversight, OVE of the Inter-American Development Bank). Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank. p.1-50. Retrieved from http://services.iadb.org/wmsfiles/products/Publications/36337146.pdf Image credits for this section: Junta de Andalucía. (2012). Tres culturas, un solo barrio: Habitar 2.0. Programa de Cooperación Transfronteriza, España-Fronteras Exteriores (Report by Junta de Andalucía, Spain). Seville, Spain: Junta de Andalucía. p.1. Retrieved from http://www.laciudadviva.org/recursos/documentos/B1_Medellin.pdf King, R. & Abbot, T. (2016, February 17). Lima’s Villa El Salvador: A Story of Structured Informal Development. The City Fix. Retrieved from http://thecityfix.com/blog/lima-peru-villa-el- salvador-story-ordered-informal-development-thomas-abbot-robin-king/

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Ministerio del Interior, Obras Públicas y Vivienda de Argentina (Presidencia de la Nación) (2017). Programa Rosario Hábitat. Retrieved from http://www.gobiernolocal.gob.ar/?q=node/3640#field_consiste_programa Morgan, D. (2007). Housing Policy Issues in Costa Rica. Guidelines and Regulation Flexibility for Slum Improvement (Report for Housing Development & Management, Lund University). Lund, Sweden: Lund University. Retrieved from http://www.hdm.lth.se/fileadmin/hdm/alumni/papers/SDD_2007_242a/Daniel_Morgan__Costa _Rica.pdf

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Negrete Mata, J. & Hernández Vicencio, T. (Eds.) (2001) La experiencia del PAN: diez años de gobierno en Baja California. Mexico City, Mexico: Plaza y Valdés. p.223-224. Next City. (2015, April 7). Finding Inspiration in Medellin’s Library Parks. Next City Magazine. Retrieved from https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/finding-inspiration-in-medellins-library-parks Osorio Gaviria, D. A. (2015). The Northeastern Urban Integration Project [PUI], Medellín, Colombia (Master’s Thesis, KU Leuven University). p.1-20. Peláez Serna, J. C. & Muñoz Montoya, H. D. (2012). Informe Especial “Estado actual del proceso de construcción y entrega de los colegios de calidad” (Report prepared for Contraloría Auxiliar de Auditoría Fiscal de Empresas Industriales y Comerciales del Estado). Retrieved from http://www.cgm.gov.co/infpub/Informes%20de%20auditoria/Estado%20Actual%20del%20Pro ceso%20de%20Construcci%C3%B3n%20y%20Entrega%20de%20los%20Colegios%20de%2 0Calidad.pdf. Peña Gallego, L. E. (2011). Las bibliotecas públicas de Medellín como motor de cambio social y urbano de la ciudad. BID Textos universitarios de biblioteconomía i documentació, 27. Retrieved from http://bid.ub.edu/27/pena2.htm

PRODEL (2012). Inversiones en Desarrollo Local Sirviendo Nicaragua desde 1993. Retrieved from http://prodel.org.ni/es/acerca/ Red de Bibliotecas [Reddebibliotecas] (2012, July 12). Parque Biblioteca Manuel Mejía Vallejo Guayabal [Video File]. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eqvXyfFZTt0 Rivas, S. (2007). Subprograma Mejoramiento de Barrios en Bolivia. Lecciones aprendidas de proyectos integrales: components tangibles e intangibles (Cuaderno de Análisis No 16, Programa de Capacitación para el Mejoramiento Socio Habitacional [PROMESHA] and Housing Development & Management [HDM]). Stockholdm, Sweden: Lund University. p-1-53. Retrieved from http://www.hdm.lth.se/fileadmin/hdm/Cuaderno_Analisis_No_16.pdf Rosenstein, C. (2005). El Programa Rosario Hábitat y la integración como factor de mejora en la calidad de vida. El caso del asentamiento “La Lagunita”. Estudios del Hábitat, 10(2). p.59-73. Retrieved from http://www.fau.unlp.edu.ar/shared_resource/pdf/publication/estudiosdelhabitat- vol10-ClaudiaRosenstein.pdf Ruster, J., & Imparato, I. (2003). Slum Upgrading and Participation: Lessons from Latin America. Washington D.C.: Directions in Development, World Bank. Saborido, M. (2006). Experiencias emblemáticas para la superación de la pobreza y precariedad urbana: provision y mejoramiento de la vivienda (Report prepared for UN Economic

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Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC). Santiago de Chile, Chile: ECLAC. p.57-76. Retrieved from http://archivo.cepal.org/pdfs/2006/S2006049.pdf Sida. (1997). New models for aid agencies seeking to improve housing for low-income groups: Sida’s initiatives in Costa Rica, Chile and Nicaragua. Environment and Urbanization, 9(2). p.213-232. Retrieved from http://www.ucl.ac.uk/dpu- projects/21st_Century/resources/papers/documents/Sida.pdf Sida. (2005). Los programas apoyados por Asdi en Centroamérica: Vivienda y desarrollo local (Report by Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida). Stokholm, Sweden: Sida. p. 1-12. Retrieved from https://www.sida.se/contentassets/398f8daa42944d1db62a034c46ec2708/14741.pdf Stein, A. (1999). Participation and sustainability in social projects: the experience of the Local Development Programme (PRODEL) in Nicaragua (Report prepared for the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida). Retrieved from http://www.microfinancegateway.org/sites/default/files/mfg-en-case-study-participation-and- sustainability-in-social-projects-the-experience-of-the-local-development-program-prodel-in- nicaragua-jun-2000.pdf Stein, A. (2001). Participation and sustainability in social projects: the experience of the Local Development Programme (PRODEL) in Nicaragua. Environment and Urbanization, 13(1). p.11- 36. Retrieved from http://www.ucl.ac.uk/dpu- projects/21st_Century/resources/papers/documents/stein.pdf UN-HABITAT. (2004). Good Policies and Enabling Legislation for Attaining the Millenium Development Goals: A Methodology for Review and Documentation (Guide by the United Nations Human Settlements Programme, UN-HABITAT). Nairobi, Kenya: UN-HABITAT. p. 7. Retrieved from http://mirror.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/8096_76701_ultimate.pdf Urban Upgrading Site (2001). El Mezquital, Guatemala City. Retrieved from http://web.mit.edu/urbanupgrading/upgrading/case-examples/ce-GT-elm.html Vasconcelos de Freitas, L. F. (2015). Do PROFAVELA à Izidora: a luta pelo direito à cidade em Belo Horizonte (Post-graduate dissertation, Faculdade de Direito da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais). p.41-49. Vilar, K., & Cartes. I. (2016) Urban design and social capital in slums. Case study: Moravia’s neighborhood, Medellin, 2004-2014. Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences 216(2016) 56- 67. Retrieved from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877042815061881

Villagra Romay, W. (2006). Evaluación del subprogram de mejoramiento de barrios. Barrio Villa Ingenio UV-4 Ciudad de El Alto (Master’s Thesis, Universidad Andina Simón Bolivar). p.1-102. Winchester, L. (2005). Sustainable human settlements development in Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL – SERIE Medio ambiente y desarrollo No. 99). Santiago de Chile, Chile: CEPAL. Retrieved from http://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/5671/1/S053167_en.pdf

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13.7. Annex 7: Names of Informal Settlements All Over Latin America49

Villa Miseria: informal settlements in Argentina (Demonym: villeros). Barrios: informal settlements in Bolivia. Favela, vilas or invasões: informal settlements in Brazil (Demonym: favelados). Campamentos or poblaciones callampas: informal settlements in Chile. Invasiones or barrios piratas: informal settlements in Colombia. Precarios: informal settlements in Costa Rica. Invasiones or conventillos: informal settlements in Ecuador. Tugurios or colonias ilegales or urbanizaciones: informal settlements in El Salvador. Asentamientos, palomares, colonias or barrios marginales: informal settlements in Guatemala. Tugurios or asentamientos informales: informal settlements in Guyana. Colonias populares or colonias proletarias: informal settlements in Mexico. Rancheros pobres: informal settlements in Paraguay. Barriadas or pueblos jóvenes: informal settlements in Peru. Barrios de ranchos or ranchos: informal settlements in Venezuela.

49 Those countries of the region that do not appear here listed is due to no information found on the topic.

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13.8. Interview to Slum Upgrading Expert

(Spanish)

Entrevista oral a Ana Cubillo Arias – Planificadora Urbana y Consultora especializada en asentamientos informales para ONU-Hábitat (Nairobi, Kenia)

Transcription, March 3, 2018:

1. Por la experiencia y conocimientos que has adquirido a partir de tu trabajo en ONU-Hábitat, ¿cuál es tu perspectiva acerca del futuro de los asentamientos informales y su mejoramiento? Es decir, ¿en qué punto crees que nos encontramos, en términos reales, y qué líneas de acción crees que se están siguiendo?

From the insight that you have acquired at UN-Habitat, what are your perspectives on the future of slums and slum upgrading? That is, where do you think we are in real terms and which lines of action you believe we are following?

Ahora yo diría que, cuando se habla de asentamientos informales y de la mejora de asentamientos informales, la tendencia es de hacer mejora in situ. Es decir, ya no existe, o se está intentando acabar con la lógica que existía hasta hace poco, o incluso existe en algunos países, de que hay que demoler los asentamientos informales. Se ha visto que al final al hacer eso desplazas el problema a otro sitio: igual a un sitio más periférico en la ciudad o donde el suelo tenga menos valor, pero no estás resolviendo el problema. Entonces, yo diría que ahora estamos en el momento de la mejora in situ y de intentar mejorar progresivamente las condiciones de los asentamientos informales.

Muchas veces se empieza con las infraestructuras porque es el área en el que la inversión pública tiene que ser más grande. El tema de la vivienda, en principio, es un tema más privado y es más caro, por lo que se suele empezar por la mejora infraestructuras, de accesibilidad y de red viaria. En mi opinión esto es muy buen abordaje porque lo que estás intentando hacer es desencadenar que los propios habitantes inviertan en la mejora posterior de los barrios. Si tú mejoras las infraestructuras y les das seguridad de la tenencia de la tierra estás consolidando su permanencia en ese barrio y les estás diciendo que pueden invertir en mejorar sus casas y en mejorar sus condiciones. Entonces un poco la forma de abordar el problema es no aspirar a cambiar todo, a mejorar todo, sino a desencadenar esa mejora por parte también de los habitantes. El problema de los asentamientos informales es tan grande que no hay dinero para cubrir eso. No se puede pensar que con inversión pública o con ayuda externa se va a conseguir resolver el problema, porque además es un problema que crece igual de rápido que lo estás intentando resolver. Por lo tanto, esa es una de las formas de abordarlo: intentar desencadenar un cambio de mentalidades en la población y en los gobiernos sobre cómo se ven los asentamientos informales para dejar de pensar que son algo con lo que hay que acabar para empezar a verlos como algo que forma parte de la ciudad, que contribuye a la economía de la ciudad, y que, simplemente, hay que mejorar o ayudar a integrar tal visión global de la ciudad.

Diría que esta no es una perspectiva únicamente exclusiva de ONU-Hábitat, sino que también es la de las ONG. En la ONG en la que trabajaba antes (Arquitectos Sin Fronteras), hacíamos

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exactamente lo mismo: intentar cambiar nuestro objetivo. Al final hacíamos calles y regularizábamos derechos de tenencia de la tierra, pero el mayor logro que conseguimos fue cambiar la manera en la que la gente veía su barrio y la forma en que la gente valoraba vivir ahí para acabar con la imagen de que hay que salir de los barrios informales. Esta es una idea que sigue pasando. En cuanto la gente tiene recursos, cambia y se mueve, pero el objetivo es que los barrios informales consigan tener las condiciones para que vayan mejorando desde dentro. Además, cuando se habla de ONU-Hábitat o de otras ONG hay que tener en cuenta que la tarea de ONU-Hábitat y de las ONG son diferentes, son complementarias. Las ONG trabajan con la sociedad civil, trabajan a otro nivel, no tienen influencia política, ni aspiran a ello. Muchas de ellas, de hecho, están del otro lado, del de la sociedad civil, de reivindicar, crear conciencia política desde dentro y de trabajar mucho más cerca de la población y de los beneficiarios. Esto lo hacen con proyectos en general más pequeños, bueno con otro enfoque, no tienen por qué ser más pequeños económicamente pero sí más concentrados y más locales. La ONU o ONU-Hábitat trabaja para los gobiernos, para cambiar mentalidades a nivel gubernamental y para darles capacidades técnicas y asistencia para el mismo problema, pero desde el punto de vista de los gobiernos. Para ello trabaja con beneficiarios, con barrios, con casos reales y con organizaciones a pie de calle, pero lo hace para probar metodologías para dar herramientas a los gobiernos. Ambas labores son complementarias.

2. ¿Cuál dirías que es el enfoque de ONU-Hábitat hacia la participación de la comunidad en el contexto de los programas de mejoramiento de asentamientos informales? ¿Cómo se incluye a las comunidades (si es que se hace en absoluto) en el mejoramiento de sus barrios?

What would you say is UN-Habitat’s approach to community participation in the context of slum upgrading programs? How are the communities included (if at all) in the slum upgrading of their neighborhoods?

El enfoque de la participación se tiene cada vez más en cuenta porque no se puede no tener en cuenta. Primero, porque la gente que vive en los barrios informales es la que mejor conoce sus necesidades y, segundo, porque si no tienes en cuenta a la gente que vive, que usa y que está ahí, no vas a conseguir cambio. Además, tal y como te decía, lo más importante es conseguir un cambio de mentalidades. Además, si no se tiene en cuenta a las personas, puedes llegar a hacer cosas que sean contraproducentes. Por ejemplo, hicimos un taller comunitario en Mozambique, en Maputo, para el diseño de espacios públicos. Convocamos una reunión de consulta comunitaria para hacer un diseño participativo. Nosotros queríamos construir bancos en la calle porque no hay espacios de encuentro; hay personas mayores que tienen puestos de venda y pensábamos que los bancos en la calle eran una buena idea. Para que veas que una cosa tan inocente como esa debía ser consultada. En la reunión comunitaria que tuvimos, los vecinos nos dijeron que ni se nos ocurriese hacer bancos, que si hacíamos bancos en ese sitio se iban a usar para subir a los muros y entrar a las casas para robar, y que si construíamos bancos los iban a destruir a la semana. Las conclusiones de esa reunión son un poco más matizables, pero sirven para ver que la participación y la consulta son muy importantes y se tienen que tener en cuenta porque en ese caso hubiésemos gastado el dinero en construir bancos y los propios vecinos los hubiesen destruido poco después. En este caso no estábamos teniendo en cuenta toda la complejidad de la situación porque éramos personas externas. Además, aunque en el equipo había mozambiqueños y gente con mucha experiencia en el país, aun así, no éramos capaces de entender la

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particularidad y las necesidades concretas del lugar. Esto es para ejemplificar que la participación es imprescindible.

Por otra parte, la participación tiene dos niveles: en la toma de decisiones y en la implementación. Diría que la participación en la implementación se lleva haciendo más tiempo, es más habitual y sencilla. Por ejemplo, cuando vas a mejorar una calle eliges una técnica de alta intensidad de mano de obra (se llaman IMO) para generar empleo, o promueves que la construcción de infraestructuras emplee mano de obra comunitaria o que la comunidad contribuya con materiales o con otro tipo de ayuda para abaratar costos, para involucrarlos, para responsabilizarlos, para asegurar que esa infraestructura que estás construyendo tiene un mejor mantenimiento (porque si involucras a la población se van a apropiar de ello). Cuando involucras a la gente y ellos participan, estás seguro de que lo que estás haciendo lo quieren y lo necesitan; no estás haciendo un banco que van a destruir. Yo creo que la participación a ese nivel es una cosa muy habitual y muy positiva, además de que también sirva para lo que decía antes de que cuando se hace mejora en barrios informales se intenta no solo mejorar las estructuras físicas, mejorar la imagen, sino también mejorar la sociedad y mejorar la economía. Lo que uno intenta es crear actividades económicas que luego vayan a poder generar mejores condiciones de vida, que a su vez luego vayan a poder generar inversión de las personas en su barrio y unas condiciones socio-económicas más saludables, ya que este uno de los problemas más importantes de estos barrios.

La participación a nivel de toma de decisiones es más complicada, pero es igualmente importante, y es algo que se está haciendo también, tanto a nivel de las ONG como de ONU-Hábitat. Yo en el programa en el que trabajo se llama Programa Participativo de Mejoramiento de Asentamientos Informales (Participative Slum-Upgrading Program, PSUP). La participación en la toma de decisiones también es relevante. En el ejemplo del banco que te ponía hicimos eso: les dimos espacio para que dijeran que querían en su espacio público y como nos dijeron que no querían nada, no hicimos nada. Lo que hicimos fue ir a otra zona del barrio en la que, a través de un proceso participativo, diseñamos algo con los vecinos que estaban de acuerdo y lo implementamos. Cuando involucras en la toma de decisiones a veces es difícil involucrar de verdad. Es decir, cuando la comunidad te dice algo con lo que no estás de acuerdo, es difícil aceptarlo e integrarlo. Hay muchos procesos en la participación en la toma de decisiones que, en mi opinión, son falsos. Por ejemplo, es una práctica muy habitual en muchos países que cuando se hace un plan urbano haya procesos de ausculta pública. Entonces, se presenta el borrador de plan director o parcial para el barrio a audiencia pública. Muchas veces esos procesos no son reales porque no se da a la gente las herramientas para entender exactamente en qué consiste lo que se quiere hacer. Entonces, para conseguir una participación real en la toma de decisiones tienes que dar esas herramientas; no le puedes dar un plano a una persona que no ha visto un plano nunca. Tienes que crear esos espacios de participación. Puede ser a través de talleres, a través de maquetas, a través de muchas otras herramientas, pero en general los procesos participativos, entre comillas, se quedan cojos en dar estas herramientas de manera real.

Otra de las cosas importantes para que la participación en la toma de decisiones sea real, válida y verdaderamente constructiva es que tienes que dar voz a todos los grupos. En lugares como los asentamientos informales en los que las dinámicas sociales son muy complejas no es tarea fácil. Hay muchos arreglos de poder internos, digamos. Hay grupos vulnerables, como pueden ser las mujeres, que no suelen tener voz, y, en esos casos, tienes que conseguir crear mecanismos para que todos sean escuchados de la misma forma. De esta forma evitas que llegue el dueño de la tienda, que es el que

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tiene más dinero y el que controla la opinión pública en el barrio, y haga valer su opinión por encima de la de las personas mayores que no tienen dinero y dependen de sus vecinos para subsistir; o de las mujeres, que viven en contextos machistas, no tienen espacios de participación y que a la hora a la que haces las reuniones tienen que estar cuidando de sus hijos, por ejemplo, o preparando la comida. Entonces, crear espacios para asegurar la participación de todos, sobre todo de los más vulnerables, en la toma de decisión es imprescindible.

En general cuando se hace un proyecto de intervención en el barrio siempre se crea un comité de acompañamiento (aunque también tienen otros nombres) en el que reúnes a personas del barrio para hacer un seguimiento del proyecto para que expresen su opinión y para que representen a los demás vecinos. Eso es una práctica habitual tanto en las ONG como en ONU-Hábitat, incluso cuando es el propio municipio o gobierno el que hace una intervención. Esto es por lo que te decía antes: porque si no involucras a la gente, las cosas no saldrán nada bien. En el caso de los municipios, como es una sociedad política, se quiere que la acción tenga una visibilidad, unas repercusiones, y que la gente esté contenta. Hacerles participar y escucharles es una forma de hacer que la gente esté más satisfecha con lo que vas a hacer. Por ejemplo, en esos espacios de participación, en el programa en el que trabajo yo, lo que se hace es que se obliga o se protege un cupo para los diferentes grupos vulnerables. Entonces, por ejemplo, de los 15 miembros del comité de acompañamiento, la comunidad tiene que elegir un representante de los jóvenes, de las personas mayores, de las mujeres, etc. Esto asegura que no solo las personas más populares o con más voz tengan espacio en ese grupo. Eso es una posibilidad. Otra posibilidad es hacer diferentes grupos de consulta o dar facilidades a las mujeres para que participen en las reuniones comunitarias: hacer guarderías comunitarias para que cuiden de los niños, o cambiar los horarios de las reuniones para que ellas puedan asistir. Eso con las mujeres, pero con el resto de grupos vulnerables también hay que pensar en maneras de facilitar su participación para que la toma de decisiones y la participación sean realmente efectivas, y para que no estés perpetuando las situaciones de poder existentes. Si no haces esto, al final, los que ya tienen el poder, los que mandan van a seguir si no mandando más.

Luego, hay un tema referente al trabajo que pueden hacer las ONG en los barrios informales. Se trata de un trabajo de sociedad civil, de ayudar a que las asociaciones comunitarias tengan una voz que se escuche más en las autoridades locales o gobiernos. Ese nivel de participación para cambiar o para incidir a nivel político dentro de los gobiernos. Esto es un rol que ONU-Hábitat no tiene, porque trabaja directamente con los gobiernos. Por este motivo, en ONU-Hábitat no se hacen temas de reivindicación o de abogacía por la sociedad civil. O sea, sí, pero no enfocados a que los gobiernos escuchen la voz de los vecinos porque ONU-Hábitat ya tiene ese link directo con los gobiernos y entonces puede abogar por las necesidades de los vecinos sin tener que dar ese poder a la sociedad civil. Pero hay ONG que sí que lo hacen. Por ejemplo, a través de la creación de radios comunitarias o de ayudarles a crear alegaciones cuando creen que hay un plan o un proyecto que no respeta sus derechos. Son organizaciones de la sociedad civil que luchan la participación ciudadana a la hora de la toma de decisiones.

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3. ¿Cómo crees que ONU-Hábitat incluye las particularidades de cada región, país y localidad en los programas de mejoramiento de barrios que apoya?

How does UN-Habitat include the particularities of each region, country, locality in the slum upgrading programs it supports?

Nunca se trabaja solo, sin una contraparte o sin alguien que conozca el terreno. Es imposible hacerlo porque cada barrio es un mundo. Incluso dos barrios diferentes dentro de una misma ciudad son dos mundos diferentes. Entonces, la herramienta principal es a través de contrapartes, es decir, organizaciones locales que conocen a la población, el lugar, los problemas y el histórico de lo que se ha hecho ahí y lo que no. Estas pueden ser organizaciones locales u ONG que lleven tiempo en terreno, como en el caso de ONU-Hábitat. Siempre hay lo que en inglés se conoce como «implementing partner», en español «contraparte».

Cuando las ONG crean un programa o un proyecto en un barrio, todos los financiadores te van a pedir que tengas una contraparte en el país incluso cuando ya se tiene experiencia en el país. Sobre todo, esto es así porque la labor de las ONG y de ONU-Hábitat no es resolver problemas, sino transferir capacidades o conocimiento. Por lo tanto, se trabaja conjuntamente con estas ONG u organizaciones locales para que ellos puedan resolver el problema. La idea no es seguir teniendo que estar contribuyendo o apoyando infinitamente, sino crear las capacidades a nivel local para que estos problemas puedan resolverse a nivel local. Por eso es imprescindible que haya contrapartes: alguien que conozca. Por su parte, el tema de la participación también ayuda a adecuar las respuestas al contexto.

Además, cuando se trabaja con gobiernos, cada gobierno quiere o desea una cosa. A un gobierno no se le puede obligar a que haga lo que uno quiere; vas entonces a asesorarle para intentar hacer mejor las cosas. Eso, a nivel de ONU-Hábitat, ya te hace cambiar tu perspectiva de un país a otro, o de un lugar a otro. No es posible tener la misma forma de abordar para un gobierno que cree en el mejoramiento in situ que para un gobierno que todavía está haciendo demoliciones y expulsiones de barrios informales. Hay que tener flexibilidad y entender que cada país tiene condiciones diferentes. Por otro lado, es muy importante en materia de sostenibilidad que, al nivel de selección de técnicas constructivas o de materiales, se sepa lo que se está haciendo va a ser sostenible teniendo en cuenta el clima y demás factores. También influye lo que hablábamos antes de involucrar a la gente en la construcción. Si utilizas una técnica constructiva local propia puedes conseguir que la población participe y que sea una cosa sostenible que puedan replicar en el futuro. Si se trae una cosa de fuera que no tiene nada que ver, no podrán apropiárselo y utilizarlo en el futuro.

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4. ¿Crees que los enfoques al mejoramiento de asentamientos informales trascienden la mejora física, por ejemplo, que llega a dimensiones económicas, políticas, sociales, culturales, psicológicas y emocionales? Si es así, ¿cómo hace ONU-Hábitat para abarcar estos elementos en el terreno?

Do you think that its slum upgrading approaches transcend physical upgrading to include, for instance, economic, political, social, cultural, psychological and emotional dimensions? If so, how does this organization encompass these elements in the terrain?

Siempre, siempre, siempre. La definición de ONU-Hábitat de «asentamientos informales» tiene cinco elementos que son prácticamente relativos a la dimensión física (abastecimiento de aguas, saneamiento, seguridad en la tenencia de la tierra, casas seguras y casas con suficiente espacio habitable). Aunque esa sea la definición oficial, tanto en las ONG, como en ONU-Hábitat, como incluso en los gobiernos, se sabe que las dimensiones socioeconómicas influyen o están vinculadas a la dimensión física. Es como una simbiosis: los barrios informales tienen problemas de los dos tipos y estos están vinculados entre sí. El hecho de que la gente no tenga dinero hace que, por ejemplo, las condiciones de las viviendas sean muy precarias. Pero también al revés: el hecho de que no haya una buena infraestructura hace que la gente se ponga enferma, o el hecho de que no haya iluminación en las calles hace que haya inseguridad. Es una doble entrada o doble influencia. Las condiciones socioeconómicas influyen en las físicas y viceversa. En cuanto tocas en un lado o en el otro, estás a la vez beneficiando al otro lado. Por ejemplo, hay un proyecto muy bonito en Khayelitsha, un slum de Cape Town, Sudáfrica. Este país tiene muchos problemas de inseguridad, sobre todo en los barrios informales, y por ello crearon espacios públicos seguros: con iluminación, calles, promovieron el uso de espacio público, y propusieron actividades. El resultado fue que la inseguridad descendió. Ahí ves cómo la mejora del espacio público regenera las condiciones de vida y sociales. También hay ejemplos que actúan al revés. Muchos de los proyectos que nosotros hacemos son, por ejemplo, de formación técnico-profesional para jóvenes porque en los barrios informales hay un problema de desempleo y de falta de capacidades. Por lo que nosotros formamos a jóvenes en albañilería o fontanería para que tengan más posibilidades de acceder a mercados de empleo y, a la vez, para que puedan ayudar con sus servicios a mejorar las condiciones físicas del barrio. Esto es otra forma de, al tocar uno de los componentes, mejorar el otro.

Por lo tanto, siempre se tiene en cuenta. Cada vez que se hace una intervención en un barrio informal, primero se debe hacer un diagnóstico socioeconómico, cultural, físico, para tener en cuenta todos los factores. A nivel participativo, las cuestiones socioeconómicas y culturales son muy importantes porque, si no, se pueden estar perpetuando las condiciones. Uno puede hacer una intervención a nivel físico que se considere muy buena y en realidad quizá esté perpetuando grupos de poder. Como este no es el objetivo, es relevante entender las dinámicas sociales y económicas para poder intervenir con el enfoque adecuado.

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5. Por tu tiempo viviendo en Kenia, una ciudad que alberga uno de los asentamientos más grandes del mundo (Kibera), ¿cómo percibes que este gran asentamiento informal y otros afectan la ciudad en conjunto?

From your experience of living in Kenya, a city which hosts one of the largest informal settlements in the world (Kibera), how do you perceive that this big slum and others affect the city at large?

Yo no trabajo en Kibera, especialmente, por lo que no lo conozco demasiado bien. Sin embargo, voy a intentar responder, pero es una pregunta difícil. Voy a intentar darte mi opinión. Kibera, supongo que lo sabrás, está en un sitio muy céntrico de Nairobi, bastante bien comunicado con el centro (de Kibera a la ciudad se tarda 20 minutos en bus). Este barrio tiene una posición privilegiada en una ciudad muy grande y extensa. En Nairobi es ya de por sí difícil vivir cerca del centro porque es una ciudad poco densa. Kibera no es el único asentamiento informal que hay en Nairobi: es el más famoso, pero no el único. Hay varios otros que también están cerca del centro y que tienen condiciones parecidas a Kibera. Nairobi es una ciudad muy desigual, muy zonificada (aunque eso pasa en muchas ciudades): hay barrios residenciales buenos y barrios informales. La mayoría de los barrios residenciales buenos son condominios cerrados y vallados con una verja de alambre de espinos arriba, las calles están diseñadas para los coches y el ocio se hace en centros comerciales. Al lado de esos barrios, pero separados, están los barrios informales, como Kibera. Yo creo que la particularidad de Kibera y su relación con Nairobi se encuentra en el precio del suelo. Para que te hagas una idea, en Kibera el metro cuadrado de suelo, de casa, es más caro que en el barrio donde vivo yo. Es decir, no sé si es el más caro de Nairobi, pero puede llegar a ser el precio más alto por metro cuadrado de alquiler de la ciudad. ¿Qué pasa? Que los alojamientos son muy pequeños y en valor absoluto el precio es mucho más asequible que en otros barrios. Esto hace de Kibera un foco de especulación porque en torno a un 70% de los alojamientos son alquilados. Hay varios propietarios que tienen varias casas y las han subdividido, han hecho cuartos y los alquilan a familias. Con estos alojamientos ganan más dinero por metro cuadrado que en los barrios más elegantes de Nairobi. Esto es posible porque es un barrio que está muy cerca del centro y, por tanto, de las oportunidades profesionales. Además, a niveles absolutos Kibera el que más barato es porque los alojamientos son muy precarios. También, para que te hagas una idea, en Kibera las casas no tienen baños. Hay baños comunitarios por los que los vecinos tienen que pagar. Hay algunas calles principales, lo demás son callejones. Es muy denso, las casas son muy precarias, de chapa, y es muy muy denso, más denso de lo que yo había conocido en Mozambique, por ejemplo.

Dicho esto, yo diría que la forma en la que afecta a la ciudad es siendo una bolsa de especulación: da mano de obra barata y cercana a la ciudad. Esta es la razón histórica por la que los asentamientos informales están cerca de las ciudades africanas porque durante la colonización se quería que la mano de obra barata estuviese cerca. Y Kibera está cerca por eso, en una ciudad muy zonificada, una ciudad que tenía muy claro donde iban a vivir los ricos (en las zonas altas y buenas) y los pobres (en las zonas bajas, precarias e inundables). El Nairobi de ahora ha heredado esa fuerte zonificación, pero Kibera con la expansión de Nairobi se ha quedado en el centro.

Este un tema muy complicado porque el tema del alquiler es muy difícil de resolver. Además, si quieres hacer mejoras en el barrio es muy difícil conseguir que el valor añadido o la mejora beneficie a los que tiene que beneficiar (los vecinos) y no beneficie solo a los propietarios ausentes. Cuando se mejoran las condiciones de una calle el propietario ausente puede aumentar el alquiler porque los vecinos tienen ahora mejores condiciones y, como digo, es un sitio que ya es muy caro. En otras

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palabras, cuesta dinero vivir en Kibera, no es un barrio informal como otros: la gente de Kibera no tiene un buen estatus económico, pero tiene ciertos medios que les permiten vivir donde viven. Entonces, es un sitio muy querido y muy buscado para vivir porque está muy cerca de las oportunidades de empleo.

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